The Psychological Measurement of Cultural Syndromes

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An examination of a range of definitions of culture *indicates that almost all researchers agree that culture is reflected in shared cognitions, standard operating procedures, and unexamined assumptions. Cultural syndromes consist of shared attitudes, beliefs, norms, role and self definitions, and values of members of each culture that are organized around a theme. Two methods of measurement of syndromes that allow the examination of the convergence of the data from each method in each culture are (a) the identification of questionnaire items to which an arbitrary 90% of each sample responds on the same side of the neutral point and (b) the identification of items to which an arbitrary 90% of triads—consisting of members of each culture—agree among themselves in fewer than 60 seconds on the appropriate response to the item. The shorter the time to reach agreement, the more likely it is that the item is an element of culture. Examples of these approaches are presented, and discussion focuses on how to obtain good descriptions of cultures through psychological methods.*

Almost all the theories and data of contemporary psychology come from Western populations (e.g., Europeans, North Americans, Australians, etc.). Yet about 70% of humans live in non-Western cultures (Triandis, 1995). If psychology is to become a universal discipline it will need both theories and data from the majority of humans. In recent years, psychologists who were raised in non-Western traditions such as Hui, Kim, Kitayama, Leung, Setiadi, and others (see Triandis, 1995, for references to their work) have supplied such data. Their work has suggested that each culture may have, at least to some extent, its own psychology. These indigenous psychologies (Kim & Berry, 1993) are both similar and different from contemporary psychology. Contemporary psychology is best conceived as a Western indigenous psychology that is a special case of the universal psychology we as contemporary psychologists would like to develop. When the indigenous psychologies are incorporated into a universal framework, we will have a universal psychology.

To bridge the gap between contemporary psychology and many of the indigenous psychologies, we need constructs that will indicate how a phenomenon found in contemporary psychology is modified in indigenous psychologies. This article proposes that *cultural syndromes* (Triandis, 1993, 1995) are such constructs. Cultural syndromes are conceived as dimensions of cultural variation that can be used as parameters of psychological theories. That is, if a population is high on a given dimension of cultural variation, the theory will take one form; if the population is low on that dimension, the theory might take a somewhat different form (e.g., Kitayama, Markus, & Lieberman, 1995; Kitayama, Markus, & Matsumoto, 1995). In that way, the current psychological theories will become special cases of the universal theories.

The first step toward the development of dimensions of cultural variations is the identification of cultural syndromes (Triandis, 1993, 1995). This article discusses how psychological methods can be applied to study such syndromes.

The importance of the identification of theories appropriate for non-Western cultures becomes clearer when we realize that all humans are ethnocentric (Triandis, 1994, in press) and suffer from *naive realism* that limits the full appreciation of "the subjective status of their own construals, and, as such, they do not make sufficient allowances for the uncertainties of construal when called on to make behavioral attributions and predictions about others" (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995, p. 404). We psychologists often use unexamined assumptions found in our own culture when constructing theories (Ichheiser, 1949, 1970), so that our theories often reflect our culture. This is much more the case in clinical, social, and personality psychology than in animal, experimental, or physiological psychology, but the extent of shaping of psychological theories by unstated assumptions found in our culture is unknown.

The tendency to use constructs from Western culture to construct psychological theories while believing that we are constructing universal theories is also aggravated by the phenomenon of *false consensus* (Mullen et al.,

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1985). People who agree with a position believe that a large percentage of humans agrees with that position; people who disagree with a position believe that a very small percentage of humans agrees with the position. The effect is strong (Mullen et al. report effect sizes of .3 to 1.3) and extraordinarily statistically significant ($p <$ .0000000001); several attempts to eliminate it have proved ineffective (Krueger & Clement, 1994).

In short, people tend to believe that the way they see the world is the way most people see the world. Therefore, they tend to see their psychological theories as universal. To control this tendency, we as psychologists need objective data that tell us how people from other cultures see the world. Such data often show that our theories need to be modified when they are applied to non-Western populations. For example, our theories tend to emphasize the importance of attitudes, beliefs, needs, personality, and idiosyncratic values because Western culture is individualistic and Western psychology focuses on individuals and processes internal to individuals. However, in non-Western cultures norms, collective needs, collective self-definitions, and values are often more important. External processes, such as the membership of the individual in a collective (i.e., family, village, work group, religious community, or nation) and the context of behavior, are emphasized.

