Spillover Effects in Complementary Markets: A Study of the Indian Cellphone and Wireless Service Markets

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This Paper

- Studies the indirect network effects on product variety and firm entry in two complementary markets
 - Indirect network effects occur when the value of a product in one market depends on products in another market
 - Examples: EV-charging station, hardware-software, cellphone-wireless plans, ...
 - They affect demand, firm pricing, and ...
- Highlights and quantifies a new channel: Presence of technologically more advanced int'l firms in an open market
 - Contributes to the development of a complementary market by encouraging entry (firm entry)
 - Affects domestic firms in the open market by affecting their profits from new products (product variety)

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Intro

Indian mobile industry during the 4G rollout

- Two markets
 - handset market: int'l handset firms play an important role and occupy the higher-end of the market
 - wireless service market: mostly Indian carriers
- Two complementary markets
 - a consumer needs both a handset and a service plan to enjoy mobile service
 - only enjoys advanced features and the fast speed with a 4G handset/4G network combination

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Intro

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Handset market Wireless service market Easier for int'l handset firms More likely to start 4G to introduce 4G phones networks

Intro

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
Handset market


Wireless service market


Easier for int'l handset firms to introduce 4G phones


More likely to start 4G networks (cross-market spillover)

Intro ○○●○○○










Intro

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■ The presence of the technologically more advanced int'l handset firms speeds up the expansion of 4G network and may accelerate the introduction of 4G handsets by domestic firms, benefiting consumers

Research Questions

- 1 How does the presence of int'l handset firms affect the rollout of 4G networks?
 - cross-market effect
- 2 How does the presence of int'l handset firms affect the introduction of 4G handsets by Indian handset firms?
 - within-market effect
- **3** What is the welfare effect?
 - margins: 4G networks, product variety, and prices

What We Do

- Develop a structural model of demand, network expansion, product choice, and pricing in the Indian handset and wireless service markets
- Estimate the model using data on handsets, plans, and networks
 - four key empirical findings
- Quantify the spillover effects and the welfare effects
 - three counterfactual simulations

Intro

Literature Review and Contributions - A Short Version

- 1. We study two complementary markets simultaneously
 - Literature on network effects b/w complementary markets
- This paper: a new topic
- 2. We study both handset firms' product choices and carriers' network expansion decisions
 - Literature on endogenous product choice
 - Literature on dynamic entry games
 - This paper: both embed a static product choice model in a dynamic network expansion model
- 3. We study the effect of opening a market to international competitors
 - Trade literature
 - This paper: a new channel

Industry Background

- Handset market: 4 Indian, 6 other-Asian, and 2 non-Asian handset firms
- Wireless market: 8 carriers Airtel, Vodafone, Idea, BSNL, Reliance Jio, Reliance Communications, Aircel, MTNL
- 22 telecommunications regions: 3 Metro regions (most developed: Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai), 5 Category-A, 8 Category-B, and 6 Category-C regions (least developed) → map

Data

- 2011 2018Q2
- Handset data
 - price, sales, and product characteristics at the product/time level
- Wireless service data
 - price and sales at the plan/quarter level
 - availability at the plan/quarter/region level video
 - plan = carrier/technology (e.g., Airtel 4G)
- ▶ summary stats

Data Pattern 1

1. Int'l firms, especially other Asian firms, play an important role in the handset market

Origin	Firm	Sales Share	Total
Indian	Intex	3.3%	
Indian	Lava	3.2%	
Indian	LYF	15.7%	
Indian	Micromax	6.0%	28%
Other-Asian	Gionee	1.3%	
Other-Asian	Lenovo	4.9%	
Other-Asian	Oppo	4.8%	
Other-Asian	Samsung	33.0%	
Other-Asian	Vivo	6.2%	
Other-Asian	Xiaomi	13.7%	64%
Non-Asian	Apple	1.8%	
Non-Asian	Microsoft/Nokia	6.1%	8%

• Sales share = (3G/4G handset sales by a firm in the sample)/(total 3G/4G handset sales)

