


A Case Study of FULLMETAL's PyArmor Usage

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Quem sou eu?

- Analista de Malware @ Kroll Inc.
- Autor @ deobfuscation.club
- Bacharelado em Matemática.
- Software Protection, (De)Obfuscation, Program Analysis, Compilers.



Agenda

- **FULLMETAL STEALER**
- **PyArmor**
- **Patch no interpretador Python**
- **ELF**
- **Binary Ninja API**



Disclaimer



<https://cyber.wtf/>



01

FULLMETAL



FULLMETAL: Visão Geral


Vetor de Ataque

- Abuso de aplicações legítimas de manuseio de PDFs
- Comprometimento do “*updater*” da aplicação
- Segundo estágio codificado em base64
- *%TEMP%/pdf/file.bin*

Capacidades

- Stealer
- PyArmor
- Multi-arquitetura
- Detecção de ambiente virtual
- Interação com Browsers
- Interação com Cloud
- Persistencia Através de scheduled tasks

FULLMETAL: Corrente de Infecção



FULLMETAL: Payload Final

- Seção .rsrc contém o payload final
 - “CUSTOMDATA”
- Criptografado com uma cifra XOR.
- Arquivo com nome pseudo-randômico recebe o payload.
 - Similar a
%TEMP%\system26506a16168b4007c.exe
- Escreve o payload final em disco.

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```
if (temp_path != 0 && temp_path_len != 0) {  
    for (int32_t idx = 0; idx < 0x65; idx += 1) {  
        *(&some_buf + sx.q(idx)) = *(Resource + sx.q(idx)) ^ (  
            *"5e99ec07-5372-4105-9c27-8cccc50d38ff")[zx.q(modu.dp.d(  
                0:idx, _0x24))]  
        )  
    }  
    ...  
    fprintf(&temp_file_path, "%s\\system%da%db%dc", temp_path)  
    ...  
}
```

<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/6c2d8a47cbb42721bd7a6fc2ddcce705e9255596bdfc4b0829949bcfc262a4b1>



02

PyArmor



PyArmor: O que é?

Casos de Uso

- Proteger software
- Prevenir engenharia reversa
- “Vincular” o software a uma máquina específica
- Expiração ou Licenciamento de Software

Mecanismos de Proteção

- Packing
- Modo BCC
- Modo RFT
- Modo de assembler dinâmico
- Themida



PyArmor: Visão Geral

- **Packing**
 - Pyinstaller
- **Modo BCC**
 - “Transpila” código Python para código C
 - Compila para código nativo
 - Impossível de recuperar 100% o código ofuscado
 - Imports também podem ser protegidos com o modo BCC
- **Modo RFT**
 - Renomeia funções, métodos, classes, variáveis, argumentos e imports para nomes aleatórios
- **Modo de assembler dinâmico**
 - GNU lightning
 - Assembla dinamicamente código x86 para computar o IV do GCM
 - Aparece ser opcional, nem sempre aplicado
 - Pouca/Nenhuma pesquisa ou documentação até o momento



PyArmor: Packing

- **PyInstaller**

- Software open-source que agrupa uma aplicação Python e todas as suas dependências em um único pacote.
- Permite ao usuário rodar a aplicação sem a necessidade de ter o Python instalado.
- [pyinstxtractor-ng](#)
- Retorna um *.pyc



PyArmor: Packing

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```
(venv) C:\Users\User\Documents\py-armor_malw\pyinstxtractor-ng>pyinstxtractor_ng.py ..\system26506a16168b4007c
[+] Processing ..\system26506a16168b4007c
[+] Pyinstaller version: 2.1+
[+] Python version: 3.11
[+] Length of package: 19435493 bytes
[+] Found 115 files in CArchive
[+] Beginning extraction...please standby
[+] Possible entry point: pyiboot01_bootstrap.pyc
[+] Possible entry point: pyi_rth_inspect.pyc
[+] Possible entry point: pyi_rth_cryptography_openssl.pyc
[+] Possible entry point: pyi_rth_pkgutil.pyc
[+] Possible entry point: pyi_rth_pythoncom.pyc
[+] Possible entry point: pyi_rth_multiprocessing.pyc
[+] Possible entry point: pyi_rth_pywintypes.pyc
[+] Possible entry point: main.pyc
[+] Found 477 files in PYZ archive
[+] Successfully extracted pyinstaller archive: ..\system26506a16168b4007c
```

