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Ideology-driven opinion formation in Europe: The case of attitudes towards the third sector in Sweden

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Abstract. This paper uses attitudes towards the third sector in Sweden to test general assumptions about how citizens in West European political systems apply ideological schemas as shortcuts to political preferences. Attitudes towards the third sector are found to be affected by all ideological schemas reflected in the Swedish party system (state-market, Christian traditionalism, and growth-ecology). Contrary to what is implied by findings from America, these effects are very stable across socio-economic groups (especially those of the dominant state-market schema). Similarly, no interaction effects of political sophistication could be traced, and the relative impact of the schemas remains the same regardless of whether or not the third sector is presented as an alternative to the welfare state. The implications of these findings for the nature of public opinion formation in ideologically clear and structured political systems are discussed.

Introduction

Citizens regularly face political issues which they know little about and towards which they have no firm pre-existing attitudes. Yet if you ask them, people will somehow manage to swiftly form opinions on the spot, based only on immediately available information (Zaller 1992; Sniderman 1993; Lupia 1994; Chong 1996; Kinder 1998). One powerful explanation for this is that they use *ideological shortcuts* (Downs 1957; Inglehart & Klingemann 1976; Popkin 1991; Sniderman et al. 1991). When forming an opinion, citizens do not collect large amounts of issue-specific information. Rather, they are 'cognitive misers' who apply a more general ideological orientation to the meagre information directly at hand.

This paper tests a number of key assumptions about such shortcut-driven opinion formation. More exactly, I examine hypotheses about *which* ideological shortcuts are used by *which* citizens. These hypotheses are examined in the context of attitudes towards 'the third sector' (in broad terms, voluntary non-profit organisations) among the Swedish electorate. Moreover, the paper explores the implications of the fact that theories about ideological shortcuts have been developed mainly in America. This poses the problem of how these theories can be developed in order to travel comfortably to European countries, where political conflicts have a considerably higher degree of ideo-

logical clarity, stability and persistence (Granberg & Holmberg 1988; van der Eijk et al. 1996; van der Brug & van der Eijk 1999).

The paper first identifies some basic assumptions about how individuals use ideological schemas as shortcuts to opinions. Second, those assumptions are examined in the light of the fact that Sweden is a West European political system marked by ideologically clear and stable political conflicts. The nature of these conflicts has implications for predictions as to which schemas will be used by which citizens. Third, relevant research on the structure of ideological conflict in Sweden is reviewed. Fourth, the paper goes on to discuss why the case of attitudes towards the third sector in Sweden offers a suitable laboratory to examine the character and impact of ideological schemas. The theoretical discussion generates a set of empirical hypotheses about the relationship between attitudes towards the third sector and ideological schemas among different groups of people and these are developed in the fifth part of the paper. After a presentation of the data, empirical tests are undertaken in the sixth part of the paper. Finally, the implications of theories and findings for the nature of opinion formation in ideologically structured West European political systems are discussed.

Ideological schemas as informational shortcuts

The ideological shortcut argument has been specified in several ways. For example, Downs (1957) assumed that citizens simplify the political world by relating issues to one overarching conflict dimension which can subsume much of political life. Cognitive misers 'reduce all political questions to their bearing upon one crucial issue: how much government intervention in the economy should there be?' (Downs 1957: 116). When a citizen forms her opinions, the most important information is how different alternatives fit with her position along that dimension (Fuchs & Klingemann 1989; Knutsen 1995).[1]

In recent decades, the ideological shortcut argument has increasingly been interpreted from the perspective of social psychological 'schema theory' (see Conover & Feldman 1984; Lau & Sears 1986; Sniderman et al. 1991; Wyer & Ottatti 1993; Eagly & Chaiken 1993).[2] A schema is a cognitive structure of previous knowledge and feelings about a class of objects. Typically, schemas are organised around semantic categories, for instance 'welfare state', 'taxes', 'market economy' and so on. Such categories are often affect-laden; they carry an 'affective tag' of memorised degrees of goodness and badness (Fiske 1986; Lodge & Stroh 1993; Sears 1993). There are also a number of related beliefs ('the welfare state gives people an equal opportunity', 'the market

generates wealth'). Ideological schemas, then, are schemas organised around semantic categories of very general political relevance.[3]

An ideological schema can be used to interpret and evaluate novel political objects. Rather than collecting costly object-specific information people make inferences from what they already know and feel about a more general category to which the new issue is perceived to belong (Conover & Feldman 1984; Lau & Sears 1986). Schemas are thus stereotyping devices which replace missing data with familiar information which has been previously evaluated (see Hofstetter et al. 1999; Valentino 1999). How does this work? First, the citizen searches her mind for schema categories which may approximate the issue. Cognitive misers interrupt their search when an acceptable, rather than perfect, understanding of the issue has been reached (Fiske 1986; Kinder 1998). Second, the affect associated with the activated schema category is transmitted to the new issue (Sears 1993; Lodge & McGraw 1995). The formed opinion, then, will not be a function of information and deliberation particular to the specific issue. Rather, it echoes beliefs and feelings belonging to a more general ideological schema.

Many studies conclude that people typically have several schemas which can be used for interpretation of the same political objects (Lau 1989; Kinder 1998). Such competing schemas are often relatively independent of each other. This lack of integration means that depending on which schema an individual applies to an issue, significantly different opinions may be formed (Zaller 1992). As Sapiro & Soss (1999: 287) explain, "citizens do not all share a single set of 'capstone ideas' through which they understand and judge politics. People's responses to politics reflect a wide range of considerations. Indeed, individuals' manifest preferences and opinions often reflect ambivalent mixtures of conflicting considerations and values". In turn, the observation that several competing schemas can exist side by side in the mind of the citizen has given birth to an intriguing research problem: "How (are) we to know which political schema will be applied?" (Lau & Sears 1986: 362). In other words, how can we explain which ideological schemas are used by which citizens?

Which schemas among which citizens?

Much research contends that individuals are quite volatile and open to systematic influence in their choices of schemas to be used for opinion formation (Lau & Sears 1986; Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Zaller 1992; Gamson 1992; Mutz et al. 1996; Chong 1996; Valentino 1999). People seem prone to pick *certain* schemas, and momentarily to forget about others. Few are sophisticated

enough to devote additional consideration to the issue by looking at it through a second or even a third schema (Sniderman et al. 1991; Zaller 1992).

These results introduce the possibility that different people use different schemas to interpret the same political objects. For instance, Lau (1989) demonstrated that some Americans tend to evaluate presidential candidates on the basis of party-related information. Yet other groups of people make up their minds using group-, issue- or candidate-centred schemas (Lau 1989: 25–28; Huckfeldt et al. 1999).

Similarly, Sapiro & Soss (1999) found that attitudes towards the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill scandal reflected very different considerations among different subsets of the population. Interpretations of the issue reflected group affiliations and living conditions, rather than a commonly defined dimension of conflict. For instance, white women were more likely to look at the issue as a case of gender politics and sexual harassment, whereas blacks were inclined to apply a race politics schema, and so on. These findings not only suggest that different groups of citizens hold different opinions. More interestingly, they also suggest that different people use different schemas to interpret the same issue. People differ not only as to what they think about political objects, but also as to what they think objects *are about*. Expressed differently, different groups of citizens do not share a common conflict dimension. Neither do they share a common language for political communication (Sapiro & Soss 1999).

