

# **XSS Cheat Sheet**

**CQ/GRANITE ENGINEERING** 

# **Philosophy**

# - Allow all input - Encode all output

Do not filter or encode input that gets stored but always protect the user on output.

### - Encode at the very end

Encode the output-statement itself not intermediate values, so it is always obvious that an output statement is not dangerous, and you know you are encoding for the right context.

### - Don't think too much

Encode the content no matter where it is coming from. Your code might be copied or included, and the ACLs on the property might change.

### - Never do it yourself

Never write the encoding/filtering methods yourself. XSS encoding is very difficult and error prone. If something is missing in the library, please file a bug.

# - Prefer a validator to an encoder

Some situations, such as href and src attributes, MUST use a validator

HTL automatically filters and escapes all variables being output to the presentation layer to prevent cross-site-scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities.

https://docs.adobe.com/docs/en/htl/docs/expression-language.html#Display%20Context



# How to get the XSSAPI Service?

## Java component

private XSSAPI xssAPI;

@Reference

import org.apache.sling.xss.XSSAPI;

```
java
import org.apache.sling.xss.XSSAPI;

public class MyClass {
    private void myFunction(ResourceResolver resourceResolver) {
        XSSAPI xssAPI = resourceResolver.adaptTo(XSSAPI.Class);
    }
}
```

#### JSI

```
<<@ include file="/libs/foundation/global.jsp" %>
<title><%= xssAPI.encodeForHTML(title); %></title>
```

# **XSSAPI: Methods**

### Validators (excerpt)

```
// Get a valid dimension (e.g. an image width parameter)
public String getValidDimension(String dimension, String defaultValue);

// Get a valid URL (Needs request-/resourceresolver specific API, see below)
public String getValidHref(String url);

// Get a valid integer from a string
public Integer getValidInteger(String integer, int defaultValue);

// Get a valid long from a string
public Long getValidLong(String long, long defaultValue);

// Validate a Javascript token.

// The value must be either a single identifier, a literal number, or a literal string.
public String getValidJSToken(String token, String defaultValue);
```

### **Encoders (excerpt)**

```
// Encode string to use inside an HTML tag
public String encodeForHTML(String source);

// Encode string to use inside an HTML attribute
public String encodeForHTMLAttr(String source);

// Encode string to use inside an XML tag
public String encodeForXML(String source);

// Encode string to use inside an XML attribute
public String encodeForXMLAttr(String source);

// Encode string to use as a JavaScript string
public String encodeForJSString(String source);

// Encode string to use as a CSS string
public String encodeForCSSString(String source);
```

#### **Filters**

```
// Filter a string using the AntiSamy library to allow certain tags
public String filterHTML(String source);
```

Filters potentially user-contributed HTML to meet the AntiSamy policy rules currently in effect for HTML output (see the XSSFilter service for details).

# JCR based URL mapping

```
// Use one of these to get an XSSAPI suitable for validating URLs
public XSSAPI getRequestSpecificAPI(SlingHttpServletRequest request);
public XSSAPI getResourceResolverSpecificAPI(ResourceResolver resolver);
```

# **Taglib**

## **Taglib**

```
<cq:text property="jcr:title" tagName="h2" escapeXml="true">
```

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#### HTL

HTL automatically filters and escapes all variables being output to the presentation layer to prevent cross-site-scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities, by detecting the correct escaping context depending on the current HTML node and / or attribute.

For more details check the available display contexts from : https://github.com/Adobe-Marketing-Cloud/sightly-spec/blob/master/SPECIFICATION.md#121-display-context.

#### **Exceptions**

- 1. Output generated in <script> and <style> tags require an explicit context, since by default HTL will not add one and will instead output empty strings.
- 2. The style and the HTML Event attributes [1] also require an explicit context.
- [1] https://www.w3.org/TR/html5/webappapis.html#event-handlers-on-elements,-document-objects,-and-window-objects

# **Examples**

# **Example API usages for the most common contexts**

```
String title = request.getParameter("title");
  String alertText = request.getParameter("alertText");
  String link = request.getParameter("link");
  String fontSize = request.getParameter("fontSize");
  String className = request.getParameter("className");
  XSSAPI myXssAPI = xssAPI.getRequestSpecificAPI(request);
<%@ include file="/libs/foundation/global.jsp" %>
<html>
   <head><title><%= xssAPI.encodeForHTML(title); %></title></head>
      <%= xssAPI.filterHTML("Text with legitimate <b>HTML</b> Tags"); %>
      <font size="<%= xssAPI.getValidInteger(fontSize); %>">
         <a href="<%= myXssAPI.getValidHref(link) %>" >click me</a>
      <span class="<%= xssAPI.encodeForHTMLAttr(className); %>">
         <cq:text property="jcr:description" tagName="p" escapeXml="true">
      <script>alert('<%= xssAPI.encodeForJSString(alertText); %>');
      </script>
   </bgdy>
</html>
```

# Some exploit strings for testing

### **HTML** attributes

"><script>alert(23);</script>

#### **Node namest**

"><img src=bogus onError=alert(23)>

### **JSON Attributes**

"};alert(23);a={"a":

### **HTML** tags

</script><script>alert(23);</script>

See also: OWASP XSS Filter Evasion Cheat Sheet



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