C577: Introduction to Blockchain and Cryptocurrency

Mid-Semester Exam.

Name: M. Maheeth Reddy

Roll No :: 1801CS31

Answers

Ans 1: Reason why Merkle Torce is used to store bitcoin transactions in

a block:

Merkle tree maintains the integrity of the data. If any single detail of transactions or order of the transactions changes, then these changes are reflected in the hash of that transaction. This change would cascade up the Merkle Tree to the Morkle Root, changing the value of the Merkle Root and thus invalidating the block. So, everyone can see that Morkle Tree allows for a quick and semple test of whether a specific transaction is included in the set or not.

Merkle Trees have the following benefits:

- 1) It provides a means to maintain the integrity and validity of data.
- 2) It helps on saving the memory or disk space as the proofs, computationally easy and fast.
- 3 Their proofs and management require tiny amounts of information to be transmitted across networks.
- (4) Membership of its items can be verified in O(log n) without downloading an entire block [SPV-Simplified Payment Verification]

 Preventing Double Spending Attack:

 Payment Verification

Consider the following scenario:

Alice has some bitcoin with her. She has a malicious intent and is trying to spend that money twice in two seperate transactions by sending the same bitcoins to Bob and Charles. For simplicity, I will call the transactions with Bob & Charles as T₁ & T₂ respectively.

Now, T₁ and T₂ will go into the good of unconformed transactions. If T₁ is confirmed first, it is added to the subsequent block and T₂ is would become invalid.

Similar thing would happen if To is confirmed-first. Then To would be invalid. In case To and To are confirmed simultaneously, the transaction with the highest number of confirmations will be included in the blockchain, and the other one will be discarded.

Here, we can notice an issue. Assuming T, was confirmed & To failed, Charles (the secipient in T2) would not succeive his articipated bitcoins though does not have a port in the failing of to. So, users are advised to wait for 6 more subsequent blocks being added to the bitcoin blockchain after their transaction has been added to a block. Once, that is done, users can safely assume that the transaction is valid. Double spending Attacks could also occur when an attacker ean control atteast 51% of the network's nodes. Then they could attempt to reverse these attacks and create a seperate, private blockchain. However, the rapid growth of bitcoin network and its . Proof of Work (PoW) consensus model requires an enormous amount of computing power, to take over the network & reverse the transactions. So, the 51% attack is impossible in reality.

Son reaching consensus through Broof of block mining, and combining complementary security features of the blockchain network and its decentralized network of miners to verify the transactions before they are added to the blockchain, we can prevent the double spending attacks on Bitcoin blockchain.

We are given 2 valid transactions T1. T2 and a new toransaction Tz. For the ith transaction, the hashes are denoted by hi, public key as Pi, private key as Si

- Each transaction consists of 3 parts:
- 1) Metadata contains information related to version, no of input, no of output, size etc.
- contains hash of previous transaction, index of previous transaction's output that's being claimed signature of the claimer
- contains value that is being transferred, script containing hash of public key of the recipient

The inputs and outputs both form an overay and contain scripts.

To validate a new transaction, we combine its input script if the earlier transaction's output script. The Bitcoin scripting language checks validity of the transaction using stack-based execution. So, to check T3's validity the have to consider the given transaction:

Metadata - "hash": "h3", em T3 hash (unique)

"ver": 1, esoftware version

"ven &z": 2, em no of Enputs

"vout_82": 1, em no of outputs

"lock time": 0,

"size": 604, em Size of block

P.T.O

"prevout": { "hash": "hi", 3, "ecript Sig": "S2 P2" "prev_out": 3 "hash": "h2", 3, "script sig": "32 P2"

In Tz, we have 2 inputs, the first input should refer to h, i.e., the hash pointer to Ti. The induct of Ti's output that is being claimed here is zeroeth output and the first input is signed using the private key Sz. Hence, the claimer for this previous transaction Ti's output has publickey as Pz & private key as Sz. Suppose, the claimer is Y

As we know T₁ is valid, so by this output script

Y(public key = P₂, privatekey=S₂) is receiving a value of

10.12

For T3's second input, we should refer to h2 which is the hash pointer of transaction T2 and output index that should refer here is 1st output of T2. This input is signed using private key S2. So, it is also being signed by Y. So again Y is the claimer here and they claim that 1st output value of transaction T2 belongs to them.

