Getting Started

To get started, you should first download and install the Alisa feature with the plugins that support the different notations of Alisa as well as the assurance harness that executes the verification activities specified in verification plans on an instance of the AADL model for the system of interest. You then create a project as a Java project and then configure it with the AADL nature. You can create separate projects for your architecture models in AADL, for your requirement/verification specifications, and for other specifications such as Resolute libraries used in the verification - as shown in the example. Make sure you specify *Project References* through the *Preferences* menu. Select a project, select *Preferences* under the *Window* menu, (type *pref* into the search bar of the preferences dialog and then specify the projects in which this project will reference file content.

```
## AADL Navigator 

#
                                                                                                                                            DCS.reqspec 

SCS.reqspec resourcebudgets.aadl SCSCase.assure predefined.cat
                                                                                                                                                   system requirements scsreqs for resourcebudgets::SCS [

→ S > AlisaBasics [models Peter]

                                                                                                                                                                   val MaximumLatency = 20 ms
        Plugins.methodregistry
                                                                                                                                                                   requirement R1 : "SCS weight limit" [
         > predefined.cat
                                                                                                                                                                                 val MaximumWeight = 1.2 kg
 SimpleAlisaExample [models Peter]
                                                                                                                                                                                  compute actualbudget
     ₄ 📾 aadl
                                                                                                                                                                                  description this " shall be within weight of " MaximumWeight
           🔑 instances
                                                                                                                                                                                  predicate actualbudget <= MaximumWeight</pre>
           🔋 👊 resourcebudgets.aadl
                                                                                                                                                                                  see goal SCSgoals.g2
     🛾 🔊 alisa
            B DCS.regspec
                                                                                                                                                                   requirement R2 : "SCS sensor to actuator response time limit" [
            dcsvplan.verify
                                                                                                                                                                                  {\tt description} this " shall have a sensor to actuator response time
            mine.constants
            mymethods.methodregistry
                                                                                                                                                                   include Peter.rl for system
            Peter.reqspec
            PeterPlan.verify
            Resolute.methodregistry
            SCS.regspec
            SCSgoals.goals

■ SCSVerification.alisa

            a scsvplan.verify
            🗟 sei.org
     ■ SCSCase.assure
            SCSWeight.assure
           BudgetResolute.aadl
```

You will create stakeholder goals and system requirements. You will do so in the context of an AADL model that represents the system of interest in its operational context by explicitly modeling all the entities in the operational environment that the system may be exposed to and interact with.

Stakeholders are defined as members of an organization. Each organization and its members is defined in a separate *.org* file.

```
scsacp.verify verification... resourcebudg... SCSV
organization sei
stakeholder phf [
full name "Peter Feiler"
]
stakeholder dpg [
full name "David Gluch"
]
```

Stakeholder Descriptions as Members of Organizations

Users can define a collection of stakeholder *goals* for a system . For each goal one or more stakeholders can be identified. In the process the user want to utilize a use case notation such as the URN Use Case Maps (UCM) - see jUCMNav.

```
stakeholder goals SCSgoals for resourcebudgets::SCS.tier0 [
    goal g1 : "Safety" [
        description "The system shall be safe."
        rationale "This is a control system, whose failure affects live stakeholder sei.phf sei.dpg
]
    goal g2 : "Maximum weight" [
        description "The system shall stay within a speficied weight lestakeholder sei.phf
        rationale "The system is part of an aircraft."
]
```

Stakeholder Goals

System *requirements* are specified in a system *requirement specification*. They are traced to stakeholder goals and they identify the component type or implementation in the AADL model the requirement is associated with. Users can also specifies values as constants that can be used in descriptions and as operands in assert expressions. Typically, those are values that the user may want to change.


Requirements can be refined into requirements that are verifiable. All *leaf* requirements are expected to be verifiable.

For each system the user specifies a verification plan. The verification plan specifies a claim for each requirement of the system of interest, identifying a collection of verification activities and making the argument of sufficient evidence if these verification activities applied to a system implementation pass. Users may impose an order to indicate that some are dependent on the successful completion of others, and specify that in case of an incomplete execution (*error*, *timeout*), or returning a negative result (*fail*) an alternative verification activity may be performed.

Verification Plan for System Requirements

Typically the user will work with an existing *registry* of *verification methods* for the OSATE plugins. Users can define additional registries for methods they wrote in Resolute, Java/Xtend.

Finally, the user will define the an *assurance plan* for a particular system. The assurance plan represents a configuration for verifying a system implementation that identifies the verification plans of those system components that the user is responsible for verifying. The user may define assurance tasks that specify selection criteria for a subset of the verification activities in the assurance plan that are to be performed as part of this assurance task. The selection criterion is expressed in terms of *selection category* tags that have been attached to verification methods or activities. From the assurance task specification an assurance task instance is created. This instance is used to drive the execution of the verification activities and to record the results as assurance *evidence*.



Users then initiate the execution of all verification activities for an assurance case by opening the *assure* file and selecting the root element in the *Outline* view, bring up the context menu by right clicking, and invoking the *Verify All Evidence* command.

Note that multiple assurance tasks can be defined for the same system. Each task may focus on assuring different aspects of the system, as identified by the chosen selection categories. Similarly users can define assurance plans to include different combinations of verification plans for different subsets of system components, leading to an incremental approach of verification.