



The bridge to possible

# Quantum Ready Firewalls

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BRKSEC-1036

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
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# Why Be Quantum Ready?



	Existing Public Key Infrastructure	Quantum Safe	
		Hardware Based Solution	Software Based Solution
Is the communication safe today?	Yes		
Can it withstand today's SNDL attacks?	No	Yes (QKD)	Yes (RFC 8784)
Will it be safe after Q-Day?	No	Yes (QKD)	Yes (PQC Algorithms)

# Agenda

- How can Quantum Computers break Cryptography?
  - Principles of Quantum Computing
  - Impact of Quantum computing on cybersecurity
- Quantum Safe Cryptography
- Quantum Readiness of Cisco firewall VPNs

# Vetri !

- 18 years with Cisco
- CCIE – Wireless
- Married; One daughter.

## Loves

- Bike riding
- Travelling
- Adventure sports



# Anupama !




- 20 years of Industry Experience
- 3 years with Cisco

## Loves

- Classical Music and Dance
- Books
- Movies

# Principles of Quantum Computing

## Qubit




The Basic Unit of Information in Quantum Computing

A qubit represents 0, 1, or any quantum superposition of these classical states.


# Principles of Quantum Computing

## Superposition

Classical Computer



Quantum Computer




Linear combination of infinite number of states.

Possible states of  $N$  qubits are  $2^N$ .



# Principles of Quantum Computing

## Entanglement



Entangled qubits correlate with each other to form a single system.


Measuring the state of one of the qubits allows us to know the state of the other.

Quantum entanglement enables qubits to interact with each other instantaneously.

This is not affected by distance or limited to the speed of light.


# Principles of Quantum Computing

## De-coherence



# Principles of Quantum Computing

## No-cloning Theorem



It is impossible to create an independent and identical copy of an arbitrary unknown quantum state.


This property is vital in quantum cryptography.

It forbids eavesdroppers from creating copies of a transmitted quantum cryptographic key.


The No-Cloning Theorem

# Principles of Quantum Computing

## Quantum Parallelism



Classical Computer




Quantum Computer

A classical silicon-based computer can solve one problem at a time (or a few on multi-core computer).


With “n” bits, a classical computer chooses one of  $2^n$  values to do the computation.

With n-qubits, all the  $2^n$  values are used to computation at the same time in parallel.




Impact on cybersecurity




# Asymmetric Key Cryptography



# Diffie Hellman Key Exchange



# Shor's Algorithm



On a classical computer, convert the factoring problem to the problem of order-finding.




Using a quantum algorithm, solve the order-finding problem.

Source: [Shor's Algorithm](#)



# Impact on Symmetric Key Cryptography

## Grover's Algorithm



Solution for an unstructured search.


Proposed by Lov Grover.

Number of steps using classical computation  $\rightarrow O(N)$

Given  $y = f(x)$ , Find input value  $x$ , such that,

- $f(x) = 1$  for only one value of  $x$ ,
- $f(x) = 0$  for all other

Number of steps using quantum algorithm  $\rightarrow O(\sqrt{N})$ . Provides Quadratic Speedup.




# How Common Cryptographic Algorithms are impacted?

Cryptographic Algorithms	Type	Purpose	Impact from Large Scale Quantum Computer
RSA	Asymmetric	Signatures, Key establishment	No longer secure
DH / DSA	Asymmetric	Signatures, Key exchange	No longer secure
ECDH / ECDSA	Asymmetric	Signatures, Key exchange	No longer secure
AES	Symmetric	Encryption	Larger Key Size Needed
SHA-2, SHA 3	-----	Hash Functions	Larger Key Size Needed

Source: [NISTIR 8105 Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography](#)


# Quantum Urgency

Harvest Now, Decrypt Later!



Post Quantum Cryptography is needed **today!**

# Quantum Safe Cryptography



# Techniques for Quantum Safe Cryptography

## Hardware Techniques

Quantum Key Distribution

## Quantum Safe Symmetric Cryptography

Increasing Key Length for Symmetric Key Encryption (Eg: AES128 -> AES256)

## Quantum Safe Asymmetric Cryptography

Hash Based Cryptosystems

Code Based Cryptosystems

Multi Variate Based Cryptosystems

Lattice Based Cryptosystems

# Quantum Key Distribution

- A secure communication method
- Implements a cryptographic protocol.
- It involves components of quantum mechanics.
- Eg: Fibre Optics, Satellite Based

Communicating users can detect the presence of eaves droppers.

In accordance with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, a third-party observer will end up physically changing the values of some of the bits in the data stream in a detectable way.

As per the no-cloning theorem, it is physically impossible to make a perfect copy of an unknown quantum state.

Properties of quantum entanglement will cause de-coherence.

# Quantum Key Distribution

## Disadvantages

Expensive dedicated hardware.

Limited transmission distance.

Need to support QKD protocols.

Elegance of Public Key Cryptography is lost

P2Pconnection between sites -  $O(N^2)$  connections.

