

Lecture: The Absoluteness of Constructibility

We would like to show that L is a model of $V = L$, or, more precisely, that L is an interpretation of $ZF + V = L$ in ZF . We have already verified that σ^L holds (in ZF) for all axioms σ of ZF . To verify that $ZF \vdash (V = L)^L$, we need to show (in ZF) that

$$(\forall x \exists \alpha x \in L_\alpha)^L$$

holds. Since $L \cap \text{Ord} = \text{Ord}$, the former is equivalent to

$$\forall x \in L \exists \alpha (x \in L_\alpha)^L.$$

This could fail to hold if the definition of L “inside L ” yields a different structure than the constructible hierarchy itself. Therefore, we have to analyze the function $\alpha \mapsto L_\alpha$ and show that it is *absolute* for L . We identify L with this function, i.e. we let $L : \text{Ord} \rightarrow V$ be given by $L(\alpha) = L_\alpha$. We have to show that $L^L(\alpha) = L(\alpha)$ for all ordinals.

To do this, we analyze the set theoretic complexity of the definability notion.

Gödelization

We assign to every variable v_n the Gödel number (or rather the Gödel set)

$$\ulcorner v_n \urcorner = (1, n).$$

We also extend our language by introducing, for every set a , a new constant \underline{a} . This way, we can address elements of a set theoretic structure (M, \in) when defining, for example, the relation $(M, \in) \models \varphi[\underline{a}]$. When, for $a \in M$, the interpretation of \underline{a} is to be a itself, we speak of the *canonical interpretation*. The Gödel number of a constant is

$$\ulcorner \underline{a} \urcorner = (2, a).$$

Now we can recursively assign Gödel numbers to all set theoretic formulas (in the extended language).

$$\ulcorner x = y \urcorner = (3, (\ulcorner x \urcorner, \ulcorner y \urcorner))$$

$$\ulcorner x \in y \urcorner = (4, (\ulcorner x \urcorner, \ulcorner y \urcorner))$$

$$\ulcorner \neg \varphi \urcorner = (5, \ulcorner \varphi \urcorner)$$

$$\ulcorner \varphi \wedge \psi \urcorner = (6, (\ulcorner \varphi \urcorner, \ulcorner \psi \urcorner))$$

$$\ulcorner \exists v_n \varphi \urcorner = (7, (n, \ulcorner \varphi \urcorner))$$

Definability of syntactical notions

We can express “ a is (the Gödel number of) a variable” as (recall the definition of a set theoretic pair)

$$\text{Var}(a) \leftrightarrow \exists y \in a \exists x \in y (a = (1, x) \wedge x \in \omega).$$

We want to keep track of the complexity of the definitions. All quantifiers are bounded, so Var is Δ_0 , provided the expression $x \in \omega$ is Δ_0 , too. A proof of the latter fact is given in Lemma 12.10 in [Jech \[2003\]](#), for example.

Using Var , we can go on to define set theoretic formulae saying

$\text{Fml}^n(e) \leftrightarrow e$ is the Gödel number of a formula φ whose free variables are among v_0, \dots, v_{n-1} ,

$\text{Fml}_a^n(e) \leftrightarrow e$ is the Gödel number of a formula φ whose free variables are among v_0, \dots, v_{n-1} , and which contains constants \underline{a}_i with $a_i \in a$.

The definition of Fml is not difficult, but a little tedious and has to be worked out carefully. Details can be found in [Devlin \[1984\]](#), Section 1.9 (but see also [\[Mathias, 2006\]](#)).

Informally, the definition of $\text{Fml}^n(e)$ says that there exists a finite sequence of Gödel numbers of formulae and a way to put them together (a “formula tree”) so that the resulting formula has Gödel number e , and the only free variable that occur are among v_0, \dots, v_n . One needs to resort to a suitable recursion principle to do this.

This definition of Fml is no longer Δ_0 . In order to still be able to establish absoluteness results, one has to provide a careful analysis of the logical complexity of Fml .

