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Context in Person, Person in Context:
A Cultural Psychology Approach to Social-Personality Psychology

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Abstract
This chapter describes a cultural psychology approach to social-personality psychology. Extending the standard social-psychological emphasis on the importance of context, the first section considers the *cultural constitution of personal experience*. A history of engagement with particular cultural affordances shapes a person with an associated set of residual tendencies such that what appear to be "personal" dispositions are instead a form of *context in person*: embodied traces of a person's engagement with ecological structures of mind that continually reconstitute the person's habitual ways of being. Extending an emphasis on importance of subjective construal, the second section considers the *psychological constitution of cultural worlds*. As people act on subjective interpretations, their behavior leaves traces on objective realities to create a form of *person in context*: everyday constructions of reality that bear the influence of personal activity. In this way, a cultural psychology analysis balances the traditional social psychological emphasis on the power of the situation with a restored emphasis on the power of the culturally grounded person as (re)constructor of intentional worlds.

Keywords: action, cultural affordance, ecological, habitus, identity, intentional world, mutual constitution, selfways

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> A cultural psychology aims to develop a principle of intentionality—action responsive to and directed at mental objects or representations—by which culturally constituted realities (intentional worlds) and reality-constituting psyches (intentional persons) continually and continuously make each other up. (Shweder, 1990, pp. 26-27)

In this chapter, we approach the guiding theme of this *Handbook*—the integration of social and personality psychology—from a perspective of cultural psychology. Contrary to common understandings, the point of a cultural psychology analysis is not merely to examine how psychological phenomena vary across cultural settings; instead, a cultural psychology analysis highlights how psyche and culture "make each other up" (Shweder, 1990; p. 27). That is, a cultural psychology analysis emphasizes the extent to which person-based structures of experience that are the focus of most psychological research exist in a dynamic relationship of *mutual constitution* with socially constructed *affordances* (i.e., qualities of an object or environment that allow performance of an action; see Gibson, 1977) embedded in the structure of everyday worlds. We apply this cultural psychology framework to provide an account of social-personality psychology that balances the traditional social psychological emphasis on "the power of the situation" with a restored emphasis on the power of the person as creator of intentional worlds (see Gjerde, 2004).

With its defining focus on the mutual constitution of cultural worlds and psychological experience, a cultural psychology analysis extends an earlier discussion of the relationship between social and personality psychology by Lee Ross and Richard Nisbett (1991), who proposed that the field of social psychology rests on a small set of basic principles.[1] The first principle, the "power of the situation," refers to the typically underappreciated extent to which subtle contextual features moderate the course of psychological experience. In contrast to the general thrust of psychological science and its emphasis on personal dispositions, this principle emphasizes environmental regulation of action and experience. The second principle, "the importance of subjective construal," refers to the role of human imagination in the creation of meaning from inherently ambiguous stimuli. In contrast to the layperson's sense of direct access to an objective reality (i.e., *naive realism*), this social-psychological principle emphasizes the dynamic construction of experience from typically underspecified, environmental inputs.[2]

A cultural psychology analysis elaborates these social-psychological principles by adding considerations of history and materiality. Extending "the power of the situation," one direction of the mutual constitution relationship refers to the *cultural constitution of psychological experience*. Psychological development is not simply the natural outgrowth of inborn programming or unfolding of genetic potential; instead, it reflects the incorporation and embodiment—literally, "taking into the body"—of blueprints for psychological experience deposited over historical time in the structure of everyday cultural worlds. The idea here is not a weak form of contextualism that emphasizes the "power of the situation" to regulate personal experience, but rather a strong form of contextualism in which cultural realities are *constitutive* of psychological experience. In terms of species-typical tendencies, this means that what we have come to regard as normal human development would not be possible without the tools or scaffolding that socially constructed, historically evolved, cultural affordances provide. In terms of individual personalities, this means that a history of engagement with particular sets of

cultural affordances shapes a person with an associated set of residual tendencies such that what appear to be "personal" dispositions are instead a form of *context in person*: embodied traces of a person's engagement with ecological structures of mind that continually reconstitute the person's habitual ways of being.

Extending the idea of subjective construal, the other side of this mutual constitution relationship refers to the *psychological constitution of cultural worlds*. Cultural worlds do not exist apart from human action; instead, people continually reproduce environmental extensions of the person into which they inscribe, objectify, and *realize* (literally, "make real"; see Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Moscovici, 1984) their beliefs and desires. Again, the idea here is not a relatively weak form of constructivism that emphasizes the dynamic role of human imagination in the interpretation of reality, but rather a strong form of constructivism in which human subjectivity is *constitutive* of everyday realities. As people act on subjective interpretations, their behavior leaves traces on objective realities to create a form of *person in context*: everyday constructions of reality that bear the influence of personal activity. One important implication is that species-typical human beings do not inhabit anything close to a "just natural" environment, Even many settings where humans live "close to nature" are cultural products, shaped by choices to preserve or cultivate a "natural" state (see e.g., Adams & Mulligan, 2003). Moreover, what appears at first glance to be wilderness apart from human contact often upon further investigation reveals influence of human activity, whether temporally distant interventions in the landscape due to earlier habitation (e.g., Ferme, 2001; Heckenberger, 2005) or spatially distant activity that results in local climate change and related consequences for local ecology. In short, human beings are born into and develop within cultural ecologies: everyday worlds of collective design that are already structured by human understanding.

In the sections that follow, we consider the intersection of social and personality psychology in terms of both directions of the mutual constitution process. Reflecting the emphasis of existing work, the first section of the paper considers the cultural constitution of personal experience: the extent to which the structure of persons bears the embodied influence of contextual scaffolding. In the second section, we consider the equally important, but typically less well articulated, psychological constitution of cultural worlds: the extent to which the cultural-ecological context bears the accumulated influence of personal activity.

CONTEXT IN PERSON: SOCIOCULTURAL CONSTITUTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE

One of the most significant developments in social-personality psychology during the past two decades has been unprecedented attention to the cultural constitution of psychological experience. This work suggests that psychological tendencies observed in the typical experiment are not "just so," but instead reflect the particular cultural-psychological ecologies of the worlds in which the science developed. One of the most important statements of this idea is a review of cultural variation in constructions of self by Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama (1991).

Independent Constructions of Self

Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that theory and research in psychological science primarily considered (and treated as normative or "just natural") historically particular patterns of experience associated with what they referred to as *independent self-construal*: an atomistic understanding of self as a bounded entity, inherently separate from social and physical context, composed of defining or essential attributes abstracted from particular situational performances. The key feature of independent self-construal is not devaluation of relational connection, but

instead an experience of such connection—for better or worse—as the secondary, manufactured product of inherently separate selves.

With respect to perception and cognition, research has linked independent constructions of self with *analytic* tendencies to focus attention on properties of people and objects as the primary unit of reality (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; see also Kühnen, Hannover, & Schubert, 2001; Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002). The experience of self as a bounded entity abstracted from context reflects and promotes perceptual tendencies to a focus on discrete objects and their defining attributes independent of their background fields (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Nisbett et al., 2001). In turn, the tendency to focus on defining attributes of objects reflects and promotes tendencies to understand or explain everyday events with disproportionate emphasis on actors' personal traits or dispositions (i.e., the "fundamental attribution error," Ross, 1977; see Cousins, 1989; Miller, 1984). Similarly, the focus on defining properties of bounded objects reflects and promotes analytic tendencies of taxonomic categorization, whereby people categorize objects on the basis of common attributes (e.g., rather than functional relationship; see Nisbett et al., 2001). Finally, perceptual or cognitive tendencies to abstract objects from context are associated with analytic reasoning styles whereby people view the world as operating according to universal abstract rules and laws (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002).

With respect to motivation, research has linked independent constructions of self with *promotion-focused* tendencies (Higgins, 1996; see also Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000) to express authentic dispositions and to pursue opportunities for self-enhancement (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). Independent constructions of self foster motivations to express defining attributes (e.g., beliefs and preferences) via acts of disclosure and personal choice (Kim & Sherman, 2007; Savani, Markus, & Conner, 2008), to highlight one's uniqueness (Kim & Markus, 1999), and to influence one's surroundings to fit one's preferences, goals, or wishes (Morling, Kitayama, & Miyamoto, 2002). Likewise, the focus on defining attributes of independent selves reflects and promotes an emphasis on cultivation of self-esteem (e.g., Singelis, Bond, Lai, & Sharkey, 1999) and a tendency to maintain positively biased self-views (Heine & Hamamura, 2007) via "self-serving" patterns of memory and attribution (Endo & Meijer, 2004). This motivation to seek self-enhancement (at the expense of self-improvement) is especially evident in tendencies to persist at a task longer after success feedback than failure feedback (Heine et al., 2001).

With respect to affect and emotion, research has linked independent constructions of self to tendencies of experience and expression that highlight positive personal attributes and affirm the self as an independent entity (Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2010). For example, research has associated independent constructions of self with an emphasis on the personal meaning of emotional experience (rather than normative or consensual understandings; Mesquita, 2001; Oishi, Diener, Scollon, & Biswas-Diener, 2004) and positive evaluation of self-conscious emotions (e.g., pride) that signal personal accomplishment (Eid & Diener, 2001). Likewise, research has associated independent constructions with a self-indulgent preference for high-arousal positive affective states (Tsai, 2007).