The weights we give to specific variables in predicting psychological phenomena shift with the context, and culture is one of the most important contexts. To put it differently, the psychology of the individualistic cultures of the West differs to some extent from the psychology of the collectivist cultures of the East and the traditional cultures of Africa and Latin America (Triandis, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1995; Triandis, Brislin, & Hui, 1988; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). Thus, cross-cultural psychology offers a means for the development of a universal psychology (Triandis, in press).

Definition of Culture

The definition of *culture* has been controversial in the social sciences. Cultural anthropologists have defined it in more than one hundred ways (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). It has been defined as the human-made part of the environment (Herskovits, 1955), and thus it can be distinguished into objective culture (e.g., tools or roads) and subjective culture (e.g., categorizations, beliefs, attitudes, norms, role definitions, or values; Triandis, 1972). It has been defined also as a complex schedule of reinforcements (Skinner, 1981), as being to humans what a program is to a computer (Hofstede, 1991). Some have emphasized shared behaviors (Goodenough, 1970), and others emphasized shared cognitive systems (Goodenough, 1971/1981) or meanings (Pelto & Pelto, 1975; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). Some have emphasized shared symbolic systems (Geertz, 1973; Schneider, 1968). Keesing (1981) defined it as a system of competencies shared by a group of people. Some have mentioned shared cognitive maps (Murdock, 1945), but others have argued that it is a construct only in the mind of the investigator (Spiro, 1951). Other definitions have stressed that culture is to society what memory is to individuals (Kluckhohn, 1954) and have viewed it as consisting of shared elements of subjective culture and behavioral patterns found among those who speak a particular language dialect, in a particular geographic region, during a specific historic period (Triandis, 1994).

Thus, although there are many definitions, there is wide agreement that culture consists of *shared* elements (Shweder & LeVine, 1984) that provide the standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating, communicating, and acting among those who share a language, a historic period, and a geographic location. The shared elements are transmitted from generation to generation with modifications. They include unexamined assumptions and standard operating procedures that reflect "what has worked" at one point in the history of a cultural group.

The study of cultural differences aims, in part, to identify *cultural regions* within which cultures are more or less alike. In general, geography is an important way to identify such regions. For example, the West, consisting of Europe and North America, and the East, consisting of the cultures of East Asia, can be seen as different regions.

Different disciplines have used different methods of identifying cultural regions. For example, leading anthropologists (Burton, Moore, Whiting, & Romney, in press) have paid much attention to social structure. In a multidimensional scaling of social structural data from 351 cultures, these researchers identified 10 regions. What is striking about this work is that Europeans, Koreans, Japanese, and Polar Eskimos end up in the same region, whereas Native Americans are so diverse that they require five regions. In any case, if Europeans and East Asians have similar social structures, it must be that the social structure criterion is insufficient to provide discriminations among cultures that are obviously rather different. Thus, a psychological method of analysis might be used to augment the sensitivity of these discriminations and develop a clearer understanding of cultural differences. One way of doing this analysis is to use well-established psychological constructs, which leads to the use of *cultural syndromes.*

A cultural syndrome is a pattern of shared attitudes, beliefs, categorizations, self-definitions, norms, role definitions, and values that is organized around a theme that can be identified among those who speak a particular language, during a specific historic period, and in a definable geographic region (Triandis, 1993, 1994, 1995). Examples of such syndromes are

Tightness: In some cultures, there are very many norms that apply across many situations. Minor deviations from norms are criticized and punished; in other cultures, there are few norms, and only major deviations from norms are criticized (Triandis, 1994). Tightness is highly situational; for example, the United States is, at this time, rather loose in marital arrangements but tight in banking

regulations. However, across situations, Japan is tighter overall than the U.S. because there are many more rules concerning many more situations, and people are extremely concerned that they not break them (Iwao, 1993).

Cultural Complexity: The number of different cultural elements, such as role definitions, can be large or small (e.g., about 20 jobs among hunters and gatherers vs. 250,000 types of jobs in information societies). Cultural complexity is higher when the size of settlements is large (e.g., Mexico City with about 20 million people vs. a village with 200 people). Also, cultures differ in the complexity and multiplicity of religious, economic, political, educational, social, and aesthetic standards.

