

# **Risk Analysis Report of James Bond Airport**

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## Executive Summary

This report details the cybersecurity risks associated with James Bond airport Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices. For the efficiency, these devices are essential, but also highly vulnerable and underpin sensitive operations such as surveillance, building management, and air traffic control. The focus of this report is to determine these risks, their potential impact, and ways to contribute to improving cybersecurity that remains consistent with cybersecurity standards.

### 1. Purpose and Objectives:

The main purpose of this report is to ensure that IIoT systems in airports are secure, resilient, and compliant with the regulatory frameworks.

To achieve this, the report:

- Identifies vulnerabilities in the form of command injection, outdated firmware, unencrypted communications, etc in IIoT devices (NCSC, 2019; CISA, 2021).
- Examines the application of global standards, including ISO/IEC 27001, IEC 62443, and the UK Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) to these systems (ISO, 2018; IEC, 2020; NCSC, 2019).
- Suggests solutions to reduce vulnerabilities efficiently, without reducing operational efficiency.

### 2. Key Findings:

Category		Details
Significant Risks Identified	Command Injection Vulnerabilities	Attackers can remotely control some Hikvision cameras (CVE-2021-36260).
	Unencrypted Communications	Honeywell Building Management Systems transmit sensitive data without encryption, making it interceptable (CVE-2017-5140).
	Outdated Firmware	Devices like Axis Cameras and Garrett Metal Detectors have vulnerabilities due to delayed firmware updates (CVE-2021-31986; CVE-2021-21901).
	Network Segmentation Weaknesses	Thales TopSky ATC is insufficiently isolated, exposing it to lateral attacks (Thales Group, 2023).
Implications	Operational Disruption	Security breaches can disrupt critical systems, affecting air traffic management and passenger services (CISA, 2021).
	Compliance Risks	Non-compliance with standards like ISO/IEC 27001 or CAF can lead to significant financial and reputational losses (ISO, 2018).
	Passenger Safety Concerns	Weak points in air traffic control systems could create serious risks to passenger safety and airport operations (Thales Group, 2023).

Figure: Key Findings

### 3. Proposed Hybrid Model

To address these challenges, a hybrid cybersecurity framework is suggested in the report. This model integrates the strengths of the following frameworks:

- ISO/IEC 27001: It provides a structured governance and compliance approach (ISO, 2018).
- IEC 62443: It delivers IIoT-specific security controls for industrial automation systems (IEC, 2020).
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF): It offers a flexible, risk-based strategy for protecting critical infrastructure (NIST, 2020).
- Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF): It ensures compliance with UK-specific regulatory requirements (NCSC, 2019).
- ISO 31000: It aligns risk management strategies with broader organisational objectives (ISO, 2018).

#### Key Features of the Hybrid Model:

- **Comprehensive Coverage:** The model combines technical, operational, and strategic security measures.
- **Scalability:** It adapts to evolving cybersecurity challenges and emerging technologies.
- **Regulatory Alignment:** It ensures compliance with global and UK-specific standards.
- **Strategic Integration:** It aligns cybersecurity efforts with organisational goals, enhancing risk prioritisation and resource allocation.

### 4. Key Recommendations:

- **Conduct Regular Security Audits:** It ensures proactive identifications of vulnerabilities, safeguarding sensitive data, and maintaining compliance with industry regulations (NCSC, 2019).
- **Encrypt Communications:** The data sent by the Honeywell Building Management system can be protected during transfer using encryption solutions, such as TLS 1.3 (Honeywell, 2020).
- **Firmware Updates:** Updates automation around Axis Cameras can help in keeping devices up to date regarding firmware and boot images. This decreases the possibility of an attacker by taking advantage of any known vulnerability (Axis Communication, 2021).
- **Network Segmentation:** Use firewalls and VLANs to isolate critical systems, such as Thales ATC, from less secure networks (Thales group, 2023).
- **Real-Time Monitoring:** When it comes to IIoT activity, SIEM and SOAR tools can help in spotting potential threats as they happen in real time (Gartner, 2023). Deploying these tools can be very beneficial for security efficiency.

## 5. Monitoring and Continuous improvement:

- **Track Risks:** Always pay attention to failed logins, unexpected traffic, and whether firmware updates are happening on time. Catching these important issues early can make a big difference (ISO, 2018).
- **Review and Improve:** Go over your systems regularly and use what you learn from past incidents to tweak and improve your approach (NIST, 2020).
- **Team Up with Stakeholders:** Make sure to stay in close contact with IT teams, vendors, and regulators to stay ahead of new threats and make sure you are meeting updated standards (NCSC, 2019).

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Purpose and Objectives

The report characterizes the current state of understanding and management of the cybersecurity risks of IIoTs devices in James Bond airport. The major use of IIoTs deployed across the airport currently enables a wide range of critical operations: surveillance, building management, and air traffic control. It identifies the risks associated with these devices, evaluates vulnerabilities, and suggest effective solutions to mitigate them.

The main objectives to achieve are:

- Risk Identification: It indicates the vulnerabilities, and potential threats present around IIoT systems. It allows determining the impacts on operations of the airport.
- The Application of the Frameworks: How standards like ISO/IEC 27001, IEC 62443, CAF Framework, etc might be utilized to manage those risks.
- Recommendations: Propose practical, framework-based recommendations that could further strengthen cybersecurity.

### 1.2. Scope of the Report

The scope includes the following:

Category		Details
Devices and Systems	Critical Systems	Hikvision Cameras, Garrett Metal Detectors, Thales TopSky ATC.
	Passenger Support Devices	These range from in-flight entertainment devices to Zebra Printers.
Areas of Key Risk	Technical Risks	Outdated firmware, unencrypted communications, and use of default credentials.
	Operational Risks	Interdependencies within systems that may cause disruptions.
	Compliance Risks	Adherence to UK frameworks like CAF and global standards such as ISO/IEC 27001.
	Integration of Framework	Integrates global standards with UK-focused frameworks for comprehensive cybersecurity risk management.

*Figure 1.2: Scope of the report*

### 1.3. Methodology

- Risk Identification
  - Anomaly Analysis: Analyse device vulnerabilities, including documented CVEs, by utilizing the National Vulnerability Database (NVD).
  - Operational Risks: Classify operational risks by device functionalities and system interlink.

- Framework Evaluation
  - Assess the applicability of the following frameworks: ISO/IEC 27001, IEC 62443, CAF, and NIST CSF, in the mitigation of identified risks.
- Stakeholder Input
  - Collaborate with IT teams, airport authorities, and device manufacturers to garner insight into the feasibility of the recommendations.
- Prioritization of Risks
  - Employ tools like the CVSS scoring and heat maps to identify, score, and rank the risk regarding its impact and likelihood.

