

# Keyless Entry Systems


**KASTEL-Praktikum Sicherheit**

Katharina Männle, Samuel Groß


KOMPETENZZENTRUM FÜR ANGEWANDTE SICHERHEITSTECHNOLOGIE (KASTEL)



# Car (wireless) attack surface



# Car (wireless) attack surface



# Motivation



- Most cars can be opened remotely from a short distance
- Interesting for attackers
  - Allows access to vehicle
- But: not much documentation available
  - ➔ Need to reverse engineer
- What are possible attacks?





# Brainstorming Attacks: Replay

- Capture unlock signal
- Replay later




- Mitigated by rolling code?
  - Counter, encrypted with preshared key
  - Incremented after each use
  - Car has own counter, synchronized
  - Car accepts future codes (e.g. up to 256),  
**but not previous ones**

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# Brainstorming Attacks: Relay

Capture unlock signal indoors, use outdoors

- Assumption: unidirectional communication
- Limited practicality, need access to key
- (Actually, need “unused” signals)




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# Brainstorming Attacks: Jamming + Relay

Prevent “use” of signal with jammer, use signal later

- “Victim” would notice this, can we avoid it?




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# Brainstorming Attacks: Packet Modification

Turn lock signal into unlock signal?

- Does this enable any interesting attacks?
- Need knowledge of packet format






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# Brainstorming Attacks: Cryptography

Attack cryptography (rolling code)

- Find flaw in encryption algorithm
- Recover shared key
  - Hardware attack



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# Brainstorming Attacks - Summary

1. **Replay:** capture unlock signal, replay later on
2. **Relay:** capture unlock signal indoors, use outdoors
3. **Jamming:** prevent “use” of signal with jammer, use signal later
4. **Modify packets:** turn lock signal into unlock signal?
5. Break cryptography


A decorative L-shaped line consisting of a horizontal segment on the left and a vertical segment extending downwards from its right end.

# **Capturing the Signals**

A short introduction to SDR and  
Gnuradio

# Some Radio Theory

- Electromagnetic waves
- Typical frequencies: 433MHz, 2.4GHz, 5GHz, ...
  - so called unlicensed bands
- Waves overlap additively: superposition
- “Recover” frequencies with fourier transformation




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
# Modulation

- How to transmit a binary signal through radio waves?  
⇒ Modulation
- Different (basic) types of modulation:


Amplitude modulation



Frequency modulation




Phase modulation



# GNURadio

## an example flowgraph





# Hardware




- **Software-defined Radio:** control a radio device with software
- Can control frequency, modulation, amplitude, ...
- Can filter, convert, ...
- HackRF produces sequence of samples (complex number) with fixed sample rate (e.g. 2MHz)
- All other processing done in software (e.g. GNURadio)

# Capturing the key signal

1. **Tune HackRF to specific frequency  
(433.92MHz)**
2. *Optional:*  
**Add filter to remove unwanted signals**
3. *Optional:*  
**Add GUI sinks for visualization**
4. **Write samples into a file  
for offline processing**






# Demo




# Checklist

1. Capture signal ✓



# ~~First attack: Replay~~

## Second attack: Relay



1. Capture signal (inside)
2. Replay signal (outside)
3. :)

Possible attack scenario: car owner inside, can get access to key for a short while



# Checklist

- Capture signal ✓
  - ~~Attack: Replay~~
  - Attack: Relay







# Signal Analysis

# Understanding the signal


- “Waterfall” graph indicates amplitude modulation
- Clearly visible ones and zeroes



# Decoding the signal



- Clearly amplitude modulation is used
- In GNURadio: Complex-To-Magnitude block
  - Replaces each sample with the magnitude of the wave at that time
- Then use binary slicer to obtain sequence of ones and zeroes



**Variable**  
**ID:** baud\_rate  
**Value:** 5.4272k

**WX GUI Scope Sink**  
**Title:** magnitude  
**Sample Rate:** 5.4272k  
**V Scale:** 500m  
**T Scale:** 2  
**Trigger Mode:** Auto  
**Y Axis Label:** Counts

Variable	Variable	Variable
<b>ID:</b> samp_rate	<b>ID:</b> key_freq	<b>ID:</b> offset
<b>Value:</b> 2M	<b>Value:</b> 433.92M	<b>Value:</b> 220k

**Parameter**  
**ID:** filename  
**Value:**  
**Type:** String

**File Source**  
**File:** filename  
**Repeat:** No

**Throttle**  
**Sample Rate:** 2M

**Band Pass Filter**  
**Decimation:** 1  
**Gain:** 100  
**Sample Rate:** 2M  
**Low Cutoff Freq:** 220k  
**High Cutoff Freq:** 270k  
**Transition Width:** 50k  
**Window:** Hamming  
**Beta:** 6.76

**Complex to Mag**

**Add Const**  
**Constant:** -1.5

**File Sink**  
**File:** ...ni/rkes/carkey.bytes  
**Unbuffered:** Off  
**Append file:** Overwrite


**Binary Slicer**

**WX GUI FFT Sink**  
**Title:** FFT Plot  
**Sample Rate:** 2M  
**Baseband Freq:** 433.7M  
**Y per Div:** 10 dB  
**Y Divs:** 10  
**Ref Level (dB):** 0  
**Ref Scale (p2p):** 2  
**FFT Size:** 1.024k  
**Refresh Rate:** 15  
**Freq Set Varname:** None