Research has also linked independent constructions of self to a set of implications for relational and collective belonging. Contrary to stereotypes about solitary, relationship-disdaining individualists, a cultural psychology perspective suggests that the relevant feature of independent constructions is a "promotion-focused" experience of relational belonging as a somewhat voluntary, effortful choice of atomistic "free agents" who strive to create connection in contexts of inherent separation. Independent constructions of self afford open, uninhibited

pursuit of pleasurable companionship and a sense of freedom both to choose attractive partners and to avoid onerous obligations (e.g., to relatives). They resonate strongly with *market pricing* models of relationality (Fiske, 1991) that emphasize a free market of relationship in which people are at liberty to choose whether to initiate or dissolve connections. They also resonate strongly with *equality matching* models of relationality (Fiske, 1991) and conceptions of a highly disordered "state of nature" in which "all [people] are created equal . . . with unalienable rights [that] include . . . liberty and the pursuit of happiness" in mutually rewarding, companionate relationship. These conceptions find expression in tendencies for people to report a relatively large number of friends (Adams & Plaut, 2003); to report a sense of freedom from enemies (Adams, 2005); to emphasize verbally oriented, emotional intimacy as the essence of social support (Adams & Kurtiş, 2015); and to rely on self-disclosure as a mechanism for establishing intimacy and communion across the intersubjective gap of inherent interpersonal separation (Kurtiş & Adams, 2015a; Schug, Yuki, & Maddux, 2010).

Similarly independent constructions of self afford a voluntaristic experience of collective belonging as a product of personal choice that grants people liberty (and requires them) to create their own group memberships (Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). The high degree of social mobility associated with independent models is associated with a relatively limited experience of obligation and high conditionality of group identification (Oishi, Ishii, & Lun, 2009), meaning that people feel free to invest in group memberships, or not, to the extent that doing so serves their current personal projects. In general, independent constructions of self afford a sense of freedom to create a relatively large number of thin connections dependent on the extent to which they satisfy personal goals.

As another manifestation of this relatively thin construction of sociality, Yuki (2003) has proposed that independent constructions promote a "common identity" experience of belonging (Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994)—as assimilation to a representation of an identity category—that resonates strongly with self-categorization theoretical perspectives (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). From this perspective, the glue that holds collective identity together is not actual connection among people, but instead a sense of *imagined community* (Anderson, 1983) with abstract or hypothetical others in the same category. As we note in a later section, this sense of imagined community typically rests on cultural artifacts (e.g., monuments, national media, standardized national languages; see Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) that afford particular constructions of the collective self and convey knowledge about prototypical members.

Interdependent Constructions of Self

In contrast to the independent constructions of self that inform scientific imagination and conceptions of normative, Markus & Kitayama (1991) suggested that the more typical patterns of subjectivity in human communities across time and space have been more relational understandings of self-in-context that they referred to as *interdependent self-construal*. One of many statements of this idea comes from the Kuranko (Sierra Leone, West Africa) settings where one of us (GA) lived for three years while working as a secondary school mathematics teacher with the Peace Corps. When discussing what it means to be human, people in Kuranko settings often make statements similar to the idea that "One's birth is like the bird-scaring rope" (Jackson, 1982, p. 17). The bird-scaring rope is an agricultural tool that consists of a network of rope with bits of metal tied to stakes and stretched back and forth across a field. By tugging from a central point, a farmer sets in motion the whole network of rope and produces a cacophony of clanking metal that scares marauding birds away from the maturing rice crop. This tool serves as

an apt metaphor for personal experience in many West African settings. People emphasize that they do not exist in isolation; rather, their actions reflect the influence of others in the community. When one person is agitated, the whole network shakes. Likewise, people emphasize that their actions trigger consequences for others that reverberate across networks of social relations like a tug of the bird-scaring rope. From this perspective, the defining feature of interdependent self-construal is not greater value of relationship, but instead an experience—again, for better or worse—of embeddedness in community.

With respect to perception and cognition, research has linked interdependent constructions of self with *holistic* tendencies to focus attention on contextual forces or relationships as the primary unit of reality (Nisbett et al., 2001). The experience of self as a relational node embedded in context reflects and promotes "field-dependent" perceptual tendencies to focus on relations among objects in their surrounding context, to make sense of situations by considering relationships among objects or events, and to make *situational attributions* when understanding the sources of action (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Nisbett et al., 2001). Similarly, the holistic focus on relationships between objects and attention to background context reflects and promotes tendencies to categorize objects according to functional relationship rather than defining attributes, dialectic reasoning styles, and tolerance for logical contradiction (Nisbett et al., 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999).

With respect to motivation, research has linked interdependent constructions of self with *prevention-focused* tendencies (Higgins, 1996; see also Lee et al., 2000) to meet obligations, live up to normative expectations, and attend to domains that require self-improvement (e.g., Kitayama et al., 1997). Interdependent constructions of self as a node in a network of interpersonal connection are associated with a de-emphasis on expression of personal attributes (Savani et al., 2008), motivations to act in ways that fit in with others (Kim & Markus, 1999), and an emphasis on adjusting or accommodating oneself to one's surroundings (Morling et al., 2002). Likewise, research has associated interdependent constructions of self with motivations to maintain relatively unbiased self-views (Heine & Hamamura, 2007) via attention to information that indicates shortcomings or failure to meet normative standards and obligations (Kitayama et al., 1997). This motivation to prevent shortcomings (rather than promote self-enhancement) is especially evident in tendencies to persist at a task longer after failure feedback than success feedback (Heine et al., 2001).

With respect to affect and emotion, research has linked interdependent constructions of self to tendencies of experience and expression that emphasize adjustment of self to interpersonal context (Kitayama et al., 2010). For example, research has associated interdependent constructions of self with emphases on external, "objective," or *consensual meaning of emotional experience* (Mesquita, 2001; Oishi et al., 2004) and positive evaluation of emotions that signal one's shortcomings (e.g., guilt; see Eid & Diener, 2001). Likewise, research has associated interdependent constructions with preference for low-arousal positive affective states (e.g., contentment) and deemphasis on expression of elated happiness due to its potentially disruptive effects on interpersonal relationships (Tsai, 2007).

Research has also linked interdependent constructions of self to implications for relational and collective belonging. A cultural psychology perspective suggests that the relevant feature of interdependent constructions is an experience of relationality as environmentally afforded connection. This sense of inherent connection affords a "prevention-focused" orientation to relationship that emphasizes painstaking management of obligations for material support—what Coe (2011) has referred to as "the materiality of care" (see also Adams & Kurtiş,

2015; Adams & Plaut, 2003; Kim et al., 2008—and an acute awareness of the potential hazards of embeddedness in thickly overlapping networks of enduring interpersonal connection (Adams, 2005). Interdependent constructions resonate strongly with *authority ranking* models of relationality (Fiske, 1991) that promote a sense of vertical positioning characterized by reciprocal obligations of deferent obedience and benevolent supervision. They also resonate with *communal sharing* models of relationality (Fiske, 1991) that emphasize fundamental connectedness, for better or worse, in prefabricated webs of interpersonal connection. In many West African settings, these conceptions find expression in tendencies for people to report a relatively small number of friends (Adams & Plaut, 2003), to be vigilant for attacks from envious personal enemies (including family and other intimate spaces; Adams, 2005; Geschiere, 1997), and to emphasize silence and concealment rather than self-disclosure and revelation (e.g., Ferme, 2001; Kurtiş & Adams, 2015a; Shaw, 2000). Rather than valorize "manufactured" romantic or mating relationships, interdependent constructions resonate with an experience of kinship as the prototype of human relationality (Salter & Adams, 2012).

Similarly, interdependent constructions of self afford a relationally embedded experience of collective belonging associated with a "common-bond" experience of group membership as a network of actual connections (Prentice et al., 1994; Yuki, 2003). Although this relationally embedded notion of collective belonging may provide a strong sense of tangible bonds, it also places constraints on the number of bonds that people can claim (in part because of the corresponding experience of substantial obligation; see Triandis et al., 1988). In contrast to assumptions that "group-oriented" collectivists will show stronger patterns of group-relevant phenomena, Yuki (2003) proposes that the more relational experience of collective belonging associated with interdependent constructions will promote relatively weak patterns of the phenomena detailed by the social identity tradition. This includes ingroup favoritism, (Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999), especially in the case of minimal groups or other artificially imposed categories.

Resonating with Yuki's (2003) account, researchers propose that people in many societies have experienced collective belonging not in terms of imagined community in an abstract category, but rather as deeply embedded connection in locally rooted networks characterized by a long history of tangible interactions (see Hawkins, 2002; and Lentz, 2006, for examples from what is now Northern Ghana). One implication of this perspective is that the "standard" patterns of belonging meticulously documented in such mainstream traditions as social identity theory and self-categorization theory are partly the product of human invention—that is, cultural innovations for imagination of community—rather than a natural law of human psychology (for discussions of cultural affordances that scaffold imagination of national community, see Anderson, 1983; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Winachakul, 1994).

Beyond Self-Construal: Cultural-Ecological Scaffolding of Self

Especially as appropriated in mainstream social-personality psychology, the notions of independent and interdependent self-construal are somewhat limiting to the extent that they entail problematic reifications of both culture and self (Adams & Markus, 2004; Kurtiş & Adams, 2013; Lewis & Wigen, 1997; Okazaki, David, & Abelmann, 2007; Said, 1978). A formulation that resonates more clearly with a cultural psychology analysis is one that Markus and Kitayama (along with Patricia Mullally) later referred to as *selfways*: scaffolding or affordances for psychological functioning embedded in the structure of everyday cultural ecologies (Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997). The notion of selfways makes explicit the idea that the influence of culture on self is not a matter of reified cultural traditions shaping, once-

and-for-all, an essentially independent or interdependent self. Instead, the notion of selfways affords more fluid understandings of culture and self. With respect to *culture*, the notion of selfways suggests fluid forms of cultural influence infused in diffuse institutions, practices, and artifacts rather than calcified traditions associated with rigidly bounded groups (Adams & Markus, 2004). This more fluid notion of cultural influence focuses on the ecological scaffolding that promotes psychological tendencies rather than labeling tendencies as the product of some reified cultural tradition. With respect to *self*, the notion of selfways makes explicit that the foundations of psychological experience are not limited to internal architecture, but also reside in the structure of everyday cultural worlds. Rather than trait-like construals that solidify during early childhood and persist via inertia throughout the life course, the notion of selfways treats the cultural construction of self as the repeated reconstitution of relatively fluid, habitual tendencies that are the product of ongoing engagement with ecologically inscribed, psychological resources.

