

MILITARY AFFAIRS IN EGYPT.

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MR. PRESIDENT:—The Institution has honored me with an invitation to read before this meeting a paper on “Military Affairs in Egypt,” and I cheerfully respond to the invitation.

The subject is surely a comprehensive one, for it embraces the consideration of the military affairs of a country which possessed and maintained a well-organized regular army of grand proportions, more than 4,500 years before a European ever set foot upon the island where we are to-day assembled, and which, from that time to the present day has played a more or less important part in the military history of the world.

The apparently flimsy but well-preserved papyrus, and the grand old monuments in enduring stone and bronze still existing, give us accounts not only of the organization, but also of the exploits of that ancient Egyptian Army; and from those clear records, we know that not only during the reigns of Sesostris and his father, but even under far more ancient kings than they, the regular army of the country was composed of the fighting arms of service, with the proper staff-corps, engineers, quartermasters, and provost troops.

We have also details of battles and combats won by that army, and even the orders issued by those ancient Pharaohs, detailing the composition of expeditions sent forth for various purposes, and fixing, with all the precision of an Adjutant-General's order of the present day, the due proportions of infantry and war chariots, with the regulation number of staff-officers, engineers, and police troops. The Bureau of Military Justice and the agreeable Pay Department were never missing.

In justice to our much-abused Quartermaster's Department

of the present day, I feel bound to state here that even in the time of *Seti 1st*, fourteen and a half centuries before the commencement of the Christian era, the soldiers of his grand old battalions were subject to details for daily duty in the Quartermaster's Department, for making and repairing roads and building quarters. So my old comrade, the Quartermaster-General, has well-established precedent for his unwelcome demands on company commanders.

In those days, too, the regular army had good hard frontier duty to perform, far away from the capital and the comforts of the great cities.

Then, just as it is with our young officers now, the young captain who married a belle of Memphis, of Thebes, or Bubastes, must either leave his young bride to pine at home while he led his "hundred" in fighting the savages of Pount beyond the Gulf of Aden, or the Takrouri in the mountains of Marrah, two thousand miles away, or he must take her from the luxuries of her father's house to face the fatigues and hardships of life on the frontier.

The young "chief of a hundred" in those days, however, had one advantage over the captain of the present day if married to a belle of the city : for the luxuries and the instruments of music of those days, with which the Egyptian ladies were wont to charm their lovers and their lords, were much more easy of transportation than the grand pianos of to-day; were more easily protected from ruin and dust, and more easily arranged when "out of tune."

A battalion of the old Egyptian Infantry must have been a noteworthy sight. It was composed, as nearly as I have been able to learn, of one hundred companies of one hundred men each.

Each company had a captain, a lieutenant, ten corporals, and ninety privates.

"The title of the captain was: "Chief of a Hundred," and to-day, in Egypt and Turkey, the captain of a company is called *Uzebashi*, which means "Head of a Hundred."

In those old days a corporal was called a "Chief of Ten," and to-day, in Egypt, the corporal is called *Umbashi*, which means "Chief of Ten."

In the battalion of 10,000 men each ten companies had their "Chief of a Thousand," and to-day, in Egypt, a major, whether he commands ten or eight companies, is called a *Bimbashi*, which means "Chief of a Thousand."

The formation of the battalion for combat was as follows :

The 100 captains formed the front rank of the battalion, and each captain had his 100 men in file behind him, a corporal at the head of each nine men. The chief of each 1,000 men was in front of the centre of his two companies, while the colonel commanding the grand battalion was in front of its centre.

The leaders were not mounted on horseback, but were mounted in two-wheeled chariots, drawn, usually, by two horses. In the chariots were carried a supply of javelins and arrows for the use of the chief, who usually had in the chariot with him a soldier, who held a buckler to cover him from the arrows of the enemy, while he dealt about him with his bow and spears.

In the early days, and down to the time of Sesostris, the officers and non-commissioned officers carried bucklers and swords, while the private soldiers of infantry carried each a buckler and a battle-axe. Sometimes the battle-axe was accompanied by, and sometimes replaced by, a spear.

It is easy to see that Moses drew from the military organization of Egypt that which he adopted for the Israelites, and later on the Greeks their formations. Both these nations took their first lessons in civilization and organization from Egypt.

In the earliest monuments and records of the Egyptian Army, there is no sign of the existence of the horse as a military animal, while in the monuments of the 18th dynasty, the war-horse is everywhere indicated. It is probable that the war-horse was first introduced by the Shepherd Kings, who came in from Syria about 4,100 years ago. It is certain that the horse formed an important agent in the military establishment of Egypt, under the legitimate kings of the country, 1,700 years before the Christian era, and the lack of monuments erected during the 500 years of struggle between the Shepherd Kings and the Thebans explains easily the lack of record on this subject. Sesostris had at one time 20,000 war chariots in line, drawn by horses.

Cavalry, as we understand it, where the warrior mounted and rode his horse, was, in that army, not introduced until a late period. The chariot and its director in those old days played more or less the part of both artillery and cavalry.

About 2,550 years ago, Egypt, after having in the past given lessons in civilization and organization to all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, saw herself excelled in military tactics and energy by the Greeks ; and the Pharaoh of the time,

hard-pressed by his enemies, took for his army Greek instructors, and for his navy Greek constructors, who in a short time made him, with his immense resources, again master of the situation in Northeastern Africa.

This importation from Greece of instructors for the Egyptian Army is the first of which I have been able to find a record. But from that time to the present, one importation has followed another, sometimes from one country, sometimes from another, down to the present time.

The army, trained by Greek instructors, protected the country from internal revolt and foreign invasion for more than a century and a quarter; but, led by a weak Pharaoh against Cambyses, it was through the weakness of that Pharaoh defeated and destroyed, and the country was ruled by the Persians until the Greek hero, Alexander, drove them forth and reorganized the country and the army. This Alexandrian organization lasted some 275 years, until Egypt ceased to be a nation and became a Roman province, garrisoned by the cohorts of Cæsar and Mark Anthony.

During several centuries succeeding the fall of the Ptolemaic Pharaohs, from a little before the Christian era until the last half of the ninth century, Egypt had no important army. Her territory was occupied by foreign troops. But about the year 870, Ahmed ebn Touloon, the military governor of Egypt under the Caliph, formed a considerable army and maintained it in good condition. Many of his officers and non-commissioned officers were Turcoman mamelukes, as were some of the soldiers; but the latter were generally Egyptians and negroes from the Soudan. With this army Touloon occupied not only Egypt but also Syria, and it was he who built the citadel of Jaffa and fortified Sour, the ancient Tyre.

The Egyptian Caliphs maintained a regular army which enabled them to hold their territory intact until the second half of the twelfth century, while all that portion of Syria not dependent on Egypt had fallen into the hands of the crusaders.