You can now use a python decompiler on the pyc files within the extracted directory

pyinstxtractor-ng output



PyArmor: Estrutura de Arquivos

- **main.pyc**
 - Bytecode compilado
- **pyarmor_runtime_00XXXX/**
 - pyarmor_runtime.pyd
 - Interpretador Python modificado pelo PyArmor
- ***.pyd**
 - 64-bit DLLs
- ***.pyz**
 - Zip com header que permite ser invocado por código
 - 7zip

Name	Date modified	Type	Size
certifi	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	File folder	
cryptography	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	File folder	
cryptography-42.0.8.dist-info	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	File folder	
tz4	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	File folder	
tz4-4.4.3.dist-info	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	File folder	
psutil	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	File folder	
pyarmor_runtime_00XXXX/	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	File folder	
Pythonwin	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	File folder	
pywin32_system32	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	File folder	
PYZ-00.pyz_extracted	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	File folder	
win32	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	File folder	
_asyncio.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	64 KB
_bz2.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	83 KB
_cffi_backend.cp311-win_amd64.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	174 KB
_ctypes.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	122 KB
_decimal.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	248 KB
_hashlib.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	64 KB
_lzma.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	156 KB
_multiprocessing.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	34 KB
_overlapped.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	51 KB
_queue.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	32 KB
_socket.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	78 KB
_sqlite3.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	118 KB
_ssl.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	173 KB
_uuid.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	25 KB
base_library.zip	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	WinRAR ZIP archive	1,409 KB
build.stamp	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	STAMP File	1 KB
default.sjson	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	JSON Source File	1 KB
libcrypto-3.dll	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Application exten...	5,071 KB
libffi-8.dll	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Application exten...	39 KB
libssl-3.dll	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Application exten...	769 KB
main.pyc	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Compiled Python ...	35 KB
pyexpat.pyd	4/24/2025 4:02 PM	Python Extension ...	194 KB



PyArmor: Python Bytecode

- Incompatível entre versões
 - dis
- Dependente do CPython
- Código da biblioteca “Marshal” frequentemente modificado
- 3 dados importantes em .pyc’s
 - Magic number de 4 bytes
 - Timestamp de 4 bytes
 - Código “marshalled”
- Magic number muda conforme o código de marshalling
- Timestamp baseado no “Unix timestamp” do arquivo original que gerou o .pyc
- Resto do arquivo semelhante ao output de “marshal.dumps”
- Marshal != Pickle



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From Flare-On 12's "project_chimera.py"

```
0      0 RESUME      0

...
8      34 LOAD_CONST      2 (b'c$|e+0>7&-6`m!Rzak~llE<snip>')
      36 STORE_NAME      4 (encoded_catalyst_strand)

10     38 PUSH_NULL
      40 LOAD_NAME      5 (print)
      42 LOAD_CONST      3 ('--- Calibrating Genetic Sequencer ---')
      44 CALL      1

11     54 PUSH_NULL
      56 LOAD_NAME      5 (print)
      58 LOAD_CONST      4 ('Decoding catalyst DNA strand...')
      60 CALL      1

12     70 PUSH_NULL
      72 LOAD_NAME      0 (base64)
      74 LOAD_ATTR      12 (FunctionType)
      84 CACHE
      86 CACHE
      88 CACHE
      90 CACHE
      92 CACHE
      94 LOAD_NAME      4 (encoded_catalyst_strand)
      96 CALL      1

13    106 PUSH_NULL
      108 LOAD_NAME      1 (zlib)
```

Flare-On's 12 "project_chimera" challenge



PyArmor: Python Bytecode

- **Alvo: 3.11**
 - Specialization
 - CACHE Instruction
- uncompyle6 ✕
 - ≤ 3.8
- decompyle3 ✕
 - ≥ 3.7
- pycdc ✓