Active–Passive: This syndrome, first described by Diaz-Guerrero (1967), includes a number of active (e.g., competition, action, and self-fulfillment) and passive (e.g., reflective thought, leave the initiative to others, and cooperation) elements.

Honor: This pattern is a rather narrow syndrome, focused on the concept of honor. It emerges in environments in which property is mobile and to protect it individuals have to appear fierce so that outsiders will not dare to try to take it from them. It includes beliefs, attitudes, norms, values, and behaviors (e.g., hypersensitivity to affronts) that favor the use of aggression for self-protection, to defend one's honor, and to socialize children so that they will react when challenged (Cohen & Nisbett, 1994).

Collectivism: In some cultures the self is defined as an aspect of a collective (e.g., family or tribe); personal goals are subordinated to the goals of this collective; norms, duties, and obligations regulate most social behavior; taking into account the needs of others in the regulation of social behavior is widely practiced. Traditional cultures and many of the cultures of Asia and Africa include many collectivist elements.

Individualism: The self is defined as independent and autonomous from collectives. Personal goals are given priority over the goals of collectives. Social behavior is shaped by attitudes and perceived enjoyable consequences. The perceived profit and loss from a social behavior is computed, and when a relationship is too costly it is dropped. Western Europe and North America are high on this syndrome (Hui & Triandis, 1986; Triandis, 1990; Triandis et al., 1986, 1988; Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985). This construct has a long history in philosophy and the social sciences (Dumont, 1983; Kim, Triandis, Kagitçibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Triandis, 1995) and is linked to the ideology of modernity.

Vertical and Horizontal Relationships: In some cultures hierarchy is very important, and ingroup authorities determine most social behavior. In other cultures social behavior is more egalitarian.

In these examples the importance of norms, complexity, action, honor, collectives, and individuals is the organizing theme of each of the syndromes.

Number of Cultural Syndromes

The number of syndromes for an adequate description of cultural differences is at this time unknown. It is hoped that a dozen or a score of syndromes, to be identified in the future, will account for most of the interesting, reliable cultural differences. There is also the problem that syndromes are somewhat related to each other. For example, tight, passive, simple cultures are likely to be more collectivist; loose, active, complex cultures are likely to be more individualistic. The higher these correlations, the less does any one syndrome provide independent information about cultural differences.

Collectivism and Individualism as Polythetic Constructs

Triandis (1995) suggested that four attributes define collectivism and individualism:

- The meaning of the self. Collectivists cut up the social space by using groups as the units of analysis; individualists use individuals for that purpose. The definition of the self in collectivist cultures is interdependent with members of groups (Markus & Kitayama, 1991); in individualist cultures it is autonomous and independent of groups (Reykowski, 1994). Interdependence is theoretically distinct from social identity (Markus & Kitayama, 1994, p. 570).
- The structure of goals. Collectivists use individual goals that are compatible with the goals of their ingroups. If there is a discrepancy between the two sets of goals, collectivists give priority to the ingroup goals. Individualists use individual goals that may or may not be compatible with the goals of their ingroups. If there is a discrepancy between the two sets of goals, individualists give priority to their personal goals (Schwartz, 1990, 1992, 1994; Triandis, 1988, 1990).
- Behavior is a function of norms and attitudes. Across a wide range of situations, collectivists give more weight to norms than to attitudes as determinants of their social behavior; individualists give more weight to attitudes than to norms as determinants of social behavior (Bontempo & Rivero, 1992; Davidson, Jaccard, Triandis, Morales, & Diaz-Guerrero, 1976; Miller, 1994).
- Focus on the needs of the ingroup or social exchanges. Collectivists pay much attention to the needs of members of their ingroups in determining their social behavior. Thus, if a relationship is desirable from the point of view of the ingroup but costly from the point of view of the individual, the individual is likely to stay in the relationship. Individualists pay attention to the advantages and costs of relationships, as described by exchange theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). If the costs exceed the advantages, individualists drop the relationship. As a result, generally across situations, collectivists engage in communal relationships,

whereas individualists engage in exchange relationships (Mills & Clark, 1982).