It was an Egyptian Army which enabled the King Selah-e-din (whom we call Saladin) to successfully resist the attempts of the crusaders to retain possession of the coast of Egypt, Jerusalem, and the country about Damascus, in the last quarter of the twelfth century; and it was the Egyptian Army under Moazzem-ebn-Saleb, which in April, 1250, defeated the army of the crusaders

which had invaded the country, and made King Louis IX. of France a prisoner in Mansourah. In the action which resulted so disastrously to the French king, among the killed were the brother of that monarch and hundreds of other distinguished knights, including the bold William—Longsword of England.¹

Having freed the country by victory in 1250 from all danger from the crusaders, the Egyptian Army, during nearly three hundred years, until 1517, maintained the independence of the country and enabled their Sultans to hold Syria also. But in that last-named year the Ottoman Sultan, Selim 1st, conquered both Syria and Egypt; and the Egyptian Army again disappeared, to give place, during two hundred and seventy years, to the soldiers of Turkey, who ruled over and vexed the land through the Circassian mameluke Beys.

These mameluke Beys drew their recruits, as a rule, from their native and neighboring mountains. But they also introduced into their corps a certain number of the native Arabs; and sometimes held in pay whole tribes of Arab cavaliers; so that the Bedouins on the outskirts of Egypt learned many good military points from that cavalry which Napoleon the Great pronounced, after he had fought it, "the most splendid cavalry in the world." Marks of the training of those famous horsemen can to-day be seen in the evolutions of the Bedouins of the desert.

The destruction of the mameluke army in Egypt dates from the time it met General Bonaparte at Chebriess and near Embabeh in July, 1798. Its strength was then effectually broken, although remnants of it again struggled against Napoleon in his famous victory over the Turks and mamelukes at Aboukir in July, 1799, and again against Mehemet-Aly at the time of his victory over the British and mamelukes combined in 1807; but in both these campaigns the mamelukes formed only a small auxiliary force in detachments, and could no longer be called an army.

The next Egyptian Army that was formed, the first truly Egyptian Army that had been formed during three hundred years, was that of Mehemet-Aly, after he had won the government of Egypt in the early part of the present century, forming what may be called the 43d dynasty of Egyptian rulers, which dynasty is still on the throne.

Mehemet-Aly was in all respects a born leader of men.

¹ See Guizot, "Histoire de France"; also Vaujany, "Histoire de l' Egypte."

When, in the autumn of 1801, the French Army evacuated Egypt, he was a major in the Turkish army of occupation. On the 3d of August, 1805, he had become the ruler of Egypt, recognized by a firman from the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, brought forth on the united demand of the Albanian portion of the army of occupation and the people of Cairo.

He immediately made himself strong by the organization of mixed Egyptian and Albanian troops; and in 1807 was sufficiently solid in military organization, and sufficiently able in strategy and tactics, to inflict disastrous defeat on the invading force of British troops which, 5,000 strong and composed of choice regiments and corps, landed in Egypt with the intention of dethroning him and replacing him by England's protégé, the mameluke Bey Elfy.

The details of this campaign are so little mentioned in any history written in the English language, and is so honorable to the Egyptian Army, that I trust the Institution will excuse me should I enlarge somewhat on it.

The British invading force arrived from Malta, at Alexandria, on the 17th of March, 1807. It consisted of a division of infantry and artillery, 5,100 strong, under the command of General Fraser, who depended on his ally Elfy-Bey to furnish the requisite cavalry from among his mameluke and Bedouin friends. An important fact of which General Fraser was ignorant was, that Elfy-Bey, repulsed at Damanhour, which city he had been besieging, was dead; and his party already dispersed by Mehemet-Aly. So, from the start, the British commander was destitute of cavalry. He had, however, 3,900 splendid infantry (including the 31st and 35th regiments and the 78th highlanders) and 1,200 marines and artillery.

General Fraser occupied Alexandria on the morning of the 22d of March, without firing a shot, and as soon as he had rendered the place secure, pushed out a force of about 2,000 men, under the command of his second brigadier, to capture and occupy the city of Rosetta, which was defended by only a few hundred men (600 to 700), commanded, however, by one of Mehemet-Aly's best colonels.

On the 31st of March, the British brigade appeared before Rosetta, and approached the town without encountering any resistance. The Egyptian commander had first cut off all chance of retreat for his soldiers and the inhabitants, by sending across

the Nile all the boats in the place, and then had concealed his men in and upon the houses of the principal streets, with strict orders not to fire until he should give the signal.

Perceiving no enemy, the British commander supposed he could find no opposition, and marched his troops into the streets of the town, where, fatigued, hot, and dusty, the men threw themselves down in the shade of the buildings to rest.

Suddenly they were charged by a small portion of the garrison, while a lively fire of musketry was opened upon them from the roofs, doors, and windows of all the houses near them. A panic was quickly created, and a disorderly flight immediately took place. The commanding brigadier, a large number of officers, and more than a hundred soldiers were killed, a hundred and twenty were captured, with two cannon, and the remainder rushed in disorder back to Alexandria.

When the news of the invasion reached Mehemet-Aly, he was in Upper Egypt, whither he had gone to complete the destruction of the mameluke party. He returned in haste to Cairo and thence dispatched all his disposable force to the relief of Rosetta.

General Fraser, to wipe out the stain his division had received in the affair of Rosetta, dispatched against that place a second force of more than three thousand men with six guns and four mortars, under the command of General Stuart.

This force arrived in front of Rosetta on the 8th of April, and, rendered cautious by the mishap of his predecessor, General Stuart posted five companies of Roll's regiment in a village some five miles to the south of the town, holding the bank of a canal leading from the Nile toward Lake Edkou, while he established his batteries on the heights of Abou-Mandour, about three quarters of a mile from the place, on the left bank of the Nile.

From the 9th to the 21st of April Rosetta was bombarded. But the little garrison and the population, rendered enthusiastic by previous success, far from surrendering to bombardment, made almost daily sorties.

On the evening of the 21st besieged and besiegers saw with surprise the approach from the south of two large bodies of Egyptian troops: one division, under Hassan-Pacha, coming down on the left bank of the Nile; the other, under the lieutenant-general of Mehemet-Aly, coming down the right bank, and keeping each other in view.

On the 22d, Hassan-Pacha made an unsuccessful attack on the

five companies entrenched on the canal, but succeeded in killing twenty and capturing fifteen of that force. General Stuart reinforced the assailed position by three companies of the 35th and two companies of the 78th, under Colonel McLeod, who believed he could, with the original detachment and what he brought with him, hold the position against Hassan-Pacha, protected as it was by the canal and entrenchments.

At seven o'clock on the 23d, Colonel McLeod saw two bodies of troops advancing to attack him, but still supposing that he had only Hassan-Pacha's force to deal with, he quietly awaited the attack.

As the forces developed, however, he found he had to deal with both the Egyptian divisions, the lieutenant-general having crossed the river during the night. He then, too late, gave the order to retreat on the main body ; but, surrounded by the enemy, his entire force was either killed or captured.