PyArmor: Descompilação

```
from pyarmor_runtime_00XXXX import __pyarmor__  
__pyarmor__(__name__, __file__,  
b'PY00XXXX\x00\x03\x0b\x01\x00\x00\x00\x80\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00@x00  
\x00\x12\x89\x06\x00`\x1e\xf4\xad\xba\xb8\xc3\x85\xd9k\x85\x03`'\x80w\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x85!%  
\x91g\x98f\x8eg\xcd\x00\x16b\xfb\xb5+\xe1!\xae.\xd3\xa2  
\x86\x10\x01\xb5\xe1\xeb\x8f\xc2\xd2\xcedf\xd3t\xf5\x1a\x15\xb8\xa3\xd2r\x84\x96#\x93p\x1c\xdeq\xdf\xf6!\xc6\xf5  
\x01\xd9\xc0\x15\x91\x88I\xa3\x1d\xb0g\xff\x02:\xb8\xd9\xfd~ <snip>'
```

pycdc output



PyArmor: Descompilação

```
from pyarmor_runtime_00XXXX import __pyarmor__  
__pyarmor__(__name__, __file__,  
b'PY00XXXX\x00\x03\x0b\x01\x00\x00\x00\x80\x00\x01\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00@ \x00  
\x00\x12\x89\x06\x00 \x1e\xff\xad\xba\xb8\xc3\x85\xd9k\x85\x03'\x80w\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x85!%  
\x91g\x98f\x8eg\xcud\x00\x16b\xfb\xb5+\xe1!\xae.\xd3\xa2  
\x86\x10\x01\xb5\xe1xeb\x8f\xc2\xd2\xcedf\xd3t\xf5\x1a\x15\xb8\xa3\xd2r\x84\x96#\x93p\x1c\xdeg\xd\xff!\xc6\xff  
\x01\xd9\xc0\x15\x91\x88I\xxa3\x1d\xb0g\xff\x02:\x8b\xd9\xfd~ <snip>'
```

Module Magic	.pyc Magic	Ciphertext Size	Fake IV Bytes
Major Version	Protection Type	IV Bytes [0:4]	IV Bytes [4:12]
Minor Version	Ciphertext Offset	GCM Applied? Any of the bits being 1: yes	



PyArmor: Key Derivation

- **MD5 + XOR**
 - pyarmor-vax-XXXX\x00\x00
 - RSA key
- ida_getkey.py - GDATA
- bn_getkey.py

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[ScriptingProvider] bn_getkey.py:

[ScriptingProvider] 2c4bab68aebb4497fe9c5e44af23360f

bn_getkey.py output




PyArmor: Descriptografia

- decrypt_gcm.py
 - .dec
 - .dec.elf
- Docker com interpretador modificado (GDATA)
 - 3.12 ✕



PyArmor: Marshal

- Importa apenas *PyMarshal_WriteObjectToString*
- *PyMarshal_ReadObjectFromString* não é importado
 - Implementação própria
- Específico para a versão
- Modifica como “code objects” são lidos



Binary Ninja “Symbols” tab



03

3.11 PATCH



ok ima fight



```
from pytransform import pyarmor  
pyarmor(__name__, __file__, b'\\x50\\x59\\x41\\x52\\x4d\\x4f\\x52\\x00'  
\\x41\\xf9\\xa3\\x0d\\xb3\\x55\\x00\\x05\\x2c\\x17\\xc4\\x40\\xf8', 2)
```

damn

got hands

PyObject* r_object(struct RFILE* p)



3.11 Patch: Mudanças

- Specialization ✕
- CACHE ✕
- marshal.c - L1504



3.11 Patch: r_object

- Responsável pela “desmarshalização”
 - Marshal format → Python Object
- Tipo de “desmarshalização” controlado pela “type” flag do retorno de r_byte()
- Retorna PyObject *

