#### TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN



## National Security Agency/Central Security Service

18 April 2013

### Information Paper

(S//REL to USA, FVEY) Subject: NSA Intelligence Relationship with Sweden

### (U) Introduction

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA's relationship with the Swedish SIGINT service, Forsvarets Radioanstalt (FRA), was established in 1954 under the UKUSA agreement. At that time it was agreed that GCHQ would take the lead for the exchange of COMINT information and that NSA would take the lead for the ELINT exchange. As of April 2004, NSA, GCHQ and the FRA agreed to dissolve this part of the UKUSA agreement and hold bilateral exchanges on both COMINT and ELINT.

(TS//SI//NF) NSA's relationship with the FRA, an extremely competent, technically innovative, and trusted Third Party partner, continues to grow. The FRA provided NSA with access to its cable collection in 2011, providing unique collection on high-priority Russian targets such as leadership, internal politics, and energy.

FRA's efforts against counter-terrorism (CT) targets continue to expand, and new legislation enacted in January 2013 has improved its ability to work directly with the Swedish internal security service (SÅPO). NSA's Data Acquisition is actively engaged with the FRA, which has numerous collection sites and is proficient in collecting a wide variety of communications.

#### (U) Key Issues

(TS//SI//NF) The FRA continues to place more emphasis on cyber. NSA's National Threat Operations Center (NTOC) and FRA analysts have an ongoing exchange discussing malware topics. The FRA is positioning itself to become the cyber defense authority in Sweden and hopes to receive the Swedish government mandate in the near future.

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### (U) What NSA Provides to Partner

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Technical support, collection, processing equipment and training (S//NF) NSA accepts selectors from FRA and tasks them to approved NSA collection sites

(U//FOUO) Accommodation purchases of equipment (U//FOUO) Membership in multinational forums

# (U) What Partner Provides to NSA

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Unique intelligence on Russia, the Baltic, Middle East, and CT (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Outstanding and unique input on ELINT signals (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) Access for special collection initiatives (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Collaboration on cryptanalytic issues

# (U) Success Stories

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evolved, technical SIGINT issues for both COMINT and ELINT. In 2004 we mutually agreed that our 50-year-old arrangement was no longer operable since we, (TS//SI) Based on a 1954 agreement between NSA and GCHQ (later ratified in the 1956 UKUSA accords), GCHQ had the lead with Sweden for COMINI matters. NSA had the lead for ELINI and, as things

both GCHQ and we are separately asking for the same or similar exchanges. As a result of this change, our COMINT relationship with the FRA has burgeoned on both sides. The relationship with Sweden is protected at to deal with the FRA on COMINT issues without pre-coordination with GCHQ. The paper also requires both of us to keep the other informed as to what we are doing with the FRA, and requires the FRA to dedupe if the TOP SECRET level because of that nation's political neutrality. (TS//SI) Therefore, we drafted a paper that was signed by NSA's Principal Director for Foreign Affairs, GCHQ's head of Foreign Relations, and the Director General of Sweden's SIGINT Service (FRA), allowing NSA