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Among the direct or indirect gains of this kind for us have been the whaling grounds of the north-east and the fisheries of Behring Strait, a region rendered safe by the voyage and charts of the *Vincennes*, the explorations of the Coast Survey, and latest by the *Corwin* and the Signal Service. Alaska is now attracting immigration; but its shores seemed forbidding in the extreme before the surveys of Rodgers and the trial observations of Dall and others were charted for the guidance of the mariner. The increasing returns to the Government and to the merchant from the fur seal and the otter have shown the wisdom of the purchase.

Still higher results are associated with the hydrography of the great oceans; the observations needed for the further knowledge of the laws governing the origin and the course of storms; and magnetism, with its relation to the compass, the telegraph, and the telephone. "We shall never accurately know," says the President of our own Geographical Society, "the laws of aerial and oceanic currents, unless we know more about what takes place in the Arctic Circle."

Such research was made the special object of the stations at Point Barrow and Fort Conger. The chief of the Signal Service had justly reported that "the study of the weather maps of England and America cannot be fully prosecuted without filling up the blank of the Arctic region"; and among the results to be expected from the colony at Lady Franklin Bay, the act making the appropriations recited "a more accurate knowledge of the conditions which govern the origin and paths of the storms, the descent of polar waves of unusual cold, and *uncertain movements in the Atlantic*." The instructions of the Signal Service and the Coast Survey have now been carried out by continuous observations at Ooglamie during two years, and at Lady Franklin Bay for a yet longer period. A casual inspection, courteously permitted, of Ray's reports warrants an expectation of results of much practical value. They include, among many points of interest, long-continued observations of the temperature of the earth at great depths, and of the waters on the shores of the great ocean, with hourly observations of the magnetic force and dip, a reverse of the usual experience of these being observed in the increased force and dip at Ooglamie during the *morning* hours and a decrease in the afternoon. Ray's magnetic work, discussed by Mr. C. A. Schott of the Coast and Geodetic survey,—the same officer who discussed Kane's and Hayes's,—will form Appendix 13 of the Coast Survey report of 1882; the whole work at Ooglamie making a full quarto volume.

Of the labors of the party at Fort Conger it were premature to speak as yet with fullness; but enough has been reported by Lieut. Greely to warrant the expectation at the Signal Office that the observations and the topographical work of Lockwood at this point, north of other expeditions, will develop themselves, when reduced, with a completeness and scope in advance of what has ever been attained before. The party were well housed for more than two summers, and were supplied with instruments such as neither Kane nor Hayes could in their day secure. When Ray's and Greely's observations shall have been placed with those received from the other thirteen stations of the Arctic, they will form a full link in the series of

synchronous observations thus carried on for the first time around the northern zone.

If such investigations are worth pursuing, if the existing relations between all branches of science and between the individual facts of each be admitted, Arctic exploration will not be soon abandoned—not until the problems referred to are fully solved. Let such as henceforth go to the ice zones depend on native help more largely than in the past; two Esquimaux to every three or four white men, at least. Natives alone can provide sustenance in the extremities of want; they alone improvise the snow hut and capture the seal and the walrus. They saved Hall and the party of Tyson's ice-floe; they would have saved Franklin, and I believe would have preserved the Greely party also.

J. E. Nourse.

The Bombardment of Alexandria.

REJOINDER BY STONE PASHA.

FLUSHING, L. I., August, 1884.

I HAVE read in THE CENTURY for August an open letter signed "C. F. Goodrich, Lieutenant-Commander U. S. N.," in which he discusses a letter of my own that appeared in the June CENTURY as an introduction to the "Diary of an American Girl in Cairo during the War of 1882."

Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich, over his official signature as an officer of the United States Navy, comes into print, "very reluctantly," to prevent the evil which might result from the promulgation of my opinion expressed in the introductory letter above referred to, *because*, as he writes, "this opinion involves serious charges against the British Government, as represented by its diplomatic and naval officers in Egypt." He says his observations lead him "to conclusions opposed to those advanced by Stone Pasha."

