





Advanced WSA Deployment and Troubleshooting

with a side of Advanced Threat Technologies

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BRKSEC-3771



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Cisco Webex Teams

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- 1 Find this session in the Cisco Events Mobile App
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- 4 Enter messages/questions in the team space



This session is about Advanced Deployment & Configuration of the Web Security Appliance (WSA). Topics include web deployment topologies and best practices.

We will dive deep in performance troubleshooting and configurations around some of the WSA's leading Advanced Threat integrations. Advanced Malware Protection (AMP), Cognitive Threat Analytics and Threat Grid.

This Session is targeted at Security & Network Administrators that are deploying the WSA and are familiar with the basic installation of the WSA.

Abstract



About me Literally who?

Professional

- Content Security TME
- Previously...
 - MSP Technical Lead
 - TAC engineer
 - · Sysadmin / NetAdmin
- CCIE Security



Personal

- Father of three, husband of one
- Musician, fisherman, beer drinker
- · Raleigh, NC USA


Agenda

- Introduction
- Network Topology and Configuration
- Services Configuration
- Policy Configuration
- Monitoring and Troubleshooting
- Q&A



Disclaimer

Best Practices are Guidelines
Not Laws



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Network Design and Configuration



Network environment and topology



- WSA uses Path MTU Discovery
- Set MTU manually if needed with etherconfig

Firewall



- Prevent NAT pool exhaustion
- Exempt from outbound DoS protections

Anti-Spoofing





Per Beware of unicast reverse path forwarding and similar protections



WCCP with IP spoofing

- Know your routing!
- Requires a second service ID for response packets








Internet

WCCP with IP spoofing

- Know your routing!
- Requires a second service ID for response packets




192.168.1.1



Internet

Management network

- M1 should be connected to a dedicated management network
 - Good network security hygiene
 - Reduces attack surface
 - Protects management availability
- Enable split-routing
 - Restricts management services to M1
 - Creates two routing tables





Routing by service

Specify the routing table to use for the following services

Routes

- External URL feeds
- AMP services
- Updates and upgrades
- Authentication services
- DNS







Whitelisting outbound services



cloud-sa.amp.cisco.com (N America)
cloud-sa.eu.amp.cisco.com (Europe)
cloud-sa.apjc.amp.cisco.com (Asia Pac)
panacea.threatgrid.com (N America)
panacea.threatgrid.eu (Europe)



downloads-static.ironport.com updates-static.ironport.com 208.90.58.105 (port 80) 208.90.58.25 (port 80) 184.94.240.106 (port 80)




Transparent load balancing

- WCCP is the best method
 - Flexible bypass methods
 - Provides weighted load balancing
- Catalyst switches
 - Use ingress redirection
 - Use mask-based assignment
- ASA firewall
 - No IP spoofing
 - Client and WSA must be in the same zone




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Transparent load balancing

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Explicit load balancing



- Most flexible method
- Can also work well in transparent deployments




- Use GPO, not WPAD
- Host the file on a web server or the WSA

PAC file hosting




















Services Configuration



Authoritative vs. Recursive



- Separate resolvers is recommended
- If only one, consider the query load
- WSA can use internet root servers for external domains only
- Individual domains can be assigned to different servers

Minimum TTI



- Default minimum TTL is 1800 seconds
- Suggested minimum is 300 seconds
- Reduces conflicts with client resolution for CDN records



```
Select one of the following options:
```

- 0 = Always use DNS answers in order <- Default
- 1 = Use client-supplied address then DNS
- 2 = Limited DNS usage
- 3 = Very limited DNS usage



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How much do you trust your client?

cisco Live!


Client supplied

```
Select one of the following options:
0 = Always use DNS answers in order ← Default
 TCP connection ◀
 Security policy -
              Dest: 30.1.1.1
                                     cisco.com. 1800 IN A 40.1.1.1
              Host: cisco.com
```

DNS resolved

```
Select one of the following options:
```


1 = Use client-supplied address then DNS





Select one of the following options:


2 = Limited DNS usage





Select one of the following options:


3 = Very limited DNS usage





Select one of the following options:

3 = Very limited DNS usage



- Trusted downstream proxy
- SSL Offload device
- Load balancer



cisco.com. 1800 IN A 40.1.1.1

DNS resolved

Authentication



- WSA supports Kerberos, NTLM, Basic, SSO TUI
- Always use a surrogate (IP address if possible)
- Surrogate timeout should be no lower than 15 minutes




 Add custom accesslog fields to track auth mechanism and group membership

%m - Auth mechanism (BASIC, NTLMSSP, NEGOTIATE, etc.)


