

# **CS577: Introduction to Blockchain and Cryptocurrency**

## **Introduction to Cryptography**

**Dr. Raju Halder**


Hash function:

mathematical function


takes any string as input

fixed-size output (we'll use 256 bits)

efficiently computable (say,  $O(n)$ )




# One-Way Hash Functions



## Example

- $M = \text{"Elvis"}$
- $H(M) = (\text{"E"} + \text{"L"} + \text{"V"} + \text{"I"} + \text{"S"}) \bmod 26$
- $H(M) = (5 + 12 + 22 + 9 + 19) \bmod 26$
- $H(M) = 67 \bmod 26$
- $H(M) = 15$


# Collision




## Example

- $x = \text{"Viva"}$
- $y = \text{"Vegas"}$
- $H(x) = H(y) = 2$

# avalanche effect



# HASH PROPERTIES



- Collision resistance implies 2<sup>nd</sup> pre-image resistance
- Collision resistance does not imply pre-image resistance

# Authentication



## Basics

- Authentication is the process of validating the **identity** of a user or the **integrity** of a piece of data.
- Technologies that provide authentication
  - Message Digests (MD)
  - Message Authentication Codes (MAC)
  - Digital Signatures
  - Others....

# Authentication

## Message Digests (MD)

- A message digest is a fingerprint for a document.
- Purpose of the message digest is to provide proof that data has not altered - Integrity.
- Process of generating a message digest from data is called **hashing**






# Authentication

## Message Authentication Codes (MAC)

- A message digest created with a key
- Creates security by requiring a secret key to be possesses by both parties in order to retrieve the message
- A MAC is a short string used to verify the message integrity and authentication



# COMMONLY USED HASH FUNCTIONS



- **MD** (Message Digest)
  - MD5
    - Max message  $< 2^{64}$
    - Output: 128-bit
- **SHA** (Secure Hash Algorithm)
  - SHA-1
    - Max message  $< 2^{64}$
    - Output: 160-bit
  - SHA-2
    - Max message  $< 2^{128}$
    - Max output: 512-bit
  - SHA-3
    - Max message: Unlimited
    - Max output: 512-bit


# HASH VS. ENCRYPTION




- Hashing is a one-way
  - No unhashing
- Publicly known and there is no key used
- Efficient
- Deterministic (compared)
  - $H(m) == H(m')$
  - Of course, hashes with salts are not!
    - $H(m || s1)$  and  $H(m || s2)$
- Encryption is not one-way
  - Decryption renders the original message
- Publicly known algorithms but the key is kept secret
- Slower
- May or may not be deterministic (compared)
  - Randomised encryption
    - $Enc(k, t1 || m)$  and  $Enc(k, t2 || m)$

# Cryptographic Hash Functions: Applications

- Integrity





# Attack Against Cryptographic Function



(b) Man-in-the-middle attack

The hash value must be **protected**.

# Applying Symmetric Cryptography



Confidentiality



Symmetric Cryptography

Integrity



Cryptographic Hash + Symmetric Cryptography

Authenticity



?

Accountability




?

# Authentication


## Message Authentication Codes (MAC)

- The digest  $h = H(m)$  is generated without any key, such that anyone (including the adversary) can create it
- What if a key is used? Now the adversary cannot forge a keyed-hash value without the key
- So, a MAC is a short string used to verify the message integrity and authentication
- **A Popular MAC Algorithm: HMAC**






# Schema of Applying MAC




# Vulnerable to Replay Attack


- $mac = MAC(k, m)$
- Adversary A can replay a message  $m$  that has been sent earlier by x and received by y



## Adding timestamp, sequence number

- $\text{mac} = \text{MAC}(k, t/\text{seq}, m)$ 
  - To prevent the **replay attack**, the message should contain timestamp, or sequence number






## Question

Can Message Authentication Code be used to verify data integrity, authentication, and achieve accountability?

MAC can be used to verify data integrity and authentication, but CANNOT achieve accountability (non-repudiation).