In addition, many researchers expect an impact of *political sophistication* (Converse 1964; Sniderman et al. 1991; Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996; Ferejohn & Kuklinski 1990; Bartels 1996; Gastil & Dillard 1999; Huckfeldt et al. 1999; Goren 2001). An individual is more politically sophisticated the more political information she remembers, the more political domains the remembered information covers and the more interrelated with each other (or 'constrained') the pieces of information are (Luskin 1987, 1990). Several scholars have suggested that the politically sophisticated are better at identifying the opinion that fits best their ideological predispositions (Converse 1964; Hamill & Lodge 1986; Zaller 1992; Bartels 1996). That is, politically sophisticated citizens are thought to be more skilled in encoding the ideological content of political information (Zaller 1992). Also, the politically sophisticated are more likely to consider several, perhaps competing, ideological schemas. A large and tightly knit cognitive structure makes the individual more sensitive to alternative interpretations. For these reasons the literature suggests that the effects of ideological schemas on opinions should grow with political sophistication (Sniderman et al. 1991).

How an issue is *cued* (or 'framed') is also a crucial issue in this research. Political stimuli typically come with a number of ideological cues answer-

ing questions like 'what is this issue about?' and 'to which of my schema categories is it relevant?' (Fiske 1986; Zaller 1992; Gamson 1992). People use these cues to figure out which schema category might approximate the object to be evaluated. Consequently, alterations of which ideological cues are emphasised, for instance in survey questions, should influence citizens' schema choices.

Finally, *salience* is important. Schemas used often, and those recently activated, are more likely to be applied again than those which have been rarely used (Srull & Wyer 1979; Wyer & Ottati 1993; Huckfeldt et al. 1999). Zaller (1992: 48) drew on this idea in his accessibility axiom: 'the more recently a consideration has been called to mind or thought about, the less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related considerations from memory and bring them to the top of the head for use'. An implication of the accessibility axiom is that people are likely to use ideological schemas that they have often used in the recent past, also when less salient schemas would be logically just as appropriate.[4]

Schemas go Europe: The impact of ideologically clear and structured party systems

These assumptions about schemas and shortcuts have been developed mainly in America. How can they be refined in order to travel comfortably to European political systems? Here, a number of researchers have found that the nature of opinion formation and voting behaviour varies with the nature of the party system (Granberg & Holmberg 1988, 1990, 1996; van der Eijk et al. 1996; Oppenhuis 1995). If elite politics is clearly and persistently structured by stable party-driven ideological conflict (as opposed to individualist candidate-driven), it is easier to learn, remember and apply ideological schemas. The stronger party conflict is in these respects, the more well-developed, emotionally strong, and easily accessible the corresponding ideological schemas in citizens' minds (for similar discussions and/or findings, see Budge et al. 1976; Carmines & Stimson 1980; Niemi & Westholm 1984; Fuchs & Klingemann 1989; Dalton & Wattenberg 1993; Bartels 1996; van Wijnen 2000). Using political psychology parlance, such schemas can be thought of as 'symbolic orientations' (Sears et al. 1980; Sears 1993) which over time are made 'chronically accessible' (Lau 1989) to citizens by ideologically clear and persistent party conflict.

How does a strong party system affect predictions as to which schemas are used by which citizens? According to one modification to the theory, very different groups of citizens will tend to choose the same schemas when forming opinions. This is because a strong party system provides people who

have different group affiliations and living conditions with a clear, persistent and common source of political learning. As parties reiterate the same symbolic conflicts, corresponding ideological schemas will finally become chronically accessible among virtually all groups of citizens. In contrast to what has convincingly been demonstrated in American studies, a common understanding of what 'politics is about' will be established across different groups in society (compare with Lau 1989; Sapiro & Soss 1999; Huckfeldt et al. 1999). People might differ as to what they think about political issues, but there will be consensus as to what they think issues are about. This is to say that different groups of citizens share common dimensions of conflict, and that they share a common language for political communication (Granberg & Holmberg 1988; van der Eijk et al. 1996; Oscarsson 1998; van der Brug & van der Eijk 1999; Thomassen 1999).

Another modification to the theory in European systems concerns political sophistication. Even unsophisticated citizens should be able to recall and accurately use ideological schemas mirrored by clear and persistent party conflict. Recollection and use of schemas demands little sophistication if one is persistently and consistently reminded about their importance and content (for similar arguments, see Carmines & Stimson 1980; Granberg & Holmberg 1988). Even the politically inattentive will learn to apply the enduring and unmistakeable basic building blocks of political competition. Thus, in a strong party system, the prediction is that people with different levels of political sophistication will not differ much as to which and how many party-promoted schemas they use.

A third theoretical modification is that in a strong party system we would expect the impact of ideological cueing to be small. Again, the reason is that certain ideological schemas have been dubbed 'chronically accessible' by an ideologically clear and persistent party system. The impact of such chosen schemas will not be easily manipulated by subtle cueing. Regardless of what ideological cues look like, people automatically recall chronically accessible schemas as soon as they are confronted with political objects (Sears 1993).[5] They do not look carefully at cues stating what an issue is about. Rather, they assume that old reliable schemas are relevant to the new object as well. If needed, old schemas are used to impute missing data into unknown issues so that issues fit schemas even better.

Ideological schemas in Sweden

So far the discussion has covered ideological schemas in the abstract. However, to arrive at testable hypotheses one must consider which schemas come into question in the political system under study. Recycling Schank & Abel-

son observe that (1977: 10), 'it does not take one very far to say that schemas are important: one must know the contents of the schemas'.

Research has detected several schemas which structure political choices among the Swedish electorate. Three of these will be analysed here: *state-market orientations, Christian traditionalist orientations*, and *growth-ecology orientations*.[6] The argument for focusing on these is that they reflect the three basic substantive political conflicts represented in the Swedish party system (Holmberg 1981; Gilljam & Holmberg 1993; Bennulf 1994; Oscarsson 1998; Aardal et al. 1998). This is crucial as our hypotheses about which schemas are used by which citizens will be based on the assumption that the schemas are clearly and persistently mirrored by stable party conflict.

The state-market schema has been a crucial variable ever since survey-based electoral research started in Sweden in the mid-1950s (see Särlvik 1970, 1974; Petersson 1977; Holmberg 1981; Granberg & Holmberg 1988; Gilljam & Holmberg 1990, 1995; Bennulf 1994; Oskarson 1992, 1994; Oscarsson 1998). The core component of this schema is a conflict about how much state intervention in the market economy there should be. The important semantic categories defining the schema are 'the public sector', 'the welfare state', 'market economy', 'taxes', 'privatisation' and the like. Feelings and beliefs about these symbols are very powerful predictors of opinions and party choice. There are no immediate signs that they will lose their prominence in this respect (Gilljam and Holmberg 1995; Oscarsson 1998).

