



(U) Battlefield SIGINT Conference

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(U//FOUO) On 25-26 May 2004, Cryptanalysis and Exploitation Services (CES - S31) hosted its first-ever BATTLEFIELD SIGINT CONFERENCE. The conference succeeded in gathering key SIGINT partners from across the Extended Enterprise to discuss how to move toward improved national/tactical integration in support of military operations. Attendees included representatives from the Service Cryptologic Elements (SCE), service engineering/technical offices, collection management staffs of the theater and unified commands, 2nd Party SIGINT partners, the Regional Security Operations Centers, and NSA.

(U//FOUO) A host of briefings were presented during the two-day conference. On the first day, the Chiefs of CES and NTIO (National Tactical Integration Office - S14) provided an overview of how battlefield SIGINT looks from their perspective and discussed actions that should be taken to meet the challenges posed by new technologies. Also provided were a number of presentations about key NSA initiatives, such as a UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) tactical effort called [PINERIDGE](#) and Net-centric Exploitation Applications via the [Distributed Common Ground System](#).

(U//FOUO) The second day included an in-depth look at NTI from a tactical perspective. Presentations included a review of the requirements message format that CES is currently implementing to make the process used by the military to request cryptanalysis support faster and easier. Two of NSA's 2nd Party SIGINT partners presented their country's NTI efforts, and the FAD/Military Affairs Advisor briefed 3rd Party relations and how they impact the use of host-nation airspace, land and sea-lanes by the U.S. for SIGINT purposes. Each SCE briefed its strategy for NTI, often referencing "lessons learned" from cooperation with NSA during recent deployments.

(U//FOUO) A major point of discussion was centered on the move away from tactical "black boxes" toward processes whereby military customers can directly leverage cryptanalytic capabilities when the exploitation systems themselves cannot, due to technological and analytical factors, be forward deployed to combat venues as self-contained packages. In these cases, combat commanders must be able to routinely benefit from cryptanalysis via a virtual "black box" made up of geographically separate and distant exploitation systems and analysts that dependably disseminate actionable intelligence when needed to front line forces.

(U//FOUO) A recurring theme during the conference was that as steps are being taken by members of the extended enterprise to improve SIGINT NTI, conferences like the BSC are needed to review their status, ensure they are being taken in the same direction, and provide a venue to honestly discuss potential disagreements about the implementation of the individual steps in an open forum. BSC attendees understood that advances in communications technology coupled with the large number of potential SIGINT targets means that the distinction between national and tactical no longer exists - everyone must act as partners in one seamless enterprise to provide the best possible intelligence for customers.

(U//FOUO) To view the conference agenda, list of attendees and presentations, you can visit CES homepage at the following URL: [REDACTED].

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