

Block Oriented Programming: Automating Data-Only Attacks

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Automatic CFI-aware Exploitation



Introduction

Memory corruption results in arbitrary code execution

Mitigations: DEP, ASLR, Canaries, CFI, Shadow Stacks, ...

Advanced mitigations call for advanced attacks

Data-Only attacks are still possible

Approach in a nutshell

• Perform <u>Code Reuse</u> using <u>Data-Only attacks</u>

Leverage a memory corruption vulnerability

Build Turing-complete payloads as execution traces

Express execution traces as memory writes


Contributions


- A language for expressing exploit payloads (SPL)
- Block Oriented Programming (BOP)
- Effective concolic execution algorithm to stitch BOP gadgets
- Open source implementation


Block Oriented Programming (BOP)


Block Oriented Programming: Gadget


- Gadget: Sequence of basic blocks
- Functional blocks
 - Perform useful computations
- Dispatcher blocks
 - Connect functional blocks
 - Avoid clobbering blocks
- Clobbering blocks
 - Destruct execution context















Block Oriented Programming: Concept


- Construct attacker's intended execution
 - As an "exploit program"
- Find and stitch BOP gadgets to implement "exploit program"
 - Follow CFG

- Encode execution trace as a set of memory writes
 - Data-Only Attack

Design

How it's made





SPL payload

- Payload expression language
 - Architecture independent
 - Turing-complete
- High level; Subset of C
 - Variables
 - Library Calls
 - Conditionals
 - 0 ...
- Abstract registers as volatile vars

```
void payload() {
   string prog = "/bin/sh\0";
   int64* argv = {&prog, 0x0};

   __r0 = &prog;
   __r1 = &argv;
   __r2 = 0;

   execve(__r0, __r1, __r2);
}
```