The Levy hierarchy of set theoretic formulae

We have already discussed the notion of Δ_0 formulae. If we allow unbounded quantifiers, we obtain a hierarchy of formulae, classified according to the number of quantifier changes (similar to the arithmetical hierarchy of number theoretic formulae).

φ is a Σ_1 formula $\leftrightarrow \varphi = \exists v_1 \dots \exists v_n \psi$, for a Δ_0 formula ψ ,

φ is a Π_1 formula $\leftrightarrow \varphi = \forall v_1 \dots \forall v_n \psi$, for a Δ_0 formula ψ ,

Continuing inductively (letting $\Sigma_0 = \Pi_0 = \Delta_0$), we put

$$\begin{aligned}\varphi \text{ is a } \Sigma_{n+1} \text{ formula} &\leftrightarrow \varphi = \exists v_1 \dots \exists v_n \psi, \text{ for a } \Pi_n \text{ formula } \psi, \\ \varphi \text{ is a } \Pi_{n+1} \text{ formula} &\leftrightarrow \varphi = \forall v_1 \dots \forall v_n \psi, \text{ for a } \Sigma_n \text{ formula } \psi,\end{aligned}$$

Note that these definitions only apply to formulae in prenex normal form. However, we can extend the definition to other formulae by saying φ is Σ_n (Π_n) if it is logically equivalent to a Σ_n (Π_n) formula.

Sometimes a proof that a certain formula is Σ_n requires not only logical equivalences (such as $\exists v_1 \neg \forall v_3 \psi \leftrightarrow \exists v_1 \exists v_2 \neg \psi$), but set theoretic axioms. For example, consider the definition of an ordinal,

$$\text{Ord}(a) \leftrightarrow a \text{ is transitive and } a \text{ is well-ordered by } \in$$

The property of being well-ordered by \in is formalized as

$$\forall x [x \subseteq a \rightarrow \exists b \in x \forall c \in x (c \not\subseteq b)].$$

This definition is not Δ_0 . However, if we assume the Axiom of Regularity, every set is well-founded with respect to \in , so it suffices to require that a is *linearly ordered* by \in . In fact, it suffices to require (exercise!) that

$$a \text{ is transitive and } \forall x, y \in a (x \in y \vee x = y \vee y \in x),$$

which is Δ_0 .

In some cases, one can use set theoretic operations to bound quantifiers. For instance, using the definition of $\bigcup a$, we obtain that

$$\exists x \in \bigcup a \dots \leftrightarrow \exists y \in a \exists x \in y \dots$$

is a bounded quantifier in the sense of Δ_0 formulae. Regarding other set theoretic operations, this kind of argument has to be used with caution, though. A quantifier of the form

$$\exists x \in \mathcal{P}(a)$$

cannot be regarded as bounded, since the definition of $\mathcal{P}(a)$ is not Δ_0 , but Π_1 .

If T is a theory (in the language of set theory) we say

$$\begin{aligned}\varphi \text{ is } \Sigma_n^T &\text{ iff there exists a } \Sigma_n \text{ formula } \psi \text{ so that } T \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi, \\ \varphi \text{ is } \Pi_n^T &\text{ iff there exists a } \Pi_n \text{ formula } \psi \text{ so that } T \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow \psi, \\ \varphi \text{ is } \Delta_n^T &\text{ iff } \varphi \text{ is } \Sigma_n^T \text{ and } \Pi_n^T.\end{aligned}$$

Extending absoluteness

We are particularly interested in the case $n = 1$, since this allows us to extend absoluteness results beyond Δ_0 in a relatively easy manner.

Proposition 1.1: *Let M be a transitive model of T , where T is a subtheory of ZF.*

- (1) *For any Σ_1^T formula φ , $\varphi^M \rightarrow \varphi$.*
- (2) *For any Π_1^T formula φ , $\varphi \rightarrow \varphi^M$.*
- (3) *For any Δ_1^T formula φ , $\varphi^M \leftrightarrow \varphi$.*

We say Σ_1 formulae are *upward absolute*, whereas Π_1 are *downward absolute*.