#### 1.4. Stakeholder Roles

Addressing IIoT risks requires collaboration among key stakeholders, including:

- **IT Teams**
  - They should be involved in device configuration management, periodic updating of firmware, and network security for the security of IIoT systems.
- **Device Vendors**
  - They must provide secure default configurations, release timely firmware updates, and offer support to resolve vulnerabilities in their devices.
- **Airport Authorities**
  - They must ensure that IIoT systems are aligned with operational objectives while also complying with the frameworks.
- **Regulators**
  - They ensure compliance with standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 to avoid potential legal issues, including financial penalties.

#### 1.5. Why This Matters

Unsecured IIoT devices might pose serious consequences. For example, a security breach could lead to operational disturbances at airports, jeopardizing the safety of passengers, and drawing big reputational and financial loss. This is how airports can defend critical systems, combined with technical controls, operational strategies, and compliance measures that maintain public trust.

## 2. Critical Analysis of Risk Management Standards and Frameworks

### 2.1. Overview of standards

Framework	Purpose	Strengths	Limitations	Usefulness
<b>ISO 31000</b>	It provides a broad approach to risk management, connecting cybersecurity risks with an organization's overall objectives.	It promotes strategic alignment by considering cybersecurity risks alongside financial, operational, and other risks (ISO, 2018). It also fosters interdepartmental collaboration.	It does not provide detailed technical guidance on cybersecurity; it is a high-level guide.	It can be used as a foundational framework for overall risk management; works well when paired with more technical approaches.
<b>ISO/IEC 27001</b>	It focuses on safeguarding sensitive information through an Information Security Management System (ISMS).	It is globally recognized and structured for securing information. It is audit-friendly, simplifying compliance with regulations (ISO/IEC, 2013).	It is not tailored for IIoT or operational technology (OT); requires adjustments. Its implementation is resource intensive.	It is ideal for managing sensitive airport data like passenger information and operational plans but needs customization for IIoT contexts.
<b>IEC 62443</b>	It is designed for industrial control systems, focusing on securing IIoT and OT devices throughout their lifecycle.	It provides comprehensive security for devices and networks (IEC, 2020). It is well suited for complex IIoT environments like air traffic control systems.	It requires specialized expertise for implementation. Significant resources and time are needed for adoption of this framework.	It is very essential for IIoT-heavy environments like airports but requires skilled teams for execution.
<b>CAF Framework</b>	It aims to protect critical national infrastructure (CNI) from cyber threats, developed by the UK's NCSC.	It aligns closely with UK regulations, relevant for airports (NCSC, 2019). Includes practical maturity models for gap identification and resolution.	It is more focused on UK-specific needs, limiting international use. Lacks detailed technical guidance for devices.	It is essential for ensuring compliance with UK laws and defending against nation-state-level cyber threats.
<b>NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)</b>	It provides a flexible, iterative approach to managing cybersecurity risks via five core functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.	It is adaptable to organizations of different sizes and industries (NIST, 2018). The framework emphasizes continuous improvement for evolving threats.	It lacks detailed controls specific to IIoT systems.	It is excellent for establishing a strong overall cybersecurity approach but requires support from specific frameworks for IIoT systems.

*Figure 2.1: Overview of standards*



## 2.2. Applicability of IIoT Systems

Cybersecurity risk management at an airport is complex; the systems range from simple surveillance cameras to air traffic control systems and in-flight entertainment. Each system has its unique challenges, and several key frameworks effectively address these:

Focus Area	Description
Strategic Alignment	ISO 31000 will strategically align the airport's overall security strategies with organizational objectives for a cohesive approach (ISO, 2018).
Data Protection	ISO/IEC 27001 prevents data breaches into sensitive information, such as those regarding passengers and time schedules of operation (ISO/IEC, 2013).
Device Security	IEC 62443 covers device security in building management and air traffic control security (IEC, 2019).
Compliance	The CAF Framework ensures compliance with UK-specific regulations that protect the critical national infrastructure, meaning standards are met to a legislatively approved level (Cabinet Office, 2021).
Change Management	NIST CSF implements an organizational culture of continuous improvement that allows airports to stay competitive as cybersecurity threats keep changing (NIST, 2018).

*Figure 2.2 Applicability of IIoT Systems*

## 2.3. Recommended Hybrid Approach

Airport IIoT systems face unique challenges that require more than a one-size-fits-all solution. A hybrid approach, blending the strengths of multiple frameworks (Figure 9.2), is the most effective way to address these complexities:

- **ISO/IEC 27001:** It provides robust data security and ensures compliance with regulatory standards (ISO/IEC, 2013).
- **IEC 62443:** It offers security solutions for devices and networks within IIoT systems (IEC, 2019).
- **CAF Framework:** It aligns systems with UK-specific regulatory requirements (Cabinet Office, 2021).
- **NIST CSF:** It adapts to a constantly changing cybersecurity landscape with a flexible, iterative framework (NIST, 2018).
- **ISO 31000:** It helps embeds cybersecurity into the broader risk management framework (ISO, 2018).

## 2.4. Cost Benefit Assessment of Hybrid Approach

Framework	Total Cost Estimate	Benefits	Net Assessment
<b>ISO/IEC 27001</b>	Certification fees: £5,000–£15,000 (ISO, 2018).	It improves governance, risk management, and compliance.	Moderate cost; high benefit. Crucial for building a strong security foundation.
	Internal training: £10,000–£25,000 (ISO, 2018).	It builds trust with stakeholders by demonstrating strong cybersecurity practices.	
	Implementation audits: £10,000–£20,000 annually (ISO, 2018).	It mitigates the risk of financial penalties due to non-compliance.	
<b>IEC 62443</b>	Framework adoption and integration: £20,000–£50,000 (IEC, 2020).	It provides IIoT-specific security controls, reducing vulnerabilities in devices.	High cost; high benefit. Vital for IIoT technical controls, especially in industrial environments.
	Training for technical teams: £10,000–£15,000 (IEC, 2020).	It enhances resilience against cyber threats targeting industrial automation.	
	Ongoing compliance: £5,000–£10,000 annually (IEC, 2020).	It protects critical systems such as air traffic control and surveillance systems.	
<b>NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)</b>	Implementation costs: £15,000–£30,000 (NIST, 2020).	It offers a flexible, risk-based approach to threat identification and mitigation.	Moderate cost; high benefit. Provides operational resilience and adapts to emerging threats.
	Internal training: £10,000–£20,000 (NIST, 2020).	It aligns cybersecurity practices with global standards, enhancing organizational reputation.	
	Regular updates and risk assessments: £5,000 annually (NIST, 2020).	It ensures continuous improvement in cybersecurity measures.	
<b>Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF)</b>	UK-specific alignment: £10,000–£20,000 (NCSC, 2019).	It ensures compliance with critical national infrastructure regulations, reducing legal and reputational risks.	Low cost; high benefit. Critical for compliance in UK critical infrastructure environments.
	Training for compliance teams: £5,000–£10,000 (NCSC, 2019).	It facilitates collaboration with stakeholders like regulators and vendors.	
	Ongoing audits and compliance checks: £5,000 annually (NCSC, 2019).	It mitigates risks of operational disruptions due to non-compliance.	