Independent Selfways

Theory and research have associated independent selfways with a variety of ecological realities. With respect to distal ecological forces, independent selfways often feature a high degree of market integration and organizational scale that allow for depersonalized economic transactions between anonymous strangers (Henrich et al., 2005). Independent selfways often feature voluntary settlement patterns (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006) and relatively high levels of spatial and social mobility (Oishi & Kisling, 2009) that both reflect and promote a sense of independence from any particular social or geographical context (Giddens, 1991). Similarly, independent selfways often include collective realities of relative affluence (amid pockets of individual scarcity) that afford high degrees of mobility (e.g., via roads, mass transit, and other transportation infrastructure), convenient access to resources (e.g., fuel, electricity, and water), and a sense of financial independence: the ability to enact one's preferences and pursue life projects with relative freedom from material constraint (Markus, Ryff, Curhan, & Palmersheim, 2004). In turn, high levels of mobility and affluence are associated with "neolocal" residence (i.e., the practice of leaving a parental home to occupy a separate residence upon reaching adulthood), self-contained housing (i.e., with its own kitchen, bath, and toilet rather than communal or public amenities), and a small ratio of persons to rooms—all of which afford an experience of privacy and interpersonal insulation.

With respect to proximal forces, independent selfways often involve sociocultural organization of bodily functions in ways that reflect and afford a sense of privacy and interpersonal separation. These include bedtime rituals of parent-child separation to foster an experience of independent subjectivity (e.g., Shweder, Jensen, & Goldstein, 1995). These also include food rituals—such as individual place settings, individually wrapped meals from drive-through windows of fast food restaurants, "modern" conveniences that allow one to prepare and consume food quickly with a minimum of labor, and a high frequency of eating alone—that reflect and afford a socially disembedded experience of the biological activity of eating (see e.g., Rozin, 2007). Other proximal realities of independent selfways include low-context communication practices that assume relatively little common ground between speakers and rely on direct or explicit reference (Hall, 1976), linguistic features (e.g., pronoun use; Kashima & Kashima, 1998) that reflect and promote a sense of bounded actors abstracted from relational or physical context, and a host of "promotion-focused" childcare practices (Higgins, 1996)—including visually and verbally oriented interaction with infants as more or less equal partners (Keller, Schölmerich, & Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1988; LeVine et al., 1994; see Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003)—that emphasize exploration (Rothbaum, Weisz, Pott, Miyake, &

Morelli, 2000), bolstering (Higgins, 1996); nurturance (Higgins, 1997); and the emotional value of children (Kağıtçıbaşı & Ataca, 2005).

A relatively recent focus of cultural psychological research has been the inscription of different selfways in material artifacts (see Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008). To cite only a few examples, researchers have associated independent selfways with magazine advertisements that emphasize originality, freedom, and rejection of traditional roles (Kim & Markus, 1999); media interviews with Olympic athletes and other forms of reportage that locate the source of performance in individual ability or effort (Markus, Uchida, Omoregie, Townsend, & Kitayama, 2006); popular music that valorizes self-expression and independence (Snibbe & Markus, 2005); and pictures in children's books that valorize excitedly happy affective states (Tsai, Louie, Chen, & Uchida, 2007). In summary, people in worlds informed by independent selfways inhabit objective realities that—regardless of personal endorsement—reflect and promote intersubjective understandings of individuality and self-expression as normal and normative ways of being (Chiu, Gelfand, Yamagishi, Shteynberg, & Wan, 2010).

Interdependent Selfways

The preceding section describes a set of realities that hegemonic psychology tends to portray as "just natural" (and then bases a science of human experience on interactions with this "natural" environment).[3] Accordingly, it is useful to recall the extent to which these realities are highly unusual in the context of human history (Arnett, 2008; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). To get some sense for alternative models of person and context, consider ecological realities associated with the relatively interdependent selfways common across a variety of West African worlds. These realities include such distal ecological forces as limited spatial and social mobility (e.g., due to difficulty of transportation) that both reflect and promote a sense of rootedness in community and place; Giddens, 1991; Tengan, 1991). These realities often (but not always) involve labor-intensive, subsistence activities; difficult access to basic amenities (e.g., fuel, electricity, and water); and a collective reality of scarcity (with nearly half of the population living on less than $1.25 per day; United Nations Development Program, 2010) that demand extensive coordination within and between domestic units and reciprocal obligations of support to ensure viable existence. Similarly, these realities often include residence in communal or compound houses with multiple generations of relatives who are typically linked by patrilineal descent (occasionally by matrilineal descent; Oppong, 1974) and often include relationships (e.g., cowife and siblings of the same father by different mothers) that arise from the widespread practice of polygynous marriage (up to 25% of all conjugal unions; see Dodoo, 1998). These residential realities require people to share space and amenities (e.g., bedrooms, kitchen, bath, and toilet) in ways that—regardless of personal endorsement—constitute an experience of embedded interdependence.

With respect to proximal forces, the interdependent selfways common in many West African settings include sociocultural organization of bodily functions—for example, eating from a common bowl, drinking from a common cup, and sleeping together in a common bed (Morelli, Rogoff, Oppenheim, & Goldsmith, 1992; Keller, 2003)—in ways that afford an experience of embeddedness in community (see Fiske, 1991). They include "prevention-focused" childcare practices (Higgins, 1996)—including bodily contact, parental control, and familial obligation (LeVine et al., 1994; Keller, 2003)—that emphasize prudence (cf. Higgins, 1996), security, and contribution of children to the family's economic survival (LeVine et al., 1994; Kağıtçıbaşı, 1996; Keller, 2003). They include practices of ritualized avoidance and deferential respect that constitute the experience of authority-ranked relationality (Radcliffe-

Brown, 1940; see Fiske, 1991), rituals of memory (e.g., libation and offerings; Cole, 2001; Fiske, 1991) that promote a sense of ongoing relationship with departed ancestors, and socially distributed forms of childcare (e.g., fosterage; Bledsoe, 1990; Goody, 1982) that promote experience of broad connection rather than intense dyadic attachment (Weisner, 2005). Together with an abundance of material artifacts—including lorry slogans (van der Geest, 2009), calendars (Adams & Dzokoto, 2003), and movies (Meyer, 1998), to name only a few—these everyday realities reflect and promote intersubjective understandings of embedded relationality as normal and normative ways of being.

History and Materiality of Self(ways)

From this cultural psychology perspective, contextual variation in self and experience is less the product of conscious indoctrination into different value systems than it is something that arises in bottom-up fashion as people repeatedly engage everyday realities that elicit or shape psychological habits. A useful concept in this regard is *habitus* (see Bourdieu, 1977), which refers to direct inscription of ecological affordances on a person's habitual modes of affect, cognition, motivation, and being in the world. This notion provides a useful alternative to prevailing understandings of sociocultural influences on self. Perhaps reflecting their origins in the discipline of psychology, typical formulations have tended to locate sociocultural influence in individual endorsement of cultural values (see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002) or individual construal of self as independent or interdependent (Matsumoto, 1999). More recently, theorists and researchers have proposed a conceptual move away from individual endorsement toward intersubjective knowledge of modal community tendencies as carriers of sociocultural influence (Chiu et al., 2010). The notion of habitus extends this conceptual move beyond relatively conscious, intersubjective knowledge to emphasize relatively nonconscious processes of environmental regulation via implicit ecological blueprints embedded in the structure of everyday cultural worlds. From this perspective, tendencies that psychologists have associated with different varieties of self-construal are not essential features of an independent or interdependent self, but instead constitute a form of "history in person" (Holland & Lave, 2001): embodied traces from a history of engagement with material realities that continually reconstitute those tendencies. In this way, the notion of habitus adds considerations of history and materiality to counteract essentialist notions of independent or interdependent self.

A similar form of reification is evident in discussion of selfways. Hegemonic psychology tends to consider realities associated with independent selfways as "just natural" and tends to portray prevailing patterns in an essentialist manner as a manifestation of timeless traditions or reified cultural entities (see Gjerde, 2004; Hermans & Kempen, 1998; Okazaki et al., 2007). In contrast, recent work in cultural psychology has illuminated cultural-ecological forces that underlie observed patterns. For example, scholars have noted how the experience of mobility (Oishi & Kisling, 2009; Oishi, Schug, Yuki & Axt, 2015; Yuki & Schug, 2012), frontier ecology (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, & Ramaswamy, 2006), particular forms of livelihood (e.g., fishing versus farming; Uskul, Nisbett, & Kitayama, 2008; wheat versus rice agriculture; Talhelm et al., 2014), and ecologies of affluence (Adams, Bruckmüller, & Decker, 2012; Kraus et al, 2012) afford the habits of mind associated with independent selfways.

