

Computer Networks

COL 334/672

Network Security

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Slides adapted from KR

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Recap: Cryptographic Techniques for Network Security

- Confidentiality
- Authentication
- Message Integrity

How do we use these techniques to secure the network/networked applications?


This Class

- Security for:
 - Email
 - TCP
 - Network-layer

Operational security: firewall and IDS

Secure e-mail: confidentiality

Alice wants to send *confidential* e-mail, m , to Bob.



Alice:


- generates random *symmetric* private key, K_S
- encrypts message with K_S (for efficiency)
- also encrypts K_S with Bob's public key
- sends both $K_S(m)$ and $K_B^+(K_S)$ to Bob

Bob:

- uses his private key to decrypt and recover K_S
- uses K_S to decrypt $K_S(m)$ to recover m

Secure e-mail: integrity, authentication


Alice wants to send m to Bob, with *message integrity, authentication*



- Alice digitally signs hash of her message with her private key, providing integrity and authentication
- sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature

Secure e-mail: integrity, authentication

Alice sends m to Bob, with *confidentiality, message integrity, authentication*



How do Alice and Bob obtain each other's public keys?

This Class

- Security for:
 - Email ✓
 - **TCP**
 - Network-layer

Operational security: firewall and IDS

(HTTP) / $\frac{\text{TLS}}{\text{TCP}}$

Transport-layer security (TLS)

- widely deployed security protocol above the transport layer
 - supported by almost all browsers, web servers: https (port 443)

HTTP + TLS

- provides:

- confidentiality: via *symmetric encryption*
- ↙ • integrity: via *cryptographic hashing*
- ↘ • authentication: via *public key cryptography*

} all techniques we have studied!

- history:

- early research, implementation: secure network programming, secure sockets
- secure socket layer (SSL) deprecated [2015]
- TLS 1.3: RFC 8846 [2018]

OpenSSL


Transport-layer Security (TLS): Key Steps

- Exchange secret keys and authenticate

t-tls: initial handshake

→ Key exchange
→ Authentication

Client VHTTP Server
(Google)




t-tls handshake phase:

- Bob establishes TCP connection with Alice
- Bob verifies that Alice is really Alice
- Bob sends Alice a master secret key (MS), used to generate all other keys for TLS session
- potential issues:
 - 3 RTT before client can start receiving data (including TCP handshake)

t-tls: cryptographic keys

4x128 bits




- considered bad to use same key for more than one cryptographic function
 - different keys for message authentication code (MAC) and encryption
- four keys:
 - 🔑 K_C : encryption key for data sent from client to server
 - 🔑 M_C : MAC key for data sent from client to server
 - 🔑 K_S : encryption key for data sent from server to client
 - 🔑 M_S : MAC key for data sent from server to client
- keys derived from key derivation function (KDF)
 - takes master secret and (possibly) some additional random data to create new keys

Transport-layer Security (TLS): Key Steps

- Exchange secret keys and authenticate
- Data encryption and integrity

t-tls: encrypting data


m $K_c(H(m))$
MAC



- recall: TCP provides data *byte stream* abstraction
- Q: can we encrypt data in-stream as written into TCP socket?
 - A: where would MAC go? If at end, no message integrity until all data received and connection closed!
 - solution: break stream in series of "records"
 - each client-to-server record carries a MAC, created using M_c
 - receiver can act on each record as it arrives
- t-tls record encrypted using symmetric key, K_c , passed to TCP:



t-tls: encrypting data (more)




possible attacks on data stream?

- *re-ordering*: man-in middle intercepts TCP segments and reorders (manipulating sequence #s in unencrypted TCP header)

- *replay*

solutions:

- use TLS sequence numbers (data, TLS-seq-# incorporated into MAC),
- use nonce



$$MAC = H(Data + Seq \#)$$

Transport-layer Security (TLS): Key Steps

- Exchange secret keys and authenticate
- Data encryption and integrity
- Connection closure

t-tls: connection close

firewalls


TCP headers
are unencrypted

- truncation attack:
 - attacker forges TCP connection close segment
 - one or both sides thinks there is less data than there actually is
- **solution:** record types, with one type for closure
 - type 0 for data; type 1 for close
- MAC now computed using data, type, sequence #





Transport-layer security (TLS)

- TLS provides an API that *any* application can use




QUIC



This Class


- Security for:
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 - TCP
 - **Network-layer**

Operational security: firewall and IDS




IP Sec

- provides datagram-level encryption, authentication, integrity
 - for both user traffic and control traffic (e.g., BGP, DNS messages)
- two “modes”:



transport mode:

- *only* datagram *payload* is encrypted, authenticated



tunnel mode:


- entire datagram is encrypted, authenticated
- encrypted datagram encapsulated in new datagram with new IP header, tunneled to destination

Two IPsec protocols

- Authentication Header (AH) protocol [RFC 4302]
 - provides source authentication & data integrity but *not* confidentiality
- Encapsulation Security Protocol (ESP) [RFC 4303]
 - provides source authentication, data integrity, *and confidentiality*
 - more widely used than AH

Security associations (SAs)


- before sending data, **security association (SA)** established from sending to receiving entity (directional)
- ending, receiving entities maintain *state information* about SA
 - recall: TCP endpoints also maintain state info
 - IP is connectionless; IPsec is connection-oriented!