% - Group information ("DOMAIN\contractors")



Authentication



- Order doesn't matter with multiple DCs
- SYN is sent to all DCs at once
- First to respond is used, others are RST



- Kerberos is the most secure and is supported by OSX
- Do not use basic unless you have to and enable credential encryption

Kerberos integrated authentication (SSO)






- NTLMv1/2: Hashes can be cracked offline or relayed
- Kerberos performs better
- Kerberos is supported by OSX/iOS
- Kerberos offers simpler trust management between domains

- Resources must use FQDNs (no shortnames)
- Browsers must be configured to trust the devices
- Resources must be domain-joined

https://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/msoffice/forum/all/ntlm-vskerberos/d8b139bf-6b5a-4a53-9a00-bb75d4e219eb




Chrome / IE / Edge SSO on Windows




Chrome / IE / Edge SSO in GPO

{Computer|User} Configuration\Policies\Administrative Templates\Windows Components\Internet Explorer\Internet Control Panel\Security Page\



Trusted Sites Zone\Logon options



Firefox SSO




about:config requires the redirect hostname:

- Kerberos:
 - network.negotiate-auth.trusted-uris
- NTI M:
 - network.automatic-ntlm-auth.trusted-uris



Firefox SSO with GPO

https://github.com/mozilla/policy-templates






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Firefox SSO with GPO


https://github.com/mozilla/policy-templates





Firefox SSO with GPO

https://github.com/mozilla/policy-templates





Chrome on Mac OSX

https://www.chromium.org/administrators/policy-list-3#AuthServerWhitelist

Terminal command:

defaults write com.google.Chrome AuthServerWhitelist "wsal-pl.chclasen.lab"

Chrome flag:

--args --auth-server-whitelist="wsa1-p1.chclasen.lab"





Integrated authentication (SSO)

- Confirm that the SPN is set for the redirect hostname
- Manually delete old SPNs and re-join the domain if necessary
 - Use the setspn Windows utility

```
PS C:\WINDOWS\system32> setspn -L wsa6 | Select-String HTTP

HTTP/WSA6-P1.CHCLASEN.LAB.CHCLASEN.LAB

HTTP/WSA6.CHCLASEN.LAB.CHCLASEN.LAB

HTTP/wsa6.chclasen.lab

HTTP/WSA6
```









Src: 192.168.1.1

Dst: 30.1.1.1

TCP 80







TCP 80



GET / HTTP/1.1

Host: cisco.com



TCP 80



HTTP GET

307 Proxy Redirect HTTP/1.1

Location: http://redirect.wsa.lab/B0001D{...}/192.168.1.1/http://cisco.com



TCP 80





GET /B0001D{...}/192.168.1.1/http://cisco.com HTTP/1.1

Host: redirect.wsa.lab





TCP 80



HTTP GET

HTTP 307


HTTP GET

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized


WWW-Authenticate: Negotiate

WWW-Authenticate: NTLM


WWW-Authenticate: Basic















TCP 80




HTTP GET

307 Proxy Redirect HTTP/1.1


Location: https://redirect.wsa.lab/B0001{...}/192.168.1.1/http://cisco.com


















Identity Services Engine

















Identity Services Engine **RADIUS Guest Users** 802.1x authentication IIIII Domain Users **Active Directory**

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Passive Identity Connector

















Active Directory














Web proxy

- Specify forward mode if no transparent traffic
- Enable range request header forwarding
 - Global setting makes no changes
 - Allows for use in access policies

Range Request Forwarding:	☑ Enable Range Request Forwarding
	When enabled, range requests will be forwarded to the destination server. This can save bandwidth, but may result in reduced efficacy for Application Visibility and Control.
	When range request forwarding is enabled and the Application Visibility and Control service is in use, additional settings related to range request handling for AVC are available in Access Policies (see Web Security Manager > Access Policies > Applications).



HTTPS Proxy

Invalid Certificates / OCSP



- These settings should be set to at least decrypt and never monitor
- WSA will use AIA chasing by default

Decrypt for EUN / Auth



- Enable these in order to serve an HTML block page even when set to drop
- Reduces helpdesk tickets
- DECRYPT_ADMIN_2 decision tag




AMP dashboard integration

- Additional steps are required to add the WSA to AMP Unity
- Make sure the correct region is selected
- Allows for custom whitelists/blacklists and file trajectory info

Routing Table:	Data
▼ Advanced Settings for File Reputation	
File Reputation Server:	EUROPE (cloud-sa.eu.amp.cisco.com) Cloud Domain: cloud-sa.eu.amp.cisco.com
AMP for Endpoints Console Integration ?	Register Appliance with AMP for Endpoints
SSL Communication for File Reputation:	☑ Use SSL (Port 443)



AMP client processes



AMP client

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AMP cache hit






amp_log:

Info: (instance=0) Binary scan: filename[totes_legit.exe]
filemime[application/x-dosexec] file_extension[exe] len[73802b]
ampverdict[(2, 3, 'amp', 'W32.9238BD1D43-95.SBX.TG', 0, 95, False)]
scanverdict[0] malwareverdict[37] spyname[W32.9238BD1D43-95.SBX.TG]
SHA256[9238bd1d43c9d83bdaab411ad70c8bf49d8e41a6ddd1361e530dfaaa21354e4
6] From[Cache] uploadreason[File reputation upload action is dont
send] verdict_str[MALICIOUS]









AMP file reputation hit prox Cache File reputation connector

Malicious!