Figure 2.3: Risk benefit assessment of hybrid approach

## 2.5. Stakeholder Roles

An effective implementation of this hybrid model relies on collaboration among key stakeholders:

- **IT and Security Teams:**

These teams are responsible for implementing technical security measures and monitoring systems continuously for potential threats. Their role includes applying best practices from the frameworks to address both long-term and immediate cybersecurity needs.

- **Regulatory Bodies:**

They ensure that airport systems comply with UK laws and global cybersecurity standards. They enforce adherence to frameworks like CAF and ISO/IEC 27001, ensuring that operations remain secure and lawful (Cabinet Office, 2021).

- **Vendors:**

They play a crucial role by providing secure device configurations and responding promptly to vulnerabilities through firmware updates. Their compliance with standards like IEC 62443 ensures that IIoT devices meet security benchmarks (IEC, 2019).

- **Operations Management:**

They align cybersecurity strategies with business objectives by working closely with technical team. They ensure the integration of frameworks like ISO 31000 to maintain a balance between security and operational efficiency (ISO, 2018).

This hybrid approach not only strengthens the overall security posture but also ensures that cybersecurity measures are aligned with organizational goals and industry standards.

### 3. Risk Analysis of IIoT Devices

#### 3.1. Identifications of Risk

The IIoT devices integrated into airport environments have significantly increased operational efficiency. However, this advancement has also introduced substantial cybersecurity risks. These risks come from vulnerabilities in the devices, misconfigurations, and outdated security practices.

Risk Category	Risk Factor	Description
Technical Risks	Default Credentials	Devices like Hikvision Cameras are prone to unauthorized access due to factory-set passwords. CVE-2021-36260, a command injection vulnerability, allows attackers to take full control of affected Hikvision devices (MITRE, 2021).
	Outdated Firmware	Delayed or ignored firmware updates in systems like Axis Network Cameras increase their vulnerability. For example, CVE-2021-31986, a buffer overflow vulnerability in Axis products, can lead to application crashes or data exposure (Axis Communications, 2021).
	Un-encrypted Communications	Honeywell Building Management Systems transmit sensitive data in unencrypted form, making it susceptible to interception and misuse (Honeywell, 2020).
Operational Risks	Interdependencies	Poor network segmentation between systems, such as Thales IFE and TopSky ATC, allows attackers to move laterally within the network, increasing the scale of potential damage (Thales Group, 2021).
	Downtime	Cyberattacks on devices like Garrett Metal Detectors can disrupt essential operations, such as passenger screening, significantly affecting workflows and causing operational delays (Garrett, 2021).
Compliance Risks	Regulatory Penalties	Non-compliance with standards like ISO/IEC 27001 or the CAF Framework can result in financial penalties, loss of reputation, and legal challenges (Cabinet Office, 2021; ISO/IEC, 2013).
	Data Breaches	Unsecured access to passenger or operational data may violate GDPR requirements, leading to costly fines and loss of stakeholder trust (European Union, 2016).
Physical and Environmental Risks	Tampering	Physical tampering with devices, such as Garrett Metal Detectors, can render them less functional and introduce new vulnerabilities (Garrett, 2021).
	Targeted Attacks	Nation-state actors may target critical infrastructure, such as Thales TopSky ATC, posing significant threats to safety and operational continuity (Thales Group, 2021).

*Figure 3.1: Identification of risks*

### 3.2. STRIDE Analysis

Device	Spoofing	Tampering	Repudiation	Information Disclosure	Denial of Service (DoS)	Elevation of Privilege
<b>Hikvision Cameras (DS-2CD2xxx Series)</b>	Weak authentication mechanisms can allow attackers to spoof credentials and gain unauthorised access.	Command injection vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-36260) could allow tampering with camera settings.	Lack of proper logging may make it difficult to track unauthorised access attempts.	Intercepted feeds could lead to data leaks about sensitive airport areas.	Overloading the camera with malicious traffic could render it inoperable.	Exploiting vulnerabilities could allow attackers to escalate access to the network.
<b>Honeywell XL Web II Controller</b>	Weak authentication could lead to identity spoofing and unauthorised system control.	Vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-5140 to CVE-2017-5143) could allow attackers to tamper with configurations.	Lack of proper logs and monitoring can hinder tracking of malicious activities.	Unencrypted communications expose sensitive building management data.	Targeted DoS attacks could disrupt building management operations.	Exploiting privilege escalation vulnerabilities could allow full system control.
<b>Thales ATC Systems (TopSky ATC &amp; Eurocat-C)</b>	Spoofing communication protocols to impersonate legitimate air traffic messages.	Legacy protocols could allow tampering with data transmission between systems.	Insufficient logging mechanisms may enable attackers to deny malicious activities.	Unauthorised access to data could disclose flight paths and operational details.	Flooding the system with malicious traffic could disrupt air traffic control operations.	Exploiting outdated protocols could provide administrative access.
<b>Garrett Metal Detectors (PD 6500i &amp; Multi Zone)</b>	Exploitation of weak access controls could allow attackers to spoof maintenance credentials.	Buffer overflow vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-21901) could enable tampering with detection configurations.	Limited logging capabilities make repudiation a risk, as attackers may deny responsibility.	Interception of system data could reveal security screening metrics or bypass mechanisms.	Overwhelming devices with network traffic could render them unable to perform screening tasks.	Exploiting code vulnerabilities could allow elevation to administrative privileges.
<b>Axis Network Cameras (Q6032-E &amp; M3005-V)</b>	Spoofing authentication mechanisms to gain unauthorised access to video feeds.	Vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-31986, CVE-2021-31988) could allow tampering with camera firmware or feeds.	Inadequate logging may hinder tracking unauthorised access or tampering.	Interception of video feeds could expose sensitive areas of the airport.	Targeted DoS attacks could disrupt video surveillance, affecting security operations.	Exploiting vulnerabilities could allow attackers to gain administrative privileges.
<b>Zebra Card Printers (ZXP Series 9)</b>	Spoofing credentials to produce unauthorised access cards or IDs.	Tampering with card printing systems could lead to the production of fraudulent cards.	Insufficient logging may allow attackers to deny malicious activities.	Access to system data could expose information about personnel or secure areas.	Flooding the system with requests could disrupt the issuance of critical ID cards.	Weak access controls could allow privilege escalation, enabling production of fake credentials.
<b>Thales IFE System (TopSeries i5000)</b>	Spoofing user credentials to access or control in-flight entertainment systems.	Tampering with firmware could disrupt entertainment services or compromise passenger data.	Insufficient monitoring could hinder the identification of unauthorised	Unauthorised access to system data could expose passenger preferences or browsing habits.	Overloading the system could render entertainment services unavailable.	Exploiting vulnerabilities could lead to unauthorised administrative access.