In addition to these four attributes, Triandis (1995) has identified some 60 other attributes that are sometimes found in a collectivist or individualist culture. Current research keeps adding findings that distinguish individualist and collectivist cultures. For example, individualists are higher than collectivists in self-esteem and self-efficacy, and use internal states (e.g., emotions) as means of appraising situations, whereas collectivists use inputs from ingroups to appraise situations (Oettingen, 1995; Oettingen, Little, Lindenberger, & Baltes, 1994). Whereas individualists explicitly enhance their self-esteem, collectivists do so implicitly (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1995).

The collectivism and individualism constructs should be defined polythetically. In zoology, a few attributes (e.g., feathers or wings) are used to define a "bird," and many additional features are used to define hundreds of species of birds. Similarly, in the case of cultures we can use the above-mentioned four attributes to decide whether a culture is on the whole collectivist or individualist. Then we can use the 60 additional attributes to decide what species of collectivism or individualism is found in that culture.

For example, in Eastern collectivist cultures it is very important to maintain harmony within the ingroup (Bond, 1994). However, in the Israeli kibbutz this is not emphasized. In fact, strong intellectual arguments are welcomed and enjoyed in that species of collectivism.

Vertical and Horizontal Varieties of Collectivism and Individualism

Triandis (1995) suggested that the two most important species of individualism and collectivism are the horizontal and vertical ones. There is evidence that we as researchers can distinguish vertical and horizontal individualist and collectivist cultures. One of the ways to do that is to use the values of the subjects.

In a large project, one that tested 200 teachers and 200 students (or representative samples of the culture) in almost 50 countries, the participants rated 56 values on nine-point scales, according to their importance (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). It was found through smallest space analysis (a form of multidimensional scaling) that in most cultures the values formed approximately the same pattern. One axis was Collectivism versus Individualism. The Collectivist side included Conformity and Security and other collectivist values, which are especially high in East Asian countries, in traditional societies, and in the former communist countries. The Individualist side included cultures that emphasized Self-Direction and Hedonism as well as other individualistic values that are high in Western cultures.

The second axis was vertical (Power and Achievement) versus horizontal (Benevolence and Universalism). If we add Benevolence to the collectivist values, we have Horizontal Collectivism. If we add Universalism (this pattern includes "equality") to the individualist values, we have Horizontal Individualism. If we add Power to the collectivist values, we have Vertical Collectivism. If we add Achievement to the Individualist values, we have Vertical Individualism.

Rokeach (1973) also studied values, and argued that political systems can be characterized by the extent people rank "freedom" and "equality" either high or low. Rokeach used content analyses of the speeches of political leaders that indicated that they used the words "freedom" and "equality" with very different frequencies. For instance, communist leaders such as Lenin mentioned equality frequently and freedom rarely; social democrats mentioned both freedom and equality with high frequencies; fascists mentioned neither; leaders in Western democracies mentioned freedom very frequently, and equality infrequently.

In a study of managerial values in 43 nations, Smith, Dugan, and Trompenaars (in press) identified two independent dimensions that parallel the horizontal–vertical/individualism–collectivism typology.

The pattern of Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism can also be seen in the social orientations identified by Fiske (1990, 1992). What Fiske called *communal sharing* has much in common with Collectivism; *authority ranking* with Vertical social relationships; *equality matching* with Horizontal relationships; and *market pricing* with Individualism.

Integrating the work on the self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), which can be interdependent or independent, with the idea of a "same" self or a "different" self, Triandis (1995) presented the attributes of Vertical and Horizontal Collectivism and Individualism, as shown in Appendix A.

Traditional societies tend to be Vertical Collectivist. For example, in India differences in status (reflected in the caste system) but also strong obligations to the family and the caste create a Vertically Collectivist culture. In cultures in which competition for distinctiveness is high, as in the U.S. where it is a great compliment to say that someone is "distinguished," there is Vertical Individualism. Consistent with Vertical Individualism, middle- and upper-class Americans are offended if an experimenter suggests to them that they are "average" (Weldon, 1984; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

Americans often emphasize equality (Horizontal Individualism), but they also tolerate inequality (e.g., racial or social class) better than do Swedes, who are willing to be taxed at high rates so that income inequality can be reduced. For example, if we consider the ratio of the income of the top 20% of the country's income distribution to the bottom 20% of the income distribution, we find that the U.S. has now a ratio of 9.0. In 1970 this ratio was 7.0, so recent years have increased inequality (i.e., made the society more vertical). France and the United Kingdom now have ratios of 7.0. However, in Sweden this ratio is 3.0 (both in 1970 and 1993); in Japan it is now 5.0, from a 1970 ratio of 4.0; in the Netherlands it is now 5.5 from about 5.0 in 1970. Thus, in most so-

cieties the trend is toward higher ratios (United Nations, 1994).

