

# H4H

**Owner:**

**Reviewer:**

**Contributors:**

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# Executive Summary

## High level system description

Not provided

## Summary

|                         |    |
|-------------------------|----|
| Total Threats           | 26 |
| Total Mitigated         | 15 |
| Not Mitigated           | 11 |
| Open / High Priority    | 5  |
| Open / Medium Priority  | 6  |
| Open / Low Priority     | 0  |
| Open / Unknown Priority | 0  |

# DFD-H4H

## Visit Scheduler (Process)

Description: FastAPI App

| Number | Title                            | Type                   | Priority | Status    | Score | Description  | Mitigations  |
|--------|----------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----------|-------|--|--|
| 11     | Forged user ID in requests       | Spoofing               | High     | Open      |       | Attackers could manipulate request bodies to act on behalf of another vendor/client and tampering with the issuing of visits that they book/accept and e.g. pay a deposit for. |  |
| 12     | ElasticSearch query manipulation | Tampering              | High     | Open      |       | Injection of malicious search filters to bypass constraints and return unauthorized data.  | Use of proper ElasticSearch query builders, more resistant to such attempts. |
| 13     | Missing audit logs for bookings  | Repudiation            | Medium   | Mitigated |       | Without proper event logging, users could deny placing a booking or changing their availability.   | Proper logging and persistance and data retention.                           |
| 14     | Improper role enforcement        | Elevation of privilege | Medium   | Mitigated |       | Clients potentially accessing vendor-only functionality (calendar availability) and vice-versa, Vendors being able to book visits with other Vendors.                          | User role validation via JWT.  |
| 15     | Heavy search queries             | Denial of service      | Medium   | Open      |       | Unbounded queries stressing ElasticSearch and slowing down its performance due to heavy processing.  | Employ proper pagination within ES.  |

## Visit Manager (Process)

Description: FastAPI app

| Number | Title  | Type                   | Priority | Status    | Score | Description  | Mitigations   |
|--------|--|------------------------|----------|-----------|-------|--|---|
| 23     | Payment data manipulation                        | Tampering              | High     | Open      |       | Modifying Stripe request data for altering payment amount, recipient etc.        |   |
| 24     | SQL injection                                    | Tampering              | High     | Mitigated |       | Direct injection of malicious code.  | Use of parametrized queries and ORM.  |
| 25     | User Personally Identifiable Information leakage | Information disclosure | Medium   | Open      |       | Email, phone number, address exposed via poor API restrictions.                  | Following of GDPR guidelines in handling of data. Selective logging and masking of potentially sensitive information. |
| 26     | Stripe webhook forgery                           | Spoofing               | High     | Mitigated |       | Malicious requests resulting in faking of the payment events and status changes. | Validating of Stripe signatures and secrets.  |

## User Chat (Process)

Description: FastAPI app

| Number | Title                        | Type     | Priority | Status    | Score | Description  | Mitigations                                      |
|--------|------------------------------|----------|----------|-----------|-------|--|--|
| 16     | Impersonation via JWT replay | Spoofing | High     | Mitigated |       | Interception and reusing of JWT tokens resulting in attackers sending messages on behalf of other users. | Short-lived JWT, enforce TLS encryption (HTTPS). |

| Number | Title                                | Type                   | Priority | Status    | Score | Description  | Mitigations  |
|--------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----------|-------|--|--|
| 17     | Unauthenticated message sending      | Spoofing               | Medium   | Mitigated |       | Bots or anonymous users sending spam messages if endpoints lack strict authentication. | JWT authentication enforced on all endpoints.                                  |
| 18     | Denial of message sending            | Repudiation            | Medium   | Mitigated |       | User denying sending a message, difficult to prove message origin.                     | Proper logging and storing of message metadata, including origin verification. |
| 21     | Accidental logging of sensitive data | Information disclosure | Medium   | Open      |       | Sensitive message content may unintentionally get logged.                              | Log redaction, selective storing of only the necessary metadata.               |
| 22     | Lack of logging for message delivery | Repudiation            | Low      | Mitigated |       | Loss of message traceability upon sending.   | Implementation of proper message delivery receipts in the logging system.      |

## App Load Balancer (Process)

Description: Nodejs App

| Number | Title                       | Type                   | Priority | Status    | Score | Description  | Mitigations   |
|--------|-----------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----------|-------|--|---|
| 1      | JWT forwarding              | Spoofing               | High     | Open      |       | Attacker intercepting or replaying tokens due to improper security controls at ALB level; could result in full account takeover. | TLS encryption enforced upon the communication between the services (HTTPS). Proper token validation, short-lived JWTs. |
| 2      | Volumetric attacks          | Denial of service      | Medium   | Mitigated |       | Large scale traffic floods designed to overwhelm ALB or downstream resources.  | GCP Cloudflare employed.  |
| 3      | Request header mangling     | Tampering              | Medium   | Open      |       | Attackers replacing specific request headers leading to potential bypass of security checks.                                     | Proper header validation and sanitization.  |
| 4      | Routing misconfiguration    | Information disclosure | Medium   | Mitigated |       | Misconfigured routing may expose internal endpoints to the public.   | Blocking and restricting access to internal paths.  |
| 5      | Lack of request attribution | Repudiation            | Low      | Mitigated |       | Without proper logging at the level of App Load Balancer it may be difficult to notice and track malicious activity.             | Accurate monitoring setup at the outer-most layer and alerting on anomalies (Cloud Logging).                            |
| 6      | CORS misconfiguration       | Information disclosure | Medium   | Open      |       | Without proper restriction, App Load Balancer may allow cross-origin requests, leaking data to potentially malicious sites.      | Proper CORS configuration, specific headers and only trusted origins.   |

## Firestore DB (Store)

Description:

| Number | Title                                 | Type                   | Priority | Status    | Score | Description   | Mitigations   |
|--------|---------------------------------------|------------------------|----------|-----------|-------|---|---|
| 19     | Document manipulation                 | Tampering              | High     | Mitigated |       | If security rules are improperly configured, attackers may modify chat history records.                                     | Strict security rules within the DB.                |
| 20     | Access to unauthorized chat histories | Information disclosure | Medium   | Mitigated |       | Missing access checks may lead to the potentially malicious users seeing conversations that they should not have access to. | Enforce Firestore access control for all documents. |

## Web frontend (Process)

Description: Nodejs app

| Number | Title                           | Type     | Priority | Status | Score | Description  | Mitigations           |
|--------|---------------------------------|----------|----------|--------|-------|--|-----------------------|
| 7      | Token leakage from localStorage | Spoofing | High     | Open   |       | Attackers getting user's locally stored credentials with the use of malicious scripts. | Use of PKCE in OAuth. |

| Number | Title                                    | Type                   | Priority | Status    | Score | Description   | Mitigations   |
|--------|--|------------------------|----------|-----------|-------|---|---|
| 8      | Sensitive data leakage from localStorage | Information disclosure | Medium   | Mitigated |       | Data such as chat history, or payment information, if stored locally can be leaked.                       | Avoid storing sensitive data client-side.                           |
| 9      | Volumetric attacks on backend endpoints  | Denial of service      | Medium   | Open      |       | Risk of repeated spam on the endpoints of the downstream microservices.                                   | Enforcing rate limits per IP address or user.                       |
| 10     | Unauthorized access to dev tools         | Elevation of privilege | High     | Mitigated |       | Routes that are not blocked/restricted properly may expose access to administration/development features. | Routing safeguarding, access restriction via backend authorization. |