Data Pattern 2


2. While Indian handset firms occupy the low-end market, int'l handset firms dominate the higher end of the market.

	4G Handset Sales Share			
Origin	Low-Price	Medium-Price	High-Price	
Indian	100%	26%	1%	
Other Asian	-	74%	91%	
Non-Asian	-	-	7%	


Data Pattern 3

3. Co-movement in the two markets: 4G network coverage expanded and 4G handset sales increased

(b) Sales of 4G Handsets







Consistent with Pattern 2, the increase in Indian 4G handset sales is largely driven by a set of low-end phones

Data Patterns: Summary

- Int'l handset firms play a big role in the handset market
- They started selling 4G handsets first and Indian firms later introduced low-end 4G handsets
- Concurrent 4G handset sales growth and 4G network expansions

$$s^h \left(\underbrace{p_t^h}_{\text{handset prices}}, \underbrace{p_t^p}_{\text{lan prices}}, \underbrace{\mathcal{J}_t^h}_{\text{available handsets}}, \underbrace{\{\mathcal{R}_{ct}\}_{c=1}^{\mathcal{C}}}_{\text{each carrier's network}} \right), s^p(\dots)$$


$$s^h \left(\begin{array}{c} p_t^h \\ p_t^h \end{array}, \begin{array}{c} p_t^p \\ p_t^h \end{array}, \begin{array}{c} p_t^h \\ p_t^h \end{array}$$

$$s^h \left(\underbrace{p_t^h}_{\text{handset prices}} \text{,} \underbrace{p_t^p}_{\text{t}} \text{,} \underbrace{\mathcal{J}_t^h}_{\text{t}} \text{,} \underbrace{\{\mathcal{R}_{ct}\}_{c=1}^{\mathcal{C}}}_{\text{each carrier's network}} \right), s^p(\dots)$$

Stage-2 pricing eqm:
$$p^{*h}(\mathcal{J}_t^h, \{\mathcal{R}_{ct}\}_{c=1}^{\mathcal{C}}), \ p^{*p}(...)$$
 Eqm carrier profit given networks: $\pi_{ct}(\{\mathcal{R}_{ct}\}_{c=1}^{\mathcal{C}})$ Stage-1 product choice eqm: $\mathcal{J}_t^{*h}(\{\mathcal{R}_{ct}\}_{c=1}^{\mathcal{C}})$


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 Eqm carrier profit given networks: $\pi_{ct}(\{\mathcal{R}_{ct}\}_{c=1}^{\mathcal{C}})$



Estimation Results: Demand

	Est.	Std. Error	
Price (10K INR)	-29.1***	5.57	
$Price \times Income$	4.47***	0.89	
$Price \times Normal Draw$	0.36***	0.15	
Screen Size (Inch)	0.27*	0.17	
Camera (MP)	0.09***	0.02	
Storage (10GB)	0.41***	0.07	
RAM (GB)	0.39***	0.15	
Battery Capacity	0.32***	0.11	
$1(4G \text{ Handset}) \times 1(4G \text{ Network})$	3.24***	0.82	
Handset Technology FE	Yes		
Plan Technology FE	Yes		
Handset Firm FE	Yes		
Carrier FE	Yes		
Time FE	Yes		
Jio First Year FE	Yes		

Estimation Results: Demand


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Plan Technology FE	•	Yes	
Handset Firm FE	,	Yes	
Carrier FE		Yes	
Time FE	,	Yes	
Jio First Year FE	,	Yes	

The estimated coefficient of 3.24 is equivalent to a willingness to pay of 4,248 INR given the average price coefficient

Estimation Results: Marginal Cost

Table: MC Estimation Result

1. Indian handset firms have a cost advantage at the low end



2. MC costs decrease over time: negative coefficients for time trend

Estimation Results: Fixed Cost

Finding: cost advantages of int'l handset firms:

Origin	Low-Quality	Low-Medium	High-Medium	High-Quality
Indian	983	1458	_	_
International	544	1353	5003	5984