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```
#define FLAG_REF                '\x80' (1000 0000) (MSB)
static PyObject* r_object(RFILE *p) {
    ...
    // r_byte() le o primeiro byte de "RFILE *p"
    int type, code = r_byte(p);
    ...
    type = code & ~FLAG_REF;
    switch (type) {
        ...
    }
}
```

<https://github.com/python/cpython/blob/c4ccaf4b1051b3c1ae0138a9c92657606f578fbd/Python/marshal.c#L1160>



3.11 Patch: r_object

- `r_byte()` inlined
- Bitwise AND para/com a “BCC Flag”
 - `0x20000000`
- Bytes adicionais são lidos antes do “code object”
 - específicos para uso do modo BCC

```
○○○  
  
// PyObject* r_object(struct RFILE* p) @ 655c9cf0  
// Logic @ 655cb9c3  
  
#define TYPE_CODE 'c'  
...  
  
switch ( type )  
...  
    case TYPE_CODE:  
        ...  
        if ((flags & 0x20000000) != 0) {  
            char* ptr_3 = p->ptr  
            uint32_t rax_142  
  
            if (ptr_3 == 0) {  
                if (p->readable == 0) {  
                    rax_142 = getc(_Stream: p->fp)  
  
                    if (rax_142 != 0xffffffff) {  
                        goto dealloc_chain  
                    }  
  
                    PyErr_SetString(PyExc_EOFError, "EOF read where object expected")  
                    result_2 = nullptr  
                } else {  
                    char* rax_148 = r_byte(1, p)  
  
                    if (rax_148 != 0) {  
                        rax_142 = zx.d(*rax_148)  
                        goto dealloc_chain  
                    }  
                }  
            }  
        }  
        ...
```

Pyarmor_runtime_.pyd.bndb @ 655cb9c3



```

56 diff --git a/Python/marshal.c b/Python/marshal.c
57 index 29f3bab..8a867db 100644
58 --- a/Python/marshal.c
59 +++ b/Python/marshal.c
60 @@ -1365,6 +1365,7 @@ r_object(RFILE *p)
61     PyObject *code = NULL;
62     PyObject *consts = NULL;
63     PyObject *names = NULL;
64 +     PyObject *pyarmor_data = NULL;
65     PyObject *localsplusnames = NULL;
66     PyObject *localspluskinds = NULL;
67     PyObject *filename = NULL;
68 @@ -1431,6 +1432,15 @@ r_object(RFILE *p)
69     if (exceptiontable == NULL)
70         goto code_error;
71
72 +     if ((flags & 0x20000000) != 0) {
73 +         int armor_len = r_byte(p);
74 +         if (armor_len) {
75 +             const char *extradata = r_string(armor_len, p);
76 +             printf("Got pyarmor-specific data of length %d\n", armor_len);
77 +             pyarmor_data = PyBytes_FromStringAndSize(extradata, armor_len);
78 +         }
79 +     }
80 +
81     struct _PyCodeConstructor con = {
82         .filename = filename,
83         .name = name,
84 @@ -1443,6 +1453,7 @@ r_object(RFILE *p)
85
86         .consts = consts,
87         .names = names,
88 +         .pyarmor_data = pyarmor_data,
89
90         .localsplusnames = localsplusnames,
91         .localspluskinds = localspluskinds,
92 @@ -1475,6 +1486,7 @@ r_object(RFILE *p)
93     Py_XDECREF(code);
94     Py_XDECREF(consts);
95     Py_XDECREF(names);
96 +     Py_XDECREF(pyarmor_data);

```

<https://github.com/GDATAAdvancedAnalytics/Pyarmor-Tooling/blob/main/py311/armor-marshal-311.patch>



3.11 Patch: Docker

- **Interpretador patcheado**
 - `git clone --branch 3.11 https://github.com/python/cpython.git`
 - `cd cpython`
 - `patch -p1 -i ./armor-marshall-311.patch`
 - `./configure && make regen-all`
- **Analyze crypted code.py**
 - Descreve como descriptografar code objects individuais
 - `in *.py.dec`
 - `out *.py.dec2`



3.11 Patch: Docker

- decrypt gcm.py
 - in *.py.dec2
 - out *.py.dec2 (descriptografado)
- disassemble.py