While these accounts provide important contributions to non-essentialist understandings of culture and self, they tend to portray independent selfways as the product of cultural innovation and intellectual progress. In contrast, decolonial theorists working from epistemic perspectives of the Global South (e.g., Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012; de Souza Santos, 2014) link independent selfways and associated forms of neoliberal individualism to the coloniality of

everyday life in the modern global order (Grosfoguel, 2002; Mignolo, 2009; Quijano, 2000). Rather than the leading edge of human progress, decolonial perspectives emphasize that the modern global order is a product of colonial and racial violence.

This recognition of coloniality as the "dark side of modernity" (Mignolo, 2009) affords similar recognition of the coloniality of being (Maldonado-Torres, 2007) as the dark side of psychological modernity (e.g., Inkeles, 1969; Inkeles & Smith, 1974). From this perspective, the sense of freedom from constraint and abstraction from context associated with independent selfways is not a politically innocent development. Instead, independent selfways have their foundations in colonial and interpersonal domination (e.g. Shaw, 2000). The modern subject position arose and became typical for a privileged few through the appropriation of others' productivity (e.g. in the gendered domestic household, the racialized violence of slavery, or in exploitative economic arrangements) which provided them with resources of time, energy, and material security to explore personal desires, follow their heart, and pursue their dreams (Coltrane, 2000). In this way, a decolonial vision of cultural psychology links the independent selfways valorized by hegemonic accounts of psychological science to histories of violent appropriation and material oppression.

Beyond Cultural Variation: Sociocultural Bases of Psychological Experience

Most people understand a cultural psychology approach as a means for investigating diversity in psychological functioning along "cultural-group" dimensions. However, a cultural psychology approach is a broader attempt to examine the foundation for psychological experience in the structures of everyday cultural worlds. This approach applies beyond questions of cultural diversity to topics across the spectrum of psychological science (see Cole, 1996).

Sociocultural Bases of Species-Typical Tendencies

With respect to general tendencies, a cultural psychology analysis considers the extent to which apparently natural psychological capacities are particular technologies of mind made possible by common cultural ecologies. From this perspective, human beings share a set of species-typical tendencies that are the product of near-universal engagement with widely distributed cultural tools. For example, researchers have noted how apparently "natural" cognitive or perceptual abilities are associated with cultural ecologies in which language and literacy practices are standard features. Tomasello (1999) argued that many forms of higher cognition characteristic of species-typical humans are not themselves innate, but instead depend on cultural tools that have developed via processes of cumulative cultural evolution. Similarly, many near-universal and species-typical cognitive and perceptual abilities—including the use of graphic conventions to represent and perceive depth in two-dimensional drawings, memory for disconnected lists of information, spontaneous strategies for organizing memory, taxonomic versus functional categories to organize test objects, and willingness to go beyond personal experience in answering logical problems—are not innate properties of the human organism, but instead reflect near-universal engagement with widespread institutions of literacy and formal, school-based education (Rogoff, 1990; see also Scribner & Cole, 1981).

Likewise, the near-universal influence and expansion of market economic activity to a variety of "traditional" settings carries with it cultural affordances that systematically evoke certain forms of experience (Greenfield, Maynard, & Marti, 2009). For example, researchers noted that apparently "standard" tendencies to diverge from unrestrained self-interest and make relatively egalitarian offers in one-shot economic games are not "just natural" features of genetic inheritance, but instead are associated with integration into market economies that require abstract forms of impersonal cooperation (Henrich et al., 2005). Similarly, researchers who

observed a Zinacanatec Mayan setting over time documented increasing integration into market economic activity that was, in turn, associated with increased reliance on technology, individuation and opportunities for expression of individual choice, and specialization for economic tasks (Greenfield et al., 2009). The researchers also noted associated changes due to increased urban residence, including increased contact with strangers, contact with people of different ethnicities, and increases in the range of economic and social possibilities for women.

Finally, technological advances have contributed to a global cultural space that has a similar impact on identity-development processes of youth from a variety of national settings, despite differences in local traditions of identity construction. Youth around the world encounter manifestations of global popular culture that include film, music, and fashion distributed via such widely (although unevenly; see Ferguson, 2006) available mechanisms as satellite television, cell phones, and Internet cafes. As a result, they often develop a form of bicultural identity reflecting the influence of engagement with local communities of origin and an "imagined" global community (Arnett, 2002). This bicultural identity increases the range of options for construction of personal identity and therefore grants some measure of increased authorship over one's life story. However, this bicultural identity also creates challenges for identity integration and increases potential for intergenerational conflict (Arnett, 2002).

In all of these cases, the emphasis of a cultural psychology analysis is not cultural diversity, but rather cultural-ecological structures—whether unique to a particular community or shared across human societies—that continually reconstitute apparently "natural" features of human psychological functioning. One noteworthy implication of these ideas is that failure to observe a difference in comparisons of samples from two communities does not mean lack of a cultural difference. Rather than "natural" features of the human organism, the observed similarity can be the product of universal engagement with the same cultural-ecological affordances. Likewise, a study with university students from different national settings does not necessarily constitute a cross-cultural comparison. Although the students may differ in national cultures, they share engagement with ecological affordances associated with university cultural spaces.

Sociocultural Bases of Personal Experience

With respect to personal dispositions, one application of a cultural psychology analysis might be to investigate variation in personality across "cultural" settings (see McCrae & Allik, 2002). Instead, we consider a more general issue: the extent to which personal dispositions reflect the particular sociocultural ecologies that a person inhabits. Just as a cultural psychology perspective does not deny the existence of genetically inherited, species-typical capacities, it likewise does not deny the existence of genetically inherited temperaments or predispositions—what one might refer to as "traits"—that vary across individuals. However, just as genetically inherited capacities require complementary input from cultural-ecological affordances to produce species-typical skills of recognizable human beings, so too do genetically linked predispositions require complementary input from cultural-ecological affordances to produce normally functioning, recognizably human persons.

Personal identity. Among the most important ecological affordances in this regard are resources for the life stories that constitute personal identity (McAdams, 2001). One contribution of cultural ecologies to the construction of personal identity concerns content. What matters for inclusion in one's identity story—category identities such as gender, nationality, ethnicity, lineage, class, and age set; or role identities such as sibling, parent, child, patron, client, and foster parent—depends on the cultural world that one inhabits. For example, the influence of gender on experience of personal identity varies greatly across settings, determining many

aspects of a person's life story (e.g., occupation) in some worlds, but exerting more limited influence in others. Likewise, the influence of different roles varies across settings. In many Majority-World spaces, the roles of sibling or parent exert strong influence on one's evolving life story and matter more than the "manufactured" role of spouse. In other worlds informed by the notion of a "sacred couple" (Shweder et al., 1995), the role of spouse looms large in one's life story, and the search for a (soul)mate is one of the defining themes of a person's life.

Cultural ecologies vary in conceptions of the life course in ways that impact personal identity stories. Some cultural ecologies emphasize initiation ceremonies, parenthood, and "becoming an ancestor" upon one's death as defining scenes in life stories (e.g., Cole, 2001; Oppong, 1973). Other cultural ecologies emphasize school graduations, marriage, professional employment, home ownership, retirement, and "going to heaven" as defining scenes. One of the most important variations in life course imagination concerns "leaving home." In many cultural ecologies that inform hegemonic psychology, the expectation is that a person will leave the family home to start an independent life in a new location soon after reaching adulthood. Many identity tasks that hegemonic psychology portrays as "just natural" features of a healthy life course—establishing a "secure" attachment bond between parents and children or resolving Eriksonian identity crises (1968)—may reflect adjustment to this culturally variable, life-course mandate of separation (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swindler, & Tipton, 1985). This contrasts with many West African communities, in which the expectation is enduring connection—often a lifetime spent in or near the same residence—that persists even after death through practices such as libation, offerings of food, and divination (e.g., Fiske, 1991, pp. 281–283). In these worlds, problems of adjustment concern embeddedness as an ecological fact of life and successful management of developmental tasks associated with "being a relative" (Reisman, 1992).

Beyond content, different cultural ecologies also impact the process and organization of identity stories. One of the most important functions of identity stories is to integrate or abstract an experience of sameness or unity from an individual's different performances or presentations of self across time and audiences (Goffman, 1959; McAdams, 2001). Cultural ecologies differ in the degree to which they afford or promote such integration and abstraction. A typical pattern across human history has been one in which everyday realities afford an experience of identity tied to situated performances (e.g., occupational role, family position). In contrast, a history of engagement with "modern" spaces promotes a relatively integrated experience of being as a bundle of essential features, abstracted from situated performances, that define a person's authentic self-identity (Baumeister, 1987; Giddens, 1991).

From this perspective, the experience of personal identity is not the unfolding and expression of some core, authentic essence; instead, it is a sociocultural construction: the product of affordances that permit abstraction and integration of identity across situations. Indeed, research suggests that cultural ecologies vary in the extent to which they both afford such abstraction and require it for social approval and well-being (Suh, 2002). In summary, a cultural psychology analysis emphasizes the extent to which identity stories reflect not only the collective identities, role identities, and conceptions of life course that are prominent in different cultural ecologies (Erikson, 1968; Reisman, 1992), but also affordances for abstraction or embeddedness of identity associated with different selfways (Suh, 2002).

Attitudes and dispositions. Although few psychologists would deny that the construction and experience of personal identity reflects considerable sociocultural influence, prevailing approaches in hegemonic psychology regard other person factors—for example, attitudes, preferences, traits, and habitual self-construals—as deeply embodied, essential features

of individual organisms. Perhaps reflecting the tendency to see context-abstracted persons as the source of agency and experience, prevailing understandings hold that, whether conceived as genetically inherited traits or habitual dispositions acquired during early socialization, it is these internal structures that guide behavior and experience. From this hegemonic perspective, the primary task of an integrated social-personality psychology is to determine the properties of situations that moderate the operation of these guiding dispositions. This prevailing model does not necessarily deny the possibility of change in guiding dispositions (as the enormous body of research on such topics as attitude change suggests). However, the implicit conceptions at work in this model portray such change as a case of rewriting a person's operating code with a new set of internal guides to replace earlier ones. As a productive contrast to this prevailing view of personal dispositions, a cultural psychology analysis emphasizes two points.

