

# Impermax Periphery Smart Contract Audit

Date: February 24, 2021 Report for: Impermax Finance By: CyberUnit.Tech This document may contain confidential information about IT systems and the customer's intellectual property and information about potential vulnerabilities and exploitation methods.

exploitation methods.

The report contains confidential information. This information can be used internally by the customer. The customer can release the information after fixing all vulnerabilities.

#### **Document**

Name	Impermax Periphery	
Platform	EVM	
Name	Impermax-x-uniswapv2-router	
Date	Feb 24, 2021	



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#### **Introduction**

This report presents the Customer`s smart contract's security assessment findings and its code review conducted between January 18 – February 3 2021.

## Scope

The scope of the project is Impermax-x-uniswapv2-router smart contract.

We have scanned this smart contract for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities. Here are some of the widely known vulnerabilities that are considered (the full list includes them but does not limit by them):

- Reentrancy
- Timestamp Dependence
- Gas Limit and Loops
- DoS with (Unexpected) Throw
- DoS with Block Gas Limit
- Transaction-Ordering Dependence
- Style guide violation
- Transfer forwards all gas
- ERC20 API violation
- Compiler version not fixed
- Unchecked external call Unchecked math
- Unsafe type inference
- Implicit visibility level

## **Executive Summary**

According to the assessment, Customer' smart contracts are well-secured.



Our team performed an analysis of code functionality, manual audit, and automated checks with Slither and remix IDE (see Appendix B pic 1). All issues found during the automated investigation reviewed have been manually, and application vulnerabilities are presented in the Audit overview section. A general overview is shown in the AS-IS section, and all found issues can be found in the Audit overview section.

We found one low and didn't find any medium, high, and critical issues in a smart contract.



# **Severity Definitions**

Risk Level	Description
Critical	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to tokens loss etc.
High	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also significantly impact smart contract execution, e.g., public access to crucial functions.
Medium	Medium-level vulnerabilities are essential to fix; however, they can't lead to tokens loss.
Low	Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused, etc., code snippets that can't significantly impact execution.
Lowest / Code Style / Best Practice	Lowest-level vulnerabilities, code style violations, and info statements can't affect smart contract execution and can be ignored.

## **AS-IS** overview

Impermax x Uniswap V2 Router contract consists of the next smart contracts:

- 1. SafeMath.sol,UQ112x112.sol,TransferHelper.sol, UniswapV2Library.sol contracts supporting libraries
- 2. IBorrowable.sol, ICollateral.sol, IERC20.sol, IImpermaxCallee.sol, IPoolToken.sol, IRouter01.sol, IUniswapV2Pair.sol, IWETH.sol contracts interfaces
- 3. Impermax contract RouterO1.sol


Contracts from point one were compared to original "Openzeppelin," and "Uniswap-v2-core" templates; no logic differences were found. They are considered secure.

Contracts from point 2 Impermax Interfaces – describe the actions that an object can perform.

Contracts from point 3 The Impermax classes implementing the "Impermax x Uniswap V2" protocol will be detailed in the report.



#### Router01:



RouterO1 contract inherits the IRouterO1,IImpermaxCallee

PrestakingProvisioner contract init function was called with following parameters:

- address(\_factory) address(\_bDeployer) address(\_cDeployer) address(\_WETH)

mint function was called with following parameters:

- address(poolToken)
- address(underlying)
- uint(amount)
- address(to)

\_mint function was called with following parameters:

- address(poolToken)
- address(underlying)
- uint(amount)
- address(from)
- address(to)

mintETH function was called with following parameters:

- address(poolToken)
- address(to)
- uint(deadline)

mintCollateral function was called with following parameters:

- address(poolToken)
- uint(amount)
- address(to)
- uint(deadline)
- bytes calldata (permitData)



## **redeem** function was called with following parameters:

- address(poolToken)
- uint(tokens)
- address(to)
- uint(deadline)
- bytes calldata (permitData)

# **borrow** function was called with following parameters:

- address(borrowable)
- uint(amount)
- address(to)
- uint(deadline)
- bytes calldata (permitData)

# **borrowETH** function was called with following parameters:

- address(borrowable)
- uint(amountETH)
- address(to)
- uint(deadline)
- bytes calldata (permitData)

# \_repayAmount function was called with following parameters:

- address(borrowable)
- uint(amountMax)
- address(borrower)

# repay function was called with following parameters:

- address(borrowable)
- uint(amountMax)
- address(borrower)
- uint(deadline)

# repayETH function was called with following parameters:

- address(borrowable)
- address(borrower)
- uint(deadline)

## liquidate function was called with following parameters:

- address(borrowable)
- uint(amountMax)
- address(borrower)
- address(to)
- uint(deadline)

## liquidateETH function was called with following parameters:

- address(borrowable)
- address(borrower)
- address(to)
- uint(deadline)

## **\_leverage** function was called with following parameters:

- address(uniswapV2Pair)
- uint(amountA)



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- uint(amountB)
- address(to)

leverage function was called with following parameters:

- address(uniswapV2Pair)
- uint(amountADesired)
- uint(amountBDesired)
- uint(amountAMin)
- uint(amountBMin)
- address(to)
- uint(deadline)
- bytès calldatá (permitDataA)
- bytes calldata (permitDataB)

