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Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Architecture and Overlay Security

Shamil Fernando - Global Technical Solutions Architect
BRKENT-2716



Cisco Webex App


Questions?

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How

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Webex spaces will be moderated by the speaker until December 22, 2023.



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- Catalyst SD-WAN
- Architecture
- Fabric Security
- Overlay Management Protocol (OMP)
- Wrap-Up
- Q&A

New Naming: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN

Old Name	New Name (rebranding)	Documentation	Displayed on Screens	API/CLI - Documentation
Cisco SD-WAN	Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN	Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN	Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN	Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN
vManage	Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager	SD-WAN Manager	Manager	vManage
vAnalytics	Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Analytics	SD-WAN Analytics	Analytics	vAnalytics
vBond	Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Validator	SD-WAN Validator	Validator	vBond
vSmart	Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controller	SD-WAN Controller	Controller	vSmart
Self Service Portal	Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Portal	Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Portal	Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Portal	SD-WAN Portal
Cloud-Delivered Cisco SD-WAN	Cloud-Delivered Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN	Cloud-Delivered Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN	Cloud-Delivered Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN	NA



Catalyst SD-WAN




Today Applications are Moving to Multiple Clouds





Flexible Architecture for Intent-based Networking









SD-WAN Architecture



Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Architecture








Orchestration Plane



Validator

- Orchestrates control and management plane
- First point of authentication (white-list model)
- Distributes list of Controllers/ Manager to all Secure Edges
- Facilitates NAT traversal
- Requires public IP Address [could sit behind 1:1 NAT]
- Highly resilient






Control Plane



Controller

- Facilitates fabric discovery
- Dissimilates control plane information between Secure Edges
- Distributes data plane and appaware routing policies to the Secure Edges
- Implements control plane policies, such as service chaining, multitopology and multi-hop
- Dramatically reduces control plane complexity
- Highly resilient






Data Plane



Secure Edge

- Provides secure data plane with remote Secure Edge Devices
- Establishes secure control plane with Controller (OMP)
- Implements data plane and application aware routing policies
- Exports performance statistics
- Leverages traditional routing protocols like OSPF, BGP, EIGRP, RIP and RIPng
- Support Zero Touch Deployment
- Physical or Virtual form factor (100Mbps to 100Gbps)





Management Plane



Manager

- Single pane of glass for Day0, Day1 and Day2 operations
- Multitenant with web scale
- Centralized provisioning
- Policies and Templates
- Troubleshooting and Monitoring
- Software upgrades
- GUI with RBAC
- Programmatic interfaces (REST, NETCONF)
- Highly resilient



Catalyst SD-WAN Fabric Deployment Models

Reduce operational burden of customers

Customer Hosted (On-Prem, AWS & Azure)

Customer Data Center

MSP Data Center

Cisco Hosted (AWS & Azure)

Standard Environment (Shared and Dedicated)

Certified Environment (PCI, SOC2, ISO, C5, etc.)

Gov. Cloud (FedRAMP)

Cloud-delivered

- Life Cycle Management of SD-WAN Fabric
- Agile and scalable service access
- Operational simplicity
- Rich analytics providing actionable insights

Flexible deployment models aligned to your business needs

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
SD-WAN Fabric Security





Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Secure Edge

Network Team
Router (Private Links)









Cisco Catalyst Secure Edge

(Private & Public Links)





Catalyst SD-WAN Security Fundamentals



Secure Edge Parameter Protection

- Explicit Deny
- Zones Based Architecture
- No Open Ports
- DDOS Mitigation
- Trust Anchor Module (TAm)
- Secure Boot of Signed Images
- Runtime Defenses (RTD)



Onboarding & Authentication

- Devices Onboarding Process
- Zero Trust
- Certificate-based
 Authentication &
 Whitelisting
- Automate Custom Certificate Authority (CA)
- Management through using SD-WAN Manager



Transport Security

- IKE less IPsec (Key exchange using a controller, high scale)
- Key Using RNG (NIST SP 800-90A)
- Key Rotation 24hr Default
- Anti-Replay Protection