The two hundred highlanders fought sturdily around their colonel to the last ; but he fell, and Captain MacKaye, who succeeded to the command, had finally to surrender with only seven of the highlanders left alive and unwounded.

At nightfall General Stuart learned that he had lost one third of his command in killed and prisoners ; and at ten o'clock at night, having spiked his heavy guns and set fire to his baggage and ammunition, he commenced a rapid retreat toward Alexandria.

The cavalry of Mehemet-Aly pursued the flying force as far as Aboukir, where General Stuart embarked for Alexandria.

General Fraser, fearful of the capture of Alexandria itself, caused the great dykes to be cut and allowed the sea-water to surround the city, where he remained, incapable of making any movement into the interior.

Mehemet-Aly, supposing that the British would be reinforced as soon as the news should reach England, first strengthened the defences and garrison of Cairo, and then, mustering a considerable force, with a large park of artillery, he marched to Damanhour to take the offensive. Fortunately for Egypt, England at that time, just after the peace of Tilsit, had too much need of troops in Europe to spare enough for another Egyptian campaign, and General Fraser was left without reinforcements.

During the last days of August, 1807, General Sherbrook presented himself at Damanhour to Mehemet-Aly, with full

powers on the part of General Fraser, and an arrangement was made by which the British troops were to immediately evacuate the country, which they did on the 14th day of September. Mehemet-Aly generously restored to the British general all the prisoners captured at Rosetta.

This successful defence of Egypt against a European power gave great prestige to the new ruler among the people of that country and the neighboring provinces of Palestine and Syria. Mehemet-Aly was not slow to improve his opportunities; and his quick mind had appreciated the advantages possessed by the armies of Western Europe in organization, discipline, and tactics. He introduced, little by little, but as rapidly as was safe, into his army, a better system of discipline and instruction, employing for the purpose Spanish, Italian, and French officers whenever he could procure them, and he made his army as permanent in organization as was practicable.

In spite of all the care he exercised in introducing gradually these improvements, the regularity of military service in time of peace and the discipline of the Western armies proved very irksome to the Eastern soldiers, officers as well as men, and caused frequent revolts against the Pacha's authority. But he wisely persevered, and adopted the true method of obtaining success by quietly putting in training a large number of intelligent young men, whom he placed in a military school to learn what was necessary to become officers of a regular army.

Chance gave him exactly the man he needed to prepare young men for the profession. Colonel Sèvre, a devoted soldier of the Emperor Napoleon, and ex-aide-de-camp of Marshal Grouchy, on the fall of the first French Empire shook from his skirts the dust of Bourbon France and tendered his faithful sword to Mehemet-Aly.

The Pacha received him with confidence, and entrusted him with the military education of his officers and the organization of his new regiments, appointing him, later, Chief of the General-Staff of his Army.

Sèvre, a soldier of severe principles and a high sense of the dignity of the military profession, began in the right manner, and isolated his young military students on an island in the Nile near Assouan.

There he trained them in the duties of the soldier, the non-commissioned officer, and the subaltern officer, maintaining over them an iron discipline.

It is related of him that while one day drilling a battalion of these young men, he stood in front of the line when commanding a fire by file, and a bullet whistled past his head. "Cease firing!" he commanded; and then: "Clumsy fellows! take better aim next time!" "Fire by file! Battalion ready! Commence firing!" This cool courage gained him the respect and admiration of those orientals, and, as he made no attempt to ascertain who were the culprits, thenceforth his word was law to them from affection and respect as well as from fear.

In three years Colonel Sèvè formed, in his isolated school, a thousand fairly instructed officers, and with these and some European officers, organized a very regular force of 30,000 men. On that nucleus was rapidly formed the grand Army of Egypt, more than 150,000 strong, which, by its achievements in Arabia, Greece, and Syria, made itself and its chief respected throughout Europe; made that chief the absolute ruler of Nubia, Kordofan, and Senaar in Africa on the south, and of Palestine and Syria on the east; and which, in 1831-33, defeated army after army sent against him by the Sultan, and placed Constantinople at the mercy of the Viceroy of Egypt.

In the most brilliant of these campaigns, it was Ibrahim, the son of Mehemet-Aly, who commanded the armies of his father, and Sèvè, who had assumed the name of Suleyman and had been promoted to the grade of Pacha, served as his chief of the staff. In the campaign of 1833, Ibrahim led the victorious Egyptian Army of the 43d dynasty beyond the farthest point to the northward which had been reached even by the army of the famous 19th dynasty, which, 1,450 years before the birth of Christ, had conquered Tyre and Sidon, and placed them under tribute to the Pharaoh.

In April, 1833, Ibrahim had passed the Taurus range and defeated the last army the Sultan of Turkey could raise to oppose him—the road to Constantinople was open before him. He had settled the question of relative strength between the Sultan and his father entirely to the advantage of the latter, and Constantinople, which had seen the entrance of so many different conquerors within her walls, was about to see that of the Egyptian Army, when, suddenly, Europe interposed to stay the further progress of the soldier prince.

England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria all joined in a cry to save the Sultan, and Russia promptly sent a corps d'armée to the Bosphorus, and stationed it opposite Constantinople.

Peace was made and Egypt's ruler still held all Palestine and Syria.

Six years later, the Sultan, having employed this time in recruiting and organizing a force which he deemed sufficient to crush the Egyptian Pacha, and having meantime done his best to create revolt and trouble in Egypt and Syria, sent forth Hafiz-Pacha with a well-appointed army of 23,000 infantry, 14,000 cavalry, and 140 guns, to fall upon Ibrahim in Syria, while the latter was engaged in suppressing some serious revolts in that region.

No sooner did Mehemet-Aly learn that such advance was to be made on Syria than he dispatched orders to his son not to await attack, but to advance toward Constantinople and fight Hafiz-Pacha in Anatolia.

Ibrahim marched promptly to the north with 43,000 men, and early in June, 1839, approached the position in which the Turkish army was encamped, a little to the south of Nezib. The position occupied by Hafiz-Pacha was a difficult one to attack, and several days passed in reconnoissances, cannonading, and unimportant skirmishes.

Hafiz-Pacha had in his staff quite a number of European officers, among whom was Major von Moltke, of the Prussian army, of whom the world has since heard much; but, fortunately for the Egyptians, the proud Turkish commander paid but slight attention to the suggestions of such officers.

On the 23d of June, Ibrahim made a determined attack on the Turkish army, pushing his field-batteries up to close range in front, while his light cavalry dealt with the irregular troops, and his infantry rapidly turned the flank of the Turks. In three hours the whole force of Hafiz was flying in disorder toward Marash, leaving 4,000 killed and 2,000 wounded on the field. More than 100 guns and 1,500 prisoners were captured by the Egyptians, whose losses in killed and wounded amounted to nearly 3,000.