Estimation Results: Fixed Cost

Finding: cost advantages of int'l handset firms:

Median 4G Handset Fixed Cost (Million INR)


Origin	Low-Quality	Low-Medium	High-Medium	High-Quality
Indian	983	1458	-	-
International	544	1353	5003	5984



Estimation Results: Summary

- 1 Complementarity between 4G phones and 4G networks
- Lower fixed cost for int'l handset firms to sell 4G handsets
- Declining marginal cost
- Domestic cost advantage at producing low-quality handsets

Key Findings and the Channel



- Finding 1 is the foundation for the spillover effects
- Findings 2 and 3 support the cross-market spillover effect at the initial stage of the 4G rollout and in the later stage of the continued expansion
- Finding 4 gives rise to the within-market spillover effect so that Indian handset firms benefit from the presence of int'l handset firms

Counterfactual Simulation Design

Quantification

- CF1. remove int'l handset firms from India
- CF2. replace each int'l handset firms by an Indian firm

A policy analysis

• CF3. ban on budget Chinese phones (price < 12,000 INR)

■ Fixed:

- 2G and 3G networks
- each handset firm's potential products

■ Recomputed:

- 4G network in each period
- set of handsets in each period
- handset prices and plan prices in each period

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Intro

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CF1. Economic Forces

CF1. Remove int'l handset firms from India

- Affects prices (less competition)
- Affects handset variety directly (products by int'l firms removed)
- Affects handset variety indirectly by affecting Indian handset firms' product choices
- Affects 4G networks, which, in turn, affects Indian handset firms' product choices and pricing competition

CF2 Details

CF2. Replace each int'l handset firms by an Indian firm

- Less of a shock to the industry
- Accommodates the possibility that the void created by the absence of the int'l firms may be filled by the entry of new domestic firms

Operationalization:

- Firm fixed effect in demand: $FE^{CF} = avg(\hat{FE}_{Indian})$
- MC: 1(Indian) = 1
- Fixed cost: $C_{jt}^{\text{CF}} = \frac{\text{avg}_{j \in \text{Indian}} \hat{C}_{jt}}{\text{avg}_{j \in \text{Indian}} \hat{C}_{jt}} \hat{C}_{jt}$

CF3. ban on budget Chinese phones

- Chinese handset firms face a price floor of 12,000 INR
- Affects prices
- Affects product choices
- Affects 4G networks, which, in turn, affects handset firms' product choices and pricing competition

Expected Results

- 1. Cross-market spillover effect
 - Outcome of interest: evolution of # regions and population covered by 4G networks
 - Expected result: a slower expansion of 4G networks in CF b/c
 - estimated cost advantage of int'l handset firms in selling 4G phones
 - estimated complementarity between 4G phones and 4G handsets

Expected Results (Cont.)

- 2. Within-market spillover effect
- Outcome of interest: evolution of # and sales of Indian 4G phones
- Expected result: ambiguous
 - slower expansion of 4G networks \rightarrow a later intro and a slower growth of domestic 4G phones
 - less competition, higher variable profits \rightarrow an earlier intro and a faster growth of domestic 4G phones

Expected Results (Cont.)


3. Welfare

- Consumer surplus ↓ b/c
 - slower expansion of 4G network coverage
 - slower development of the 4G phone market
- Carrier profits ↓ b/c
 - complementarity between the two markets
- Domestic handset firms' profits?
 - less competition in CF1 scenario, more homogeneous competitors in CF2, less competition in the low-end of the market in CF3
 - no within-market spillover effect

Conclusion


- Indirect network effects on product variety and firm entry
- A new channel through which int'l competition affects product variety and welfare
 - presence of int'l firms helps the development of a complementary market, which, in turn, affect their own market
- Four key findings supporting the channel
 - 4G-4G complementarity
 - int'l firm cost advantages
 - declining MC
 - domestic cost advantage at producing low-end handsets
- Quantify the cross-market and within-market spillover effects,
 and the welfare effects

Thank you!