SHA upload

amp_log:

sandboxing] verdict str[MALICIOUS]

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Reputation



AMP client

AMP unknown / unseen

Cache
File reputation

connector

SHA upload





amp_log:


Info: (instance=0) Binary scan: filename[totes_legit.exe]
filemime[application/x-dosexec] file_extension[exe] len[73802b]
ampverdict[(1, 1, 'amp', '', 0, 0, True)] scanverdict[0]
malwareverdict[0] spyname[]
SHA256[eaf39315d3d573d579304dd6ddd5e7356e20d53db9cf5c7cd5cbc367e965da0
0] From[Cloud] uploadreason[Enqueued in the local queue for submission to upload] verdict str[FILE UNKNOWN]








AMP client


cisco Live!











AMP cache hit

prox Cache File reputation connector Local pre-class engine TG class connector TG file analysis connector AMP client

amp_log:

```
Info: (instance=0) Binary scan: filename[totes_legit.exe]
filemime[application/x-dosexec] file_extension[exe] len[73802b]
ampverdict[(2, 3, 'amp', 'W32.9238BD1D43-95.SBX.TG', 0, 95, False)]
scanverdict[0] malwareverdict[37] spyname[W32.9238BD1D43-95.SBX.TG]
SHA256[9238bd1d43c9d83bdaab411ad70c8bf49d8e41a6ddd1361e530dfaaa21354e4
6] From[Cache] uploadreason[File reputation upload action is dont
send] verdict_str[MALICIOUS]
```









- Submission is free with an AMP license (limited to 200 per day)
- Premium license is required for cloud portal access
- Add your WSA File Analysis ID to see sandbox information
 - Requires a TAC case

▼ Advanced Settings for File Analysis	
File Analysis Server:	EUROPE (https://panacea.threatgrid.eu) ~
Proxy Settings:	☐ Use File Reputation Proxy
	Server: Port: 80
	Username:
	Passphrase:
	Retype Passphrase:
File Analysis Client ID:	02_VLNWSA82930172_4227E23960263E3147B0-83F0FE0DC20C_S100V_000000

What do I get without TG cloud access?

- General information
- Basic behavioral indicators
- Static file info (hashes)
- Link to TG information

Analysis Report

ID 77a1d0fde9be7e2b3e611b69233df043 OS 7601.18798.amd64fre.win7sp1_gdr.150316-1654

Started 4/17/19 18:11:38 Ended 4/17/19 18:17:53 Duration 0:06:15

Sandbox fra-work-037 (pilot-d)

 Magic Type
 PE32 exe

 Analyzed As
 exe

 SHA256
 9238bd1c

 SHA1
 06033a2f

MD5 28199bc/ Score: 95

Behavioral Indicators

- Metasploit Payload Detected
- O Artifact Flagged as Known Trojan by Antivirus
- Artifact Flagged by Antivirus and Machine Learning Model
- Machine Learning Model Identified Executable Artifact as Likely Malicious
- Artifact Flagged by Antivirus
- O Potential Code Injection Detected
- Executable with Encrypted Sections



What do I get with TG cloud access?

File metadata

Sample ID	87b16d181b1f3bdf4715333e883e7196 🚉	Filename	totes_legit.exe €
Submitted By	d902142f-b6aa-43cd-a064-5ebc08f19002	Magic Type	PE32 executable (GUI) Intel 80386, for MS Windows
os	Windows 7 64-bit	File Type	exe
Started	4/17/19 1:04:31 pm	First Seen	4/17/19 1:04:30 pm
Ended	4/17/19 1:10:42 pm	Last Seen	4/17/19 1:04:30 pm
Duration	0:06:11	SHA-256	Q eaf39315d3d573d579304dd6ddd
Sandbox	fra-work-042	SHA-1	b5e2b80a618c542baaec8ffa8a133f79b93330e8 🚉
Playbook	Random Cursor Movement with Image Recognition	MD5	ca52ab1efcef4345762dce7c3b78c1e5 📴
Network Exit	EU - Germany - Frankfurt	Tags	•
Localization		FP/FN	O False Positive / 0 False Negative



What do I get with TG cloud access?

Detailed behavioral indicators

		Se	earch	2
+	Title ¬¬	Categories	ATT&CK ⊕	Tags
>	Metasploit Payload Detected	toolkit		malware, tools
>	Artifact Flagged as Known Trojan by Antivirus	antivirus		RAT, trojan
>	Artifact Flagged by Antivirus and Machine Learning Model	antivirus		antivirus, cognitive, machine le
>	Machine Learning Model Identified Executable Artifact as Lik ely Malicious	antivirus		antivirus, cognitive, machine le
>	Artifact Flagged by Antivirus	antivirus		file
>	Possible Backdoor Behavior Detected	network-anomaly	command and control	backdoor, malware, tools
>	Potential Code Injection Detected	code-injection	defense evasion	memory
>	Executable with Encrypted Sections	attribute	defense evasion	crypter, encoding, packer, PE



What do I get with TG cloud access?

