

and a typical pentest

# Threat Modeling

- Step 1: Read all documentation
- Step 2: Use the application to perform basic tasks
- Step 3: Watch how data moves
- Step 4: Define user roles
- Step 5: Define assets
- Step 6: Define components
- Step 7: Access matrix
- Step 8: Component diagram
- Step 9: Threat tree

Introduction to Threat Modeling - What is Threat Modeling

- Software development is about creating applications that enable users to perform some tasks
- Secure development requires determining what a user shouldn't do and ensuring that the code properly restricts users to authorized actions
- Threat modeling is a design activity that guides this process

Introduction to Threat Modeling – How Threat Modeling Helps

- Threat Modeling enables you to:
  - Identify threats
  - Identify vulnerabilities
  - Identify mitigating factors
  - Perform risk analysis
  - Prioritize security fixes
  - Derive security test cases

Introduction to Threat Modeling - Threat Modeling Walkthrough

- For our threat modeling walkthrough, we will have an example in which we model a simple online store application that allows users to buy alcohol
- We will apply the process step-by-step to our example

The Threat Modeling Process

- Threat Modeling Process
  - Collecting Information
  - Decomposing the Application
    - Identifying Entry Points
    - Identifying Assets
    - Identifying Roles
  - Building the Activity Matrix
  - Building the Threat Profile
    - Identifying Threats
    - Classifying Threats
    - Building Threat Trees
    - Identifying Vulnerabilities
  - Analyzing Risks

The Threat Modeling Process – Collecting Information

- Background information:
  - Can be collected relatively fast
  - Is crucial for a good start of a threat model
  - Helps to understand the application and its basic purposes
  - Provides better understanding of threat mitigations
  - Can be used throughout the entire iterative threat modeling process

The Threat Modeling Process – Collecting Information

- There are five main sources of background information:
  - Specifications
  - Implementation Assumptions
  - External Dependencies
  - Internal and External Security Notes
  - People

The Threat Modeling Process – Collecting Information: Specifications

- Usually include:
  - Customer requirements
  - Intended purposes
  - Use cases
- Define the primary functionality of the system
- Scope the threat model by providing common and uncommon uses of the System Under Test (SUT)
- Can be used later to analyze the threats that emerge depending on the specific use case

The Threat Modeling Process – Collecting Information: Implementation Assumptions

- Decisions made before developing or during architectural or project revisions
- Capture basic architectural and design assumptions that may raise security issues
- List features that may increase the attack surface of the SUT (System Under Test)
- Help in defining mitigations to specific threats.

The Threat Modeling Process – Collecting Information: External Dependencies

- List the software components which the SUT relies to function properly
- Can be used to construct dependency contracts to capture third-party security concerns

The Threat Modeling Process – Collecting Information: Security Notes

- Internal and external security notes
- Hidden security concerns and steps that were taken against them
- Are used to capture the security assumptions from an architectural point of view
- Help to make the threat model clearer
- Aid in defining mitigations for threats discovered during step
   4 (Building the Threat Profile)

The Threat Modeling Process – Collecting Information: People

- Find out what is really happening
- Pinpoint areas of concern
- Compare assumptions of developers, QA, PMs, etc. against assumptions in the design documentation
- Fill in gaps from missing, incomplete, or immature paper documentation

The Threat Modeling Process – Collecting Information: Example

- High-level information for our online store application:
  - The application stores customer data such as shipping and billing addresses, DoB, and credit card information
  - The application interfaces with a 3<sup>rd</sup> party payment processing system
  - The application interfaces with a separate inventory system to manage stock and re-orders

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The Threat Modeling Process - Decomposing the Application

- Decomposing the application...
  - Is key in defining the main elements of a threat model
  - Provides a more structured and formal approach to threat modeling
  - Is a great exercise to understand the inner workings of the software being modeled
  - Helps to find threats during threat discovery phase

The Threat Modeling Process – Decomposing the Application

- Decomposing the application consists of three steps:
  - Identifying Entry Points
  - Identifying Assets
  - Identifying Roles

The Threat Modeling Process – Decomposing the Application: Identifying Entry Points

- Find the sources of input to your application. List all the points in which your system receives data from outside
- List all components that receive hidden sources of input such as components that interact with the file system, registry, RPC/DCOM, memory, etc.
- Collect entry points by looking at background information (use cases or external dependencies will reveal entry points for a threat model)

The Threat Modeling Process – Decomposing the Application: Identifying Entry Points Example

- Identifying entry points in our online store application:
  - Front-end Web server
  - Merchandise database
  - Interface with 3<sup>rd</sup>-party credit card processing system
  - Interface with inventory system

The Threat Modeling Process – Decomposing the Application: Identifying Assets

- To find assets one needs to think about what the attacker will target
- When enumerating threats during the next step, you will see that most threats relate to an attacker exploiting or stealing an asset
- While doing this exercise you might start encountering threats (note them down for later use)

The Threat Modeling Process – Decomposing the Application: Identifying Assets Example

- Identifying assets in our online store application:
  - Customer PII data
  - Checkout cart
  - Merchandise
  - Inventory
  - The recommendations algorithm
  - User purchase history
  - Uptime