Industry •00000000000

The 12 Telecommunications Regions



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Industry




JioPhone LF-2401

Screen Size	2.4 inch			
Rear Camera	2MP			
Front Camera	0.3MP			
RAM	0.5GB			
4G connectivity	Yes			
Built-in Apps	Yes			
Voice control	Yes			
Price	\$22 in 2017			


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
LYF handsets					Jio bundle			Jio Stand-Alone Plan	
Quarter	#handsets	Quantity	Quantity Market	Within-4G	#handsets	Quantity	Market	Within-4G	Market
			Share	Share			Share	Share	Share
2015Q4	1	198,972	0.1%	2.2%					
2016Q1	7	1,545,400	1.1%	12.5%					
2016Q2	8	1,226,209	0.9%	9.5%					
2016Q3	8	2,182,501	1.6%	11.7%					0.8%
2016Q4	6	1,225,272	0.9%	6.3%					2.9%
2017Q1	3	462,857	0.3%	2.1%					3.7%
2017Q2									4.4%
2017Q3					9	2,719,100	2.0%	8.3%	4.5%
2017Q4					8	15,473,620	11.2%	39.6%	0.2%
2018Q1					10	21,132,740	12.4%	50.2%	1.0%
2018Q2					9	14,219,938	8.3%	36.2%	3.5%


2013Q1





2013Q2














2014Q3





2014Q4




2015Q1










2015Q4










2016Q3







2017Q1








2017Q4









Industry

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- Annual auctions between 2010 and 2016, and then in 2021
- Each auction corresponds to a specific spectrum of frequencies and specific geographic blocks
- Carriers seem not constrained: in 2015, 11% of the spectrum offered was unsold; in 2016, 60%

Estimation

Spectrum usage charges

- Spectrum usage charges (SUC)
 - Prior to 2015: flat rate of 5% of the Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR)
 - 2016–2017: In October 2016, the Department of Telecommunications announced a new formula for calculating SUC based on a weighted average formula, which varied depending on the amount of spectrum held and the brands of spectrum used. In July 2017, the Telecom Commission approved the weighted average formula.
 - 2018: flat rate of 3% of AGR for spectrum acquired in future auctions
- A carrier's profit function: (price*(1-SUC)-mc)*quantity(prices)
 - Our estimated mc is "mc/(1-SUC)"

Carriers

Industry

Airtel

Vodafone

Idea

BSNL (Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited)

Reliance Jio

Reliance Communications

Aircel

MTNL (Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited)

Carriers

- Airtel, Jio, and Idea: domestic and owned by Indian entrepreneurs (owned by Bharti Airtel Limited, Reliance Iio and Aditya Birla Group respectively)
- BSNL and MTNL: public companies owned by Indian government
- Vodafone-India: an Indian subsidiary of UK-based parent company
- Aircel: an Indian firm started by Apollo Hospitals; Maxis Communications – a Malaysian firm held 74% stake in the firm

List of Carriers

Carrier	Total Subscribes (million)
Airtel	4485
Vodafone	3452
Idea	3061
BSNL	1701
Reliance Jio	1626
Reliance Communications	1554
Aircel	1468
MTNL	68

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Carrier	Total Subscribes (million)
Reliance Jio	517
Airtel	341
Idea	218
Vodafone	218
BSNL	113
Aircel	73
MTNL	3.5

Online vs. Offline Handset Sales

January 2018 - June 2018

Origin	Handset Firm	Online	Offline
Indian	Intex	7%	93%
	Lava	1%	99%
	LYF	38%	62%
	Micromax	4%	96%
Other-Asian	Gionee	1%	99%
	Lenovo	71%	29%
	Oppo	4%	96%
	Samsung	15%	85%
	Vivo	4%	96%
	Xiaomi	67%	33%
Non-Asian	Apple	39%	61%
	Microsoft/Nokia	28%	72%