Demo(dulation)

# Checklist

- Capture signal ✓  
    Attack: Replay  
    Attack: Relay
- Demodulation ✓



```
*
001fcff0 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 | .....|
001fd000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | .....|
*
001fd420 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 | .....|
001fd430 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 | .....|
*
001fd830 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | .....|
001fd840 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 | .....|
*
001fe070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 | .....|
001fe080 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 | .....|
```

```

001fd420 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
001fd430 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
*
001fd830 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
001fd840 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
*
001fe070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01
001fe080 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
*
001fe490 01 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
001fe4a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
*
001fe8c0 00 00 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
001fe8d0 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
*

```

- 

[illegible]



$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{ } \\ \text{ } \end{array} \right\}$$

## End of Packet marker?

[illegible]

# Decoding

- Looking at bits: never 3 ones or 3 zeroes in a row
- Possible Manchester Encoding?
  - 10 => 1, 01 => 0 (or vice versa)
- Preamble of zeros (0101010101...)
- Long series of ones => Packet boundary
- Next steps:
  - decode manchester encoding
  - convert bits to bytes  
(176 manchester-bits = 88 bits = 11 bytes)



01017709012f63bc44ca59

—1.1424s  
—1.144s  
—1.1456s  
—1.1472s  
—1.1488s  
—1.1504s  
—1.152s  
—1.1536s

—0.752s  
—0.7536s  
—0.7552s  
—0.7568s  
—0.7584s  
—0.76s  
—0.7616s  
—0.7632s  
—0.7648s  
—0.7664s  
—0.768s  
—0.7696s  
—0.7712s  
—0.7728s  
—0.7744s  
—0.776s  
—0.7776s  
—0.7792s  
—0.7808s  
—0.7824s  
—0.784s  
—0.7856s  
—0.7872s  
—0.7888s  
—0.7904s

# Checklist

- Capture signal ✓
  - Attack: Replay
  - Attack: Relay
- Demodulation ✓
  - => Bitstream
- Decoding ✓
  - Clock recovery
  - Manchester decoding
  - Bits to bytes

[illegible]

00000001111010100011011000001001001011010110000001001

0102770901f51d824b5c09

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# Understanding the packets

- Approach: capture different packets and compare them
- Also: guessing and trial + error

Lock:

```
0x1 0x1 0x77 0x9 0x1 0x86 0x18 0x93 0xbb 0xc8 0x19
0x1 0x1 0x77 0x9 0x1 0x4b 0x43 0x79 0x4a 0x45 0xe9
0x1 0x1 0x77 0x9 0x1 0x2f 0x63 0xbc 0x44 0xca 0x59
```

Unlock:

```
0x1 0x2 0x77 0x9 0x1 0xf8 0x4c 0xb3 0xd9 0xa3 0xf9
0x1 0x2 0x77 0x9 0x1 0x2b 0xb6 0x82 0x90 0xf2 0x29
0x1 0x2 0x77 0x9 0x1 0x8a 0x46 0x9a 0xff 0xd4 0x39
```

---

# Understanding the packets

- Approach: capture different packets and compare them
- Also: guessing and trial + error

Lock:

0x1 0x1 0x77 0x9 0x1 0x86 0x18 0x93 0xbb 0xc8 0x19

0x1 0x1 0x77 0x9 0x1 0x4b 0x43 0x79 0x4a 0x45 0xe9

0x1 0x1 0x77 0x9 0x1 0x2f 0x63 0xbc 0x44 0xca 0x59

Unlock:

0x1 0x2 0x77 0x9 0x1 0xf8 0x4c 0xb3 0xd9 0xa3 0xf9

0x1 0x2 0x77 0x9 0x1 0x2b 0xb6 0x82 0x90 0xf2 0x29

0x1 0x2 0x77 0x9 0x1 0x8a 0x46 0x9a 0xff 0xd4 0x39

---

# Understanding the Packets

```
chksum = reduce(operator.xor, a[1:9])
```

0x1 0x1 0x77 0x9 0x1 0x86 0x18 0x93 0xbb 0xc8 0x19

Action  
(lock, unlock, ...)

Key ID

Rolling Code

Checksum



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# Modifying packets

- Question: can we turn a “lock” signal into an “unlock” signal and vice versa?
- Obviously would need to recompute checksum ...
- ... , but would only work if same rolling code counter is used for both
- Need to test out  $\Rightarrow$  Works!

01**01**7709012f63bc44**ca**59



01**02**7709012f63bc44**c9**59

# Checklist

- Capture signal ✓

Attack: Replay

Attack: Relay

- Demodulation ✓

- => Bitstream


- Decoding ✓

- Clock recovery
- Manchester decoding
- Bits to bytes


Attack: Transform “Lock signal” to “Unlock signal”

# Final Attack

- Idea:
  - Jam a valid signal and reuse later
  - Record signal while jamming
    - How?
  - Use jammed signal later
- Scenario:
  - Owner parks car
  - Wants to lock it
  - Jam lock signal
  - Turn into unlock signal
  - Use signal when owner is gone
- But: victim will notice?



# Final Attack



# Summary

- Capture signal ✓

Attack: Replay

Attack: Relay

- Demodulation ✓

- => Bitstream

- Decoding ✓

- Clock recovery
- Manchester decoding
- Bits to bytes

Attack: Transform “Lock signal” to “Unlock signal”

Attack: Jamming + Packet Modification