If the gallant officer finds it his duty, or his pleasure, to make himself, over his official signature as an officer of the United States Navy, the defender of the proceedings of the British Government in Egypt, it is no affair of mine. It is a matter for his own intelligence and taste to decide. But if in the discharge of his self-imposed duty he permits himself to make an utterly unprovoked attack upon me, who never attacked him, if he permits himself to misquote my written words and to misstate facts in reference to my own personal action in the management of my family, then he makes his paper my business. These things he has permitted himself to do.

He commences his open letter by giving several good reasons why my opinions should be respected. Then he gives the reasons why his own opinions should be respected. These latter are, to use his own words, as follows: "I happened to be in Alexandria prior to and during the bombardment, and afterward was accredited to Lord Wolseley's staff as military and naval *attaché*."

I was aware that he was, for a few days prior to the bombardment, on board a man-of-war in the harbor of Alexandria; but I seriously doubt his having been, during the bombardment, either in Alexandria or even in its harbor. He was, I believe, and his own letter would seem to indicate it, outside the bombard-

ing fleet during that time, and he can know only by hearsay what occurred in the bombarded town. Shortly after the bombardment, I think, the ship to which he was attached left the harbor of Alexandria for Europe, and it was not until a late day in the campaign of Tel-el-Kebir that he returned to Egypt to join General Sir Garnet Wolseley as American *attaché* to the British staff. There all his associations were with the British, and never with the people of the country. His total residence in Egypt in 1882 could hardly have been three months, and his sources of information were almost purely British.

Commander Goodrich expresses the opinion that "the bombardment should, logically, have taken place immediately after" the occurrences of June 11, 1882. See how widely we differ. My deliberate opinion is that had the guns of the British fleet bombarded Alexandria immediately after June 11, 1882, Egyptians to the number of many hundreds would have perished in addition to the hundreds who perished on that day; and that Europeans, many thousands in number, would have perished in Alexandria and in the interior of the country. The Egyptian story of that day, June 11, 1882, has never yet been told in print; or, at least, I have never seen it in print; but a careful reading of the British Government papers, in the Blue Book, will give one some indication of what the feeling was. Had not cool heads then prevented hasty action on the part of the British fleet, frightful disaster would, in my opinion, have followed.

His attack on me for not doing what *then seemed to him*, and now seems to *him*, my duty to my family, while it appears to me, in the words used, far to exceed in arrogance and rudeness the limits of gentlemanly discussion, hardly requires a serious answer from me, since he himself furnishes the answer. He knew nothing of any peculiar circumstances which might exist in my family in Cairo, whom he at that time, I think, had never seen. He knew nothing of my peculiar official responsibilities to the sovereign and Government of Egypt; he knew nothing of any special negotiations going on at the Court of the Khédive; while I, as he himself writes, "reached a solution of the problem in singularly full acquaintance with all the elements which entered into it." I thought that I was fully acquainted with all the elements which entered into the problem, a problem of vast importance to me, for it was *my* family whose welfare was at stake, and not that of Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich; and I probably gave more serious thought to it each hour than that gallant officer has in all his life. Knowing, as I did, the letter of the British Admiral addressed to the military commander of Alexandria, which Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich quotes; knowing, as I did, the answer to that letter, which he *does not* quote; knowing the action taken by the diplomatic agents of European powers other than the British; knowing some of the diplomatic steps taken by the Ottoman Sultan (possibly the archives of the Department of State of the United States may contain valuable information on the subject); knowing that many thousands of Europeans were still in the interior, among them French, German, and Italian employees of the Egyptian civil administration *under the direction of British chiefs of administration*, not then gathered together and brought to a place of safety (the chiefs,

it is true, were all on the coast and ready to embark);—knowing all this, and much more, while believing from the actions of the British Admiral that he would finally bombard the forts and batteries of Alexandria, making a pretext if he could not find one, *unless prevented by mediation* or other action of foreign powers,—which seemed to me more than possible, from some proceedings which were known to me,—yet I could not conceive it possible he would proclaim bombardment on so short notice that it would be impossible to transfer to the coast the mass of foreign residents in the interior. Notice which would have been sufficient for the thousands of others, would have been more than sufficient for me. On the other hand, had I, the senior general officer in the service of the Khédive, *prematurely* ordered the flight of my family, I, whose duty it was to do all for his service, would have created a panic which could not have failed at that time seriously to complicate the negotiations. If the Lieutenant-Commander cannot understand how a sense of duty to a government one is serving in a military capacity, can weigh upon one, I am sure that most of his comrades in the United States navy can do so, and that most of my old comrades of the army can.

