



(U) NSA's Oldest Third Party SIGINT Partnership

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(S//SI) Our "oldest" Third Party partner is Turkey, with whom we've had a SIGINT relationship since 1949. That begs a question, since NSA wasn't created until November 1952. This article answers that question and sketches the relationship between NSA and our two Turkish SIGINT partners.

(S//SI) The NSA/CSS Representative, Turkey (NCR TURK), located in beautiful Ankara with a staff of about 40 NSAers, is responsible for providing SIGINT technical assistance, engineering advice, maintenance support, equipment, and training to both of the Turkish SIGINT organizations:

- the **General Electronic Service (GES)**, a military SIGINT command under the J2 Intelligence Directorate of the Turkish General Staff (TGS); and
- the **Electronic and Technical Intelligence (ETI)** Directorate, the SIGINT element of the civilian Turkish National Intelligence Organization (TNIO).

(S//SI) Our SIGINT exchange with these partners includes information on a variety of regional military targets and a significant amount of data on terrorism targets, to include international groups and indigenous terrorist organizations such as the Kurdistan People's Congress (Kongra Gel / KGK, formerly known as the PKK). In return, GES provides information on Russian military forces, regional activity in the Caucasus, and [REDACTED] GES also identifies shipping traffic in the Dardanelles and collects radar signatures under the SEA SENTRY program. GES and ETI provide language assistance on KGK/PKK traffic; and ETI and NSA have a dedicated circuit for CT [Counterterrorism] analytic exchanges.

(S//SI) Throughout the Cold War, Turkey's location on the Black Sea afforded the US with unique access to the underbelly of the Soviet beast. Turkey is now a committed US/Coalition partner both in the Global War on Terrorism and in NATO peacekeeping and stabilization operations throughout the region. Turkey's borders with Iraq, Iran and Syria have obvious geopolitical significance for US military planners and political strategists. In addition, ongoing joint signals surveys between NSA and GES have the potential to provide unique access to emerging targets of interest.

(TS//SI) In answer to the question begged above, the US/Turkey SIGINT relationship did begin in 1949, but it was based on a verbal agreement between CIA and ETI, with CIA offering funding and equipment to ETI in exchange for raw COMINT traffic. In 1979, the program of support for ETI was assumed by NSA and incorporated into the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP). The legal basis for the US SIGINT relationship with GES stems from a June 1954 Joint Military Facilities Agreement that was further amplified in a 1962 MOU that committed the US to provide SIGINT information, training, equipment, and assistance in the development of a SIGINT capability for GES.

(TS//SI) NSA entered into this 1962 agreement with the TGS in exchange for Turkish permission to operate US SIGINT sites on Turkish soil. NSA's overt SIGINT operations in Turkey ceased with the dosing of Sinop in September 1993. SCS continues to conduct covert SIGINT collection from sites in Istanbul and Ankara.



(U) *Adana Mosque, on the Seyhan River in Adana, Turkey*

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