			access attempts.			
<b>Thales IFE System (TopSeries AVANT)</b>	Spoofing credentials to impersonate legitimate users or devices.	Poor segmentation could allow attackers to tamper with network configurations.	Lack of logging may hinder identification of breaches or modifications to configurations.	Unauthorised access to system data could lead to exposure of passenger data or operational details.	Targeted DoS attacks could make entertainment systems unavailable.	Exploiting network vulnerabilities could enable privilege escalation to sensitive data.
<b>Garmin Integrated Flight Deck (G1000)</b>	Spoofing communication channels to deliver false flight data to pilots.	Tampering with firmware or software updates could disrupt flight operations.	Inadequate logging could allow attackers to deny responsibility for malicious actions.	Exposed data channels could disclose sensitive flight operations or plans.	Denial-of-service attacks could make critical flight systems unavailable to pilots.	Exploiting vulnerabilities could provide attackers with access to critical flight operations.
<b>Frequentis VCS (VCS 3020X)</b>	Spoofing voice communication to impersonate air traffic controllers.	Misconfiguration vulnerabilities could allow tampering with voice communication channels.	Lack of detailed logging makes repudiation a risk, as malicious actors can deny their actions.	Unauthorised interception could disclose critical communication between pilots and ATC.	Flooding the system with malicious traffic could disrupt air traffic communications.	Misconfigurations could allow attackers to escalate their privileges within the system.

*Figure 3.2 STRIDE Analysis of IIoT devices*

### 3.3. Risk Register

Risk ID	Device	Model	Risk Description	Cause	Impact	Likelihood	Risk Level	CVE	Mitigation
R1	Hikvision Surveillance Cameras	DS-2CD2xxx Series	Unauthorized access via command injection	Improper input validation in web server	High	High	Critical	CVE-2021-36260	Enforce strong passwords; implement multi-factor authentication (MFA).
R2	Honeywell Building Management	XL Web II & EBI R500	Unencrypted communication.	Lack of encryption for sensitive data transmission.	High	High	Critical	CVE-2017-5140, CVE-2017-5141, CVE-2017-5142, CVE-2017-5143	Deploy TLS 1.3; enforce encrypted communication protocols.
R3	Thales Air Traffic Control Systems	TopSky ATC & Eurocat-C	Exploitation of outdated communication protocols.	Legacy systems with insufficient updates.	High	Medium	High	Not applicable	Upgrade communication protocols; segment networks.

R4	Thales IFE System	TopSeries i5000	Vulnerability due to unpatched firmware.	Delayed or missed firmware updates.	Medium	Medium	Medium	CVE-2019-9109	Automate firmware updates; collaborate with manufacturers for timely patches.
R5	Garrett Metal Detectors	PD 6500i & Multi Zone	Stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability allowing RCE	Improper handling of specially crafted UDP packets	High	Medium	High	CVE-2021-21901, CVE-2021-21903, CVE-2021-21904, CVE-2021-21905, CVE-2021-21906, CVE-2021-21907, CVE-2021-21908, CVE-2021-21909	Update firmware; restrict network access; monitor for anomalous detection.
R6	Axis Network Cameras	Q6032-E & M3005-V	Exploitation due to outdated firmware.	Delayed updates leave vulnerabilities unpatched.	Medium	Medium	Medium	CVE-2021-31986, CVE-2021-31988	Implement automated firmware updates and active vulnerability scanning.
R7	Zebra Card Printers	ZXP Series 9	Weak authentication leading to unauthorised use.	Insufficient access control policies.	Medium	Medium	Medium	Not applicable	Apply MFA; enforce robust access controls and periodic audits.
R8	Thales IFE System	TopSeries AVANT	Network segmentation gaps exposing sensitive passenger data.	Poor segmentation between critical and non-critical systems.	Medium	Medium	Medium	Not applicable	Segment networks using VLANs; enforce role-based access control.
R9	Garmin Integrated Flight Deck	G1000	Exposure to system hijacking during firmware updates.	Lack of secure update mechanisms.	High	Medium	High	Not applicable	Secure update processes with signed firmware and encrypted channels.
R10	Frequentis VCS	VCS 3020X	Misconfiguration leading to unauthorised access to voice communications.	Poor initial configuration settings.	High	Medium	High	Not applicable	Conduct regular configuration audits and enforce secure deployment practices.

*Figure 3.2: Risk Register*

### Key Observations from the Risk Register

The key observations from the above risk matrix break down into critical, high, medium, and low risks based on their impact and likelihood.

- **Critical Risks (High Impact, High Likelihood)**
  - **R1 (Hikvision Cameras):**  
Command injection is a severe vulnerability which allows attackers to exploit them easily (CVE-2021-36260; MITRE, 2021).
  - **R2 (Honeywell XL Web II):**  
Unencrypted communications, coupled with listed vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-5140, CVE-2017-5141, CVE-2017-5142, CVE-2017-5143), increase cybersecurity threats (Honeywell, 2017).
- **High Risks (High Impact, Medium Likelihood)**
  - **R3 (Thales TopSky ATC):**  
Legacy systems present exploitable weaknesses with potential disruption to critical air traffic operations (Thales Group, 2021).
  - **R9 (Garmin G1000):**  
Firmware updates lacking encryption make flight operations vulnerable to cyberattacks (Garmin, 2021).
  - **R10 (Frequentis VCS):**  
Misconfigurations in voice communication systems could cause operational failures at airports (Frequentis, 2021).
  - **R5 (Garrett metal Detectors):**  
Attacker can alter configuration or can disable critical detection systems through remote code execution (CVE-2021-21901).
- **Medium Risks (Medium Impact, Medium Likelihood)**
  - **R4 (Thales i5000) and R6 (Axis Cameras):**  
Delay in firmware updates creates a window for exploitation of these devices (Thales Group, 2021; Axis Communications, 2021).
  - **R7 (Zebra Printers):**  
Weak authentication mechanisms increase the risk of unauthorized device access (Zebra Technologies, 2021).
  - **R8 (Thales AVANT):**  
Poor network segmentation exposes in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems to breaches (Thales Group, 2021).



