

Efficient NIZK for NP without Knowledge Assumptions

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Abstract. Insert abstract here.

1 Introduction

In this work we construct a NIZK argument of knowledge (NIZK-AoK) for the language

$$\text{CircuitSat} := \{C : \exists \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^m \text{ s.t. } C \text{ is an algebraic circuit and } C(\mathbf{x}) = 1\},$$

with proof size $\kappa + \Theta(\text{depth}(C))$ elements of a bilinear group, where κ is the size of a proof of knowledge of \mathbf{x} . In the case of binary circuits, i.e. $p = 2$, we have that $\kappa = 2|\mathbf{x}| + O(1)$ using the techniques of [?]. In general, κ could be independent from the circuit.

We organize the circuit gates by level, where level ℓ is formed by the gates at distance ℓ from the output gate. For example, the d -th level, where $d := \text{depth}(C)$, contain the gates whose inputs are only elements from the circuit input \mathbf{x} and the 0-th level contains the unique gate whose output is the output of the circuit.

To each gate we might associate a vector of degree 2 polynomials $\mathbf{p}_\ell \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n_\ell}[W_1, \dots, W_{m_\ell}]$, where $m_\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ is the number of inputs of level ℓ and $n_\ell \in \mathbb{N}$ is the number of outputs (or, equivalently the number of gates) of level ℓ . Note that it must hold that $\sum_{i < \ell} n_i \geq m_\ell \geq n_{\ell-1}$ (**TODO: Check this**). It must hold that for every $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^m$

$$C(\mathbf{x}) = (\mathbf{p}_d \circ \mathbf{p}_{d-1} \circ \dots \circ \mathbf{p}_0)(\mathbf{x}) \text{ **TODO: I need to add id gates**}$$

We work on asymmetric bilinear groups and our construction is built from the following primitives:

1. A commitment scheme for vectors in \mathbb{Z}_q^m for which we can construct a NIZK argument of knowledge of the opening.
2. An homomorphic commitment scheme **Com** for vectors in \mathbb{Z}_q^m and randomness in \mathbb{Z}_q^r with (possibly) constant-size commitments in \mathbb{G}_s^k , $s \in \{1, 2\}$. Additionally we require that, whenever $k = m + r$, **Com** defines perfectly binding commitments.

3. A QA-NIZK argument for the following language

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{deg-2}, ck, ck'}(\mathbf{p}) := \left\{ [c]_s, [c']_s : \begin{array}{l} \text{knowledge of } \mathbf{x} \text{ s.t. } [c]_1 = \text{Com}_{ck}(\mathbf{x}) \implies \\ \text{knowledge of } \mathbf{y} \text{ s.t. } [c']_1 = \text{Com}_{ck'}(\mathbf{y}) \\ \text{and } \mathbf{y} = \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{x}) \end{array} \right\},$$

for some $\mathbf{p} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n[X_1, \dots, X_m]$ of degree at most 2. In turn, this QA-NIZK argument is constructed from the following primitives:

I don't know if it would be a good idea to introduce a notion of conditional argument (or proof) of knowledge, where the soundness reduction has access to an opening of the commitments.

(a) A QA-NIZK argument for the following language

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{prod}, ck_1, ck_2} = \left\{ [a]_1, [b]_2, [c]_1 : \begin{array}{l} [a]_1 = \text{Com}_{ck_1}(\mathbf{x}) \text{ and } [b]_2 = \text{Com}_{ck_2}(\mathbf{y}) \\ \implies [c]_1 = \text{Com}_{ck_3}(\mathbf{x} \otimes \mathbf{y}) \end{array} \right\},$$

where $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m, \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, \mathbf{x} \otimes \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mn}$, $ck_3 = ck_1 \otimes ck_2$, and \otimes denote the kroenecker product.