TCP/IP stream information

					Search			⊴
_	Stream -	Process	Src. IP	Src. Port	Dest. IP va	Dest. Port	Snort Hits	Tran
>	0		0.0.0.0	68	255.255.255.255	67	0	UDF
>	1 (DHCP)		192.168.1.236	68	192.168.1.1	67	0	UDF
>	2		192.168.1.236	137	192.168.1.255	137	0	UDF
>	3		192.168.1.236	68	255.255.255.255	67	0	UDF
>	4 (DHCP)		255.255.255.255	68	192.168.1.1	67	0	UDF
>	5		192.168.1.236	138	192.168.1.255	138	0	UDF
~	6	2 (totes_legit.exe)	192.168.1.236	49157	30.1.1.1	4444	0	TCP



What do I get with TG cloud access?

Process information

					Se	arch		4
+	Process -	Name -	Parent	Children	₹ ▲	File Actions	Registry Actions	Analysis Reason
>	2	totes_legit.exe			0	0	0	Is target sample.
>	3	csrss.exe			0	0	0	Process activity aft
>	4	svchost.exe	17 (services.exe)		0	1	0	Process activity aft
>	6	svchost.exe	17 (services.exe)		0	0	0	Process activity aft
>	7	svchost.exe	17 (services.exe)		0	8	0	Process activity aft
>	8	taskhost.exe	17 (services.exe)		0	0	0	Process activity aft
>	9	svchost.exe	17 (services.exe)		0	0	0	Process activity aft
>	10	wmiprvse.exe	13 (svchost.exe)		0	0	0	Process activity aft



What do I get with TG cloud access?

Artifact information

				Search			3
+	Artifact -	Path 🕶	Source	Size VA	Imports	Exports -	AV Sigs 🛂
>	1	♠ totes_legit.exe	submitted	73802	115	0	3
>	2	☐ \TEMP\totes_legit.exe	disk	73802	115	0	3
>	3	□ \Windows\rescache\rc0008\ResCache.hit	disk	4176	0	0	0
>	4	□ \Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell%4Operational.evtx	disk	69632	0	0	0
>	5	□ \Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-W MI-Activity%4Operational.evtx	disk	69632	0	0	0



What do I get with TG cloud access?

File system information

Search		
0.000.01		

Process - A	Action	Path TA
3 (csrss.exe)	Read	
4 (svchost.exe)	Modified	\srvsvc
4 (svchost.exe)	Read	\srvsvc
16 (Explorer.EXE)	Read	\Users\Administrator\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Themes\slideshow.ini
7 (svchost.exe)	Modified	\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Local\lastalive0.dat
7 (svchost.exe)	Modified	\Windows\ServiceProfiles\LocalService\AppData\Local\lastalive1.dat
7 (svchost.exe)	Modified	\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-BranchCacheSMB%4Operational.evtx
7 (svchost.exe)	Modified	\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Diagnosis-DPS%4Operational.evtx



Cognitive Threat Analytics



- Uses the WSA as a sensor
- Establishes a baseline of traffic behavior
- Especially good at finding C&C and TOR relay traffic
- Continuously updated



- Can be connected to your AMP dashboard
- Suspicious activity is pushed from CTA to the AMP dashboard for investigation

MALWARE
95% confidence

★ NEW / TRIAGE ...

▲ AFFECTING

dzIBDtr1ce281bKCBeL/QPIOc91vjrDv1+/U/UXpY5g=

192.168.178.21


→

OCCURRENCE

23 days


May 2 - May 25

Add notes...



Cognitive Threat Analytics

- Added as a W3C log subscription
- All appropriate fields are pre-filled






Cognitive Threat Analytics


ADD DEVICE ACCOUNT

Success! Account created for this device. Use the following information to set up log subscription on WSA5





Policy Configuration



Policy configuration

- Configured in Web Security Manager
- · We will focus on
 - Identification profiles
 - Decryption policies
 - Access policies
 - Custom and external categories

How you configure these policies has an effect on performance and stability!

- Slow GUI and CLI at best
- Slow request processing at worst



Identification Profiles

- Groups users together by:
 - IP/subnet
 - User-agent
 - Protocol
 - Destination URI
- All criteria must match
- Enforce authentication (or not) against those groups
- Top-down, stops at the first match (ACL logic)





Authentication exceptions



Updater agents



AV agents



Servers



System daemons

Identification Profiles

Success - Your changes have been committed.


Client / User Identification Profiles						
Add Identification Profile						
Order	Transaction Criteria	Authentication / Identification Decision	End-User Acknowledgement	Delete		
1	Auth Exempt URL Protocols: HTTP/HTTPS URL Categories: AV Update Server	Exempt from Authentication / User Identification	(global profile)	<u> </u>		
2	Auth Exempt User Agent Protocols: HTTP/HTTPS User Agent: Firefox: Firefox Any Versions	Exempt from Authentication / User Identification	(global profile)	Û		
3	Auth Exempt Subnet Subnets: 10.0.1.0/24 Protocols: HTTP/HTTPS	Exempt from Authentication / User Identification	(global profile)	Û		
	Global Identification Profile	Authenticate: Realm: ActiveDirectory (Scheme: NTLMSSP, Kerberos)	Not Available			
Edit Order						

User Identification Method: Authentication Transparent Identification



What is complex?