Incidentally, this ratio is very high in some societies (e.g., Brazil), and the frequency of criminal acts in large cities appears correlated with this ratio. Presumably, the larger this ratio the more those at the bottom feel hostile to those at the top and are willing to do something to restore the "balance of income" by taking resources from those who are better off than they are.

Swedes (Daun, 1991, 1996) are individualistic, but they also tend to be horizontal. They do not want to be distinguished. For example, in one study the desire for high status was expressed by only 2% of the Swedish sample, 7% of the American sample, and 25% of the German sample. Australians are also individualistic, but they tend to want to bring down "tall poppies" (Feather, 1994), suggesting that they are horizontal.

Measurements of Individualism and Collectivism

The self can be studied in many ways. For example, Triandis, McCusker, and Hui (1990) asked participants to complete 20 statements that began with the words "I am. . . ." Content analyses of their responses indicated that in collectivist cultures, the self has more social content (averages between 30% and 50% in different samples) than in individualistic cultures (averages of 6% to 30% in different samples; the mode of 509 University of Illinois students was zero!). Especially interesting is the study by Altrocchi and Altrocchi (1995), which showed that the social content of the self of unacculturated Cook islanders averaged in the 27% to 58% range for different samples; for those Cook islanders who were acculturated to New Zealand, it averaged in the 20% to 31% range.

A more detailed content analysis presented by Rhee, Uleman, Lee, and Roman (1995) used nine rather than just two categories for the spontaneous responses of Korean and American participants to the aforementioned 20 statements test. The category "pure traits" is especially interesting. Of course, it is a nonsocial response. European Americans gave this response 29% of the time; Koreans gave it only 12% of the time. Rhee et al. also classified Asian Americans according to whether they had identified their ethnicity (e.g., "I am Asian" or "I am Chinese"). Those Asian Americans who did not use ethnic responses were assumed to be assimilated to American society. They averaged 39% pure trait responses (i.e., they overshot the American norm). Those who gave an ethnic response only once were assumed to be integrated into American society. They averaged 25% pure trait responses. Those who gave two ethnic responses were assumed to be less acculturated; they averaged 17% pure trait responses. In other words, the predictions of the way acculturation will affect the responses to the 20-statement self-descriptions test were fully supported by their data.

Trafimow, Triandis, and Goto (1991) randomly assigned participants to two conditions in the laboratory that were designed to prime their collectivism or individualism. The collectivist condition used the instruction "think of what you have in common with your family and friends." The individualist condition used the instruction "think of what makes you different from your family and friends." These instructions resulted in statistically different social content of the self in the expected direction. Furthermore, the social content of the sentence completions of introductory psychology students with Chinese names was significantly higher than the social content of the students with European names.

It is possible to identify attitude items that measure horizontal–vertical, collectivism–individualism (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). A sample of such items is presented in Appendix B.

In all cultures, individuals are capable of using all four patterns of responding. In some situations (e.g., when the ingroup is under attack from outsiders, and there are respected ingroup leaders) people use a vertical collectivist pattern in all cultures. However, the use of a particular pattern is likely to be culture-specific. Thus, in a specific culture, in some situations, people will be *vertical collectivists* (VC), in others, *vertical individualists* (VI); in some situations people may be *horizontal collectivists* (HC), and in others, *horizontal individualists* (HI).