Proof. (1) Assume φ is Σ_1^T . Suppose φ is equivalent over T to a formula $\exists v\psi(v)$, where ψ is Δ_0 . Assume σ^M holds for every $\sigma \in T$. Let θ be a conjunction of finitely many sentences from T that prove $\varphi \leftrightarrow \exists v\psi(v)$. Then, since $\vdash \theta \rightarrow (\varphi \leftrightarrow \exists v\psi(v))$, and validities are absolute for any structure, $\theta^M \rightarrow (\varphi^M \leftrightarrow \exists v \in M \psi^M(v))$, and hence $\varphi^M \leftrightarrow \exists v \in M \psi^M(v)$. So if φ^M , then $\exists v \in M \psi^M(v)$ and hence $\exists v\psi(v)$. Since Δ_0 formulas are absolute for transitive models, we obtain $\exists v\psi(v)$. Since T is a fragment of ZF, it follows that $\text{ZF} \vdash \varphi \leftrightarrow \exists v\psi(v)$, and thus φ .

The proof for (2) is similar, and (3) follows from (1) and (2). □

Defining definability

We mentioned above that the definition of $\text{Fml}^n(e)$ states the existence of a sequence of Gödel numbers of formulae and a way to put them together (a “formula tree”). This turns out to be a Σ_1 definition. However, one can bound the domain from which the sequence is drawn by a set theoretic operation A . This set theoretic operation is Δ_1^T definable for a finite fragment T of ZF. Using this operation, we can rewrite the definition of $\text{Fml}^n(e)$ as “ $\forall a$ (if $u = A(e)$ then $\exists x \in u$ such that x is a sequence of Gödel numbers . . .)”.

This way we can establish

Proposition 1.2: $\text{Fml}^n(e)$ and $\text{Fml}_a^n(e)$ are Δ_1^{ZF} .

To show $\text{Fml}^n(e)$ and $\text{Fml}_a^n(e)$ are Δ_1 , it suffices to consider a weak fragment of ZF. *Kripke-Platek set theory* (KP) consists of the Axioms of Extensionality,

Pairing, and Union, and also of the following axiom schemes:

$$\begin{aligned}
(\Delta_0\text{-Separation}) \quad & \exists y \forall z (z \in y \leftrightarrow x \in a \wedge \varphi(x)) \\
(\Delta_0\text{-Replacement}) \quad & \forall x \exists y \varphi(x, y) \rightarrow \exists z \forall x \in a \exists y \in z \varphi(x, y) \\
(\text{Foundation}) \quad & \forall x \varphi(x) \rightarrow \exists x (\varphi(x) \wedge \forall y \in x \neg \varphi(y))
\end{aligned}$$

Here, the first two schemes only apply to Δ_0 formulae φ . KP_∞ denotes the theory obtained by also adding the Axiom of Infinity.

KP_∞ can be seen as a generalized recursion theory and is strong enough to develop the recursive definitions needed to develop syntactical notions such as $\text{Fml}^n(e)$. In particular, one can show that $\text{Fml}^n(e)$ and $\text{Fml}_a^n(e)$ are $\Delta_1^{\text{KP}_\infty}$.

Now we can go on and give set-theoretic definitions of semantical notions. There exists a set theoretic formula $\text{Sat}(a, e)$ which is $\Delta_1^{\text{KP}_\infty}$ and expresses the following

$\text{Sat}(a, e)$: e is the code of a formula $\varphi(\underline{a}_1, \dots, \underline{a}_n)$ with no free variables and φ holds in (a, \in) under the canonical interpretation.

We also write $(a, \in) \models e$ instead of $\text{Sat}(a, e)$. One can use Sat to formally establish the equivalence of a formula holding relativized and holding in the corresponding set theoretic structure (for *set* structures only).