## 4. Critical Evaluation of Risks and Vulnerabilities

### 4.1. Top Severe Risks: Analysis and mitigation strategies

#### R1: Hikvision Surveillance Cameras

##### Analysis:

The command injection vulnerability (CVE-2021-36260) enables unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands remotely. This can result in full device compromise, unauthorized access to surveillance feeds, and lateral movement within the network (MITRE, 2021).

##### Mitigation Strategies:

- Regularly update devices to the latest firmware.
- Segregate IoT devices, including cameras, into isolated network zones to limit access.
- Apply strict firewall rules and leverage network monitoring tools to detect and respond to anomalies.

#### R2: Honeywell XL Web II Controller

##### Analysis:

Multiple vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-5140 to CVE-2017-5143) expose the system to risks such as unauthorized access, session forgery, and privilege escalation. This exploitation can result in unauthorized control, data interception, or operational disruptions (Honeywell, 2017).

##### Mitigation Strategies:

- Upgrade firmware to version 3.04.05.05 or newer to eliminate vulnerabilities.
- Implement TLS 1.3 or equivalent encryption protocols to secure communications.
- Restrict user privileges to essential tasks and perform regular audits of access logs to identify unusual activity.

#### R5: Garrett Metal Detectors

##### Analysis:

Garrett Metal Detectors (PD 6500i and Multi Zone) are affected by a stack-based overflow vulnerability which can allow an attacker to execute remote code execution via specially crafted packets, disabling detection systems or altering configurations (CVE-2021-21901).

##### Mitigation Strategies:

- Apply Firmware updates provided by vendor.
- With the help of firewalls and VLANs, restrict network access.
- For anomalies indicative of attempted exploitation, monitor network traffic.

### R3: Thales Air Traffic Control Systems

#### Analysis:

Thales TopSky ATC systems rely on outdated communication protocols and experience delays in security updates. These weaknesses can disrupt air traffic operations, posing safety and compliance risks (Thales Group, 2021).

#### Mitigation Strategies:

- Replace outdated communication protocols with secure options such as TLS 1.3.
- Implement robust network segmentation to reduce potential attack vectors.
- Deploy intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS) to monitor and block real-time threats.

#### 4.2. Top Vulnerabilities: Root cause, impact, and resolution

##### ▪ Hikvision Cameras Vulnerability (Command Injection)

**Root Cause:** Insufficient input validation in the web server component.

**Impact:** Full device compromise, enabling attackers to control surveillance feeds and infiltrate connected systems.

**Resolution:**

1. Apply firmware updates to address CVE-2021-36260.
2. Limit device exposure by segmenting devices into isolated network zones.
3. Enforce strict access controls, including the use of multi-factor authentication (MFA).

##### ▪ Buffer Overflow Vulnerability (Garrett Metal Detectors)

**Root Cause:** Vulnerable code in the check\_udp\_crc function, enabling remote code execution (CVE-2021-21901).

**Impact:** Compromises the integrity of detection systems, potentially leading to operational safety risks.

**Resolution:**

1. Install Garrett's patched firmware to address CVE-2021-21901.
2. Limit device exposure by restricting network access through firewalls.

##### ▪ Unencrypted Communications (Honeywell XL Web II Controllers)

**Root Cause:** Lack of encryption for sensitive data transmissions.

**Impact:** Potential data interception and manipulation, disrupting operations.

**Resolution:**

1. Use TLS 1.3 to encrypt communications.
2. Conduct routine encryption audits to ensure compliance with security standards.
3. Train administrators to configure and maintain secure communication channels.

- **Axis Network Cameras (Outdated Firmware)**

**Root Cause:** Delayed firmware updates leave devices vulnerable to exploits such as CVE-2021-31986 (Axis Communications, 2021).

**Impact:** Increased risks of unauthorized access, lateral movement, and data breaches.

**Resolution:**

1. Automate firmware updates to ensure vulnerabilities are promptly addressed.
2. Implement a patch management policy to track vendor advisories and prioritize critical updates.

#### **4.3. Justifications for Prioritization**

The prioritization of risks and vulnerabilities is based on three key factors:

1. **Operational Impact:** Hikvision cameras and Honeywell controllers are integral to airport operations. Their compromise could lead to significant downtime and security breaches.
2. **Likelihood of Exploitation:** Vulnerabilities like command injection (CVE-2021-36260) and unencrypted communications are frequently exploited, highlighting the urgency of mitigation.
3. **Severity:** These risks pose direct threats to passenger safety, data security, and regulatory compliance, necessitating immediate action.

## 5. Risk Mitigation Strategies

### 5.1. Comprehensive Risk Mitigation Plan

Each risk is managed through preventive measures, contingency strategies, and risk transfer options to ensure robust protection and continuity.

#### **Preventive Measures:**

- Hikvision Surveillance Cameras (R1):
  - Update firmware to address the command injection vulnerability (CVE-2021-36260).
  - Segment networks to restrict unauthorized IoT access.
  - Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for user verification.
- Honeywell XL Web II Controller (R2):
  - Upgrade firmware to version 3.04.05.05 or later to resolve vulnerabilities (CVE-2017-5140 to CVE-2017-5143).
  - Secure communication with TLS 1.3 encryption.
  - Implement Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to manage user privileges.
- Garrett Metal detectors(R5):
  - Install the recommended firmware update to mitigate the CVE.
  - With firewalls and VLANs, restrict access to network devices.
  - Identify unusual activities by monitoring network traffic.
  - Perform regular integrity checks on device configurations.
- Thales TopSky ATC (R3):
  - Transition to secure protocols like TLS 1.3.
  - Deploy Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for real-time threat mitigation.
  - Isolate ATC systems on dedicated network segments.

#### **Contingency Strategies:**

- Axis Network Cameras (R6):
  - Develop an incident response plan to counter firmware exploitation (e.g., CVE-2021-31986).
  - Set up backup and recovery protocols to sustain operations during disruptions.
- Zebra Card Printers (R7):
  - Ensure contingency measures for essential printing during security incidents.
  - Regularly audit access logs to detect and address unusual activities.

