DISCOVERING VULNERABLE UEFI FIRMWARE AT SCALE

Yuriy Bulygin, Alex Bazhaniuk

Presented: September 14, 2017. Last Update: October 14, 2017

Motivation

- > We tend to focus on new vulnerabilities in firmware of new systems
- > Yet there are still many systems that don't have basic firmware security "hygiene"
- > And lots of old systems which are in use for years
- ➤ Tools like CHIPSEC can help with checking these problems on individual systems
- > But can we understand the state of entire population of systems?




System Flash

- > SPI Flash Memory device(s) containing main UEFI firmware, Intel ME firmware, GBe persistent settings, EC firmware etc.
- Direct Access by software through physical address space
 - > 0xffffffff PA maps to 0xffffff Flash Linear Address
- > Program Register Access by software via SPI MMIO registers
 - > FLA are programmed explicitly
- Descriptor describes other regions

Region	Content	
0	Flash Descriptor	
1	BIOS	
2	Intel Management Engine	
3	Gigabit Ethernet	
4	Platform Data	

System Flash Descriptor

- > Region 0 at FLA 0 FFFh (4 KB)
- > Signature: **OFFOA55Ah** at 10h LBA
- **>** Contains the following sections:
 - Component: flash device configuration
 - > Region: describes other regions
 - ➤ Master: defines Rd/Wr Access Control table
- Access Control table defines which masters (CPU, ME, GbE) can access regions



Security of System Flash

- 1. Firmware update image must be signed
 - > UEFI uses "capsules" for signed UEFI updates upon reboot or sleep
 - Capsule contains firmware volumes with firmware to be updated
 - Contains firmware executable that performs update
 - Boot-time firmware checks capsule signature before flashing
- 2. System flash must be read-only at run-time
 - > Enforces secure update as SW cannot flash FW at run-time w/o signature checks
 - Some systems check signature & flash at run-time in SMM
- 3. Flash descriptor must be read-only
 - Programmed at manufacturing then never updated

Breaking a Whack-a-Mole


- ▶ Usual way to check if system firmware is protected is to <u>run CHIPSEC</u>
- > But it requires testing on real hardware
- > Sure enough, many platforms (even newest) are found to be vulnerable
 - Skylake based MSI
 - **▶** Gigabyte BRIX BIOS Write Protection is not enabled (CLVA-2017-01-002)
 - **Coreboot**
- ➤ Can we scale this analysis, at least for basic firmware protections, without testing every single system?

We have tons of UEFI update images from platform vendors. Let's put them to work!

Can we find out which systems don't protect their system flash based on just the update images?

On the shoulders of giants

- Amazing work by Teddy Reed
 - Analytics, and Scalability, and UEFI exploitation! (Infiltrate 2014)
 - **▶** <u>UEFI Spider</u> can crawl/download BIOS updates from OEM web-sites
- > Tools that can parse UEFI firmware images or "capsules"
 - **CHIPSEC**
 - <u>uefi-firmware-parser</u> by Teddy Reed
 - ▶ <u>UEFITool</u> by Nikolaj Schlej



What If?

Update image is not "signed capsule" & contains valid descriptor



Update is a full ROM image

Easily automatable



Suspected unsigned firmware update



Actually used as the update image



Not easily automatable


System flash is not protected

What this means exactly...

Every such ROM image would indicate that corresponding platform model [probably] has the following vulnerabilities

- > UEFI firmware update are not signed
- > System flash is writeable by software
- > SPI flash descriptor is writeable by software

High-Level Process



Let's get started...

- ▶ 32987 firmware updates packages from 9 platform vendors
 - Acer 647, ASRock 306, ASUS 6871, Dell 9400, Gigabyte 2606, HP 3138, Intel 4408, Lenovo 2952, MSI 1813
- > 44318 candidate images extracted
 - Does a binary look like UEFI image? (CHIPSEC, uefi-firmware-parser)
 - > Other binary heuristics (known magic values etc.)
 - > File extensions: ROM, BIN, IMG, BIO, CAP, IMA, FD, WPH, HDR, FL*...
- ▶ Parsed and analyzed 21204 unique UEFI firmware images (extracted from 19150 update packages)
 - > The rest are either legacy BIOSes or we couldn't extract/parse

UEFI "update" must be generic?

- > Vendor firmware update != UEFI image or UEFI update image
 - > There's no standard format of UEFI firmware updates
- > Examples of what we saw in firmware update packages:
 - ➤ May contain update utilities for different OS (EFI, DOS, Windows, Linux)
 - > UEFI Images may be encrypted inside updates
 - May contain multiple types of firmware images used in different cases
 - > May have firmware images embedded into update tool executables

They should be easy to extract, right?