One way to think of an individual's personality is to construct a profile of these tendencies. For example, an individual might have a profile such as this one: VC 10% of the time, across situations; 30% VI; 5% HC; and 55% HI. Suppose we look at the distributions of these scores across a sample of individuals that is representative of a culture. By paying attention to the modal values on each of the four dimensions, we can characterize the culture as being primarily VI, VC, HI, or HC. In most societies, the four themes coexist (e.g., in India, the vertical collectivist theme of family interdependence and obligations coexists with the HI theme of renouncing society and living alone as a holyman; Dumont, 1983). Individuals may select these themes at different times and in different situations, though there is a modal pattern that is selected most frequently.

If we are to describe a culture adequately we need to take seriously the fact that, by definition, culture consists of shared elements. We can do that in at least two ways:

1. We can examine the response distributions to items that measure elements of subjective culture. For example, in the case of attitude items, such as those of Appendix B, in one study we started with 80 items that reflected vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism. We defined a *cultural item* as an item to which 90% of the participants gave an answer (on a 9-point agree–disagree scale) on the same side of the neutral point. Our sample consisted of Illinois undergraduates. We found that 61% of the items that met this criterion happened to be HI items; 5% were VI; 24% were HC, and 10% were VC items. Thus this sample is predominantly horizontal (85%) and individualist (66%).

One can also use scenarios, such as those of Appendix C. We used 36 such scenarios with a sample of Illinois undergraduates. For these scenarios, we used the criterion

that if at least 50% of the sample selected one of the four answers, it constituted a *cultural response.* We found that in the case of 65% of the scenarios that reached this criterion, the HI response had been selected. In the case of 25% of the "cultural" scenarios, the HC response had been selected. All of the remaining 10% of the scenarios showed that the VI response had been selected. Thus, there is consistency in the way the attitude items and the scenarios were answered. The cultural responses of Illinois undergraduates are HI (61% to 65% of the time) and HC (24% to 25% of the time).

2. One can also assemble 40 or so triads of members of a culture and present subjective culture items to them and ask them to respond as quickly as possible on whether they, as a group, agreed that the idea is important or unimportant.

This study was done in Hong Kong and the United States (Triandis, Bontempo, Leung, & Hui, 1990). We used, in this case, a cutoff of one minute and an arbitrary agreement level of 85% of the triads. That is, if the triads agreed that a particular value was important in less than one minute and 85% of the triads reached agreement, we considered the item "cultural." For example, "persistence" is a very clear value in Hong Kong, wherein 100% of the triads agreed that it was important, with an average time of 2.7 seconds. In Illinois, this value did not reach criterion. "Self-actualization" was considered important by 96% of the Illinois triads, with an average time of 4.3 seconds; it did not reach criterion in Hong Kong. Thus it is a value in Illinois but not in Hong Kong. "To be well adjusted" was a value in both cultures.

These two examples suggest how we can use psychological methods to study cultural syndromes. We need to identify items that measure each of the elements of the cultural syndromes such as beliefs, attitudes, norms, role and self-definitions, and values. We can examine the response distributions to each of these elements and select items that meet the 90% agreement criterion. We can also assemble triads of individuals and ask them to respond to elements of subjective culture. Timing their responses and degrees of agreement can indicate which of the elements are "cultural." We can do such studies, not only in different cultures but also across gender, social class, and other demographics. In some cases, the demographic breakdowns may turn out to be more important than the cultural.

Discussion

In this article, I suggested how we might study cultural syndromes through psychological methods. One might be curious to know if the cultural syndromes I described are in any way related to each other. In Triandis (1994), I speculated that they are. Specifically, I suggested that tight-simple cultures are most collectivist, and loose-complex cultures most individualistic.

I suggested also that when a culture is homogeneous it is possible to have clear norms and impose them tightly; when the culture is heterogeneous, as is typical in multicultural settings, looseness is necessary to avoid friction. When members of a culture must be interdependent to survive, as happens in many agricultural societies wherein irrigation canals require common actions, norms will be clear and imposed; when people live separated by large distances, they can tolerate deviations from norms. In complex cultures people have many choices; in poor, simple ones there are few choices.

Collectivism is maximal when a society is low in complexity and tight; individualism is maximal when a society is complex and loose. Thus, individualism is high in affluent societies, in which individuals can decide without consultation with ingroup members about how to use their resources. Collectivism is high in societies in which collectives decide how to dispense resources. Note, however, that collectivism requires that the ingroup have resources to dispense. In very poor societies such as the Ik (Turnbull, 1972), or in the Brazilian favelas (Scheper-Hughes, 1985), the ingroup has no resources to dispense—we find in such societies intensive individualism. Several additional factors probably contribute to collectivism such as joint ownership of resources, schooling that glorifies the ingroup, large families, stability of residence, and isolation from outside influences. Several factors contribute to individualism such as high social class, migration, social mobility, and exposure to the mass media.

