



(S//SI) Korea IMT Holds 6th ROCK DRILL

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(S//SI//REL) In mid-June, the [Korea Issue Management Team](#) (KIMT) held a ROCK DRILL that included representatives from across the Extended Enterprise and from our Second Party partners.

(S//SI//REL) For the first time, the KIMT addressed the SIGINT response to Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) in both Seoul and Pyongyang, eliciting a great deal of discussion from both First and Second Party attendees. The next scenario addressed tactical SIGINT in a counteroffensive responding to a North Korean attack and the final brainstorming session concerned Phase IV operations in a newly-unified Korea. In all of these conversations, the partners provided a unique perspective that energized the exchange and highlighted critical gaps.

(S//SI//REL) Most important among these gaps was communications between and among the US, Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Almost all of these difficulties are a direct result of our agreements, policies and practices associated with the combined US-South Korean (ROK) SIGINT partnership and, therefore, require creative thinking and/or policy changes to resolve. For example, the current threat warning networks in the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO) do not allow for Second Party access and most, if not all, computer networks in the KTO are US-ROK or US only.

(S//SI//REL) Database access and Blue Forces data issues also figured prominently in discussions. Lessons were drawn from our cooperation in other theaters, including Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, the Second Parties asked for permission to disseminate the new OPLANS to their customers so that they can determine what their intelligence needs would be during a Korean crisis - something about which most of the partners have, admittedly, not yet addressed in any detail.

(S//SI//REL) Twenty-two nations, including the Five-Eyes community, have already signed the still-extant 1950's-era U.N. resolution to defend South Korea if North Korea attacks. While many sharing and cooperation issues exist with our Second Party partners, ROCK DRILL 6 made clear that these issues will be magnified when it comes to sharing with other coalition partners, such as the Philippines, Colombia and Luxembourg, to name a few. ROCK DRILL 6, therefore, was a useful tool to raise the issue of intelligence sharing beyond the traditional US-ROK paradigm for both Second Parties and others. Over the summer months, the KIMT will be working through some of these problems, with the goal of exercising the resulting solutions sometime in early 2005.

(U//FOUO) If you have any questions, please feel free to contact:

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