First output of transaction T2:

"out": [{ "value": "5.00",

"script Publey": " --- < hash of P2>---",
}

To is a valid transaction, so we need not check its validity.

But if we need to check, we can see that someone, say Z,

whose public & private keys one B& so respectively, transfers

value of 5.00 to Y. Z is receiving some value in transaction

Ti's second output, 5.25, and spending 5.00 from its

to Y. Z has 0.25 remaining.

So, after seeing T₁ and T₂, we can see that Y has 10.12 from T₁ and 5.00 from T₂. So, Y has 15.12. Y is referring to both this output in input of T₃ and signing it with its private key S₂.

Now in the output of T3, we can see that,

"value": "15.10",

"scriptPubKey": "....< hash of P4>----"

27

In the output the value 15.10 is sent to someone who has P₄ as its public key that means. the value 15.10 is transferred to the address which is hash of P₄. We saw that Y has value 15.12 so Y can send a value of 15.10. This transaction is hence valid. The scripting language does not check validity in this way. It uses stack based execution. To perform that tirst, a transaction—based ledger is drawn here for simplicity. Suppose a person \(\) has a public key P₄ and

X has public key P, and private key S,.

Input: ho[o] w) (Suppose X had this money already)

Output: 10.12 -> Y

5.15 -> Z

Signed(X)

Transaction-based

Ledger Similar to the

o.15-> Z Signed(Z)


Input: h₁[o], h₂[o]

Output: 15.10-> S

Output: 15.10-> S

Stack Based Validity Checking of T3:

Execution of Bitcoin Script



there, the first 2 instructions are one data instructions—the signature (<52 p2>) and the public key used to verify that signature which is specified in the script Sig component of the input part of the transaction. Tz. As they are data instruction, they are pushed onto the stack.

Now in the scriptPubley point, that is the output script of T2, 1st we have OP_DUP which pushes a copy of top element into the stack top. [scriptPubley of T1 can also be used to validate]

The rest instruction is OP_HASH160 which pops the top value, compute the cryptographic hash and pushes the result onto top of the stack.

Then we will push one more data onto the stack. This data was specified by the sender of the transaction T2. It is the hash value of a public key that was specified; the corresponding private key must be used to generate the signature to redeem these coins. At this point, there are two values at the top of the stack.

There is the bash of the public key, as specified by the sender and the bash of the public key that was used by the recepient when trying to claim the coins. OP EQUAL VERIFY checks these I values at the top. If they are not equal, error occurs, script stops. Else if both of them are equal, the instruction consumes these values. Now, stack has a signature and the public key.

The public key is already checked so we have to check validity of the signature. OP_CHECKSIG pops both the signature & public key and does the signature verification. It then returns TRUE, implying T3 is a valid transaction as in the same way we can check validity for 1st input as well as output.

Ans3

The bitcoin transaction T will cointain the hash of the block of its inputs and their indices in their suspective blocks. So, we could use those block hashes to retrieve the blocks and in turn T's input transactions.

The inputs for T could be like shown here:

"in": [ş

"prevout": Solvek hash of

"hash": "hi"

"hash": "hi"

"n" ender of first input

of Tin block hi

"stript Sig": "si pi"

"stript Sig": "si pi"

--- // other inputs

1

we will go to block h, , see the nth transaction. So, this is how we search for input 1 of T. Do the same for other inputs as well.

Mechanism to reduce the time & space complexities of search
Time Complexity:

The length of blockhash is always fixed. So, I suggest we use a Trie Dota Structure such that the end node will contain a pointer to our block. Now, we can retrieve the value and script Pubkey to actually validate transaction T.

The time complexity of finding a datablock will take O(n) time $(n \rightarrow length of hash of block]$

Space Complexity

Now, there are a large no of transactions taking place in the Bitcoin blockchain. So, we need to come up with a strategy to reduce the space complereity of the data structure proposed above, for the search operations.

Now, transactions involve 2 accounts: Sender & Receiver.

And the new transaction T, would depend on the input transactions which earlier involved one of the accounts.

So, I propose we maintain a True for each account. The True of an account will only store the block hashes in which a transaction involving that account is present.

This will reduce the space required per account basis to manage.

So, first we will create a True DS for each account and so, first we will create a True DS for each account and traverse the whole blockchain to populate it. So, space traverse the whole blockchain to populate it. So, space complexity is O(m) where m is the length of blockchain.

In case of an update, we will update the Trie of only the involved accounts in O(n) time complexity.

THE END