# Post Quantum Algorithms – NIST

Algorithm	Type	Class	Comments
CRYSTALS-Kyber	PKE/KEM	Lattice Based (M-LWE)	NIST Round 3 Winner
CRYSTALS-Dilithium	Signature	Lattice Based (M-LWE, M-SIS)	NIST Round 3 Winner
FALCON	Signature	Lattice Based (SIS)	NIST Round 3 Winner
SPHINCS+	Signature	Hash Based	NIST Round 3 Winner
BIKE		Code Based	Round 4
Classic-McEliece		Code Based	Round 4
HQC		Code Based	Round 4
SIKE		Super singular elliptic curve isogeny	Round 4 (Broken)


Source:

[NIST PQC Standardization selected-algorithms-2022](#)

[NIST PQC Standardization Round 4 Submissions](#)



# NIST Algorithms based on Lattice Based Cryptography




Algorithm	Underlying Hard Problem
CRYSTALS-Kyber	M-LWE Problem
FALCON	(SIS) over NTRU lattices
CRYSTALS-Dilithium	Module Lattices

1. The objective of Shortest Vector Problem (SVP), is to find the shortest non-zero vector within the lattice.
2. This problem is NP-hard.
3. No known quantum algorithm to solve SVP.

# Lattice Based Cryptography

## Lattices and Basis Vectors



Lattices are regular-spaced grid of a set of points that are infinite in number.


**Vector** is the name of a point, and the numbers on it are called coordinates.

A **lattice** is a collection of these vectors in an infinite series.

**Basis** is a collection of vectors used to present any point in the lattice grid that forms a lattice. Eg: Vector A = (1,0), Vector B = (0,1)

# Lattice Based Cryptography

## Custom Basis Vector



A lattice grid can be comprised of multiple sets of basis vectors. Eg: Vector A1=  $(4,1)$ , Vector B1=  $(1, 2)$


Basis vectors of a lattice is not unique.

A set of basis vectors almost orthogonal to each other can be defined as “good” basis vectors.

A set of basis vectors almost parallel to each other can be defined as “bad” basis vectors.

# Lattice Based Cryptography

## Shortest Vector Problem



Given the basis vectors, what integer linear combination of the vectors is closest to the origin.

Find the point closest to the origin.


Let Vector  $A_1 = (4, 1)$ , Vector  $B_1 = (1, 2)$

Point  $(7, 0) = 2A_1 - B_1 = \sqrt{49}$

Point  $(6, -2) = 2A_1 - 2B_1 = \sqrt{40}$

# Lattice Based Cryptography

## Closest Vector Problem



Given the basis vectors, what integer linear combination of the vectors is closest to the given point.


Find the lattice point closest to the given point.

Let Vector A1 = (4,1), Vector B1 = (1, 2)

CVP is the lattice point  $(2,4) = 1 \cdot A1 + 2 \cdot B1 - 1 \cdot A1$


# Lattice Based Key Exchange

Alice




Good Basis: Private Key

Bob




Bad Basis: Public Key

# Lattice Based Key Exchange



# Quantum Readiness of Cisco Firewall VPNs





# Software Based Approaches




PPK - Post Quantum pre-shared Key (RFC 8784)





Multiple Key Exchange (RFC 9242, RFC 9370)

# Post Quantum Pre-shared Key




# VPN IKEv2/IPSec

## PPK



# VPN IKEv2/IPSec

## PPK



- Post Quantum Preshared Key (PPK) is configured between the IKEv2 Initiator and Responder
- Configuration is part of IPsec tunnel-group.
- This value is mixed into the SKEYSEED derivation process.
- The subsequent key material can be now considered quantum secure.

# VPN IKEv2/IPSec

## PPK (RFC 8784) Configuration (ASA 9.18.1)

### CLI Configuration Snippet

```
tunnel-group peer-1 ipsec-attributes
    ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key *****
    ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key *****
    ikev2 remote-authentication post-quantum-key ***** identity test mandatory
no tunnel-group-map enable ike-id
```

### Debug Logs

debug crypto ikev2 protocol 255

```
IKEv2-PROTO-7: (52): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=B4FC811A5AA58718 R_SPI=0B5553D5FBB84AB3 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState:
I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_FOR_PPK
IKEv2-PROTO-7: (52): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=B4FC811A5AA58718 R_SPI=0B5553D5FBB84AB3 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState:
I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_CHK_PPK_MAND
IKEv2-PROTO-7: (52): SM Trace-> SA: I_SPI=B4FC811A5AA58718 R_SPI=0B5553D5FBB84AB3 (I) MsgID = 00000000 CurState:
I_BLD_AUTH Event: EV_MIX_PPK
```

# VPN IKEv2/IPSec


## Advantages

- Provide Quantum Resistant Cryptography “TODAY”.
- Ensures Backward Compatibility.

## Disadvantages

- Scalability challenges with Remote Access VPN users

# Multiple Key Exchange



# VPN IKEv2/IPSec



## Multiple Key Exchanges





# VPN IKEv2/IPSec

## Multiple Key Exchanges



# VPN IKEv2/IPSec

## Multiple Key Exchange

### Advantages

- Backward Compatibility.
- Provide Cryptographic Agility.
- Scalable
- Applicable to S2S and RA-VPN.

### Disadvantages

- Efficiency
- Performance


# Key Take Aways

Advancements in quantum computing makes Public Key Cryptography insecure.

Mitigation of the quantum computing threat is quantum safe cryptography.

Organizations should start planning the transition to post quantum cryptography

# Q & A



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[avetrive@cisco.com](mailto:avetrive@cisco.com)



The bridge to possible

# Thank you

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