# \_addLiquidityAndMint function was called with following

## parameters:

- address(uniswapV2Pair)
- uint(amountAMin)
- uint(amountBMin)
- address(to)

## impermaxBorrow function was called with following parameters:

- address(sender)
- address(borrower)
- uint(borrowAmount)
- bytès calldata (data)

## impermaxRedeem function was called with following parameters:

- address(sender)
- uint(redeemAmount)
- bytes calldata (data)

## **\_permit** function was called with following parameters:

- address(poolToken)
- uint(amount)
- uint(deadliné)
- bytes memory(permitData)

## \_permitUniswapV2Pair function was called with following parameters:

- address(uniswapV2Pair)
- uint(amount)
- uint(deadline)
- bytes memory(permitData)

# **\_borrowPermit** function was called with following parameters:

- address(borrowable)
- uint(amount)
- uint(deadliné)
- bytes memory(permitData)

getBorrowable function was called with the following parameters:



- address(uniswapV2Pair)uint8(index)

getCollateral function was called with the following parameters:

address(uniswapV2Pair)

getLendingPool function was called with the following parameters:

address(uniswapV2Pair)



#### **Audit overview**

#### Critical

No critical severity vulnerabilities were found.

# High

No high severity vulnerabilities were found.

#### Medium

No medium severity vulnerabilities were found.

#### Low

Different versions of Solidity are used in Version used: ['=0.6.6', '>=0.5.0'] (see Appendix A pic. 1 for evidence)

#### **Conclusion RouterO1**

Smart contracts within the scope were manually reviewed and analyzed with static analysis tools. For the contract, a high-level description of functionality was presented in the report's As-is overview section. Please note that for automatic testing of the RouterO1 contract, we replaced the hash of the sum (see Appendix A pic. 2 for evidence).

The audit report contains all found security vulnerabilities and other issues in the reviewed code.

The overall quality of the reviewed contracts is well-secured. Security engineers found one low vulnerability, which couldn't have any significant security impact.

#### **Disclaimers**

## **Disclaimer**

The smart contracts given for audit had been analyzed following the best industry practices at the date of this report, concerning: cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report, (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment, and functionality (performing the intended functions).

The audit makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. It can also not be considered a sufficient assessment regarding the code's utility and safety, bug-free status, or any other contract statements. While we have done our best to conduct the



analysis and produce this report, it is essential to note that you should not rely on this report only – we recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contracts.

#### **Technical Disclaimer**

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on the blockchain platform. The platform, programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have their vulnerabilities leading to hacks. Thus, the audit can't guarantee the explicit security of the audited smart contracts.



## **Appendix A. Evidences**

## Pic 1. Different pragma directives are used:

```
Different versions of Solidity is used in:

- Version used: ['=0.6.6', '>=0.5.0']

- =0.6.6 (Router01.sol#1)

- ABIEncoderV2 (Router01.sol#2)

- >=0.5.0 (interfaces/IBorrowable.sol#1)

- >=0.5.0 (interfaces/IERC20.sol#1)

- >=0.5.0 (interfaces/IERC20.sol#1)

- >=0.5.0 (interfaces/IImpermaxCallee.sol#1)

- >=0.5.0 (interfaces/IPoolToken.sol#1)

- >=0.5.0 (interfaces/IRouter01.sol#1)

- >=0.5.0 (interfaces/IUniswapV2Pair.sol#1)

- >=0.5.0 (interfaces/IWETH.sol#1)

- =0.6.6 (libraries/SafeMath.sol#1)

- =0.6.6 (libraries/TransferHelper.sol#3)

- >=0.5.0 (libraries/UniswapV2Library.sol#1)
```

# Pic 2. Different pragma directives are used:



## **Appendix B. Automated tools reports**

## Pic 1. BAllowance Slither automated report:

```
ethosededitionizations/contracts soliter RouterOl. 6 de ethosededitionizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationizationiz
```

```
INFO:Detectors:

Low level call in TransferHelper.safeApprove(address, address, uint256) (libraries/TransferHelper.safe7-18):

- (success, data) = token.call(abi.encodeMithSelector(0x095ea703, to, value)) (libraries/TransferHelper.safe7-18):

- (success, data) = token.call(abi.encodeMithSelector(0x095ea703, to, value)) (libraries/TransferHelper.safe7):

- (success, data) = token.call(abi.encodeMithSelector(0x0959cab, to, value)) (libraries/TransferHelper.safe7):

- (success, data) = token.call(abi.encodeMithSelector(0x09309cab, to, value)) (libraries/TransferHelper.safe7):

- (success, data) = token.call(abi.encodeMithSelector(0x09309cab, to, value)) (libraries/TransferHelper.safe7):

- (success, data) = token.call(abi.encodeMithSelector(0x09309cab, to)) (libraries/TransferHelper.safe7):

- (success) = to.call(value: value) (new bytes(0)) (libraries/TransferHelper.safe7)(0):

- (success) = to.call(value: value) (new bytes(0):

- (success) = to.call(value: value) (new bytes(0):

- (suc
```



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