

# Red Hat Security: Securing Containers & OpenShift (DO425)

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## Objectives

1. Understand, identify, and work with containerization features
  - (a) Deploy a preconfigured application and identify crucial features such as namespaces, SELinux labels, and cgroups
  - (b) Deploy a preconfigured application with security context constraint capabilities and view the application's capability set
  - (c) Configure security context constraints
2. Use trusted registries
  - (a) Load images into a registry
  - (b) Query images in a registry
3. Work with trusted container images
  - (a) Identify a trusted container image
  - (b) Sign images
  - (c) View signed images
  - (d) Scan images
  - (e) Load signed images into a registry
4. Build secure container images
  - (a) Perform simple S2I builds
  - (b) Implement S2I build hooks
  - (c) Automate builds using Jenkins
  - (d) Automate scanning and code validations as part of the build process
5. Control access to OpenShift Container Platform clusters
  - (a) Configure users with different permission levels, access, and bindings
  - (b) Configure OpenShift Container Platform to use Red Hat Identity Management services (IdM) for authentication
  - (c) Query users and groups in IdM
  - (d) Log into OpenShift Container Platform using an IdM managed account
6. Configure single sign-on (SSO)
  - (a) Install SSO authentication

- (b) Configure OpenShift Container Platform to use SSO

- (c) Integrate web applications with SSO

## 7. Automate policy-based deployments

- (a) Configure policies to control the use of images and registries

- (b) Use secrets to provide access to external registries

- (c) Automatically pull and use images from a registry

- (d) Use triggers to verify that automated deployments work

## 8. Manage orchestration

- (a) Restrict nodes on which containers may run

- (b) Use quotas to limit resource utilization

- (c) Use secrets to automate access to resources

## 9. Configure network isolation

- (a) Create software-defined networks (SDN)

- (b) Associate containers and projects with SDNs

## 10. Configure and manage secure container storage

- (a) Configure and secure file-based container storage

- (b) Configure and secure block-based container storage

# 1. Describing Host Security Technologies

## INTRODUCING THE RHEL AND CRI-O CONTAINER TOOLS

- invoke the `crictl` locally from an OpenShift master or node, not remotely like `oc`
- `crictl` = tool to interface with the CRI-O container engine from Kubernetes

```
NAME:
  crictl - client for CRI
USAGE:
  crictl [global options] command [command options] [arguments...]
VERSION:
  unknown
COMMANDS:
  attach      Attach to a running container
  create      Create a new container
  exec        Run command in a running container
  version     Display runtime version information
  images      List images
  inspect     Display the status of one or more containers
  inspecti    Return the status of one or more images
  inspectp    Display the status of one or more pods
  logs        Fetch the logs of a container
  port-forward Forward local port to a pod
  ps          List containers
  pull        Pull an image from registry
  runp        Run a new pod
  rm          Remove one or more containers
  rmi         Remove one or more images
  rmp         Remove one or more pods
  pods        List pods
  start       Start one or more created containers
  info        Display information of the container runtime
  stop        Stop one or more running containers
  stopp       Stop one or more running pods
  update      Update one or more running containers
  config      Get and set crictl options
  stats       List container(s) resource usage statistics
  completion  Output bash shell completion code
  help, h     Show a list of commands or help for one command
GLOBAL OPTIONS:
  --config value, -c value      Location of the client config file (default: "/etc/crictl.yaml")
                                [$CRI_CONFIG_FILE]
  --debug, -D                  Enable debug mode
  --image-endpoint value, -i value Endpoint of CRI image manager service [$IMAGE_SERVICE_ENDPOINT]
  --runtime-endpoint value, -r value Endpoint of CRI container runtime service (default:
                                "unix:///var/run/dockerhim.sock") [$CONTAINER_RUNTIME_ENDPOINT]
  --timeout value, -t value     Timeout of connecting to the server (default: 10s)
  --help, -h                    show help
  --version, -v                 print the version
```

- `skopeo` = tool to manage container images stored in the local file system and in container registries

```
NAME:
  skopeo - Various operations with container images and container image registries
USAGE:
  skopeo [global options] command [command options] [arguments...]
VERSION:
  0.1.32
COMMANDS:
```

copy	Copy an IMAGE-NAME from one location to another
inspect	Inspect image IMAGE-NAME
delete	Delete image IMAGE-NAME
manifest-digest	Compute a manifest digest of a file
standalone-sign	Create a signature using local files
standalone-verify	Verify a signature using local files

GLOBAL OPTIONS:

--debug	enable debug output
--policy value	Path to a trust policy file
--insecure-policy	run the tool without any policy check
--registries.d DIR	use registry configuration files in DIR (e.g. for container signature storage)
--override-arch ARCH	use ARCH instead of the architecture of the machine for choosing images
--override-os OS	use OS instead of the running OS for choosing images
--command-timeout value	timeout for the command execution (default: 0s)
--help, -h	show help
--version, -v	print the version

- podman = tool to start and manage standalone containers on OCI-compliant container engines (podman build = buildah)

NAME:  
podman - manage pods and images

USAGE:  
podman [global options] command [command options] [arguments...]

VERSION:  
1.0.5

COMMANDS:

attach	Attach to a running container
commit	Create new image based on the changed container
container	Manage Containers
build	Build an image using instructions from Dockerfiles
create	Create but do not start a container
diff	Inspect changes on container's file systems
exec	Run a process in a running container
export	Export container's filesystem contents as a tar archive
history	Show history of a specified image
image	Manage images
images	List images in local storage
import	Import a tarball to create a filesystem image
info	Display podman system information
inspect	Displays the configuration of a container or image
kill	Kill one or more running containers with a specific signal
load	Load an image from docker archive
login	Login to a container registry
logout	Logout of a container registry
logs	Fetch the logs of a container
mount	Mount a working container's root filesystem
pause	Pauses all the processes in one or more containers
list, ls, ps	List containers
pod	Manage pods
port	List port mappings or a specific mapping for the container
pull	Pull an image from a registry
push	Push an image to a specified destination
restart	Restart one or more containers
rm	Remove one or more containers
rmi	Removes one or more images from local storage
run	Run a command in a new container
save	Save image to an archive
search	Search registry for image
start	Start one or more containers
stats	Display percentage of CPU, memory, network I/O, block I/O and PIDs for one or more containers
stop	Stop one or more containers

tag	Add an additional name to a local image
top	Display the running processes of a container
umount, unmount	Unmounts working container's root filesystem
unpause	Unpause the processes in one or more containers
version	Display the Podman Version Information
volume	Manage volumes
wait	Block on one or more containers
help, h	Shows a list of commands or help for one command

#### GLOBAL OPTIONS:

--cgroup-manager value	cgroup manager to use (cgroupfs or systemd, default systemd)
--cni-config-dir value	path of the configuration directory for CNI networks
--common value	path of the common binary
--cpu-profile value	path for the cpu profiling results
--hooks-dir value	set the OCI hooks directory path (may be set multiple times)
--log-level value	log messages above specified level: debug, info, warn, error (default), fatal or panic (default: "error")
--namespace value	set the libpod namespace, used to create separate views of the containers and pods on the system
--root value	path to the root directory in which data, including images, is stored
--tmpdir value	path to the tmp directory
--runroot value	path to the 'run directory' where all state information is stored
--runtime value	path to the OCI-compatible binary used to run containers, default is /usr/bin/runc
--storage-driver value, -s value	select which storage driver is used to manage storage of images and containers (default is overlay)
--storage-opt value	used to pass an option to the storage driver
--syslog	output logging information to syslog as well as the console
--help, -h	show help
--version, -v	print the version

- buildah = tool to build container images

#### NAME:

buildah - an image builder

#### USAGE:

buildah [global options] command [command options] [arguments...]

#### VERSION:

1.5 (image-spec 1.0.0, runtime-spec 1.0.0)

#### COMMANDS:

add	Add content to the container
build-using-dockerfile, bud	Build an image using instructions in a Dockerfile
commit	Create an image from a working container
config	Update image configuration settings
containers	List working containers and their base images
copy	Copy content into the container
from	Create a working container based on an image
images	List images in local storage
inspect	Inspects the configuration of a container or image
mount	Mount a working container's root filesystem
pull	Pull an image from the specified location
push	Push an image to a specified destination
rename	Rename a container
rm, delete	Remove one or more working containers
rmi	removes one or more images from local storage
run	Run a command inside of the container
tag	Add an additional name to a local image
umount, unmount	Unmounts the root file system on the specified working containers
unshare	Run a command in a modified user namespace
version	Display the Buildah Version Information
help, h	Shows a list of commands or help for one command

#### GLOBAL OPTIONS:

--debug	print debugging information
---------	-----------------------------

```

--registries-conf value          path to registries.conf file (not usually used)
    [$REGISTRIES_CONFIG_PATH]
--registries-conf-dir value      path to registries.conf.d directory (not usually used)
--root value                     storage root dir (default:
    "/home/lmaly/.local/share/containers/storage")
--runroot value                  storage state dir (default: "/run/user/104536")
--storage-driver value           storage driver (default: "overlay")
--storage-opt value              storage driver option (default:
    "overlay.override_kernel_check=true")
--usersn-uid-map ctrID:hostID:length default ctrID:hostID:length UID mapping to use
--usersn-gid-map ctrID:hostID:length default ctrID:hostID:length GID mapping to use
--help, -h                       show help
--version, -v                     print the version

```

## INSPECTING THE LINUX NAMESPACES

- unshare = command to create new namespaces

### Usage:

```
unshare [options] [<program> [<argument>...]]
```

Run a program with some namespaces unshared from the parent.

### Options:

```

-m, --mount[=<file>]            unshare mounts namespace
-u, --uts[=<file>]              unshare UTS namespace (hostname etc)
-i, --ipc[=<file>]              unshare System V IPC namespace
-n, --net[=<file>]              unshare network namespace
-p, --pid[=<file>]              unshare pid namespace
-U, --user[=<file>]             unshare user namespace
-C, --cgroup[=<file>]          unshare cgroup namespace
-f, --fork                      fork before launching <program>
    --kill-child[=<signame>]    when dying, kill the forked child (implies --fork); defaults to SIGKILL
    --mount-proc[=<dir>]        mount proc filesystem first (implies --mount)
-r, --map-root-user             map current user to root (implies --user)
    --propagation slave|shared|private|unchanged
                                modify mount propagation in mount namespace
-s, --setgroups allow|deny      control the setgroups syscall in user namespaces
-h, --help                     display this help
-V, --version                   display version

```

```
unshare --uts --net /bin/sh          # starts a shell in new UTS and
    network namespaces
```

```
unshare --ipc --uts --net --mount sleep 1h &          # starts a sleep command in the
    background in four namespaces: IPC, UTS, network, and mount, returns PID e.g. 8672
```

- lsns = command to list all the namespaces on the system

### Usage:

```
lsns [options] [<namespace>]
```

List system namespaces.

### Options:

```

-J, --json                      use JSON output format
-l, --list                      use list format output
-n, --noheadings                don't print headings
-o, --output <list>             define which output columns to use
-p, --task <pid>               print process namespaces
-r, --raw                      use the raw output format
-u, --notruncate                don't truncate text in columns
-W, --nowrap                    don't use multi-line representation
-t, --type <name>              namespace type (mnt, net, ipc, user, pid, uts, cgroup)
-h, --help                     display this help
-V, --version                   display version

```

Available output columns:

NS	namespace identifier (inode number)
TYPE	kind of namespace
PATH	path to the namespace
NPROCS	number of processes in the namespace
PID	lowest PID in the namespace
PPID	PPID of the PID
COMMAND	command line of the PID
UID	UID of the PID
USER	username of the PID
NETNSID	namespace ID as used by network subsystem
NSFS	nsfs mountpoint (usually used network subsystem)

lsns -p 8672

*# similar to ls -l /proc/8672/ns*

- **nsenter** = command to run a program in an existing namespace, if you do not provide a command as argument, **nsenter** runs `/bin/bash`

Usage:

**nsenter** [options] [<program> [<argument>...]]

Run a program with namespaces of other processes.

Options:

-a, --all	enter all namespaces
-t, --target <pid>	target process to get namespaces from
-m, --mount[=<file>]	enter mount namespace
-u, --uts[=<file>]	enter UTS namespace (hostname etc)
-i, --ipc[=<file>]	enter System V IPC namespace
-n, --net[=<file>]	enter network namespace
-p, --pid[=<file>]	enter pid namespace
-C, --cgroup[=<file>]	enter cgroup namespace
-U, --user[=<file>]	enter user namespace
-S, --setuid <uid>	set uid in entered namespace
-G, --setgid <gid>	set gid in entered namespace
--preserve-credentials do not touch uids or gids	
-r, --root[=<dir>]	set the root directory
-w, --wd[=<dir>]	set the working directory
-F, --no-fork	do not fork before exec'ing <program>
-Z, --follow-context	set SELinux context according to --target PID
-h, --help	display this help
-V, --version	display version

**nsenter -t 8672 --net ip addr**

*# lists the network devices and*

*addresses in a network namespace*

**nsenter -t 8672 --ipc --uts --net --mount**

*# execute a shell in multiple*

*namespaces at the same time*

- **runc** = Open Container Initiative runtime

USAGE:

**runc** [global options] command [command options] [arguments...]

VERSION:

spec: 1.0.1-dev

COMMANDS:

checkpoint	checkpoint a running container
create	create a container
delete	delete any resources held by the container often used with detached container
events	display container events such as OOM notifications, cpu, memory, and IO usage statistics
exec	execute new process inside the container
init	initialize the namespaces and launch the process (do not call it outside of runc)
kill	kill sends the specified signal (default: SIGTERM) to the container's init process
list	lists containers started by runc with the given root

```

pause      pause suspends all processes inside the container
ps         ps displays the processes running inside a container
restore    restore a container from a previous checkpoint
resume     resumes all processes that have been previously paused
run        create and run a container
spec       create a new specification file
start      executes the user defined process in a created container
state      output the state of a container
update     update container resource constraints
help, h    Shows a list of commands or help for one command

```

#### GLOBAL OPTIONS:

```

--debug          enable debug output for logging
--log value      set the log file path where internal debug information is written (default:
                 "/dev/null")
--log-format value set the format used by logs ('text' (default), or 'json') (default: "text")
--root value     root directory for storage of container state (this should be located in tmpfs)
                 (default: "/run/user/1000/runc")
--criu value     path to the criu binary used for checkpoint and restore (default: "criu")
--systemd-cgroup enable systemd cgroup support, expects cgroupsPath to be of form "slice:prefix:name"
                 for e.g. "system.slice:runc:434234"
--rootless value ignore cgroup permission errors ('true', 'false', or 'auto') (default: "auto")
--help, -h      show help
--version, -v   print the version

```

When you create a pod, OpenShift runs the 'pod' process to create these namespaces and place the container processes in them. This means that all containers in a pod share the same network, the same System V IPC objects, and have the same host name.

#### How to find PID in OpenShift?

```

oc describe pod myweb-1-bmmwq | grep 'Container ID'          # 7084...383d
runc state 7084...383d | grep "pid"                          # 8997
nsenter -t 8997 -p -r ps -ef                                # To use the ps command in a
                                                             container namespace, also specify the -r or --root option to get the same file systems as the
                                                             container. This is because the ps command uses the /proc file system to list the processes, and it
                                                             needs to use the one from the container hierarchy and not the one from the host system.

```

#### SECURING CONTAINERS WITH SELINUX

- With OpenShift, containers processes always get the `container_t` context type when they start, and the files and directories the containers need to access on the host system gets the `container_file_t` context type.
- MCS (Multi Category Security) is a SELinux feature that solves issue of containers protect themselves from other container by taking advantage of the level part of the context: `system_u:system_r:container_t:s0:c4,c9` (s0=sensitives, c4,c9=categories). Sensitivity is not used, but categories are. Category values are between c0 and c1023 each. When a container starts, the system assigns two random categories to the processes in the container. But OpenShift behaves differently when assigning the SELinux categories - OpenShift allocates the two random categories at the project level. Therefore, and by default, all pods and containers in a project get the same category pair. This is useful when multiple containers in the project need to access the same shared volume.