```
>>> dis.dis(pyarmor_malware)
Got pyarmor specific data of length 8
Got pyarmor specific data of length 8
Got pyarmor specific data of length 8
Got pyarmor specific data of length 8
Got pyarmor specific data of length 12
0      0 NOP

1      2 NOP
      4 PUSH_NULL
      6 LOAD_CONST          1 ('__pyarmor_enter_54443__')

2      8 LOAD_CONST          2
(b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00
\x8c\x02\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00')
     10 BUILD_TUPLE          1
     12 CALL_FUNCTION_EX     0
     14 POP_TOP
     16 RESUME               0
     18 JUMP_FORWARD         4 (to 28)
     20 BUILD_TUPLE          1
     22 CALL_FUNCTION_EX     0
     24 POP_TOP
     26 RETURN_VALUE

>> 28 NOP
     30 NOP

1      32 NOP

4      34 LOAD_CONST          3 (0)
     36 LOAD_CONST          4 (('xtsbkayardnvoilxnzyk',))
     38 IMPORT_NAME          1 (vpjlhxxhakszessmqtxe)
     40 IMPORT_FROM          2 (xtsbkayardnvoilxnzyk)
     42 STORE_NAME           2 (xtsbkayardnvoilxnzyk)
     44 POP_TOP

6      46 LOAD_CONST          3 (0)
     48 LOAD_CONST          5 (None)
     50 IMPORT_NAME          1 (vpjlhxxhakszessmqtxe)
     52 STORE_NAME           1 (vpjlhxxhakszessmqtxe)
```

Disassembled malware bytecode



04

ELF



ELF: Visão Geral

- Bytecode constantemente invoca metodos do ELF
 - `__pyarmor_bcc_54441__`
 - `__pyarmor_bcc_54442__`
 - ...
- Maioria das capacidades maliciosas do malware
 - Chama Imports
 - Sincroniza com a nuvem
 - Checa os argumentos do programa
- Imports também são protegidos com o modo BCC