## RSA's Digital Signature




To prevent the **replay attack**, timestamp or sequence number should also be added

## Question


Can Digital Signature be used to verify data integrity, authenticity, and achieve accountability?

### Yes.


- Data integrity and authenticity: the adversary may corrupt or replace the information being sent, but does not have the private key to sign the message digest
- Accountability: only the sender can generate the digital signature, since only the sender owns the private key. Thus, the sender cannot deny that the message was signed by her/him









Integrity




Confidentiality & Integrity




**Integrity & Authenticity**



**Confidentiality & Integrity & Authenticity**



## Integrity & Authenticity & Accountability



## Confidentiality & Integrity & Authenticity & Accountability

# Authentication

## Message Digests (MD)

- Standards:

**MD5** : 128 bit hashing algorithm by Ron Rivest of RSA

- Broken since 2004 by Xiaoyun Wang
- Collisions can be constructed in seconds on a laptop

**SHA & SHA-1** : 160 bit hashing algorithm developed by NIST

- Considered insecure
- Practically broken since 2005 by Xiaoyun Wang

**Do not use them in your security products!**

# Authentication


## Message Digests (MD)

- SHA-2 family: 224, 256, 384 or 512 bits
- SHA-3 family output can be arbitrary size
  - NIST started a competition for SHA-3 in 2007.
  - NIST's original concern was that SHA-2 would soon be broken, although in fact SHA-2 is still fine.
- SHA-3 (Secure Hash Algorithm 3) is the latest member of the Secure Hash Algorithm family of standards, released by NIST on August 5, 2015.

# MD5: Message Digest Version 5


- Author: R. Rivest, 1992
- 128-bit hash
  - based on earlier, weaker MD4 (1990)
- **Collision resistance (B-day attack resistance)**
  - only 64-bit
- Output size not long enough today (due to various attacks)

# MD5 Overview



Similar for MD4/MD5/SHA-1

# MD5: Padding




- Given original message  $M$ , add padding bits “100...” such that resulting length is 64 bits less than a multiple of 512 bits.
- Append *original length in bits* to the padded message
- Final message chopped into 512-bit blocks




# MD5: Blocks

- As many stages as the number of 512-bit blocks in the final padded message



# MD5: Single Block Process




# MD5: Single Block Process

- Every message block contains 16 32-bit words:  
 $m_0 | m_1 | m_2 \dots | m_{15}$
- Digest  $MD_0$  initialized to:  
 $A=01234567, B=89abcdef, C=fedcba98, D=76543210$
- Every stage consists of four *rounds*, each involves 16 *basic operations*..

# MD5: One Operation

(4 rounds, each with 16 operations)



**For 4 rounds:**

$$F(x,y,z) = (x \wedge y) \vee (\sim x \wedge z)$$

$$G(x,y,z) = (x \wedge z) \vee (y \wedge \sim z)$$

$$H(x,y,z) = x \oplus y \oplus z$$

$$I(x,y,z) = y \oplus (x \wedge \sim z)$$

$x \ll y$ :  $x$  left rotate  $y$  bits

$$K_i = \text{abs}(\sin(i + 1)) * 2^{32}$$

$M_i$  denotes a 32-bit block  
of the message input

# Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)


- SHA originally designed by NIST & NSA in 1993
- was revised in 1995 as SHA-1
- US standard for use with DSA signature scheme
  - standard is FIPS 180-1 1995, also Internet RFC3174
- based on design of MD4 with key differences
- produces 160-bit hash values
- 2005 results on security of SHA-1 raised concerns on its use in future applications

# Revised Secure Hash Standard

- NIST issued revision FIPS 180-2 in 2002
- adds 4 additional versions of SHA
  - SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
- designed for compatibility with increased security provided by the AES cipher
- structure & detail is similar to SHA-1
- hence analysis should be similar
- but security levels are rather higher

# SHA-512 Overview

- 1. Append padding bits
- 2. Append length




$+$  = word-by-word addition mod  $2^{64}$

# SHA-512 Compression Function


- heart of the algorithm
- processing message in 1024-bit blocks
- consists of 80 rounds
  - updating a 512-bit buffer
  - using a 64-bit value  $w_t$  derived from the current message block
  - and a round constant based on cube root of first 80 prime numbers



