



You make **possible**



Unprecedented Visibility and Forensics

Analyze system integrity and trustworthiness
of network devices

Deepak Bhargava, Product Manager
Dan Backman, Portfolio Architect

@deebhargava
@jonahsfo

BRKSPG-1415

CISCO *Live!*

Barcelona | January 27-31, 2020




Cisco Webex Teams

Questions?

Use Cisco Webex Teams to chat with the speaker after the session

How

- 1 Find this session in the Cisco Events Mobile App
- 2 Click “Join the Discussion”
- 3 Install Webex Teams or go directly to the team space
- 4 Enter messages/questions in the team space



“Network devices are ideal targets. Most or all organizational and customer traffic must traverse these critical devices.”

Source: US-CERT Alert (TA18-106A)

Original release date: April 16, 2018

“The Increasing Threat to Network Infrastructure Devices and Recommended Mitigations.”

Source: US-CERT Alert (TA16-250A)

Original release date: Sep 6, 2016




You need the ability to analyze the
Trustworthiness of your network devices

Agenda

- Risks to the Network Infrastructure
- What is Trust and Why does it matter?
- Measuring and Validating Trust in Cisco IOS-XR routers
- Trust Visualization and Attestation requires a Service
- Demonstration
- Implementing closed-loop automation
- Conclusion

Growing Concerns for Service Providers

Targeted attacks on **Critical Infrastructure**



Impact on Economy



Untrusted Locations



Complex to Manage

Service Provider Security Concerns



Denial of Service



MitM attacks



Cloud Security




IoT Security



Ransomware




Credential/Service
Theft



Third Party Security



Malware and Botnets



Known Vulnerabilities



Segmentation
Issues

Tough Questions for Critical Infrastructure

? If hardware or software running my critical systems was modified, how would I know?

? How would I prove where & when critical security updates are applied and are active?

? In an audit, how can I prove my systems are running compliant hardware and software?

? How can I track what hardware and software has changed?

? How do I know that the running software is built by Cisco?

? How do I prove what HW & SW was running in the past?


What is Trustworthy and Why Does It Matter?



To build a trustworthy platform

The network infrastructure must be constructed on a platform of trustworthy technologies to ensure devices operating are authentic and can create verifiable evidence that they have not been altered.

Trustworthy Platform: Mandatory for Operators



Would you trust a
device to tell you
that it's trusted?

Measuring and Validating Trust



Boot & Runtime Measurements

Known Good Values (KGV)



e5fa44f2b31c1fb553b46021e7360d07d5d91ff5e
7448d8798a4380162d4b56f9b452e2f6f9e24e7a
a3db5c13ff90a36963278c6a39e4ee3c22e2a436

e5fa44f2b31c1fb553b46021e7360d07d5d91ff5e
7448d8798a4380162d4b56f9b452e2f6f9e24e7a
a3db5c13ff90a36963278c6a39e4ee3c22e2a436



9c6b057a2b9d96a4067a749ee3b3b0158d390cf
1
5d9474c0309b7ca09a182d888f73b37a8fe1362c

9c6b057a2b9d96a4067a749ee3b3b0158d390cf
1
5d9474c0309b7ca09a182d888f73b37a8fe1362c



ccf271b7830882da1791852baeca1737fcbe4b90
d3964f9dad9f60363c81b688324d95b4ec7c8038

ccf271b7830882da1791852baeca1737fcbe4b90
d3964f9dad9f60363c81b688324d95b4ec7c8038



dd71038f3463f511ee7403dbcbc87195302d891c
4143d3a341877154d6e95211464e1df1015b74b
b6abd567fa79cbe0196d093a067271361dc6ca8b
136571b41aa14adc10c5f3c987d43c02c8f5d498

dd71038f3463f511ee7403dbcbc87195302d891c
4143d3a341877154d6e95211464e1df1015b74b
b6abd567fa79cbe0196d093a067271361dc6ca8b
136571b41aa14adc10c5f3c987d43c02c8f5d498