- > Try common (de)compression utilities: zip, 7z, zlib-flate. If decompression doesn't work: binwalk -e
- > Utilities required for update packages of specific vendors

```
cabextract (Lenovo)
innoextract (Lenovo)
InsydeFlash.exe -cpf (HP)
```

> Command-line arguments required for self-extracting update packages

```
/writeromfile (Dell)
/VERYSILENT (Lenovo)
```

- Can also try other things
 - Mount and extract firmware images if update package if ISO
 - > Run update package and monitor file system (e.g. temp directories)

Searching for SPI descriptors...

- > Exclude known UEFI "capsule" images (e.g. *.FL1/FL2/CAP files)
- > Include only images with exact 2MB, 4MB, 8MB, 16MB size
- > Include only images with valid SPI flash descriptor at offset 0x00
- Include only images with Read/Write-able SPI descriptor

Valid Flash Descriptor

```
SPI FLASH DESCRIPTOR
0x0010 Signature: 0x0FF0A55A
  FLMAP0 = 0x00040003 << Flash Map 0 Register (FDBAR + 0x14)
   [00] FCBA
                      = 3 << Flash Component Base Address
   [08] NC
                      = 0 << Number of Components
   [16] FRBA = 4 << Flash Region Base Address
[*] FLMAP1 = 0x58100208 << Flash Map 1 Register (FDBAR + 0x18)
                    = 8 << Flash Master Base Address
   [00] FMBA
   [08] NM
                      = 2 << Number of Masters
   [16] FPSBA
                      = 10 << Flash PCH Strap Base Address
           = 58 << PCH Strap Length
   [24] PSL
[*] FLMAP2 = 0x00310330 << Flash Map 2 Register (FDBAR + 0x1C)
   [00] FCPUSBA
                  = 30 << Flash CPU Strap Base Address
   [08] CPUSL
                      = 3 << CPU Strap Length
```

R/W Access to Flash Descriptor

Region	FLREGX	Base	Limit			
0 Flash Descriptor	00000000	00000000	00000000			
1 BIOS	0FFF0700	00700000	00FFF000			
2 Intel ME	06FF0003	00003000	006FF000			
3 GBe	00020001	00001000	00002000			
4 Platform Data	00007FFF	07FFF000	00000000	(not used)		
8 Embedded Controller	00007FFF	07FFF000		(not used)		
+ 0x0080 Master Section: ====================================						
Master Read/Write Acces	s to Flash F	Regions				
Region	CPU ME					
0 Flash Descriptor	RW	l				
1 BIOS	RW R	V .				
2 Intel ME	RW R	V			19	
3 GRA	I RM I RM	1				

Our Suspects

Unique UEFI Images	Analyzed	Full SPI Images
Acer	312	3 (1%)
ASRock	440	73 (16.6%)
ASUS	3697	629 (17%)
Dell	4673	78 (1.7%)
Gigabyte	1330	1117 (84%)
НР	1593	94 (5.9%)
Intel	4387	0
Lenovo	3053	75 (2.5%)
MSI	1719	1461 (85%)
Total 21204		3530 (16.6%)

False Positives

- Not all update packages containing full SPI images indicate that corresponding systems are vulnerable
- Some images can only be flashed from USB thumb drive during BIOS Setup (requires user interaction)
- > Some updates packages include full SPI images along with signed capsules which may be used at manufacturing(?)

False Negatives

- > Presence of signed capsule in the update package (or absence of full SPI image) does **not** mean system flash is protected
 - > Example: ASUS P8Z77-PRO here
- > Update packages may embed SPI images into executables of update utilities which we couldn't extract
- > We excluded images with Read-Only flash descriptor
- Capsule images may be unsigned


Vulnerable Systems

Manufacturer	Vulnerable firmware images	Vulnerable models
Acer	0 - 2	0 – 2
ASRock	73	~53 models (all older than Skylake)
ASUS	629	∼61 models (all older than Ivy Bridge)
Dell	51	~11 models (Vostro and Inspiron older than 2014)
Gigabyte	1117 (345 Skylake+)	~247 models including Skylake (6 Gen Intel Core) or newer
НР	11	~6
Intel	0	0
Lenovo	75	~26 (ThinkServer TS150-550, ThinkCentre/IdeaCentre)
MSI	1461 (495 Skylake+)	∼98 models including Skylake (6 Gen Intel Core) or newer
Total	3417 (16.1%)	~502 models