(b) A QA-NIZK argument for the language

$$\mathcal{L} = \left\{ [c]_1, [c']_1 : \begin{array}{l} \text{knowledge of } \mathbf{x} \text{ s.t. } [c]_1 = \text{Com}_{ck_1 \otimes ck_2}(\mathbf{x}) \implies \\ [c']_1 = \text{Com}_{ck'}(\mathbf{x}) \end{array} \right\},$$

(c) A QA-NIZK argument for the language

$$\mathcal{L} = \left\{ [c]_1, [a']_1, [b']_2 : \begin{array}{l} \text{knowledge of } \mathbf{x} \text{ s.t. } [c]_1 = \text{Com}_{ck}(\mathbf{x}) \\ \implies [a']_1 = \text{Com}_{ck_1}(\mathbf{\Gamma}_1 \mathbf{x}) \text{ and } [b']_2 = \text{Com}_{ck_2}(\mathbf{\Gamma}_2 \mathbf{x}) \end{array} \right\},$$

2 Technical Overview

Constant-Size Multiplicative Homomorphic Commitments. Both Groth-Sahai and Pedersen commitments are special cases of the following general commitment scheme

$$ck := [\mathbf{G}]_s = [\mathbf{G}_0 | \mathbf{G}_1] \in \mathbb{G}_s^{k \times (n+r)}, \quad \text{Com}_{ck}(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\rho}) = [\mathbf{G}_0]_s \mathbf{x} + [\mathbf{G}_1]_s \boldsymbol{\rho}.$$

Groth-Sahai commitments correspond to the case $k = n + r$, which defines perfectly binding commitments if \mathbf{G} is invertible, and Pedersen commitments correspond to the case $k = 1$, which defines perfectly hiding commitments. We will consider the case $k > 1$ which has been called *somewhere statistically binding* commitments and is a mixture between Groth-Sahai and Pedersen commitments.

With this formulation is easy to derive commitments to $\mathbf{x} \otimes \mathbf{y}$ from commitments to $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ and $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, as follows

$$\text{Com}_{ck_3}(\mathbf{x} \otimes \mathbf{y}; \boldsymbol{\rho}_3) := \text{Com}_{ck_1}(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\rho}_1) \otimes \text{Com}_{ck_2}(\mathbf{y}; \boldsymbol{\rho}_2),$$

where $ck_2 := [\mathbf{H}_0 | \mathbf{H}_2]_1$, $ck_3 = [\mathbf{G} \otimes \mathbf{H}]_T$ and

$$\boldsymbol{\rho}_3 = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{0}_m \\ \boldsymbol{\rho}_1 \end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{y} \\ \frac{1}{2} \boldsymbol{\rho}_2 \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{x} \\ \frac{1}{2} \boldsymbol{\rho}_1 \end{pmatrix} \otimes \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{0}_n \\ \boldsymbol{\rho}_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

(ρ_3 has a different form?).

This approach has the disadvantage that once we compute $[c]_T = \text{Com}_{ck_3}(x \otimes y)$ we are stuck in the target group and no more multiplications are possible. But one can still *bootstrap* commitment $[c]_T$ (in some analogy with FHE techniques, when one bootstraps for diminishing the error) by bringing it to one of the base groups \mathbb{G}_s and requiring the verifier to check that

$$e([a]_1, [b]_2) = e([c]_s, [\mathbf{I}]_{2-s+1}).$$

Going a step forward, we will have to give two shares of $[c]_s$, $[c']_1$ and $[d']_2$, such that $c = c' + d'$. We omit the “primes” in the shares and now the verifier checks that

$$e([a]_1, [b]_2) = e([c]_1, [\mathbf{I}]_2) + e([\mathbf{I}]_1, [d]_2).$$

The first share is computed using commitment key $ck_{3,1} := [\mathbf{G} \otimes \mathbf{H} - \mathbf{Z}]_1$ and the second share is computed using commitment key $ck_{3,1} := [\mathbf{Z}]_2$, for $\mathbf{Z} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{k_1 k_2 \times mn}$.

Arguments of Equal Opening. Given $[c]_1 = \text{Com}_{ck}(x; \rho)$, where $ck = ck_1 \otimes ck_2$, we want to show that $[c']_1$ can be also opened to x but ck' is a random commitment key.