#### MANAGING RESOURCES WITH CGROUPS

```

cat /proc/1938/cgroup          # Systemd automatically organizes its
                               services in control group hierarchies. It places all services under the /system.slice control groups
ls -l /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/system.slice/rsyslog.service/           # this is the standard structure
systemd-cgls                   # list all the control groups on the
                               system
tree -d /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/kubepods.slice/                       # this is OpenShift/Kube specific
                               structure

```



```

lab host-isolation start
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project host-isolation
oc new-app -f ~/D0425/labs/host-isolation/host-isolation.yml          # isol pod contains postgresql &
    httpd containers
oc describe pod isol | grep 'Node:|Container ID:'                    # returns node1 and IDs
ssh root@node1.lab.example.com
runc state <ID1,2> | grep pid                                         # returns PID1, PID2
lsns -p <PID1,2>                                                      # lists the namespaces associated
    with the two containers, compare 'uts', 'ipc', 'net' numbers - they are the same for both
nsenter -t <PID1> -n ip addr
nsenter -t <PID1> -p -r ps -ef                                       # container only sees its processes,
    and the PIDs start at 1 inside the container
nsenter -t <PID1> -u hostname                                        # isol
nsenter -t <PID1> -u hostname mynewname                             # change hostname to 'mynewname'
nsenter -t <PID2> -u hostname                                        # mynewname, because the two
    containers share the same UTS namespace
ps -Z -p <PID1>,<PID2>                                                # both have the same categories -
    e.g. c5,c11
runc state <ID1> | grep rootfs                                        #
    /var/lib/containers/storage/overlay/<ID>/merged/
ls -Zd </var/lib/containers/storage/overlay...>                     # same categories c5,c11
oc get pod isol -o yaml | grep uid                                   # on the workstation get UID of the
    pod, e.g. 8a8285dc-e350-11e8-88a6-52540000fa0a
oc get pod isol -o yaml | grep containerID                           # also look for a containerID of the
    container you want (e.g. httpd)
cd /sys/fs/cgroup/memory/kubepods.slice/kubepods-burstable.slice/   # on the node
cd kubepods-burstable-pod<UID>.slice/                               # or cd *8a8285dc*
cd crio-<containerID>.scope/
grep <PID1 or 2> tasks                                               # returns PID1 or 2
cat memory.limit_in_bytes                                           # e.g. 67108864
cat memory.usage_in_bytes                                           # e.g. 9691136
lab host-isolation finish

```

## LISTING AVAILABLE LINUX CAPABILITIES & LIMITING THEM

```

capsh --print                                                         # capsh (Capabilities Shell) is a
    utility for viewing the available capabilities on a system for user running it
cat /proc/<PID>/status | grep Cap                                     # capabilities for process: CaCapInh
    (inheritable), CapPrm (permitted), CapEff (permission checks), CapBnd (bounding set), CapAmb (ambient)
capsh --decode=0000003fffffffff                                     # decode HEX
capsh --print -- -c "ping -c 1 localhost"                             # contains cap_net_raw among other
    things
capsh --drop=cap_net_raw --print -- -c "ping -c 1 localhost"         # drops the cap_net_raw capability
    which makes the ping fail

```

## MANAGING CAPABILITIES IN CONTAINERS

- Podman possess a set of two options for managing capabilities: --cap-add and --cap-drop
- Default common capabilities by podman: cap\_chown, cap\_mknod, cap\_dac\_override, cap\_audit\_write, cap\_setfcap, cap\_fsetid

```

podman run --rm -it --name=capabilities rhel7/7.5 capsh --print
podman run --rm -it --cap-add=sys_time --name=test_caps rhel7/7.5 capsh --print # adds change system time
    capability

```

Avoid CAP\_SYS\_ADMIN, which is too broad.

## INTRODUCING SECURE COMPUTING MODE seccomp

- If a process attempts to perform a system call that it is not allowed to performed, the process is terminated according the policy that is in place

- Two modes:
- A) allows a process to make only four system calls: `read()`, `write()`, `_exit()`, and `sigreturn()`. With this seccomp mode enabled, processes cannot fork new threads, nor monitor network activity.
- B) seccomp-bpf Kernel extension allows generic system call filtering. For example, you can define a rule that allows a process to only access certain files. seccomp allows you to define a profile that contains a set of filters, which are applied to every system call that submitted from a process to the kernel.

## RESTRICTING PROCESSES WITH `seccomp`

- To enable seccomp protection, a parent process sets a profile right before forking a child process
- Podman allows you to use the `--security-opt` option to attach a security profile to your container
- Two annotations:
- A) `seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/pod`
- B) `container.seccomp.security.alpha.kubernetes.io/<container_name>`

An example of the `custom_policy.json`:

```
{
  "defaultAction": "SCMP_ACT_ALLOW",
  "architectures": [
    "SCMP_ARCH_X86_64",
    "SCMP_ARCH_X86",
    "SCMP_ARCH_X32"
  ],
  "syscalls": [
    {
      "names": [
        "chroot"
      ],
      "action": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
      "args": [],
      "comment": "",
      "includes": {
        "caps": [
          "CAP_SYS_CHROOT"
        ]
      },
      "excludes": {}
    }
  ]
}
```

Attach this policy to a container using Podman and test it:

```
sudo podman run --rm -it --security-opt seccomp=custom_policy.json --name chroot rhscl/httpd-24-rhel7
chroot / # not permitted
grep Seccomp /proc/10/status # inspect the status file of any
child process running inside the container
```

Another example:

```
. . .
"syscalls": [
  { "name": "fchmodat",
    "action": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
    "args": []
  },
```

```
{ "name": "fchowmat",
  "action": "SCMP_ACT_ERRNO",
  "args": []
}
]
```

## Default seccomp profile

- Provides a sane default for running containers with seccomp and disables around 44 system calls out of 300+. It is moderately protective while providing wide application compatibility. The default Docker profile can be found:

`less /etc/docker/seccomp.json` - defaultAction is deny

```
# 3 actions:
SCMP_ACT_ALLOW
SCMP_ACT_KILL
SCMP_ACT_ERRNO
```

In effect, the profile is a whitelist which denies access to system calls by default, then whitelists specific system calls. The profile works by defining a `defaultAction` of `SCMP_ACT_ERRNO` and overriding that action only for specific system calls. The effect of `SCMP_ACT_ERRNO` is to cause a `Permission Denied` error. Next, the profile defines a specific list of system calls which are fully allowed, because their `action` is overridden to be `SCMP_ACT_ALLOW`. Finally, some specific rules are for individual system calls such as `personality`, and others, to allow variants of those system calls with specific arguments.

`strace -cf ping 172.25.250.13` shows table with used system calls

```
# It is not recommended to change the default seccomp profile, but rather --cap-add or --cap-drop:
podman run --name testsec -dit --security-opt=seccomp=seccomp.json --cap-drop NET_BIND_SERVICE hello-world
podman attach testsec
```

## Limitations:

1. Filtering policies apply to the entire pod or container, and not only to the application running inside a container. Consider also the system calls that the container runtime makes when starting the container.
2. OpenShift does not support yet policy precedence. If developer defines custom profile for their containers, it overrides the default profile by OpenShift.

## Identifying System Calls that Processes Invoke:

1. Creating a container with the `SYS_PTRACE` capability. This capability allows a container to trace arbitrary processes using `ptrace`
2. Invoking the `strace` command from inside the container.
3. Locating the commands that are invoked.
4. Updating the security policy to include all relevant system calls.
5. Instantiating a new container with the updated security profile.

## LAB 1.2

```
lab host-privilege start
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project host-privilege
podman search registry.lab.example.com/http
oc new-app -f ~/D0425/labs/host-privilege/host-privilege.yml
oc get pods
oc rsh httpd bash
  capsh --print
    cap_chown is listed
touch test-cap
```

*# 4 images*

*# ensure httpd pod is running*  
*# open bash on the pod*  
*# list current capabilities,*

```

chown nobody test-cap # it works
exit
oc describe pod httpd | grep Node: # retrieve the node where the pod is
    running
oc describe pod httpd | grep cri-o # get the container ID
ssh root@node1 # connect to the node on which your
    container is running
runc state <containerID> | grep pid # inspect the container, get PID
grep Cap /proc/<PID>/status | grep CapInh # check the capabilities
capsh --decode=000000000000425fb # obtain the list of capabilities of
    the CapInh - inherited set, cap_chown is present
exit
oc delete pod httpd
cd ~/D0425/labs/host-privilege/
cat host-privilege-drop.yml
    containers:
    - image: rhsc1/httpd-24-rhel7:latest
      name: httpd
      securityContext:
        runAsUser: 0
        capabilities:
          drop:
            - CHOWN
oc new-app -f host-privilege-drop.yml # recreate the application with this
    template
oc rsh httpd bash
    capsh --print # cap_chown is not present
    touch test-cap
    chown nobody test-cap # operation not permitted
    exit
oc delete pod httpd
sudo podman run -dit --name dev-seccomp --hostname seccomp-unrestricted
    registry.lab.example.com/rhel7/rhel-tools # create a container dev-seccomp
sudo podman exec dev-seccomp bash # log in to the container
    ps # bash PID is 13
    grep Seccomp /proc/13/status # Seccomp: 2 = enabled & filtering
    mode
    chmod 400 /etc/hosts # works
    chown nobody /etc/hosts # works
    exit
cat ~/D0425/labs/host-privilege/seccomp-profile.json # fchmodat & fchownat are
    SCMP_ACT_ERRNO
sudo podman run -dit --name dev-seccomp-restricted --hostname seccomp-restricted --security-opt
    seccomp=seccomp-profile.json registry.lab.example.com/rhel7/rhel-tools:latest
    # second container called dev-seccomp-restricted
    and attach it the security profile by using the --security-opt
sudo podman exec dev-seccomp-restricted bash # log in to the container
    chmod 400 /etc/hosts # operation not permitted
    chown nobody /etc/hosts # operation not permitted
    exit
sudo podman stop dev-seccomp && sudo podman rm dev-seccomp # cleanup
sudo podman stop dev-seccomp-restricted && sudo podman rm dev-seccomp-restricted
lab host-privilege finish

```

## 2. Establishing Trusted Container Images

Red Hat OpenShift Platform v3.11 points to the new registry.redhat.io registry by default

```
podman login registry.redhat.io # Podman stores your encrypted  
credentials in a file called /run/user/<UID>/containers/auth.json  
skopeo inspect --creds developer1:MyS3cret! docker://registry.redhat.io/rhsc1/postgresql-96-rhel7 # Skopeo  
uses the auth.json file from podman login, but you can alternatively do --creds (or  
--src-creds/--dest-creds for copy)  
podman logout registry.redhat.io  
podman logout --all
```

### QUAY

```
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com  
podman pull quay.apps.lab.example.com/developer2/rhel-tools:latest # or have the rhel-tools public and  
then you don't need auth
```

### Configuring Jenkins to support Quay integration

To use Quay as the container image registry, some requirements must be addressed: The Quay repository must use a valid SSL certificate to communicate with OpenShift and Jenkins. If you are using self-signed certificates, each node from OpenShift must have the self-signed certificate in the Quay's certificate directory (/etc/docker/certs.d/<quay-URI>). Furthermore, the Jenkins slave container must have the certificate to sign the container image as well as the skopeo command line to push changes to the registry.

### LAB 2.1

```
lab containers-registries start  
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com  
oc project quay-enterprise # groups all resources of Quay  
oc get pods # Quay does not support running the  
database on OpenShift, but in the lab it does (you'll see clair, clair-postgresql, quay,  
quay-postgresql, redis)  
oc get routes # e.g.  
https://quay.apps.lab.example.com  
# Configure Quay here via web GUI (admin/redhat123) - create user, change password, create organisation  
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com # on the workstation  
skopeo copy docker://registry.lab.example.com/httpd:latest  
docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/exampledev/httpd:latest  
podman logout quay.apps.lab.example.com  
sudo -i  
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com # as developer1  
podman pull quay.apps.lab.example.com/exampledev/httpd:latest  
podman logout quay.apps.lab.example.com  
lab containers-registries finish
```

### Using Images Annotations for Security

```
<namespace containing image's quality>/<vulnerability|policy>.<provider ID>  
quality.images.openshift.io/vulnerability.redhatcatalog: {SEE THE EXAMPLE BELOW}  
quality.images.openshift.io/vulnerability.jfrog: {SEE THE EXAMPLE BELOW}  
quality.images.openshift.io/license.blackduck: {SEE THE EXAMPLE BELOW}  
quality.images.openshift.io/vulnerability.openscap: {SEE THE EXAMPLE BELOW}
```

Each annotation supports these fields:

- name (provider display name),
- timestamp of the scan,
- description (not required),
- reference,

- scannerVersion,
- compliant (yes x no),
- summary (label [critical/important], data, severityIndex, reference)

Example:

```
{
  "name": "Red Hat Container Catalog",
  "description": "Container health index",
  "timestamp": "2016-09-08T05:04:46Z",
  "reference": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2016:1566",
  "compliant": null,
  "scannerVersion": "1.2",
  "summary": [
    {
      "label": "Health index",
      "data": "B",
      "severityIndex": 1,
      "reference": null
    }
  ]
}
```

```
oc describe is <image stream> -n openshift # read the status of an image stream
to see the annotation
```

The annotation `images.openshift.io/deny-execution=true` is added by a security scanner, to define a policy that admission plugin prevents images from being retrieved if they are not marked as compliant: `vim /etc/origin/master/master-config.yml:`

```
admissionConfig:
  pluginConfig:
    openshift.io/ImagePolicy:
      configuration:
        kind: ImagePolicyConfig
        apiVersion: v1
        resolveImages: AttemptRewrite
        executionRules:
        - name: execution-denied
          onResources:
            - resource: pods
          reject: true
          matchImageAnnotations:
            - key: images.openshift.io/deny-execution
              value: "true"
          skipOnResolutionFailure: true
```

```
master-restart api
master-restart controllers
```

## Image signing and verification

- Signer server is the host responsible for generating the signature that embeds the image manifest digest and publish the signature to the signatures server
- On the server, the `/etc/containers/registries.d/registry.yaml` location contains configuration files that specify where signatures are stored after their generation and where to download signature for each registry - e.g. `registry.yaml`:

```
docker:
  registry.example.com:
    sigstore-staging: file:///var/lib/atomic/sigstore # stores new sigs under the filesystem
    sigstore: http://sigstore.lab.example.com # retrieves them from web
```

Configure clients (nodes pulling images) - you can have different policies for different nodes:

```
vim /etc/containers/policy.json # images require signatures?
```

Allow only images from the registry.lab.example.com server. All other images are rejected:

```
{
  "default": [
    {
      "type": "reject"
    }
  ],
  "transports": {
    "docker-daemon": {
      "": [
        {
          "type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
        }
      ]
    },
    "docker": {
      "registry.lab.example.com": [
        {
          "type": "signedBy",
          "keyType": "GPGKeys",
          "keyPath": "/home/signer/pub/image-signer-pub.gpg"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}
```

## LAB 2.2

```
lab containers-images start
sudo rngd -r /dev/urandom -o /dev/random # ignore warnings, they are harmless
ps ax | grep rngd # see if the previous command is
running
gpg2 --gen-key # generate GPG key pair as a student,
do not 'su'
RSA
1024
0
y
Real name # "Image Signer"
Email address # student@lab.example.com
0 # (0)key
reset
gpg2 --list-keys # /home/student/.gnupg/pubring.gpg
# Export the public key to the application nodes (import signer_key.pub to node1, 2)
lab containers-images configure
# Signatures are stored by default in the /var/lib/atomic/sigstore directory - this is exposed as
http://sigstore.lab.example.com
ssh node1 cat /etc/containers/registries.d/registry.yaml
docker:
  registry.lab.example.com:
    sigstore-staging: file:///var/lib/atomic/sigstore
    sigstore: http://sigstore.lab.example.com
# SSH to connect to node1 in order to ensure that the node can access the signatures over HTTP
ssh node1 curl http://sigstore.lab.example.com # ensure that the node can access the
signatures over HTTP
ssh node2 curl http://sigstore.lab.example.com
```

```
podman search registry.lab.example.com/mongodb-32-rhel7 # ensure that the mongodb-32-rhel7
    image is present
skopeo copy --sign-by student@lab.example.com
    docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhsc1/mongodb-32-rhel7:latest
    docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhsc1/mongodb-32-rhel7:signed
    signature # --sign-by option allows you to generate a detached
firefox http://sigstore.lab.example.com # look at the signature in rhsc1
    folder
skopeo inspect docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhsc1/mongodb-32-rhel7:signed | grep Digest # same
    signature
ssh root@node1
vim /etc/containers/policy.json # unsigned images rejected
...output omitted...
{
    "default": [
        {
            "type": "reject"
        }
    ],
    ...output omitted...
    "docker": {
        "registry.lab.example.com": [
            {
                "type": "signedBy",
                "keyType": "GPGKeys",
                "keyPath": "/root/.gnupg/pubring.gpg"
            }
        ]
    }
}
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project containers-images
oc new-app -f ~/D0425/labs/containers-images/containers-images.yaml # contains unsigned httpd and signed
    mongo
oc get pods # httpd will be ImagePullBackOff,
    because it isn't signed
oc describe pod httpd | grep 'Source image rejected'
oc delete project containers-images
lab containers-images finish
```

## Inspecting image layers

```
mkdir /tmp/mongo
skopeo copy docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhsc1/mongodb-32-rhel7 dir:/tmp/mongo # extracts the
rhsc1/mongodb-32-rhel7 image in the /tmp/mongo/ directory
ls /tmp/mongo
cat /tmp/mongo/manifest.json
  schemaVersion # 2 for OCI
  config # image metadata, location of the
config in the folder structure
  layers # base layer first (size, digest ...)
mkdir /tmp/layer
tar xf /tmp/mongo/9205...f599 -C /tmp/layer # layer is a compressed tar file
ls /tmp/layer # bin/ boot/ dev/ ..., other layers
only contain additions or modifications to those base directories
```

## # Examining Packages with rpm

```
rpm -qa                                # query all packages installed
rpm -qi <PACKAGE>                     # info about the package
rpm -ql <PACKAGE>                     # files installed by the specified
    package
rpm -q --scripts                      # install/remove scripts
```

### # Listing the RPM Packages in an Image Layer

```
rpm -q -a --root /tmp/layer # list all packages in layer
```



```
rpm -q bash --root /tmp/layer # list package bash in layer
rpm -q bash -i --root /tmp/layer # info about bash in layer
```

## Introducing Clair

```
oc logs clair-2-bfp2c | grep fetching # Clair log shows the retrieval of
the vulnerability metadata from the Internet
```

- Clair only analyses images based on Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Alpine Linux, Debian, Oracle Linux, and Ubuntu because it only retrieves the vulnerabilities from these system vendors or projects
- Clair also limits its scan to the distribution packages and does NOT check vulnerabilities in your application code, or libraries or artifacts retrieved from other sources