Forty-eight hours from any *noon* would have sufficed to bring the mass of Europeans to the sea-coast; twenty-four hours' notice given at an *evening hour*, after the departure of the six o'clock train, was mere mockery. The difference was between *one* regular train, starting to arrive late, and *eight* regular trains, starting in time to arrive in season. Had forty-eight hours from the *noon* of any day been given, *eight thousand* Europeans might have been, and would have been, transported to a place of safety before the commencement of fire. Had forty-eight hours' notice been given, there would have been no massacre of European men, women, and children at Tantah or Calicoub; and the brave French and Italian inspectors with their families at Mehallet-el-Kebir could have been with their English chief in safety on board a ship of refuge, instead of being left to the fate of having their quivering flesh thrown to the dogs in the streets!

The flimsy argument that any preparation during an extra twenty-four hours in the batteries of Alexandria might have endangered the chances of the splendid iron-clad fleet of Great Britain is an insult to the British navy. Not only this, but the documents published in the British Blue Book prove that the Egyptian Government, far from making new and formidable preparations during the twenty-four hours allowed, formally offered, in order to induce the British Admiral to abstain from bombardment, to dismount three of the guns then in position.

Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich states that Stone Pasha advances a new doctrine in reference to giving delay in bombardment for the purpose of allowing the escape of neutrals. I think not. And if I were the first to enunciate a principle like this, that in civilized warfare neutrals in the position of the Europeans then in Egypt, no war having been declared, should not be subjected to unnecessary danger, I would be neither afraid nor ashamed to declare and defend the doctrine on sound principles of the law of nations and the existing laws of war.

Public opinion in England has gone much further than I in this matter when *another nation* was the

actor in bombardment. Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich is too young to remember, but he may have read, what a storm of denunciation was poured out by the English press when an American fleet and an American army gave formal notice of bombardment to a walled city with a supporting castle, some thirty-seven years and more ago. In that case active war had been going on for nearly a year, and the investment of the place had been going on for more than ten days; and the only Europeans, neutrals, who could be endangered were those actually within the place itself, from which they could have come out on the appearance of the investing force or at any time during the investment. If the delay allowed in that instance was, according to British opinion, too short for a civilized army and navy to grant, what must one say of the shorter time accorded at Alexandria, where war had not even been declared, and where the danger of the neutrals, who were perhaps a hundred fold more numerous, was so fearfully aggravated? It is true that in the case of Vera Cruz the attacking force was American, and not English, and that circumstance may make a very considerable difference in the judgment of some.

Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich permits himself strangely to misstate my letter in one point, when he writes that I "decided that the discomfort of a crowded train was more to be dreaded than the dangers he [I] describes as the inevitable sequence of a bombardment." What I did write is, as can be seen in THE CENTURY for June:

"I felt that four ladies struggling in a railway station for place, in the midst of a crowd of panic-stricken Europeans, would have but small chance; and even should they succeed in securing places in the railway carriages, it was more than probable that they would be turned out at some point of the road to make place for soldiers on their way to the threatened city."

This sentence conveys to my mind a horror which can hardly be compared to the "*discomfort of a crowded train.*" I imagine that almost any man, not excepting the Lieutenant-Commander, would have had, in the case of his own family, much the same feeling.