Although the state-market schema still dominates Swedish electoral politics it now faces competition. Oscarsson's (1998) analysis of the dimensionality in citizens' party evaluations during the last forty years showed that, although the state-market dimension is still of prime importance in structuring perceptions of the party space, its dominance has weakened somewhat. For instance, Christian traditionalist orientations are responsible for breaking up the uni-dimensionality of party evaluations. Christian traditionalists hold positive feelings and beliefs about schematic categories such as 'Christian values', 'the family, 'law and order' and 'Swedish traditions' (Oscarsson 1998; Holmberg 1981). In the party system, the Christian Democrats are closest to the Christian traditionalist schema extreme. This party gained parliamentary representation for the first time in 1991.[7]

The third ideological schema is the growth-ecology schema. At the ecology extreme we find people strongly in favour of efforts to solve environmental problems, even if it means declining growth and reductions in consumption (Nas 1995). When measuring the growth-ecology schema, one is likely to capture variation also along some conceptually related dimensions (Nas 1995; Scarbrough 1995). Of course, the most important one is the post-

materialist dimension. Inspired by Inglehart's (1977, 1990) work, researchers have looked for 'new politics' in Sweden (Bennulf & Holmberg 1990; Bennulf 1994, 1995; Oscarsson 1998). Such politics would be driven by a value conflict between materialists (who value economic consumption standards and physical protection) and postmaterialists (who emphasise non-physical values such as quality of life, democratic principles and a healthy environment). The new value conflict would structure attitudes towards a wide range of topics such as growth-ecology issues, authority, democratic principles, decentralisation and citizen participation. However, the available evidence suggests that the new postmaterialist politics has a far weaker impact on the structure of political conflict in Sweden than the old materialist politics (Bennulf 1994, 1995; Bennulf & Holmberg 1990; Oscarsson 1998). Nevertheless, these studies also indicate that voters have a more limited growth-ecology schema consisting of fairly interrelated 'green' attitudes which improves predictions of party preferences significantly. In the party system, the ecology extreme is represented most clearly by the Greens (which entered parliament in 1988), and by the countryside-oriented Centre Party.

Why study attitudes towards the third sector in Sweden?

The third sector can be understood as a set of voluntary and non-profit organisations (Salamon & Anheier 1997).[8] These more or less formalised organisations are driven mainly by forces other than the market or political decisions. The sector involves a diverse set of undertakings such as human services, culture, recreation and political mobilisation. (Gidron et al. 1992; Salamon & Anheier 1997; Lundström & Wijkström 1997; Johnson et al. 1998; Billis & Glennerster 1998). The central dependent variable in this paper is popular attitudes towards letting the third sector become more important in social and political life.

Why do attitudes towards the third sector in Sweden offer a suitable laboratory for examining ideological schemas? First, the issue could easily be interpreted by each of the three ideological schemas.[9] For instance, one might expect state interventionists to view the third sector as a threat to a strong welfare state. Moreover, Christian traditionalists might associate the third sector with a preferred traditional social order with small communities meeting a moral obligation to assist people in the locality. Finally, ecology-oriented citizens might welcome third sector voluntarism as a counterweight to centralised authority. Indeed, they might perceive the third sector as a well-suited forum for the new politics slogan 'think global, act local'. In summary, because the third sector can easily be given multiple ideological meanings,

it offers opportunities to test hypotheses about which schemas are used by which citizens.

Why should one look at attitudes towards the third sector in Sweden? The first reason is that the nature of political conflict in Sweden is markedly different to that of the United States where, to a large extent, theories of schemas and shortcuts have been developed. In Sweden, as in many other countries in Western Europe, 'responsible parties' appeal to voters on the basis of general platforms based on ideology and policy (Klingemann et al. 1994; Esaiasson & Holmberg 1996; Schmitt & Thomassen 1999). The ideological conflict dimensions underlying these appeals only change with glacial velocity (Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 1992; Oskarson 1994). In addition, the responsible party mode of political competition in Sweden gives much less attention to individual politicians than the more candidate-oriented American system (see Wattenberg 1990; Esaiasson & Holmberg 1996). Since this paper argues that a strong party-based system has consequences for predictions as to which schemas are used by which citizens, Sweden is a relevant case to study (see Granberg & Holmberg 1988, for a similar argument).

A second argument in favour of basing the analysis on a study of Sweden has to do with the role of the third sector in Swedish society. Because of the large welfare state, Swedish third sector organisations are mainly responsible for recreation, sport or political mobilisation. In contrast to many other West European countries, the main activity is not production of human services and welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990; Boli 1991; Gidron et al. 1992; Lundström & Wijkström 1997; Salamon & Anheier 1997). Therefore, the relationship between the third sector and the public sector has rarely been one of deep political conflict. Rather, in Scandinavia, this relationship can be characterised by a high degree of co-operation and consensus (Klaussen & Selle 1996; Boli 1991; Rothstein 1998). Since the Swedish third sector is not overly politicised it is unlikely that many citizens are motivated enough to build and keep track of well-developed attitudes towards the third sector which they can simply report from memory when prompted (Lodge & Stroh 1993; Feldman 1995; Huckfeldt et al. 1999).[10] Of course, this does not mean that people cannot make sense of the third sector. However, because most of them lack firm pre-existing attitudes, they must rely on familiar ideological schemas to impute political meaning into a rarely encountered issue.

Four hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: The state-market, Christian traditionalist, and growth-ecology schemas respectively, all affect third sector attitudes: market-oriented in-

dividuals, Christian traditionalists and ecologists respectively, hold more positive attitudes towards the third sector than others.

Many studies contend that citizens are prone to emphasise one schema and momentarily 'forget' about others (for an overview, see Kinder 1998). However, since the three particular schemas in Hypothesis 1 are persistently and simultaneously emphasised in a strong party system, we expect them to be 'chronically salient'. That is, people recall all of them more or less automatically. They do not reduce the meaning of the complex third sector issue by processing it through only one of the relevant schemas.

Hypothesis 2: The effects of the three party system-promoted schemas in Hypothesis 1 are stable across socio-economic and demographic groups.

The notion that people emphasise different schemas on different occasions (Zaller 1992) opens the door to differences in emphasis across different groups in society. This has been convincingly shown to be applicable in American studies (Lau 1989; Sapiro & Soss 1999; Huckfeldt et al. 1999). However, as reflected by Hypothesis 2, strong party systems forcefully establish a common political language which is easily accessible and well-rehearsed regardless of group affiliation, living conditions and the like. Empirically, Hypothesis 2 will be tested by allowing the effects of ideological schemas on attitudes towards the third sector to interact with a number of variables which have been suggested in the literature as potential causes of schema usage (for example age, sector employment, class affiliation and income). Of course, Hypothesis 2 predicts that such interactions will not enhance our ability to explain third sector attitudes.

Hypothesis 3: In Sweden, with its clear and stable party system, the magnitude of state-market, Christian traditionalism, and growth-ecology effects on attitudes towards the third sector will not increase at higher levels of political sophistication.

American public opinion researchers have often found that effects of ideological schemas increase with political sophistication (see Goren 2001; Sniderman et al. 1991; Zaller 1992; Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996). In a strong party system, however, we expect even the politically unsophisticated to learn and use those schemas which are persistently reiterated by stable party conflict.

Hypothesis 4: Regardless of whether ideological cues are clearly related to the welfare state or not, the relative impact of state-market, Christian traditionalist, and growth-ecology orientations respectively stays the same.