## LAB 2.3

```
lab containers-scanning start
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com # admin/redhat123
skopeo copy docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhsc1/mongodb-32-rhel7
      docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/admin/mongodb-32-rhel7
skopeo copy docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhsc1/php-56-rhel7
      docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/admin/php-56-rhel7
podman logout quay.apps.lab.example.com
# While Quay is scanning, inspect the layers
mkdir /tmp/php
skopeo copy docker://registry.lab.example.com/rhsc1/php-56-rhel7 dir:/tmp/php
cat /tmp/php/manifest.json
{
  "schemaVersion": 2,
  "config": {
    "digest": "sha256:520f...f381"
  },
},
"layers": [
  {
    ...
  },
  {
    "digest": "sha256:e0b3...4dad"
  }
]
}
# Object containing more details (build, author, ports, env) about the image is located in:
cat /tmp/php/520f...f381 | python -m json.tool # config digest = config folder
# Extract the lowest layer of the image:
mkdir /tmp/php/layer
sudo tar xf e0b3...4dad -C /tmp/php/layer # extract lowest layer (last entry),
must be sudo
ls /tmp/php/layer
rpm -qa --root /tmp/php/layer
rpm -q patch --root /tmp/php/layer # retrieve the version of the patch
package in the layer
sudo rm -rf /tmp/php
# See if Quay found vulnerabilities in the 'patch' package 2.7.1-8.el7 - yes, fixable by updating to
2.7.1-10.el7
lab containers-scanning finish
```

## FINAL LAB 2

TBA

### 3. Implementing Security in the Build Process

#### Implementing Image Change Triggers

```
oc set triggers bc build-config-name --from-image="image:tag"      # change made to that image stream
                           automatically starts a build process, this configures image change trigger in an existing build config.

# The hook fails if the script or command returns a non-zero exit code or if starting the temporary
# container fails. In that case, the image is not pushed to the registry.
oc set build-hook bc/build-config-name --post-commit --command -- <command> # create build hook in an
existing bc (or instead of --command, use --script="/path/to/script")
```

#### LAB 3.1

```
lab build-s2i start
git clone http://services.lab.example.com/openshift-tasks
cat home/student/D0425/labs/build-s2i/security.txt                # It uses findbugs-maven-plugin
                           profile
cat /home/student/openshift-tasks/pom.xml                        # append to the last closing element
                           the content of security.txt (last <profile> section in <profiles>)
cd openshift-tasks
git add .
git commit -m "Added Security support"
git push
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project build-s2i
oc new-app --build-env
MAVEN_MIRROR_URL=http://services.lab.example.com:8081/nexus/content/groups/training-java
jboss-eap71-openshift:latest-http://services.lab.example.com/openshift-tasks
                           # start a S2I build, MAVEN_MIRROR_URL parameter is used by the build to
                           download the dependencies from an internal repository as the Internet is not available; creates
                           is/bc/dc/svc
oc logs -f builds/openshift-tasks-1                             # check the build is running - found
                           pom.xml, attempted to build using mvn, builds war and creates image + pushes it to OCR
oc set build-hook bc/openshift-tasks --post-commit --script="cd /tmp/src; mvn test -Psecurity" # update
                           hook to invoke the security check plugin as part of build
oc export bc/openshift-tasks | grep -A1 postCommit               # inspect build configuration
postCommit:
script: cd /tmp/src; mvn test -Psecurity
oc start-build openshift-tasks                                   # test the build hook, starts build 2
oc logs -f builds/openshift-tasks-2                             # inspect if the web hook was
                           executed. It shows mvn not found + cannot set terminal process group (-1): Inappropriate ioctl for
                           device
oc set triggers bc openshift-tasks --from-image='jboss-eap71-openshift:latest' # configure the build
                           configuration to execute the build process again when the IS is updated (this was already created by bc)
oc export bc/openshift-tasks | grep -A5 "ImageChange"           # ensure that the image change
                           trigger is created
# Unpack the container image to push the update the classroom registry:
cd ~/D0425/labs/build-s2i/
tar xzf eap71-openshift.tar.gz                                   # unpack the container
skopeo copy oci:eap71-openshift-1.3-17 docker://registry.lab.example.com/jboss-eap-7/eap71-openshift:latest
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc import-image jboss-eap71-openshift:latest --confirm -n openshift # update the internal registry with
                           the container image from the classroom registry
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc get builds                                                     # build 3 is running automatically
oc logs -f build/openshift-tasks-3                               # running post-commit hook works
oc expose svc openshift-tasks
firefox http://openshift-tasks-build-s2i.apps.lab.example.com    # if you see website, it is OK
lab build-s2i finish
```

Ensure Jenkins is deployed

```
oc new-app jenkins --param ENABLE_OAUTH=true # deploy Jenkins container with
persistent storage and use the OCP credentials to log in to it
```

To create Jenkins pipeline, you have to create this resource:

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: BuildConfig
//omitted
strategy:
  jenkinsPipelineStrategy:
    jenkinsfile: |-
      def mvnCmd = "mvn -s configuration/cicd-settings.xml"
      pipeline {
        agent {
          label 'maven'
        }
        //stages omitted
      }
    type: JenkinsPipeline
```

```
oc create -f definition.yaml
oc start-build buildconfig-name
```

Integration point in a Jenkins Pipeline - slave hosts are started as containers using a Jenkins Kubernetes plugin:

- <name> is the name of the slave used in Jenkinsfile (agent - label)
-  # image used to
        start build process
      # configuration omitted
    </org.csanchez.jenkins.plugins.kubernetes.ContainerTemplate>
```

# An example of the step in Jenkins pipeline - integrating security check tools:

```
stage('Validate source code') {
  steps {
    sh "${mvnCmd} deploy -DskipTests=true -P nexus3"
  }
}
```

## LAB 3.2

```
lab build-pipeline start # takes 20mins
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc project cicd
oc get pods # ensure Jenkins & SonarQube are
running
cat /home/student/D0425/labs/build-pipeline/pipeline-template.yaml
# Pipeline is part of 'kind: BuildConfig' resource: spec.strategy.jenkinsPipelineStrategy.jenkinsfile
```

```
def mvnCmd = "mvn -s configuration/cicd-settings.xml"
pipeline {
    agent {
        label 'maven'
    }
    . . . omitted "Build app", "Test", "Archive app", "Build image", "Deploy DEV"
    stages {
        stage('Promote to STAGE?') {
            agent {
                label 'skopeo'
            }
            // Add skopeo call below.
        }
        . . . omitted "Deploy STAGE"
    }
}
```

# Skopeo call:

# Implement the image tagging step that tags the image on Quay for the stage environment:

```
steps {
    script {
        openshift.withCluster() {
            withCredentials([usernamePassword(credentialsId:"${openshift.project()}-quay-cicd-secret",
                usernameVariable: "QUAY_USER", passwordVariable: "QUAY_PWD")]) { sh "skopeo copy
                docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/admin/tasks-app:latest
                docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/admin/tasks-app:stage --src-creds \"\$QUAY_USER:\$QUAY_PWD\"
                --dest-creds \"\$QUAY_USER:\$QUAY_PWD\" --src-tls-verify=false --dest-tls-verify=false"
            }
        }
    }
}
```

*# Note: Command is also located in /home/student/D0425/labs/build-pipeline/command.txt*

```
cd ~/D0425/labs/build-pipeline
oc new-app pipeline-template.yaml # deploying template cicd/cicd for
    pipeline-template.yaml to project cicd
oc start-build bc/tasks-pipeline
oc logs build/tasks-pipeline-1 # logs are available on Jenkins
# open Jenkins (log in with OCP credentials) and promote to stage, inspect security metrics:
https://sonarqube-cicd.apps.lab.example.com
https://quay.apps.lab.example.com # in the admin organisation
lab build-pipeline finish
```

## FINAL LAB 3

TBA

## 4. Managing User Access Control

RBAC resources:

- Users = can make requests to OpenShift API
- Service Accounts = used for delegating certain tasks to OpenShift
- Groups
- Roles = collections of rules
- Rules = define verbs that users/groups can use with a given resource
- Security Context Constraints = control the actions pod/container can perform
- Role bindings = roles to users/groups

```
oc describe clusterrole admin
Name: admin
Created: 5 weeks ago
Labels: kubernetes.io/bootstrapping=rbac-defaults
Annotations: openshift.io/description=A user that has edit rights within the project and can change the
              project's membership.
              openshift.io/reconcile-protect=false

Verbs          (...) Resources
[delete get patch update] (...) [projects] # user can retrieve list of projects,
              delete/modify them
[get list watch] (...) [namespaces]
```

Two levels:

1. Cluster-wide RBAC - applicable across all projects
2. Local RBAC - apply to a given project

```
oc describe rolebinding admin -n developer # access local role bindings
Name: admin
Namespace: developer
Created: 9 minutes ago
Labels: <none>
Annotations: <none>
Role: /admin
Users: developer
Groups: <none>
ServiceAccounts: <none>
Subjects: <none>

Verbs          (...) Resources
[get list watch] (...) [namespaces]
[impersonate] (...) [serviceaccounts]
...output omitted...
```

The following excerpt shows how to include a SCC to a role. This gives privileges to the user or the group that uses this role to access the `restricted-scc` security context constraint:

```
rules:
  apiGroups:
  - security.openshift.io
  resources:
```

```
- securitycontextconstraints                                # name of the resource group that
  allows you to include a SCC in the role
verbs:
- use
resourceNames:
- restricted-scc                                           # name of the SCC that is applied to
  all pods or containers that inherit this role
```

*# Some of the defaults cluster roles that are available in OpenShift - e.g.:*

```
oc describe clusterrole self-provisioner
```

*# Groups & users*

```
oc adm groups new <group_name> <user_name>
```

```
oc create user <user_name>
```

*# Managing Roles*

```
oc create role <name> --verb=<verb> --resource=<resource type> -n <project> # local role for a project
```

```
oc create clusterrole <name> --verb=<verb> --resource=<resource>           # cluster role
```

```
oc create role manager --verb=create,get,delete --resource=pod,service -n cicd
```

```
oc adm policy add-role-to-user manager developer -n cicd
```

A good list with all resources and verbs: `oc describe clusterrole.rbac`

Some examples of the role definition:

- This “Role” is allowed to read the resource “Pods” in the core API group:

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  name: read-pods-within-ns
  namespace: default
rules:
- apiGroups:
  - ''
  resources:
  - pods
  verbs:
  - get
  - list
  - watch
```

- This “Role” is allowed to read and write the “Deployments” in both the “extensions” and “apps” API groups:

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  name: read-write-deployment-in-ext-and-apps-apis
  namespace: default
rules:
- apiGroups:
  - extensions
  - apps
  resources:
  - deployments
  verbs:
  - get
  - list
  - watch
  - create
  - update
```

- patch
- delete

- This “Role” is allowed to read “Pods” and read/write “Jobs” resources in API groups:

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  name: read-pods-and-read-write-jobs
  namespace: default
rules:
  - apiGroups:
    - ''
    resources:
    - pods
    verbs:
    - get
    - list
    - watch
  - apiGroups:
    - batch
    - extensions
    resources:
    - jobs
    verbs:
    - get
    - list
    - watch
    - create
    - update
    - patch
    - delete
```

- This “Role” is allowed to read a “ConfigMap” named “my-config” (must be bound with a “RoleBinding” to limit to a single “ConfigMap” in a single namespace):

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
  name: read-configmap-within-ns
  namespace: default
rules:
  - apiGroups:
    - ''
    resources:
    - configmaps
    resourceName:
    - my-config
    verbs:
    - get
```

- This “ClusterRole” is allowed to read the resource “nodes” in the core group (because a Node is cluster-scoped, this must be bound with a “ClusterRoleBinding” to be effective):

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  name: read-nodes
rules:
```

```
- apiGroups:
  - ''
resources:
  - nodes
verbs:
  - get
  - list
  - watch
```

- This “ClusterRole” is allowed to “GET” and “POST” requests to the non-resource endpoint “/healthz” and all subpaths (must be in the “ClusterRole” bound with a “ClusterRoleBinding” to be effective):

```
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRole
metadata:
  name: get-and-post-to-non-resource-endpoints
rules:
  - nonResourceURLs:
    - /healthz
    - /healthz/*
    verbs:
    - get
    - post
```

#### *# Managing Role Bindings - cluster level*

```
oc adm policy add-cluster-role-to-user role user # Binds a given role to specified
users for all projects in the cluster
oc adm policy remove-cluster-role-from-user role user # Removes a given role from specified
users for all projects in the cluster.
oc adm policy add-cluster-role-to-group role group # Binds a given role to specified
groups for all projects in the cluster.
oc adm policy remove-cluster-role-from-group role group # Removes a given role from specified
groups for all projects in the cluster.
```

#### *# Managing Role Bindings - local/project level (-n <PROJECT>, otherwise in current project)*

```
oc adm policy who-can verb resource # Indicates which users can perform
an action on a resource.
oc adm policy add-role-to-user role user # Binds a given role to specified
users in the current project.
oc adm policy remove-role-from-user role user # Removes a given role from specified
users in the current project.
oc adm policy remove-user user # Removes specified users and all of
their roles in the current project.
oc adm policy add-role-to-group role group # Binds a given role to specified
groups in the current project.
oc adm policy remove-role-from-group role group # Removes a given role from specified
groups in the current project.
oc adm policy remove-group group # Removes specified groups and all of
their roles in the current project.

oc adm policy add-role-to-user edit manager -n developer # Give the manager user the edit role
in the developer project
oc describe rolebinding manager -n developer
```

### Determining User Privileges

```
oc auth can-i delete pods # yes
oc auth can-i create deploymentconfigs # yes
oc auth can-i delete users # no - no RBAC policy matched
oc policy can-i --list # determine all the actions that you
can perform
```

## INTRODUCING TOKENS



```
cat ~/.kube/config
oc whoami --show-token                                # only for 24 hours
oc sa get-token registry                              # long-lived token of the registry
    service account
oc sa get-token default                              # same as "oc describe secret
    default-token-z62lg | grep 'token:.'
```

## LAB 4.1

```

lab auth-access start
oc login -u developer1 -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project project1
oc new-app -f /home/student/D0425/labs/auth-access/auth-access.yaml # The application deploys an httpd pod
oc login -u developer2 -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project project2
oc new-app -f /home/student/D0425/labs/auth-access/auth-access.yaml # The application deploys an httpd pod
oc login -u manager -p redhat
oc get pods -n project1 # User "manager" cannot list pods in
    the namespace "project1": no RBAC policy matched
oc get pods -n project2 # same error
firefox https://master.lab.example.com # log in as admin to cluster console
Administration -> Projects -> project1 -> Role bindings -> Subject name: developer1
Administration -> Projects -> project2 -> Role bindings -> Subject name: developer2
# grant read access to the manager user for the project1 project and read and write accesses for the
    project2 project:
project1 -> Role Bindings -> Creating Binding -> Namespace role binding:
Role Binding Name: viewer
Namespace: project1
Role Name: view
Subject: User
Subject Name: manager

project2 -> Role Bindings -> Creating Binding -> Namespace role binding:
Role Binding Name: editor
Namespace: project2
Role Name: edit
Subject: User
Subject Name: manager
# delete the role binding that gives the developer1 user administrative privileges in the project1 project
project1 -> Role Bindings -> admin [gear] -> Delete Role Binding
# Test if it worked:
oc login -u developer1 -p redhat
oc delete pod httpd -n project1 # forbidden
oc login -u manager -p redhat
oc get pods -n project1 # works this time
oc delete pod httpd -n project1 # forbidden (only view role in
    project 1)
oc delete pod httpd -n project2 # works (edit role in project 2)
oc delete project project2 # forbidden, manager only had edit
    role
Administration -> Projects -> project2 -> Role Bindings -> Creating binding
Role Binding Name: admin-1
Namespace: project2
Role Name: admin
Subject: User
Subject Name: manager
oc delete project project2 # works now
oc delete user developer2 # forbidden, requires cluster-wide
    priv
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc delete project project1 # works
lab auth-acces finish

```

## CONFIGURING AN OPENSIFT IDENTITY PROVIDER FOR RED HAT IDENTITY MANAGEMENT (IdM)

- OpenShift masters can be configured with different identity providers that allow an OpenShift cluster to delegate user authentication and group membership management to different identity stores.
- To configure an OpenShift `LDAPPasswordIdentityProvider` identity provider to integrate with an IdM domain, you need the following information about your IdM domain and servers:
  - DNS domain name of your IdM domain (`organization.example.com`)
  - FQDN of one of your IdM servers (`ldap1.organization.example.com`)
  - LDAP user name with read access of the entire user accounts tree (`uid=admin,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com`)
  - LDAP container of the user accounts tree (`cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com`)
  - public key TLS certificate of your IdM domain (`/etc/ipa/ca.crt` file in any server or client of your IdM domain)
- Example stanza under the `identityProviders` attribute on the OpenShift master configuration file `/etc/origin/master/master-config.yaml`

```
. . .
identityProviders:
- challenge: true
  login: true
  mappingMethod: claim
  name: idm_ldap_auth                                # can be anything
  provider:
    apiVersion: v1
    kind: LDAPPasswordIdentityProvider
    attributes:
      id:
      - dn
      preferredUsername:
      - uid
    insecure: false                                  # use TLS, refuse invalid certs
    ca: /etc/origin/master/idm-domain-ca.crt          # public key TLS cert of the IdM
      domain
    url:
      "ldaps://server1.organization.example.net:636/cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com?uid="
      # LDAP search URL for user accounts
    bindDN: "uid=admin,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com" # username
    bindPassword: "secret"                          # password
```

## SYNCHRONIZING GROUPS BETWEEN OPENSIFT AND IdM