He makes the extraordinary statement that the ships of refuge, after leaving the harbor of Alexandria on the 10th of July, were, with the exception of a pull of three miles in a man-of-war's boats, "precisely as accessible as the day previous." If such was the case, how did it happen that, in fact, the European families which arrived by the train from Cairo on the afternoon of the 10th, failed to reach the ships of refuge? They arrived in Alexandria in safety, which to me was a cause of wonderment; but they could not, even by the offer of large sums of money, procure transportation from the shore to the ships. Notwithstanding the strenuous efforts made by them to do so, they were, the most of them, forced to remain in Alexandria throughout the bombardment and the scenes of conflagration and pillage which followed, during which time no prompt landing of marines or sailors was made to arrest either. I myself saw in the afternoon of the 11th some of those European ladies and children in the house where they had taken refuge, near the great square, and a shell from the fleet had burst in the court-yard of that house during their occupancy of it. I saw them rescued from the fire after they had been defended by brave

Frenchmen from outrage and pillage, and I hope that the family of no one who may read these lines may ever be in so pitiable a condition. These were the fortunate ones, who were finally rescued. Of the others, perhaps the less said of the manner of their going out the better. These were some of the occupants of "the crowded train," which the Lieutenant-Commander professes to think I should have caused my family to take.

As for the slur cast by the Lieutenant-Commander on the governments of all other nations excepting that of Great Britain, that they are less solicitous than it for the welfare of their citizens, I can say that in the case of Alexandria in July, 1882, it is unmerited. America, Austria, Greece, Italy, Russia, and Spain, as well as France, all sent ships of war to afford protection, and all who had large numbers of their nationality in the country sent transports to carry their citizens to a place of safety. The four United States ships of war received all American citizens who presented themselves, and the admiral and the commanders of the three corvettes made place on their ships for many of other nationalities. But sufficient time, by official notice to the representatives of the foreign powers, *was not given* by the British authorities. It is idle to try to make it appear that it was.

Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich states that he does not think it can be shown that hundreds of Egyptian women and children perished in the bombardment, and in the panic-flight from the hastily bombarded town, "as Stone Pasha states." I think that it can and will be shown.

He states that the history of June 11, 1882, has not been written as ~~yet~~. Here we agree perfectly, if he means by his words a correct and impartial history. A strong endeavor has been made, however, by British writers to forestall that history. When the true history shall be written, it may not appear to the world as it has while only one side has had speech and pen.

He states that care was taken on July 11 to spare the town as much as possible. I have no doubt that such orders were given, and have no more doubt that the commanders of the British war-vessels generally did their best to comply with such orders as far as they could, while carrying out their orders to destroy the batteries. But as the town lay behind the batteries, and as accurate fire from a floating gun is not possible when there is any sea or swell, and as the guns used were among the heaviest and most powerful known, it was impossible that the town should not suffer very considerably. And it did so. When projectiles weighing a ton or thereabouts happen to pass through a dwelling-house, they often cause loss of life and limb; and the British shells of July 11 were no exceptions to the general rule. When Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich returned to Alexandria after the bombardment, many houses which had been struck by shells had afterward been burned down; and he could not judge fairly of what the shell-practice had done before the conflagration.

I passed through the town late in the afternoon of the day of bombardment, and noted as well as was practicable the effect of the shot upon it. Considering the number of shells which had fallen in the town, I was surprised that greater damage had not been caused. This small damage resulted from the fact

that a large number of the heaviest shells did not explode. At daybreak on the following morning I visited the barracks and the batteries on the north side, observed their condition and that of the men occupying them, and took reports as to the number of killed in each one.

I next visited the hospitals, examined, conversed with, and counted the wounded, did all in my power to have them cared for, and then went to the Prefecture of Police, where I received reports of the cases of death among the citizens which had been reported there. That day I saw the momentary renewal of bombardment, and saw the commencement of the panic-flight from the city. Crowds of women of all classes of society were rushing forth into the open country outside, the greater number carrying each a small child and conducting other children; these, with old men who had hardly strength and activity to make their way, and young, strong, and fierce men, carrying, some of them, what they could of their household goods or of plunder, made up a scene which one would never wish to see again.

It was from such personal observations, and from the reports received the following morning of what had been the scenes of starvation, exposure, and outrage during the night, and from trustworthy reports of what happened later on, that I formed the opinion expressed in my letter, that "hundreds of Egyptian women and children perished in the bombardment and in the panic-flight" which accompanied and followed it. I now repeat the statement, and am quite sure that it will never be overthrown by the results of impartial investigation. If it could be proved that less suffering and destruction of life occurred among those unfortunate people, I should be quite as well pleased as any one.