```
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
00000000 7F 45 4C 46 02 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ELF.....
00000010 01 00 3E 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .>.....
00000020 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  @.....X.....
00000030 00 00 00 00 40 00 38 00 01 00 40 00 04 00 03 01  ...@.8...@.....
00000040 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....@.....
00000050 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000060 90 76 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 76 00 00 00 00 00 00  .V.....V.....
00000070 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  .....
00000080 06 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 01 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000090 80 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 89 74 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....t.....
000000A0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
000000B0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 30 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  .....0.....
000000C0 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 76 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....v.....
000000D0 10 76 00 00 00 00 00 00 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .V.....H.....
000000E0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
000000F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 05 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  .....
00000100 32 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 76 00 00 00 00 00 00  2.....`v.....
00000110 60 76 00 00 00 00 00 00 28 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  `v.....(.....
00000120 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000130 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 22 00 00 00 01 00 00 00  .....
00000140 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 76 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....v.....
00000150 90 76 00 00 00 00 00 00 A0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .V.....
00000160 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000170 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000180 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 56 57 55 53 48 81 EC 88  AWAVAUATVWUSH...
00000190 01 00 00 0F 29 B4 24 70 01 00 00 48 89 CF 48 8B  ....).$p...H..H.
000001A0 05 68 74 00 00 48 8D 8C 24 80 00 00 31 F6 31  .kt..H..$....1.1
main.py.dec.elf                                NORMAL ----- ELF 00000000 0%
```

1b360e4bd684c17dabea80d71888144e98407c682aac3e63d4ea0695c53966b0





Import Identifier	Capability	Constants
fbeykubgdfxnhsakoxq	Imports platform, system, and Windows	None
fjbfxiomqcuhragobfh	Detects MS Edge	detect
gdgwwyizgdsngwpfwfzy	Decrypts MS Edge data	edge_get_user_private_key, edge_calculate_verify, decrypt_local, decrypt_cloud
gdtwzxiypsoswtttbxt	Detects EdgeDev	edgedev
gjjgsfyiguydxavsueew	Detects ChromeCanary	detect
hpdixsgpnfynxvtyjvvp	Detects Brave	detect
idrzptmdyrzxvgugjql	Enumerate processes, enumerate windows, keylogging, OSAScript (macOS targets) execution	is_app_open, process_has_windows, psutil, process_iter, find_processes, kill, GetWindowText, sleep, WM_KEYDOWN, EnumWindows, osascript -e 'quit app \", system_on_osx
onzyiyaffyfphhzhkati	Unknown (maybe re-import)	system_on_osx
phdwsjcemknnkstgfynz	Detects EdgeSXS	detect
ssketngoynayogyqyamp	Detects Firefox	detect
vkjzrrhfvpcwcjcjeorb	Parse .pak files	parse_pak_v5, pak path not found:, BROWSER_T00_OLD
wrmzcuabpkajuwcgyqx	Detects ChromeDev	detect
xtsbkayardnvoilxnzyk	Detects Chrome	detect
zcxjqbccwrnfrjwphuyk	Decrypt Chrome data	ChromeRegistryHashStoreValidationSeed, calculate_hmac, clean_json, keys, secret, b64encode, decode



ELF: BCC

- **Memória *RWX* alocada em tempo de execução**
 - *VirtualAlloc*
 - Tamanho do ELF
- **Mapeamento de como patchear o objeto de código sendo lido**
 - *co_consts*
 - Métodos nativos injetados
- **Constante patcheada torna-se PyCMethod**
- **PyCMethod(PyObject *self) ✗**
- **PyCMethod(co->co_consts) ✓**
 - *(None, '__pyarmor_bcc_54440__', ('sys', 'exit'))*



ELF: Ferramentas BCC

- Bcc info.py
 - *.elf.json
- IDA-centricas ✗
- Binary Ninja ✓
 - Lê o JSON (offsets, nomes, consts)
 - Acha o ponteiro para constantes
 - $r12 = *(arg1 + (sx.q(*(arg1 + 0x10)) << 3) + 0x10)$
 - Acha “aliases” ao ponteiro (*r12*)
 - Percorre a AST “HLIL”
 - Mapeia Offset → Index da constante → Adiciona o comentário



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```
2025-12-04 17:19:35,479 - INFO - Offset: 0x140, Name: bcc_41_main, Constants: 109
2025-12-04 17:19:35,480 - INFO - Function already exists at 0x140, renaming to 'bcc_41_main'
2025-12-04 17:19:35,481 - INFO - Found consts pointer identifier void* r12 = *(rdi_1 + (sx.q(*(rdi_1 + 0x10)) << 3) + 0x10)
2025-12-04 17:19:35,482 - INFO - Found XRefs: [<ref: x86_64@0x193, hlil@6>, <ref: x86_64@0x198, hlil@7>, <ref: x86_64@0x1a0, hlil@8>,
<ref: x86_64@0x1e3, hlil@19>, <ref: x86_64@0x221, hlil@25>, <ref: x86_64@0x2cc, hlil@37>, <ref: x86_64@0x88b, hlil@44>, ...]
2025-12-04 17:19:35,488 - INFO -
Alias Mapping Results:
2025-12-04 17:19:35,488 - INFO - 576460751984656472 -> 1729382257025613907
2025-12-04 17:19:35,488 - INFO - 576460751934325132 -> 1729382257025613907
2025-12-04 17:19:35,650 - INFO - Added comment 'browsers' at 0x3137
2025-12-04 17:19:35,652 - INFO - Added comment 'browser_whitelist' at 0x31a9
2025-12-04 17:19:35,653 - INFO - Added comment 'browsers' at 0x346f
2025-12-04 17:19:35,654 - INFO - Added comment 'browsers' at 0x31da
2025-12-04 17:19:35,656 - INFO - Added comment 'split' at 0x34aa
2025-12-04 17:19:35,657 - INFO - Added comment ',' at 0x3508
2025-12-04 17:19:35,660 - INFO - Added comment 'platform' at 0x35b2
2025-12-04 17:19:35,661 - INFO - Added comment 'detect_vm' at 0x35f7
2025-12-04 17:19:35,670 - INFO - Added comment 'VM_DETECTED' at 0x3bb1
...
2025-12-04 17:19:35,766 - INFO - Added comment 'vpjlhxxhakszessmqtxe' at 0x501d
2025-12-04 17:19:35,779 - INFO - Added comment 'xtsbkayardnvoilxnzyk' at 0x5122
2025-12-04 17:19:35,780 - INFO - Added comment 'Chrome' at 0x5174
2025-12-04 17:19:35,782 - INFO - Added comment '../testfiles/1.txt.out' at 0x51d1
2025-12-04 17:19:35,783 - INFO - Added comment '/Applications/Google Chrome Canary.app/Contents/Frameworks/Google Chrome
Framework.framework/Versions/Current/Resources/resources.pak' at 0x51e5
...
2025-12-04 17:19:36,162 - INFO - Added comment 'is_cloud_mode' at 0xad5
2025-12-04 17:19:36,165 - INFO - Added comment 'None' at 0xcc8
2025-12-04 17:19:36,167 - INFO - Added comment 'sync_cloud_config' at 0xdab
...
2025-12-04 17:19:36,739 - INFO - Added comment 'do_persistence' at 0x470e
2025-12-04 17:19:36,779 - INFO - Added comment 'has_sufficient_privileges' at 0x40ed
2025-12-04 17:19:36,873 - INFO - Added comment 'safetorun' at 0x52f
2025-12-04 17:20:18,570 - INFO - Added comment 'is_mdm' at 0x3a7e
2025-12-04 17:20:18,771 - INFO - Added 18043 comments to function at 0x140
```



```
int32_t* bcc_41_main(int64_t arg1, int64_t arg2, int64_t arg3, int64_t arg4, int512_t arg5 @ zmm0, int512_t arg6 @ zmm1, int512_t arg7 @ zmm2, int512_t arg8 @ zmm3, int512_t arg9 @ zmm4, int512_t arg10 @ zmm5, int128_t arg11 @ zmm6)
```