Cultural-ecological variation. The first point concerns cultural-ecological variation in the extent to which local realities permit (or require) individual exercise of personal dispositions. Cultural ecologies associated with independent selfways typically promote *disjoint* constructions of action as the self-directed product of internal dispositions, and these ecologies afford the opportunity to exercise these personal dispositions. In contrast, cultural ecologies associated with interdependent selfways typically promote *conjoint* constructions of action as a collaborative production of personal dispositions in concert with environmental affordances (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 2004). Accordingly, even when people across settings are similarly shaped to have dispositional stances, these dispositional stances typically have a greater impact on action and experience in worlds informed by independent selfways than worlds informed by interdependent selfways. For example, research suggests that subjective emotional experience informs life satisfaction judgments to a greater extent in "individualist" settings than "collectivist" settings (where normative standards are equally strong predictors of life satisfaction judgments; Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998). Similarly, research suggests that personal preferences serve as a guide for product choice to a greater extent in middle-class American settings than similarly situated, middle-class Indian settings, for whom product choices also reference preferences of important relatives (Savani et al., 2008). Finally, research suggests that preferences for attractiveness have a greater impact on interpersonal outcomes in cultural ecologies associated with independent selfways (North American or urban settings) than in cultural ecologies associated with interdependent selfways (e.g., West African or rural settings; Anderson, Adams, & Plaut, 2008; Plaut, Adams, & Anderson, 2009).

In short, worlds informed by independent selfways both afford and require recruitment and enactment of personal dispositions—whether attitudes (Ybarra & Trafimow, 1998), assessments of individual happiness (Suh et al., 1998), product preferences (Savani et al., 2008), or interpersonal attractions (Anderson et al., 2008)—to an extent that worlds informed by interdependent selfways do not. Indeed, the association of independent selfways with the "fundamental attribution error" (Ross, 1977)—the tendency to overweight personal dispositions and underweight ecological affordances as causes of behavior—may be a reflection of this variability in affordances for exercise of personal dispositions. That is, dispositional attributions may be less "erroneous" in settings informed by disjoint rather than conjoint models of agency.

Sociocultural sources. Beyond the issue of cultural variation, the defining feature of a cultural psychology analysis is to bridge the conceptual divide between embodied personal dispositions and the cultural-ecological structures that continually tune those dispositions. From this perspective, ecological structures do not merely moderate the direction of preexisting dispositions; instead, a history of engagement with particular ecological structures continually

reconstitutes configurations of affect, motivation, and cognition. Rather than essential characteristics, a cultural psychology perspective highlights the extent to which personal dispositions are embodied traces of *context in person*: an acquired environmental charge resulting from a history of engagement with ecological affordances for psychological experience embedded in the structure of local worlds (Mischel, 1968).

There are a number of noteworthy resonances between this notion of context in person and other theoretical perspectives. One is the "environmental associations" interpretation of implicit attitudes, which highlights the extent to which a person's "automatic" affective stances toward objects reflect histories of engagement with ecological representations that portray the object with positive or negative connotations (e.g., Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Related to this is recent work on the "social tuning" of attitudes (and the perspective of shared reality theory more generally; see Sinclair, Lowery, Hardin, & Colangelo, 2005; Hardin & Higgins, 1996), which emphasizes the extent to which people collaboratively construct situated attitudes and other personal stances in the course of creating common ground with particular audiences. Another point of resonance is with discourse analytic perspectives, which emphasize how people's reports of attitudes and other personal stances are not the expression of some essential internal attribute, but instead reflect embodied representation of culturally inscribed rituals and discursive repertories that people reproduce in situated performances of persuasion and justification (Durrheim & Dixon, 2004).

Another expression of the idea of "context in person" is a cultural psychology account of an enduring topic of research on personal dispositions in social-personality psychology: dispositions of racist bias (Adams, Biernat, Branscombe, Crandall, & Wrightsman, 2008).[4] Accounts of racism in hegemonic psychological science have focused almost exclusively on personal dispositions of stereotyping and prejudice. Critics have noted how this understanding of racism in terms of individual bias directs interventions toward the task of changing hearts and minds while neglecting the cultural-ecological structures that afford racist subjectivity and reproduce racist inequality (see Wright & Lubensky, 2008). In contrast, the defining feature of a cultural psychology analysis is to bridge the conceptual divide between embodied personal dispositions and the cultural-ecological structures that continually tune those dispositions. This perspective conceives of prejudice, stereotypes, and other tendencies of racist bias as the product of engagement with racist ecologies. In turn, recognition of the cultural psychological foundations of personal bias suggests a shift in emphasis of intervention efforts from changing personal dispositions to transforming the ecologically embedded structures that continually reconstitute those dispositions.

Summary

A cultural psychology perspective emphasizes the extent to which much of psychological experience—not only the psychological correlates of independent and interdependent selfways that have been the focus of most work in cultural psychology, but also habits and dispositions that are the topic of hegemonic psychology more generally—is not the "just natural" expression of internal essence. Instead, it reflects the sociocultural constitution of the person: the continual tuning of subjectivity to historically evolved structures for mind embedded in the stuff of everyday worlds. This idea has been an enduring theme in the interdisciplinary exercise of social psychology (e.g., Mead, 1934). A cultural psychology perspective is one of several theoretical bases from which to recapture this theme.

PERSON IN CONTEXT: PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION OF CULTURAL WORLDS

The preceding focus on the cultural constitution of psychological experience resonates with the objectivism and environmentalist roots of social psychology evident in discussions of automaticity (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Devine, 1989) and ecological affordances (Gibson, 1977; McArthur & Baron, 1983). However, an exclusive emphasis on contextual determinants neglects what may be the defining element of psychological science (as opposed to behavioral science or neuroscience): namely, a subjectivist appreciation for the role of dynamic construction processes—and related concepts of activity (versus behavior; Bruner, 1990), agency, meaning, construal, and imagination—in the perception, interpretation, and (re-)production of everyday reality (Griffin & Ross, 1991).

Upstream Impacts on Action

The typical way in which psychologists have considered dynamic construction processes is with respect to the upstream side of action. For example, psychologists have considered the necessarily "subjective" perception of "objective" physical stimuli. Whether the topic is visual perception (e.g., Segall, Campbell, & Herskovitz, 1963), auditory perception (Bregman, 1990), memory (Bartlett, 1932), or identity (Mead, 1934), people do not have direct access to objective reality; instead, they build (i.e., construct) an emergent experience of reality from underspecified inputs. Likewise, social psychologists have emphasized the phenomenon of subjective construal, whereby people actively interpret situations that are inherently ambiguous (e.g., whether a remark about a person's appearance is a put-down, come-on, ingratiation, or relatively innocent compliment; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Griffin & Ross, 1991).

In similar fashion, cultural psychologists emphasize that the intersection of cultural-ecological niches does not wholly determine a person's experience; instead, people exercise some direction over selection and meaning of cultural resources that they appropriate. An important implication for a cultural psychology analysis is that each act of appropriation or interpretation constitutes a form of selection pressure on the evolution of cultural realities (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001; Lau, Chiu, & Lee, 2001; McIntyre, Lyons, Clark, & Kashima, 2004; Norenzayan & Atran, 2004; Schaller, Conway, & Tanchuk, 2002). As people preferentially attend to and act on interpretations of some features of a situation, they not only ensure the continued relevance or reproduction of those features (in slightly altered form), but also produce continued irrelevance of or silence about other possible features (Trouillot, 1995).

As an illustration, consider a classic study of sleeping arrangements among people in Chicago, Illinois, United States, and Bhubaneswar, Orissa, India (Shweder et al., 1995). Noting that people in the former city tend to sleep with fewer people to a space than do people in the latter city, researchers considered whether this pattern reflected differences in desired ways of being or was merely a function of material resources impinging on a universal desire for privacy. When the researchers asked participants to allocate sleeping space to a 7-member family under different conditions of resource availability, participants tended to reproduce locally typical sleeping patterns regardless of material affordances. That is, participants in Chicago tended to preserve the privacy of the "sacred" conjugal couple even in conditions of resource scarcity, and participants from Bhubaneswar tended to preserve the local patterns of cosleeping (e.g., to protect vulnerable members and guarantee female chastity) under conditions of resource abundance. This study suggests that, even when cultural ecologies appear to be static and unchanging across generations, this appearance of inertia often reflects the dynamic exercise of

human intentionality and preferential selection to maintain desired cultural ecologies in the face of structural forces (e.g., acquisition of resources) that might enable other ways of being.