Least Access Principle

- Segmentation (VRF) True VRF with separate route table & different topology each VRF
- Overlay Management Protocol (OMP)




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Secure Edge - Parameter Protection





- Explicit Deny
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Cisco Trustworthy Technologies



Secure Boot of Signed Images

- Prevents malicious code from booting on a Cisco platform
- Automated integrity checks
- Monitors startup process and shuts down if compromised
- Faster identification of threats



Trust Anchor module (TAm)

- Tamper-resistant chip with X.509 cert installed at manufacturing
- Provides unique device identity and anti-counterfeit protections
- Secure, non-volatile on-board storage and RNG/crypto services
- Enables zero-touch provisioning and minimizes deployment costs



Runtime Defenses (RTD)

- Protects against injection of malicious code into running software
- Makes it harder for attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in running software
- Runtime technologies include ASLR, BOSC, and X-Space

Trustworthy technologies enhance the security and resilience of Cisco solutions

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


Onboarding & Authentication



- Devices Onboarding Process
 - Zero Trust
- Certificate-based Authentication & Whitelisting
 - Automate Custom Certificate Authority (CA)
- Management through using SD-WAN Manager

SD-WAN Fabric with Zero-Trust Authentication




- ✓ Mutual certificate-based authentication
- ✓ Validator validates Controller and Manage certificate serial numbers against authorized white-list

- ✓ Embedded device identity (TPM)
- ✓ AES 256-GCM-based encryption
- ✓ Frequent key rotation (default: 24 hours)



Cisco SD-WAN Controller Identity




- Private and public keys are generated on the control element
- Certificate is generated
- Certificate is signed by Cisco CA / Enterprise CA
- Certificate is installed into the control element
- Control element has a root CA trust chain for Cisco root CA

In Software




Secure Control Channel: Control Elements



- Certificates are exchanged and mutual authentication takes place
- Validator validates Controller and Manage certificate serial numbers against authorized white-list
- Controller and Manage validate Validator Orchestrator certificate organization name against locally configured one
- DTLS/TLS secure connection is established

Catalyst SD-WAN Onboarding Process




- Customer/Partner sends the PO to Cisco with service account (CA) virtual account (VA) info.
- Cisco uploaded the Secure Edge Devices serial numbers to PnP
- Cisco Manager downloads the serial numbers from PnP
- Only downloaded serial numbers can participate on the overlay.



Cisco Secure Edge Identity

During Manufacturing



- Each physical Cisco Secure Edge is uniquely identified by the chassis ID and certificate serial number
- Certificate is stored in on-board SUDI chip (Secure Unique Device Identifier) - Trusted Platform Module.
 - Installed during manufacturing process
- Certificate is signed by Cisco root CA
 - Trusted by Control Plane elements
- Cisco root CA chain of trust is used to validate Control Plane elements
- Alternatively, Enterprise root CA chain of trust can be used to validate Control Plane elements
 - Can be automatically installed during PnP



Secure Bring-up with Approval


Chassis Number	Certificate Serial	Hostname	IP Address	Validate ↓
9391da23-f0d1-4259	0334D73E5EC036F87ABE	DataCenter	1.1.1.5	invalid staging valid
4de0b85f-a2ae-42ec	585A0084DEA8396DD77B	RemoteSite	1.1.1.4	invalid staging valid
5f05358a-bef7-4e15	248792F938E6EA8BEE6FD	AWS	1.1.1.6	invalid staging valid

- Single stage (Zero Touch Provisioning) Identity is automatically trusted
- Two stage (One Touch Provisioning) Identity is not automatically trusted. Requires administrator validation.
- Staging Mode Identity is automatically trusted for control, but not for data. Requires administrator validation.