- Low complexity
 - 10 ID profiles
 - 10 Decryption policies
 - 10 Access policies
 - · 10 Custom categories
 - 10 regex entries
 - 50 server IP addresses
 - 420 server names




Low Complexity Definition			
10 Access Policie	es		
10 Identities			
10 Custom	10 Regex		
Categories	50 Server IP's		
	420 Server		
	Names		

Medium Complexity = 2 x Low Complexity

High Complexity = 3 x Low Complexity







HTTPS policy operations

- Drop
 - Connection is closed
- Decrypt
 - Traffic is decrypted and evaluated by access policies
- Passthrough
 - Transaction is not decrypted
 - · Client negotiates directly with server
- Monitor
 - No action is taken; move to the next column



HTTPS traffic is special

- Explicit mode
 - The client asks for a tunnel using the CONNECT HTTP method
 - Host and User-agent headers are visible
- Transparent mode
 - Client expects a TLS negotiation before speaking HTTP
 - No headers are visible
 - We must decide to decrypt before decrypting (duh..)

How do we make policy decisions?



Explicit HTTPS - What do we know?









Explicit HTTPS - What do we know?



TCP 80





CONNECT cisco.com:443 HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0

Host: cisco.com





TCP 80





CONNECT cisco.com:443 HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0

Host cisco.com

We know...

Host header





TCP 80



CONNECT cisco.com:443 HTTP/1.1

User-Agent Mozilla/4.0

Host: cisco.com



- Host header
- 2. User-agent







TCP 80

CONNECT cisco.com:443 HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0

Host: cisco.com



TCP 443

TLS Client Hello

TLS Server Hello

We know...

- 1. Host header
- 2. User-agent





TCP 80

CONNECT cisco.com:443 HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0

Host: cisco.com



- 1. Host header
- 2. User-agent



TCP 443

TLS Client Hello

TLS Server Hello







TCP 80

CONNECT cisco.com:443 HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0

Host: cisco.com



TCP 443

TLS Client Hello

TLS Server Hello



We know...

- 1. Host header
- 2. User-agent
- 3. Certificate Issuer

Issuer: C=US, O=Ye Olde CA, CN=YOCA

Validity

Not Before: Dec 19 13:45:14 2018 GMT

Not After: Dec 19 13:45:14 2019 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=San Jose, O=Cisco Systems,

CN=cisco.com

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name





TCP 80

CONNECT cisco.com:443 HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0

Host: cisco.com



TCP 443

TLS Client Hello

TLS Server Hello



We know...

- 1. Host header
- 2. User-agent
- 3. Certificate issuer
- 4. Certificate validity

Issuer: C=US, O=Ye Olde CA, CN=YOCA

Validity

Not Before: Dec 19 13:45:14 2018 GMT

Not After: Dec 19 13:45:14 2019 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=San Jose, O=Cisco Systems,

CN=cisco.com

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name





TCP 80

CONNECT cisco.com:443 HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0

Host: cisco.com



TCP 443

TLS Client Hello

TLS Server Hello



We know...

- 1. Host header
- 2. User-agent
- 3. Certificate issuer
- 4. Certificate validity
- 5. SAN field

Issuer: C=US, O=Ye Olde CA, CN=YOCA Validity

Not Before: Dec 19 13:45:14 2018 GMT

Not After: Dec 19 13:45:14 2019 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=San Jose, O=Cisco Systems,

CN=cisco.com

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name





TCP 80

CONNECT cisco.com:443 HTTP/1.1

User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0

Host: cisco.com



TCP 443

TLS Client Hello

TLS Server Hello



We know...

- 1. Host header
- 2. User-agent
- 3. Certificate issuer
- 4. Certificate validity
- 5. SAN field
- 6. CN field

Issuer: C=US, O=Ye Olde CA, CN=YOCA Validity

Not Before: Dec 19 13:45:14 2018 GMT Not After: Dec 19 13:45:14 2019 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=San Jose, O=Cisco Systems,

CN=cisco.com

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name























We know...

1. SNI





TCP 443

TLS Client Hello SNI: cisco.com



TCP 443

TLS Client Hello

TLS Server Hello



We know...

- 1. SNI
- 2. Certificate issuer

Issuer: C=US, O=Ye Olde CA, CN=YOCA

Validity

Not Before: Dec 19 13:45:14 2018 GMT

Not After: Dec 19 13:45:14 2019 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=San Jose, O=Cisco Systems,

CN=cisco.com

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name





TCP 443

TLS Client Hello SNI: cisco.com



TCP 443

TLS Client Hello

TLS Server Hello



We know...

- 1. SNI
- 2. Certificate issuer
- 3. Certificate validity

Issuer: C=US, O=Ye Olde CA, CN=YOCA

Validity

Not Before: Dec 19 13:45:14 2018 GMT

Not After: Dec 19 13:45:14 2019 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=San Jose, O=Cisco Systems,

CN=cisco.com

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name





TCP 443

TLS Client Hello SNI: cisco.com



TCP 443

TLS Client Hello

TLS Server Hello



We know...