Charles P. Stone.

COMMENT ON COMMANDER GOODRICH'S LETTER, BY THE
COMMANDER OF THE GALENA.

IN THE CENTURY for August Lieutenant-Commander (now Commander) Goodrich, U. S. N., replies to a letter of Stone Pasha published in THE CENTURY for June, regarding events in Egypt in 1882. In so doing he has himself fallen into errors, both directly and by implication, which I take the liberty of pointing out; this I do without hesitation, knowing that Commander Goodrich desires to be severely accurate in his statements.

Stone Pasha speaks of the event which took place at Alexandria on the 11th of June as "the so-called 'massacre.'" Commander Goodrich speaks of it in one place as "the massacre," and in another place he says: "Those who witnessed the events of that day, and escaped with their lives, will find difficulty in reading with composure that they only beheld a so-called massacre."

I had the misfortune to witness a part of the affair, and I prefer to speak of it as a riot, for reasons which will appear later. In alluding to this event, Commander Goodrich says: "The bombardment should, logically, have taken place immediately after the massacre." I find it difficult, not to say impossible, to understand the "logic" of this statement. The facts of the matter as then known are these: The British

fleet entered the harbor of Alexandria on a professedly friendly mission. During its presence there a disturbance took place between the Egyptians and foreigners, in which about sixty foreigners and a far greater number of Egyptians were killed. For some hours the Egyptian authorities seemed to take no steps to put down the disturbance, but finally the troops were called out and order was restored. And, furthermore, order was maintained in the city from that date until the bombardment, a month later, in spite of the threat to "open fire" made July 6. It was thought at that time that this riot was premeditated, but a cool investigation showed that it was entirely accidental. Such being the case, the "logic" of a bombardment by a foreign fleet on a friendly mission is not apparent.

It should not be forgotten in speaking of this "riot" that the Egyptians had no weapons but "donkey sticks" and such fragments of chairs and tables as they could secure in the cafés and shops they had "looted," while the foreigners had fire-arms, and from balconies and windows in perfect safety shot down their opponents. This accounts for the much larger number of Egyptians killed. One needs, too, to know the character of a large majority of the (nominal) foreigners in Alexandria at that time to appreciate the situation, and then there is no difficulty in understanding why Stone Pasha speaks of the event as "the so-called 'massacre'" (of foreigners).

Again, Commander Goodrich says it is true "that other governments are less solicitous than the British for the welfare of their citizens." This may be true as an abstract proposition, but I do not think the events of those days prove it, and I turn to official records for my reasons. I find that on the day of the "riot" there were in the harbor of Alexandria the following men-of-war, leaving out the British, which were there on a mission: French, *La Glassonnière*, *Aima*, *Frobin*, *Aspic*, and *La Hirondelle*; Greek, *Le Roi George* and *Hellas*; Turkish, *Is Iddin*; Egyptian, *Mahomet Ali* and *Maheusa*; American, *Galena*. Later, the French sent the *Thetis* and the immense transports *Sartre* and *Corrice* for the express purpose of transporting French citizens to a place of safety. It will interest Commander Goodrich to know that these two great vessels were taken from "ordinary," manned, provisioned, and dispatched from Toulon within twenty-four hours of the receipt of the order from Paris—a feat, I believe, unequaled in naval annals.

The Greeks sent a large transport, which made regular trips, carrying refugees. The Italians sent the *Castelfidardo* and *Stafetta*; the Germans, the *Habicht*; the Dutch, the *Manix*; Austria, the *Loudon*; Russia, the *Asia* and —; Spain, a large iron-clad (the name of which, like that of the second Russian, is not given); and America, the *Lancaster* and *Quinnebaug*. In fact, only one maritime power—Sweden-Norway—was not represented by a national vessel. All hastened to send assistance as soon as it was known that the mission of the British fleet had changed from peace to war. The following quotations from official reports will probably be sufficient, with what I have said, to establish my point:

" . . . As all (Americans) have been repeatedly warned to seek safety, . . . it will be their own fault if harm overtakes them." This on June 20-