This battle completed the ruin of the Sultan Mahmoud, whose capital and empire were again at the mercy of the Egyptian Army; but, again, civilized Europe intervened to protect the sovereign who had twice proved himself incapable of resisting Mehemet-Aly, and England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria combined their influence and their military forces to press the energetic ruler of Egypt back into what they called his place, as a vassal of that

Turkey which he had twice fairly beaten in war, and that in war which had each time been provoked by Turkey.

Undismayed by the threats of five nations, Mehemet-Aly held his ground firmly. In reply to the insolent demands of Turkey, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England, that he should submit to their decision and sue for terms to the Sultan, he proudly replied, in effect : " What I have has been gained by the sword and held by the sword. If the issue of arms shall be against me, I must submit ; but I will not disgrace myself and my family by quietly submitting to injustice."

The five great nations boldly sent fleets and soldiers against him. With less courage they busied themselves in sending arms into the mountains of Syria, and supplicating the mountaineers of Lebanon to revolt against the Egyptians ; and by a free use of their intrigues, their money, and their force, the five great nations succeeded, after six months, in overcoming the Egyptian Army. England thus, with the assistance of four other nations, was enabled to roll under her tongue a small morsel of vengeance for the defeat which British troops had, thirty-three years before, suffered at the hands of that same army, under the same Mehemet-Aly !

Yet, much as the war had crippled him and reduced his army, the five powers did not deem it prudent to attempt to crush him, and rather than fight the wounded lion to the death, they made peace, leaving him the Viceroy of Egypt, with the hereditary right in his family.

To prevent further trouble from Mehemet-Aly and his family, care was taken to stipulate that the Egyptian Army should in future not exceed 18,000 men, unless Turkey should need their assistance in war.

A stipulation more effective, since it cuts off from the Viceroy the sinews of war, required that one fourth of the gross revenue of Egypt should be sent to the Sublime Porte.

If Mehemet-Aly and the Egyptian Army of 146,000 men succumbed in 1841, it was only before a coalition of nearly the same powers before whom Napoleon and the French army yielded in 1815, and the defeat cannot be considered as a disgraceful one for them.

Up to the last year of his reign, 1848, Mehemet-Aly strove to make the little army of 18,000 men that the Great Powers felt safe in allowing him to maintain, as perfect as possible. He

maintained a military school for the formation of officers, and established in Paris an Egyptian school under military rule, directed by French officers, for completing the education of youths who in the schools of the country showed peculiar aptitude for instruction. His son Ibrahim, who succeeded him, but who reigned only a few months, during his short reign adopted measures improving the discipline; but his successor, Abbas-Pacha, who reigned from 1848 to 1854, destroyed the military school, and did little to advance the condition of the army.

Saïd-Pacha, who reigned from 1854 to January, 1865, did little to improve the army, but much to deteriorate its discipline. He used it rather as a plaything than any thing else. During his reign the Crimean war took place, and a large contingent of Egyptian troops rendered good service to the Sultan Abdul-Medjid during the whole of that war.

During the reigns of Ibrahim, Abbas, and Saïd, the old Chief of the General Staff, Suleyman-Pacha (Sève), continued in his high office, and to the day of his death constantly rendered excellent service, giving to the army the living example of a brave man and a soldier devoted to duty.

Traditions of Suleyman-Pacha are now kept up in that army, and will doubtless long hence be kept, which cannot fail to produce good effects upon the officers. One of many stories of him which I have heard is the following: During the campaign of Syria, on one occasion, he had, in a council-of-war, been voted down upon a serious question about the proper movement to be made by the army, and the prince in command had decided with the majority, against him. The old general said no more after the decision, but immediately after the council broke up he was seen outside his tent, tying together the legs of the horse which he usually rode in battle. One of the council asked him the object of this operation, and Sève replied: "I am arranging my steed in such a manner that, when the panic retreat shall come, he may not disgrace me by fast running to the rear!" The remark was carried to the Prince, who revised the decision arrived at and adopted the idea of his chief of staff, which happily gave him complete success in the movement.

On the death of Saïd-Pacha, which took place January 18, 1865, Ismail, the son of Ibrahim, mounted the throne of Egypt.

As a youth, he had accompanied his father during the campaign of Syria, and he had received, in the Egyptian military

school at Paris, a careful education, together with excellent ideas of discipline. One of his first cares on coming to the throne was the improvement of his army, which had greatly deteriorated during the last two preceding reigns.

Ismail re-established the military schools as well as establishing civil schools throughout the country, and, being on excellent terms with the Emperor Napoleon III., procured from that monarch the services of a large number of French officers of distinction to guide the instruction of his army. These officers constituted what are called "*la mission Française*," and they were placed in various positions of instruction and inspection. But while they worked hard and did much good, they remained always officers of the French Emperor and always subject to the orders, more or less, of the French Consul-General; and this fact was very prejudicial to their influence in the army. With one exception, these officers all returned to France after a short service in Egypt. One, Colonel Larmée, remained, however, as Chief of the School of Artillery and Engineers, and with a short interval, 1870-71, has remained up to the present time.

In 1869-70, the Khedive Ismail, after the departure of the French Mission, invited into his service a number of American officers, who, far from forming an American "Mission," became in fact and deed, according to their grades, officers of the Egyptian Army, and as such could exercise command as well as give instruction.

They were sworn to render faithful service to the Khedive of Egypt and do all in their power to maintain his throne; to fight against all his enemies or opposers whomsoever, *excepting that they could not be required to make war against the United States of America.*

This gave them a different position from the officers of European states serving in the Egyptian Army, and increased their proper influence with the Egyptian officers and authorities. Moreover, no change of European politics could possibly touch the interests of Americans in the Egyptian service to render them antagonistic to Egypt, and, therefore, they could be safely consulted on points where European officers could not be so safely approached.

The American officers called to Egypt included all grades, from that of general officer to that of captain, inclusive, and represented all the arms of service, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and the

various staff corps and departments. There were also some who had had naval training and service in the signal corps.

One of the four general officers (who had seen service in America as a corps-commander during the war of 1861-5), was placed in command of the coast from the western limit to Damietta. Another was made chief of the artillery of the coast, another was made an aide-de-camp of the Khedive, and the other, chief of the general staff. This was the distribution which existed in July, 1871. The officers of grades from colonel below, were distributed between the Bureau of the General Staff in Cairo, and the staffs of the several general officers, both American and Egyptian. Two of the naval officers were placed in command of transport steamships at one time, but were afterward sent on expeditions of exploration and reconnaissance.

The Chief of the General Staff was made *ex officio* Inspector-General of the Military Schools.

Inspections developed the following among other evils in the military organization of the country:

1st. Under the reign of the Khedive Ismail's predecessor, many intelligent and instructed officers had been displaced, and a large number of promotions had been made from the ranks, so that more than a third of the officers of the army could neither read nor write; and as many uneducated officers had by favoritism been promoted rapidly to the grade of field-officer, they, jealous of instructed younger officers, depreciated their qualities and made "schooling" as much as possible contemptible in the army. Not one in ten of the rank and file could either read or write their names.