#### **Risk Transfer Options:**

- Obtain cybersecurity insurance to reduce financial impacts of breaches.

- Employ external vendors for vulnerability assessments and penetration testing.

## 5.2. Responsibility Allocation

### Key roles and their responsibilities:

- **IT Security Teams:**
  - They can oversee firmware updates and network segmentation.
  - They can help to monitor system health and respond to IDS/IPS alerts.
- **Vendors and Manufacturers:**
  - They should provide timely patches and updates and support airport authorities in maintaining system integrity.
- **Airport Authorities:**
  - They can help in allocating resources for mitigation implementation and ensure adherence to UK regulatory standards (Cabinet Office, 2021).
- **Operational Staff:**
  - They should follow secure access protocols and report irregularities and regularly participate in cybersecurity training and awareness initiatives.

## 5.3. Residual Risk Analysis

Residual risks are assessed by likelihood and impact to determine their acceptability and required actions:

- **Risk Acceptance Criteria:**
  - Low Likelihood & Low Impact: Acceptable with routine monitoring.
  - Medium Risks: Require periodic review and controls adjustment.
  - Critical & High Risks: Unacceptable; additional controls or external expertise needed.
- **Monitoring Residual Risks:**
  - Track Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) to measure the effectiveness of mitigation efforts.
  - Maintain an updated Risk Register to account for changes in threats and organizational structure.

## 6. Framework-Driven Risk Management Strategies

Cybersecurity around airports demands structured, evidence-based frameworks designed to address the complex combination of technology, operations, and safety. The table below evaluates key frameworks and their applicability to managing cybersecurity risks within airport systems.

Framework	Why It Matters	How It Applies
<b>CAF Framework</b>	Proactive Threat Management: Facilitates early detection and structured responses to minimize disruptions. Operational Continuity: Ensures vital systems, like air traffic control and passenger services, remain operational during cyber incidents. Regulatory Alignment: Supports compliance with GDPR and UK CNI standards (NCSC, 2019).	Deploy advanced monitoring systems to detect anomalies in IIoT devices like Hikvision cameras and Honeywell controllers. It aligns incident response protocols with CAF principles to minimize downtime and streamline recovery efforts.
<b>ISO/IEC 27001</b>	Comprehensive Risk Mitigation: It tackles both technical and organizational vulnerabilities. Credibility and Trust: It demonstrates commitment to robust security practices, boosting stakeholder confidence. Systematic Approach: It provides clear methods for identifying, assessing, and addressing risks (ISO, 2013).	Protect operational data in systems such as Thales TopSky ATC and Zebra printers using encryption, access controls, and periodic audits. Establish a process for continuous improvement to adapt to evolving cybersecurity threats.
<b>IEC 62443</b>	Lifecycle Protection: Covers security from design through decommissioning of IIoT devices. Device-Level Security: Focuses on vulnerabilities unique to industrial equipment. Collaborative Approach: Encourages manufacturers to embed security measures during product development.	Secure systems like building management controls and air traffic control equipment using IEC 62443 principles. Collaborate with vendors (e.g., Honeywell and Thales) to ensure compliance with stringent security standards.
<b>NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF)</b>	Continuous Improvement: Encourages regular evaluation and updates to cybersecurity strategies. Scalability: Adapts to airports of varying sizes, from regional hubs to international airports (NIST, 2018). Focus on Resilience: Prioritizes recovery to minimize operational downtime after incidents.	Assess and strengthen systems like Frequentis VCS and Garmin Flight Deck using the framework. Leverage its recovery-oriented approach to resume critical operations quickly after cyber disruptions.
<b>ISO 31000</b>	Strategic Integration: Ensures cybersecurity aligns with overarching organizational objectives. Broad Applicability: Covers risks at technical, operational, and organizational levels (ISO, 2018). Interdisciplinary Collaboration: Promotes cooperation across departments for more effective risk management.	Align cybersecurity initiatives with the airport's broader risk management strategies to optimize resources. Use ISO 31000 to implement consistent cybersecurity practices across all airport departments.

*Figure 6.1: Framework driven risk management strategies*

## 7. Key Recommendations

### 7.1. Summary table of Recommendations

Recommendation	Expected Outcomes	Responsibility	Timeline
<b>1. Apply firmware updates to all devices</b>	It can resolve known vulnerabilities such as CVE-2021-36260, CVE-2021-21901, and CVE-2021-31986/31988.	IT Security Team, Vendors	Immediate (0–3 months)
<b>2. Implement network segmentation</b>	It will isolate critical systems, reducing attack surface and lateral movement risks.	IT Security Team, Network Admins	Medium-term (3–6 months)
<b>3. Deploy TLS 1.3 encryption for communication</b>	It will protect sensitive data in transit from interception or tampering.	IT Security Team	Medium-term (3–6 months)
<b>4. Introduce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)</b>	It can reduce unauthorised access risks through enhanced authentication.	IT Security Team	Medium-term (3–6 months)
<b>5. Conduct regular security audits and testing</b>	It can identify emerging vulnerabilities and ensures compliance with standards.	Third-party Auditors, IT Security	Continuous (Ongoing)
<b>6. Implement Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)</b>	It can restrict user permissions to only those necessary for their role.	IT Security Team	Medium-term (3–6 months)
<b>7. Enable Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS)</b>	It can provide real-time alerts and automatic prevention of malicious activities.	IT Security Team	Medium-term (3–6 months)
<b>8. Improve Physical Security Controls</b>	It can ensure physical protection of devices from tampering or theft.	Physical Security Team	Medium-term (3–6 months)
<b>9. Enable Secure Logging and Monitoring</b>	It can improve tracking and response to security incidents.	IT Security Team	Continuous (Ongoing)
<b>10. Develop Incident Response Plans</b>	It can provide a structured approach to managing and mitigating the impact of cybersecurity incidents.	IT Security Team, Management	Medium-term (3–6 months)
<b>11. Provide Regular Cybersecurity Training</b>	It can improve awareness among staff to recognise and respond to potential threats, reducing risks from phishing and human error.	HR, IT Security Team	Continuous (Ongoing)
<b>12. Apply Device Hardening Practices</b>	It can minimise attack surfaces by disabling unnecessary features, ports, and protocols.	IT Security Team	Medium-term (3–6 months)

*Figure 7.1: Key Recommendations*

## **7.2. Detailed Evaluation of Top 3 Recommendations**

### **Recommendation 1: Update Firmware on Vulnerable Devices**

#### **Justification**

Firmware vulnerabilities provide critical entry points for cyberattacks. Known issues in Hikvision Cameras (CVE-2021-36260) and Honeywell XL Web II Controllers (CVE-2017-5140 to CVE-2017-5143), can allow unauthorized access and disrupt operations. Regular updates address these weaknesses (MITRE, 2021; Honeywell, 2017).