The Threat Modeling Process – Decomposing the Application: Identifying Roles

- Roles reflect the different privileges included in your application
- They are nouns that usually translate to the different users of the system (user, admin/root, guest, wheel, etc), but can also can refer to different privilege levels such as user mode vs. kernel mode
- Each entry point and asset will have an associated list of roles
- Noting down the roles per entry point or asset might reveal escalation of privilege or information disclosure threats

The Threat Modeling Process – Decomposing the Application: Identifying Roles Example

- Identifying roles in our online store application:
  - Customer
  - 3<sup>rd</sup>-party payment processing system
  - Customer service representative
  - QA
  - Developers
  - Ops

The Threat Modeling Process – Decomposing the Application: Identifying Roles Example

- Identifying components in our online store application:
  - HTML and CSS components
  - Database framework
  - Load balancer
  - Edge router
  - Developer's computer
  - Ops scripts

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The Threat Modeling Process – Building the Activity Matrix

- The activity matrix is a set of explicit mappings between roles and asset
- Each <role, asset> pair lists the access types granted to a role for the asset
- The activity matrix is used in later steps to derive threats to the system based on improper asset access

The Threat Modeling Process – Building the Activity Matrix: Example

Building the activity matrix for our online store application:

	<b>Customer PII Data</b>	Merchandise	[]
Customer	Read: Own = always Other = never	Read: always  Modify: never	
	Modify: Own = always Other = never		
[]			

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The Threat Modeling Process - Building the Threat Profile

#### A Threat Profile is:

- A list of threats
- A threat tree for each of the discovered threats
- A description of mitigations
- A list of vulnerabilities

The Threat Modeling Process – Building the Threat Profile

- This step uses all the information collected to this point from the previous steps:
  - Use cases serve to identify threats in specific scenarios
  - Security notes, external dependencies, and implementation assumptions imply where to look and narrow the scope
  - Data Flow Diagrams are great resources to understand the attack surface of your application
  - Assets are target of threats
  - Entry points give context, help to identify attacks
  - Roles affect threat mitigations

The Threat Modeling Process - Building the Threat Profile

- Building the Threat Profile is achieved with the following four steps:
  - Identifying Threats
  - Classifying Threats
  - Building Threat Trees
  - Identifying Vulnerabilities

The Threat Modeling Process – Building the Threat Profile: Identifying Threats

- Threats are possible attacks
  - A threat is what an attacker might try to do to a component or through an entry point to gain access to an asset
  - Threats spring out of the "sometimes" and "never" entries in the activity matrix
- Threats have the following characteristics:
  - They are usually expressed as verbs (actions)
  - They involve at least one entry point or one asset
  - They are written in the following form:
    - Attacker [verb] to\from\with\etc [component/asset] (for goal)

The Threat Modeling Process – Building the Threat Profile: Identifying Threats Example

- Threat examples from our online store activity matrix:
  - Threat #1: Attacker steals customer information
  - Threat #2: Attacker connects to merchandise database to delete merchandise thus causing a denial of service

The Threat Modeling Process – Building the Threat Profile: Classifying Threats

#### STRIDE

- Spoofing
- Tampering with Data
- Repudiation
- Information Disclosure
- Denial Of Service
- Escalation of Privilege

The Threat Modeling Process – Building the Threat Profile: Classifying Threats Example


- Classifying our online store threats:
  - Threat #1: Attacker steals customer information
  - Threat #2: Attacker connects to merchandise database to delete merchandise and cause denial of service
  - Threat #3: Attacker can run arbitrary server commands

The Threat Modeling Process – Building the Threat Profile: Building Threat Trees

- Threat trees provide comprehensive details about a threat, describing the conditions required to realize it:
  - The root node is the threat
  - Child nodes are the conditions necessary for the threat to realize
- Threat trees are used during penetration testing to construct test cases from the condition nodes

The Threat Modeling Process - Building the Threat Profile: Building Threat Trees Example

- Threat tree example from our online store:
  - Threat #1: Attacker steals customer information



The Threat Modeling Process – Building the Threat Profile: Identifying Vulnerabilities

- Threats and conditions can be mitigated or unmitigated
- Attack paths can be built by identifying unmitigated routes from the leaf conditions to the root threat
- Unmitigated attack paths yield vulnerabilities
- Vulnerabilities inherit the root threats' STRIDE classifications

The Threat Modeling Process – Building the Threat Profile: Identifying Vulnerabilities Example

- Vulnerability from our online store threat tree:
  - A SQL injection vulnerability in the query fields allows an attacker to obtain access to an account without proper credentials
    - Information Disclosure

The Threat Modeling Process - Building the Threat Profile

- Suggestions for building the threat profile:
  - Arrange a meeting to brainstorm on threats
  - Don't think too much into solutions or mitigations
  - Identify each threat with a proper ID

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#### Threat Based Testing – Analyzing Risks

The Threat Modeling Process – Analyzing Risks

- Mitigations aren't free
  - Time
  - Money
  - Personnel
  - Cheap, secure, usable (pick 2)
- Risks are not all the same
  - How does a remote command injection compare to a verbose error message?
- Risks need to be ranked and prioritized, then a mitigation plan can be developed
- A realistic list and a wish list need to be created one helps focus, the other helps vision

If time, DREAD v2

- Defense in Depth
- Directly Exploitable