```
oc adm groups sync --confirm                          # run regularly to keep OpenShift and
  LDAP groups in sync
oc adm groups sync --help                             # whitelist & blacklist!
  # Sync all groups from an LDAP server
oc adm groups sync --sync-config=/path/to/ldap-sync-config.yaml --confirm # see LDAPSyncConfig

  # Sync all groups except the ones from the blacklist file from an LDAP server
oc adm groups sync --blacklist=/path/to/blacklist.txt --sync-config=/path/to/ldap-sync-config.yaml
  --confirm

  # Sync specific groups specified in a whitelist file with an LDAP server
oc adm groups sync --whitelist=/path/to/whitelist.txt --sync-config=/path/to/sync-config.yaml --confirm

  # Sync all OpenShift Groups that have been synced previously with an LDAP server
oc adm groups sync --type=openshift --sync-config=/path/to/ldap-sync-config.yaml --confirm
```

```
# Sync specific OpenShift Groups if they have been synced previously with an LDAP server
oc adm groups sync groups/group1 groups/group2 groups/group3 --sync-config=/path/to/sync-config.yaml
--confirm
```

#### Options:

```
--blacklist='': path to the group blacklist file
--confirm=false: if true, modify OpenShift groups; if false, display results of a dry-run
--sync-config='': path to the sync config
--type='ldap': which groups white- and blacklist entries refer to: ldap,openshift
--whitelist='': path to the group whitelist file
```

```
oc adm groups prune --confirm # deletes all current orphan groups
from OpenShift
```

### Configuring LDAP Synchronization Connection Parameters (similar to LDAPPasswordIdentityProvider):

```
kind: LDAPSynConfig
apiVersion: v1
url: ldaps://server1.organization.example.com:636 # LDAP URI FQDN
bindDN: uid=admin,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com # username
bindPassword: secret # plaintext password
insecure: false # not allowing insecure communication
    and thus forcing TLS
ca: /home/student/idm-ca.crt # must exist on the client where you
    run the 'oc'
augmentedActiveDirectory: # variation of MS AD schema
  groupsQuery:
    baseDN: "cn=groups,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com" # user account container
    scope: sub
    derefAliases: never
    pageSize: 0
  groupUIDAttribute: dn
  groupNameAttributes: [ cn ]
  usersQuery:
    baseDN: "cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=organization,dc=example,dc=com" # groups container
    scope: sub
    derefAliases: never
    filter: (objectclass=inetOrgPerson)
    pageSize: 0
  userNameAttributes: [ uid ]
  groupMembershipAttributes: [ memberOf ]
```

### MANAGING OPENSIFT USERS AND IDENTITIES

- You may need to delete the identity resource for a user if the same user name exists on different identity providers.

```
oc get user
NAME      ...  IDENTITIES
admin     ...  htpasswd_auth:admin
idmuser   ...  idm_ldap_auth:uid=idmuser,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=...
```

OpenShift retains identities for deleted users, and these identities may prevent a new user from logging in, if that user has the same name of an old user:

```
oc delete user idmuser
oc delete identity idm_ldap_auth:uid=idmuser,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=...
```

### LAB 4.2

```
lab auth-idm start
scp root@idm:/etc/ipa/ca.crt ~/idm-ca.crt # copy the public certificate of root
CA of the IdM server to the student user home folder on the workstation
```

```

export LDAPTLS_CACERT=~/.idm-ca.crt
ldapsearch -x -H ldaps://idm.lab.example.net:636 -D
    "uid=admin,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=lab,dc=example,dc=net" -w RedHat123~ -b
    "cn=accounts,dc=lab,dc=example,dc=net" -s sub= '(objectClass=posixaccount)' uid # see existing users
ldapsearch -x -H ldaps://idm.lab.example.net:636 -D
    "uid=admin,cn=users,cn=accounts,dc=lab,dc=example,dc=net" -w RedHat123~ -b
    "cn=accounts,dc=lab,dc=example,dc=net" -s sub= '(objectClass=posixgroup)' cn member # see existing
groups
scp ~/.idm-ca.crt root@master:/etc/origin/master/ # copy the root CA to master
ssh root@master
# Copy & paste LDAPPasswordIdentityProvider from ~/D0425/labs/auth-idm/idm-identity-provider.yaml to the
# master configuration /etc/origin/master/master-config.yaml under "oauthConfig" section as one of the
# "identityProviders"
master-restart api # restart master pods ...
master-restart controllers # ... and the node service
systemctl restart atomic-openshift-node
systemctl status atomic-openshift-node # look for errors
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc get user # only admin & developer
oc get group # no resources
oc login -u jrdev1 -p redhat # successfull
oc project internalapp # not a member of this project
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc get user # now contains also jrdev1
oc get group # no resources
oc adm groups sync --confirm --sync-config ~/D0425/labs/auth-idm/idm-sync-config.yaml # synchronize
OpenShift and IdM groups
oc get group # ipausers, juniordevs, seniordevs
oc login -u jrdev1 -p redhat
oc project internalapp
oc create cm myconfig --from-literal key1=value1
oc project externalapp # not a member of this project
oc login -u srdev1 -p redhat
oc project externalapp # works
oc create cm myconfig --from-literal key2=value2
oc project internalapp # not a member of this project
ssh root@idm
kinit admin # RedHat123~
ipa user-add srdev2 --first=Developer2 --last=Senior
ipa user-mod srdev2 --password # redhat
ipa user-mod srdev2 --setattr=krbPasswordExpiration=20250606060606Z # far in the future (year 2025)
ipa group-add-member seniordevs --users=srdev2 # make srdev2 member of the group
oc login -u srdev2 -p redhat # back on the workstation
oc project externalapp # you are not member of the project
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc adm groups sync --confirm --sync-config ~/D0425/labs/auth-idm/idm-sync-config.yaml # sync again
oc get group # seniordevs = srdev1, srdev2
oc login -u srdev2 -p redhat
oc project externalapp # now it works
oc create cm myconfig2 --from-literal key3=value3
lab auth-idm finish

```

## DEPLOYING SINGLE SIGN-ON ON OPENSIFT

Passthrough vs. re-encryption SSO templates

Typically coming from [registry.redhat.io/redhat-sso-7/sso72-openshift:1.0](https://registry.redhat.io/redhat-sso-7/sso72-openshift:1.0) (or v1.1, v1.2 ...)

To integrate an application with Red Hat's SSO server you define and configure, at minimum, one 'realm', one or more 'clients', and one or more 'users':

1. Web console: <https://sso-fqdn/auth/admin>
2. `/bin/kadm.sh`

## CONFIGURING AN OPENSIFT IDENTITY PROVIDER FOR SSO

The OpenIDIdentityProvider identity provider allows OpenShift to delegate authentication to a SSO server using the OpenID Connect standard (master-config.yml):

```
. . .
identityProviders:
- challenge: true
  login: true
  mappingMethod: claim
  name: sso_realm                                # name of your choice
  provider:
    apiVersion: v1
    kind: OpenIDIdentityProvider
    clientID: MyApp                               # client ID of existing client on the
      SSO realm
    clientSecret: 41b5677d-09b1-4ffc-890a-99f10204bde9 # secret of the SSO client
    ca: /etc/origin/master/ca-bundle.crt           # absolute path on the master
    urls:
      authorize: https://sso.server.example.com/auth/realms/MyRealm/protocol/openid-connect/auth
      token: https://sso.server.lab.example.com/auth/realms/MyRealm/protocol/openid-connect/token
      userInfo: https://sso.server.lab.example.com/auth/realms/MyRealm/protocol/openid-connect/userinfo
  claims:
    id:
      - sub
    preferredUsername:
      - preferred_username
    name:
      - name
    email:
      - email
```

The OpenID Connect API endpoints of your SSO realm, that follow the format: `https://<sso-server-fqdn>/auth/realms/<RealmName>`

operation = Name of an OpenID Connect API operation, such as 'auth', 'token', and 'userinfo'

```
curl -sk https://sso-server-fqdn/auth/realms/RealmName /.well-known/openid-configuration | python -m
  json.tool # lists all URLs for a SSO realm, for example the RealmName realm
```

## LAB 4.3

```
lab auth-sso start
git clone http://services.lab.example.com/sso72-dev # copy of the sso folder of the
  jboss-openshift/application-templates project
less sso72-dev/sso72-https.json | grep sso72-openshift # sample template to deploy the
  sign-on containerized server
less sso72-dev/sso72-image-stream.json | grep sso72-openshift # image stream that points to the
  single sign-on container image
podman search registry.lab.example.com/sso # is the image available on the
  classroom registry? Yes, ../redhat-sso-7/sso72-openshift
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc project openshift
for f in ~/sso72-dev; do oc delete -f $f; done # delete existing SSO resources, SSO
  image stream and templates may already exist
for f in ~/sso72-dev; do oc create -f $f; done # create new IS and template
  resources for SSO
oc describe istag redhat-sso72-openshift:1.2 | head -n 3 # did IS import container
  'redhat-sso72-openshift'? Yes, also try 'oc get is | grep sso'
~/D0425/labs/auth-sso/provision-storage.sh sso-db # provision NFS storage for SSO DB
  and create PV
oc get pv | grep sso-db # verify that the sso-db persistent
  volume is available - Yes, 512Mi
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc new-project websso
```

```
oc new-app --template sso72-x509-postgresql-persistent -p APPLICATION_NAME=sso -p DB_USERNAME=sso -p DB_PASSWORD=redhat -p VOLUME_CAPACITY=512Mi -p SSO_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin -p SSO_ADMIN_PASSWORD=redhat
    # use the sso72-x509-postgresql-persistent template to deploy a containerized PostgreSQL database and a containerized SSO server
oc get pvc | grep sso-postgresql-claim # bound volume sso-db
#oc rollout cancel dc/sso # if it takes too long and sso pod is in error state
oc get pod | grep sso # 'sso-1-XYZW' and 'sso-postgresql-1-XYZW' should be running
oc logs sso-1-XYZW | tail -n 2 # should say started, must not say "with errors" or "X services failed or missing dependencies"
firefox https://sso-websso.apps.lab.example.com/auth/admin
```

1. Add realm OpenShift ("Select realm" - "Add realm")
2. Create the contractordev1 user in the OpenShift realm ("Manage" - "Users")
3. Assign a non-temporary password to the contractordev1 user ("Credentials")
4. Create the "MasterAPI" client ID in the OpenShift realm with openid-connect client protocol ("Clients" - "Create")
5. In MasterAPI settings, select Confidential in the 'Access Type' field and type https://master.lab.example.com:443/\* in the Valid Redirect URIs.
6. Retrieve the client secret for the MasterAPI client's credential tab
7. Log off from the single sign-on web console.

```
firefox https://sso-websso.apps.lab.example.com/auth/realms/OpenShift/account
```

1. Login as contractordev1 and retype the password to activate the account.
2. Sign out

```
ssh root@master
cat ~/D0425/labs/auth-sso/sso-identity-provider.yaml # copy the content, but change clientSecret
vim /etc/origin/master/master-config.yaml # paste it here = add a new OpenIDIdentityProvider, do not delete HTTPAsswdPasswordIdentityProvider
master-restart api
master-restart controllers
systemctl restart atomic-openshift-node
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc login -u contractordev1 -p redhat # verify that OpenShift can authenticate users from single sign-on
oc project contractorapp
oc create cm myconfig --from-literal key1=value1 # create ConfigMap in the contractorapp project to prove user has write access
oc project internalapp # error = You are not a member of project "internalapp"
lab auth-sso finish
```

## FINAL LAB 4

TBA

## 5. Controlling the Deployment Environment

### REVIEWING SECRETS AND CONFIGMAPS

- You can store the registry credentials in a secret and instruct OpenShift to use that secret when it needs to push and pull images from the registry.

#### SECRETS

Individual secrets are limited to 1MB in size.

```
oc create secret generic secret_name --from-literal=username=operator --from-literal=password=MyS3cr3T
```

Or in YAML:

```
echo operator | base64 # b3BlcmF0b3IK
echo MyS3cr3T | base64 # TXlTM2NyM1QK
vim secret.yaml
```

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: secret_name
data:
  username: b3BlcmF0b3IK # must be base64 encoded
  password: TXlTM2NyM1QK # must be base64 encoded
```

```
oc create -f secret.yaml
```

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: test-secret
  namespace: my-namespace
type: Opaque # bypasses any validation
data:
  password: dmFsdWUtMQOK # must be base64 encoded
stringData:
  hostname: myapp.mydomain.com
  admin_password: redhat123 # plain text value will automatically
                           # be converted to base64
```

How to use the above secret in the deployment config:

```
...output omitted...
env:
- name: APP_ADMIN_PASSWORD # environment variable retrieves
  value from test-secret secret
  valueFrom:
    secretKeyRef: # similarly to configMapKeyRef
      name: test-secret
      key: admin_password
```

Another use case is the passing of data, such as TLS certificates, to an application by using the `--from-file=file` option. This exposes a sensitive file to an application. The pod definition can reference the secret, which creates the secret as files in a volume mounted on one or more of the application containers.

```
...output omitted...
spec:
  containers:
...output omitted...
  volumeMounts:
  - mountPath: /conf/app/extra_ca_certs # mounts certs_volume to
    /conf/app/extra_ca_certs
    name: certs_volume
```

```

volumes:
- name: certs_volume
  secret:
    defaultMode: 420
    secretName: application-certificates # maps the volume to
    application_certificates secret

```

## CONFIGURATION MAP

```
oc create configmap special-config --from-literal=serverAddress=172.20.30.40
```

Or in YAML:

```
vim special-config.yaml
```

```

apiVersion: v1
kind: ConfigMap
metadata:
  name: special-config
data:
  serverAddress: 172.20.30.40

```

```
oc create -f special-config.yaml
```

Populate the APISERVER environment variable inside a pod definition from the above configuration map:

```

env:
- name: APISERVER
  valueFrom:
    configMapKeyRef: # similarly to secretKeyRef
      name: special-config
      key: serverAddress

```

## Encrypting Secrets in Etcd

1. On master nodes, define the experimental-encryption-provider-config in the /etc/origin/master/master-config.yaml file:

```

...output omitted...
kubernetesMasterConfig:
  apiServerArguments:
    experimental-encryption-provider-config: # <-- important
    - /etc/origin/master/encryption-config.yaml # <-- important
    storage-backend:
    - etcd3
...output omitted...

```

1. Create encryption-config.yaml file: vim /etc/origin/master/encryption-config.yaml

```

kind: EncryptionConfig
apiVersion: v1
resources:
- resources:
  - secrets:
  providers:
  - aescbc: # algorithm used, strongest cypher
    keys:
    - name: key1
      secret: hifzYhVwb0FYl7X+oGoEqwblf94sJFoVg7IOECcCk+Q= # base64 encoded and 32-byte length
  - identity: {}

```



```
head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 # random secret used above as key1
master-restart api
master-restart controllers
# From now on, new secret object are encrypted:
etcdctl3 get /kubernetes.io/secrets/mytest/mysecret2 -w fields --cacert=/etc/etcd/ca.crt
--key=/etc/etcd/peer.key --cert=/etc/etcd/peer.crt --endpoints 'https://172.25.250.10:2379' | grep Value
# If you need to encrypt already existing secrets:
oc adm migrate storage --include=secrets --confirm # reads all secrets then updates them
to apply server-side encryption
```

## Preparing Secrets for Accessing Authenticated Registry

```
oc create secret docker-registry <secret_name> --docker-username=<user> --docker-password=<pass>
--docker-server=<registry_full_host_name>
```

With Quay, you can create robot accounts (tokens) and grant them access to the repositories in an organization. Quay can generate a YAML Kubernetes resource file that you can also use with OpenShift (`oc create -f ~/Downloads/myorg-openshift-secret.yml`).

## Configuring Project Service Account for Image PUSHING

The build process uses the OpenShift builder service account in your project. For the builder service account to automatically use that secret for authentication, link it to the secret:

```
oc secrets link serviceaccount/builder secret/<secret_name>
oc new-build GIT_project_URL --push-secret=<secret_name> --to-docker
--to=<remote_registry>/<namespace>/<image> # S2I build process will now push to another registry
```

## Configuring Project Service Account for Image PULLING

```
oc secrets link serviceaccount/default secret/<secret_name> --for=pull # link default SA in your project to
the secret
```

## Configuring OpenShift for Accepting Certificates Signed by a Private CA

1. Install CA's certificate on each node, under the `/etc/docker/certs.d/<registry_full_host_name>/` directory:

```
mkdir /etc/docker/certs.d/quay.apps.lab.example.com/
mv -v ca.crt /etc/docker/certs.d/quay.apps.lab.example.com/
```

1. And on the master you need to do:

```
# v3.10 and later:
# Configure the OpenShift API Server to use the CA's certificate, on the master you do:
cat myca.crt >> /etc/origin/master/ca-bundle.crt
# Path to the /etc/origin/master/ca-bundle.crt file is defined by the 'additionalTrustedCA' variable in
/etc/origin/master/master-config.yaml. So if there is a reference to 'additionalTrustedCA' in the
'imageImportPolicy' section of the master config, you need to do for example:
cat myca.crt >> /etc/origin/master/additional_ca.crt
master-restart api
```

Or:

```
# v3.11.43 and later:
oc version # v3.11?
# in addition to the certificates in /etc/origin/master/ca-bundle.crt, the API server also trusts the
certificates in the system /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.trust.crt file, to automatically append:
mv -v ca.crt /etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors/
update-ca-trust extract # this will append the CA to the file
```

## LIMITING REGISTRIES, PROJECTS, AND IMAGES

```
cat /etc/containers/policy.json # on all nodes, no need to restart
when changed, default file accepts any image:
```

```
{
  "default": [
    {
      "type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
    }
  ],
  "transports": {
    "docker-daemon": {
      "": [{"type": "insecureAcceptAnything"}]
    }
  }
}
```

- system uses the default entry when no other rule matches
- **insecureAcceptAnything** = accept any image
- **reject** = refuse all images (usually set this requirement in the default entry and add specific rules to allow your images)
- **signedBy** = accept signed images (provide additional parameters such as the public GPG key to use to verify signatures)
- Using wildcards or partial names does NOT work!
- Under the **transports** section file groups registries by type: **docker** (Registry v2 API), **atomic** (OCR), **docker-daemon** (local daemon storage):

Another example:

```
{
  "default": [
    {
      "type": "reject"                                <-- reject all images if no other
      rule matches
    }
  ],
  "transports": {
    "docker": {
      "registry.access.redhat.com": [                  <-- use any images from
        registr.access.redhat.com as long as they are GPG signed
        {
          "type": "signedBy",
          "keyType": "GPGKeys",
          "keyPath": "/etc/pki/rpm-gpg/RPM-GPG-KEY-redhat-release"
        }
      ],
      "quay.apps.lab.example.com/production": [        <-- use any image from the production
        organization in Quay
        {
          "type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
        }
      ],
      "quay.apps.lab.example.com/staging/mypostgres-95:latest": [ <-- pull latest tag of the
        mypostgresl image in the staging of Quay
        {
          "type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
        }
      ]
    },
    "atomic": {
```

```

    "172.30.13.172:5000": [                                <-- pull any image from the local
      OpenShift Container Registry (OCR)
      {
        "type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
      }
    ]
  },
  "docker-daemon": {
    "": [
      {
        "type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
      }
    ]
  }
}
}
}

```

## Configuring Signature Transports

That above configuration ("type", "keyType", "keyPath") is not enough; you also need to indicate the URL to the web server that stores the detached image signatures. To declare that URL, create a file under `/etc/containers/registries.d/` such as:

```

cat /etc/containers/registries.d/redhat.yaml
docker:
  registry.access.redhat.com:
    sigstore: https://access.redhat.com/webassets/docker/content/sigstore

```

For the OpenShift Container Registry, that you define with the 'atomic' transport type, you do not need to perform this extra configuration. The OCR has API extensions to store the signatures, and the atomic transport type consumes them.

## USING DEPLOYMENT TRIGGERS

```

oc get dc                                     # look at 'TRIGGERED BY' column

```

For example if it says `config,image(redis:latest)`, there are two types of triggers:

1. A configuration change trigger causes a new deployment to be created any time you update the deployment configuration object itself.
2. An image change trigger causes OpenShift to redeploy the application each time a new version of the `redis:latest` image is available in the registry

When you create an application with the `oc new-app` command, or from the web interface, OpenShift creates a deployment configuration object with the above two triggers already defined.

This is how it looks like in the YAML:

```

apiVersion: apps.openshift.io/v1
kind: DeploymentConfig
...output omitted...
triggers:
- type: ConfigChange
- type: ImageChange
  imageChangeParams:
    automatic: true
    containerNames:
    - <container_name>
  from:
    kind: ImageStreamTag
    name: <image_stream_name>:latest
    namespace: <image_stream_project>
template:
...output omitted...

```

```

# Use the oc set triggers command on an existing deployment configuration object:
oc set triggers dc/<dc_name> --from-image=<image_stream_project>/<image_stream_name>:latest -c
  <container_name>
# Use the oc import-image command to create an image stream object from an image in a remote repository
  (and poll regularly):
oc import-image <image_stream_name> --from=<registry_full_host_name>/<namespace>/<image_name> --confirm
  --scheduled=true
# Follow the triggering of new deployments (similar to 'Events' column in oc describe dc <dc_name>):
oc rollout history dc/<dc_name>

```

## CUSTOMIZING OPENSIFT PIPELINES

1. Clone a Git repository and execute a Maven build and installation:

```

stage('Build App') {
    steps {
        git url: 'http://services.lab.example.com/bookstore'
        sh "mvn install -DskipTests=true"
    }
}

```

1. Submit the code for analysis to a SonarQube instance:

```

stage('Code Analysis') {
    steps {
        script {
            sh "mvn sonar:sonar -Dsonar.host.url=http://sonarqube:9000 -DskipTests=true"
        }
    }
}

```

1. Input command asks the user for confirmation:

```

stage('Promote to QA?') {
    steps {
        timeout(time:15, unit:'MINUTES') {
            input message: "Promote to QA?", ok: "Promote"
        }
    }
}

```

1. Pipeline can also make calls to OpenShift - this rolls out the deployment of the application latest image in the bookstore-qa project:

```

stage('Deploy QA') {
    steps {
        script {
            openshift.withCluster() {
                openshift.withProject('bookstore-qa') {
                    openshift.selector('dc', 'bookstore').rollout().latest()
                }
            }
        }
    }
}

```

## LAB 5.1

```
lab deployment-policy start
# Use the Red Hat Quay Enterprise web interface to create the operator2 user account and set its password
# to redhat123. Also create the deploymentpolicy organization and a robot account named openshift with
# read access to the organization's repositories. In a later step, you configure OpenShift to use this
# account to authenticate with Quay. This way, you do not expose the credentials of a real user account.
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com # operator2/redhat123
# Push the local /home/student/D0425/labs/deployment-policy/v1/intranetphpv1.tar image to Quay, under the
# deploymentpolicy organization, use GPG key operator2@lab.example.com:
skopeo copy --sign-by operator2@lab.example.com
docker-archive:/home/student/D0425/labs/deployment-policy/v1/intranetphpv1.tar
docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/deploymentpolicy/intranetphp
ssh root@master vim /etc/containers/policy.json # limit registries - allow OCR, allow
# admin org in Quay, allow signed from deploymentpolicy org, reject all others:
{
  "default": [
    {
      "type": "reject"
    }
  ],
  "transports": {
    "atomic": {
      "172.30.13.172:5000": [
        {
          "type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
        }
      ]
    },
    "docker": {
      "quay.apps.lab.example.com/admin": [
        {
          "type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
        }
      ],
      "quay.apps.lab.example.com/deploymentpolicy": [
        {
          "type": "signedBy",
          "keyType": "GPGKeys",
          "keyPath": "/etc/containers/operator2.pub" <-- this has to be local to the
            master/node
        }
      ],
      "registry.lab.example.com": [
        {
          "type": "insecureAcceptAnything"
        }
      ]
    }
  }
}
scp /etc/containers/policy.json node1:/etc/containers/policy.json
scp /etc/containers/policy.json node2:/etc/containers/policy.json
gpg2 --armor --export operator2@lab.example.com > operator2.pub # from the workstation extract a copy
# of operator2's public key and distribute it everywhere
scp operator2.pub root@master:/etc/containers/ # must match keyPath
scp operator2.pub root@node1:/etc/containers/ # keyPath
scp operator2.pub root@node2:/etc/containers/ # keyPath
vim quay.yaml
docker:
  quay.apps.lab.example.com: # URL of the host with detached sigs
  sigstore: http://signatures.lab.example.com
```

```

scp quay.yaml root@master:/etc/containers/registries.d/
scp quay.yaml root@node1:/etc/containers/registries.d/
scp quay.yaml root@node2:/etc/containers/registries.d/
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project deployment-policy
oc create -f /home/student/Downloads/deploymentpolicy-openshift-secret.yml # create the secret that
contains the credentials to authenticate to Quay
oc secrets link serviceaccount/default secret/deploymentpolicy-openshift-pull-secret --for=pull # associate
the secret to the default service account in the deployment-policy project. Three SAs are automatically
created in every project: builder, deployer, default. 'default' is used to run all pods.
cat ~/D0425/labs/deployment-policy/intranetphp.yaml # file creates the intranetphp
application, notice that the deployment uses your image in Quay (intranetphp:latest)
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/deployment-policy/intranetphp.yaml # contains image from Quay
oc get pods
oc get routes
curl intranetphp-deployment-policy.apps.lab.example.com # version 1
oc set triggers dc/intranetphp # only the configuration change
trigger is defined (TYPE: config)
# Create an image stream to monitor the deploymentpolicy/intranetphp image in Quay. Add the
--scheduled=true option to instruct OpenShift to regularly poll Quay to detect new versions of the
image:
oc import-image intranetphp --from=quay.apps.lab.example.com/deploymentpolicy/intranetphp --confirm
--scheduled=true
oc set triggers dc/intranetphp --from-image=deployment-policy/intranetphp:latest -c intranetphp
oc set triggers dc/intranetphp # image trigger is there now
podman login quay.apps.lab.example.com # as operator2 again
skopeo copy --sign-by operator2@lab.example.com
docker-archive:/home/student/D0425/labs/deployment-policy/v2/intranetphpv2.tar
docker://quay.apps.lab.example.com/deploymentpolicy/intranetphp
oc rollout history dc/intranetphp # new deployment automatically
triggered caused by image change
curl intranetphp-deployment-policy.apps.lab.example.com # version 2
podman logout quay.apps.lab.example.com
oc delete project deployment-policy
lab deployment-policy finish

```

## SECURITY CONTEXT CONSTRAINTS (SCCs)

- SCCs define conditions that a pod must satisfy in order to be created
- Similar to policies, which enforce certain actions or prevent others from a service or a user (or service account)
- By default resources get **restricted** SCC (no root, mknod, setuid)
- Create your own SCC rather than modifying a predefined SCC

Control:

1. Privileged mode - running privileged containers should be avoided at all costs
2. Privileges escalation - on/off privileges escalation inside a container
3. Linux capabilities - Linux capabilities to and from your containers (e.g. KILL)
4. Seccomp profiles - allow or block certain system calls (e.g. CAP\_CHOWN)
5. Volume types - permit or prevent certain volume types (e.g. emptyDir)
6. System control (Sysctl) settings - modify kernel parameters at runtime
7. Host resources - permit or prevent a pod for accessing the following host resources: IPC namespaces, host networks, host ports, and host PID namespaces

8. Read-only root file system - forces users to mount a volume if they need to store data
9. User and group IDs - restricting users to a certain set of ID or GIDs. Each project gets assigned its own range, as defined by a project annotation, such as `openshift.io/sa.scc.uid-range=1000190000/10000` and `openshift.io/sa.scc.supplemental-groups=1000190000/10000`. /=number of allowed values (e.g. 1000190000 up to 1000200000).
10. SELinux labels - define an SELinux label to the pods
11. File system groups - allows you to define supplemental groups for the user, which is usually required for accessing a block device

## Introducing SCC Strategies

Categories:

1. Boolean (`Allow Privileged: true`)
2. Allowable set (`RequiredDropCapabilites: KILL,MKNOD,SETUID,SETGID`)
3. Controlled by a strategy, SCC Strategies:
  - (a) `RunAsAny` - any ID defined in the pod definition (or image) is allowed (security issue), no SELinux labels
  - (b) `MustRunAsRange` - the project or the pod must provide a range within an allowable set, lowest value is default
    - Run As User Strategy:

```
MustRunAsRange
UID: <none>
UID Range Min: 10000000
UID Range Max: 10000100
```

3. 'MustRunAs' - project or the pod must provide a single value, for example SELinux context

## Managing Supplemental Groups - shared storage example (e.g. NFS)

```
# You should not be running containers as root, only containers with an UID of 100001 or members of the
  group with the ID of 100099 are permitted to access the NFS storage:
oc describe demo-project
...output omitted...
Annotations: openshift.io/sa.scc.supplemental-groups=1000190000/10000 # default range in OpenShift
...output omitted...
ls -lZ /opt/app/nfs -d # NFS server defines a directory
  accessible by the user ID 100001 and the group ID 100099
```

Annotation is used by OpenShift to determine the range for supplemental groups.

I. One way to allow access to the NFS share is to be explicit in the pod definition by defining a supplemental groups that all containers inherit. All containers that are created in the project are then members of the group 100099, which grants access to the volume, regardless of the container's user ID:

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
...output omitted...
spec:
  containers:
  - name: application
  securityContext:
    supplementalGroups: [ 100099 ] # arra of supplemental group(s)
...output omitted...
```

```
oc rsh application-pod id
uid=1000190000 gid=0(root) groups=0(root),100099,1000190000
# You must also ensure that the value is within the allowable range. This is enforced if the strategy for supplemental groups is set to MustRunAsRange. You must then ensure that the SCC applied to the pod allows this value.
```

II. Another solution is the creation of a custom SCC that defines a range for the group IDs, enforces the usage of a value inside the range, allows the GID 100099:

```
kind: SecurityContextConstraints
...output omitted...
priority: 10                                # larger number = higher priority
supplementalGroups:
  type: MustRunAs                            # strategy
  ranges:                                    # allowed range
  - min: 100050
    max: 100100
...output omitted...
```

### Managing File System Groups - block storage example (e.g. iSCSI)

Unlike shared storage, block storage is taken over by a pod, which means that the user and group IDs supplied in the pod definition are applied to the physical block device. If the pod uses a restricted SCC that defines a **fsGroup** with a strategy of **MustRunAs**, then the pod will fail to run. OpenShift doesn't allocate any GID to block storage, so if the pod definition doesn't explicitly set **fsGroup** and SCC uses **RunAsAny**, permission may still be denied! Define a file system group in the pod definition:

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
...output omitted...
spec:
  containers:
  - name: application
    securityContext:
      fsGroup: [ 600 ]                      # filesystem group applied to the
      block storage
...output omitted...
```

### Managing SELinux context with SCCs

Restricted SCC defines a strategy of **MustRunAs**, the project must define the options, such as user, role, type, and level otherwise pod will not be created

At creation time, OpenShift assigns a SELinux type to containers' main process, **container\_runtime\_t**

Define the values for the SELinux context in SCC and relationship with the project:

```
oc describe scc restricted
...output omitted..
SELinux Context Strategy: MustRunAs
User: <none>
Role: <none>
Type: <none>
Level: <none>
oc describe project default
...output omitted...
Annotations: openshift.io/sa.scc.mcs=s0:c1,c0
```

If the pod needs to access a volume, the same categories must be defined for the volume. Define the SELinux context for a pod:

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
spec:
  containers:
  ...output omitted...
  securityContext:
    selinuxOptions:
      level: "s0:c123,c456"                # sensitivity 0, categories 123,456 =
      same must be on the volume
```



MANAGING SCCS

oc describe scc restricted

```
Name: restricted
Priority: <none>
Access:
  Users: <none>
  Groups: system:authenticated # <-- members of SCC
Settings:
  Allow Privileged: false
  Default Add Capabilities: <none>
  Required Drop Capabilities: <none> # <-- e.g. KILL,MKNOD,SETUID,SETGID
  Allowed Capabilities: <none>
  Allowed Volume Types:
    awsElasticBlockStore,configMap,emptyDir,iscsi,nfs,persistentVolumeClaim,rbd,secret
  Allow Host Network: false # <-- access to host network
  Allow Host Ports: false
  Allow Host PID: false
  Allow Host IPC: false
  Read Only Root Filesystem: false
  Run As User Strategy: MustRunAsRange # <-- project using this SCC must
    define range for user IDs
  UID: <none>
  UID Range Min: <none>
  UID Range Max: <none>
  SELinux Context Strategy: MustRunAs
  User: <none>
  Role: <none>
  Type: <none>
  Level: <none>
  FSGroup Strategy: RunAsAny
  Ranges: <none>
  Supplemental Groups Strategy: RunAsAny
  Ranges: <none>
```

oc get scc

NAME	PRIV	CAPS	SELINUX	RUNASUSER	FSGROUP	SUPGROUP	PRIORITY	READONLYROOTFS
VOLUMES								
anyuid	false	[]	MustRunAs	RunAsAny	RunAsAny	RunAsAny	10	false
	[..omitted..]							
hostaccess	false	[]	MustRunAs	MustRunAsRange	MustRunAs	RunAsAny	<none>	false
	[..omitted..]							
hostmount-anyuid	false	[]	MustRunAs	RunAsAny	RunAsAny	RunAsAny	<none>	false
	[..omitted..]							
hostnetwork	false	[]	MustRunAs	MustRunAsRange	MustRunAs	MustRunAs	<none>	false
	[..omitted..]							
nonroot	false	[]	MustRunAs	MustRunAsNonRoot	RunAsAny	RunAsAny	<none>	false
	[..omitted..]							
privileged	true	[*]	RunAsAny	RunAsAny	RunAsAny	RunAsAny	<none>	false
	[..omitted..]							
restricted	false	[]	MustRunAs	MustRunAsRange	MustRunAs	RunAsAny	<none>	false
	[..omitted..]							