As we develop measurements of tightness (now in progress), affluence (Gross National Product per capita) and individualism–collectivism (e.g., Singelis et al., 1995), we should be able to test these speculations.

Conclusions

Starting with the definition of culture, we have identified several psychological methods that can be used to characterize a culture. This work is at the cultural level and uses methods and approaches that are not usually used by psychologists.

We can also use data from the individual level (i.e., individual differences information). By doing this, we identified individuals who are allocentric or idiocentric (Triandis et al., 1985). These personality attributes correspond to collectivism and individualism. The cultural and individual difference analyses are complementary and allow us to describe cultures and also identify individuals who are countercultural (e.g., allocentrics in an individualistic culture who join communes and gangs, or idiocentric in a collectivist culture who feel oppressed by the culture and usually leave it if they are allowed to do so).

The study of cultural syndromes can provide theory and method for the development of a universal psychology. Contemporary psychology can be seen as a special case of the to-be-developed universal psychology, and cultural syndromes may become the parameters of this universal psychology.

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Appendix A
Four Cultural Patterns

Dimension/study	Collectivism		Individualism
Vertical self		Different from others	
Markus & Kitayama (1991)	Interdependent		Independent
Fiske (1992)	Communal sharing	+ Authority ranking	Market pricing
Rokeach (1973)	Low freedom Communalism (e.g., Indian village)	Low equality	High freedom Market democracy (e.g., United States)
Horizontal self		Same as others	
Fiske (1992)	Communal sharing	+ Equality matching	Market pricing
Rokeach (1973)	Low freedom Communal living (e.g., Kibbutz)	High equality	High freedom Democratic socialism (e.g., Sweden)

Appendix B

Items for the Measurement of Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism

Vertical Individualism (α = .82)

It annoys me when other people perform better than I do.
Competition is the law of nature.
When another person does better than I do, I get tense and aroused.
Without competition, it is not possible to have a good society.
Winning is everything.
It is important that I do my job better than others.
I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others.
Some people emphasize winning; I'm not one of them (and vice versa)

Horizontal Individualism (α = .81)

I often do "my own thing."
Being a unique individual is important to me.
I'd rather depend on myself than on others.
I rely on myself most of the time; I rarely rely on others.
My personal identity, independent from others, is very important to me.
I am a unique person, separate from others.
I enjoy being unique and different from others.

Vertical Collectivism (α = .73)

I would do what would please my family, even if I detested that activity.
I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group.
We should keep our aging parents with us at home.
I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not approve of it.
Children should be taught to place duty before pleasure.
It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups.
Self-sacrifice is a virtue.
It annoys me if I have to sacrifice activities that I enjoy to help others (reverse scoring).

Horizontal Collectivism (α = .80)

The well-being of my coworkers is important to me.
If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.
If a relative were in financial difficulty, I would help within my means.
It is important to me to maintain harmony within my group.
I like sharing little things with my neighbors.
It is important to consult close friends and get their ideas before making a decision.

Note. From "Horizontal and Vertical Individualism and Collectivism: A Theoretical and Methodological Refinement" (Table 4), by T. Singelis, H. C. Triandis, D. Bhawuk, and M. Gelfand, 1995, *Cross-Cultural Psychology, 29*, pp. 240–275. Copyright 1995 by Sage Publications, Inc. Reprinted with permission.

Appendix C

Examples of Scenarios Used in the Study Mentioned in the Text

1. Which of the following activities are likely to be most satisfying to you?
   A. thinking about yourself _
   B. doing your duty, as expected of you by important groups _
   C. linking with others _
   D. beating your competitors _

2. In your opinion, in an ideal society, national budgets will be determined so that
   A. all people have adequate incomes to meet basic needs _
   B. some people will be rewarded for making brilliant contributions _
   C. there will be maximum stability, law, and order _
   D. people can feel unique and self-actualized _