Downstream Consequences of Action

A second way in which one can theorize dynamic construction processes is with respect to the downstream side of action. As people act on their interpretations of events, they inscribe observable traces of their subjectivity on intersubjective space and material realities. These materialized traces of psychological experience influence the subsequent flow of interpretation and activity not only for producers and their immediate interaction partners, but also for present and future third-party observers who come in contact with those behavioral products. For example, a person who expresses greater or less interest in a phone conversation as a function of beliefs about visual attractiveness of the conversation partner elicits verbal responses from the partner that subsequent, third-party observers find more or less interesting (Snyder, Tanke, & Berschied, 1977). A man who responds with aggression (versus laughter) when another person calls him "Asshole!" reconstructs normative understandings of the event as a personal attack or insult that demands retaliation (rather than a ridiculous loss of self-control that one should ignore), and suggests to observers that any man's personal honor requires that he do the same (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; see Vandello & Cohen, 2004). A person who responds with liking or approval of someone who maintains high identity consistency across diverse situations reproduces normative understandings of this consistency as authenticity (versus insensitivity or failure to accommodate self to situations) and increases the likelihood of others will strive for such consistency (Suh, 2002). A mother who routinely asks her child about subjective emotional experience of daily events (rather than normative understandings of those events) directs her child's emerging autobiography in ways that habitually reference subjective emotional experience (versus normative understandings) as a guide to interpretation of events (Wang & Brockmeier, 2002). A man who responds to somatic manifestations of anxiety by raising the alarm that a passerby has stolen his penis not only produces a construction of that interaction as an incident of magical theft, but also reproduces the associated realities (e.g., charged atmosphere of anxiety or the belief in a world populated by magical penis thieves) that reconstitute fertile ground for others to report a similar experience (Adams & Dzokoto, 2007). By drawing attention to such downstream consequences of action, a cultural psychology perspective extends the idea of subjective construal in historical and material directions. When people act on subjective construals they produce material realities that bear the traces of their subjectivity and thereby inscribe personal psychology into ecological context.

To illustrate this idea of "person in context," consider a classic study among students at Kyoto University (Japan) and the University of Oregon (United States; Kitayama et al., 1997). Researchers asked students in these universities to provide situations from their own lives in which they experienced success and failure. The researchers then exposed different samples of students from these universities to a random sample of 100 success situations and 100 failure situations from each university, and they asked them to consider whether (and how much) their self-esteem would rise or fall if they experienced those situations. Besides an effect of participant background, such that European American students at Oregon (who reported net self-esteem gain) tended to report higher self-esteem in response to situations than did Japanese students at Kyoto (who reported net self-esteem loss), results also revealed an effect of situation source. Regardless of participant background, Oregon-produced situations tended to elicit more self-enhancing (or less self-critical) responses and Kyoto-produced settings tended to elicit more self-critical (or less self-enhancing) responses. This study suggests that the patterns of promotion-

focused self-enhancement and prevention-focused self-criticism observed in American and Japanese settings (e.g., Heine et al., 1999) reside not only in the psychological habits of persons, but also in the enhancement-affording or criticism-affording situations that people in these settings create. These situations bear the self-evaluation tendencies of their producers, and exert influence on the self-evaluation of subsequent actors who encounter them.

Dynamic Construction of Personal Identity

To further illustrate dynamic construction processes, consider again the phenomenon of identity. Integration and stability in personal identity are not merely the reflection of some authentic, internal core. Instead, the apparent stability of personal identity requires continual acts of (re-)creation as a person collaborates with a relatively stable set of audiences (Hammack, 2008; Pasupathi, 2001) and draws on relatively stable configurations of ecological affordances—including selfways, subject positions (Hermans, 2001), and collective identity stereotypes—to keep the story going (McAdams, 2001).

In terms of upstream influences, a person can exercise agency and direction over the identity process by "selectively appropriating" elements of past autobiography or local affordances and "imaginatively construing" them in ways that make sense for the person's particular identity story (McAdams, 2001, p. 101). For example, research suggests that people do not recall autobiographical events in neutral or objective fashion, but instead do so in ways that serve identity needs of the present (e.g., emphasizing success over failure to preserve a sense of moral adequacy, personal efficacy, or self-esteem; Wilson & Ross, 2003). In terms of downstream influences, the identity stories that people tell themselves and others have important consequences for self-knowledge and motivation (e.g., Pasupathi, 2001; Wilson & Ross, 2003); in particular, psychologists have noted the extent to which identity stories provide a person with a sense of meaning, direction, and purpose.

A cultural psychology perspective suggests the extent to which integration and stability in identities occur via the psychological constitution of everyday realities that provide the ecological foundation for those identities. An interesting program of research in this regard concerns the "behavioral residue" of personality: for example, the extent to which the content and arrangement of artifacts in a room represent material expressions of personal traits (e.g., Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris, 2002). Similar work comes from research on place-making: the process by which people transform natural space, often through use of tangible objects, by individually or jointly infusing it with meaning. For example, people constitute relationships in part through the collaborative production of a jointly constructed, material reality; that is, they buy jointly owned objects, decorate and furnish homes, create gardens, and otherwise inscribe their relationality on the structure of everyday worlds (Lohmann, Arriaga, & Goodfriend, 2003). Likewise, research has examined the extent to which people express collective identities by displaying national flags (Skitka, 2005), wearing clothing with university symbols, and otherwise "basking in reflected glory" (Cialdini et al, 1976). All of these cases illustrate the psychological constitution of cultural-ecological realities, by which actors deposit traces of their psychological experience in the material stuff of everyday worlds. However, rather than see such behavioral residue as the end-product of experience, a cultural psychology analysis emphasizes the extent to which the associated artifacts—unmade beds, joint purchases, national flags—provide scaffolding that continually reconstitutes the associated personal, relational, and collective experience (see Mischel, 1968; Ross & Nisbett, 1991).

One important implication of this discussion is to propose greater space for the exercise of human agency than one might otherwise expect from a perspective that emphasizes ecological

regulation. Researchers who emphasize the "automaticity of everyday life" have provocatively asserted that perhaps 95% of psychological experience occurs via environmental regulation of habitual responses. This suggests that only 5% of psychological experience is open to self-reflection or personal control toward meaningful, self-defining pursuits (Bargh, 1997; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Without necessarily disputing this assessment, a cultural psychology analysis proposes the psychological constitution of cultural realities as an additional, typically underappreciated process by which people exercise self-direction. People exercise reflection and intention not only to direct current activity, but also to construct worlds into which they deposit their subjectivity and thereby permit a form of "automatic" intentional influence during future moments in other settings when their action and experience are under environmental regulation. Accordingly, some discussions of ecological regulation may understate the impact of human agency because they fail to appreciate the extent to which the ecology of human experience is not a "just natural" environment. Indeed, this failure to appreciate the psychological constitution of everyday ecologies affords tendencies to naturalize the status quo and to deny the "possessive investment" (Lipsitz, 1998) that people have in world maintenance. In contrast, a cultural psychology perspective emphasizes that the ecology of human experience is a cultural product that mediates the imagination and motivation of the intentional activity that created it.

Intentional Worlds

In addition to his famous definition of cultural psychology as the study of mutual constitution, Shweder (1990, p. 3) less famously defined cultural psychology as the study of "intentional worlds." As the social-psychological principle of subjective construal emphasizes, reality is typically ambiguous in the sense that any situation is open to multiple understandings. When people act on particular understandings of a situation, they invest everyday realities with beliefs and desires associated with those understandings. This process results in the (re)production of *intentional worlds*: "already-there" (Shweder, 1990, p. 26) cultural ecologies that bear the influence of collective understandings and subsequently direct activity toward particular ends.

Although the idea of mutual constitution has been central to a cultural psychology perspective in social-personality psychology (e.g., Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Kashima, 2000), psychologists have typically ignored the idea of intentional worlds. In part, this neglect likely reflects a disciplinary division of labor in which (even social) psychologists typically study person-based manifestations of human experience and leave the study of "the world" to other social sciences (for a discussion, see Shweder, et al., 2006). As we emphasize throughout this paper, this division of labor ignores the extent to which the world is a psychological product that mediates self-direction and social influence. However, this neglect also reflects a conception of mind as a brain-limited processing mechanism, independent of content and abstracted from context (Shweder, 1990). In contrast, the idea of intentional worlds resonates with discussions of extended mind (e.g., Clark & Chalmers, 1998) and an appreciation for the extent the extent to which species-typical experience requires engagement with the scaffolding provided by ecologically embedded mentalities.

The "intention" in intentional worlds does not necessarily refer to the mental states of people who produce, appropriate, or fall under the influence of these cultural products. People may appropriate cultural tools without self-conscious reflection; they may engage them with little intention or awareness about their (often "unintended") consequences; and they may reproduce them with little intention or awareness about the extent to which they inscribe their own beliefs and desires. Rather, the adjective "intentional" refers to the directive force of cultural

realities. Instead of a (just) natural habitat, species-typical human beings inhabit psychologically charged, cultural ecologies that systematically orient action toward particular directions. To illustrate this concept, Shweder (1990) proposed an analytic framework for the study of the relationship between "reality-constituting psyches (intentional persons) and culturally constituted realities (intentional worlds)" (p. 27).

One can speak of an *active relationship* between psyche and reality "when the target person himself [or herself] creates or selects his [or her] intentional world" (Shweder, 1990; p. 28). As an example of a *negative* active relationship—one in which "the intentionality of the world diminishes or contravenes the intentionality of the person" (Shweder, 1990, p. 27)—consider a person who places an activated alarm clock across the room so that they must get out of bed (rather than hit snooze button) to deactivate it the next morning (Shweder, 1990; based on Schelling, 1984). In this example, a "reality-constituting person" recognizes the limitations of self-directive capacity to follow more noble intentions in the moment of temptation and "constructs an intentional world using collective resources to contravene his or her own anticipated preference to stay in bed and go back to sleep" (Shweder, 1990, p. 28). In this and other examples, people exercise a distal or culturally mediated form of self-regulation whereby they actively invest their higher purposes in intentional worlds that provide more proximal, automatic regulation to contravene their less noble intentions in some future moment.