Cisco Trust Anchor Module (TAm)



Anti-Theft and Anti-Tamper Chip Design

Built-In Crypto Functions

Hardware Entropy

Secure Storage

- Hardware designed to provide both End-user and supply chain protections
 - End-user protections include highly secure storage of user credentials, passwords, settings.
 - Supply chain protections -- Cisco SUDI (secure unique device identifier) inserted during manufacturing
- Secured at Manufacturing. No user intervention required
- Ideal for embedded computing like routers and Wi-Fi access points

Unique hardware Identity (SUDI)

“How do I know this is really my router?”

- Unique cryptographic key embedded in hardware trust anchor module within every IOS XR Router
 - Secure Unique Device Identifier (SUDI)
 - Provides 802.1AR Secure Device Identity
 - Immutable key imbedded in Trust Anchor Module at time of manufacture
 - Signed by Cisco for proof of authenticity
 - Includes PID and Serial number of device
- Cryptographically strong identification of remote hardware
- Establishes unique, immutable hardware identity



Process Fingerprinting and Signatures (IMA)


Logging (Process Fingerprinting)



```
10 7103f91ed91be355abeef84853301e11dccd9e4a ima-sig  
sha256:0b46fb8e7635a02320aeced326128b0f146c369476dfe5fd704aceca4a135b88 /bin/sh
```

IMA Log: /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements

Appraisal (Signature Validation)



FAIL: Execution Blocked

Pass: Execution Allowed + Log w/ Signature

```
10 d27747646f317e3ca1205287d0615073fe676bc6 ima-sig sha1:08f8f20c14e89da468bb238  
d2012c9458ae67f6a /bin/sh 030202afab451100802b22e3ed9f6a70fb5babf030d1181  
8152b493bd6bfd916005fad7fcd7f88d43f6cfa6fd1ea3b75032dd702b661d4717729e4a3fa4  
ee95a47f239955491fc8064eca8cb96302d305d59750ae4ffde0a5f615f910475eee72ae0306e4ae  
0269d7d04af2a485898eec3286795d621e83b7dedc99f5019b7ee49b189f3ded0a2
```


Analyzing IMA

What can we do with this?
> Identify known-good signatures <

Read till seqno 38857

	Package	Knowns files	Found running	Missmatch
0	xrv9k-sysadmin-xrv9k-7.0.1.118I-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	160	64	0
1	xrv9k-bgp-2.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	171	105	0
2	xrv9k-sysadmin-mgbl-7.0.1.118I-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	161	100	0
3	xrv9k-sysadmin-hostos-7.0.1.118I-r701118I.admin.x86_64_signed.rpm	0	0	0
4	xrv9k-iosxr-os-5.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	994	573	0
5	xrv9k-iosxr-routing-4.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	244	112	0
6	xrv9k-base-2.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	172	114	2
7	xrv9k-spirit-boot-2.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	21	16	1
8	xrv9k-parser-2.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	61	32	0
9	xrv9k-gcp-fwding-4.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	200	94	0
10	xrv9k-common-pd-fib-2.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	34	29	0
11	xrv9k-sysadmin-hostos-7.0.1.118I-r701118I.host.x86_64_signed.rpm	234	97	0
12	xrv9k-iosxr-fwding-4.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	2858	1440	0
13	xrv9k-iosxr-infra-4.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	3408	1669	0
14	base	22557	760	10
15	xrv9k-sysadmin-shared-7.0.1.118I-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	647	231	1
16	xrv9k-os-support-3.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	79	53	0
17	xrv9k-sysadmin-system-7.0.1.118I-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	596	208	1
18	xrv9k-sysadmin-topo-7.0.1.118I-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	46	21	0
19	xrv9k-fwding-2.0.0.0-r701118I.x86_64_signed.rpm	297	214	0

What can we meaningfully learn from this?