Several studies have suggested that different schemas acquire primacy depending on how a stimulus is framed (Fiske 1986; Zaller 1992; Gamson 1992;

Kinder 1998). Again these studies originate from the USA where political conflict revolves around candidates and their competence rather than around party-based ideological conflict (Wattenberg 1990). Such a political system makes it less likely that certain schemas are recalled clearly and persistently enough to become chronically salient at the expense of others. People will therefore need to look more intensely for cues as to which schema might be relevant. Conversely, citizens in strong party systems will, out of habit, assume that a new issue can be readily interpreted with chronically salient schemas. In examining Hypothesis 4, the empirical focus will be on one politically important case of 'cue manipulation': the relative presence of cues indicating a relation between the third sector and the welfare state.

Data and measurement

The data come from three sources.[11] First, the author was given the opportunity to collect data within the 1998 Swedish Election Study.[12] This study included a battery of questions inviting responses to suggested ways of organising society in the future. Among them was the suggestion that one should 'Create a society where idealistic organisations and voluntarism play more important roles'. Respondents placed this suggestion on an eleven-point scale from zero (very bad suggestion) to 10 (very good suggestion) with 5 (neither good nor bad suggestion) explicitly labelled as the middle alternative.

Two further sources of data came from two surveys conducted by the SOM Institute[13] among social science students at Göteborg University.[14] In the fall of 1997, 314 students responded to an item very similar to the one subsequently included in the 1998 Election Study. One year later exactly 600 students evaluated the proposals to 'Redistribute some of society's resources via voluntary organisations instead of via public benefit systems' and 'Transfer some public social service tasks to voluntary organisations'. The alternatives were 'very good', 'rather good', 'neither good nor bad', 'rather bad' and 'very bad suggestion'. To familiarise ourselves with these dependent variables, let us look at their univariate distributions (Table 1).

The items in Table 1 fulfil the most basic criterion for subsequent use in explanatory analysis: the stimuli manage to produce substantial variation in response. However, the distributions are skewed. Those who responded to the 11-point scale items were more likely to express positive attitudes towards the third sector (for these items around 50 percent were on the positive side of the third sector fence). Conversely, those who answered the questions used in the 1998 student survey tended to be negative (only 18 and 23 percent respectively regarded these suggestions as 'very' or 'rather' good).[15]

Table 1. Frequency distributions of dependent third sector attitude variables

	Create a society where idealistic organisations and voluntarism play more important roles		Create a society where idealistic efforts and voluntary organizations play more important roles	
	The 1998 Swedish Election Study (mean 5.85 SD 2.20)		The 1997 Student SOM Survey (mean 5.69 SD 2.54)	
	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency
0 very bad suggestion	2.2	39	4.3	13
1	0.9	15	1.3	4
2	4.5	78	7.3	22
3	5.4	94	7.9	24
4	5.6	97	3.3	10
5 neither good nor bad suggestion	30.9	538	27.2	82
6	12.3	214	8.3	25
7	15.1	264	12.9	39
8	12.4	216	15.9	48
9	4.0	70	3.3	10
10 very good suggestion	6.8	118	8.3	25
Total	100.0	1743	100.0	302
	Redistribute some of society's resources via voluntary organizations instead of via public benefit systems		Transfer some public social service tasks to voluntary organisations	
	The 1998 Swedish Election Study (mean 5.85 SD 2.20)		The 1997 Student SOM Survey (mean 5.69 SD 2.54)	
	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency
Very good suggestion	4.1	24	3.2	19
Rather good suggestion	18.4	108	14.5	85
Neither good nor bad suggestion	24.6	144	23.2	136
Rather bad suggestion	29.5	173	32.8	192
Very bad suggestion	23.4	137	26.2	153
Total	100.0	586	100.0	585

One needs to handle such measurements with great care. It is tempting to treat these variables as interval level scales. However, since we are dealing with an issue that has not been submitted to the court of public opinion on a regular basis, primarily because of the extended welfare state arrangements in Sweden, it is unlikely that many citizens hold firm pre-formed attitudes towards the third sector (Feldman 1995; Huckfeldt et al. 1999). Consequently, it would be hazardous to treat attitudes towards the third sector as delicately chosen positions along a fine-tuned gradual continuum. It is more reasonable to regard responses as rougher and somewhat more categorical statements (see Diamond & Cobb (1996) for a similar argument). Empirically this will mean dichotomization, dividing the dependent variable into support or opposition for the third sector. While this involves some loss of information, the information lost is unlikely to be systematic or theoretically meaningful.

Empirical results

Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2: Effects of the three ideological schemas, and differences in schema usage across groups

We first turn to empirical tests of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. The 1998 Swedish Election Study allows operationalisation of all the concepts involved. Three schema measures and one political sophistication scale were extracted using principal components factor analysis (one factor analysis for each of the four measures).[16] The variables were scored so that high values represent high degrees of support for the market, Christian traditionalism, ecologism, and political sophistication respectively. Table 2 reports three logistic regression models where attitudes towards the third sector constitute the dependent variable, as measured by the 11-point scale in Table 1. The scale has been dichotomised (1 = positive or neutral response, 0 = negative response to the third sector). The models thus predict the log-odds of giving a positive (meaning non-negative) response towards the third sector.

The model in the first column involves the three schema variables only. The main observation is that all three display significant and roughly equal logit coefficients.[17] It is predicted that an increase of one standard deviation unit along the factor scales increases the log-odds of positive third sector response with about 0.3 to 0.4. Market-oriented citizens, Christian traditionalists, and ecologists are thus all more likely than others to favour the third sector. To get a more intuitive feeling for these logit effects, we may translate them into effects on predicted probabilities. At the mean (0) of the two other variables in the equation, the effect of moving from the lower standard deviation point (−1) to the higher (+1), on the probability of a positive third

Table 2. Effects of ideology, control variables, and political sophistication interaction terms on attitudes towards the third sector in the 1998 Swedish Election Study (logistic regression)

	Model 1: Ideological schemas		Model 2: Ideological schemas and control variables		Model 3: Ideological schemas, control variables and political sophistication interactions	
	B	*p*-value	B	*p*-value	B	*p*-value
Ideological schemas						
State-market orientations	0.394	0.000	0.422	0.000	0.398	0.000
Christian traditionalism	0.386	0.000	0.322	0.000	0.290	0.000
Growth-ecology orientations	0.285	0.000	0.298	0.000	0.318	0.000
Control variables						
Age in years	–	–	0.010	0.048	0.010	0.057
Gender (1 = woman, 0 = man)	–	–	0.023	0.886	0.017	0.916
Public sector employment	–	–	−0.232	0.125	−0.206	0.182
Subjective class identification (1 = middle class, 0 = worker)	–	–	−0.200	0.194	−0.206	0.182
Income (100,000 SEK)	–	–	0.005	0.940	0.007	0.919
Religious	–	–	0.226	0.241	0.216	0.264
Political sophistication	–	–	−0.057	0.495	−0.306	0.676
Political sophistication × schema interactions						
Political sophistication × state-market	–	–	–	–	0.041	0.610
Political sophistication × christian traditionalism	–	–	–	–	0.094	0.210
Political sophistication × growth-ecology	–	–	–	–	−0.035	0.663
Constant	1.490	0.000	1.177	0.000	1.188	0.000
Chi-square improvement (df)	77.62 (3)	0.000	9.65 (7)	0.209	2.55 (3)	0.466