2d. The coast defences were entirely insufficient, in bad condition, and, with the exception of a few Armstrong guns, were armed with smooth bores only. In fact, the coast was in almost as indefensible condition as that of the United States is to-day.

3d. There was no torpedo or signal service in the army.

4th. While the Remington musket had been adopted there were no means in the country of making ammunition for it, and the army was dependent for small-arm ammunition on foreign countries; so that the supply might be cut off at any moment in case of war with a foreign power, and what came to the country of cartridges were often unserviceable.

5th. There was no staff, and there were no staff corps, excepting a chief of engineers, with a few assistants.

6th. The guns of the field artillery were insufficient in number and of bad and various models—all muzzle-loaders.

7th. The military magazines were wofully empty of raw materials, with the exception of those in the small arsenal of construction and repairs, under the command of a French officer who had entered the army many years before, and had managed, under great difficulties, to keep up a fair supply of timber and iron for ordinary purposes. But even there, for a war with any respectable power, there would have been soon a lack of almost everything.

8th. There was no organization of divisions or brigades, and the instruction in drill and guard duty was not uniform—each regimental commander carrying out his own ideas of drill in the details, and each one communicating directly with and receiving orders from the Minister of War.

There being neither Pay Department, Quartermaster's Department, nor Commissariat, colonels drew monthly the money for the payment of their regiments directly from the treasury of the War Department, and procured their rations, quartermaster's supplies, and ordnance stores by requisitions made on the Minister of War, without supervision or control from any other superior than the Minister of War.

There was much to do, and much was done, and that as rapidly as was safe and prudent. The Khedive desired to place his military establishment on a respectable footing, and was willing to strengthen the hands of those whom he expected to improve it. Of course there was much opposition on the part of subordinates of the Khedive, desirous of maintaining the old state of affairs, but patience and the support of the Khedive conquered the opposition. The Khedive called upon the Chief of the General Staff immediately after his arrival (1870) for a paper on the subject of what is the necessity of a staff in an army, and what are its relations to the army.

The report was made that, considering the army as a human body, the staff represents the nerves—starting from the head, which represents the commander-in-chief, and extending through all the various members. That, as the nerves communicate to the brain the exact condition and wants of the members, so the staff communicates to the commander-in-chief the condition and wants of even the smallest fraction of the army. And as the nerves communicate the will of the brain to all the members of

the body, so the staff, in its various branches, communicates the orders of the commander-in-chief to the different units of the army, and provides for and watches over the execution of such orders. That a staff is of quite as much necessity to an army as the nerves are necessary in the human body.

This report produced an order for the organization of a staff for the Egyptian Army, and power was given to the Chief of the Staff to select officers and organize it. This brought a demand for the establishment of a staff college for the due preparation of officers, and this demand was answered by authority given to create one, with full power to the Chief of Staff to select any pupils he might find capable in any of the civil schools. A staff college was then formed and organized on a basis as nearly that of West Point as the customs of the country would permit, and the training of young officers for the staff was commenced. Meantime a certain number of American officers were assigned to the various sections of the staff, and a few Egyptian officers, whose education had more or less fitted them for staff duties, were assigned with them.

The staff organization proposed by the Chief of Staff and approved by the Khedive was as follows:

The General Staff of the Army was composed of the Cabinet of the Chief and six sections.

The 1st Section embraced very nearly the duties of the Adjutant-General's Department in the U. S. Army.

The 2d Section was the section of military history ; it collected materials of past military history, and kept up the history of the day, and was charged with the care of the library and printing-office, and correspondence with the military schools.

The 3d Section was that of geography, military reconnoissances, fortifications, signal service, and telegraphy.

The 4th Section—Military justice and inspections and secret service.

The 5th Section—Administration, embracing the duties of our Quartermaster's, Commissary's, and Paymaster's Departments.

The 6th Section—Ordnance and torpedo service, and studies of defence of the coast.

It was made a requisite that all officers entering the staff should command at least one language besides that of the country.

Young officers graduating at the staff college were assigned,

on graduation and promotion to the grade of officer, to one of the sections of the General Bureau for one year to become accustomed to staff duty, and then were to be sent for a year to a regiment, or on service in the field. If they returned after a year of such outside service with a good report, they were to be promoted captain in the staff; but otherwise they should be transferred permanently to a regiment of the line, or discharged altogether, according to the state of their case.

Before being promoted to the grade of major in the staff, a captain was to pass one year (or at least six months) in a company of the line, or in some distant expedition. And before being promoted to a lieutenant-colonel in the staff, he must pass at least six months in a battalion of the line or in a distant expedition.

Simultaneously with the creation of the staff college, schools for the education of artillery, infantry, and cavalry officers were enlarged and improved.

Impressed with the vast importance of instruction to the whole army, the Chief of Staff procured from the Khedive in August, 1870, an order forbidding the promotion of any individual in the army unless he could read and write, so that not even a private soldier could be made corporal without fulfilling this condition, and no officer could ever be advanced until he should know at least that much.

This made the whole army a school during an hour and a half each day, and restored the prestige of the officers who had received education. Education became at once respectable.

The result of this regulation was, that in 1873 fully seventy-five per cent. of the rank and file of the army could read and write, and knew more or less of arithmetic and the geography of Africa. To become a non-commissioned officer in that army a man must be able to keep his roster and make out the necessary papers.

In 1873 there was not a battalion in the Egyptian Army in which signal duty was not thoroughly well carried on; not one which had not a dozen officers capable of sending messages by telegraph.

In this year of 1873 the Khedive succeeded in having the restriction as to the number of troops Egypt might lawfully maintain removed; and he called upon the Chief of Staff to propose an organization suitable for his purposes.

The organization proposed and accepted was as follows:

1 Division, Troops of the Guard	{ 4 regiments, infantry. 2 regiments, cavalry. 1 regiment, artillery. 1 battalion, engineer troops.
4 Divisions of the Line	{ 16 regiments of infantry. 8 regiments of cavalry. 4 regiments of artillery. 4 battalions, engineer troops.

3 regiments heavy artillery-siege and garrison.

The four divisions of the Line to form two corps d' armée of two divisions each ; the troops of the Guard to form the reserve of the active army.

The reserve force to consist of an equal number of regiments, composed of soldiers who had served and retired to their homes.

Each division had two brigades of infantry, one brigade of cavalry, one regiment of artillery, and one battalion of engineer troops.

The regiment of infantry was composed of four battalions of eight companies each, and each company had 100 rank and file on war footing and sixty-eight on peace establishment.

The regiment of field artillery was composed of ten batteries, two of which were horse artillery, to serve with the brigade of cavalry belonging to its division.

The regiment of cavalry was composed of six squadrons, each squadron of one hundred and fifty sabres.

The regiments of siege and garrison artillery were composed each of four battalions of four companies each, and each company of one hundred and fifty men.

This organization was carried out gradually with the exception of part of the 4th Division.