# SHA-512 Compression Function




# SHA-512 Creation of 80 Words



- $W_t = \sigma_1(W_{t-2}) + W_{t-7} + \sigma_0(W_{t-15}) + W_{t-16}$
- $\sigma_0(x) = \text{ROTR}^1(x) + \text{ROTR}^8(x) + \text{SHR}^7(x)$
- $\sigma_1(x) = \text{ROTR}^{19}(x) + \text{ROTR}^{61}(x) + \text{SHR}^6(x)$
- $\text{ROTR}^n(x) = \text{rotate right by } n \text{ bits}$
- $\text{SHR}^n(x) = \text{Left shift } n \text{ bits with padding by 0's on the right}$
- $+$  = Addition modulo  $2^{64}$

# SHA-512 Round Function



- ❑ Conditional fn  $Ch(e, f, g)$ : if  $e$  then  $f$  else  $g$   
 $= (e \text{ AND } f) \oplus (\text{Not } e \text{ and } g)$
- ❑ Majority Fn  $Maj(a, b, c)$ : True if 2 of 3 args are true  
 $= (a \text{ AND } b) \oplus (a \text{ AND } c) \oplus (b \text{ AND } c)$

# SHA-512 Round Function

$$\text{Maj}(a, b, c) = (a \text{ AND } b) \oplus (a \text{ AND } c) \oplus (b \text{ AND } c)$$

*the function is true only if the majority (two or three) of the arguments are true*

$$\left( \sum_0^{512} a \right) = \text{ROTR}^{28}(a) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{34}(a) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{39}(a)$$

$$\left( \sum_1^{512} e \right) = \text{ROTR}^{14}(e) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{18}(e) \oplus \text{ROTR}^{41}(e)$$

$\text{ROTR}^n(x)$  = circular right shift (rotation) of the 64-bit argument  $x$  by  $n$  bits

$W_t$  = a 64-bit word derived from the current 512-bit input block

$K_t$  = a 64-bit additive constant

$+$  = addition modulo  $2^{64}$

The padded message consists blocks  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_N$ . Each message block  $M_i$  consists of 16 64-bit words  $M_{i,0}, M_{i,1}, \dots, M_{i,15}$ . All addition is performed modulo  $2^{64}$ .

$$\begin{array}{ll} H_{0,0} = 6A09E667F3BCC908 & H_{0,4} = 510E527FADE682D1 \\ H_{0,1} = BB67AE8584CAA73B & H_{0,5} = 9B05688C2B3E6C1F \\ H_{0,2} = 3C6EF372FE94F82B & H_{0,6} = 1F83D9ABFB41BD6B \\ H_{0,3} = A54FF53A5F1D36F1 & H_{0,7} = 5BE0CDI9137E2179 \end{array}$$

**for**  $i = 1$  **to**  $N$

1. Prepare the message schedule  $W$

**for**  $t = 0$  **to**  $15$

$$W_t = M_{i,t}$$

**for**  $t = 16$  **to**  $79$

$$W_t = \sigma_1^{512}(W_{t-2}) + W_{t-7} + \sigma_0^{512}(W_{t-15}) + W_{t-16}$$