- ... This is a very useful whitelisting engine for RUNTIME measurements
- ... know FOR SURE what has been running, match to known-good
- ... can also be used to track known 3rd party code
- ... can be used to track execution of code (hashes) with known vulnerabilities

What would you do with this?

Verifiable evidence is the
foundation for Trust
Attestation

Why Evidence matters?



- It's a cryptographically verifiable view into what was running in the past
 - You want this to troubleshoot things
 - You want this to know **WHAT CHANGED**
 - You want this to be a **SIGNED** and **SECURE** audit trail
 - You want to be able to report on this flexibly
 - You want a standard way to gather this type of data

What is Evidence?



- Basic Inventory Information
 - Hardware and Software Inventory
 - Running and/or Persistent Configuration
- Boot-Time Integrity Measurements
 - Hardware BIV attestation with PCRs (Boot Integrity)
 - Traditional TPM-style PCR values
 - New forms of hardware measurements
- Run-time Integrity Measurements
 - Kernel IMA Values
- Operational Reports
 - Any “show” command
 - Ex: Reboot history, etc

Operational Value of Trust Evidence




- Inventory:
 - Track hardware and software history and changes
 - Query hardware SUDI to validate PID / Serial number / Authenticity
- Reporting on runtime IMA measurements
 - Track running SW vs installed SW
 - Track 3rd party code
 - Track code with known vulnerabilities
 - Which version of a binary is running where
 - Software inventory based on observed running code
 - ... a totally new view into your systems and operations

What would you do with Trust Evidence?



- Secure quote process
 - A more complete data model to include more extensive evidence gathering
 - Support for complex systems (modular platforms with many running OS kernels)
- Signature
 - Considerations for signing keys and device enrollment?
 - What key do you use to sign the data?
 - Key usage in modular systems
- Reporting on evidence timeline
 - Build extensible reporting for useful operational values
 - Dashboard (What changed since yesterday)
 - Device lifecycle and history

Secure Quote Process



Known-Good-Values



Where can you get known-good values?

- Source: Cisco
 - Extract hashes from known-good images/ISO
 - Published KGV from Cisco (HW and SW)
- Source: 3rd Party or user-provided code
 - Extract hashes from known-good packages
 - Signed KGV output from developers
 - Track known software installed onto IOS XR systems

Trust Visualization and Attestation requires a Service

The product, features and releases described are currently unavailable, remain in varying stages of development, and will be offered on a when-and-if-available basis.

The information provided is for informational purposes only and is subject to change at the sole discretion of Cisco.

Cisco will have no liability for delay in the delivery, or failure to deliver, any of the products or features described.



You need the ability to analyze the
Trustworthiness of your network devices

Introducing Crosswork Trust Insights



- Visualize Trustworthiness



- Track & Verify Inventory




- Utilize Trusted Data for Automation




A Cloud-based SaaS offer that reports on the trustworthiness of network devices and provides forensics for assured inventory

Crosswork Trust Insights Components




- On-Premises Data Gateway collects signed trust dossier from IOS XR Routers
- Dossier is human-readable
- Utilizes up-to-date feed of Known-Good-Values (KGV) from IOS XR Build and Regression
- Constantly evolving analytics of hardware and software fingerprints in Cloud Service

Journey to Unprecedented Visibility & Forensics



Deploying Crosswork Data Gateway



- Deployed as Base VM
 - Configure network settings
 - On-Premise with access to [Crosswork.cisco.com](https://crosswork.cisco.com)
- Generates an Enrollment Package (JSON encoded) for registration, includes:
 - Name, Description
 - UUID
 - Certificate chain, etc.
- Export the enrollment package from CDG

Registering Crosswork Data Gateway

CrossworkCloud
Elizabeth Baker
Add, Test, Admin

Dashboard
Alarms
ASNs
Prefixes
Devices
Peers
Policies
Data Gateways

Add Device

gateway

1 Upload VM CDG Bundle
2 Device Information
3 Tags
4 Review Network Information
5 Accept Security Certificate

Device Name: SJC20_acme_02
Host Name: 123.34.97.123
Port: 22
Country: [Dropdown]
City: San Jose
Site: SJC20
Device Time Zone: Pacific UTC-8
Credential Group: admin_grp_03
Tags: 2
Tags provide means to group and identify Trust devices with similar traits.

