# Vulnerability Report

Microsoft Windows DiagTrack 'UtcApi\_DownloadLatestSettings' Arbitrary File Read

# 1 Executive Summary

Platform	Windows 10 Pro WIP (19041.1.amd64fre.vb_release.191206-1406)
Affected Component	DiagTrack Service
Type of Vulnerability	Arbitrary File Read
Impact	Information Disclosure
Severity	Important

This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on affected installations of Microsoft Windows. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.

The specific flaw exists within the DiagTrack service. Any local user can interact with this service thanks to local RPC calls. One of the exposed functions, "UtcApi\_DownloadLatestSettings" copies user-owned files to a folder in "ProgramData" which is world-readable. A local attacker may leverage this operation to read an arbitrary file in the context of "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM". This vulnerability could be used to get a copy of a SAM backup file or access files owned by other users on the same machine.

# 2 Root Cause Analysis

### 2.1 DiagTrack RPC Interfaces

The DiagTrack service has several RPC interfaces which can be easily viewed using RpcView.




Figure 1: RpcView - DiagTrack Interfaces

The interface with the ID "4c9dbf19-d39e-4bb9-90ee-8f7179b20283" has 37 methods.




Figure 2: RpcView - Interface methods

The rest of the report will focus on the "UtcApi\_DownloadLatestSettings" procedure.

## 2.2 The "UtcApi\_DownloadLatestSettings" procedure

The prototype of the UtcApi DownloadLatestSettings procedure is as follows:

```
long DownloadLatestSettings(
   /* [in] */ handle_t IDL_handle,
   /* [in] */ long arg_1,
   /* [in] */ long arg_2
)
```

The first parameter is the RPC binding handle. The two other parameters are unknown.

I first tried to invoke this function with the following parameters.

```
RPC_BINDING_HANDLE g_hBinding;
HRESULT hRes;
hRes = DownloadLatestSettings(g_hBinding, 1, 1);
```

And, I observed the background file operations with *Process Monitor*.




Figure 3: Procmon - QueryDirectory \*.xml

Although the service is running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, I noticed that the it was trying to enumerate XML files located in the following folder, which is owned by the currently logged-on user.

C:\Users\lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager\_cw5n1h2tx
yewy\LocalState\Tips\

Note: lab-user is a "normal" user without admin privileges.

This operation originated from a call to FindFirstFileW() in "diagtrack.dll".




Figure 4: Procmon - Event Properties - FindFirstFileW()

The folder seems to be empty by default so I created a few XML files there.

```
Command Prompt
                                                                                                                             П
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.18362.535]
(c) 2019 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
:\Users\lab-user>cd C:\Users\lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\Loc
:\Users\lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\LocalState\Tips>echo tes
:\Users\lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\LocalState\Tips>echo tes
 > file2.xml
:\Users\lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\LocalState\Tips>echo te
 > file3.xml
:\Users\lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\LocalState\Tips>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 7612-A323
Directory of C:\Users\lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\LocalState
80/12/2019 15:59
                      <DIR>
30/12/2019
30/12/2019
           15:58
15:58
0/12/2019
                          21 bytes
29,530,411,008 bytes free
                2 Dir(s)
```

Figure 5: XML test files

I ran my test program once again and observed the result.




Figure 6: file1.xml is being copied to C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Diagnosis\SoftLandingStage\

This time, the QueryDirectory operation succeeds and the service reads the content of file1.xml, which is the first XML file present in the directory and copies it into a new file in the C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Diagnosis\SoftLandingStage\ folder.

The same process applies to the two other files file2.xml, file3.xml.





Figure 7: file2.xml is being copied to C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Diagnosis\SoftLandingStage\



 $\textit{Figure 8: file3.xml is being copied to C:} \\ \textit{ProgramData} \\ \textit{Microsoft} \\ \textit{Diagnosis} \\ \textit{SoftLandingStage} \\ \\ \textit{Total Copied to C:} \\ \textit{ProgramData} \\ \textit{Microsoft} \\ \textit{Diagnosis} \\ \textit{SoftLandingStage} \\ \textit{Total Copied to C:} \\ \textit{Total C:} \\ \textit{T$ 

Finally, all the XML files which were created in C:\ProgramData\[...]\SoftLandingStage are deleted at the end of the process.