The dependent variable is coded 1 = positive or neutral response (5–10), 0 = negative response (0–4). N = 1372, initial −2 log likelihood value = 1374.7. For information about schema measures, and the political sophistication measure, see text. Other independent variables were coded as follows. Public sector employment: 1 = national-, regional-, or local government administration, 0 = others. Subjective class identification: 0 = working class family, 1 = white-collar, academic, farming, or private enterprise. Religious: 1 = respondent stated that she was rather or very religious, 0 = others.

sector response is 0.12 for both state-market and Christian traditionalism, and 0.11 for growth-ecology.[18]

In order to reduce the risk of spurious effect interpretations, the second column in Table 2 adds a number of demographic control variables to the model. Controlling for ideological schemas, these variables only modestly

Table 3. Adding interaction terms to main-effects logistic regression models predicting attitudes towards the third sector (1998 Swedish Election Study)

Added interactions	Chi-square improvement	df	*p*-value
Schemas × subjective class	2.24	3	0.525
Schemas × public employment	5.80	3	0.122
Schemas × age	2.18	3	0.536
Schemas × income	11.99	3	0.007
Schemas × religious	1.82	3	0.610
Schemas × gender	0.843	3	0.839

For variable descriptions see Table 2 and related main text.

increase the model fit (chi-square improvement = 9.65, df 7, $p = 0.209$). Nevertheless, some coefficients approach significance and are substantively meaningful, although weak. For instance, higher age and religiosity are predicted to make attitudes towards the third sector more positive. Public sector employees and middle class citizens hold somewhat more negative attitudes than others.

Consistent with Hypothesis 1, then, these data provide some evidence that no fewer than three ideological schemas promoted by the party system are used by the Swedish electorate to interpret and evaluate the third sector. Hypothesis 2, however, makes the even stronger claim that schema effects are stable across groups. The strong party system is believed to facilitate an ideological framework common to virtually all groups in society. Of course, the data so far do not test this hypothesis. In fact, it is quite possible that important interaction variables have been left unspecified, and that their inclusion would alter the neat and coherent picture shown in Table 2.

To test Hypothesis 2, an analysis in two steps was undertaken. In the first step, sets of interaction variables were added to main-effects models. For instance, to a model including the main effects of the three schemas and the main effect of subjective class, I added three 'class × schema' interaction terms. The results from this first step in the analysis can be inspected in Table 3.

The interaction variables were chosen on the basis of theoretical expectations as to how they could affect schema usage. First, it was hypothesised that the state-market schema is more salient to members of the working class than to others. Swedish workers have been successfully mobilised by strong trade unions with close links to the Social Democratic Party (Korpi 1983; Oskarson 1992; Rothstein 1992). These organisations have been involved mainly in the politics of wages, redistribution, taxes and welfare (Rothstein 1992). It

is possible that workers, because of their closer connection to state-market focused interest organisations, face political information related to the state-market schema more often than other citizens. Such information should make the state-market schema more accessible, and the Christian traditionalism and growth-ecology schemas less accessible, in workers' minds. However, this prediction is not supported by the data. The three subjective class interaction terms make only a small and statistically insignificant contribution to the overall model fit (chi-square improvement = 2.24, df 3, $p = 0.525$; to be significant at the 0.05-level, an observed chi-square improvement with three degrees of freedom must amount to 7.81).

It is possible that public sector employment tends to make the state-market schema more accessible at the cost of growth-ecology and Christian traditionalist concerns. In recent years, there have been severe cutbacks in most parts of the Swedish public sector (Svallfors 1996). A reasonable expectation is that people who face problems directly related to questions concerning the size of the public sector in their everyday work environment are more used to thinking about politics in terms of the state versus the market (for similar arguments see Dunleavy 1979; Lipsky 1980). Consequently, public employees might have less accessible Christian traditionalist and growth ecology schemas. The results in Table 3 indicate that there might be something to this prediction as the contribution of the three sector interactions to the model fit approaches significance (chi-square improvement = 5.80, df 3, $p = 0.122$).

Furthermore, younger voters might have more salient growth-ecology schemas than older voters. The oldest generations were socialised into a political environment where growth-ecology concerns and new politics were largely absent (Inglehart 1990; Bennulf & Holmberg 1990). Therefore, this schema might be less well-developed and less accessible among older citizens. The three age-schema interaction terms, however, make only small and statistically insignificant contributions to the explanatory power of the model (chi-square improvement = 2.18, df 3, $p = 0.536$).

One might also expect income level to affect schema usage. Inglehart (1981) suggests that a lower standard of living makes one more prone to thinking about political issues in materialist state-market terms, as opposed to post-materialist terms. Conversely, the argument goes, struggles which have less to do with the allocation of material goods (Christian traditionalism, growth-ecology) will be less salient (see also Sears & Funk 1991; Green 1988). The empirical test does not refute this hypothesis as the chi-square increase is relatively large (chi-square improvement = 12.00, df 3, $p = 0.007$). Finally, in addition to the examination of interactions suggested by the theoretical discussion, exploratory tests of gender (chi-square improvement =

0.843, df 3, $p = 0.839$) and religiosity (chi-square improvement = 1.82, df 3, $p = 0.610$) interactions were also performed.

In summary, the data suggest that effects of the three schemas on attitudes towards the third sector do not vary greatly across social classes, age groups, gender, and groups with different degrees of religiosity. However, the inclusion of both public employment and income interactions increased the explanatory power of the model. To assess how seriously these two interactions damage Hypothesis 2, a further step was taken. It involved adding six interaction terms (three schemas × public employment and three schemas × income) to a model including the main effects of the three schemas, public sector employment, and income (chi-square improvement = 15.18, df 6, $p = 0.019$). Interestingly, it turned out that three of these interaction coefficients were statistically insignificant and substantively unimportant. Most notably, the state-market effect was neither altered by public employment nor by income level. The impact of the most important ideological schema in the Swedish party system is thus insensitive also to levels of income and public sector employment. In addition, the effect of Christian traditionalism is unaffected by public sector employment.

What remains, then, is three influential interaction terms. The following equations express the predicted growth-ecology and Christian traditionalism effects on attitudes towards the third sector as a function of two components: a constant main effect, and an interaction component which is sensitive to the level of public employment and income respectively (p-values within parenthesis).

Growth-ecology effect =	0.740	−	0.166 × INCOME : 100,000 Kronor
	(0.000)		(0.017)
		−	0.322 × PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
			(0.033)
Christian traditionalism effect =	0.177	+	0.091 × INCOME : 100,000 Kronor
	(0.210)		(0.151)

An initially striking feature of the first equation is that the impact of income on the growth-ecology effect does not have the hypothesised sign. Contrary to expectations, growth-ecology effects on attitudes towards the third sector *decrease* at higher income levels. This observation runs counter to the hypothesis that materially harsh living conditions make schemas other than state-market less salient. While it is difficult to speculate here about the causes of this surprising interaction, an assessment of its magnitude is still relevant from the perspective of Hypothesis 2. More exactly, the equation predicts that an income change of 100,000 Swedish kronor will decrease the log-odds effect of growth-ecology on third sector endorsement by −0.166 (average sample income 172,300, median 156,000). As much as this interaction is

clearly influential, also people with incomes far above average appear to make quite some use of the growth-ecology schema for forming third sector attitudes.