Secure Control Channel: Secure Edge


Connection to Validator Orchestrator



- Certificates are exchanged and mutual authentication takes place between Validator and Secure Edge
 - Over encrypted tunnel
- Validator validates Secure Edge serial number and chassis ID against authorized Edge white-list
- Secure Edge validates Validator certificate organization name against locally configured one
- Provisional DTLS/TLS tunnel is established between Validator and Secuer Edge
- Validator returns to Secure Edge a list of Controllers and Manage
- Validator notifies Controller and Manage of Secure Edge public IP address
- Provisional DTLS/TLS tunnel between Validator and Secure Edge is terminated

Secure Control Channel: Secure Edge


Connection to Controller and Validator Manage




Org Name Confia

- Certificates are exchanged and mutual authentication takes place between Controller, Manage and Secure Edge
 - Over encrypted tunnel
- Controller and Manage validate Secure Edge
- Verify serial number and chassis ID against authorized Secure Edge white-list
- Secure Edge validates Controller and Manage certificate organization name against locally configured one
- Permanent DTLS/TLS tunnel between Controller,
 Manage and Secure Edge is established

Zero Touch Bring up










- IKE less IPsec (Key exchange using a controller, high scale)
- Key Using RNG (NIST SP 800-90A)
 - Key Rotation 24hr Default
 - Anti-Replay Protection

Data Plane Integrity

- Validator discovers WAN Edge public IP address, even if traverses NAT
- Validator communicates IP Info controler
- WAN Edge computes AH value based on the post NAT public IP

- Packet integrity (+IP headers) is preserved across NAT
- Man-in-the-Middle Attack Mitigation






Data Plane Privacy

Centralized Encryption Key Distribution

- Each Secure Edge device advertises its local IPsec encryption keys as OMP TLOC attributes
- IPSec encryption keys are distributed by the Controllers to all Secure Edge devices
- Encryption keys are per-transport


- Use AES256-GCM/CBC ESPv3 for data authenticity (integrity) and confidentiality
- IPSec encryption keys are frequently rotated (default 24h), new keys are advertised in control plane updates



Controllers




Data Plan - SD-WAN Transport Security



Anti-Replay Protection

- Encrypted packets are assigned sequence numbers.
 Secure Edge drop packets with duplicate sequence numbers
 - Replayed packet
- Secure Edge drop packets with sequence numbers lower than the minimal number of the sliding window
 - Maliciously injected packet


- Upon receipt of a packet with higher sequence number than received thus far, Secure Edge will advance the sliding window
- Sliding window is COS aware to prevent low priority traffic from "slowing down" high priority traffic





Tunnel Liveliness Detection


Bidirectional Forwarding Detection



- Path liveliness and quality measurement detection protocol
 - Up/Down, loss/latency/jitter, IPSec tunnel MTU
- Runs between all Secure Edges
 - Inside IPSec tunnels
 - Automatically invoked after each IPSec tunnel establishment
 - Cannot be disabled
- Uses hello (up/down) interval, poll (app-aware) interval and multiplier for detection
 - Fully customizable per-Edge, per-color











- Segmentation (VRF) True VRF with separate route table & different topology each VRF
- Overlay Management Protocol (OMP)

End-to-End Segmentation




End-to-End Segmentation with Multi-Topology




Segment connectivity across the SD-WAN fabric without reliance on underlay transport

Secure Edge maintain per-VPN routing table for complete control plane separation






- Routes connecting locations to physical networks
- Advertised to Controllers
- Most prominent attributes:
 - Site-ID
 - Encap-SPI
 - **Encap-Authentication**
 - **Encap-Encryption**
 - Public IP
 - Public Port
 - Private IP
 - Private Port
 - **BFD-Status**
 - Tag
 - Preference
 - Weight




- Routes learnt from local service side (connected, Static or Dynamic)
- WAN Edge Advertise to Controller
- Controller distribute to other WAN edges
- Most prominent attributes:
 - TLOC
 - Site-ID
 - Label
 - VPN-ID
 - Tag
 - Preference
 - Originator System IP
 - Origin Protocol
 - Origin Metric




