

Validating a hardware write blocker (or a similar device)

Issues

An unsafe command* can pass-through to a drive

An unsafe command* can be issued to a drive by a write blocker (on its own)

A safe command can be blocked or ignored

A device can misbehave when a faulty sector is read

Other issues:
large drives (> 2 TB), 4096-byte sectors

* – unlocking a data area protected with HPA/DCO is considered safe

Examples

AgeStar 3FBCP (firmware: unknown version), PATA/SATA-to-USB bridge
Unsafe ATA pass-through commands are not filtered in the read-only mode

Tableau TD3 (firmware: 2.0.0), forensic imager & network-based write blocker
The device writes to a drive attached to a «write blocked» port when a specific state of the Ext4 file system is encountered (no command from a host is required)

Tableau T356789iu (firmware: 1.3.0), forensic bridge
The device is blocking a host from reading sectors near the unreadable one (a read error is returned to a host even if a sector can be read: a single unreadable sector results in 128 sectors being reported as unreadable to a host)

Multiple write blockers
The device requires a USB reset when an unreadable sector is encountered

Validation directions*

* – repeat for each interface to a host used

Verifying that drives with faulty sectors work as expected

Run a test against a drive with an unreadable sector

Does a block device disappear in Linux? Does it appear again (later)? What about Windows?

Checking the issues with large drives (> 2 TB), 4096-byte sectors

Run a test against a large (> 2 TB) drive

Are all sectors visible and readable?

Run a test against a 4Kn drive

What is the reported sector size (as seen by a host)?

Validation directions

* – the «read-write-read-compare» scenario: read a sector, [try to] write something different to that sector, read the sector again, compare the data read

Sending unsafe commands and verifying execution results

Things to consider

Try to write or discard (e.g. TRIM) something and check the result

Testing a USB bridge?
The «UNMAP-to-TRIM» translation for SSDs
Can be used by third-party software to issue TRIM commands for SSDs and USB sticks

Not a mistake!

Non-typical commands:
WRITE AND VERIFY (32), etc.
SCSI UNMAP
ATA PASS-THROUGH
Vendor-specific commands

Running tests against HDDs, SSDs, other types of media

Running tests against a drive with an unreadable sector

Is it possible to reset the write protection after trying to read an unreadable sector (if a drive is revalidated by the firmware)?

A write blocker can cache the original version of data in the «read-write-read-compare» scenario* (if a write command does not invalidate the cache)

Rebooting a write blocker before checking if a sector has been modified

An operating system can cache the original version of data in the «read-write-read-compare» scenario* (for example, when there is a mounted file system)

Direct IO or raw read commands

Checking if unsafe commands can be issued without a command from a host

Things to consider

Extracting and reverse-engineering the firmware to locate weak spots

Linux-based firmware only

Running file system tests specific to Linux (if a write blocker mounts a file system)

Checking if safe commands work well

Things to consider

Try to read all sectors and check the result

Include a data area hidden with HPO/DCO

If such a data area is not exposed by a write blocker, send an «unlocking» command from a host

Running tests against a drive with an unreadable sector

Checking the error granularity of a write blocker: are readable sectors reported (to a host) as unreadable?

This is similar to existing issues with live forensic distributions

Issuing non-typical safe commands

Would be nice to know...

1. How does a write blocker handle sectors changed by a drive itself? If such a sector is not changed, as observed by a host, then there is a cache. *Examples of such drives:*
- Old SSDs (file system-aware garbage collection);
- Old USB Flash drives (non-deterministic sectors).

2. Is it possible to boot a write blocker from attached suspect storage?
Example. The firmware is located on an SD card, but there is another slot for a suspect SD card. Is it possible to trick the boot loader, or the initial RAM file system, or something else into running the code from a suspect SD card?