As expected, the growth ecology-effect also decreases among public employees (−0.322). The assumption is that these individuals are primed by their work environment to view political questions as issues of the state versus the market, and less in terms of other schemas. However, this interaction effect too is a matter of gradual tendency rather than of a radical shift in schema usage. For instance, among public employees with an average income, the effect of the growth ecology schema is still predicted to be 0.132. In order to find individuals among which the growth-ecology schema has no effect we must look among public employees with an income above sample average. Of course, this group constitutes a rather small minority of people. Hence, these interactions notwithstanding, our data suggest that a large majority of Swedes make use of the growth-ecology schema to arrive at third sector attitudes.

Finally, as expected, the Christian traditionalist schema becomes a better predictor of attitudes towards the third sector at higher income levels. However, again we are dealing with a quite subtle, rather than radical, interaction. Even among people with no income, the effect of Christian traditionalism approaches significance (0.177, $p = 0.210$). More realistically, among people with an average income, the predicted log-odds coefficient for the Christian traditionalism scale amounts to 0.333.

Hypothesis 3: The absent interaction effect of political sophistication

Looking at the third column of Table 2, the three interaction terms make only a small and statistically insignificant contribution to the overall model fit (chi-square improvement = 2.55, df 3, $p = 0.466$). To say that all three schema effects remain the same at different levels of political sophistication is not a bad approximation of reality. Even the least politically sophisticated citizens appear to make simultaneous use of all three ideological schemas. It should be pointed out that there is some tendency for Christian traditionalist effects to rise with sophistication. However, this schema is influential even at the lower standard deviation point (−1) of the sophistication scale (predicted logit effect $0.290 - 0.094 = 0.196$). Moreover, analogous to the previous analysis, the schema most persistently stressed in party competition – the state-market schema – does not behave differently across sophistication levels. The same applies for the growth-ecology schema.

Taking the three hypotheses (1, 2 and 3) together, the data suggest that most respondents, regardless of socio-economic location and political sophistication, simultaneously use three schemas promoted by the party system to interpret and evaluate the third sector issue. Few respondents seem to have

reduced the meaning of the issue by processing it through only one or two of the schemas. Even when interaction terms are significant and substantially meaningful (as in the case of sector employment and income) the differences across groups are gradual. Moreover, these conclusions are especially valid for the most stable, persistent and clear political conflict in Sweden: the impact of state-market orientations is *completely* insensitive to group affiliation, socio-economic location and political sophistication, even in the case of the ideologically complex third sector issue.

Hypothesis 4: The unimportance of ideological cues

Several American studies contend that alterations of ideological cues affect schema usage (Sniderman et al. 1991; Zaller 1992; Kinder 1998). However, in a strong party system people may automatically apply chronically salient schemas, regardless of any subtle alterations in cues. To test Hypothesis 4, I used the two SOM student surveys from 1997 and 1998. In 1997 the students responded to a statement about the third sector that was relatively free from clear ideological cues: whether it is a good idea to 'create a society where idealistic efforts and voluntary organisations play more important roles'. Here, by and large, respondents had to decide for themselves the precise nature of the stimulus (whether it is an alternative to the welfare state, a vehicle for Christian traditionalism or an ecologists' think-global-act-local nostrum). The 1998 items were different: they asked whether it was desirable to 'redistribute some of society's resources via voluntary organisations instead of via public benefit systems' and 'transfer some public social service tasks to voluntary organisations'. These items emphasise that the third sector is an alternative to public provision and that there is a trade-off to be made between the two. In other words, clear state-market schema cues were communicated to the respondents.

These dependent variables were dichotomised and used in the three logistic regression models reported in Table 4 (1 = positive or neutral response to the third sector, 0 = negative response). As in the previous analysis, the independent variables measure state-market, Christian traditionalism and growth-ecology orientations. Unfortunately, the conditions for constructing Christian traditionalism and growth-ecology measures were less favourable than in the 1998 Election Study. For this reason, the Christian traditionalism measure consists of a dichotomised proxy that separates people who in the last twelve months went to a religious ceremony at least every six months, from those who did not.[19] The growth-ecology measure is a dichotomy separating those who prefer the Green Party from others. For the state-market measure, additive indices were created from responses to the items 'reduce the public sector' and 'introduce more private health care'; these indices were

dichotomised as close to the median as possible.[20] Since the Christian traditionalism and growth-ecology proxies are rough measures, one should not make too much of the relative impact of the three schemas at a given point in time. Given the quality difference it is almost self-evident that the state-market measure will be the best predictor. Fortunately however, Hypothesis 4 is not about the relative impact at a given point in time. Rather, it predicts that the relative impact of the three ideological schemas *will not change* when ideological cues are manipulated.

The first column in Table 4 reports the 1997 findings, and the second and third columns contain results from 1998. Although the 1998 questions are different in terms of ideological cues, the relative effects of our three ideological dimensions are largely stable. No systematic changes seem to occur as a result of the alterations in question wording. Looking at the first column, we see that the state-market schema does not need clear state-market cues to be activated. Looking at the second and third columns, we see that Christian traditionalism and growth-ecology effects are not reduced because of a clear emphasis on state-market concerns.

It should be noted that when comparing the 1997 'cueless' item and the 1998 proposal to 'redistribute some of society's resources via voluntary organisations instead of via public benefit systems', one can discern a pattern somewhat at odds with Hypothesis 4; the effect of the state-market schema rises slightly (from 1.27 to 1.46), and the other effects decrease. However, these changes are quite small and not paralleled in a comparison between the first and the third column. Here, in spite of clearer state-market cues, the pattern is almost reversed with somewhat stronger effects of Christian traditionalist and green orientations in 1998, and a stable coefficient for state-market orientations.[21]

Implications

Research on citizens' tendencies to apply schemas, shortcuts and stereotypes to political reality has improved our understanding of public opinion. However, most studies have reported American data (for overviews, see Sniderman 1993; Kinder 1998), and findings should not be automatically generalised across the Atlantic. As Granberg & Holmberg (1988: 1) remind us, 'in analyzing political behavior and political psychology, it is essential to bear in mind the nature of the political system in which people are thinking and acting'. In this spirit, evidence demonstrating that clear and persistent party conflict affects individuals' use of ideological schemas is accumulating (Niemi & Westholm 1984; Granberg & Holmberg 1988, 1990, 1996; van der Eijk et al. 1996; Oppenhuis 1995; Oscarsson 1998; van der Eijk et al. 1999;

Table 4. Logistic regression of attitudes towards the third sector (1997 and 1998 SOM Student Surveys)

	Create a society where idealistic efforts and voluntary organisations play more important roles (1997)		Redistribute some of society's resources via voluntary organisations instead of via public benefit systems (1998)		Transfer some public social service tasks to voluntary organisations (1998)	
	Logit coefficient	*p*-value	Logit coefficient	*p*-value	Logit coefficient	*p*-value
State-market dichotomy (0 = state, 1 = market)	1.27	0.000	1.46	0.000	1.28	0.000
Religious activity (0 others, 1 = religiously active)	0.43	0.647	0.06	0.767	0.34	0.095
Green partisan (0 = others, 1 = green)	0.16	0.269	0.31	0.236	0.49	0.060
Constant (*p*-value)	1.87 (0.000)		0.63 (0.000)		0.17 (0.250)	
Chi-square improvement (df; *p*-value)	16.4 (3; 0.001)		64.7 (0.000)		54.4 (0.000)	
Number of respondents	268		525		525	

The dependent variables were coded: 0 = response other than positive, 1 = positive response to the third sector. Initial −2 log likelihood values: 1997 = 306.48, 1998 = 749.24 (redistribute resources) and 733.22 (transfer public social service tasks) respectively.

van Wijnen 2000). The assumptions and data presented and analysed here add some pieces to the emerging puzzle.