- 1. SNI
- 2. Certificate issuer
- 3. Certificate validity
- 4. SAN field

Issuer: C=US, O=Ye Olde CA, CN=YOCA Validity

Not Before: Dec 19 13:45:14 2018 GMT Not After: Dec 19 13:45:14 2019 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=San Jose, O=Cisco Systems,

CN=cisco.com

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name





TCP 443

TLS Client Hello SNI: cisco.com



TCP 443

TLS Client Hello

TLS Server Hello



We know...

- 1. SNI
- 2. Certificate issuer
- 3. Certificate validity
- 4. SAN field
- 5. CN field

Issuer: C=US, O=Ye Olde CA, CN=YOCA

Validity

Not Before: Dec 19 13:45:14 2018 GMT

Not After: Dec 19 13:45:14 2019 GMT

Subject: C=US, ST=CA, L=San Jose, O=Cisco Systems,

CN=cisco.com

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name



Decryption policy baselines

- Decrypt categories that require HTTP controls
- Decrypt traffic that must be scanned for malware
- Passthrough user sensitive traffic (finance, health)
- Drop traffic that will end up being blocked by access policies
- Drop traffic that can be identified by category only

Access policies

- Decrypted connections are evaluated here
- HTTP request are evaluated immediately after ID profile match
- Two access_log entries for each decrypted connection
 - tunnel:// or tcp_connect
 - HTTP method (GET, POST, etc.)
- Do not block uncategorized requests
 - Still scanned by AV and AMP
 - Enable DCA to reduce the number of uncategorized sites



Access policies

- Enable range request headers for update services
 - If you cannot bypass OS or application updates
 - Use well-known user-agent strings to identify the traffic
- Object scanning / blocking / AV
 - Be careful inspecting all archives
 - Do not block unscannable




Custom URL categories

- Use regex sparingly
- Keep the total number of custom categories to less than 20
 - · A larger number of category lists is more impactful on performance than a small number with many entries
- Use external custom categories for dynamic lists
 - Can be used with internal servers
 - · Office365 API is available



Monitoring and Troubleshooting



The Internet is slow...must be the WSA!

- Enhance your MTTI
 - Mean time to innocence
- Things to check
 - · Hardware (RAID, interfaces, etc.)
 - · Sizing; are we overloaded?
 - Configuration complexity
 - DNS (The Sysadmin's Haiku)
 - Authentication
 - Disk latency





Overloaded?

status detail CLI command

Status as of:	Thu Mar 21 15:38:34
2019 GMT	
Up since:	Mon Mar 11 13:27:00
2019 GMT (10d 2h 11m 34s)	
System Resource Utilization:	
RAM	59.8%
Transactions per Second:	
Average in last minute	
Maximum in last hour	
	16
Maximum since proxy restart	10
Average since proxy restart	
Bandwidth (Mbps):	
Maximum since proxy restart	102.323
Average since proxy restart	0.000
Response Time (ms):	
Maximum since proxy restart	2105876
Average since proxy restart	146574

Cache Hit Rate:	
Average in last minute	0
Maximum in last hour	0
Average in last hour	0
Maximum since proxy restart	0
Average since proxy restart	0
Connections:	
Idle client connections	0
Idle server connections	1
Total client connections	27
Total server connections	0
SSLJobs:	
In queue Avg in last minute	0
Average in last minute	0
SSLInfo Average in last min	0
Network Events:	
Average in last minute	1.0
Maximum in last minute	1
Network events in last min	- 58
noonozn ovenes zn zaso mzn	



Overloaded?

proxystat CLI command

wsa4.chclasen.lab (SERVICE) > proxystat									
Press Ct	trl-C to	stop.							
%proxy	y reqs				client	server	%bw	disk	disk
CPU	J /sec	hits	blocks	misses	kb/sec	kb/sec	saved	wrs	rds
2.00	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0	0
55.00	2781	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0	0
61.00	3905	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0	0
61.00	2668	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0	0
61.00	1589	0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0	0
		0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0	0
		0	0	0	0	0	0.0	0	0



Overloaded?

shd_log subscription

- System health daemon
- Log written every one minute
- One line contains many useful fields including:
 - CPU
 - Memory
 - RPS
 - Connection count (client/server)
 - Latency
 - AV scanning time



shd_log

shd log field	Description
CPULd	Percentage of CPU in use as reported by the OS, 0-100%
DskUtil	Percentage of log partition disk usage, 0-100%
RAMUtil	Percentage of free memory as reported by the OS, 0-100%
Reqs	Average number of requests in the past minute
Band	Average bandwidth saved in the past minute
Latency	Average latency in the last minute
CacheHit	Average number of cache hits in the past minute
CliConn	Total number of client-side TCP connections
SrvConn	Total number of server-side TCP connections
Membuf	Total amount of memory buffer space that is available
SwpPgOut	Number of pages that were swapped out as reported by the OS
xLD entries	CPU utilization by individual services (AV scanners, WBRS, WTT, etc.)

cisco Live!

track_stats log

Single most important log for performance troubleshooting

- · Written every five minutes
- No log subscription
- Accessed using SCP or FTP
- Most entries have a corresponding access_log custom field