Results: MSI

- > 1461 UEFI update images for ~98 models appear to be vulnerable
- > Including 496 Skylake (2015) and newer
- Confirmed on some of MSI systems
- > Example: MSI H110 PRO-VD

Example: MSI H110 PRO-VD (BIOS V2.E)



Example: MSI H110 PRO-VD (BIOS V2.E)

```
C:\...ppData\Local\Temp\F3TF005.tmp\E7996IMS.2E0 h 1252
0000000000: FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
                                     FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
0000000010: 5A A5 F0 0F 03 00 04 00
                                     08 02 10 58 30 03 31
0000000020: FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
                                     FF FF FF FF FF FF
0000000030: F4 00 5C 12 00 00 00 00
                                     00 00 00 00 FF FF FF
0000000040: 00 00 00 00 00 02 FF 07
                                     01 00 FF 01 FF 7F 00
0000000050: FF 7F 00 00 FF 7F 00 00
                                     FF 7F 00 00 FF 7F 00
0000000060: FF 7F 00 00 FF 7F 00 00
                                       FF FF FF FF FF
0000000070: FF FF FF FF
                                       FF FF FF FF FF
0000000080: 00 FF FF FF 00 FF FF
                                       FF FF FF 00 0<u>0 00</u>
0000000090: 00 FF FF EF 00 00 00 00
                                     FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
```

Full ROM image with R/W flash descriptor

MSI Live Update

Title Version Release Date File Size

Live Update 6 6.2.0.20 2017-09-11 12.48 MB



Description

- Online update BIOS/Driver/Firmware/Utility.
- Live Monitor auto-detects and suggests the latest BIOS/Driver/Utilities information.

Note

- 1. .net framework 4.0 is required.
- 2. Antivirus Software need to be disabled to prevent conflict when using Live update utility. LIVE UPDATE 6
 User Guide | Click |

Results: Gigabyte

- > 1117 UEFI update images for ~247 models appear to be vulnerable
- Including **345** Skylake (2015) and newer

Results: Dell


- > 78 UEFI update images corresponding to 24 models are suspects
- ▶ 13 update images for 4 models are false positives. Updates are using signed capsules but also includes full SPI images
- > 51 update images for 11 models appear to be vulnerable
 - ➤ Inspiron & Vostro 2011–2014 models with updates up to 2016
 - ➤ Confirmed on **Dell Inspiron 3847** desktop (circa 2013, UEFI firmware release 06/2015)
- > Investigating 14 update images for 8 models
 - > Full SPI images with R/W descriptors via option /writeromfile

Example: Dell Inspiron 3847

```
description: Desktop Computer
 product: Inspiron 3847 (0622)
 vendor: Dell Inc.
                                                              HIPSEC] API mode: using CHIPSEC kernel module API
  serial: 3SYJW52
                                                               HIPSEC] OS
                                                                             : Linux 4,8.0-54-generic #57~16.04.1-Ubuntu SMP Wed May 24 16:22:28 UTC 2017 x86_64
  width: 64 bits
                                                              CHIPSEC] Platform: Desktop 4th Generation Core Processor (Haswell CPU / Lynx Point PCH)
 capabilities: smbios-2.7 dmi-2.7 vsyscal132
                                                              HIPSELL
                                                                           VID: 8086
                                                               HIPSEC
                                                                           DID: 0C00
  configuration: boot=normal chassis=desktop
                                                            f+l loaded chipsec.modules.common.bios.up
*-core
                                                                running loaded modules ..
      description: Motherboard
      product: 088DT1
                                                               *] running module: chipsec.modules.common.bios_wo
      vendor: Dell Inc.
      physical id: 0
                                                              [*] BC = 0x08 << BIOS Control (b:d.f 00:31.0 + 0xDC)
      version: A01
       serial: .3SYJW52.CN7016357L01K5.
                                                                  [00] RIDSHE
                                                                                     = 0 << BIOS Write Enable
                                                                  [01] BLE
                                                                                     = 0 << BIOS Lock Enable
       slot: To be filled by O.E.M.
                                                                                     = 2 << SPI Read Configuration
     *-firmware
                                                                  [04] TSS
                                                                                     = 0 << Top Swap Status
           description: BIOS
                                                                                     = 0 << SMM BIOS Write Protection
                                                               [-] BIOS region write protection is disabled!
           vendor: Dell Inc.
           physical id: 1
                                                               [*] BIOS Region: Base = 0x00400000, Limit = 0x007FFFFF
           version: AOB
                                                               SPI Protected Ranges
           date: 06/29/2015
                                                               PRx (offset) | Value
                                                                                               Limit
           size: 64KiB
                                                                PRO (74)
                                                                PR1 (78)
                                                                             00000000
                                                                                                00000000
                                                                                      00000000
                                                                PR2 (7C)
                                                                             00000000
                                                                                      00000000
                                                                                                00000000
                                                                PR3 (80)
                                                                             00000000
                                                                                      00000000
                                                                                                             0
                                                                                                00000000
                                                                 [1] None of the SPI protected ranges write-protect BIOS region
                                                                 [1] BIOS should enable all available SMM based write protection mechanisms or configure SPI protected ranges
                                                                 [-] FAILED: BIOS is NOT protected completely
```