Attitudes towards the third sector are affected by all three party system-promoted ideological schemas. In contrast to what has been successfully demonstrated in several American studies, the pattern of effects was very stable across socio-economic groups (see Sapiro & Soss 1999). This observation holds especially for the state-market conflict which still clearly dominates Swedish party competition. The theoretical interpretation of these findings is that a strong party system facilitates a pervasive political language, which is chronically accessible to virtually all citizens. Citizens in such a system will share common mental tools for interpreting political information, and a common language for political communication between the electorate and its representatives (Oscarsson 1998).

Furthermore, the effects of ideology on attitudes towards the third sector are not larger among politically sophisticated citizens. This is a different picture than the one painted in many American studies, where significant interaction effects between political sophistication and ideology-driven opinion formation have been reported (see Converse 1964; Sniderman et al. 1991; Bartels 1996). Converse's (1964) classical argument that preference formation works differently at different levels of sophistication might thus be less accurate for many European countries than for the United States. It seems as though ideologically strong party systems make it easier for the unsophisticated and inattentive to learn and accurately apply ideological schemas (Carmines & Stimson 1980; Granberg & Holmberg 1988; Oscarsson 1998). Hence, cognitive misers in such systems might be less dependent on extensive and detailed information to make political choices which correspond to their underlying preferences. Given that political choices can be interpreted with well-rehearsed ideological shortcuts, cognitive misers can choose *as if they were informed* (see Lupia 1994; Bartels 1996). Given the right conditions, then, an extremely well-informed electorate might not be all that crucial for achieving accurate political representation and public policies which are congruent with public preferences.

Moreover, the effects of welfare state cues on the relative impact of ideological schemas in Sweden are weak. Respondents seem to evaluate the third sector using the three schemas in a way that is insensitive to apparent cues surrounding the object. This finding implies poorer prospects for attempts by political elites to influence public opinion in strong party systems. The reason is that citizens habitually apply the same chronically salient belief structures, relatively independent of any accompanying information telling them what issues 'are about'. Conversely, as can be predicted from the assumptions presented here, several studies assert that American political elites

and media have quite an impressive power over its audience in this respect (see Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991; Zaller 1992, 1996; Chong 1993, 1996; Gamson 1993; Miller & Krosnick 1996; Kinder 1998: Valentino 1999).

In conclusion, the main argument in this paper is that strong party systems of the kind common in Europe influence how citizens apply ideological schemas as shortcuts to political preferences. Of course, just as theories and findings cannot be automatically generalised across the Atlantic, neither should they be thoughtlessly exported within Europe. As I have analysed only Swedish data, one might wonder how valid findings are for other European countries. Here, it should be acknowledged that Sweden is probably a *very* clear-cut case of a stable policy-driven political system (Särlvik 1974; Granberg & Holmberg 1988; Oskarson 1992; Oscarsson 1998). However, comparative research asserts that electoral politics in most political systems in Europe are structured by similar, though not identical, patterns of structured ideological party competition (Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Inglehart & Klingemann 1976; Knutsen 1995). Recent empirical findings demonstrate that European voters have impressively clear and uniform perceptions of these ideological conflicts (van der Brug & van der Eijk 1999), and that ideology is the most powerful predictor of party choice (van der Eijk et al. 1996). Findings such as these suggest that the arguments presented in this paper have a bearing on many other European countries as well.

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Notes

1. Political behaviour and public opinion studies concerned with left-right ideology have often built on the rational choice paradigm (Green & Shapiro 1994). It is believed that voters are (1) self-consciously aware of their own ideological shortcut, and (2) relate different possible specific political alternatives to the shortcut in a rational and cognitively driven decision process. The ideological shortcut argument as such, however, extends beyond the rational choice paradigm. It does not presuppose a rational decision process. On the contrary, empirical research contends that shortcuts are often affective in nature with the capacity of triggering emotionally strong responses (Sears et al. 1980; Sears 1993; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock 1991).
2. For introductions and further references to this line of public opinion research, see Lau & Sears (1986), Sniderman (1993), Delli Carpini & Keeter (1996), Listhaug (1995), Pappi (1996), and Kinder (1998). For a critical discussion, see Kuklinski et al. (1991), and Lodge & McGraw (1995).
3. An alternative term for schema would be 'stereotype' (see Kinder 1998).
4. The notion that certain beliefs are more accessible from 'top of the head' than others has received empirical support, not only in survey research (Zaller 1992) but also in qualitative interview data analysis (Chong 1993, 1996).
5. This prediction is in line with recent findings reported by Huckfeldt et al. (1999). They demonstrated that people with accessible schemas (as measured by computer-timed survey responses) were much less likely to change policy opinions as the result of persuasion attempts (Huckfeldt et al. 1999: 903–904).
6. A conceptual note is in order. The three schemas must all be kept conceptually separated from subjective left-right placement (see Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Inglehart & Klingemann 1976; Fuchs & Klingemann 1989; Knutsen 1995, 1999). This concept refers to citizens' subjective identification with the spatial images of left-right. The important difference is that, taken on their own, left and right are substantively undefined political categories. As Knutsen (1998: 294) explains, left and right 'can be considered as empty containers ready to be filled with political content'. In contrast, the three schemas analysed here are organised around semantic categories which, taken on their own, have substantive political meaning ('the state', 'the family', 'the environment'). It is an empirical, not conceptual, question whether subjective left-right ideology is correlated with either or all of the substantive schematic dimensions at focus in this paper (Fuchs & Klingemann 1989; Knutsen 1995). In fact, nothing prevents left and right from having different substantive meaning at different points in time, in different countries, or among different groups of citizens. For example, Knutsen (1995) found that, in Western Europe, state-market orientations, religious traditionalism, and postmaterialist orientations all contribute to citizens' subjective left-right ideology (see also Inglehart 1990). Interestingly, in recent years there has been a tendency in many countries for postmaterialist orientations to become more strongly associated with subjective left-right placement (Knutsen 1995). In contrast, Oscarsson (1998) found that, in Sweden over the last thirty years the substantive contents of the left-right dimension have changed surprisingly little. By and large, left and right are still defined by the industrial-age question of how large state intervention in society there should be.
7. Christian traditionalist orientations are only weakly correlated with state-market orientations (Gilljam & Holmberg 1993; Kumlin 1997).

