

(U) Lost in the Open

FROM:

Special Operational Support (S3092)

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Need to hide you NSA affiliation when making a call? Let your fingers do the walking -- without "fingerprints" (C)

(U//FOUO) NSA is known throughout the world. "They" know where we work, the addresses of our buildings and even our telephone numbers. So, how do we get lost in the **open** and perform missions using non-secure communications?

(U//FOUO) Background: NSA owns a large non-secure telephone central office or C.O. This C.O. provides dial tone and features to your non-secure telephone. NSA owns forty thousand telephone numbers. Many are very well known. 301-688 is probably the most "famous" NSA area-office code set. But, we also have 443-479, 240-373 and 410-854 numbers. These area-office code sets are also becoming "famous." Making customer, vendor, and limited personal calls from those NSA lines is not a problem, provided the calls are unclassified and you're not trying to hide that you're calling from NSA.

(C) What do you do, though, if you have a mission requirement to hide or at least limit NSA affiliation or to call overseas? **Special Operational Support (S3092) can help establish ano nymity or cover telephones and assist getting International Direct Distance Dialing (IDDD) access.** Can't decide which mechanism you need? Here are some guidelines to follow.

- Anonymity telephones limit access to NSA affiliation. Anonymity telephone lines are
 physically delivered to NSA from a vendor without using the NSA C.O. They have
 telephone numbers that are not "openly" affiliated with NSA. Caller I.D. for anonymity
 telephones typically shows the telephone number and either DoD or nothing at all for the
 name. Bills are usually sent to boxes owned by "DoD". Only examination of vendor-billing
 records will disclose affiliation with a physical NSA location. Anonymity telephones are to
 be used only for official government business that was coordinated with S3092.
- Cover telephones hide NSA affiliation. Cover telephones are more complex. The
 telephone numbers are procured from various vendors using alias names and post office
 addresses. Caller I.D. reflects telephone number and alias name. Although cover
 telephones utilize the NSA C.O. they have no physical delivery address from a vendor and
 there is no "open" association with NSA. Due to the sensitive nature of cover telephones
 it is imperative that it is safeguarded to ensure access is limited to the personnel
 performing official government business / functions associated with the cover support
 plan established by S3092.
- IDDD -- Policy states that NSA affiliates may use only cryptographically secure
 communications systems (e.g., STU III, STE, secure facsimiles, NSTS, etc.) when making
 calls to overseas locations. Anonymity and cover telephones do not fall under this policy
 for various reasons. S3092 is working with Security, the Groundbreaker PMO and Eagle
 Alliance to streamline the process for obtaining IDDD access for standard NSA
 telephones. For those that have an operational or administrative need to call overseas
 and NSA affiliation is not adversely affected, permission may be granted.

(C) S3092 provides training on the proper use of anonymity and cover telephone lines. We will uniquely identify those telephones with a sticker similar to what is now present on the handset.

(U//FOUO) If you need assistance or have questions concerning installation, billing, and support or maintenance procedures with any of the above mechanisms, please contact S3092

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