Results: Lenovo

- > Up to 75 UEFI update images for 26 models appear to be vulnerable (based on the analysis of update packages/images)
- Investigating systems which don't seem to protect UEFI firmware: ThinkServer (TS 150 550), ThinkCentre and IdeaCentre



Results: HP

- > Up to 84 UEFI update packages for ~74 models are suspects
 - > HP/Compaq business desktops (2011 2014)
 - > All older than Skylake (< 2016)
- > 11 update packages (SoftPaqs) for 6 models appear to be vulnerable (based on the analysis of update packages)
 - Compaq Pro 4300, RP2 Retail System 2000/2020/2030, 260 G1, ProDesk 400 G2.5
- > 73 SoftPaqs appear false positives: include signatures over full SPI images (7 appear to use RSA)

Example: HP Z220 (False Positive)

> SoftPaq SP76874

- > Contains HPQFlash Windows tool with ROM.CAB
- Uses SMM for runtime flashing (SMI # 0x8C)
- > ROM.CAB includes 16MB SPI image with some signature over it



Results: ASUS

- > 629 UEFI update images for ~61 models appear to be vulnerable
- > All vulnerable systems are older than Ivy Bridge (< 2013)
- > Starting Ivy Bridge ASUS appears to have switched to using signed UEFI capsules

Results: ASRock

- > Only have small pool of downloaded update packages (440)
- > 73 UEFI update images for ~53 models appear to be vulnerable
- ➤ All vulnerable systems are older than Skylake (< 2016)



How to build "white-list" for UEFI?

- > We cannot just collect hashes of entire ROM images
 - > Contain modifiable data: NVRAM settings, ACPI tables, x509 certificates etc.
- > UEFI firmware volumes contain PE/COFF or TE executables
 - ▶ 45 90 unique executables per UEFI firmware update image on average
 - > 100 300 executables within full UEFI firmware image on a system
- > We can build a list of hashes of known UEFI executables

Collecting UEFI hashes...

- Calculating hashes
 - > Plain hash over entire PE/COFF image
 - Authenticode compliant hashes
- Most platform vendors use Authenticode hashes for (U)EFI binaries
 - > TPM and UEFI Secure Boot use Authenticode hashes
- > All of the above?
 - > ~ 1.9M plain or Authenticode compatible hashes
 - > ~ 1M Authenticode hashes with masked TimeDateStamp field

Authenticode Hashes

- ➤ <u>Authenticode</u> hash calculation for PE/COFF executables
 - 1. Hash PE header omitting the file's **Checkum** and the **Certificate Table** entry in optional **Header Data Directories**
 - 2. Hash PE sections
 - 3. Exclude **Attribute Certificate Table** from the hash calculation and hash any remaining data
- Open source Authenticode implementations
 - ▶ https://github.com/anthrotype/verify-sigs
 - ▶ https://github.com/illphil/authenticode

```
0000000000: 4D 5A 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                        00 00 00 00 00
                                                         00
0000000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                        00 00 00
                                                00 00 00 00
0000000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                        00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                        00 00 00 C0 00 00 00
0000000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                     00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                     00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                     00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0000000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                        00 00 00 00 00 00
0000000080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                        00 00 00 00 00 00
0000000090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                        00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000000A0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                        00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000000B0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                     00 00 00 00 00 00 00
                                     E5 3E D1 55 00 00 00 00
                                                             PE d†♣ å>ÑU
00000000C0: 50 45 00 00 64 86 05 00
00000000D0: 00 00 00 00 F0 00 22 20
                                     0B 02 00 00 E0 32 00 00
                                                                     ♂9 à2
```

Masking TimeDateStamp field

Unique UEFI Hashes

Unique Hashes	Plain	Authenticode	Authenticode and TimeDateStamp=0
Acer	37292	35104	23231 (62%)
ASRock	26168	26170	1671 (6%)
ASUS	559857	549175	171948 (31%)
Dell	485970	476519	234135 (48%)
Gigabyte	168119	158328	109873 (65%)
НР	102631	97524	82632 (80%)
Intel	106924	98562	63363 (59%)
Lenovo	166212	150313	140038 (84%)
MSI	271365	257461	192731 (71%)
Total	1910649	1849156	1034661 (54%)

