Side-Channel Attacks on Optane Persistent Memory

Sihang Liu, **Suraaj Kanniwadi**, Martin Schwarzl, Andreas Kogler, Daniel Gruss, Samira Khan









Usenix Security Symposium 2023

Overview: Motivation

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
Overview: Motivation







Overview: Contributions

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
Overview: Contributions








Background


Optane, Persistent Memory, and Side Channels



















































In the system heirarchy





In the system heirarchy




In the system heirarchy













Reverse-Engineering of Optane


A glimpse into the Optane DIMM




















Optane: We have more!




Optane: We have more!




Optane: We have more!




Optane: We have more!




On-DIMM caches









On-DIMM caches





On-DIMM caches








Memory Cells
























Wear-levelling to the rescue!





Memory Cells



































Wear-levelling in Optane: How?



Wear-levelling in Optane: How?



Wear-levelling in Optane: How?



Expectations Reality

Expectations

cl == cache line

Reality

Expectations

cl == cache line

== CPU cache line

Reality

Expectations

cl == cache line

== CPU cache line

"clflush flushes only CPU caches"

Reality

Expectations

cl == cache line

== CPU cache line

"clflush flushes only CPU caches"

Reality

clflush reaches Optane!

Expectations

cl == cache line

== CPU cache line

"clflush flushes only CPU caches"

Reality

clflush reaches Optane!

Flushes RMW Buffer!

Expectations

cl == cache line


== CPU cache line

"clflush flushes only CPU caches"

Reality


clflush reaches Optane!


Flushes RMW Buffer!




An Optane Curveball: R/W Contention

An Optane Curveball: R/W Contention





An Optane Curveball: R/W Contention




The Attacks


Exploring the security implications of our new attack primitives


Optane


Optane

Attack Primitives














Our Attacks












Attack: Noteboard Covert Channel

Encoding secret messages on Optane's wear-levelling metadata






0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%












	0000	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	101100 010110 100101									
TOP										
	0000	0%	50%	0%	0%	50%	0%	0%	0%	50%
	101100 010110 100101									

	0000	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	101100 010110 100101									
TOP SECRET										
	0000	0%	50%	0%	0%	50%	0%	0%	0%	50%
	101100 010110 100101									
	0000	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
	101100 010110 100101									

+	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
10110 01011 10010									
TOP SECRET									
0000	0%	50%	0%	0%	50%	0%	0%	0%	50%
10110 01011 10010									
000	100%	50%	100%	100%	50%	100%	100%	100%	50%
10110 0101 1001	00								

0000	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
101100 010110 100101									
TOP SECRET									
0000	0%	50%	0%	0%	50%	0%	0%	0%	50%
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101100 010110 100101	0.		10	10	1	0	10	10	








Remote Sender





Remote Receiver













































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