Includes:

- Request information
- Traffic statistics
- Memory allocation
- Client/Server transaction time
- Individual service latency



How to read the track_stats log

Traffic and HTTPS transaction statistics


```
grep -iE 'https/avg reg/traffic over/total ssl' prox track.log
INFO: HTTPS Passthrough handshake skip count 0
INFO: traffic over past minute - 0.00 regs/sec
INFO: traffic over past hour - 0.90 peak / 0.01 avg regs/sec
INFO: traffic over past day - 3.40 peak / 0.01 avg regs/sec
INFO: traffic over past week - 3.40 peak / 0.01 avg reqs/sec
INFO: traffic over all time - 3.40 peak / 0.01 avg regs/sec
traffic over past minute 0.00
INFO: Total SSL Handshakes
INFO: Total SSL Handshakes Finished : 1
INFO: Total SSL Handshakes Unfinished: 3
```



How to read the track_stats log

Statistics are reset after a restart of the prox process

Total number of requests are shown across a range of time values






Configuration too complex?

Check the user time value in the track_stats log

```
Current Date: Tue, 19 Mar 2019 04:03:18 GMT
                  system time: 0.193 (0.064\%)
        max resident set size: 0
  integral sh'd text mem size: 123024
  integral unshared data size: 2310000
 integral unshared stack size: 8448
                page reclaims: 16
                  page faults: 0
                        swaps: 0
       block input operations: 0
      block output operations: 0
                messages sent: 65
            messages received: 35
   voluntary context switches: 5747
 involuntary context switches: 106
```



BRKSEC-3771



Medium Complexity = 2 x Low Complexity

High Complexity = 3 x Low Complexity






Client side






- Client side
- Internal services






- Client side
- Internal services
- External services





- Client side
- Internal services
- External services
- Server side






Client side latency

		185
		855
		180
		264
		580
		4936
	158.5	
	398.1	
	631.0	
	1584.9	
	3981.1	
		30328

- Client time in track_stats log
- The amount of time in ms that the client was waiting for a response
- May indicate upstream issues as well


%:1>	x-p2c-first-byte-time	Wait-time for first byte written to client.
------	-----------------------	---



DNS latency

- The amount of time in ms that the WSA waited for a DNS resolution
- Calls for investigation of the DNS resolvers


%:>d	* *	Time taken by the Web Proxy DNS process to send back a DNS result to the Web Proxy.
		·



Authentication latency

- Two metrics: auth helper wait time and auth helper service wait time
- Use the first for the pure auth time without the request time added

x-p2p-auth-wait-time	Wait-time to receive the response from the Web Proxy
	authentication process, after the Web Proxy sent the
	request.
-	





Authentication latency

```
Debug: PROX_AUTH : 4263 : Time out set on Helper - 0, inFD = 26, outFD = 25

Debug: PROX_AUTH : 4263 : [92926: CHCLASEN.LAB]Got user=[cisco] domain=[] workstation=[WIN10-1] l

Debug: PROX_AUTH : 4263 : NTLM Msg Type = (3)

Debug: PROX_AUTH : 4263 : Reading Response from Authenticator : nextResp = (CHCLASEN\cisco 0 3600

Debug: PROX_AUTH : 4263 : Final Response from Auth Helper: nextResp = (CHCLASEN\cisco 0 3600

Debug: PROX_AUTH : 4263 : Final Response from Auth Helper: Auth Method used is NTLM

Debug: PROX_AUTH : 4263 : Final Response from Auth Helper is AF

Debug: PROX_AUTH : 4263 : Handle Final Response : Authentication is completed. Finish processing

Debug: PROX_AUTH : 4263 : Clearing TUI marker in Authentication info for user - CHCLASEN\cisco@AD

Debug: PROX_AUTH : 4263 : Transparent Authentication complete. Redirecting...
```

%I x-transaction-id Transaction ID.	%I x	x-transaction-id	Transaction ID.



Server latency - wait time

- The amount of time in ms that the WSA waited for the first byte of the server response
- Investigate upstream devices and WAN connection

	%:>1	x-s2p-first-byte-time	Wait-time for first response byte from server
- 1			






Server latency - transaction time

Transaction		
Transaction		858
Transaction		1835
Transaction		1106
Transaction		758
Transaction		
Transaction		288
Transaction		
Transaction		
Transaction		
Transaction		8897
Transaction	158.5	
Transaction		
Transaction	398.1	
Transaction	631.0	
Transaction		
Transaction	1584.9	
Transaction		
Transaction	3981.1	
Transaction		30285

- The amount of time in ms for the entire server-side transaction to complete
- Investigate upstream devices and WAN connection
- No access_log custom field but can be determined by a combination of others