Data

Data Details

- 2011 2018Q2
- Handset data
 - 2011–2014: product/year level; 2015Q1–2018Q2: product/quarter level
 - price and sales from Counterpoint Research
 - product characteristics hand collected
- Wireless service data
 - carrier/technology-level (e.g., Airtel's 4G service). Define: plan = carrier/technology
 - sales (plan/quarter-level) and price (carrier/quarter-level) from the **GSMA** Intelligence
 - availability in each region hand collected: plan/quarter/region level video

Summary Statistics: Handsets

Summary Statistics – Handsets

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Price (INR)	11,795	11,193	1,329	86,002
Sales (Million)	0.27	0.46	0.03	8.12
Screen size (Inch)	4.6	0.9	2.0	6.4
Camera (Megapixel)	11.4	7.8	0.3	41.0
Internal Memory (GB)	15	17	0.0	128
RAM (GB)	1.5	1.1	0.0	6.0
Battery Capacity (mAh)	2,337	884	800	5,300
Number of Obs	1,429			

Note: This table reports the summary statistics of 3G and 4G handsets. Between 2011 and 2014, one observation is a handset/year. Between 2015Q1 and 2018Q2, one observation is a handset/quarter. We divide the annual sales between 2011 and 2014 by 4 in reporting the summary statistics about sales.

We lump all 2G handsets into one option of "2G handsets". The average quarterly sales of 2G handsets is 33.13 million.

Summary Statistics: 4G Handsets

Data

Summary Statistics – 4G Handsets

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Price (INR)	13,257	12,670	1,329	86,002
Sales (Million)	0.36	0.58	0.04	8.12
Screensize (Inch)	5.0	0.8	2.4	6.4
Camera (Megapixel)	15.6	7.5	0.3	41.0
Internal Memory (GB)	22	18	4.0	128
RAM (GB)	2.1	1.1	0.5	6.0
Battery Capacity (mAh)	2,799	793	1,300	5,300
Number of Obs	773			

Note: This table reports the summary statistics of handsets. Between 2011 and 2014, one observation is a handset/year. Between 2015Q1 and 2018Q2, one observation is a handset/quarter. We divide the annual sales between 2011 and 2014 by 4 in reporting the summary statistics about sales.

Summary Statistics: Plans

Summary Statistics – Plans


	Mean	Std	Min	Max
Monthly Price (INR)	130	45	6	207
Plan Price (INR)	2,586	915	115	4,148
# of Obs (Carrier/Quarters)		2	16	
Sales (Million)	54	68	0.002	517
# of Obs (Plan/Quarters)		4	92	

Estimation Results


Summary Statistics – Regions

Region	Category	Population	Average Per-capita Gross State Product
Delhi	Metro	16,787,941	296,709
Kolkata	Metro	4,496,694	225,688
Mumbai	Metro	12,442,373	495,791
Andhra Pradesh & Telangana	A	84,673,556	118,678
Gujarat & Daman & Diu	A	60,626,875	137,067
Karnataka	A	61,130,704	144,777
Maharashtra & Goa	A	113,830,695	145,467
Tamil Nadu	A	72,138,958	139,201
Haryana	В	25,353,081	163,762
Kerala	В	33,387,677	146,118
Madhya Pradesh & Chhattisgarh	В	98,137,761	66,068
Punjab	В	27,704,236	117,132
Rajasthan	В	68,621,012	81,513
UP(West) & Uttarakhand	В	81,333,884	67,823
Uttar Pradesh(East)	В	128,595,209	31,698
West Bengal	В	91,347,736	75,704
Assam	C	31,169,272	58,972
Bihar & Jharkhand	C	136,770,875	37,289
Himachal Pradesh	C	6,864,602	132,110
Jammu & Kashmir	C	12,548,926	69,644
North East	C	14,418,710	84,396
Orissa	C	41,947,358	68,541