Next

Upload the registration file with enrollment package

Verify the Data Gateway Information

Review the Network configuration


Review the Security Certificate and Accept the registration



Crosswork Trust Insights

cisco *Live!*

Enrolling the Network Devices



Routers

CISCO *Live!*

Create enrollment key with
certificate chain in the router


Provide device IP address,
hostname, login credentials,
certificate chain, tags and
other descriptors

Enroll

CISCO CrossworkCloud
Dashboard Alarms ASNs Prefixes **Devices** Peers Policies Data Gateways
Search Elizabeth Baker ABC Tech Admin EB
Add Device
Device Name SJC20_acme_02
Host Name 123.34.97.123
Port 22
Country
City San Jose
Site SJC20
Device Time Zone Pacific UTC-8
Credential Group admin_grp_03
Tags 2
Tags provide means to group and identify Trust devices with similar traits.
Submit Cancel


Crosswork Trust Insights


Collection of Signed Dossier



- 1 Cloud service assigns list of routers for collection to each Crosswork Data Gateway instance
- 2 Data Gateway logs into routers (SSH) and query Trust Dossier (CLI) per assigned schedule
- 3 Crosswork Data Gateway forwards Trust Dossier to cloud service for verification and analytics

Cisco IOS XR Trust Dossier


Based on YANG models



Content Type	Data Model
IOS XR Version + Platform Output	
Anti-Replay <i>Nonce</i>	Specified as CLI option
System Hardware inventory	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cisco-IOS-XR-invmgr-oper.yang• Cisco-IOS-XR-spi-invmgr-oper.yang
Hardware Attestation Data	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cisco-IOS-XR-remote-attestation-act.yang
SUDI (Hardware Identity) Certificate	Separate signature per FRU (includes nonce)
Software Package inventory	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cisco-IOS-XR-spirit-install-instmgr-oper.yang• Cisco-IOS-XR-install-oper.yang
Reboot History	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cisco-IOS-XR-linux-os-reboot-history-oper.yang
Rollback History	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Cisco-IOS-XR-config-cfgmgr-exec-oper.yang
Running Configuration (Optional)	<i>Crosswork Trust Insights does not gather config</i>

Cisco IOS XR Trust Dossier

Signed with Enrollment key (Not encrypted)




```
collection-end-time: 1562907541.896058
collection-start-time: 1562907518.52628
▶ license-udi: {...}
model-name: "http://cisco.com/ns/yang/Cisco-IOS-XR-ama"
model-revision: "2019-08-05"
▶ packages: {...}
▶ platform: {...}
▶ reboot-history: {...}
▶ rollback-history: {...}
▶ running-config: {...}
▼ system-integrity-snapshot:
  ▼ attestation-certificates:
    ▼ system-certificates:
      ▶ 0: {...}
    ▼ hardware-integrity:
      ▶ hardware-integrity-measurements: [...]
      ▶ identity-certificates: {...}
      model-name: "Cisco-IOS-XR-remote-attestation-act"
      model-revision: "2019-04-05"
      ▶ platform-config-registers: {...}
      result-code: "Success"
      ▶ system-boot-integrity: {...}
      ▼ system-ima:
        ▶ node-data: [...]
      ▶ system-inventory: {...}
      ▶ version: {...}
```

- Human-readable JSON encoding with signature envelope
- Supports nested signatures for hardware-signed values (ex: SUDI or BIV)


Secured Communication

Multiple Points of Security Control

IOS XR AAA Controls for Read-only login and CLI access



Visualization and Reporting



- Visualize trust and inventory data
- Analyze changes related to hardware and software integrity
- Maintain authoritative proof and evidence to support audits, compliance and forensic analysis
- Increased visibility illuminates security blind spots


Why Trust Attestation must be a Cloud Service?