Internal services latency



Webroot	Response Bod Response Bod Response Bod		14.6		See the user guide for all of the available custom fields associated wi	th
McAfee McAfee McAfee McAfee	Response Body Response Body Response Body Response Body Response Body			ms 0 ms 0 ms 0 ms 0 ms 0 ms 0	AVC Header Scan Service Time 10.0 ms AVC Header Scan Service Time 17.3 ms AVC Header Scan Service Time 30.0 ms AVC Header Scan Service Time 52.1 ms AVC Header Scan Service Time 90.3 ms AVC Header Scan Service Time 156.5 ms	8 11 3 0 0
Sophos Sophos Sophos Sophos	Response Body Response Body Response Body Response Body Response Body			ms 0 ms 0 ms 0 ms 0 ms 0 ms 0	Adaptive Scanning Service Time 1.0 ms Adaptive Scanning Service Time 1.6 ms Adaptive Scanning Service Time 2.5 ms Adaptive Scanning Service Time 4.0 ms Adaptive Scanning Service Time 6.3 ms Adaptive Scanning Service Time 10.0 ms	2 0 0 0 0

these values

cisco Livel

SNMP performance monitoring

- Traditional method for monitoring the WSA
- Performance MIB
 - OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.15497.1.2
- Traps are mostly hardware related

Enterprise Trap Status	
1. CPUUtilizationExceeded	
2. FIPSModeDisableFailure	Enabled
3. FIPSModeEnableFailure	Enabled
4. FailoverHealthy	Enabled
5. FailoverUnhealthy	Enabled
6. connectivityFailure	Disabled
7. keyExpiration	Enabled
8. linkUpDown	Enabled
9. memoryUtilizationExceeded	
10. updateFailure	Enabled
11. upstreamProxyFailure	Enabled



Disk performance

- Lower end hardware and WBRS
 - S160/S170/S190 pre-11.7 required extending the update interval
 - 11.7 provides better performance for WBRS updates
- ipcheck CLI command shows free disk space
- Reporting engines could be backed up
 - Offloading to an SMA helps
 - Disable reporting via diagnostic CLI command for diagnostic purposed diagnostic > reporting > DISABLE



Network tuning

Be careful!


>networktuning

Choose the operation you want to perform:

- SENDSPACE TCP sendspace (8192-262144) default 32768
- RECVSPACE TCP recvspace (8192-262144) default 65536
- SEND_AUTO TCP send autotuning (ON=1/OFF=0) default OFF
- RECV_AUTO TCP receive autotuning (ON=1/OFF=0) default OFF
- MBUF_CLUSTER_COUNT number of mbuf clusters (98304,147132) Default 98304
- SENDBUF_MAX Maximum send buf, size(131072 262144) default, 256K=262144
- RECVBUF_MAX Maximum recv buf, size(131072 262144) default, 256K=262144
- CLEAN_FIB_1 Remove all M1/M2 entries from Data routing table




TCP flow control







TCP flow control



TCP flow control



Buffer tuning



- Data remains in the send buffer until ACK'd in case retransmission is required
- · Limits how many packets can be in flight at once time
- Too small: performance is limited
- Too large: memory usage is high
- Should be set as closely as possible to the bandwidth delay product
 - Link capacity (bits) x round-trip time (seconds)

Network tuning recommendations Aggressive settings – your mileage may vary

Model	Memory	SEND-AUTO & RECV- AUTO	Dynamic window control	SENDSPACE	RECVSPACE	MBUF CLUSTER COUNT
S000v, S100v, S170, S370	4GB	ON	NO	32768- 65536	32768- 65536	98304
S370, S190, S300v	8GB	ON	NO	65536	65536	196608
S680, S390	16GB	ON	NO	131072	131072	393216
S690	32GB	ON	NO	131072	131072	786432/1572 864
S690/695	64GB	ON	NO	131072	131072	1572864

advancedproxyconfig > MISCELLANEOUS

Would you like proxy to perform dynamic adjustment of TCP receive window size?

[Y]>N

Would you like proxy to perform dynamic adjustment of TCP send window size?

[Y]>N



Conclusion

- Start your move to Kerberos
- Check your DNS settings
 - TTL = 300 seconds
- Integrate!
 - · ISE / ISE-PIC
 - AMP / Threat Grid
 - Cognitive Threat Analytics
 - · Cisco Threat Response

- Add some custom fields to your accesslogs
 - %m: Auth mechanism
 - %g: User groups
- Start capturing your track_stats logs
- Reach out!
 - · Catch me in the hall
 - chclasen@cisco.com



Security Beta Programs What's in it for you?

- Direct link to product development!
- Private weekly calls with the product team
- New feature training; TAC support
- Free beta loaners for customer test labs
- Ensure your bugs are fixed by GA
- Send an email to <u>wsa-beta@cisco.com</u> to reserve your spot




"I feel a personal attachment to your company through the Beta testing we do.... You guys are listening to us..., and you don't realize how rare that is."


Government Insurance Company



EMAIL, Web Security and Visibility Learning maps



Questions?



Complete your online session survey




- Please complete your session survey after each session. Your feedback is very important.
- Complete a minimum of 4 session surveys and the Overall Conference survey (starting on Thursday) to receive your Cisco Live t-shirt.
- All surveys can be taken in the Cisco Events Mobile App or by logging in to the Content Catalog on <u>ciscolive.com/emea</u>.

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
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Thank you



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