Custom SCC (only cluster admin can create it):

```
kind: SecurityContextConstraints
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
  name: custom-scc
allowHostNetwork: True # <-- access to the host namespaces and
  network stack
readOnlyRootFilesystem: true # <-- read-only file system
requiredDropCapabilities: # <-- two Linux capabilities to drop
```

```

- KILL
- SYS_CHROOT
seccompProfiles:
- unconfined                                <-- can be docker/default, unconfined
  or localhost/profile name (e.g. - localhost/my-restricted-profile) installed in node's SecComp profile
  root dir
runAsUser:
  type: RunAsAny                            <-- mandatory strategy for the user
seLinuxContext:
  type: RunAsAny                            <-- mandatory SELinux context

```

```

oc create -f custom-scc.yaml
oc describe scc custom-scc
# In order to use a custom seccomp profile, you need to enable the seccomp-profile-root directive in the
  kubeletArguments section of the nodes' configuration file /etc/origin/node/node-config.yml to point to
  a directory that contains seccomp profiles. The file must be present on all nodes + systemctl restart
  origin-node:
# kubeletArguments:
#   seccomp-profile-root:
#     - "/path/to/profile"
oc delete scc custom-scc

```

## Managing Service Accounts for SCCs

Service accounts can be member of an SCC, similarly to users. This restricts all resources created by a service account to inherit the restrictions of the SCC. By default, pods run with the default service account, unless you specify a different service account. All authenticated users are automatically added to the system:authenticated group. As such, all authenticated users inherit the restricted SCC:

```
oc describe scc restricted | grep 'Groups:'           # system:authenticated
```

If a container requires elevated privileges or special privileges, create a new service account and make it member of an existing SCC, or create your own SCC and make the service account member of that SCC. Every service account has an associated user name, so it can be added to any specific SCC.

Creating a custom service account and make it member of the anyuid SCC, which allows pods to use any UID:

```

oc create serviceaccount app-sa
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user anyuid -z app-sa      # -z=service account in the current
project
# If you need to add a SCC to the service account from another project (demo-project):
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user anyuid system:serviceaccount:demo-project:app-sa
# Update an existing deployment configuration or pod definition:
...output omitted...
spec:
  containers:
    - image: registry-demo.lab.example.com/my-app:latest
      name: my-app
  spec:
    serviceAccountName: app-sa                     # <--

```

## LAB 5.2

```

lab deployment-scc start
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc get scc | grep restricted                       # inspect existing SCCs
oc describe scc restricted                         # shows members (users & groups).
'system:authenticated' group is what applies the restricted SCC to all user projects
oc get clusterrolebinding | awk 'NR == 1 || /system:authenticated/' # list all cluster role bindings that
apply for the system:authenticated group (this shows which capabilities authenticated user have)

```

NAME	ROLE
basic-users	/basic-user
cluster-status-binding	/cluster-status
self-access-reviewers	/self-access-reviewer

```

self-provisioners                /self-provisioner  # <-- allows to create projects
servicecatalog-serviceclass-viewer-binding /servicecatalog-serviceclass-viewer
system:basic-user                /system:basic-user
system:build-strategy-docker-binding /system:build-strategy-docker
system:build-strategy-jenkinspipeline-binding /system:build-strategy-jenkinspipeline
system:build-strategy-source-binding /system:build-strategy-source
system:discovery                 /system:discovery
system:oauth-token-deleters      /system:oauth-token-deleter
system:openshift:discovery       /system:openshift:discovery
system:scope-impersonation       /system:scope-impersonation
system:webhooks                  /system:webhook

oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project deployment-scc
oc describe project deployment-scc # verify that projects provide a
    default range 1000130000 up to 1000139999 (as openshift.io/sa.scc.uid-range annotation)
# To ensure that the UID allocated to containers are in the range, create a deployment configuration by
    using the file located at ~/D0425/labs/deployment-scc/deployment-scc.yaml:
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/deployment-scc/deployment-scc.yaml # creates 1 httpd pod in
    deployment-scc project
oc get pods # deployment-scc-1-wkv5r
oc rsh deployment-scc-1-wkv5r id # uid=1000130000 gid=0(root)
    groups=0(root),1000130000
# Create a service account and edit the deployment configuration to define the new service account and to
    force the UID to allocate:
oc create sa deployment-scc-sa # create service account in project
oc get sa # shows deployment-scc-sa + default
    SCCs
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc describe scc anyuid | grep 'Run As' -A3 # RunAsAny strategy, <none> values
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user anyuid -z deployment-scc-sa # scc anyuid added to sa - WARNING:
    it succeeds even if the user does not exist!
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc edit dc/deployment-scc
...output omitted...
template:
spec:
  serviceAccountName: deployment-scc-sa # use the SA we created
  containers:
  - image: registry.lab.example.com/rhsc1/httpd-24-rhel7:latest
    securityContext: # <--
      runAsUser: 600 # <-- ID of 600 for the pod's user
oc get pods # deployment-scc-2-d7hj5 running
oc rsh deployment-scc-2-d7hj5 id # uid=600 gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
# User is no longer member of any supplemental group, as the pod overrides the project settings but does
    not define any supplemental group
cat ~/D0425/labs/deployment-scc/deployment-scc-host-mount.yaml # mount a host volume
...output omitted...
spec:
  volumes:
  - name: httpd
    hostPath:
      path: /opt/D0425/deployment-scc/
...output omitted...
ssh root@node1 ls /opt/D0425/deployment-scc # Hello.txt
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/deployment-scc/deployment-scc-host-mount.yaml
oc get pods # deployment-scc-host-mount-1-deploy
    is running but NOT working!
oc get events # hostPath volumes are not allowed to
    be used
oc create sa deployment-scc-host-sa
oc login -u admin -p redhat

```

```

oc describe scc hostaccess                                     # "Allowed Volume Types: ...,
    hostPath, ..." default SCC that shows all the allowed plugins, also MustRunAsRange
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user hostaccess -z deployment-scc-host-sa # attach this SCC to the
    deployment-scc-host-sa service account
# Another way of updating a deployment configuration is by using the oc patch verb:
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc patch dc/deployment-scc-host-mount -p '{"spec":{"template":{"spec":{"serviceAccountName":
    "deployment-scc-host-sa"}}}}' # or 'oc edit'
oc get pods                                                  # deployment-scc-hot-mount-2-pvs55
oc rsh deployment-scc-host-mount-2-pvs55
    mount | grep www                                         # that is where it is mounted
    ls /var/www/html                                         # Hello.txt
exit
# Delete the service accounts and the project:
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc adm policy remove-scc-from-user anyuid -z deployment-scc-sa # remove SCC from SA
oc adm policy remove-scc-from-user hostaccess -z deployment-scc-host-sa
oc delete project deployment-scc
lab deployment-scc finish

```

## FINAL LAB 5

TBA

## 6. Managing Secure Platform Orchestration

### MANAGING APPLICATION HEALTH

1. Liveness Probe - is the pod healthy?
2. Readiness Probe - is the pod ready to serve requests?

### MANAGING APPLICATION SCHEDULING

Scheduler filters the list of running nodes by the availability of node resources, such as host ports or memory

A common use for affinity rules is to schedule related pods to be close to each other for performance reasons.

A common use case for anti-affinity rules is to schedule related pods not too close to each other for high availability reasons.

Rules can be: mandatory (required) or best-effort (preferred)

Define 8 nodes, two regions, us-west and us-east, and a set of two zones in each region:

```
oc label node node1 region=us-west zone=power1a # west
oc label node node2 region=us-west zone=power1a
oc label node node3 region=us-west zone=power2a
oc label node node4 region=us-west zone=power2a
oc label node node5 region=us-east zone=power1b # east
oc label node node6 region=us-east zone=power1b
oc label node node7 region=us-east zone=power2b
oc label node node8 region=us-east zone=power2b
oc get nodes -L zone -L region # inspect the labels assigned to nodes
```

Rule that requires the pod be placed on a node with a label whose key is compute-CA-NorthSouth and whose value is either compute-CA-North or compute-CA-South:

```
oc label node9 compute-CA-NorthSouth=compute-CA-North
```

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: with-node-affinity
spec:
  affinity: # different from nodeSelector
    nodeAffinity: # defines usage of affinity
      requiredDuringSchedulingIgnoredDuringExecution: # it requires rule to enforce
        placement: 'required' can also be 'preferred', but then you also need 'weight' value
        nodeSelectorTerms:
          - matchExpressions: # must match this
            - key: compute-CA-NorthSouth
              operator: In # In, NotIn, Exists, DoesNotExist,
                Lt, Gt
              values:
                - compute-CA-North # first value that must match
                - compute-CA-South # second value that must match to
                  apply the rule
  containers:
    - name: with-node-affinity
      image: registry.access.redhat.com/openshift3/jenkins-2-rhel7
```

Node selector can be part of pod definition or deployment config (the below triggers new deployment):

```
oc patch dc dev-app --patch '{"spec":{"template":{"nodeSelector":{"env":"dev"}}}}' # configure the dev-app
deployment configuration so that its pods only run on nodes that have the env=dev label
```

Same in YAML:

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
spec:
```

```
nodeSelector:                                     # different from affinity
  env: dev
containers:
  - image: registry.lab.example.com/rhsc1/httpd-24-rhel7:latest
...output omitted...
```

## Node maintenance/availability

```
oc adm manage-node --schedulable=false <node>           # mark a node as unschedulable
oc adm drain <node> --delete-local-data --ignore-daemonsets # destroys (evicts) all pods running
    on the node and instructs OpenShift to recreate the pods, --delete-local-data is for emptyDir pods
```

## MANAGING RESOURCE USAGE

Define limits in a deployment configuration instead of a pod definition

1. Resource requests - indicate that a pod cannot run with less than the specified amount of resources (essentially requirements)
2. Resource limits - prevent a pod from using up all compute resources from a node

## Managing Quotas

**ResourceQuota** resource object specifies hard resource usage limits for a project; all attributes of a quota are optional, meaning that any resource that is not restricted by a quota can be consumed without bounds (you can restrict e.g. pods, rc, svc, secrets, pvcs, CPU, memory, storage).

**ClusterResourceQuota** resource is created at the cluster level, uses `openshift.io/requester` annotation:

```
oc create clusterquota user-prod --project-annotation-selector openshift.io/requester=production --hard
  pods=12 --hard secrets=20 # create a cluster quota for all projects owned by the production user
oc create clusterquota env-qa --project-label-selector environment=qa --hard pods=10 --hard services=5 #
  create a cluster quota for all the projects with a label of environment=qa
oc delete clusterquota <quota>
```

**ResourceQuota** resource object that defines limits for CPU and memory:

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: ResourceQuota
metadata:
  name: my-quota
spec:
  hard:
    limits.memory: "400Mi"           # by default quota attributes track
    resource request                  # ...prefix the attribute with
    limits.cpu: "1200m"              # 'limits.' to track resource limits
```

```
oc describe quota
Name: my-quota
Namespace: dev-env                  # If a quota that restricts the use
    of compute resources for a project is set, OpenShift refuses to create pods that do not specify
    resource requests or resource limits
Resource      Used  Hard
-----
limits.cpu    400m  1200m          # millicores
limits.memory 128Mi 400Mi          # mebibytes (1MiB=1,048,576b)
```

## Managing Limit Ranges

**LimitRange** resource, also called a limit, defines the default, minimum, and maximum values for compute resource requests and limits (also storage - default, min, max capacity requested by image, is, pvc) for a single pod or for a single container defined inside the project. A resource request or limit for a pod is the sum of its containers.

To understand the difference between a limit range and a resource quota resource, consider that a limit range defines valid ranges and default values for a single pod, while a resource quota defines only maximum values for the sum of all pods in a project.

The following listing shows a limit range defined using YAML syntax:

```

apiVersion: "v1"
kind: "LimitRange"
metadata:
  name: "limit-range"
spec:
  limits:
    - type: "Pod"
      max:
        cpu: "400m" # maximum CPU allowed across all
                     containers in a pod
        memory: "256Mi"
      min:
        cpu: "100m"
        memory: "64Mi"
    - type: "Container"
      max:
        cpu: "400m" # maximum CPU allowed per container
        memory: "256Mi" # maximum memory allowed per container
      min:
        cpu: "100m"
        memory: "64Mi"
      default:
        cpu: "200m"
        memory: "64Mi"
      defaultRequest:
        cpu: "200m"
        memory: "64Mi"
    - type: "PersistentVolumeClaim"
      min:
        storage: 2Gi
      max:
        storage: 50Gi # maximum capacity of the volume that
                     can be requested by one claim
    - type: openshift.io/Image
      max:
        storage: 1Gi # maximum size of an image that can
                     be pushed to OCR

```

```

oc create -f limits.yml
oc get limits

```

Name:	limit-range				
Namespace:	dev-project				
Type	Resource	Min	Max	Default Request	Default Limit
Pod	cpu	100m	400m	-	-
Pod	memory	64Mi	256Mi	-	-
Container	cpu	100m	400m	200m	200m
Container	memory	64Mi	256Mi	64Mi	64Mi

After creating a limit range in a project, all resource create requests are evaluated against each limit range resource in the project. If the new resource violates the minimum or maximum constraint enumerated by any limit, OpenShift rejects the resource. If the new resource does not set an explicit value, and the constraint supports a default value, then the default value is applied to the new resource as its usage value.

## LAB 6.1

```

lab orchestration-scheduling start
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc get nodes -L region # region label has no value on any
                       node (doesn't exist)
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com # or just 'oc login -u developer' if
                       you have used existing credentials before

```

```

oc new-project orchestration-scheduling
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/dc-scale.yaml
oc get pods -o=custom-columns="name:metadata.name,node:.spec.nodeName" # orchestration-scheduling-1-g29wh
    on node2
oc scale dc orchestration-scheduling --replicas=6 # scaling of deployment config
oc get pods -o=custom-columns="name:metadata.name,node:.spec.nodeName" # pods are spread across the two
    application nodes 1 & 2
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc label node node2.lab.example.com region=apps --overwrite=true
oc get nodes -L region # label 'apps' is applied to node2
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc edit dc/orchestration-scheduling # Update the spec section of the
    template group, and not the spec section of the metadata group
...output omitted...
    spec:
        nodeSelector: # location:
            dc.spec.template.spec.nodeSelector
        region: apps
        containers:
            - image: registry.lab.example.com/rhsc1/httpd-24-rhel7:latest
...output omitted...
oc get pods -o=custom-columns="name:metadata.name,node:.spec.nodeName" # all pods should be scheduled on
    node2 only after a while
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc label node node1.lab.example.com region=apps --overwrite=true # it does not move pods to node1
    automatically
oc get nodes -L region # 'apps' label is applied to node1
    and node2
oc adm manage-node --schedulable=false node2.lab.example.com # mark node2 unschedulable
oc adm drain node2.lab.example.com --delete-local-data --ignore-daemonsets # drain all pods from node2
oc get pods -o=custom-columns="name:metadata.name,node:.spec.nodeName" # all the application pods are
    running on node1
oc adm manage-node --schedulable=true node2.lab.example.com # node2 schedulable again
oc scale dc orchestration-scheduling --replicas=2 # scale down to two
# Set resource quotas and limit ranges for your project, then verify that the project's pods consume
    resources from the project's quota:
cat ~/D0425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/quota.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: ResourceQuota
metadata:
    name: orchestration-scheduling
spec:
    hard:
        limits.memory: "400Mi"
        limits.cpu: "1200m"
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/quota.yaml
oc describe quota # limits.memory used 128Mi, hard 400Mi
cat ~/D0425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/limit-range.yaml
apiVersion: "v1"
kind: "LimitRange"
metadata:
    name: "orchestration-scheduling"
spec:
    limits:
        - type: "Pod"
            max:
                cpu: "400m"
                memory: "256Mi"
            min:
                cpu: "100m"
                memory: "64Mi"
        - type: "Container"

```



```

max:
  cpu: "400m"
  memory: "256Mi"
min:
  cpu: "100m"
  memory: "64Mi"
default:
  value (if resource limit is omitted)
  cpu: "200m"
  memory: "64Mi"
defaultRequest:
  request value (if resource request is omitted)
  cpu: "200m"
  memory: "64Mi"
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/limit-range.yaml
oc describe limits
Name:      orchestration-scheduling
Namespace: orchestration-scheduling
Type       Resource  Min   Max   Default Request  Default Limit
----
Pod        cpu       100m  400m  -               -
Pod        memory   64Mi  256Mi -               -
Container  cpu       100m  400m  200m            200m
Container  memory   64Mi  256Mi 64Mi            64Mi
oc describe node node1.lab.example.com | grep -A 5 Allocated
Allocated resources:
(Total limits may be over 100 percent, i.e., overcommitted.)
Resource Requests Limits
-----
cpu       595m (29%)  525m (26%)
memory    4916Mi (86%) 3864Mi (67%)
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc get pods
oc describe pod orchestration-scheduling-2-49flz | grep -A2 Requests
oc scale dc orchestration-scheduling --replicas=3
oc describe quota
oc scale dc orchestration-scheduling --replicas=7
oc get pod
  because the sum of the pod memory exceeds 400 MiB (only 6 are running = 6x64Mi (384))
oc describe dc orchestration-scheduling | grep Replicas
oc get events | grep -i error
  requested: limits.cpu=200m,limits.memory=64Mi,
  used: limits.cpu=1200m,limits.memory=384Mi,
  limited: limits.cpu=1200m,limits.memory=400Mi
oc scale dc orchestration-scheduling --replicas=1
oc get pod
oc describe quota
oc set resources dc orchestration-scheduling --requests=cpu=100m
  by any quota
oc get pod
  orchestration-scheduling-3-4594c
oc describe pod orchestration-scheduling-3-4594c | grep -A2 Requests
oc describe quota
  against the project's quota
oc set resources dc orchestration-scheduling --requests=memory=16Gi
  than or equal to memory limit
cat ~/D0425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/dc-secret.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: List
items:
- apiVersion: apps.openshift.io/v1
  kind: DeploymentConfig

```

*# default resource requirement limit*

*# default resource requirement*

*# resources usage on node1*

*# requests CPU 200m, memory 64Mi*

*# memory = 3x 64Mi (192)*

*# limits.memory Used 192Mi, Hard 440Mi*

*# memory = 7x 64Mi (448)*

*# seventh pod is never created*

*# Replicas 6 current/7 desired*

*# exceeded quota*

*# ensure only 1 pod running*

*# limits.memory 64Mi used, Hard 400Mi*

*# Resource requests are not enforced*

*# new pod*

*# Requests cpu: 100m*

*# CPU request is not evaluated*

*# Invalid value: "16Gi": must be less*