As an example of a *positive* active relationship—one in which a "the intentionality of the world amplifies or supports the intentionality of the person" (Shweder, 1990, p. 27)—consider intentional worlds of romantic love. People on a date often deploy technologies of romance—soft candlelight, seductive fragrances, fine chocolates, sultry music, and silky textures (Adams, Kurtiș, Salter, & Anderson, 2012)—not only as a means to seduce others, but also to "put themselves in the mood" and enable their own self-seduction. In such cases, a reality-constituting person (the distracted lover) uses a culturally constituted, intentional world (the romantic dinner) to produce an experience that the person desires but cannot simply conjure up in the absence of material affordances. This example suggests that romantic love is far from a "just" natural experience; instead, romantic passion involves desires that people realize via cultural worlds designed to constitute that experience (Holland & Eisenhart, 1990).

The preceding examples illuminate how intentional persons enhance their capacity for self-direction by offloading or outsourcing self-regulation to affordances of intentional worlds. This active appropriation of cultural affordances to serve personal projects contrasts with more common understandings of cultural influence in which "other persons create or select an intentional world for the target person in light of that [target] person's intentionality" (Shweder, 1990, p. 27). In some cases, these forms of influence can relatively deliberate, as when people knowingly deploy cultural affordances to afford or constrain another person's actions or experience in ways that the person herself or himself would not otherwise do. Shweder (1990, pp. 27-28) refers to such cases as a *reactive relationship* between psyche and reality.

However, the more typical case is what Shweder (1990, p. 28) refers to as a *passive relationship* between psyche and reality: one in which intentional influence becomes embedded in routine practice or habitual ways of being that proceed without the awareness or deliberative participation of influencer or influenced. Examples of this type come from work by Alan Fiske (1991), who documented four basic relational models: Communal Sharing (CS), Authority Ranking, (AR), Equality Matching (EM), and Market Pricing (MP). Fiske emphasizes that these models are not simply evolved mechanisms hardwired into brain architecture, but also reside in the cultural ecologies that intentional persons design to instantiate the models in locally

appropriate ways (see Fiske & Schubert, 2012). Although evolved predispositions associated with the models provide potential for certain kinds of experience, people do not realize these predispositions and develop the habits of being associated with these models unless they participate in worlds that previous generations have arranged to reflect and impart the models.

To illustrate, consider practices of parent-child interaction in West African settings where the AR model is prominent (Fiske, 1991). How do people come to experience parent-child (or junior-senior) interaction in terms of this model versus others? Although elders may attempt to explicitly indoctrinate children into value systems and ideologies associated with the AR model, the more direct way that people acquire the habitual patterns associated with the model is through repeated engagement with practices that reflect and promote the model. Everyday practices of greeting, eating, sleeping, and interacting routinely direct people of junior status to receive service after others, bend their bodies, subvert their gaze, or make themselves low than others in ways that inscribe feelings of awe, respect, deference, and obedience. The same practices routinely direct people of senior status to receive service before others, to assume more expansive postures, or occupy elevated positions over others in ways that promote feelings of power and responsibility for protection of others. It is routine performance of these practices in the course of everyday interaction—not explicit indoctrination, ideological persuasion, or the natural expression/outgrowth of an inborn model—that continually (re-)constitutes the psychological habits associated with the model. It is likely that these practices find their way into everyday routines through relatively conscious selection; that is, people originally invented customary routines based on these practices because the practices reflect local beliefs about what is good or true and afford desired behaviors in attunement with those beliefs. Eventually, routine practices acquire an inertia of their own; that is, they continue to regulate everyday experience without mindful or deliberate engagement of the actors who perform the routines.

Compare these practices to parent-child interaction in middle-class North American settings where the EM model is prominent (Fiske, 1991). How do people come to experience parent-child interaction in terms of this model versus others? Again, rather than explicit indoctrination, the more direct way that people acquire associated patterns is through repeated engagement with practices—e.g., face-to-face interaction featuring conversational turn-taking while demanding eye contact (e.g., Greenfield et al., 2003)—that instantiate and promote an experience of separate actors who interact as (potentially) equal partners. It is routine engagement with these practices that continually re-constitutes the psychological habits associated with the model (e.g., habits of independent self-construal).

Although the preceding examples consider the intentionality of everyday practices, one can also consider intentionality of material artifacts. For example, an analysis of children's books suggested that authors in Taiwanese settings produce characters who model relatively low-arousal positive affect, but authors in American settings produce characters who model relatively high-arousal positive affect (Tsai et al., 2007). Likewise, content analysis of televised interviews with Olympic medalists suggests that Japanese interviews featured a balance of positive and negative evaluations and emphasized the background or social context of performance, but American interviews emphasized positive personal characteristics of the performers (Markus et al., 2006). Presumably, the primary motivation of the producers of these artifacts is to tell stories that resonate with consumers' sensibilities and preferences, thereby increasing the demand for their product. Even so, regardless of producers' intentions, their products constitute intentional worlds that shape consumers' subjectivity (see Morling & Lamoreaux, 2008).

Toward a Cultural Psychology of Power and Domination

The idea of intentional worlds has implications for topics across the spectrum of social-personality psychology. For example, this notion resonates strongly with Bakhtinian perspectives on the dialogical nature of personhood or self (Bakhtin, 1981; Hermans, 2001), which emphasize how other people's beliefs and desires constitute multiple subject positions from which a person authors an experience of self-identity. Likewise, this idea resonates strongly with research on behavioral confirmation processes, which documents how people deposit their beliefs and expectations—regarding classroom performance (Rosenthal & Jacobsen, 1968), attractiveness (Snyder et al., 1977), rejection (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, & Khouri, 1998), hostility (Dodge & Crick, 1990), or competition (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970)—into local ecologies via immediacy behaviors and other observable manifestations. For example, research suggests that people often act on anxious expectations about interracial interaction by increasing interpersonal distance as measured by physical arrangement in space (e.g., chair distance; see Goff, Steele, & Davies, 2008; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1973). These inscriptions of person in context bear the social influence of their producers and can elicit belief-confirming behavior (e.g., emotional distance or racialized affect) from the often unwitting targets of the expectancy.

A promising way in which the idea of intentional worlds can inform social-personality psychology concerns the topic of intergroup power. We briefly discuss two examples.

Privilege as Outcome Enhancement

The first example is the topic of stereotype threat. Conventional discussions of this topic have emphasized how particular constructions of performance evaluation or testing situations—specifically, as a diagnostic measure of essential intelligence or intellectual merit (Croizet, 2008; Steele, 1997)—cause underperformance among people from negatively stereotyped groups relative to their "true" ability in the absence of those harmful constructions. However, an exclusive emphasis on the harmful consequences of stereotype threat for people from disadvantaged groups obscures a key point about the psychology of oppression. Specifically, the same constructions of the test that artificially undermine oppressed group performance via stereotype threat also serve to artificially inflate dominant group performance via the phenomenon of stereotype lift (Walton & Cohen, 2003; Croizet, 2011).

This often obscured point has important implications for understandings of *performance* and *ability*. If hegemonic constructions of the test situation provide a platform that leads people from dominant groups to overperform relative to their true ability (such that they score higher than they otherwise would in the absence of the performance-enhancing construction of the test), then how is one to understand their personal ability? Is it most evident in their inflated performance under standard constructions of the test situation or their corrected performance under more neutral constructions of the test situation? Without denying the possibility of performance-relevant dispositions (whether acquired skills or essential abilities; Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993), a cultural psychology analysis of "mind in society" (Vygotsky, 1978) emphasizes that any performance is a joint product of such dispositions and the particular, culturally evolved technologies present in an activity setting. This casts doubt on the possibility of observing raw talent from any particular measure.

A second implication concerns an understanding of the test gap as the result not only of barriers that impede outcomes of people from oppressed groups, but also of affordances that enhance outcomes of people from dominant groups. Some readers may find it strange to refer to standard constructions of the test situation as oppressive or to propose (as we do in the preceding paragraph) that one might replace them with "more neutral" constructions. After all, the tendency in hegemonic psychological science is to regard the test situation as a paragon of

neutrality. From a cultural psychology perspective, such beliefs in the neutrality of the test situation require forms of "unknowing" (Geissler, 2013) similar to those that Shweder (1990) described for the experimental laboratory. Specifically, constructions of standardized tests in hegemonic psychological science treat the test situation

> as a privileged space, where, quite fantastically and against much evidence, it is conveniently assumed that one can physically enter a transcendental realm where the effects of context, content, and meaning can be eliminated, standardized, or kept under control, and [ability] observed in the raw. (Shweder, 1990; pp. 7-8)

In contrast, Shweder (1990) emphasizes the intentionality—psychologically constituted affordances and constraints—of the test situation,

> The alternative interpretation—the view from cultural psychology—is that mind left to its own devices is mindless. … According to the principles of cultural psychology, the effects of stuff won't go away, even in the lab, for there is no context-free environment. We are intentional beings who live in an intentional world of constituted and represented particulars—domain-specific, concrete, subject-dependent, artefactual things. (p. 10)

Such "constituted … things" as the standardized test situation are not neutral; instead, processes of cultural selection have imbued them with a psychological charge that reflects and serves particular interests.

What interests does the construction of the test situation as neutral space serve? The phenomenon of stereotype lift suggests that the test situation arises and persists precisely because it does important societal work. In particular, standard constructions of the test situation launder inequality (Croizet & Millet, 2012). They reproduce the same differential outcomes as the raw exercise of power, but do so in a way that legitimizes the resulting inequality as the result of differences in intellectual merit (see Jackman, 1994). Indeed, the very notion of raw, internal ability—especially as an inherited entity that indicates merit—may itself produce racist inequality (see Croizet, 2011 on the "racism of intelligence"). When this notion is in play, it not only constitutes an unfair pressure that depresses performance of people with devalued identities, but also serves as a performance-enhancing ideology that unfairly inflates the performance of people with overvalued identities.

