

Covert channels and data exfiltration

Using a simple covert channel example

A solid orange horizontal bar at the bottom of the slide.

- What is a covert channel?
- Covert channel tools and techniques
- Intel AMT Serial over LAN
- Example of homemade covert channel tool
- Covert channel mitigations
- Q&A

Why would we need a covert channel ?



What is a covert channel ?

- Communication channel
- Overt channel
- Covert channel
 - Use existing medium to convey data
 - Bypass access control mechanisms / security policies
 - Misuse overt channel properties
- Not considered a covert channel
 - FTP, IRC, File upload service,....

0

32 Bit

Version	Header Length	Type of Service	Total Length	
Fragment Identification			Flags	Fragment Offset
TTL	Protocol		Header Checksum	
Source Address				
Destination Address				
Options & Padding				

Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Header

20-60 bytes

source port number 2 bytes				destination port number 2 bytes			
sequence number 4 bytes							
acknowledgement number 4 bytes							
data offset 4 bits	reserved 3 bits			control flags 9 bits			window size 2 bytes
checksum 2 bytes				urgent pointer 2 bytes			
optional data 0-40 bytes							


IP Datagram

	Bits 0–7	Bits 8–15	Bits 16–23	Bits 24–31
IP Header (20 bytes)	Version/IHL	Type of service	Length	
	Identification		flags and offset	
	Time To Live (TTL)	Protocol	Checksum	
	Source IP address			
	Destination IP address			
ICMP Header (8 bytes)	Type of message	Code	Checksum	
	Header Data			
ICMP Payload (optional)	Payload Data			

Techniques

- Piggy back on other protocols:
 - TCP/IP → 25+ headers (ToS, Checksum, Fragments size,...)
 - ICMP → payload size or content
 - DNS → within the queries
 - HTTP → Infinite number of headers
 - Virtually any protocol (SIP, RTSP,...)
- Non-networking covert channels:
 - Shared hosts
 - Shared storage
 - Time based covert channel

Existing tools



Limitations of existing tools

- Network
 - Firewall rules, including Deep packet inspection (DPI)
 - Anomaly based network analysis
 - Blacklisted IP or Domain
- Client operating system
 - Antivirus might detect the tool
 - Tool requirements:
 - An external interpreter (Python, Perl,...)
 - Elevated privileges
 - Work only on a specific operating system (GNU/Linux,...)

Workarounds


- Network
 - Avoid unusual modification
 - Use IP and Domain with good reputation
 - Keep volume of data transferred low
 - Encrypt
 - Avoid direct communication between client and server
- Client operating system
 - Use tools available out of the box

Intel AMT SoL

- Revealed by Microsoft security research team
- Can be enabled from Operating system
- Independant from the Operating system
 - Communication doesn't go through OS Firewall

Intel® vPro™ Technology

Intel® AMT Architecture



Features

Secure Out Of Band access

Remote troubleshooting and recovery


Proactive alerting

More detailed HW inventory

Third-party, nonvolatile storage

Secure access and control of Intel® vPro™ machines, even OOB

Intel AMT Overview



Example of a simple covert channel tool

Tool constraints

- Usable on a freshly installed Windows 10 machine
- Impossible to install software
 - Need out of the box tools
- Limited account on the machine (standard user)
 - No admin privileges required

Tool overview

- Use powershell
- Using the ICMP payload to hide our data
- Client
 - Divide our data in 32 Bytes chunks to fit Windows default payload size
 - Send our chunks as ICMP payload
- Server
 - Extract the payload content and print it on screen

Echo or Echo Reply Message

```

0      1      2      3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|      Type      |      Code      |      Checksum      |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|      Identifier      |      Sequence Number      |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|      Data ...
+---+---+---+

```

Internet Control Message Protocol

Type: 8 (Echo (ping) request)
 Code: 0
 Checksum: 0x4d55 [correct]
 [Checksum Status: Good]
 Identifier (BE): 1 (0x0001)
 Identifier (LE): 256 (0x0100)
 Sequence number (BE): 6 (0x0006)
 Sequence number (LE): 1536 (0x0600)
[\[Response frame: 4\]](#)

Data (32 bytes)

Data: 6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767761...
 [Length: 32]

0000	02 00 00 00 45 00 00 3c	4d c2 00 00 80 01 00 00E..< M.....
0010	7f 00 00 01 7f 00 00 01	08 00 4d 55 00 01 00 06MU....
0020	61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68	69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70	abcdefgh ijklmnop
0030	71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61	62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69	qrstuvwxyz bcdefghi

▼ Internet Control Message Protocol

Type: 8 (Echo (ping) request)

Code: 0

Checksum: 0xda0a [correct]

Identifier (BE): 1 (0x0001)

Identifier (LE): 256 (0x0100)

Sequence number (BE): 2528 (0x09e0)

Sequence number (LE): 57353 (0xe009)

[Response frame: 2049]

▼ Data (32 bytes)

[illegible]

[Length: 32]

0000	4c	72	b9	43	8c	32	24	8a	07	91	e9	70	08	00	45	00	Lr.C.2\$. ...p..E.
0010	00	3c	2c	26	00	00	6a	01	5f	7a							.<,&..j. _z.[."[y
0020			08	00	da	0a	00	01	09	e0	41	41	41	41	41	41	.*..... ..AAAAAA
0030	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	AAAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAA
0040	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41							AAAAAAAAA AA

Demo: Exfiltrate my file

I want to see the code !

<https://github.com/yilmi/pingtransfer>

Covert Channels mitigations?

- No Silver bullet
 - Too many techniques and combinations of changes
- Prevention is better than cure
 - DPI/DPL might help for common covert channels
- Have strong security policies and enforce them:
 - Protect against malware attacks
 - Protect valuable assets
 - Have a per need access policy

Q&A