#### **Expected Impact**

- It will eliminate known vulnerabilities, reducing the attack surface.
- It will enhance the security and reliability of critical devices.
- It will improve overall operational resilience.

#### **Implementation**

1. First automate firmware updates to minimize delays and errors.
2. Then collaborate with vendors for timely delivery of patches.
3. And finally develop and enforce firmware management policies as part of a broader security strategy.

### **Recommendation 2: Enforce Network Segmentation**

#### **Justification**

Poor network segmentation facilitates lateral movement by attackers, increasing the risk of widespread breaches. Systems such as air traffic control (ATC) and building management are especially vulnerable due to their interconnection with IIoT devices. Proper segmentation isolates critical systems, reducing risks (IEC, 2020).

#### **Expected Impact**

- It will limit the scope and severity of breaches.
- It will provide a layered security approach, enhancing system resilience.

#### **Implementation**

1. Use VLANs and firewalls to create isolated zones for critical systems.
2. Regularly audit network architecture to ensure effective segmentation.
3. Incorporate segmentation principles into the design of future IIoT deployments.

### **Recommendation 3: Deploy TLS 1.3 Encryption for Data Protection**

#### **Justification**

A lack of robust encryption leaves IIoT systems vulnerable to data interception. For instance, unencrypted communications in Honeywell XL Web II Controllers heighten risks (Honeywell, 2017). TLS 1.3 provides state-of-the-art encryption, securing data confidentiality and integrity (NIST, 2018).

#### **Expected Impact**

- It will prevent eavesdropping and unauthorized data access.
- It will ensure compliance with regulations like GDPR and CAF.



- It will build trust in system security through robust encryption protocols.

#### **Implementation**

1. Audit systems to identify vulnerabilities in data communication.
2. Prioritize TLS 1.3 implementation in critical areas.
3. Train IT teams to configure and maintain encryption protocols effectively.

### **7.3. Broder Recommendations**

#### **Adopt a Zero-Trust Security Model:**

- It verifies all users and devices continuously to prevent unauthorised access.
- It will minimise trust zones within the network for added security.

#### **Strengthen Physical Security:**

- Secure physical access to devices such as Garrett Metal Detectors and Axis Cameras to prevent tampering.

#### **Enhance Monitoring Capabilities:**

- Deploy Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to identify and respond to anomalous activities in real-time.
- Implement Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) to track the effectiveness of security measures.

#### **Regularly Train Staff:**

- Make sure that staffs are trained in cybersecurity best practices to mitigate risks from human errors.

### **7.4. Cost Benefit Assessment of Suggested Mitigations**

<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Costs</b>	<b>Benefits</b>	<b>Assessment</b>
Apply firmware updates to all devices	£10,000–£15,000 for automation tools; ongoing vendor fees (Axis Communications, 2021).	Enhances security posture, ensures compliance with standards, and reduces risks.	Moderate cost; high benefit. Enhances efficiency and reduces risks.
Implement network segmentation	£20,000–£50,000 for firewalls; £15,000 for setup and configuration (UpGuard, 2023).	Reduces attack impact, limits breach spread and protects critical systems.	High cost; high benefit. Essential for complex environments.
Deploy TLS 1.3 encryption for communication	£1,000–£3,000 annually for licensing; £10,000–£20,000 for	Improves security of sensitive communications	Moderate cost; high benefit. Critical for communication security.

	upgrades (NCSC, 2019).	and compliance with regulations.	
Introduce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)	£5,000–£10,000 for integration with access management systems (Microsoft, 2020).	Prevents unauthorised access, securing sensitive data and systems.	Low cost; high benefit. Improves access control significantly.
Conduct regular security audits and testing	£5,000–£10,000 per audit; internal resource costs (CyberSec Advisor, 2021).	Ensures compliance, prevents breaches, and builds organisational trust.	Moderate cost; high benefit. Essential for proactive risk management.
Implement Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)	£10,000–£20,000 for configuration; ongoing reviews (CISA, 2022).	Minimises insider threats and improves access accountability.	Moderate cost; high benefit. Enhances access control.
Enable Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS)	£50,000–£100,000 annually for tools; £20,000–£30,000 setup costs (Gartner, 2023).	Detects threats early, reduces response time, and prevents attacks.	High cost; high benefit. Vital for real-time threat visibility.
Improve Physical Security Controls	£5,000–£10,000 for physical controls; £5,000 annually for maintenance (Honeywell, 2020).	Protects devices from tampering, ensuring operational continuity.	Low cost; high benefit. Ensures physical protection of assets.
Enable Secure Logging and Monitoring	£20,000–£50,000 for logging systems; ongoing maintenance costs (Splunk, 2021).	Enhances forensic capabilities and accountability.	Moderate cost; high benefit. Improves incident response.
Develop Incident Response Plans	£10,000–£15,000 for training and simulations; £5,000 annually for updates (NIST, 2020).	Improves readiness for incidents, reducing operational downtime.	Moderate cost; high benefit. Reduces downtime and enhances resilience.
Provide Regular Cybersecurity Training	£5,000–£8,000 annually for training sessions and materials (ISACA, 2021).	Reduces human error risks and strengthens organisational security culture.	Low cost; high benefit. Strengthens security awareness.
Apply Device Hardening Practices	£10,000–£20,000 for system reviews and reconfiguration (CISA, 2022).	Enhances baseline security, reducing vulnerabilities.	Moderate cost; high benefit. Reduces attack surface.

*Figure 7.4: Cost Benefit Analysis of Mitigations*

## 8. Conclusion

### 8.1. Implications

The assessment of IIoT systems in James Bond airport reveals serious security risks that, if ignored, could lead to operational disruptions, regulatory breaches, and compromised passenger safety. Here are the main points:

- **High-Risk Devices:**  
Hikvision Cameras and Honeywell XL Web II Controllers stand out as highly vulnerable. Issues like command injection (CVE-2021-36260) and unencrypted communication (CVE-2017-5140 to CVE-2017-5143) create opportunities for unauthorized access, data theft, and operational breakdowns. These risks need immediate attention (MITRE, 2021; Honeywell, 2017).
- **Effectiveness of Frameworks:**  
Airport can implement a well-rounded strategy by combining frameworks such as ISO/IEC 27001, IEC 62443, CAF, NIST CSF, and ISO 31000. This approach strengthens technical defences, boosts resilience, and ensures compliance with UK-specific regulations (NCSC, 2019; ISO, 2018).
- **Top Priorities for Mitigation:**  
Immediate actions like updating firmware, improving network segmentation, and introducing TLS 1.3 encryption address the most critical risks. Long-term efforts, including IDS deployment and continuous system monitoring, provide ongoing protection.