- ✓ Always-On, Automated KGV Feeds, Up-to-Date Analytics
- ✓ Vaulted Immutable Storage of Evidence
- ✓ Ease of Operational Integration
- ✓ Reduced Operational Cost and Seamless Scalability




Synopsis: How Trust Insights Works

1



Trust Insights securely requests and collects signed evidence dossier from IOS XR devices

2



Dossier evidence verified and added to timeline of running hardware and software

3




Trust data verified against Known-Good-Values (KGV) for hardware and software from Cisco

4



Trust Insights delivers assured inventory reporting with history, and trust visibility for IOS XR systems

5



Trust and Assured Inventory data accessible via API to enable Closed-Loop Automation



Demo-1: Trustworthiness Reporting

Use-case: Trustworthiness Reporting & Audit




Goal: Visualize and report on the trustworthiness of network infrastructure

Challenges:

1. How do I examine the trust posture of IOS XR devices?
2. How do I prove system integrity through examining trust evidence in IOS XR devices?
3. How do I prove authenticity and integrity of hardware* on production IOS XR devices?

Outcome:

Stay ahead of the curve by monitoring integrity of your network devices and maintaining trustworthy infrastructure



* Based on available device capabilities



Demo-2: Run-time Integrity Analysis

Use-case: Software Update & Compliance




Goal: Apply critical patches to infrastructure and maintain compliance policy

Challenges:

1. How do I know what devices are running the affected software?
2. How do I identify whether patches are already applied?
3. How do I prove that patches are not only applied but are actually running, e.g. installed SMU but not active
4. How do you prove compliance to auditors that patches were applied at a specific time?

Outcome:

Reduce the effort and time to identify where critical software updates are needed and maintain authoritative proof of compliance





Demo-3: Tracking Inventory Changes

Use-case: Forensics Analysis




Goal: Track changes in infrastructure over time. Prove historical status and inventory of systems

Challenges:

1. How do I know what hardware and software changes have occurred in production devices?
2. How do I prove what hardware and software inventory was present during past operational events?
3. How do I prove that current and previous inventory measurements are accurate?


Outcome:

- Expedite investigation into operational events with reliable visibility into current and historical systems inventory
- Ensure readiness for regulatory audits with authoritative proof of hardware and software integrity



Implementing closed-loop automation with Cisco Crosswork


Applying Automation to Network Operations Lifecycle




Full Portfolio @ cisco.com/go/crosswork

Crosswork Network Automation

Mass Awareness, Augmented Intelligence, Proactive Control



Expedite Consistency and Compliance



Conclusion

Cisco's Multi-faceted Approach to Security

Trust & Pervasive Security



Key Takeaways on Trust

- ✓ Trusted Platforms requires a hardware root-of-trust
- ✓ Evidence must be collected in verifiable manner
- ✓ Visibility and Reporting is critical to attest for the integrity of your Trusted infrastructure

Summary



Service Provider Networks are increasingly being recognized as Critical Infrastructure

Cisco is committed to continually enhancing the security and resilience of our networking solutions

Cisco Crosswork Cloud Trust Insights empowers you with visibility to analyze Trust in your Network Infrastructure



You need the ability to analyze the
Trustworthiness of your network devices

Complete your online session survey



- Please complete your session survey after each session. Your feedback is very important.
- Complete a minimum of 4 session surveys and the Overall Conference survey (starting on Thursday) to receive your Cisco Live t-shirt.
- All surveys can be taken in the Cisco Events Mobile App or by logging in to the Content Catalog on ciscolive.com/emea.

Cisco Live sessions will be available for viewing on demand after the event at ciscolive.com.

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