To help illustrate these ideas, consider discussions about performance-enhancing substances in competitions such as the Olympic Games. Implicit in these discussions is an understanding of performance as a combination of a performer's true ability plus the artificial or unnatural advantage that a person gains from using a performance-enhancing agent: whether substance, piece of equipment, or training technique. All performers rely on some technologies of performance enhancement; the question of the legitimacy of their performance rests on conventions about which agents are "natural" and permissible, and these conventions vary over time and across space. Two points follow. First, it is typically people in positions of power and influence who decide on permissibility of different technologies, and the resulting decisions tend to institutionalize their self-interested perceptions about which techniques are (un)natural. Second, when the performance-enhancing agent is conventionally legitimate, observers are likely to perceive the resulting performance as a function of the performer's ability; to forget the contribution of performance-enhancing agents to the production of the meritorious performance;

and to believe that any superior reward based on superior performance constitutes just desserts for superior merit.

We think it instructive to apply the same logic to the case of cultural privilege and notions of ability and merit. The superior performance of people from dominant or advantaged groups is not so clearly the result of superior natural ability or merit; instead, it reflects the imposition of technologies that have evolved via processes of cultural selection to disproportionately afford them the possibility of over-performance beyond their natural ability. A cultural psychology perspective calls into question the extent to which superior rewards based on such (over)performance constitute *just* desserts. Performance is not just (in the sense of *only*) a reflection of individual ability, but also reflects situations that have evolved to maximize the advantage of some individuals over others. Moreover, the processes of selection that drive this evolution are not just (in the sense of *fair*), but instead are biased in favor of the powerful. In summary then, one can speak of hegemonic constructions of the test situation as "intentional worlds" for domination: apparently "neutral" constructions of reality that (1) are infused with dominant group beliefs and desires (e.g., about merit as the source of test scores) and (2) systematically reproduce differential outcomes and racial advantage.

Collective Memory

As another example, consider work on representations of history and identity (Kurtiş et al., 2010; Salter & Adams, 2016). In one direction, corresponding to the sociocultural constitution of psychological experience, people build a sense of identity using collective constructions of the past that tend to glorify collective triumphs and deny or silence acts of collective wrongdoing (e.g., Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Loewen, 1995; Wertsch, 2002). For instance, official representations of history embedded in memorials, museums, and commemorative holidays (Carretero & Kriger, 2011; Kurtiş, Adams, & Yellowbird, 2010; Mukherjee, Saler, & Molina, 2015; Opotow, 2015) often highlight past glories and conceal injustices. In the other direction, corresponding to this section's focus on the psychological constitution of cultural reality, people do not recall the past in neutral or disinterested fashion; instead, they selectively re-member and re-produce constructions of the past in ways that address present identity concerns (Sahdra & Ross, 2007; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). For example, researchers in one study reported that the denial of collective guilt for colonial violence in the Congo was greater among Belgian participants from older than younger generations. Moreover, this denial of collective guilt was especially pronounced among older-generation participants who scored high in national identification (Licata & Klein, 2010).

To cite other examples from our own research, White American students prefer hegemonic commemorations of the American Thanksgiving holiday that glorify European colonization of the North American continent: that is, celebrating it as an opportunity to express gratitude for fulfillment of divinely ordained destiny while remaining silent about the violent destruction of indigenous societies as a result of European colonization (Kurtiş et al., 2010). Likewise, White American students prefer relatively hegemonic representations of Black History Month (BHM) that emphasize peaceful coexistence in ethnically diverse communities and individual achievements of African American heroes, but remain silent about the systems of racial domination that required heroic resistance (Salter & Adams, 2016). These preferences inform subsequent actions—failure to mention racial violence in one's own Thanksgiving celebrations or BHM assignment—that reconstitute the culturally inscribed silences that in turn promote national identification and identity-defensive activity (e.g., denial about racism in American society and opposition to antiracist policy; Kurtiş et al., 2010; Nelson, Adams, &

Salter, 2013; Salter & Adams, 2016). From this perspective, the proliferation of nation-glorifying, racism-denying representations in American society is not an accident or coincidence, but instead occurs instead through incremental acts of everyday reproduction by ordinary people acting on personal understandings and preferences.

This section's emphasis on the psychological constitution of cultural reality focuses on a question about which canonical approaches to cultural psychology remain relatively silent: How or why do prevailing constructions of reality arise and persist? The conception of cultural realities as intentional worlds proposes an answer to this question. Particular constructions of reality arise and persist because people selectively reproduce bits of everyday realities that resonate with their beliefs and desires. Because these beliefs and desires include a (barely conscious) sense of group position or collective interest (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999), the institutional structures that define social life are likely to resonate with the collective interest of the people with the most power to influence production of cultural reality.

Although domination sometimes occurs through deliberate acts of direct discrimination or conscious exercise of racial power, a cultural psychology analysis suggests that their more typical form may be preferential reproduction of apparently "neutral" cultural tools that nevertheless have "disparate impact" and reproduce dominant-group advantage. For example, relatively innocuous constructions of behavior as choice not only resonate with middle-class understandings of action and desires for perceived control, but also "just happen" to reproduce racial inequality when people withhold aid or justice from victims because they made bad "choices" (e.g., for "choosing" to live in ethnic enclaves or to stay in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina; see Stephens, Hamedani, Markus, Bergsieker, & Eloul, 2009). Similarly, models of ideal affect that emphasize high arousal positive states not only resonate with white American understandings and desires (Tsai, 2007), but also delegitimize the experience of dissatisfaction that often accompanies motivation for social change (Ahmed, 2008; Becker & Maracek, 2008). From this perspective, understandings of choice or ideal affect that prevail in North American settings (and hegemonic psychological science) are not essentially neutral constructions that have unfortunate side-effects; instead, they are dynamically reproduced cultural tools that may evolve and persist precisely because they serve interests of domination.

EXTENDING *SOCIAL* AND *PERSONAL* IN SOCIAL-PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY

A primary goal of this chapter has been to extend the *social* and *personal* of social-personality psychology in ways that challenge the prevailing individualism of hegemonic psychological science. In keeping with the reductionist roots and Euro-American colonial character of psychological science, social-personality psychologists have typically retreated to atomistic philosophical positions that portray social phenomena as the aggregate of separate individual experience. In contrast, a cultural psychology analysis illuminates a more *collective* understanding of mind, not in the sense of a collective entity with its own motivations or intentions (Allport, 1924); nor merely in the sense of individual motivations and intentions when collective identity is salient (as in self-categorization theory; Turner et al., 1987); but instead in the sense of intentional worlds: motivation and intention deposited as psychological traces into the structure of everyday cultural ecologies. The key to this extension is an emphasis on the history and materiality of persons and situations.

Regarding the former, a cultural psychology analysis emphasizes the extent to which species-general, community-specific, or individual patterns reflect the sociocultural constitution of personal experience: the inscription of context in person as one engages and acquires the

psychological charge of ecologically embedded, cultural tools. From this perspective, even the sense of abstracted independence that informs hegemonic psychological science is not "just natural," but instead is a social product that reflects the historical evolution of cultural technologies (i.e., independent selfways) that promote and maintain it. In particular, a cultural psychology perspective suggests that independent selfways have their foundation in the unprecedented affluence of North American settings associated with past and ongoing resource extraction and (neo)colonial appropriation. A cultural psychology perspective informed by perspectives of the Majority World reveals that the naturalization of "independent selfways" within hegemonic accounts of psychological science reflects and promotes the interests of a privileged minority of people in Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, Democratic (a.k.a. WEIRD; Henrich et al., 2010) settings at the expense of the marginalized majority of humanity.

Regarding the latter, a cultural psychology analysis emphasizes the extent to which situations and everyday ecologies reflect the psychological constitution of cultural realities: that is, the infusion of person in context as people imaginatively re-make material realities into which they invest their beliefs and desires. Humans do not exist in a natural environment, but instead inhabit cultural ecologies that bear the accumulated, material sediment from a social history of human activity. Besides avoiding pitfalls of an exclusive emphasis on environmental determinants of action (see Reicher & Haslam, 2006; Wrong, 1961), this emphasis on the psychological constitution of cultural realities extends the "personal" in social-personality psychology beyond the narrow concern with embodied dispositions to emphasize more enduring manifestations of personal agency embedded in everyday intentional worlds (Gjerde, 2004). From this perspective, one should locate the power of the person not only in proximal self-direction of momentary experience, but also (and more profoundly) in the imaginative capacity to construct intentional worlds (i.e., ecological manifestations of person in context) that provide distal or "culturally mediated" forms of self-regulation, even in the absence of proximal self-direction.

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[1] Indeed, in Shweder's (1990) defining statement of a cultural psychology analysis, he cites the work of Ross and Nisbett as one of the multidisciplinary sites where ideas compatible with a cultural psychology analysis flourish.
[2] Ross and Nisbett also noted a third principle of "tension systems" but, unlike the other two themes, did not devote a separate chapter to it. Although they undoubtedly meant it in more senses, this third principle is evident in the mutual constitution framework as a dynamic-tension relationship between the other two principles.
[3] By *hegemonic*, we refer to particular understandings and ways of being that originally derived from European (American) experience, but by projection of colonial power have become the default or natural standard for global humanity and mainstream academic work.
[4] For an extended discussion of this idea, see the original chapter (Adams, 2012) in the first edition of this handbook.