

(S//SI) SID and DIA Collaborate Virtually on Russian Targets

FROM: , Office of Russia Technical Director, and , DIA Account Manager
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(U//FOUO) Here's an example of Transformation 2.0 at work:

(TS//SI) Two NSA Russia analysts are collaborating closely with an analytic counterpart in DIA's Joint Warfare Support Office - Foreign Denial and Deception Division to identify critical lead information on Russian underground facilities that is often only available in open source literature, such as the Internet, and in HUMINT. The DIA analyst makes use of his outstanding language and research skills to search for, locate, and subsequently database references to Russian military and civilian organizations that NSA and DIA both follow.

(TS//SI) Through his interaction with the NSA analysts, the DIA analyst has developed an excellent sense of what kinds of lead information would be valuable in SIGINT targeting. He is mindful of the need for key telephone numbers and other contact information, street addresses and other geolocation information, and names of key individuals as he combs a wide range of newspapers, government decrees, and obscure websites for information on their mutual targets.

(TS//SI) The NSA analysts have used these leads to improve SIGINT collection against Russian hard and deeply buried targets, leadership, nuclear weapons, and military targets. The NSA analysts share with their DIA colleague their expertise on Russian defense industrial, leadership, and state security issues, discuss the significance of open source findings and help sharpen DIA's focus. The three analysts compare notes on a daily or near-daily basis by phone or via e-mail, serving as one another's sounding board for analytic hunches and conclusions.

(TS//SI) The close collaboration between the NSA analysts and the DIA analyst has been critical to the efforts of the Yamantau Working Group - an Intelligence Community (IC) initiative set up to solve the long-standing issue of the intended purpose of the hard and deeply buried facility at Yamantau Mountain, in Russia's southern Ural Mountains. Thanks to this unique partnership, the IC has a dearer understanding of the specific Russian organizations responsible for managing the Yamantau project and our targeting against these entities has improved immeasurably.

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