- Routes for advertised network services, i.e. Firewall, IDS, IPS, generic
- Advertised to Controller

- Most prominent attributes:
 - VPN-ID
 - Service-ID
 - Label
 - Originator System IP
 - **TLOC**



- Polices are configured on Controller
- Data policies are advertised using OMP
- Data policies advertised from Controller to WAN edges in XML format






- OMP is a TCP based extensible control plane protocol
- Runs between WAN Secure Edges and Controllers and between the Controllers
 - on TLS/DTLS connections
- OMP carries routes, TLOCs, Services and data policies
- Advertises control plane and security context
- Dramatically lowers control plane complexity and raises overall solution scale
- OMP orchestrates routing and secure connectivity between sites



#CiscoLiveAPJC

OMP - TLOC Routes




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OMP - Advertised TLOCs

Address Family				To Peer		Auth Type	Encrypt Type		
ipv4	1.1.1.10	public-internet	ipsec	1.1.1.1	292	sha1-hmac a	des des3	10.1.6.5	12346
ipv4	1.1.1.10	blue	ipsec	1.1.1.1	292	sha1-hmac a	des des3	10.2.5.5	12346



OMP - TLOC Routes




Controller advertise TLOCs to Edges in OMP TLOC routes

TLOCs advertised to Controllers in OMP TLOC routes

Local TLOCs (System IP, Color, Encap Pub IP/Port, Priv IP/Port)



OMP - Routes



- Routes learnt from local service side (connected, Static or Dynamic)
- WAN Edge Advertise to Controllers
- Controller distribute to other WAN edges
- Most prominent attributes:
 - TLOC
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 - Originator System IP
 - **Origin Protocol**
 - Origin Metric

OMP Received Routes


Address Family	VPN ID	Prefix	From Peer	Path Id	Label	Status	Attribute Type	Tloc IP
ipv4	1	172.16.0.0/24	1.1.1.1	3	1002	CIR	installed	1.1.1.11
-	-	-	1.1.1.1	4	1002	CIR	installed	1.1.1.11
-	1	172.16.1.0/24	0.0.0.0	69	1002	C Red R	installed	1.1.1.10
-		-	0.0.0.0	74	1002	C Red R	installed	1.1.1.10



OMP Update

Side


OMP - Routes



- Uniform control plane protocol
- OMP learns and translates routing information across the overlay
 - OMP routes, TLOC routes, network service routes
 - Unicast and multicast address families
 - IPv4 and IPv6 (future)
- Distribution of data-plane security parameters and policies
- Implementation of control (routing) and VPN membership policies




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
OMP - Network Service Routes



- Service nodes are connected to Edge
 - Directly or IPSec IKE v1/v2
 - Routed or bridged
- Service nodes can be connected to different Secure Edges
 - Can be in different sites.
- Secure Edges advertise service
 - Service route + Service label
 - Specific VPN
- Control or data policies are used to insert the service nodes




OMP - Policies



- Polices are configured on Controller
- Data policies are advertised using OMP
- Data policies advertised from Controller to Secure WAN edges




Wrap-Up





Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Architecture





Catalyst SD-WAN Security Fundamentals



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
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
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
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 - Preference
 - Weight




- Routes learnt from local service side (connected, Static or Dynamic)
- WAN Edge Advertise to Controller
- Controller distribute to other WAN edges
- Most prominent attributes:
 - TLOC
 - Site-ID
 - Label
 - VPN-ID
 - Tag

 - Preference
 - Originator System IP
 - Origin Protocol
 - Origin Metric



- Routes for advertised network services, i.e. Firewall, IDS, IPS, generic
- Advertised to Controller

- Most prominent attributes:
 - VPN-ID
 - Service-ID
 - Label
 - Originator System IP
 - **TLOC**



- Polices are configured on Controller
- Data policies are advertised using OMP
- Data policies advertised from Controller to WAN edges in XML format

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Thank you



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