Figure 9: XML files are deleted

The CreateFile operations originated from a call to DeleteFileW() in "diagtrack.dll".




Figure 10: Procmon - Event Properties - DeleteFileW()

### 2.3 The Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability

The files are not moved with a call to MoveFileW() or copied with a call to CopyFileW() and we cannot control the destination folder so, a local attacker wouldn't be able to leverage this operation to move/copy an arbitrary file to an arbitrary location. Instead, each file is read and then the content is written to a new file in C:\ProgramData\[...]\SoftLandingStage. In a way, it's manual file copy operation.

The one thing we can fully control though is the source folder because it's owned by the currently logged-on user. The second thing to consider is that the destination folder is readable by Everyone. It means that, by default, new files created in this folder are also readable by Everyone so this privileged file operation may still be abused.

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.18362.535]
(c) 2019 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\lab-user>icacls C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Diagnosis\SoftLandingStage
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Diagnosis\SoftLandingStage NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(0I)(CI)(F)
BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(0I)(CI)(RX)
Everyone:(I)(0I)(CI)(RX)

Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
```

Figure 11: SoftLandingStage folder permissions

For example, we could replace the C:\Users\lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\[...]\Tips folder with a mountpoint to an *Object Directory* and create pseudo symbolic links to point to any file we want on the file system.

If a backup of the SAM file exists, we could create a symlink such as follows in order to get a copy of the file.

```
 \lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\[...]\Tips \to \RPC\Control \\ RPC\Control\file1.xml \to \??\C:\Windows\Repair\SAM
```

Theoretically, if the service tries to open file1.xml, it would be redirected to C:\Windows\Repair\SAM. So, it would read its content and copy it to C:\ProgramData\[...]\SoftLandingStage\file1.xml.

There are two issues though:

- 1) The FindFirstFileW() call on the Tips folder would fail because the target of the mountpoint isn't a "real" folder.
- 2) The new file1.xml file which is created in C:\ProgramData\[...]\SoftLandingStage is deleted at the end of the process so there is a kind of race that we would have to win in order to get a copy of the file before this happens.

It turns out that we can work around these two issues using an extra mountpoint, several "bait" files and a combination of opportunistic locks (see the details in next part). This results in a reliable exploit which allows a normal user to get a copy of any file which is readable by NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.

#### 2.4 Remediation

#### Solution #1: Impersonation

The first solution I could think of was implementing impersonation but I also think that this function wasn't originally meant to be called by a normal user directly if I had to guess. So, this solution wouldn't work probably.

#### Solution #2: Symbolic links

The second solution would be to prevent the service from following reparse points and symbolic links. This would be efficient against the exploit I describe in the next part but it wouldn't fix the underlying behavior.

#### Solution #3: Fixing the root cause

In my humble opinion, copying and processing files from a user owned directory with System privileges is a dangerous behavior. Therefore, a reliable fix would be to remove the part of the procedure where the service queries the content of a directory owned by the currently logged on user. Obviously, I don't know why it was implemented that way and this feature certainly exists for a good reason. Still, it might be the best solution, I don't know.

## 3 PoC / Exploit

The Virtual Machine I set up has two users, lab-admin and lab-user. As their name implies, lab-admin is a local administrator and lab-user is a normal user. In this part, I will demonstrate how lab-user may read the file secret.txt owned by lab-admin.

## 3.1 Solving The FindFirstFileW() Problem

In order to exploit the behavior described in the previous part, we must find a way to reliably redirect the file read operation to any file we want. But, we cannot use a pseudo symbolic link straight away because of the call to FindFirstFileW().

This first problem is quite simple to address though. Instead of creating a mountpoint to an Object Directory immediately, we can first create a mountpoint to an actual directory.

First, we would have to create a temporary workspace directory such as follows:

```
C:\workspace
|__ file1.xml
|__ file2.xml
```

Then, we can create the mountpoint:

```
C:\Users\lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\[…]\Tips → C:\workspace
```

Therefore, FindFirstFileW() would succeed and return file1.xml. In addition, if we set an OpLock on this file we can partially control the execution flow when the service tries to access it.

Indeed, when the OpLock is triggered, we can switch the mountpoint to an Object Directory because the QueryDirectory operation already occurred and is done only once at the beginning of the FindFirstFileW() call.