Proposition 1.3: *Let $\varphi(v_0, \dots, v_{n-1})$ be a formula, let M be a set, and let $a_0, \dots, a_{n-1} \in M$. Then it holds (in KP_∞) that*

$$\varphi^M(a_0, \dots, a_{n-1}) \leftrightarrow \text{Sat}(M, \ulcorner \varphi(\underline{a}_0, \dots, \underline{a}_{n-1}) \urcorner).$$

This is proved by induction over the structure of φ . The atomic case works because we require $\varphi(\underline{a}_0, \dots, \underline{a}_{n-1})$ to hold under the canonical interpretation.

The Sat predicate puts us in a position to “define” $\text{Def}(M)$.

$$\text{Def}(M) = \{x \subseteq M : \exists e (\text{Fml}_M^1(e) \wedge x = \{z \in M : (M, \in) \models e(z)\})\}.$$

We have to be careful here, since “ $(M, \in) \models e$ ” was only defined for *fixed* Gödel numbers, but here this number seems to depend on the set z . We therefore *define* $e(z)$ to be the Gödel number of the following formula: If $e = \ulcorner \varphi \urcorner$, then

$e(z)$ is the Gödel number of the formula $\varphi(\underline{z})$ that we obtain by replacing every occurrence of the (only) variable v_0 by the symbol \underline{z} :

$$\ulcorner \varphi(v_0) \urcorner(z) = \ulcorner \varphi(\underline{z}) \urcorner.$$

(This transition is, moreover, Δ_1 -definable over KP_∞ .)

The absoluteness of definability

To establish the desired absoluteness, we have to check the complexity of the formula for Def.

Proposition 1.4: *The relation $b = \text{Def}(a)$ is $\Delta_1^{KP_\infty}$.*

Sketch of proof. That $\text{Def}(M)$ is defined by a Σ_1 formula is not hard to see once we have established the complexity of Fml and Sat. As noted in [Jech, 2003], Lemma 13.10, graphs of functions with Δ_1 domain are Δ_1^\dagger . \square

Having determined the complexity of $\text{Def}(M)$, we can go on to show

Proposition 1.5: *The function $a \mapsto L_a$ is $\Delta_1^{KP_\infty}$.*

Proof. Lemma 13.12 in [Jech, 2003] (together with the observation that graphs of Σ_1 functions with Δ_1 domain are Δ_1) reduces this task to verifying that the induction step is $\Sigma_1^{KP_\infty}$.

For α a successor ordinal, this follows from 1.4. For α limit, $L_\alpha = \bigcup_{\beta < \alpha} L_\beta$ and hence $b = L_\alpha$ iff $b = \bigcup_{\beta \in b} L_\beta$. \square

Putting all the pieces together, we obtain

Theorem 1.6: *L satisfies the Axiom of Constructibility, $V = L$.*

Furthermore, L is the smallest inner model of ZF.

Theorem 1.7: *If M is an inner model of ZF, then $L \subseteq M$.*

Proof. Suppose M is an inner model. Then M is in particular a model of KP_∞ , and thus the function $\alpha \mapsto L_\alpha$ is absolute for M , which means $L^M = L$ and hence $L = L^M \subseteq M$. \square

[†]There is another issue here: Working in KP_∞ , we cannot invoke the Power Set Axiom to claim that $\text{Def}(M)$ is a set. This requires a separate argument in KP_∞ (exercise).

The Condensation Lemma

Ordinals α so that $L_\alpha \models \text{KP}_\infty$ are called *admissible ordinals*. It follows from the preceding sections that for every admissible ordinal, L_α is a model of $V = L$. This indicates that the L_α (at certain stages) exhibit a remarkable robustness and stratification with respect to constructibility. If we refine the analysis of the absoluteness of constructibility a little bit more, we can unearth this stratification in its full glory.