False Positives


```
chipsec_main.py -i -n -m tools.uefi.whitelist -a
check,efi_lenovo.json,lenovo_t430.bin
```

```
[+] loaded chipsec.modules.tools.uefi.whitelist
                                                                                      This module
[*] running loaded modules ..
                                                                                       has never
[*] running module: chipsec.modules.tools.uefi.whitelist
[*] Module arguments (3):
                                                                                      been part of
['check', 'efi_lenovo.json', 'lenovo_t430.bin']
                                                                                      any update
    Module: simple white-list generation/checking for (U)EFI firmware
[*] reading firmware from 'lenovo t430.bin'...
[*] checking EFI executables against the list '/home/virvdova/chipsec/chipsec/efi/lenovo.json'
[*] found 414 EFI executables in UEFI firmware image 'lenovo t430.bin'
[!] found EFI executable not in the list:
   9894c265bdd79a01ef94734cc576e0dd13f21854d8b1e23ba362349b6728ce21 (sh256)
   f22ce4c0081ef57d81dbfcd8ac2360ecec19b73a (sha1)
   {5920F406-5868-44F5-A9B9-6D4031481CC9}
   LenovoOemSecPei.efi
                                      SUMMARY
```

We can also gather statistic on components/ features supported by various systems

Example: Absolute Computrace

- UEFI based Anti-Theft technology
- Contains UEFI firmware and OS level components
- ▶ Absolute Computrace Revisited



We decided to apply complex heuristic...

...search for "computrace" in the name

AbsoluteComputraceInstaller

AbsoluteComputraceInstallerWin8

BdsComputrace

BdsSmmComputrace

Computrace

ComputraceComponents

ComputraceDriver

CompuTraceDriver

ComputraceDxe

ComputraceDXE

ComputraceEnablerDxe

ComputraceLoader

ComputraceSMI

ComputraceSmm

ComputraceVariableInitDxe

DellDxeComputrace

DellSmmComputrace

Dell Smm Comput race Acpi Mode

DellSmmComputracePreInit

H19ComputraceRuntimeDxe

H19ComputraceSmm

HPComputrace

HPComputracePrivateSrc

L05Computrace

L05CompuTraceDxe

L05ComputraceEfi

L05SmmComputrace

LenovoComputraceEnablerDxe

LenovoComputraceLoaderDxe

LenovoComputraceSmiServices

LoadComputraceImage

SmbiosComputraceDxe

smmcomputrace

SmmComputrace

UEFIComputrace

UEFIComputraceDriver

UEFIEfiSmmComputrace

UEFIL05Computrace

UEFIL05SmmComputrace

Results

Vendor	*Computrace* Modules	Unique UEFI Images
Acer	146	57
ASRock	0*	
ASUS	624	312
Dell	6103	3262
Gigabyte	0*	
НР	2567	1365
Intel	0*	
Lenovo	8065	2231
MSI	0*	
Total	17506	7228

^{*} Modules weren't found but may still be present under different names

Future Improvements

- Current heuristic "detect full ROM image vs capsule" is imprecise
- > Explicitly detect capsules in update packages
 - firmware update DXE driver FV (SysFirmUpdate.efi)
 - > SystemFirmwareDescriptor PEIM
 - > Signature in EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_AUTHENTICATION block
- Detect that ROM images inside update packages support signed capsule (FmpAuthenticationLib) & secure update (SecSMIFlash, PchBiosWrireProtect)
- > Currently, we cannot answer this question: "Did particular system start protecting firmware with some update?"

Conclusions

- > ~3,417 update images corresponding to ~502 models from 9 manufacturers appear to be lacking basic firmware protections
 - > MSI & Gigabyte account for majority (2,578 images ~ 345 models)
 - > It's trivial to install firmware implants or brick such systems
- > Some manufacturers had basic firmware protections for a while. Yet older systems may be forgotten
- > Some manufacturers started recently (> Ivy Bridge or Skylake)
- Some manufacturers yet to start protecting UEFI firmware

Conclusions

- Offline analysis of updates can help us understand overall health of firmware across entire population of systems
 - > No need to test each individual system
 - > Can detect systems lacking basic firmware security protections
 - > Can be used to scan updates for other more complex problems
 - Not perfect, needs improvements
- > Helps vendors understand which systems they forgot to fix
- > Can also help us build global database of known firmware binaries
- > This is an ongoing study. We'll keep updating it with further results...

THANK YOU!