Number of Handset Models Over Time




Handset Sales Over Time







Handset Price Over Time



Plan Sales by Technology




4G Plan Sales Over Time



Estimation Results

Median Plan Price Over Time



- A consumer needs both a handset (indexed by *j*) and a wireless plan (indexed by k)
- Utility: $u_{ijkt} = x_{jkt}\beta_{it} \alpha_{it} (p_{jt} + p_{kt}) + \xi_{it} + \zeta_{kt} + \varepsilon_{ijkt}$
- Restrictions on the *ik* combination: (3G handset, 4G plan) X; (2G handset, 3G or 4G plan) X; (JioPhone, non-Jio plan) X
- Model implications: s_{ikrt} (market share for a combination jk in
- Aggregation \Rightarrow Market shares: (s_{it}, s_{kt})

- A consumer needs both a handset (indexed by *j*) and a wireless plan (indexed by k)
- Utility: $u_{ijkt} = x_{jkt}\beta_{it} \alpha_{it} (p_{jt} + p_{kt}) + \xi_{jt} + \zeta_{kt} + \varepsilon_{ijkt}$ $(x_{it}, x_{kt}, 1(4G, 4G)_{ik})$
- Restrictions on the *ik* combination: (3G handset, 4G plan) X; (2G handset, 3G or 4G plan) X; (JioPhone, non-Jio plan) X
- Model implications: s_{ikrt} (market share for a combination jk in
- Aggregation \Rightarrow Market shares: (s_{it}, s_{kt})

Industry

A consumer needs both a handset (indexed by *j*) and a wireless plan (indexed by k)

Model

- **Utility**: $u_{ijkt} = x_{jkt}\beta_{it} \alpha_{it} (p_{jt} + p_{kt}) + \xi_{jt} + \zeta_{kt} + \varepsilon_{ijkt}$ $(x_{it}, x_{kt}, 1(4G, 4G)_{ik})$
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- A consumer needs both a handset (indexed by *j*) and a wireless plan (indexed by k)
- **Utility**: $u_{ijkt} = x_{jkt}\beta_{it} \alpha_{it} (p_{jt} + p_{kt}) + \xi_{jt} + \zeta_{kt} + \varepsilon_{ijkt}$ $(x_{it}, x_{kt}, 1(4G, 4G)_{ik})$
- Restrictions on the *jk* combination: (3G handset, 4G plan) X; (2G handset, 3G or 4G plan) X; (JioPhone, non-Jio plan) X
- Model implications: s_{ikrt} (market share for a combination jk in region *r* at time *t*)
- Aggregation \Rightarrow Market shares: (s_{it}, s_{kt})

■ A consumer needs both a handset (indexed by *j*) and a wireless plan (indexed by *k*)

Model

- Utility: $u_{ijkt} = x_{jkt}\beta_{it} \alpha_{it} (p_{jt} + p_{kt}) + \xi_{jt} + \zeta_{kt} + \varepsilon_{ijkt}$ $\uparrow (x_{jt}, x_{kt}, 1(4G, 4G)_{jk})$
- Restrictions on the *jk* combination: (3G handset, 4G plan) **X**; (2G handset, 3G or 4G plan) **X**; (JioPhone, non-Jio plan) **X**
- Model implications: s_{jkrt} (market share for a combination jk in region r at time t)
- Aggregation \Rightarrow Market shares: (s_{it}, s_{kt})

Model Details (2): Static Product Choice Game

Decisions

To be estimated

Stage 1. Product choice game

Handset firms choose handsets given the current network

FC

Stage 2. Pricing game

Handset firms choose handset prices and carriers choose plan prices given the set of handsets and plans

MC

- Details: second-stage pricing game
- Details: first-stage product choice game 🔼

Model Details (3): Dynamic 4G Network Expansion

- Dynamic: entering a region with 4G services is an absorbing state
- Finite periods: by the end of our sample, all four carriers had entered in almost all regions studied in the paper
- Four carriers: we focus on the four largest carriers that account for 95% of the 4G services

Model Details: Second-stage Pricing Game

■ Handset firms: (indexed by *f*)

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{p}_f^{handset}} \pi_f^{handset}(\boldsymbol{p}_f^{handset}, \boldsymbol{p}_{-f}^{handset}, \boldsymbol{p}^{plan})$$

■ Carriers: (indexed by *c*)