2. Initialize the working variables

$$a = H_{i-1,0} \quad e = H_{i-1,4}$$

$$b = H_{i-1,1} \quad f = H_{i-1,5}$$

$$c = H_{i-1,2} \quad g = H_{i-1,6}$$

$$d = H_{i-1,3} \quad h = H_{i-1,7}$$

3. Perform the main hash computation

**for**  $t = 0$  **to**  $79$

$$T_1 = h + \text{Ch}(e, f, g) + \left( \sum_1^{512} e \right) + W_t + K_t$$

$$T_2 = \left( \sum_0^{512} a \right) + \text{Maj}(a, b, c)$$

$$h = g$$

$$g = f$$

$$f = e$$

$$e = d + T_1$$

$$d = c$$

$$c = b$$

$$b = a$$

$$a = T_1 + T_2$$

4. Compute the intermediate hash value

$$H_{i,0} = a + H_{i-1,0} \quad H_{i,4} = a + H_{i-1,4}$$

$$H_{i,1} = a + H_{i-1,1} \quad H_{i,5} = a + H_{i-1,5}$$

$$H_{i,2} = a + H_{i-1,2} \quad H_{i,6} = a + H_{i-1,6}$$

$$H_{i,3} = a + H_{i-1,3} \quad H_{i,7} = a + H_{i-1,7}$$

**return**  $\{H_{N,0} \parallel H_{N,1} \parallel H_{N,2} \parallel H_{N,3} \parallel H_{N,4} \parallel H_{N,5} \parallel H_{N,6} \parallel H_{N,7}\}$

# SHA-256

Pad the message  $M$  and break into  $N$  512-bit (sixteen 32 bits word) blocks

Initialize  $H$  (eight 32 bits word)

for  $i = 1$  to  $N$  {

    Initialize intermediate variables  $a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h$

    Prepare  $W_t$  ( $t=0\dots 63$ )

    Initialize constants  $K_t$  ( $t=0\dots 63$ )

    Pass through  $t=0\dots 63$  rounds

    update  $H$

}

Output  $H$

# SHA-256: Initialize $H$

**Initialization of chaining variable Eight 32-bit words**

$$H_0^{(0)} = 6a09e667$$

$$H_1^{(0)} = bb67ae85$$

$$H_2^{(0)} = 3c6ef372$$

$$H_3^{(0)} = a54ff53a$$

$$H_4^{(0)} = 510e527f$$

$$H_5^{(0)} = 9b05688c$$

$$H_6^{(0)} = 1f83d9ab$$

$$H_7^{(0)} = 5be0cd19.$$

# SHA-256: Initialize intermediate variables a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h

$$a = H_0^{(i-1)}$$

$$b = H_1^{(i-1)}$$

$$c = H_2^{(i-1)}$$

$$d = H_3^{(i-1)}$$

$$e = H_4^{(i-1)}$$

$$f = H_5^{(i-1)}$$

$$g = H_6^{(i-1)}$$

$$h = H_7^{(i-1)}$$



# SHA-256: Prepare $W_t$ ( $t=0\dots63$ )

$$W_t = \begin{cases} M_t^{(i)} & 0 \leq t \leq 15 \\ \sigma_1^{\{256\}}(W_{t-2}) + W_{t-7} + \sigma_0^{\{256\}}(W_{t-15}) + W_{t-16} & 16 \leq t \leq 63 \end{cases}$$

# SHA-256:

## Initialize constants $K_t$ ( $t=0\dots63$ )

Constants used in the rounds: 64 32-bit constants  $K_0, K_1 \dots K_{63}$

```
428a2f98 71374491 b5c0fbcf e9b5dba5 3956c25b 59f111f1 923f82a4 ab1c5ed5
d807aa98 12835b01 243185be 550c7dc3 72be5d74 80deb1fe 9bdc06a7 c19bf174
e49b69c1 efbe4786 0fc19dc6 240ca1cc 2de92c6f 4a7484aa 5cb0a9dc 76f988da
983e5152 a831c66d b00327c8 bf597fc7 c6e00bf3 d5a79147 06ca6351 14292967
27b70a85 2e1b2138 4d2c6dfc 53380d13 650a7354 766a0abb 81c2c92e 92722c85
a2bfe8a1 a81a664b c24b8b70 c76c51a3 d192e819 d6990624 f40e3585 106aa070
19a4c116 1e376c08 2748774c 34b0bcb5 391c0cb3 4ed8aa4a 5b9cca4f 682e6ff3
748f82ee 78a5636f 84c87814 8cc70208 90befffa a4506ceb bef9a3f7 c67178f2.
```

# SHA-256: Pass through $t=0 \dots 63$ rounds

For  $t=0$  to 63:

{

$$T_1 = h + \sum_1^{\{256\}}(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K_t^{\{256\}} + W_t$$

$$T_2 = \sum_0^{\{256\}}(a) + Maj(a, b, c)$$

$$h = g$$

$$g = f$$

$$f = e$$

$$e = d + T_1$$

$$d = c$$

$$c = b$$

$$b = a$$

$$a = T_1 + T_2$$

$$Ch(x, y, z) = (x \wedge y) \oplus (\neg x \wedge z)$$

$$Maj(x, y, z) = (x \wedge y) \oplus (x \wedge z) \oplus (y \wedge z)$$

$$\sum_0^{\{256\}}(x) = ROTR^2(x) \oplus ROTR^{13}(x) \oplus ROTR^{22}(x)$$

$$\sum_1^{\{256\}}(x) = ROTR^6(x) \oplus ROTR^{11}(x) \oplus ROTR^{25}(x)$$

$$\sigma_0^{\{256\}}(x) = ROTR^7(x) \oplus ROTR^{18}(x) \oplus SHR^3(x)$$

$$\sigma_1^{\{256\}}(x) = ROTR^{17}(x) \oplus ROTR^{19}(x) \oplus SHR^{10}(x)$$

}

# SHA-256: update $H$ and Output $H$

$$H_0^{(i)} = a + H_0^{(i-1)}$$

$$H_1^{(i)} = b + H_1^{(i-1)}$$

$$H_2^{(i)} = c + H_2^{(i-1)}$$

$$H_3^{(i)} = d + H_3^{(i-1)}$$

$$H_4^{(i)} = e + H_4^{(i-1)}$$

$$H_5^{(i)} = f + H_5^{(i-1)}$$

$$H_6^{(i)} = g + H_6^{(i-1)}$$

$$H_7^{(i)} = h + H_7^{(i-1)}$$

**After all  $N$  blocks processed, the output :**


$$H_0^{(N)} \parallel H_1^{(N)} \parallel H_2^{(N)} \parallel H_3^{(N)} \parallel H_4^{(N)} \parallel H_5^{(N)} \parallel H_6^{(N)} \parallel H_7^{(N)} .$$

# SHA

	Output size (bits)	Internal state size (bits)	Block size (bits)	Max message size (bits)	Word size (bits)	Rounds	Operations	Collisions found
SHA-0	160	160	512	$2^{64} - 1$	32	80	+, and, or, xor, rot	Yes
SHA-1	160	160	512	$2^{64} - 1$	32	80	+, and, or, xor, rot	None ( $2^{52}$ attack)
SHA-2	256/224	256	512	$2^{64} - 1$	32	64	+, and, or, xor, shr, rot	None
	512/384	512	1024	$2^{128} - 1$	64	80	+, and, or, xor, shr, rot	None

# Message Authentication Code

- A small fixed-sized block of data
  - generated from message + secret key
  - $MAC = C(K, M)$
  - appended to message when sent



# MAC Properties

- a MAC is a cryptographic checksum

$$\text{MAC} = C_K(M)$$

- condenses a variable-length message  $M$
- using a secret key  $K$
- to a fixed-sized authenticator
- is a many-to-one function
  - potentially many messages have same MAC
  - but finding these needs to be very difficult

# Requirements for MACs

- taking into account the types of attacks
- need the MAC to satisfy the following:
  1. knowing a message and MAC, is infeasible to find another message with same MAC
  2. MACs should be uniformly distributed
  3. MAC should depend equally on all bits of the message



# HMAC

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
- ◆ Construct MAC from a cryptographic hash function
  - Invented by Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk (1996)
  - Used in SSL/TLS, mandatory for IPsec
- ◆ Why not encryption?
  - Hashing is faster than encryption
  - Library code for hash functions widely available
  - Can easily replace one hash function with another
  - There used to be US export restrictions on encryption

# Structure of HMAC

ipad: 00110110

Opad: 01011100

[Repeated  $b/8$  times]



# HMAC Security

- proved security of HMAC relates to that of the underlying hash algorithm
- attacking HMAC requires either:
  - brute force attack on key used
  - birthday attack (but since keyed would need to observe a very large number of messages)
- choose hash function used based on speed verses security constraints