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}
```



Selecting Functional Blocks

- For each SPL statement: find implementing blocks
 - "Candidate" functional blocks
 - Results in a set of candidates for each SPL statement

- Select all candidate blocks for search process (next step)
- Maximum bipartite matching problem







$$rdi = 10$$











$$rax = 10$$

$$rax = 20$$





$$rax = 20$$




$$rax = 10$$

$$rdi = 10$$

$$rax = 20$$

$$rcx = 10$$



$$rax = 10$$


$$rdi = 10$$

$$rax = 20$$

$$rcx = 10$$

$$r0 = 10;$$

 $r1 = 20;$




$$rax = 10$$


$$rdi = 10$$

$$rax = 20$$

$$rcx = 10$$

$$rcx = 30$$






$$rax = 10$$


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
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$$rcx = 10$$


$$rcx = 30$$












Searching for dispatcher blocks: Concerns

- BOP gadgets are <u>volatile</u>
- BOP gadgets not arbitrarily chainable
- Stitching of BOP Gadgets is NP-hard (unlike ROP Gadgets)
 - Problem cannot even be approximated (proven)
- Backtracking (iterative process)


BOP Gadgets: Volatility



Statement #1




Statement #2



Statement #3

BOP Gadgets: Volatility




Statement #1

Statement #2

Statement #3

BOP Gadgets: Volatility




Statement #1

Statement #2

Statement #3


The Delta Graph


- Layers: Functional blocks for each SPL statement
- Nodes: Functional blocks
- Edges: Proximity of functional blocks
- Goal: Select exactly one "node" from each layer (yellow)



The Delta Graph

- Rank potential solutions
 - Block proximity as a metric
- Find N min. induced subgraphs
 - Candidate execution trace
 - Problem is NP-hard
- Functional blocks to reconstruct attacker's payload
- Context Sensitive Shortest Paths
 - Follow CFG + Shadow Stacks





Stitching BOP Gadgets

- Induced subgraph fulfills exploit program
 - All functional blocks can be connected together
- "Verify" that induced subgraph is valid:
 - Many constraints come from multiple dimensions
 - Local constraints
 - SPL constraints
 - Execution constraints

Verify using concolic execution + constraint solving

Stitching BOP Gadgets

- Utilize concolic execution
 - Keep track of <u>every</u> action and extract constraints
- Upon failure, try to patch "locally"
 - K shortest paths for every edge of the induced subgraph
- Once a solution found encode constraints as memory writes

Evaluation

Proof of Work

Program	Vulnerability	Nodes	RegSet	RegMod	MemRd	MemWr	Call	Cond	Total
ProFTPd	CVE-2006-5815	27,087	40,143	387	1,592	199	77	3,029	45,427
nginx	CVE-2013-2028	24,169	31,497	1,168	1,522	279	35	3375	37,876
sudo	CVE-2012-0809	3,399	5,162	26	157	18	45	307	5715
orzhttpd	BugtraqID 41956	1,345	2,317	9	39	8	11	89	2473
wuftpd	CVE-2000-0573	8,899	14,101	62	274	11	94	921	15,463
nullhttpd	CVE-2002-1496	1,488	2,327	77	54	7	19	125	2,609
opensshd	CVE-2001-0144	6,688	8,800	98	214	19	63	558	9,752
wireshark	CVE-2014-2299	74,186	124,053	639	1,736	193	100	4555	131276
apache	CVE-2006-3747	18,790	33,615	212	490	66	127	1,768	36,278
smbclient	CVE-2009-1886	166,081	265,980	1,481	6,791	951	119	28,705	304,027

RegSet: Register Assignment Gadgets
RegMod: Register Modification Gadgets
MemRd: Memory Read Gadgets
MemWr: Memory Write Gadgets

Cond: Function/System Call Gadgets
Cond: Conditional Statement Gadgets
Total: Total number of Functional Gadgets

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Total: Total number of Functional Gadgets

Payload	Description
"regset4	Initialize 4 registers with arbitrary values
regref4	Initialize 4 registers with pointers to arbitrary memory
regset5	Initialize 5 registers with arbitrary values
regref5	Initialize 5 registers with pointers to arbitrary memory
regmod	Initialize a register with an arbitrary value and modify it
memrd	Read from arbitrary memory
memwr	Write to arbitrary memory
print	Display a message to stdout using write
execve	Spawn a shell through execve
abloop	Perform an arbitrarily long bounded loop utilizing regmod
infloop	Perform an infinite loop that sets a register in its body