To make the details of drill uniform throughout the army, and at the same time to improve the standard of non-commissioned officers, a school of non-commissioned officers was formed at the citadel in the capital, in which were received one sergeant and one corporal from each company, and these formed, in the school, two model battalions in which the drill was carried out exactly according to the regulations. After a year in the school, the non-commissioned officers returned to their regiments and were replaced by others, so that the details of drill in the model battalions passed into all the companies of the army.

The armament of the infantry was the Remington musket;

that of the cavalry the Remington carbine and revolver, with sabre ; that of the artillery the Krupp breech-loading cannon (of which 600 were provided) and the Remington carbine.

A cartridge factory for manufacturing metallic cartridges was established, capable of turning out 60,000 cartridges per day.

A torpedo school was established for harbor and river service, and heavy Armstrong rifled guns rapidly replaced the old smooth bores in the cast batteries.

A polygon was established as a school of practice for the artillery junior officers and non-commissioned officers, with perfect arrangements for target practice for all the arms of service and all classes of cannon.

The non-commissioned officers, appreciating what they learned in their school, began, in 1873, to bring their little sons to learn from them, during their leisure hours, and from noticing this, the Chief of Staff recommended the establishment of a school for soldiers' sons, which Khedive Ismail gladly authorized and fostered. This school was not made a *charity*, but, on the contrary, it was declared the *right* of any soldier bearing arms for the Khedive to have his son or sons between the ages of eight years and sixteen years educated at the public expense. One of these schools was established for each division in the army, and that at Cairo, which represented two divisions, had in it, in 1878, 2,800 pupils, while others were maintained at Alexandria, Rosetta, and Damietta.

A gradual improvement was effected in the construction of the batteries and forts on the coast as fast as the new armament arrived, heavy earthen parapets fifty feet thick replacing the masonry of the olden time at Aboukir, Rosetta, and Damietta.

In order to make the military establishment interfere as little as possible with the production of the country, and at the same time to relieve the expense of the army, leaves of absence were given at the seeding and harvest times to large numbers of peasants' sons who had shown themselves apt in learning their duties and exact in performing them.

Following the wise policy of his grandfather, the Khedive Ismail, understanding fully the vast importance to Egypt of the Soudan, pushed his troops farther and farther into that region. The troops of the Soudan formed a separate organization, supported by the revenues of the Soudan.

In 1874 the Empire of Darfour was conquered. In 1875 the

Kingdom of Harrar was occupied after a short and sharp campaign; and he had then brought under his rule nearly all the African territory anciently ruled by the Pharaohs of the most brilliant dynasties. In 1874 one of the American officers pushed through to Lake Victoria. In 1876 a steam vessel bearing the Khedive's flag plied regularly on Lake Albert to supply the military posts which guarded the land of Unyoro. At that time the Khedive's flag was maintained over military posts in his quiet possession from Damietta to near Urundogani, a stretch of thirty-one degrees of latitude! while his staff officers, trained in the new college and led generally by his American officers, carefully explored and mapped vast regions until then practically unknown to European geographers.

In 1873 the Department of Public Works, which had previously been an independent ministry, was transferred to the Staff of the Army, and became the 7th Section of the General Staff. This threw upon the Staff of the Army the control and care of the immense system of canals for navigation and irrigation and the oversight of the great work of harbor improvement in Alexandria and Suez. Young staff officers, with their small monthly pay, were found in charge of engineering works on the canals and railways in construction or repairs, where previously young English and French engineers had been employed with salaries ten times as great—often twenty times as great. The staff college had produced fruit which amply repaid the sovereign for all that he had done for it, even in a pecuniary sense. In a moral sense, these well-instructed young officers had improved the tone of his army incalculably, and had made it far more respected by the Europeans who came in contact with them.

In 1870 the Chief of Staff could find in the War Department only three maps: one of Abyssinia, copied from an English map, one of Candia, and one other rough map. He could find there no books, excepting a few copies of infantry tactics and a few of the Arabic translation of the French Interior Regulations for the Infantry.

In 1876 there existed in the 2d Section of the Staff a well-selected library of six thousand books and manuscripts in French, English, Italian, German, and Turkish, embracing the best standard military works of Europe, and a printing-office, from which issued each month a military magazine in the language of the country, two copies of which were sent gratuitously

to each company in the army and a copy to each field and staff officer. From this section appeared well-engraved maps and the well-printed reports of reconnoissances and surveys executed by the Army Staff.

In the 3d Section were preserved thousands of maps, well arranged and well cared for.

Sixty thousand well-drilled troops stood ready to obey the behests of the Khedive in Egypt proper, while the special army of occupation of the Soudan, supported by the revenues of the Soudan, numbered thirty thousand more—and, with its indefinite sources for recruiting, was capable of becoming an admirable second reserve in case of need. The village guards in Upper and Lower Egypt, exempted from service in the army in time of peace, formed a reserve of men in the constant habit of using arms and obeying orders, which could at any time have been available for the formation of another reserve of sixty thousand men, but which cost nothing until they might be required. For these reserves good, new Remington muskets were provided and stored in the magazines—which also contained a large supply of muzzle-loading Minie muskets for the arming, in case of need, of irregular troops in the Soudan, where they would be opposed only by lances, and bows and arrows.

The net-work of railways in Lower and Middle Egypt had been added to with special reference to facilitating the rapid concentration of troops on important strategic points, and the commencement of a line of railway was made to connect Egypt proper with the Soudan. Telegraphic communication was made easy to Khartoum, Massowah, Suakim, Senaar, and Darfour, and countries unknown to Europe a few years before were brought into the great postal-union of the world. A letter dropped into the post-office in the centre of Darfour, or in Gondokoro, or Berberah, with a five-cent stamp upon it, addressed to London or San Francisco, went safely and rapidly to its destination.

Such was the work of the Khedive Ismail with his army within six years.

During the same time heavy rifled guns had been furnished by Sir William Armstrong, each gun coming with 200 rounds of ammunition, and at Aboukir, Rosetta, and Damietta batteries were prepared with thick earthen parapets and large substantial traverses and magazines. Large supplies of ammunition for the Krupp field guns were purchased and stored in the

magazines; a complete foundry for the casting of shot was established near Cairo; a complete armory for the fabrication of muskets, carbines, and pistols was ordered from America, and a powder-mill, with all the modern improvements, was ordered from Sir William Armstrong.

A large supply of torpedoes, both mechanical and electric, was procured and stored for the defence of the harbors; and wire cable and electric apparatus stored in Alexandria and at Aboukir.

In an evil hour for Egypt, the Khedive Ismail, trusting in the honor of European governments, allowed two European ministers to enter his Cabinet,—each one in charge of a very important ministry. An English Minister of Finance and a French Minister of Public Works nominally entered his service; but really they, while holding portfolios in an Egyptian Cabinet, were mere representatives of the interests of their respective governments, and each one worked to make his own government the commanding power in Egypt. This unhappy change occurred in the summer of 1878.