8. Several different terms have been used to capture what I refer to as the third sector. The examples include 'voluntary sector', 'nonprofit sector' and 'civil society' (see Anheier & Salamon 1997).
9. Of course, this does not mean that citizens' will do so by any logical necessity (indeed this is one of the questions that will be empirically investigated). Rather, it means that one *can* interpret the third sector issue from the perspectives of all the schemas, without becoming exotic or politically unrealistic.
10. Things might look different in a few years time as the Swedish third sector has now begun to carry out new responsibilities. Slowly, it is beginning to expand in areas previously defined as public sector domains. As Lundström and Wijkström (1997b: 240–241) conclude: 'Conditions for the nonprofit sector today appear to be changing rapidly. Pressure on state budgets and changes in the ideological climate [...] call for a different social policy. They emphasise freedom and individual responsibility in the social welfare system and advocate a larger space for civil society. [...] Accordingly, government policy will probably open up new space for nonprofit organizations providing services in areas such as social welfare, health and education. [...] At present there are several attempts from both local government and nonprofit organizations to initiate voluntary participation in areas traditionally run by government'.
11. All datasets used in this paper are, or will be, available for scientific purposes from the Swedish Social Science Data Archive (SSD) at Göteborg University (http://www.ssd.gu.se).
12. The Swedish Election Studies are carried out by The Swedish Election Studies Program at the Department of Political Science, Göteborg University, and headed by Professor Sören Holmberg. More information about the Swedish Election Study Program is available at http://www.pol.gu.se/sve/vod/vustart.htm.
13. The SOM Institute conducts interdisciplinary research and organises seminars on the topics of Society, Opinion and Media in Sweden (hence the name SOM). It is managed jointly by the Institute for Journalism and Mass Communication, The Department of Political Science and the School of Public Administration at Göteborg University. The Institute is headed by a steering committee consisting of Professor Sören Holmberg, Department of Political Science, Professor Lennart Weibull, Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, and Senior Lecturer Lennart Nilsson, School of Public Administration. For more information about the SOM Institute and its surveys, see Holmberg & Weibull (1997), and visit its website at http://www.som.gu.se/.
14. The student data were collected by employees at the SOM institute who, after having made appointments with lecturers, visited all undergraduate courses at the Department of Political Science, the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication, and the School of Public Administration. The students filled in the questionnaires at the end of class. By necessity, there is no exact information about the percentage of students who decided not to take part in the survey. Personal communication with the staff at the SOM Institute, however, indicates that this percentage is 'very small'.
15. A brief speculation about these differences is appropriate. In particular, two explanations come to mind. First, there is a difference as to what ideological cues are communicated through the questions. The items that produce third sector negativism all highlight more voluntary responsibility for social services. It is likely that such cues make people regard the third sector as being more of an anti-public sector suggestion than they would otherwise. (Note that this cueing effect is different from the one covered by Hypothesis 4. The latter one is about cueing effects on which ideological dimensions are or are not

used. The former one is about where on an already given ideological dimension a stimulus belongs). Second, items that produce third sector positivism contain no trade-off between priorities whereas the two others explicitly pit the third sector and the public sector against one another. When a stimulus does not indicate any such trade-off it is natural that more people are positive toward it (Green 1992).

16. The conventional constraint to extract only factors with eigenvalues larger than one was employed for each analysis (Kaiser's criteria). In each factor analysis, only one factor had a strong enough eigenvalue to be extracted. The state-market variable (explained variance 48%) was extracted from a factor analysis (loadings within parentheses) involving responses to the items 'reduce the public sector' (0.70), 'reduce social benefits' (0.63), 'lower the taxes' (0.70), 'privatise public companies' (0.77) and 'introduce more private health care' (0.72). The Christian traditionalist scale (explained variance 52%) builds on items where people evaluated proposals to work towards a society '... where Christian values play a greater role' (0.53), '... with more law and order' (0.75), '... that strengthens the position of the family' (0.82) and '... that protects traditional Swedish values' (0.76). The growth/ecology measure (explained variance 50%) comes from the following items: 'work towards an environmentally friendly society even if it means a low or non-existent growth' (0.67), 'Sweden should in the long run shut down the nuclear power production' (0.73) and 'ban private motorism in inner cities' (0.67). Finally, the political sophistication scale (explained variance 61%) was extracted using a variable counting correct answers among seven questions about which party seven different politicians belong to. In the factor analysis, this variable (loading 0.77) was used together with the following two questions: 'to what extent do you read news and articles about politics in daily papers' (0.77) and 'generally speaking, how interested are you in politics' (0.80).
17. H1 was also tested by fitting a latent variable structural equation model to the covariance structure among the observed variables (using LISREL 8.30). The tested model included three latent variables: state-market orientations, Christian traditionalism and growth-ecology orientations (as measured by indicators involved in the factor analyses reported in the text). The third sector item (as measured by the 11-point scale in Table 1) was allowed to load on all the three latent variables; this item was the only factorially complex item in the model. The model fitted the data rather well (Adjusted GFI = 0.954), with relevant fit indices just around 0.95. Also, the substantive conclusions about ideology effects on third sector attitudes remained the same: the LISREL model predicted that all the three latent variables had highly significant and about equal effects on the third sector item. I have chosen to report logistic regression results since this procedure corresponds better with the theoretical argument made in the text that third sector attitudes can hardly be regarded as conceptually continuous.
18. The formula for transforming predicted log-odds of positive third sector response into predicted probability of positive third sector response is: probability of positive response = Exp(predicted log-odds of positive response)/[1 + Exp(predicted log-odds of positive response)], where predicted log-odds of positive response = 1.490 + 0.394STATE-MARKET + 0.386CHRISTTRAD + 0.285GROWTH-ECOLOGY. See, for instance, Hosmer & Lemeshow (1989).
19. To validate the measure of Christian traditionalism I Created a similar dichotomy in the 1998 Election Study data set (0 = never goes to a religious ceremony (76%), 1 = goes at least once a year (26%). This variable had exactly the same distribution as the dichotomies used for the SOM student data, and a bivariate logit effect on third sector attitudes (0.203, $p = 0.135$). However, this effect decreased drastically when controlled for the Christian traditionalism factor (0.067, $p = 0.632$). Hence, much of the bivariate effect of the

churchgoing proxy is in fact due to uncontrolled covariation with Christian traditionalism ideology. This finding supports the idea that the churchgoing proxy can function as a (rough and imperfect) measure of Christian traditionalism. Finally, an alternative strategy would be to use the party preference variable to build a proxy for Christian Traditionalism orientations. There are, however, too few Christian Democratic partisans among Social Science students at Göteborg University to make this a viable strategy.

20. Cronbach's alpha for these indices were 0.75 (1997) and 0.76 (1998).
21. A methodological shortcoming which cannot be solved here should be pointed out. The dependent variables were measured with somewhat different techniques in 1997 compared to 1998 (see Table 1). Therefore, the conclusions rest on the assumption that the two measurement methods are roughly interchangeable when it comes to separating between those who rejected the third sector (more negative than 'neither good nor bad suggestion') and other respondents.

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