ifelse	An if-else condition based on a register comparison
loop	Conditional loop with register modification

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D						S	PL payloa	d					
Program	regset4	regref4	regset5	regref5	regmod	memrd	memwr	print	execve	abloop	infloop	ifelse	loop
ProFTPd	✓	√	1	1	√	1	√	√ 32	X ₁	√ 128+	✓ ∞	√	✓ 3
nginx	/	/	1	1	√	/	1	X_4	1	√ 128+	✓ ∞	✓	√ 128
sudo	✓	/	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	\mathbf{X}_4	√ 128+	X_4	X_4
orzhttpd	✓	/	✓	√	✓	/	/	X_4	X ₁	\varkappa_4	√ 128+	X_4	X ₃
wuftdp	/	/	√	✓	√	√	√	√	X ₁	√ 128+	√ 128+	X_4	X ₃
nullhttpd	✓	/	√	/	√	✓	X ₃	X ₃	/	√ 30	✓ ∞	X_4	X ₃
opensshd	✓	/	✓	✓	✓	✓	X_4	X_4	X_4	√ 512	√ 128+	1	√ 99
wireshark	✓	/	√	1	✓	✓	✓	√ 4	X ₁	√ 128+	✓ 7	✓	✓ 8
apache	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	1	X_4	X_4	✓ ∞	√ 128+	/	X_4
smbclient	/	/	1	1	1	1	1	√ 1	\boldsymbol{X}_1	√ 1057	√ 128+	1	√ 256

- ✓ The SPL payload was successfully executed on the target binary
- 🗶 Not enough candidate blocks
- X No valid register/variable mappings
- X_3 No valid paths between functional blocks
- X Un-satisfiable constraints or solver timeout

Duaguam						S	PL payloa	d					
Program	regset4	regref4	regset5	regref5	regmod	memrd	memwr	print	execve	abloop	infloop	ifelse	loop
ProFTPd	1	1	√	1	1	1	1	√ 32	X ₁	√ 128+	✓ ∞	√	✓ 3
nginx	/	1	1	1	1	✓	1	X_4	✓	√ 128+	✓ ∞	√	√ 128
sudo	1	1	1	1	✓	1	1	1	1	\boldsymbol{X}_4	√ 128+	X_4	X_4
orzhttpd	✓	✓	1	√	1	/	✓	X_4	X ₁	\varkappa_4	√ 128+	X_4	X ₃
wuftdp	/	✓	/	/	✓	✓	✓	✓	X ₁	√ 128+	√ 128+	X_4	X ₃
nullhttpd	/	1	✓	/	/	✓	X ₃	X ₃	/	√ 30	✓ ∞	X_4	X ₃
opensshd	/	✓	1	✓	/	√	X_4	X_4	X_4	√ 512	√ 128+	1	√ 99
wireshark	1	√	√	1	/	1	✓	√ 4	X ₁	√ 128+	✓ 7	✓	✓ 8
apache	✓	√	✓	✓	/	✓	1	X_4	X ₄	✓ ∞	√ 128+	1	X_4
smbclient	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	√ 1	X ₁	√ 1057	√ 128+	1	√ 256

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ProFTPd	/	1	√	√	√	1	√	√ 32	X ₁	√ 128+	✓ ∞	√	✓ 3
nginx	1	1	1	√	1	√	1	X_4	/	√ 128+	✓ ∞	√	√ 128
sudo	/	1	1	√	✓	1	1	1	1	\boldsymbol{X}_4	√ 128+	X_4	X_4
orzhttpd	/	1	1	√	1	1	1	X_4	X ₁	X ₄	√ 128+	X ₄	X ₃
wuftdp	/	1	✓	√	✓	1	✓	✓	X ₁	√ 128+	√ 128+	X_4	X ₃
nullhttpd	/	√	√	✓	✓	✓	X ₃	X ₃	✓	√ 30	✓ ∞	X_4	X ₃
opensshd	/	√	✓	✓	1	√	X_4	X_4	X_4	√ 512	√ 128+	√	✓ 99
wireshark	/	1	1	1	✓	1	✓	√ 4	\boldsymbol{X}_1	√ 128+	✓ 7	✓	✓ 8
apache	✓	√	/	1	✓	/	1	X_4	X_4	✓ ∞	√ 128+	/	\varkappa_4
smbclient	1	1	1	1	/	1	1	√ 1	\boldsymbol{X}_1	✓ 1057	√ 128+	√	√ 256

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
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nginx	✓	/	✓	✓	✓	✓	/	X_4	1	√ 128+	✓ ∞	1	√ 128
sudo	✓	1	1	/	✓	1	1	1	1	\boldsymbol{X}_4	√ 128+	X_4	\boldsymbol{X}_4
orzhttpd	1	1	✓	√	1	1	/	X_4	X ₁	X_4	√ 128+	X_4	X ₃
wuftdp	/	/	✓	✓	✓	✓	/	✓	X ₁	√ 128+	√ 128+	X_4	X ₃
nullhttpd	✓	/	1	✓	/	✓	X ₃	X ₃	/	√ 30	✓ ∞	X_4	X ₃
opensshd	/	1	✓	✓	1	√	X_4	X_4	X ₄	√ 512	√ 128+	1	✓ 99
wireshark	1	1	1	1	/	1	1	√ 4	\boldsymbol{x}_1	√ 128+	✓ 7	1	✓ 8
apache	✓	/	✓	✓	/	/	/	X_4	X_4	✓ ∞	√ 128+	1	X_4
smbclient	1	1	1	1	1	1	/	√ 1	X ₁	√ 1057	√ 128+	1	√ 256

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
Success Rate: 81%


Case Study: infloop payload on nginx

```
ngx signal handler()
41C765: signals.signo == 0
40E10F: ngx time lock != 0
41C7B1: ngx process 3 > 1
41C9AC: ngx cycle = \$alloc 1
        $alloc 1 > log = $alloc 2
        $alloc 2 > log level <= 5</pre>
41CA18: signo == 17
41CA4B: waitpid() return value != {0, 1}
41cA50: ngx last process == 0
41CB50: *($stack 0x03C) & 0x7F != 0
41CB5B: $alloc 2 > log level <= 1
41CBE6: *($stack 0x03C + 1) != 2
41CC48: ngx accept mutex ptr == 0
41CC5F: ngx cycle> shared memory.part.elts = 0
        r0 = r14 = 0
41CC79: ngx cycle > shared memory.part.nelts <= 0
41CC7F: ngx cycle > shared memory.part.next == 0
```



Case Study: ifelse on nginx





Conclusion

- Automatic CFI-aware Exploitation is feasible
- Block Oriented Programming automates Data-Only attacks
- Evaluation shows that this can be done in 81% of the cases
- Open Source + VM: https://github.com/HexHive/BOPC
- Contact: <u>ispo@purdue.edu</u>