



(S) Agencies Get Collective 'Boost' in Tackling Russian Missile Problem Together

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Run Date: 06/06/2005

Multiple agencies collaborating on a proliferation issue... This article was written by [REDACTED], Account Manager for DIA (S112); [REDACTED], Office of Weapons & Space (S213); and [REDACTED] SIGDEV Strategy and Governance (SSG) (U//FOUO)

(U) It seems that you cannot switch on the television or open a newspaper these days without seeing references to the recent report from the *Commission on the Capabilities of the U.S. Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction*. This report harshly criticized intelligence agencies for failing to exchange key pieces of information that might have generated a more accurate intelligence community assessment of Iraq's ability to develop and use nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

(U//FOUO) Few would dispute the need to improve communications between agencies as intelligence producers and customers. However, genuine progress in tackling some of the community's most enduring analytic challenges may depend as much -- or more -- on increased collaboration between intelligence *partners*: those agencies that routinely work together on the production of intelligence. Each partner has the capacity to bring unique information or accesses to bear against countless topics of high interest to the intelligence community. Where collaboration does occur, the results are often impressive.

(TS//SI) A case in point: as part of NSA's Customer Engagement Strategy, the Office of Weapons and Space (S2J), SIGINT Development, and the Office of Russia (S2H), are collaborating with DIA's* Missile and Space Intelligence Agency (MSIC) and GCHQ* in new ways to attempt to solve the Long Range Russian Surface-to-Air Missile Capability issue, also known as the S-400/S-500 intelligence problem, as outlined by a paper solicited by the Customer Relationships Directorate and written by MSIC. These systems could have a significant destabilizing effect on U.S. and allied military activity and are prime candidates for proliferation and technology transfer.

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(U) S-400 missile system (Janes)

(TS//SI) Previous collaboration efforts between S2J, MSIC, NGA*, DIA, and GCHQ have shown great success for TechSIGINT. TechELINT analysis and modeling is responsible for the majority of what is already known on the S-400 system to date. However, fusion of current efforts along with new avenues of intelligence is needed to further understand the S-400/S-500 systems.

(TS//SI) The initial meeting of the S-400/S-500 team took place in early March, and included members of the SIGINT community both here and in the UK. The group discussed the present status of knowledge and considered past assumptions and gaps in approach and information. A sixty day timeline was set to document further the state of play and to initiate prioritized recommendations for new approaches.

(TS//SI) Meanwhile, the SIGINT players have several initiatives underway; in part based on the S-400/S-500 team's earlier discussions. For example, S2H and S2J are sponsoring a Tailored Access Operations requirement and S2H has done a tasking scrub. Several other activities, including a High Powered Cordless Phone survey, Social Network Analysis Workcenter participation, and further review of open source data, are prime candidates to explore as this effort gets underway. Increased MSIC participation in future initiatives targeted against the S-400/S-500 intelligence problem is anticipated and other partner agencies will be included as

appropriate.

(S) The Director of National Intelligence will undoubtedly put structures in place to help overcome the barriers that currently impede information sharing. At the same time, he will work to ensure that these structures do not compromise community sources and methods. However, as demonstrated above, effective information sharing is not just a question of database access or information exchange. Our effectiveness -- both as an agency as well as a community -- also demands improved collaboration on issues, like the S-400/S-500 intelligence problem, that pose an immediate threat to national security and consequently concern us all.

*(U) Notes:

DIA = Defense Intelligence Agency

GCHQ = Britain's Government Communications HQ

NGA = National Geospatial Intelligence Agency

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