To do so we will give a QA-NIZK argument that c/c' is in the linear span of

$$\mathbf{J} := \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{G}_0 \otimes \mathbf{H}_0 & \mathbf{G}_0 \otimes \mathbf{H}_1 & \mathbf{G}_1 \otimes \mathbf{H}_0 & \mathbf{G}_1 \otimes \mathbf{H}_1 & \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{G}'_0 & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{G}'_0 \end{pmatrix}$$

However, the QA-NIZK argument only shows the existence of some w such that $c/c' = \mathbf{J}w$ but it might be the case that c' still can't be opened to x — i.e. w can't be x appended with some other vector. We will show that this is not the case.

Assume that $[c]_1 = \text{Com}_{ck}(x; \rho)$ but $[c']_1 \neq \text{Com}_{ck'}(x; \rho')$ for any ρ' , and assume also that the adversary provides a valid proof $[\pi]_1$ for $[c/c']_1$. Given knowledge of x , we can compute $[c^\dagger]_1 := \text{Com}_{ck}(x; \mathbf{0})$ and $[c^\dagger] := \text{Com}_{ck'}(x; \mathbf{0})$, and note that c^\dagger/c^\dagger is in the image of \mathbf{J} and thus we can compute a proof $[\pi^\dagger]_1$ for $[c^\dagger/c^\dagger]_1$. By the properties of the QA-NIZK arguments for linear spaces, we get that $[\pi - \pi^\dagger]_1$ is a proof for $[d^\dagger/d^\dagger]_1$, where

$$[d^\dagger]_1 = [c - c^\dagger]_1 = \text{Com}_{ck}(\mathbf{0}; \rho)$$

and

$$[d^\dagger]_1 = [c' - c^\dagger]_1 \neq \text{Com}_{ck}(\mathbf{0}, \rho^\dagger)$$

for any ρ^\dagger .

We will show that d^\dagger/d^\dagger is not in the image of \mathbf{J}' , such that $[\mathbf{J}']_1$ is computationally indistinguishable from $[\mathbf{J}]_1$.

Let $\mathbf{u}_0, \mathbf{u}_1, \mathbf{v}_0, \mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{u}'_0, \mathbf{u}'_1$ randomly chosen from \mathbb{Z}_q^k . We compute \mathbf{J}' in the same way that \mathbf{J} is computed, but now ck_1, ck_2 and ck' are computed as follows

$$\begin{aligned} ck_1 &= [\mathbf{G}_0 | \mathbf{G}_1]_1 = [\mathbf{u}_0 \mathbf{A}_0 | \mathbf{u}_1 \mathbf{A}_1]_1 \\ ck_2 &= [\mathbf{H}_0 | \mathbf{H}_1]_2 = [\mathbf{v}_0 \mathbf{B}_0 | \mathbf{v}_1 \mathbf{B}_1]_2 \\ ck' &= [\mathbf{G}'_0 | \mathbf{G}'_1]_1 = [\mathbf{u}'_0 (\mathbf{A}_0 \otimes \mathbf{B}_0) + \mathbf{u}_1 \mathbf{C}_0 | \mathbf{u}_1 \mathbf{C}_1]_1 \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

since $[\mathbf{u}]_s \mu$, $\mu \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, is indistinguishable from a random element in \mathbb{G}_s^k as long as the DDH assumption is hard in \mathbb{G}_s , it follows that the new commitment keys are indistinguishable from the original ones.

There is still a technical problem when using the DDH assumption and computing $[\mathbf{J}]_1$: when using the DDH assumption in \mathbb{G}_2 to change the distribution of ck_2 we can only compute $[\mathbf{J}]_2$. This problem has already arisen and solved in [?] and we use a similar solution in our final proof system. For the sake of clarity, for this intuitive explanation we just assume that ck_1, ck_2 and ck' are sampled from (1) in the real game (although this will make impossible to prove zero-knowledge).