R1 stores for SA:

- 32-bit identifier: *Security Parameter Index (SPI)*
- origin SA interface (200.168.1.100)
- destination SA interface (193.68.2.23)
- type of encryption used
- encryption key
- type of integrity check used
- authentication key

IPsec datagram



*tunnel mode
ESP*

- ESP trailer: padding for block ciphers
- ESP header:
 - SPI, so receiving entity knows what to do
 - sequence number, to thwart replay attacks
- MAC in ESP auth field created with shared secret key

IPsec summary

- IKE message exchange for algorithms, secret keys, SPI numbers
- either AH or ESP protocol (or both)
 - AH provides integrity, source authentication
 - ESP protocol (with AH) additionally provides encryption
- IPsec peers can be two end systems, two routers/firewalls, or a router/firewall and an end system

This Class


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Operational security: firewall and IDS

Firewalls

firewall

isolates organization's internal network from larger Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others



Firewalls: why

prevent denial of service attacks:

- SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, no resources left for “real” connections

prevent illegal modification/access of internal data

- e.g., attacker replaces homepage with something else


allow only authorized access to inside network

- set of authenticated users/hosts

three types of firewalls:


- stateless packet filters
- stateful packet filters
- application gateways

Stateless packet filtering



- internal network connected to Internet via router **firewall**
- filters **packet-by-packet**, decision to forward/drop packet based on:
 - source IP address, destination IP address
 - TCP/UDP source, destination port numbers
 - ICMP message type
 - TCP SYN, ACK bits

Stateless packet filtering: example



- **example 1:** block incoming and outgoing datagrams with IP protocol field = 17 and with either source or dest port = 23
 - **result:** all incoming, outgoing UDP flows and telnet connections are blocked
- **example 2:** block inbound TCP segments with ACK=0
 - **result:** prevents external clients from making TCP connections with internal clients, but allows internal clients to connect to outside

Stateless packet filtering: more examples

Policy	Firewall Setting
no outside Web access	drop all outgoing packets to any IP address, port 80
no incoming TCP connections, except those for institution's public Web server only.	drop all incoming TCP SYN packets to any IP except 130.207.244.203, port 80
prevent Web-radios from eating up the available bandwidth.	drop all incoming UDP packets - except DNS and router broadcasts.
prevent your network from being used for a smurf DoS attack.	drop all ICMP packets going to a "broadcast" address (e.g. 130.207.255.255)
prevent your network from being tracerouted	drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired traffic

Access Control Lists

ACL: table of rules, applied top to bottom to incoming packets: (action, condition) pairs: looks like OpenFlow forwarding (Ch. 4)!

action	source address	dest address	protocol	source port	dest port	flag bit
allow	222.22/16	outside of 222.22/16	TCP	> 1023	80	any
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	TCP	80	> 1023	ACK
allow	222.22/16	outside of 222.22/16	UDP	> 1023	53	---
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	UDP	53	> 1023	----
deny	all	all	all	all	all	all

Stateful packet filtering

- *stateless packet filter*: heavy handed tool
 - admits packets that “make no sense,” e.g., dest port = 80, ACK bit set, even though no TCP connection established:

action	source address	dest address	protocol	source port	dest port	flag bit
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	TCP	80	> 1023	ACK

- *stateful packet filter*: track status of every TCP connection
 - track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN): determine whether incoming, outgoing packets “makes sense”
 - timeout inactive connections at firewall: no longer admit packets


Stateful packet filtering

ACL augmented to indicate need to check connection state table before admitting packet

action	source address	dest address	proto	source port	dest port	flag bit	check connection
allow	222.22/16	outside of 222.22/16	TCP	> 1023	80	any	
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	TCP	80	> 1023	ACK	X
allow	222.22/16	outside of 222.22/16	UDP	> 1023	53	---	
allow	outside of 222.22/16	222.22/16	UDP	53	> 1023	----	X
deny	all	all	all	all	all	all	

Application gateways

- filter packets on application data as well as on IP/TCP/UDP fields.
- *example:* allow select internal users to telnet outside



1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.
2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host
 - gateway relays data between 2 connections
3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway

Limitations of firewalls, gateways


- **IP spoofing:** router can't know if data "really" comes from claimed source
- if multiple apps need special treatment, each has own app. gateway
- client software must know how to contact gateway
 - e.g., must set IP address of proxy in Web browser
- filters often use all or nothing policy for UDP
- *tradeoff:* degree of communication with outside world, level of security
- many highly protected sites still suffer from attacks

Intrusion detection systems

- packet filtering:
 - operates on TCP/IP headers only
 - no correlation check among sessions
- IDS: intrusion detection system
 - deep packet inspection: look at packet contents (e.g., check character strings in packet against database of known virus, attack strings)
 - examine correlation among multiple packets
 - port scanning
 - network mapping
 - DoS attack

Intrusion detection systems

multiple IDSs: different types of checking at different locations



Network Security (summary)

basic techniques.....

- cryptography (symmetric and public key)
- message integrity
- end-point authentication

.... used in many different security scenarios

- secure email
- secure transport (TLS)
- IP sec

operational security: firewalls and IDS

Attendance