At that time the heavy contingent which at heavy expense the Egyptian Army had furnished to the Sultan during the Russian-Turkish war, was just returning, and the army had large arrears of pay due.

One of the earliest economies made was the discharge of all the American officers in the army excepting the Chief of Staff, whose retention the Khedive insisted upon. One of the next economies was the complete destruction of the schools for soldiers' sons and that of the staff college—while an order was given for the disbandment of most of the regiments, the soldiers being sent off to their homes without being paid their arrears in any case more than three months, while those arrears amounted in some cases to seventeen months and in almost all to more than a year. The officers not disbanded were placed on half pay, and neither this half pay nor the arrears due them of from thirteen to seventeen months were paid to them. It seemed to those who looked on and saw the civil *employés* regularly paid and the soldiers thus badly treated, that it was the object of the new government to crush out every thing like military spirit in Egypt, and to render the country powerless to oppose any foreign power. Humble petitions sent through the regular channels by the officers and soldiers were utterly ignored, and all

military persons were left unpaid and neglected, while the new foreign ministers had their salaries increased from \$15,000 per annum to \$30,000, and it was known by the soldiers that their salaries and those of the European and native *employés* in the civil service were regularly paid each month.

Soldiers who had more than a year of pay due them, and whose officers had families nearly starving at home, guarded the buildings in which were daily stowed immense sums of gold coming from the taxes and going to pay foreign bondholders, the Turkish tribute, and the civil *employés*. Yet so firm was the discipline, that in no instance was there a failure in the duty of the soldiers guarding the public edifices or guarding or escorting treasure.

He who addresses you knew officers who appeared daily in their places for duty in cleanly uniform, and who, after a strict performance of their duty during the day, returned to their homes, put carefully aside their uniforms, and then, in peasants' dress, labored half the night as porters to earn enough to give their families bread. He knew a field-officer, remarkable for the exact and intelligent performance of his staff duty, who had the barley which a friend sent him nominally for his horses, ground to make bread for his family. His friend could not send him wheat without shocking his pride as an officer; but he knew what disposition could be made of the barley. Usurers made full use of their opportunities; but the demands upon them were so many that they would at last lend only to those of the highest rank, even on the most onerous terms.

Yet this army spoke not of revolt through months of this oppression, for the officers knew that it was not the will of the Khedive which placed them in such a position, but the will of foreigners who held the power over the treasure which they saw drawn from their fellow-countrymen at the rate of millions of dollars per month.

And this is the army whose discipline is so lightly and contemptuously spoken of by British officers and British statesmen! What European army would remain quiet under one month of such treatment, could such occur? What British or French ministry would dare to apply such a test to the discipline of their own army?

The Chief of Staff warned the ministers of the danger of such a course, and earnestly protested against the injustice, but with-

out avail. The Minister of War supported the Chief of Staff in his protests, but without avail before the European ministers.

Finally the last straw was laid on the camel, *discipline*, and it broke down. One morning, the Prime Minister was driving in his carriage from his office to his house, followed by the English Minister of Finance, in his carriage, when suddenly the street was blocked by a large number of officers, and the Prime Minister's carriage was stopped. On his asking what was the matter, he was informed by some of the officers that they were on their way to the Ministry to make a demand for their pay. He treated the matter lightly and said : " My sons, I am on my way to breakfast. Go to the Ministry and I will come back and listen to you." The words were not well chosen. An officer replied : " Excellency, our wives and children have had no breakfast. Your Excellency can wait for yours. You must return with us now to the Ministry and hear us there."

It is said that the Minister's coachman urged forward his horses, and as an officer held them back by the bridle the coachman struck him with his whip ! In an instant the coachman was hurled from his seat and rolled in the dust, for his insult to the uniform, while an officer mounted the carriage and, turning the horses, drove back toward the Ministry. The Finance Minister (English) pluckily tried to come to the assistance of his colleague and chief, but having raised his cane toward an officer, he was dragged from his carriage and roughly handled. The *cortège* soon reached the Ministry of Finance, which was quickly surrounded and occupied by officers, who insisted that immediate justice should be done them. No one can say what the result might have been, had not the Khedive Ismail come to the rescue of those ministers, his enemies, who were doing all in their power to destroy his influence in his country. Learning that the Ministry of Finance was surrounded, and that the ministers were in danger, he ordered a regiment of Infantry of the Guard to follow his carriage at the double-quick, led them to the scene, and had them posted around the entrances to the building.

His Highness entered and found within a scene of confusion with frightened European functionaries and excited officers filling the halls and offices. By a few words of command he cleared the interior of officers, and then from the balcony calmly addressed the excited crowd below, promising *he* would see to it that justice would be done to them in the matter of pay, and

then ordering them to retire to their homes. Most of the officers saluted and obeyed; but a few excited ones remained, drew their sabres, and began to use them. At this first sign of actual armed resistance to lawful command, the guards were ordered to fire, and did so.

In a moment all was over, and order restored. The word of justice and the prompt blow of authority had conquered the revolt.

A Court of Inquiry, selected by the ministers, was immediately formed, composed of European and Circassian officers, who reported that the revolt was to be severely condemned as an act of military men violating military discipline; but that the unjust course pursued against the army by the ministers was also to be condemned, as the injustice which had been enacted had caused such hardship and suffering that the officers had, in a measure, been pushed into revolt.

The Prime Minister resigned. The English Minister of Finance and the French Minister of Public Works held fast to their places and their pay, with the full knowledge that they were detested by the whole people and the sovereign whose ministers they pretended to be.

England and France insisted on their ministers being retained, and each sent a war-ship to Alexandria. A new ministry was formed, with three Egyptian ministers and the two foreigners; but as the foreign ministers had, by the arrangements made by English and French Governments, *two votes each*, they could carry matters with a high hand, and did not fail to do so. They fretted and insulted the army by hostile action, and fretted and insulted the Council of Notables by refusing to call them together to consult on public affairs, as had always been done by the Khedive when a budget was to be acted on, so that, in a month or two, not only the army but the whole people were ready for any violent action.

Such was the state of affairs in the first days of April, 1879, when Mr. Wilson, the Finance Minister, proposed to throw the Government into bankruptcy, after having secured, previously, the gift by the Khedive and his family of all their real estate, to the value of some \$40,000,000 to prevent such a measure, and also proposed to confiscate to public use the rights gained by a large number of private proprietors by a capitalization of their taxes —thus directly robbing Egyptian proprietors for the benefit of foreign bondholders!

This was the climax. The highest, the most intelligent, and the wealthiest people in the land protested in most unmistakable language, and petitioned the Khedive to prevent such injustice and protect his people. They signed an obligation pledging their lives, their honor, and their property to the maintenance of the credit of the Government if that injustice should be warded off and the Chamber of Notables maintained with fairly liberal powers.

The Khedive listened to the appeal of his people, proclaimed the adoption of the measures asked for by them, dismissed the French and English ministers from his Cabinet, and appointed ministers known and respected by all his people.