### 8.2. Strategic importance of IIoT Risk management

IIoT devices play a key role in improving airport operations, safety protocols, and passenger experience. However, their integration into critical systems introduces vulnerabilities that require close management. Here's why risk management is crucial:

- **Maintaining Operations:**  
Secure systems like air traffic control, building management, and surveillance are vital for keeping airports running smoothly. Strong cybersecurity makes sure these systems remain functional even when under threat.
- **Meeting Regulations:**  
Compliance with standards such as CAF and ISO/IEC 27001 isn't optional. It protects airports from penalties, legal action, and reputational damage while building trust with stakeholders.
- **Protecting Passengers:**  
Safeguarding passenger data and maintaining secure operations build public confidence and contribute to a better overall experience.

### 8.3. Implementation Call to Action

To strengthen cybersecurity and reduce risks, airports should prioritize the following steps:

- **Immediate Actions:**
  - Update firmware on vulnerable devices like Hikvision Cameras and Honeywell Controllers to patch known flaws.
  - Segment networks to isolate IIoT systems from sensitive infrastructure and limit the spread of breaches.
- **Medium-Term Goals:**
  - Introduce TLS 1.3 encryption to secure data transmission and eliminate risks of interception.
  - Strengthen access controls by adding Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
  - Perform regular security audits and penetration tests to identify and address emerging threats.
- **Ongoing Measures:**
  - Create a feedback loop that uses Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) and lessons from past incidents to refine security practices.
  - Keep risk registers updated with new threats and changes in compliance requirements.

### 8.4. Final Reflections

This report highlights the importance of proactive cybersecurity strategies to address vulnerabilities in IIoT systems. By combining immediate, medium-term, and ongoing measures with robust frameworks, airports can:

- Improve resilience against cyber threats.
- Stay compliant with regulatory requirements.
- Build passenger trust by ensuring a safe and secure environment.

## 9. Appendix

### 9.1. Heap Matrix Table

Likelihood / Impact	Low Impact	Medium Impact	High Impact
Low Likelihood	None	None	None
Medium Likelihood	None	R6 (Axis Cameras), R8 (Thales AVANT)	R3 (Thales ATC Systems), R5 (Garrett Metal Detectors), R9 (Garmin G1000), R10 (Frequentis VCS)
High Likelihood	None	None	R1 (Hikvision Cameras), R2 (Honeywell XL Web II)

Figure 9.1: Heap matrix

### 9.2. Gap Analysis of Recommended Frameworks

Requirement	ISO/IEC 27001	IEC 62443	NIST CSF	CAF	ISO 31000	Identified Gaps
<b>Device-Level Security</b>	High-level guidance but lacks device-specific controls.	Strong focus on industrial automation and control systems.	General security principles but not device specific.	Provides regulatory context but lacks technical depth.	Provides general risk management principles but not technical device controls.	ISO/IEC 27001, CAF, and ISO 31000 lack specific device controls. Requires integration of IEC 62443 for IIoT-specific focus.
<b>Operational Continuity</b>	Emphasises governance but lacks real-time operational controls.	Covers operational aspects for control systems.	Focuses on resilience but less applicable to IIoT-specific operations.	Highlights critical infrastructure needs but lacks implementation details.	Provides high-level continuity strategies but no operational specifics.	ISO/IEC 27001, CAF, and ISO 31000 need NIST CSF and IEC 62443 for operational focus and resilience.
<b>Compliance</b>	Globally recognised but not UK-specific.	Not compliance-focused; technical standard.	General guidance but not compliance oriented.	UK-specific and tailored for critical national infrastructure.	Provides guidance for regulatory alignment but not UK-specific.	ISO/IEC 27001, NIST CSF, and ISO 31000 require CAF for UK-specific compliance.
<b>Risk Management</b>	Strong risk management processes but not tailored to IIoT.	Focuses on risk in industrial systems.	Comprehensive risk-based approach.	Highlights risk in critical infrastructure.	Provides a structured, high-level risk management framework.	No single framework covers all IIoT risk scenarios. A hybrid approach is required for holistic coverage

Figure 9.2: Gap Analysis of Frameworks

### 9.3. Glossary of Terms

- **Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT):** Connected devices and systems for industrial operations. Example: Hikvision Cameras in airports for surveillance.
- **Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE):** A catalogue of known security vulnerabilities. Example: CVE-2021-36260 identifies issues in Hikvision Cameras.
- **Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS):** Rates vulnerability severity (0 to 10). Example: Axis Camera vulnerability scored 7.8.
- **Transport Layer Security (TLS):** Encrypts network communications. Example: Secures Honeywell Building Management Systems.
- **Virtual Private Network (VPN):** Encrypts remote connections. Example: Secures Thales ATC systems accessed remotely.
- **Network Segmentation:** Limits attack spread by dividing networks. Example: Separating Thales TopSky ATC systems for security.
- **Security Information and Event Management (SIEM):** Monitors and detects network threats. Example: Splunk tracks potential IIoT threats.
- **Firmware:** Controls device operations, needs updates to fix vulnerabilities. Example: Updated Axis Camera firmware for security.
- **Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):** Adds security layers to logins. Example: MFA secures Hikvision admin panels.
- **Endpoint Security:** Protects devices like printers and cameras. Example: Zebra Printers secured with endpoint protection.
- **Intrusion Detection System (IDS):** Detects suspicious network activity. Example: Monitors threats to building management systems.
- **Patch Management:** Updates software and devices to fix vulnerabilities. Example: Keeps Axis Cameras patched for security.
- **Air-Gapping:** Isolates systems from external networks. Example: Used for high-security Thales ATC systems.
- **Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack:** Overwhelms systems to disable operations. Example: Garrett Metal Detectors under DoS attack.
- **Resilience:** Systems recover and operate post-attack. Example: CAF Framework ensures resilience in airport infrastructure.
- **Zero-Day Vulnerability:** Exploited flaws without available fixes. Example: Thales systems' zero-day jeopardizes air traffic.
- **Least Privilege Principle:** Limits access to essential system functions. Example: Restrict admin rights in Honeywell Systems.
- **Threat Vector:** Path attackers exploit vulnerabilities. Example: Unencrypted communications as a threat to IIoT.
- **Incident Response Plan (IRP):** Outlines steps to manage cyber incidents. Example: Minimizes downtime in building systems post-breach.

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