```
C:\Users\lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\[...]\Tips → \RPC Control
\RPC Control\file2.xml → \??\C:\users\lab-admin\desktop\secret.txt
```

**Note:** at this point, we don't have to create a symbolic link for file1.xml because the service already has a handle on this file.

Thus, when the service opens C:\Users\lab-user\AppData\[...]\Tips\file2.xml, it will actually open secret.txt and copy its content to C:\ProgramData\[...]\SoftLandingStage\file2.xml.

We can trick the service into reading a file we don't own but, this leads us to the second problem. At the end of the process, C:\ProgramData\[...]\SoftLandingStage\file2.xml is removed.

#### 3.2 Solving The File Delete Problem

Since the target file is removed at the end of the process, we must "win a race" against the service and we have two options. The first one would be "bruteforce". We could implement the strategy described in the previous part and then monitor the target directory C:\ProgramData\[...]\SoftLandingStage in a loop in order to get a copy of the file as soon as System has finished writing the new XML file.

But, "bruteforce" is always the option of last resort. Here, we have a second option which is way more reliable but we have to rethink the strategy from the start.

Instead of creating two files in our initial temporary workspace directory, we will use three files.

```
C:\workspace
|__ file1.xml
|__ file2.xml
|__ file3.xml
```

The next steps will be the same but, when the OpLock on file1.xml is triggered, we will perform two extra actions.

We will first switch the mountpoint and create **two** pseudo symbolic links. We must make sure that the file3.xml link points to the actual file3.xml file.

```
C:\Users\lab-user\AppData\Local\Packages\[...]\Tips → \RPC Control

\RPC Control\file2.xml → \??\C:\users\lab-admin\desktop\secret.txt
\RPC Control\file3.xml → \??\C:\workspace\file3.xml
```

And, we set a new OpLock on file3.xml before releasing the first one.

Thanks to this trick, will are able to influence the service as follows:

- 1) DiagTrack tries to read file1.xml and hits the first OpLock.
- 2) At this point, we switch the mountpoint, create the two symlinks and set an OpLock on file3.xml.
- 3) We release the first OpLock (file1.xml).
- 4) DiagTrack copies file1.xml and file2.xml which points to secret.txt.
- 5) DiagTrack tries to read file3.xml and hits the second OpLock.
- 6) At this point, we can get a copy of C:\ProgramData\[...]\SoftLandingStage\file2.xml, which is itself a "copy" of secret.txt.
- 7) We release the second OpLock (file3.xml).
- 8) DiagTrack process terminates and the three XML files are deleted.

**Note:** this trick works because the process performed by DiagTrack is done sequentially. Each file is copied one after each other and all newly created files are deleted at the very end.

#### 3.3 Proof-of-Concept

The Proof-of-Concept works on a default installation of Windows 10 Pro WIP. The build version I'm using is 19041.1.amd64fre.vb release.191206-1406.

```
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.19041.1]
(c) 2019 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\lab-user>reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion" /v BuildLabEx

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion
BuildLabEx REG_SZ 19041.1.amd64fre.vb_release.191206-1406
```

Figure 12: Windows version

The only **prerequisite** I'm aware of for this PoC to work is that the machine **must have access to the Internet**. Otherwise, the "Download Settings" operation fails and the user directory is never queried.

To test the PoC, simply run DiagTrackAribtraryFileRead.exe from a command prompt as a normal user by providing the absolute path of the target file to read as an argument. If you want to compile the binary, open the Visual Studio solution, select **Release/x86** and generate the **DiagTrackAribtraryFileRead** project.

Note: in my lab environment, I created the file C:\Users\lab-admin\Desktop\secret.txt.

Figure 13: Proof of Concept

**Note:** the "DiagTrack service check" at the beginning of the PoC may take around one minute to complete on a Windows Insider Preview installation.

#### **Expected Result:**

When UtcApi\_DownloadLatestSettings() is called, DiagTrack fails to copy the file pointed to by the symbolic link and returns an "Access Denied" error.

#### **Observed Result:**

DiagTrack follows the symbolic link and thus copies an arbitrary file to the C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Diagnosis\SoftLandingStage folder.