Going back to the problem of whether $\mathbf{d}^\dagger / \mathbf{d}^\ddagger$ is in the image of \mathbf{J} , we get that now this is not the case. Indeed, define $\mathbf{u}_{i,j} := \mathbf{u}_i \otimes \mathbf{v}_j$, $i, j \in \{0, 1\}$, and note that matrix \mathbf{J} is equal to

$$\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{u}_{0,0}(\mathbf{A}_0 \otimes \mathbf{B}_0) & \mathbf{u}_{0,1}(\mathbf{A}_0 \otimes \mathbf{B}_1) & \mathbf{u}_{1,0}(\mathbf{A}_1 \otimes \mathbf{B}_0) & \mathbf{u}_{1,1}(\mathbf{A}_1 \otimes \mathbf{B}_1) & \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{u}'_0(\mathbf{A}_0 \otimes \mathbf{B}_0) + \mathbf{u}'_1 \mathbf{C}_0 & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{u}'_1 \mathbf{C}_1 \end{pmatrix}$$

and that $\mathbf{d}^\dagger / \mathbf{d}^\ddagger$ can be written as

$$\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{d}^\dagger \\ \mathbf{d}^\ddagger \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{u}_{0,1}\mu_{0,1} + \mathbf{u}_{1,0}\mu_{1,0} + \mathbf{u}_{1,1}\mu_{1,1} \\ \mathbf{u}'_0\nu_0 + \mathbf{u}'_1\nu_1 \end{pmatrix}, \text{ where } \nu_0 \neq 0.$$

Lets see that $\mathbf{d}^\dagger / \mathbf{d}^\ddagger$ is not in the image of \mathbf{J} by showing that there aren't solutions to $\mathbf{d}^\dagger / \mathbf{d}^\ddagger = \mathbf{J}(\mathbf{w}_{0,0} / \mathbf{w}_{0,1} / \mathbf{w}_{1,0} / \mathbf{w}_{1,1} / \mathbf{w}_2)$. Indeed, suppose that

$$\begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{u}_{0,1}\mu_{0,1} + \mathbf{u}_{1,0}\mu_{1,0} + \mathbf{u}_{1,1}\mu_{1,1} \\ \mathbf{u}'_0\nu_0 + \mathbf{u}'_1\nu_1 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} \sum_{i,j \in \{0,1\}} \mathbf{u}_{i,j}(\mathbf{A}_i \otimes \mathbf{B}_j) \mathbf{w}_{i,j} \\ \mathbf{u}_0(\mathbf{A}_0 \otimes \mathbf{B}_0) \mathbf{w}_{0,0} + \mathbf{u}'_1 \mathbf{C}_0 \mathbf{w}_{0,0} + \mathbf{u}'_1 \mathbf{C}_1 \mathbf{w}_2 \end{pmatrix} \quad (2)$$

Given that $\mathbf{u}_{0,0}$ is linearly independent from $\{\mathbf{u}_{0,1}, \mathbf{u}_{1,0}, \mathbf{u}_{1,1}\}$ and that $\mathbf{u}_{0,0}$ doesn't appear on the left side of the first row of equation (2), it must hold that $(\mathbf{A} \otimes \mathbf{B}) \mathbf{w}_{0,0} = \mathbf{0}$. Then, the second row is reduced to

$$\mathbf{u}'_0\nu_0 + \mathbf{u}'_1 \mathbf{w}_0\nu_1 = \mathbf{u}'_1 (\mathbf{C}_0 \mathbf{w}_{0,0} + \mathbf{C}_1 \mathbf{w}_2).$$

Since \mathbf{u}'_0 is linearly independent from \mathbf{u}'_1 , it must hold that $\nu_0 = 0$ but this contradicts the fact that $\mathbf{c}' \neq \text{Com}_{ck'}(\mathbf{x}; \rho')$ for all ρ' . We conclude that $\mathbf{d}^\dagger / \mathbf{d}^\ddagger$ is not in the image of \mathbf{J} .