Every proof leading up to Theorem 1.6 uses only finitely many sentences of the theory KP_∞ . We can collect these sentences in a finite fragment T .

Theorem 1.8: *There exists a finite subtheory of KP_∞ so that $L_\alpha \models T$ for all limit ordinals α and such that the following hold.*

- (1) *The relations $b = \text{Def}(a)$, $b = L_\alpha$, $b \in L_\alpha$ are Δ_1^T .
The relation $b \in L$ is Σ_1^T .
The sentence $V = L$ is Π_2^T .*

- (2) *If M is a transitive model of T , then*

$$\begin{aligned} L_\alpha^M &= L_\alpha && \text{for all ordinals } \alpha, \text{ and in particular:} \\ L^M &= L, && \text{if } M \text{ is a proper class,} \\ L^M &= L_\gamma, && \text{if } M \text{ is a set and } \alpha = \text{Ord} \cap M. \end{aligned}$$

- (3) *If M is a transitive model of $T + V = L$, then*

$$M = \begin{cases} L, & \text{if } M \text{ is a proper class} \\ L_\alpha, & \text{if } M \text{ is a set and } \alpha = \text{Ord} \cap M \end{cases}$$

Proof. The preceding sections have shown that a finite fragment of KP_∞ exists so that (1) holds for any model of KP_∞ . Similarly for the first statement of (2).

To establish the remaining statements, we work within KP_∞ and then argue that we needed only finitely many axioms.

First assume that M is a proper class. We first show that $\text{Ord} \subseteq M$. Suppose α is an ordinal. Since M is not a set, $M \not\subseteq V_\alpha$, there exists an $x \in M$ with $\text{rank}(x) \geq \alpha$. One can show that the rank-function is absolute for transitive models of KP_∞ (it is defined by recursion), thus $\text{rank}(x) = \text{rank}^M(x) \in M$. Since M is transitive, we have $\alpha \in M$.

Now we have, by absoluteness of $\alpha \mapsto L_\alpha$ and of Ord,

$$L^M = \bigcup_{\alpha \in M} L_\alpha^M = \bigcup_{\alpha \in \text{Ord}} L_\alpha = L.$$

For the third statement of (2), let $\alpha = M \cap \text{Ord}$. We make T strong enough to show that no largest ordinal exists. (Again, this can be done by including finitely many axioms from KP_∞ .) Then α is a limit ordinal and hence

$$L_\alpha = \bigcup_{\beta \in M} L_\beta.$$

But by absoluteness of $\alpha \mapsto L_\alpha$

$$L^M = \bigcup_{\beta \in M} L_\beta^M = \bigcup_{\beta \in M} L_\beta$$

and thus $L^M = L_\alpha$.

To prove (3), note that if M is transitive and a model of $T + V = L$ (T comprising now all the sentences used to establish (1)+(2)), we have

$$(\forall x \exists \alpha (x \in L_\alpha))^M$$

which means

$$\forall x \in M \exists \alpha (x \in L_\alpha^M)$$

that is, $M = L^M$. Both cases now follow immediately from the corresponding statement in (2). \square

We can rephrase (3) as follows: There exists a single sentence $\sigma_{V=L}$ (namely, the conjunction of all sentences in $T + V = L$) so that for any transitive M ,

$$(M, \in) \models \sigma_{V=L} \quad \text{iff} \quad M = L_\alpha \text{ for some limit ordinal } \alpha.$$

Now it is easy to infer the *Gödel Condensation Lemma*, a fundamental tool in the analysis of L . The result follows directly from the preceding theorem together with the Mostowski collapse.