Industry

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{p}_{c}^{plan}} \pi_{c}^{plan}(\boldsymbol{p}^{handset}, \boldsymbol{p}_{c}^{plan}, \boldsymbol{p}_{-c}^{plan})$$

■ Jio 2016Q3–2017Q1: a stand-alone plan (Jio 4G plan) and stand-alone handsets (under the brand name LYF)

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{p}_{\text{IVF}}^{\text{handset}}, p_{\text{lio}}^{\text{plan}}} \pi^{\text{plan}}(\boldsymbol{p}_{\text{LYF}}^{\text{handset}}, p_{\text{Jio}}^{\text{plan}}, \boldsymbol{p}_{-\text{LYF}}^{\text{handset}}, \boldsymbol{p}_{-\text{Jio}}^{\text{plan}}) + \pi^{\text{handset}}(.,,,.)$$

■ Jio 2017Q3–2018Q2: a stand-alone plan and bundles (Jiophones)

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{p}_{liophone}^{bundle}, p_{lio}^{plan}} \pi^{plan}(\boldsymbol{p}_{liophone}^{bundle}, \boldsymbol{p}_{lio}^{plan}, \boldsymbol{p}^{bundle}, \boldsymbol{p}_{-Jio}^{plan}) + \pi^{bundle}(.,.,.)$$

- First-stage product-choice game: handset firms choose handsets given the current network (i.e., available plans)
- Definition of potential products
 - a product = (handset firm, 3G/4G, quality index)

- Step 1. Define a grid of qualities: (min: gap: max)
- Step 2. Add qualities of observed products of the same origin and
- Step 3. Remove grid points close to observed qualities

- First-stage product-choice game: handset firms choose handsets given the current network (i.e., available plans)
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- Step 3. Remove grid points close to observed qualities

- Int'l 3G same potential products over time
 - min = $q_{3C} 0.1$, max = $\overline{q}_{3G,Int'1} + 0.1$
 - Empty from 2017Q2 on (one quarter after Int'l firms stopped selling 3G handsets in India)
- Indian 3G expanding potential products over time
 - $\min = q_{3C} 0.1$, $\max = \overline{q}_{3G.Indian.t} + 0.1$
- Int'l 4G expanding potential products over time
 - $\min = q_{AC} 0.1$, $\max = \overline{q}_{AG,Int/I,t} + 0.1$
 - (potential product set)_t = (potential product set)_{2013O1} for t < 2013Q1 (before 4G handsets
- Indian 4G expanding potential products over time
 - $\min = q_{AC} 0.1$, $\max = \overline{q}_{4G.Indian.t} + 0.1$
- Exogenous and fixed:
 - Apple handsets
 - IioPhone handsets



Definition of Potential Products (Cont.)

- Int'l 3G same potential products over time
 - min = \underline{q}_{3G} 0.1, max = $\overline{q}_{3G,Int'l}$ + 0.1
 - Empty from 2017Q2 on (one quarter after Int'l firms stopped selling 3G handsets in India)
- Indian 3G expanding potential products over time
 - $\min = q_{3C} 0.1$, $\max = \overline{q}_{3G.Indian.t} + 0.1$
- Int'l 4G expanding potential products over time
 - $\min = q_{AG} 0.1$, $\max = \overline{q}_{4G,Int'l,t} + 0.1$
 - (potential product set)_t = (potential product set)_{2013Q1} for t < 2013Q1 (before 4G handsets were sold in India)
- Indian 4G expanding potential products over time
 - $\min = q_{4G} 0.1$, $\max = \overline{q}_{4G,Indian,t} + 0.1$
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- Exogenous and fixed:
 - Apple handsets
 - IioPhone handsets



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JioPhone handsets



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- Exogenous and fixed:
 - Apple handsets

JioPhone handsets



Details on Estimating the Dynamic Network Expansion Game

■ 12 regions (66.8% of the total population): all 3 Metro regions, all 5 Category-A regions, and the 4 largest Category-B regions Delhi, Kolkata,

