

# Introduction to GNU/Linux hardening



OpenSUSE conference 2013

Thessaloniki, Greece

Γεια σου, Θεσσαλονίκη!

Shawn the R0ck

July 21 2013



# cat /proc/agenda

- \* Who am I?
- \* Smash the stack in old good hacking days
- \* Easy ways to Hardening
  - \* Mitigation tech via GCC/glibc
  - \* Network
  - \* Confinement
- \* What is security
- \* Why exploit
  - \* for Fun and... Profit
  - \* Hacker ethic




# whois

- \* Chinese dude
  - \* IT
    - \* Security guy
      - \* Monkey coder
  - \* Day job at SUSE Linux



# Smashing the stack

- \* Stack/Heap layout
- \* Stack grows down (x86, MIPS)
- \* ESP points to the current top of the stack
- \* EBP points to the current function frame



# Example of overwrite ret

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
```

```
void test(const char *input)
{
    int x; /* integer variable need 4-bytes in memory */
    char buf[10];
    strcpy(buf, input);
    printf("%s \n", buf);
}
```



```
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    printf("The address of func test(): %p, func fuck_me(): %p\n", test, fuck_me);
    test(argv[1]);  -----> It's a vulnerable func without bound checks!
    return 0;
}
```

# Further reading/hacking

- \* Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit, by Aleph One, Phrack Issue 49

- \* Join the io-wargame:

<http://smashthestack.org/index.php>

- \* Open Security Training:

<http://www.opensecuritytraining.info/Welcome.html>

# Mitigation tech via GCC/glibc

- \* Stack canary

--> A “canary” value is placed between frame pointer and data on the stack

- \* Position-Independent-Executable

--> PIE enforces every process's code segment is mmap()'d, it begins at a different base address at each execution of the application.

- \* Other



# Stack canary

GCC options:

-fstack-protector, -fstack-protector-all

Example?

```
Int fuc_me(int x, int y) /* x? WTH */
{
    Int v; /* v? */
    char buf[256];
    int h;

    .....
}
```

Original layout:

[High addr...[y].[x].[ret].[frame pointer].[v].[buf].[h]...Low addr]

Simple Canary layout:

[High addr...[y].[x].[ret].[frame pointer].[canary].[v].[buf].[h]...Low addr]

But, it might looks like this:

[High addr...[y].[x].[ret].[frame pointer].[carnary].[buf].[h].[v]...Low addr]





# Position-Independent-Executable

GCC options:

-pie, it would randomize the .text segment

Example:

```
void* getEIP () {  
    return __builtin_return_address(0);  
};
```

```
int main(int argc, char** argv){  
    printf("retaddr: %p\n",getEIP());  
    return 0;  
}
```

-----  
retaddr: 0xb78d950a  
retaddr: 0xb77a450a  
retaddr: 0xb776350a

Turn off ASLR

```
root@sl13:/tmp# echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space  
root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out  
retaddr: 0xb7fff50a  
root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out  
retaddr: 0xb7fff50a  
root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out  
retaddr: 0xb7fff50a  
root@sl13:/tmp# echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space  
root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out  
retaddr: 0xb77d450a  
root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out  
retaddr: 0xb780c50a  
root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out  
retaddr: 0xb786850a  
root@sl13:/tmp#
```

Turn on ASLR

# Other mitigation in GCC

GCC options:

-FORTIFY\_SOURCE, prevent string format vulnerability

-z nostack, non-executable stack

-z relro, -z relro -z now, read-only relocation – it's a hardening option for GOT

# Bypass these mitigations

Reference:

Scraps of notes on remote stack overflow exploitation, Phrack Issue 67

<http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=67&id=13&mode=txt>

Bypassing PaX ASLR protection, Phrack Issue 59

<http://phrack.org/issues.html?issue=59&id=9&mode=txt>

The Art Of ELF: Analysis and Exploitations

<http://fluxius.handgrep.se/2011/10/20/the-art-of-elf-analysises-and-exp>

A Eulogy for Format Strings

<http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=67&id=9&mode=txt>

# Network

Network policy:

Tcp wrapper, it's userspace implementation of host-based networking ACL. It's easy to use:

/etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny



iptables/netfilter, SuSEFirewall or your own policies? It's only 5-tuple matters.

Do you really need IDS( Snort, BRO) or layer-7 classifier( I7, opendpi)?



# Confinement

Why do we need SELinux or Apparmor? 0Day attack mitigation?

Apparmor, whitelist-based policy. Example:

```
/home/shawn/a.out {  
    #include <abstractions/base>
```

```
  
    /home/shawn/a.out mr,  
    /home/shawn/hello r,  
    /home/shawn/world w,  
    network stream,  
}
```



# cat /proc/security

Security is NOT:

- \* Security is NOT installing a firewall
- \* Security is NOT a Product or Service
- \* Security is Not a Product; It's a Process

Security is:

- \* Security is a Process, Methodology, Costs, Policies and People
- \* Security is only as good as your "weakest link"
- \* Security is 24x7x365 ... constantly ongoing .. never ending

Conclusion:

- \* Hardening should be part of your security process

# Why exploit

- \* Motivation

- \* Fun? To some hackers, hacking is part of their life. They can't live without hacking. They are happy with joy while writing exploit...

- \* Profit? Money, of course. White hat working for commercial company. Black hat?

- \* Both White and Black are possible to sale exploit in underground.



# Hacker ethic?

- \* For further reading/hacking.

- \* Book


  - \* The HACKER Ethic and the Spirit of Information Age

- \* Documentary film

  - \* Revolution OS

- \* The best security ezine

  - \* Phrack



The word 'PHRACK' is written in a large, stylized, black font. Behind the letters, there is a fiery, red and orange background. In the center of the background, there is a devil's head with horns and a mischievous grin, surrounded by flames.



# Join the Geeko!

Learn more about SUSE's  
openings, globally:

- Talk to our colleagues at the booth
- Check out our careers page [www.suse.com/careers](http://www.suse.com/careers)
- Contact our recruiting team at [jobs@suse.com](mailto:jobs@suse.com)



# Questions?

Download examples:

- <https://github.com/citypw/citypw-SCFE/tree/master>

Thanks!

Drop me a line if you want:

<Shawn the R0ck, [citypw@gmail.com](mailto:citypw@gmail.com)>

# Reference

SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 SP3  
Security and Hardening:

<https://www.suse.com/documentation/sles11/single>

Phrack:

<http://phrack.org/>