Theorem 1.9 (Gödel Condensation Lemma): *If (X, \in) is an elementary substructure of L_α , α limit, then (X, \in) is isomorphic to some (L_β, \in) with $\beta \leq \alpha$.*

The canonical well-ordering of L

Every well-ordering on a transitive set X can be extended to a well-ordering of $\text{Def}(X)$. Note that every element of $\text{Def}(X)$ is determined by a pair (ψ, \vec{a}) , where ψ is a set-theoretic formula, and $\vec{a} = (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in X^{<\omega}$ is a finite sequence of parameters. For each $z \in \text{Def}(X)$ there may exist more than one such pair (i.e. z can have more than one definition), but by well-ordering the pairs (ψ, \vec{a}) , we can assign each $z \in \text{Def}(X)$ its *least* definition, and subsequently order $\text{Def}(X)$ by comparing least definitions. Elements already in X will form an initial segment. Such an order on the pairs (ψ, \vec{a}) can be obtained in a definable way: First use the order on X to order $X^{<\omega}$ length-lexicographically, order the formulas through their Gödel numbers, and finally say

$$(\psi, \vec{a}) < (\varphi, \vec{b}) \quad \text{iff} \quad \psi < \varphi \text{ or } (\psi < \varphi \text{ and } \vec{a} < \vec{b}).$$

Based on this, we can order all levels of L so that the following hold:

- (1) $<_L \upharpoonright V_\omega$ is the canonical well-order on V_ω .
- (2) $<_L \upharpoonright L_{\zeta+1}$ is the order on $\mathcal{P}_{\text{Def}}(L_\zeta)$ induced by $<_L \upharpoonright L_\zeta$.
- (3) $<_L \upharpoonright L_\xi = \bigcup_{\zeta < \xi} <_L \upharpoonright L_\zeta$ for a limit ordinal $\xi > \omega$.

It is straightforward to verify that this is indeed a well-ordering on L . But more importantly, for any limit ordinal $\xi > \omega$, $<_L \upharpoonright L_\xi$ is definable over L_ξ . To facilitate notation, we denote the restriction of $<_L$ to some L_ξ by $<_\xi$.

Proposition 1.10: *There is a Σ_1 formula $\varphi_{<}(x_0, x_1)$ such that for all limit ordinals $\xi > \omega$, if $a, b \in L_\xi$,*

$$L_\xi \models \varphi_{<}[a, b] \quad \text{iff} \quad a <_\xi b.$$

The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof that the sequence of $(L_\zeta)_{\zeta < \xi}$ is definable in L_ξ . It relies on the strong closure properties of L_ξ under the Sat-function.

Theorem 1.11: *If $V = L$ then AC holds.*

The Continuum Hypothesis in L

We can now present Gödel's proof that the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) holds if $V = L$.

Theorem 1.12: *If $V = L$, then for all infinite ordinals α , $\mathcal{P}(L_\alpha) \subseteq L_{\alpha^+}$.*

Proof. Assume $V = L$ and let $A \subseteq L_\alpha$. Since we assume $V = L$, there exists a limit δ so that $A \in L_\delta$. Let $X = L_\alpha \cup \{A\}$. The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem and a Mostowski collapse yield a set M such that

- (M, \in) is a transitive, elementary substructure of (L_δ, \in) ,
- $X \subseteq M \subseteq L_\delta$,
- $|M| = |X|$.

The Condensation Lemma 1.9 yields that $M = L_\zeta$ for some $\zeta \leq \delta$. Since for all $\xi \geq \omega$, $|L_\xi| = |\xi|$, we obtain

$$|M| = |X| = |L_\alpha| = |\alpha| < \alpha^+$$

and hence $A \in L_\zeta \subseteq L_{\alpha^+}$ □

Theorem 1.13: *If $V = L$ then GCH holds.*

Proof. If $V = L$, then by the preceding theorem, for each cardinal κ ,

$$\mathcal{P}(\kappa) \subseteq \mathcal{P}(L_\kappa) \subseteq L_{\kappa^+}.$$

Therefore,

$$2^\kappa \leq |L_{\kappa^+}| = \kappa^+.$$

□

In the previous proofs we have used the Axiom of Choice in various places (Löwenheim-Skolem, proof of the lemma), but since $V = L$ implies AC, this is not a problem.

References

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