Mumbai (Metro), Andhra Pradesh & Telangana, Gujarat & Daman & Diu, Karnataka, Maharashtra & Goa, Tamil Nadu (A), Madhya Pradesh & Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh East, and West Bengal (B)

- Restrictions on action space consistent with the observed data
 - metro regions before other region categories
 - category-A or Category-B regions only after all Metro regions have at least one carrier
 - category-B regions only after all Metro regions and all Category-A regions have at least one carrier
 - no more than two Metro regions simultaneously, no more than three Category-A regions simultaneously, and no more than three Category-B regions simultaneously

Large action space:

- state variables: $\mathcal{R}_t = (\mathcal{R}_{1t}, ..., \mathcal{R}_{4t})$ and \mathcal{R}_{ct} is a subset of 12 regions
- there are $(2^{12})^3 \times 2$ possible values for \mathcal{R}_t
- Solution: following Sweeting (2013)
 - compute the value function on a subset of possible state variable values
 - approximate the value function at other state variable values with a linear function of some summary statistics of the state variables
 - lower-dimensional statistics: total market size of the category-g regions that carrier c has entered with its 4G network

	Est.	Std. Error
$\mathbb{1}(\text{Indian}) (\gamma_1)$	-1.31***	0.23
Quality (τ_0)	0.10***	0.02
Quality $\times \mathbb{1}(Indian) (\tau_1)$	0.16**	0.07
Time Trend $\times 1$ (Indian)	-0.05***	0.01
Time Trend $\times 1$ (International)	-0.04***	0.01
Jio First Year FE		Yes



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Jio First Year FE	Ŋ	Yes

Domestic cost advantage at producing lowquality handsets

	Est.	Std. Error	
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Jio First Year FE	Ţ	Yes	\
			\

Domestic cost advantage at producing lowquality handsets

But Indian firms' mc increase at a faster speed with quality

	Est.	Std. Error
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Time Trend $\times 1$ (International)	-0.04***	0.01
Jio First Year FE	Ţ	Yes

MC of producing handsets decreases over time

Estimation Results: Fixed Cost

■ For
$$j \in \mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)}$$
: $C_{jt} \leq \pi_{ft}^{(h)}(\mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)}, \mathcal{J}_{-ft}^{(h)}, ...) - \pi_{ft}^{(h)}(\mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)} \setminus j, \mathcal{J}_{-ft}^{(h)}, ...)$
For $j \notin \mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)}$: $C_{jt} \geq \pi_{ft}^{(h)}(\mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)} \cup j, \mathcal{J}_{-ft}^{(h)}, ...) - \pi_{ft}^{(h)}(\mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)}, \mathcal{J}_{-ft}^{(h)}, ...)$

■ FC:
$$C_{jt} = 0.8C_{jt}^{U}$$
 for $j \in \mathcal{J}_{t}^{(h)}$, $C_{jt} = 1.2C_{jt}^{L}$ for $j \notin \mathcal{J}_{t}^{(h)}$

■ Finding: cost advantages of int'l handset firms:

Origin	Low-Quality	Low-Medium	High-Medium	High-Quality
Indian	983	1458	-	~
International	544	1353	5003	5984



Estimation Results: Fixed Cost

■ For
$$j \in \mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)}$$
: $C_{jt} \leq \pi_{ft}^{(h)}(\mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)}, \mathcal{J}_{-ft}^{(h)}, ...) - \pi_{ft}^{(h)}(\mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)} \setminus j, \mathcal{J}_{-ft}^{(h)}, ...)$
For $j \notin \mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)}$: $C_{jt} \geq \pi_{ft}^{(h)}(\mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)} \cup j, \mathcal{J}_{-ft}^{(h)}, ...) - \pi_{ft}^{(h)}(\mathcal{J}_{ft}^{(h)}, \mathcal{J}_{-ft}^{(h)}, ...)$


■ FC:
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
Finding: cost advantages of int'l handset firms:

Median 4G Handset Fixed Cost (Million INR)


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




Plan Markups



4G Plan Markups



Estimation Results