VISIT PRÉCIS

BERNARD BARBIER

(PHONETIC: bear-NAR bar-BYAY)

Technical Director

Directorate for External Security (DGSE), France

PATRICK PAILLOUX

(PHONETIC: pah-TREEK pie-YOO)

Director

National Information Systems Security (ANSSI), France

12 April 2013

Guests Arrive at GH2B: 1030

Technical Presentation and Discussions: (1045-1215)

D/DIR-Hosted Lunch: (1215-1300) NSOC Courtesy Call: (1300-1330) NTOC Courtesy Call: (1330-1430) DIRNSA Courtesy Call: (1430-1500)

Accompanying Senior:

(U) BACKGROUND:

• (TS//SI/NF) Mr. Barbier and Mr. Patrick Pailloux will travel to NSA on 12 April 2013 to share information regarding May 2012 cyber attacks on the French Presidential network. In November 2012, a French magazine revealed information about the attacks and accused the U.S. of being responsible. During a January 2013 visit, unbeknownst to FAD Desk Officers and SUSLAF, DGSE and ANSSI questioned DIRNSA about the cyber attacks and asked about U.S. involvement. DIRNSA denied U.S. involvement and offered NSA's assistance to France in attributing the attacks. Two (2) NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC) Analysts were prepared to travel to Paris in March to provide support to the French; DGSE and ANSSI canceled the meeting the day before the team was scheduled to depart and instead, requested a visit to NSA on 12 April. For this visit, Mr. Barbier and Mr. Pailloux will be accompanied by:

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(U) PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:

 (TS//SI//NF) Mr. Barbier and Mr. Pailloux will present technical details of the cyber attacks against the French Presidential network from May 2012. Mr. Barbier and Mr. Pailloux will meet with senior leaders and analysts from NTOC, SID, IAD, and FAD in hopes that NSA can help with attribution.

(U) VISITOR REQUESTED:

 (S//REL TO USA, FRA) DGSE and ANSSI requests help in attributing the cyber attacks against the French Presidential network in May 2012.

(U) CDR/DCDR/DDIR GUIDANCE: N/A

(U) PREP SESSION GUIDANCE:

(TS//SI//NF) Prep sessions are scheduled for DIRNSA and D/DIR on 12 April. A
timeline of events will be prepared that describes the cyber attack, the claims by French
media, discussions with DIRNSA, and steps NSA has taken to support the Partner.

(U) NSA/CSS REQUESTED:

 (S//REL TO USA, FRA) Technical data associated with the cyber attacks against the French Presidential network. To date, no advance information has been shared with NSA.

(U) CYBERCOM REQUESTED: N/A

(U) COMMON THREADS:

 (S//REL TO USA, FRA) Stress the potential value of the NSA-DGSE-ANSSI partnership through timely cyber defense exchanges.

(U) KEY TOPIC AREAS:

(U//FOUO) Computer Network Defense (CND)

(U) KEY TAKEAWAYS:

 (S//REL TO USA, FRA) DIRECTORATE'S ROLE: Recommend DIRNSA emphasize the following point:

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 (S//REL TO USA, FRA) CND Collaboration: Reiterate the need for continued close cooperation on CND efforts and emphasize the importance of DGSE and ANSSI collaboration to leverage SIGINT to support CND.

(U) VISIT FORMAT:

- (S// REL USA, FRA) Mr. Barbier and Mr. Pailloux will lead a technical discussion relating to the May 2012 cyber attacks against the French Presidential network. D/DIR will host lunch and Courtesy Calls are scheduled with NSOC, NTOC and DIRNSA.
- S//REL TO USA, FRA) NSA participants include: DIRFA, NTOC DIR, IA DIR, SID DIR, SUSLAF, FAD Desk Officers, Analysts, and technical Target experts.

(U) PREVIOUS VISITS AND RESPECTIVE TOPICS:

 (S// REL USA, FRA) Mr. Barbier last visited NSA in May 2012 for the Strategic Planning Conference. Mr. Pailloux last visited NSA in February 2011; this visit focused on cyber issues.

(U) POTENTIAL LANDMINES:

- (TS//SI//NF) There is a chance that helping attribute the cyber attacks against the French Presidential network may reveal a U.S. ally is responsible.
- (TS//SI//NF) The French have not been forthcoming in sharing technical details of the
 cyber attacks. There is suspicion that the information is not being shared prior to the visit
 because the French want to see how NSA responds when they present their findings.
 During the January 2013 DIRNSA visit to Paris, both DGSE and ANSSI asked GEN
 Alexander about the cyber attacks in an attempt to ascertain whether or not the U.S. was
 responsible for the attacks (as reported in French magazines). At no time was FAD made
 aware that DGSE and ANSSI intended to raise the issue with DIRNSA.

(U) OTHER INFORMATION:

 (TS//SI/NF) TAO confirmed that this was not a TAO operation. TAO asked most of NSA's close 1st/2nd Party Partners whether they were involved (CIA, GCHQ, and CSEC were the mostly likely suspects); everyone has denied involvement. TAO intentionally

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did not ask either Mossad or ISNU whether they were involved as France is not an approved target for joint discussion.

 (S//NF) After repeated requests for technical information relating to the cyber attacks (in advance of the visit), ANSSI and DGSE have not provided any details.

(U) RECENT PRESS INDICATIONS:

(U) The cyber attacks against the French Presidential network took place in May 2012. An initial press report from Paris Atlantico, "French Website Says Turkish Hackers Behind Elysee Cyber Attacks," dated 12 July 2012, stated it was believed "the attacks originated from France's allies" and speculated Turkish hackers with possible links to Turkish "intelligence services or government bodies" might be responsible. No follow-on press reports have been seen that place blame on Turkey. A press report from Paris L'Express, "French Weekly Reports on Alleged US Cyber Espionage Attack on Elysee Palace," dated 20 November 2012, shifted blame for the attacks toward the United States. On 27 November 2012, @rret sur images contacted the Paris L'Express author who shared there are an "array of assumptions" that enable pointing to the United States as the origin of this attack. Paris L'Express contacted ANSSI and the Elysee; both declined to comment.

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