ELF's "bcc_41_main" subroutine

05

Binary Ninja API



Binary Ninja API: Iterar as sobre as instruções de um bloco

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```
# func = current_function |  
# for fun in bv.functions:  
  
for block in func.hlil#mlil|llil:  
    for instr in block:  
        #dosomething
```



Binary Ninja API: Pattern Matching

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```
# MLIL
match inst:
    case MediumLevelILSetVar():
        ...
    case MediumLevelILAdd() | MediumLevelILSub():
        # Extraímos o "source operand". Dest seria rhs = inst.detailed_operands[1][1]
        for side in (rhs.left, rhs.right):
            # Ha algum imm na instrucao?
            if side.operation == MediumLevelILOperation.MLIL_CONST:
                ...
            # Ha algum load r/m8/16/32/64? Se sim, eh um ponteiro?
            elif (isinstance(side, MediumLevelILLoad) and
                  side.src.operation == MediumLevelILOperation.MLIL_CONST_PTR):
                ...

# HLIL
# Checagem se a variavel eh a dereferencia de uma outra variavel + offset
if (type(expr) == HighLevelILDeref and
    type(expr.src) == HighLevelILAdd and
    type(expr.src.left) == HighLevelILVar and
    type(expr.src.right) == HighLevelILConst):
    ...
```



Binary Ninja API: XREFs de uma variável

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```
# Nossa variavel-alvo
target_var = hlil_instr.operands[0]
refs = self.func.get_hlil_var_refs(target_var)
for ref in refs:
    # variaveis (objeto) que referenciam nossa variavel-alvo
    ref_dest = ref.func.hlil[ref.expr_id].operands[0]
    ref_src = ref.func.hlil[ref.expr_id].operands[1]
```



Binary Ninja API: Dereferenciar um endereço

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```
def deref(addr, size):  
    data = bv.read(addr, size)  
    if not data:  
        return None  
    return int.from_bytes(data, "little")
```



Binary Ninja API: Comentar em um endereço

○ ○ ○

```
func.set_comment_at(addr, comment)
```



Binary Ninja API: Snippets



<https://gist.github.com/psifertex/6fbc7532f536775194edd26290892ef7>



Obrigado!

github.com/estr3llas

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