This action was received with acclamation by the Egyptians and those Europeans who loved Egypt. Well would it have been for the Egyptians, for the bondholders, and for the British Government even, had that action been frankly accepted by England and France.

Well for the Egyptians : for they would not have come to the sad state in which they now are ; but would have become a nation and prosperous. Well for the bondholders : for they would have had the pledge of the sovereign and the *people* of Egypt for the exact payment of all interest and principal of these bonds which are now, with reduced interest, of so little value. Well for the British Government : for that Government would have been spared an act of frightful injustice and cruelty which has already cost her blood, treasure, and humiliation, and which seems likely to cost her yet more of each. But no. England and France declared themselves insulted by the action of the Khedive, and calling to countenance them Germany, Austria, and Italy, and receiving their permission, they drove from the throne of Egypt the sovereign who had dared to act like a king for the protection of his country and his people against foreign interference.

They placed in his stead his son, on the throne, but claimed for themselves the power of the throne. They nominally recognized his power, but they placed each a man with the name of controller, to exercise his power. They nominally recognized a Cabinet of ministers around the young Khedive, but claimed for their controllers the right to veto the acts of that Cabinet.

This action was a sham, and, like all shams, it came to grief.

The two controllers soon felt themselves clothed with royal powers, and in many ways paraded their powers to prove that the Khedive could do nothing without their approval or consent. But they made the grave mistake, while proving that the Khedive with all his *prestige* could not rule arbitrarily, of themselves, without his *prestige*, ruling more arbitrarily than any but an absolute sovereign had ever attempted to rule.

After magnifying the evils of arbitrary rule in Ismail, and declaring that the new Khedive could not rule arbitrarily, they themselves committed acts more arbitrary than any of his, while he ruled with such rights as an absolute ruler claims—rights recognized and admitted by his people, who would not recognize such rights in foreign functionaries.

The result was the revolt of Arabi and his comrade colonels.

Far be it from him who addresses you to approve of the revolt of Arabi. On the contrary, it was he who was the first to act against that revolt and to oppose it in every way in his power—by action and by counsel, by risking position, by on more than one occasion risking life, and on one occasion risking much more than his life. From the first he looked upon the revolt as certain, if continued, to ruin Egypt. But it was the natural result of the action of the representatives of England and France and of those Governments. Pretending to be the friends and supporters of the young Khedive, they deliberately stripped him of his prestige, and when that prestige was needed for their own interests, of course it was wanting.

Time does not suffice here to describe even concisely the course of that rebellion which destroyed the Egyptian Army and gave to England the long-coveted garden of her neighbor.

When it came to the point of destroying by bombardment the second commercial city of the whole Mediterranean coast, France withdrew from the contest for supremacy in Egypt, and left to England, whose fleets had, with hers, entered the harbor "as a friend," the part of destroyer, which was effectually performed.

The troops of Great Britain were received by the Khedive as friends come to him in time of great need, and were aided most earnestly by him and by those most faithful to him. The most intelligent part of the army had remained faithful,—that is, the instructed and most capable officers, so that the British Army had to fight only the body of the Egyptian Army, without its brains.

Not only so, but the intelligent portion of the army was contributing their utmost to the success of the British Army as the friend of the Khedive. Not only so, but the Khedive's treasure was freely used to contribute to the end of making more easy the work of the British force. It is the conviction of him who addresses you, that without the assistance so received by the British Army, it would have met with disastrous defeat in the summer of 1882. Yet, the first action of the British, after success, was to insist upon the issuance of a decree by the Khedive, before his return to his capital, disbanding entirely the Egyptian Army—not the disbandment of the rebellious regiments and corps, but the disbandment of the entire army,—so that even the faithful guard of his person, who, in the moment of supreme danger at Ramleh, when his palace was surrounded, had stood firmly in his defence against twenty times their numbers, and who were proud to appear around his carriage when he drove out, were displaced, and his escort became a band of heathen Indian cavalry, who were regarded with horror and detestation by his people.

Not only this, but his palace in the capital was guarded by British troops, as if to prove that his person could not be confided to his own people, while, in fact, there were hundreds of native-born officers who had risked all in proving their fidelity and devotion, and who found themselves disbanded in company with those against whom they had been struggling.

Such was the end of the Egyptian Army of the 43d Dynasty. It ceased to exist by a decree issued by the sovereign in compliance with the demand of the British Government.

The handful of men which the British telegrams of these days call the Egyptian Army, is another thing.

Six thousand men gathered together under a British general, with a British staff, British brigade commander, and a sprinkling of British colonels, majors, and captains, can hardly claim the same name as that body which, under Mehemet-Aly, drove 5,000 British troops from Egypt; which, under Ibrahim, conquered the fierce Wahabites, Arabia, the Morea, Palestine, and Syria; which made the Ottoman Sultan tremble in his palace; which required the force of five great powers of Europe to make it retire to Egypt.

It can hardly claim the same name as that body which, during the last decade, carried the Khedive's flag to the great lakes

of Central Africa, conquered Darfour and Harrar, which sent to the aid of Turkey during the war a powerful contingent under the command of a Prince of Egypt—the only Mussulman prince who, during that war, exposed his person to the enemy ;—that body which maintained order throughout the vast regions of the Soudan.

No : this is another thing, and its work so proclaims it.

Let us hope, however, that the Egyptian Army, whose fortunes we have to-day followed through thousands of years, which we have considered in glorious successes and sad defeats, which has sometimes disappeared for generations and sometimes for centuries, and yet again reappeared and existed gloriously, may again, and that soon, within the time even of some of the elders among us, reappear in renewed glory, to assure greatness and happiness in the beautiful land of the Pharaohs.

In seconding the vote of thanks to General Stone, moved by General Crittenden, General Sickles said : " The paper just now read shows very clearly that Egypt cannot hold her position in the world without a good army. And yet it seems to be her fate to be denied the right of maintaining such an army. General Stone has also made it clear, that without a home administration and without home rule, Egypt cannot sustain herself. And yet it is plain enough—he has made it so—that the edict of England is that Egypt shall not be permitted to have a home administration. The time has come, no doubt, when the prophecy of the Emperor Nicholas of Russia will be verified. He said that Egypt would become English. Even France has withdrawn her pretensions to that joint control which put some check at least upon the extreme demands of her more powerful neighbor. It seems as if African exploration, African discovery, African invasion, African spoilation, were now the favorite employment of European adventure and enterprise. No doubt the world, from the point of view of civilization, has much to gain from this movement, and yet General Stone touched a chord of sympathy in our bosoms, when he depicted the ancient glories of that great Empire to which civilization owes so much, and from which even the most enlightened nations derived much of the inspiration that guided their progress. I have all the more pleasure, gentlemen, in seconding General Crittenden's resolution, for it recalls the first time I had the honor to meet General Stone. It was in Washington, in April and May, 1861, when he had charge of the defence of the Capitol and the public departments. The patriotism, zeal, and ability shown in that important command foreshadowed the success of his subsequent career.