```

...output omitted...
containers:
- image: registry.lab.example.com/rhsc1/mongodb-32-rhel7:latest
  name: mongodb
  env:
  - name: MONGODB_ADMIN_PASSWORD
    valueFrom:
      secretKeyRef:
        name: orchestration-secret
        key: admin_password
  - name: MONGODB_USER
    valueFrom:
      secretKeyRef:
        name: orchestration-secret
        key: username
  - name: MONGODB_PASSWORD
    valueFrom:
      secretKeyRef:
        name: orchestration-secret
        key: password
...output omitted...
cat ~/D0425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/secret.yaml
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
  name: orchestration-secret
type: Opaque
stringData:
  admin_password: redhat123
  username: developer
  password: redhat
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/secret.yaml
oc describe secret orchestration-secret                                # shows admin_password, username,
  password sizes
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/orchestration-scheduling/dc-secret.yaml      # deployment config
oc get pods                                                            # orchestration-secrets-1-fs5n5
oc set env pod orchestration-secrets-1-fs5n5 --list                   # list environment variables that pod
  uses
oc rsh orchestration-secrets-1-fs5n5
  mongo -u $MONGODB_USER -p $MONGODB_PASSWORD $MONGODB_DATABASE      # connecting to orchestration-secrets
  exit
  mongo -u admin -p redhat123 admin --eval "db.version()"              # MongoDB shell version is displayed
  exit
oc delete project orchestration-scheduling
lab orchestration-scheduling finish

```

You can inspect the RESTful API calls:

```

oc create configmap special-config --from-literal=serverAddress=172.20.30.40 --loglevel=8 # 0 to 10
# Notice how the oc command sends the new resource details through a JSON object in the request body

```

## LAB 6.2

```

lab orchestration-api start
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc project tracking
oc get pods                                                            # bus-1-xtj1w
oc get svc                                                            # bus, ClusterIP 172.30.56.233, port
  8080/TCP
oc get route                                                            # none, not accessible from outside
  the cluster
curl http://bus.tracking.svc.cluster.local:8080/bustrack.php/api/v1/stations/ # could not resolve
ssh master curl http://bus.tracking.svc.cluster.local:8080/bustrack.php/api/v1/stations/ # returns "bus
  stations" JSON

```

```
firefox https://3scale-admin.apps.lab.example.com/
```

1. Log in as admin/redhat - "New API"
2. Name: Bus Tracking  
Base URL: http://bus.tracking.svc.cluster.local:8080/bustrack.php
3. GET method: /api/v1/stations
4. Send request.

```
curl -k
  "https://api-3scale-apicast-staging.apps.lab.example.com:443/api/v1/stations/?user_key=a1b1dfef9d7db608cf8477
# To protect the back-end application, limit the number of requests to five per minute. Hit API multiple
  times to confirm.
lab orchestration-api finish
```

## OPENSHIFT SECURITY MODEL

Infrastructure components, such as application nodes, use client certificates that OpenShift generates. Infrastructure components that run in containers use a token associated with their service account to connect to the API.

OpenShift Container Platform creates the PKI and generates the certificates at installation time. OpenShift uses an internal CA (openshift-signer) to generate and sign all the certificates that are listed in the master-config.yaml configuration file. This can be overridden in Ansible:

```
openshift_master_named_certificates=[{"certfile": "/path/to/certificate.crt", "keyfile":
  "/path/to/private-key.key", "cafile": "/path/to/ca.crt"}]
```

To override names:

```
openshift_master_overwrite_named_certificates=true
openshift_master_named_certificates=[{"certfile": "/path/to/certificate.crt", "keyfile":
  "/path/to/private-key.key", "names": ["public-master-host.com"], "cafile": "/path/to/ca.crt"}]
```

On the master server, there are ~20 certificates and keys that are generated at installation time:

```
ls -l /etc/origin/master/*.{crt,key}
additional_ca.crt          # + .key
ca-bundle.crt             # + .key
etcd.server.crt           # + .key
master.kubelet-client.crt  # + .key
registry.crt              # + .key
. . .
```

## LAB 6.3

```
lab orchestration-certificates start
ssh root@master
cd /etc/origin/master          # certs for etcd, master API, node to
  node, routers
vim master-config.yaml
...output omitted...
kubernetesMasterConfig:
  proxyClientInfo:
    certFile: master.proxy-client.crt
    keyFile: master.proxy-client.key
...output omitted...
oauthConfig:
...output omitted...
  masterPublicURL: https://master.lab.example.com:443
openssl x509 -in ca.crt -text -noout          # locate the issuer of default CA
  Issuer: CN=openshift-signer@1234567890
  ...output omitted...
  CA:TRUE
openssl x509 -in etcd.server.crt -text -noout  # same openshift-signer, CA:FALSE
exit
ssh root@node1
cd /etc/origin/node
ls -l          # certificates/, client-ca.crt,
  node-config.yaml (grep -A1 -B2 certificates node-config.yaml - points to /etc/origin/node/certificates)
```

```

openssl x509 -in client-ca.crt -text -noout # CA generates and signs all
      certificates for the nodes (CA: TRUE) - issuer is again 'openshift-signer'
openssl x509 -in certificates/kubelet-client-current.pem -text -noout # CN common name, embeds the node
      name in the system:nodes organization (CN=system:node:node1.lab.example.com)
exit
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc project openshift-console
oc get routes # Termination: reencrypt/Redirect
oc get service # 172.30.11.194, console
oc describe secret console-serving-cert # secret type kubernetes.io/tls
      embeds service-signer.crt and service-signer.key
firefox https://console.apps.lab.example.com # openshift-signer is the CA, which
      signs the certificate that is valid for the *.apps.lab.example.com wildcard subdomain
oc get pods -o wide | awk '{print $7}' # name of the nodes on which console
      pod is = master.lab.example.com
ssh root@master
ip r # locate device that routes
      172.30.0.0/16 = tun0
tcpdump -ni tun0 -vvvs 1024 -l -A "tcp port 443 and src host 172.30.0.1"
      firefox https://console.apps.lab.example.com # log in as developer/redhat,
      everything is encrypted so no packets captured
Ctrl+C
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project orchestration-certificates
oc new-app ~/D0425/labs/orchestration-certificates/app.yaml # two httpd pods, each on different
      node
oc get pods -o wide # IP address of the pod running on
      node2 is 10.129.0.101
oc rsh httpd-node1 bash # at the same time, run tcpdump on
      node1: tcpdump -ni vxlan_sys_4789 -vvvs 1024 -l -A "src host 10.129.0.101" - you will see some activity
      on the terminal while you do the below - we're capturing traffic between two pods on different nodes
      exec 3<>/dev/tcp/10.129.0.101/8080 # the IP address of the second pod
echo -e "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nhost: 10.129.0.101 \r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n" >&3 # fetch the web server and
      print its content. node1's tcpdump will show raw packets
Ctrl+C
exit
oc delete project orchestration-certificates

```

## FINAL LAB 6

TBA

## 7. Providing Secure Network I/O

### ISTIO

Sidecars sit alongside microservices and route requests to other proxies. These components form a mesh network.

- Definition of a `VirtualService`:

```
apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: VirtualService
metadata:
  name: reviews-route
spec:
  hosts:
  - production.prod.svc.cluster.local
  http:
  - route:
    - destination:
        host: production-v2.prod.svc.cluster.local
        subset: v2
        weight: 25
    - destination:
        host: production-v1.prod.svc.cluster.local
        subset: v1
        weight: 75
```

- The `DestinationRule` associated with this virtual service:

```
apiVersion: networking.istio.io/v1alpha3
kind: DestinationRule
metadata:
  name: production-destination
spec:
  host: production.prod.svc.cluster.local
  subsets:
  - name: v1
    labels:
      version: v1
  - name: v2
    labels:
      version: v2
```

### MANAGING SECURE TRAFFIC IN OPENSIFT CONTAINER PLATFORM

OpenShift can manage certificates by generating an X.509 certificate and a key pair as a secret in your application name spaces. Certificates are valid for the internal DNS name `service_name.namespace.svc`.

The following Red Hat Single Sign-on template shows how the service resource defines the annotation `service.alpha.openshift.io/serving-cert-secret-name` for generating the certificate with a value of `sso-x509-https-secret`.

The pod mounts the volume that contains this certificate in `/etc/x509/https`, as referenced by `secretName: sso-x509-https-secret` in the volumes section:

```
kind: Template
apiVersion: v1
...output omitted...
objects:
- kind: Service
  spec:
  metadata:
    annotations:
      service.alpha.openshift.io/serving-cert-secret-name: sso-x509-https-secret # <--
- kind: DeploymentConfig
  # <--
```

```
...output omitted...
spec:
  template:
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: "${APPLICATION_NAME}"
        image: "${APPLICATION_NAME}"
...output omitted...
      volumeMounts:
      - name: sso-x509-https-volume
        mountPath: "/etc/x509/https"
        readOnly: true
      volumes:
      - name: sso-x509-https-volume
        secret:
          secretName: sso-x509-https-secret # <--
```

Service serving certificates allow a pod to mount the secret and use them accordingly. The certificate and key are in PEM format, and stored as `tls.crt` and `tls.key`.

OpenShift automatically replaces the certificate when it gets close to expiration.

Pods can use these security certificates by reading the CA bundle located at `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/service` which is automatically exposed inside pods.

If the service certificate generation fails, force certificate regeneration by removing the old secret, and clearing the following two annotations on the service:

```
service.alpha.openshift.io/serving-cert-generation-error-<error_number>
service.alpha.openshift.io/serving-cert-generation-error-num-<error_number>
```

The service serving certificates are generated on-demand, and thus are different from those used by OpenShift for node-to-node or node-to-master communication.

## Managing Network Policies in OpenShift

### 3 SDNs:

1. **ovs-subnet** - flat network that spreads across all the cluster nodes and connects all the pods
2. **ovs-multitenant** - isolates each OpenShift project. By default, the pods in a project cannot access pods in other projects. The following command allows projectA to access pods and services in projectB, and vice versa: `oc adm pod-network join-projects --to=projectA projectB` - this give access to all pods & services in project.  
`oc adm pod-network isolate-projects <project1> <project2>` - nothing can access between the projects
3. **ovs-networkpolicy** - To use network policies, you need to switch from the default SDN provider to the **redhat/openshift-ovs-networkpolicy** provider. It allows you to create tailored policies between projects to make sure users can only access what they should (which conforms to the least privilege approach). By default, without any network policy resources defined, pods in a project can access any other pod.

To change, edit `/etc/origin/master/master-config.yaml` and `/etc/origin/node/node-config.yaml`:

```
. . .
networkConfig:
  networkPluginName:
. . .
```

Example: Both networks are separate projects - The following network policy, which applies to all pods in network-A, allows traffic from the pods in network-B whose label is `role="back-end"`, but blocks all other pods:

```
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
  name: network-A_policy
spec:
  podSelector: {}
```

```

ingress:
- from:
  - podSelector:
      matchLabels:
        role: back-end
- from:
  - namespaceSelector:
      matchLabels:
        name: network-B

```

Example: Both networks are separate projects - The following network policy, which applies to network-B, allows traffic from all the pods in network-A. This policy is less restrictive than the network-A policy, because it does not restrict traffic on any pods on the network-A project:

```

kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
  name: network-B_policy
spec:
  podSelector: {}
  ingress:
  - from:
    - podSelector: {}
  - from:
    - namespaceSelector:
        matchLabels:
          name: network-A

```

The following excerpt shows how to allow external users to access an application whose labels match `product-catalog` over a TCP connection on port 8080:

```

kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
  name: external-access
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: product-catalog
  ingress:
  - ports:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 8080

```

```

ovs-ofctl dump-flows br0 -O OpenFlow13 --no-stats          # flow rules on the Open vSwitch
    bridge on the node

```

The following network policy allows traffic coming from pods that match the `emails` label to access a database whose label is `db`:

```

kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
  name: allow-3306
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: db
  ingress:
  - from:
    - podSelector:
        matchLabels:
          app: emails
      ports:
      - protocol: TCP
        port: 3306

```

# destination

# source

You can also define a default policy for your project. An empty pod selector means that this policy applies to all pods in this project. The following default policy blocks all traffic unless you define an explicit policy that overrides this default behavior:

```
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
  name: default-deny
spec:
  podSelector:
```

To manage network communication between two projects, assign a label to the project that needs access to another project:

```
oc label namespace front-end project=frontend_project          # assigns the frontend_project label
to the front-end project
```

The following network policy, which applies to a back-end project, allows any pods in the front-end project to access the pods labeled as app=user-registration through port 8080, in this back-end project:

```
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
  name: allow-8080-user-registration
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: user-registration
  ingress:
  - from:
    - namespaceSelector:
        matchLabels:
          project: frontend_project
    ports:
    - protocol: TCP
      port: 8080
```

# can be also 'podSelector:'

## Node & Pod network

OpenShift configures each cluster node with an Open vSwitch bridge named **br0**. For each pod, OpenShift creates a **veth** device and connects one end to the **eth0** interface inside the pod and the other end to the **br0** bridge:

```
nsenter -t 13120 --net ip link show          # run as root on the node, 13120 is
PID of a process running inside the container. 'eth0@if36:' (connects eth0 inside container to the 36th
interface on the node) is one of the links in the output.
ip link show | grep ^36:                    # retrieve the other end of that veth
device - e.g. 'vetha4f3b73f@if3:'
yum install -y openvswitch                  # not installed by default, good for
inspecting the network with ovs-vsctl
ovs-vsctl show | grep vetha4f3b73f          # shows the 'br0' and all the
connected ports.
```

**tun0** interface on the node is an Open vSwitch port on the **br0** bridge, it is used for external cluster access

OpenShift uses the **vxlan\_sys\_4789** interface on the node, or **vxlan0** in **br0**, for building the cluster overlay network between nodes. Communications between pods on different nodes go through this interface.

## CONTROLLING EGRESS TRAFFIC

By default, OpenShift allows egress traffic with no restrictions. You can control traffic with egress fw, routers, static IP. OpenShift allows traffic if no rule matches, checks rules in order.

### 1. Egress FWs

This object allows the egress traffic to the 192.168.12.0/24 network, and to the db-srv.example.com and analytics.example.com systems. The last rule denies everything else. The rules only apply to the egress traffic and do not affect inter-pod communication:



```
kind: EgressNetworkPolicy
apiVersion: v1
metadata:
  name: myfirewall
spec:
  egress:
  - to:
    cidrSelector: 192.168.12.0/24
    type: Allow
  - to:
    dnsName: db-srv.example.com
    type: Allow
  - to:
    dnsName: analytics.example.com
    type: Allow
  - to:
    cidrSelector: 0.0.0.0/0
    type: Deny
```

```
oc create -f firewall.yaml -n myproject # only one per project, you must be
cluster admin to create it
```

## 1. Egress Routers

3 modes:

- (a) Redirect - image openshift3/ose-pod (TCP and UDP)
- (b) HTTP proxy - image openshift3/ose-egress-http-proxy (HTTP and HTTPS)
- (c) DNS proxy - image openshift3/ose-egress-dns-proxy (TCP)

Can be used with any of the three SDN plugins, but underlying hosting platform may need to be reconfigured. Present a unique identifiable source IP address to the firewall and the external service.

Egress router is a particular pod running in your project with two interfaces (eth0, macvlan0). It acts as a proxy between your pods and the external service.

macvlan0 interfaces are special devices that directly expose node interfaces to the container and has a MAC address seen by the underlying network.

