



(U//FOUO) Making National-to-Tactical Integration a Reality in Iraq

FROM: [REDACTED]
S2E22 IED Working Group
Run Date: 08/10/2005

(U//FOUO) Comments from a SIGINTer who deployed to Iraq as part of a Cryptologic Support Team.

(S//REL) Working in an office day to day here at Fort Meade it is hard to gain an appreciation for all of the SIGINT collection, analysis and exploitation that is being done on the ground a world away in Iraq. Earlier this year I had the opportunity to work side by side with tactical military collection and analytic elements supporting troops on the ground in Baghdad as part of a Cryptologic Support Team (CST). CST members and their counterparts in SIGINT sections in the field have been working together for almost a year now in order to make national to tactical SIGINT integration a reality.

(S//REL) While deployed to Camp Victory in Baghdad this past winter I served in conjunction with Army SIGINT elements supporting the operations of the 1st Cavalry Division and 3rd Infantry Division (3ID). Soldiers in these sections work 24 hours a day, seven days a week providing targeting support and situational awareness to the local commanders and their troops in the field. The CSTs in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq have provided these units with unprecedented access to national collection capabilities as well as analytic tools not previously available at the tactical level on a theater-wide basis.

(S//SI) Since the beginning of the year, the 3ID SIGINT section, in conjunction with CST analysts deployed by NSA, has provided near real-time support to operations that have directly contributed to the capture of insurgents and weapons caches, facilitated interrogations of high value detainees related to Baghdad's Haifa Street Gang and the al-'Abbas VBIED* network, and provided support to ongoing operations in the Salman Pak and Abu Ghraib regions. Collaboration with analysts at [Cryptologic Services Group Baghdad](#) and [SCS](#) Baghdad has further enriched these efforts and brought cooperation between national and tactical elements to a new level.

(S//SI) This level of cooperation and success has not come without painful lessons and several bumps in the road. Past experiences with national SIGINT support, or lack thereof, moved some staff officers to suggest that the division's analysts and collectors might better serve the commander as HUMINT or all-source analysts. Many soldiers also arrived in theater without adequate experience using the tools and performing the types of analysis necessary to succeed.

(S//SI) However, once the division SIGINT section was given the training and accesses it needed to conduct effective analysis and disseminate in an effective format, they began producing valuable intelligence derived from SIGINT on a regular basis. As of today, 3ID analysts, in conjunction with the local CST, continue to provide the commander and maneuver units with target packages, storyboards, and 24-hour operational support as needed to conduct missions against insurgent elements operating in central Iraq.

(U//FOUO) As we pass away the long summer days here in Maryland, fretting about whether or not the air conditioning is too cold or that we may have to mow the lawn again, we should take a moment to remember those still serving a world away in the deserts of Iraq. Until the last soldier gets back we all have a special obligation as members of the intelligence community to do whatever we can to ensure their success in Iraq and their safe return back home.

*(U) Notes:
VBIED = Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device

(U) See other articles from CST deployers:

U//FOUO) [Providing Actionable Intelligence in Mosul](#)
(U//FOUO) [How NSA Teams Support Tactical Forces in Iraq](#)

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 ([DL sid comms](#))."

DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108