### TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN

# **Talking Point Topics Proposal**

Name and Title of Visitor: (U//FOUO) Hr. Dietmar Bernal Chief Analysis and Production,
German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and Hr. Wilfried K. Chief of Collection, BND,
Accompanied by: Hr. Dietmar B. Chief Analysis & Production, German Federal Intelligence Service (BND); Chief of Station, German Embassy;
BND Liaison Officer, Washington; DNI Representative,
Berlin
Date of Visit: (U) 30 APR 1 MAY 2013
Visit Background: (TS//SL/REL TO USA, FVEY) Hr. Because and Hr. Kee will be attending the Strategic Planning Conference, the goal of which is to do planning for the German partnership with NSA.
NTOC Topic(s): Computer Network Defense (CND) - Germany:
(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Both German President Schindler, and BND SIGINT Director, BG continue to express a desire to increase CND engagement with the NSA. In addition,
they have already expanded their cyber collaboration with the Federal Office of Information Security (BSI) and BfV by establishing the T4 (Cyber Intelligence) organization.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) As CND continues to be the focus of much discussion with NSA's 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Partners, Germany is no exception. They continue to seek guidance and advice regarding their CND effort. The T4 organization, although not expected to be fully staffed for almost one year, is almost fully staffed. Of the ~150 positions within this new organization, more than 130 are already filled and the remaining billets are to be filled by 'hackers', who are still being recruited.

(C//REL TO USA, FVEY) In preparation for the 8 May visit by Dr. Maassen, Director BfV, Dr. Massen's office asked for NSA's general assessment of the Mandiant Report and our comments on the structure and responsibilities. No answer was returned to BfV as this is supposed to be a discussion topic during his visit. Regarding the Mandiant Report, NSA was aware of it prior to its release, but NSA did not request its public release nor contribute to it. Notification of this report to our SSEUR partners was given via SIGDASYS, prior to the release of the report.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) During a VTC held in early February with personnel from NTOC, FAD, SUSLAG, BND, BSI and BfV, several observations were made:

### (S//NF)

- BND/BSI/BfV's CND capability is unclear;
- NSA's Defense Industrial Base (DIB) partnerships and how NTOC gained cooperation was of interest to BSI;

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52

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- German law currently prohibits BND/BSI/BfV from doing 'near real time' cyber defense activities;
- NTOC provided a summary of TUTELAGE and how it is utilized on the NIPRNet within the .mil space, and
- NTOC requested follow on information on Germany's unique apertures for SIGINT, their ability to consume NSA reporting/data, feedback on the reporting/data being provided and defense and national level network technical information/architectures.

**LANDMINE:** (S//NF) The potential analytic and operational mission cost for engaging with the Germans appears to be much greater than the value gained by NTOC. NSA should continue to track the Germans' progress and commitment before investing heavily in analytic and operational exchanges.

# WAY AHEAD: (S//NF)

- Continue to encourage BND/BSI/BfV to collaborate regarding CND;
- Continue to assess BND/BSI/BfV's capability for collection, analysis, and/or attribution
  of cyber threat;
- Continue to encourage BND/BSI/BfV to leverage SIGINT to support CND;
- Explore options for providing Lessons Learned on cyber technical, process, and training topics that aid in the development of German SIGINT support to CND, and
- Offer selected briefings/lessons learned discussions via a VTC later this year. Potential topics include: TUTELAGE/DECS implementation, ESF program overview and administration, methodologies for building intrusion sets (Diamond Model, etc.), and lessons learned on operations/intrusion set development

NTOC Point of Contact: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) 19 April 2013.