```
nsenter -t 14171 --net ip addr show # shows eth0@if22 and macvlan0@if2.
IP address of the macvlan interface, 172.25.250.20 is not used by anything else and is the source IP
address seen by the external firewall and service
ip link show | grep ^2: # "2: eth0: ..."
```

In front of each egress router, you need to create an OpenShift service object. You use that service host name inside your application to access the external service through the router.

a/ Example - redirect mode (can only be created by cluster admin & application may need reconfiguration to access external service through egress router):

```
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod # <--
metadata:
  name: egress-router-redirect
  labels:
    name: egress-router-redirect
  annotations:
    pod.network.openshift.io/assign-macvlan: "true"
spec:
  initContainers: # <-- starts before application
    container egress-router-wait, creates NAT rules
  - name: egress-router-setup
    image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-egress-router
```

```

securityContext:
  privileged: true
env:
- name: EGRESS_SOURCE                # source IP address
  value: 172.25.250.20/24
- name: EGRESS_GATEWAY              # IP of the gateway in the source
  subnet
  value: 172.25.250.254
- name: EGRESS_DESTINATION          # IP address of the external service
  value: 23.21.165.246
- name: EGRESS_ROUTER_MODE
  value: init
containers:
- name: egress-router-wait          # application container
  image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-pod

apiVersion: v1
kind: Service                       # <--
metadata:
  name: egress-router
spec:
  ports:
  - name: postgres
    port: 5432
  - name: pgrest
    port: 80
  type: ClusterIP
  selector:
    name: egress-router-redirect    # label of the router pod

```

b/ Example - HTTP proxy mode:

```

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod                           # <--
metadata:
  name: egress-router-http
  labels:
    name: egress-router-http
  annotations:
    pod.network.openshift.io/assign-macvlan: "true"
spec:
  initContainers:
  - name: egress-router-setup
    image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-egress-router
    securityContext:
      privileged: true
    env:
  - name: EGRESS_SOURCE
    value: 172.25.250.20/24
  - name: EGRESS_GATEWAY
    value: 172.25.250.254
  - name: EGRESS_ROUTER_MODE        # that is the mode
    value: http-proxy
  containers:
  - name: egress-router-proxy
    image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-egress-http-proxy    # container image name
    env:
  - name: EGRESS_HTTP_PROXY_DESTINATION    # Squid rules:
    value: |
      !*.example.com        # except to example.com,
      !10.1.2.0/24          # or 10.1.2.0 network,
      *                      # forward requests to any external
      service

```

```

apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
  name: egress-router
spec:
  ports:
    - name: http-proxy
      port: 8080
  type: ClusterIP
  selector:
    name: egress-router-http
# label of the router pod
# <--

```

c/ Example - DNS proxy mode:

```

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: egress-router-dns
  labels:
    name: egress-router-dns
  annotations:
    pod.network.openshift.io/assign-macvlan: "true"
spec:
  initContainers:
    - name: egress-router-setup
      image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-egress-router
      securityContext:
        privileged: true
      env:
        - name: EGRESS_SOURCE
          value: 172.25.250.20/24
        - name: EGRESS_GATEWAY
          value: 172.25.250.254
        - name: EGRESS_ROUTER_MODE
          value: dns-proxy
# indicates the egress mode
  containers:
    - name: egress-router-proxy
      image: registry.redhat.io/openshift3/ose-egress-dns-proxy
# container image name
      env:
        - name: EGRESS_DNS_PROXY_DESTINATION
          value: |
# HAProxy dameon rules:
# source-port destination_host
            [destination-port]
            80 23.21.165.246
            to 23.21.165.246
            # forward request coming on port 80
            8080 www.example.com 80
            www.example.com on port 80
            # forward request coming on 8080 to
            2525 10.4.203.49 25

```

```

apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
  name: egress-router
spec:
  ports:
    - name: web1
      port: 80
    - name: web2
      port: 8080
    - name: mail
      port: 2525
  type: ClusterIP
  selector:

```

name: egress-router-dns	# label of the router pod
-------------------------	---------------------------

## 1. Enabling Static IP Addresses for External Access

You can define a static IP address at the project level, in the `NetNamespace` object. With such a configuration, all the egress traffic from the pods in the project originates from that IP address. OpenShift must use the `ovs-networkpolicy` SDN plug-in.

OpenShift automatically creates one `NetNamespace` object per project. First, associate IP with project and then node:

```
oc patch netnamespace myproject -p '{"egressIPs": ["172.25.250.19"]}' # associates the unused 172.25.250.19
                           address to the myproject project
oc get netnamespace myproject
  NAME      NETID      EGRESS IPS
myproject  13508931  [172.25.250.19]
oc patch hostsubnet node1 -p '{"egressIPs": ["172.25.250.19"]}' # associates the 172.25.250.19
                           address to node1 (you must indicate on which node OpenShift should assign the address)
oc get hostsubnet node1 # shows EGRESS IPS [172.25.250.19]
ssh root@node1 ip addr show dev eth0 # OpenShift declares the address as
                                     an alias on the external network interface of node1
```

When using the `oc patch` command to add a new address to a `HostSubnet` object that already has egress IP addresses defined for other projects, you must also specify those addresses in the `egressIPs` array:

```
oc patch hostsubnet node1 -p '{"egressIPs": ["172.25.250.19", "172.25.250.16", "172.25.250.15"]}' #
otherwise new address replaces/overwrites all the existing ones
```

## LAB 7.1

```
lab network-isolation start
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc new-project network-isolation
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/network-isolation/logic.yaml
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/network-isolation/presentation.yaml
oc get pods -o wide # logic-1-5nf56 on node2 &
                    presentation-1-sg8cz on node1 running
oc rsh logic-1-5nf56 curl http://services.lab.example.com # keep cURL running while you tail
                    httpd log
ssh root@services.lab.example.com
tail -f /var/log/httpd/access_log # you will see the curl command GET
from 172.25.250.12 (node2)
oc rsh presentation-1-sg8cz curl http://services.lab.example.com # run the same curl command from the
second pod, it will be coming from 172.25.250.11 (node1)
vim ~/D0425/labs/network-isolation/router-redirect.yaml # Deploy an egress router to access
the web server on services.lab.example.com (172.25.250.13). Use the available 172.25.250.15/24 IP
...output omitted...
env: # egress router in redirect mode
- name: EGRESS_SOURCE
  value: 172.25.250.15/24
- name: EGRESS_GATEWAY
  value: 172.25.250.254
- name: EGRESS_DESTINATION
  value: 172.25.250.13 # =services.lab.example.com
- name: EGRESS_ROUTER_MODE
  value: init
...output omitted...
oc login -u admin -p redhat # egress router needs admin
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/network-isolation/router-redirect.yaml # router pod
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/network-isolation/router-redirect-service.yaml # router service
oc get pods # egress-router running
oc rsh logic-1-5nf56 curl http://egress-router.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local # the running tail will
show request coming from 172.25.250.15
```

```

oc describe pod egress-router                                     # config of egress-router shows it is
    running on node2.lab.example.com/172.25.250.12 and the Container ID of 'egress-router-wait' (not the
    init container!) is cri-o://6e56...af33
ssh root@node2.lab.example.com
runc state 6e56...af33 | grep pid                                # "pid": 22938,
nsenter -t 22938 --net ip addr show                             # eth0@if34 = 10.129.0.40/23 and
    macvlan0@if2 = 172.25.250.15/24 (if2 = mapped to the node's physical interface whose index is 2)
ip link show | grep ^2:                                         # 2: eth0:
nsenter -t 22938 --net iptables -t nat -nvL                     # inspect NAT rules in the container
    PREROUTING, ACCEPT, target = DNAT (replaces the destination address), in = eth0, destination to =
    172.25.250.13 (services.lab.example.com)
    POSTROUTING ACCEPT, target = SNAT (replaces the source address), out = macvlan0, destination to =
    172.25.250.15
exit
oc get pods                                                      # on workstation, shows:
    presentation-1-sg8cz, logic-1-5nf56, egress-router
oc describe pod presentation-1-sg8cz                             # presentation Container ID
    cri-o://4cac...f7f0 running on node1.lab.example.com/172.25.250.11
ssh root@node1.lab.example.com
runc state 4cac...f7f0 | grep pid                                # "pid": 13120,
nsenter -t 13120 --net ip link show                             # eth0@if36 = eth0 interface in the
    container is a vEth device whose pair has the index 36 on the node
ip link show | grep ^36:                                         # 36: vetha4f3b73f@if3:
ovs-vsctl show                                                   # Bridge "br0" = "vetha4f3b73f";
    "tun0", "vxlan0" are also connected to "br0"
exit
oc login -u developer -p redhat                                  # you're still in network-isolation
    project
oc rsh presentation-1-sg8cz curl http://logic.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # works
oc rsh logic-1-5nf56 curl http://presentation.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # works
cat ~/D0425/labs/network-isolation/deny-all.yaml              # blocks all communication between
    pods in the project
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
  name: default-deny
spec:
  podSelector:                                                    # means all the pods in the project
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/network-isolation/deny-all.yaml
oc rsh presentation-1-sg8cz curl http://logic.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # fails
oc rsh logic-1-5nf56 curl http://presentation.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # fails
cat ~/D0425/labs/network-isolation/allow-pres2logic.yaml       # allows pods with app=presentation
    to connect to app=logic on 8080
kind: NetworkPolicy
apiVersion: extensions/v1beta1
metadata:
  name: allow-pres-to-logic
spec:
  podSelector:
    matchLabels:
      app: logic                                                    # destination
  ingress:
    - from:
      - podSelector:
          matchLabels:
            app: presentation                                        # source
      ports:
        - protocol: TCP
          port: 8080
oc get pods --show-labels                                         # display all the labels
oc create -f ~/D0425/labs/network-isolation/allow-pres2logic.yaml
oc rsh presentation-1-sg8cz curl http://logic.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # presentation pod

```

```
    can now access the logic pod
oc rsh logic-1-5nf56 curl http://presentation.network-isolation.svc.cluster.local:8080 # logic pod still
    cannot access the presentation pod
oc get pods -o wide                                     # logic-1-5nf56 = 10.129.0.39
    (node2), presentation-1-sg8cz = 10.130.0.33 (node1)
ssh root@node1.lab.example.com
ovs-ofctl dump-flows br0 -O OpenFlow13 --no-stats | grep nw_src=10.130.0.33,nw_dst=10.129.0.39 #
    nw_src=10.130.0.33,nw_dst=10.129.0.82,tp_dst=8080 = rule that allows the 10.130.0.33 source IP address
    (nw_src) to access the 10.129.0.39 destination IP address (nw_dst) [presentation --> logic]
exit
lab network-isolation finish
```

## FINAL LAB 7

TBA

## 8. Providing Secure Storage I/O

### CATEGORIZING STORAGE TYPES IN OPENSIFT

1. Shared storage - GlusterFS, NFS, Ceph..
2. Block storage - EBS, GCE disk, iSCSI..

#### Accessing Files in a Shared Storage Type in OpenShift

If you need to access the same share from multiple pods, then you must configure each pod to use a default GID and define the group ownership of the share with a known GID:

```
chgrp test <directory> # configure dir with known GID
cat /etc/group | grep test # test:x:1012:user
```

To enforce that your pod use a group, you must create a service account in each project. Each service account must be assigned to the same security constraint context (SCC) and it must restrict the limitations to a specific GID. Additionally, because the built-in SCC takes precedence over a custom one, you must set a higher priority in the custom SCC (`kind: SecurityContextConstraints, priority: XX`):

```
oc create serviceaccount <sccName> -n <projectName> # create the service account that
# configures the project with the custom SCC
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user <sccName> system:serviceaccount:<projectName>:<serviceAccount> # associate
# the service account with the SCC
```

#### Accessing Files in a Block Storage Type in OpenShift

Any OpenShift cluster can access block storage and even share the contents among pods in the same project. The first pod takes over ownership of the block storage, changing the GID and UID from that share. If any other pod running in the same project tries to access the same persistent volume bound to the block storage, the deployment fails due to lack of permissions.

To solve this problem, you must create a security constraint context that configures the `fsGroup` setting and allows any pod to access the same persistent volume.

### LAB 8.1

```
lab storage-isolation start
ssh root@services
ls -lZ /exports # The secure-nfs directory is an NFS
# share that only has read and write permissions to users that belong to the secure-nfs group
grep secure-nfs /etc/group # secure-nfs:x:1200:nfsnobody
showmount -e services.lab.example.com # /exports/secure-nfs *
oc login -u admin -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
oc get pv pv0001 # pv0001, 5Gi, RWO
oc describe pv/pv0001 # NFS server:
# services.lab.example.com, path: /exports/secure-nfs
oc login -u developer -p redhat
oc new-project secure-nfs
oc new-app postgresql-persistent -p POSTGRESQL_VERSION=9.5 -p VOLUME_CAPACITY=1Gi -o yaml >
~/database-secure-nfs.yaml
oc create -f ~/database-secure-nfs.yaml
oc get pvc # postgresql bound to pv0001
oc get pods # CrashLoopBackOff error
oc logs postgresql-1-4ptk4 # cannot create directory error
oc delete all -l app=postgresql-persistent
vim /home/student/D0425/labs/storage-isolation/restricted-scc.yaml # create an SCC to enable access
# using the group ID from the secure-nfs group
# 1. Remove the fields named groups and users so this SCC is not pre-linked to anyone.
# 2. Change the field named name to secure-nfs.
# 3. Delete runtime information fields such as creationTimestamp.
# 4. Also delete all annotations.
# 5. Change the supplementalGroups field to use MustRunAs, instead of RunAsAny.
# 6. Set the max value to 1300 and the min value to 1100.
...
```

```

defaultAddCapabilities: null
fsGroup:
  type: MustRunAs
# delete this: groups:
# delete this: - system:authenticated
kind: SecurityContextConstraints
metadata:
# delete all annotations
# delete this:   creationTimestamp: null   name: secure-nfs
  name: secure-nfs
priority: null
...
supplementalGroups:
  type: MustRunAs
  ranges:
    - min: 1100
      max: 1300
      # delete this: users: []
volumes:
...
oc login -u admin -p redhat
oc create -f /home/student/D0425/labs/storage-isolation/restricted-scc.yaml
oc create serviceaccount secure-nfs -n secure-nfs # can be just 'oc create sa
secure-nfs'
oc adm policy add-scc-to-user secure-nfs -z secure-nfs -n secure-nfs # create SA in secure-nfs project and
link with new SCC
oc describe scc secure-nfs # shows supplemental group range
1100-1300
oc login -u developer -p redhat
vim ~/database-secure-nfs.yaml
. . .
kind: DeploymentConfig
spec:
  . . .
  template:
    spec:
      . . .
      name: postgresql
      serviceName: secure-nfs # delete securityContext,
      capabilities, privileged sections
      securityContext:
        supplementalGroups:
          - 1200 # secure-nfs group
oc create -f ~/database-secure-nfs.yaml
oc get pods # now it works
lab storage-isolation finish

```

## FINAL LAB 8

TBA



## 9. Configuring Web Application Single Sign-on

1. Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0
2. OpenID Connect
3. JWT

Describing the OpenID Connect Authorization Code Flow

1. The application redirects to the SSO server, which presents a login screen and validates the user's credentials.
2. On successful authentication, the SSO redirects back to the application providing a 'code'.
3. The application uses the code to request an access token from SSO server.
4. The SSO server returns an access token that the application uses to authorize end user's requests and to submit requests to other applications that are clients of the same SSO realm.

### CONFIGURING KEYCLOAK ADAPTERS FOR SINGLE SIGN-ON

The core technology of Red Hat's SSO solution is the Keycloak open source project.

### DESCRIBING SSO CLIENT ACCESS TYPES

1. 'client protocol' defines whether the application uses SAML 2.0 or OpenID Connect
2. 'access type' defines whether the application is required to authenticate itself or not
3. 'valid Redirect URIs' protects the SSO server from sending tokens to applications other than the ones that initiated an authentication request

### LAB 9.1

```
lab webapp start
# Access the SSO web console and create a realm for the Ntier application.
# Create the js and java clients in the java-js-realm realm and configure them for the Ntier application
# front end and back ends.
# Create a user for the Ntier application.
# Create and configure a project for the Ntier application:
oc login -u developer -p redhat https://master.lab.example.com
cat ~/D0425/labs/webapp/create-cm.sh # Review the script that creates the
    Ntier application configuration map
~/D0425/labs/webapp/create-cm.sh
oc describe cm ntier-config #
    https://sso-websso.apps.lab.example.com/auth
cat ~/D0425/labs/webapp/deploy-pgsql.sh # Review the script that deploys the
    Ntier application database.
~/D0425/labs/webapp/deploy-pgsql.sh
oc get pod
cat ~/D0425/labs/webapp/deploy-eap.sh # Review the script that deploys the
    Java EE back end of the Ntier application.
~/D0425/labs/webapp/deploy-eap.sh
oc get pod # now we have postgresql-1-d9nfr and
    eap-app-2-ftm2q
oc logs eap-app-2-ftm2q
curl -ik https://eap-app-webapp.apps.lab.example.com/jboss-api
~/D0425/labs/webapp/deploy-springboot.sh
oc get pod # + springboot-app-2-7ktcv
curl -ik https://springboot-app-webapp.apps.lab.example.com/springboot-api/status # Access the Spring Boot
    back end REST API.
```

```
~/D0425/labs/webapp/deploy-nodejs.sh  
  the Ntier application
```

```
# Deploy the JavaScript front end of
```

```
oc get pod
```

```
# + nodejs-app-2-vcfr7
```

```
firefox https://nodejs-app-webapp.apps.lab.example.com
```

```
lab webapp finish
```

FINAL COMPREHENSIVE LAB1 - SINGLE CONTAINER APP

TBA

FINAL COMPREHENSIVE LAB2 - MULTI-CONTAINER APPS

TBA

APPENDIX

To help create objects:

```
# http://materials.example.com/docs contains all of the documents that are also available during the exam
oc api-resources | grep <RESOURCE>
oc explain dc.spec.template.spec
oc new-app --docker-image=registry.lab.example.com/image -o yaml > resources.yml
cat resources.yml
```

Table of important files:

Path	Purpose	Location
/etc/origin/master/master-config.yml	master config	masters
/etc/origin/node/node-config.yml	node config	nodes
/etc/containers/registries.d/[REGISTRY].yml	where to store new signatures and retrieve existing ones	everywhere
/etc/containers/policy.json	what registries are allowed	everywhere
/etc/docker/certs.d/[URL]/ca.crt	private CAs on each node	everywhere
/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors	automatically trusted CAs	masters
/etc/ipa/ca.crt	root CA of the IdM server	IdM
/var/lib/atomic/sigstore	locally stored image signatures	workstation