#### Introduction to GNU/Linux hardening




OpenSUSE conference 2013

Thessaloniki, Greece

Γεια σου, Θεσσαλονίκη!

Shawn the R0ck July 21 2013





## cat /proc/agenda

- \* Who am I?
- \* Smash the stack in old good hacking days
- \* Easy ways to Hardening
  - \* Mitigation tech via GCC/glibc
  - \* Network
  - \* Confinement
- \* What is security
- \* Why exploit
  - \* for Fun and... Profit
  - \* Hacker ethic



#### whois

- \* Chinese dude
- \* |T
  - \* Security guy
  - \* Monkey coder
- \* Day job at SUSE Linux



# Smashing the stack

- \* Stack/Heap layout
- \* Stack grows down (x86, MIPS)
- \* ESP points to the current top of the stack
- \* EBP points to the current function frame

```
High +-----+

| Stack |
|(grow downward)|
|-----|
| | |
| (grow upward) |
| Heap |
Low +-----+
```

## Example of overwrite ret

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
                                                                        input
void test(const char *input)
                                                                        ret
 int x; /* integer variable need 4-bytes in memory */
 char buf[10];
                                                                        ebp
 strcpy(buf, input);
 printf("%s \n", buf);
                                                                         X
                                                                       buf[10]
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 printf("The address of func test(): %p, func fuck_me(): %p\n", test, fuck_me);
 test(argv[1]); ----> It's a vunerable func without bound checks!
 return 0;
```

# Further reading/hacking

- \* Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit, by Aleph One,
- \* Smashing the stack in 2010:

http://www.mgraziano.info/docs/stsi2010.pdf

\* Smashing the Stack in 2011:

https://paulmakowski.wordpress.com/2011/01/25/smashing-the-stack

\* Open Security Training:

http://www.opensecuritytraining.info/Welcome.html

\* Join the io-wargame:

http://smashthestack.org/index.php





# Mitigation tech via GCC/glibc

- \* Stack canary
- --> A "canary" value is placed between frame pointer and data on the stack



- \* Position-Independent-Executable
- --> PIE enforces every process's code segment is mmap()'d, it begins at a different base address at each execution of the application.
- \* Other

## Stack canary

```
GCC options:
-fstack-protector, -fstack-protector-all
Example?
Int fuc_me(int x, int y) /* x? WTH */
  Int v; /* v? */
  char buf[256]];
  int h;
Original layout:
[High addr...[y].[x].[ret].[frame pointer].[v].[buf].[h]...Low addr]
Simple Canary layout:
[High addr...[y].[x].[ret].[frame pointer].[canary].[v].[buf].[h]...Low addr]
But, it might looks like this:
[High addr...[y].[x].[ret].[frame pointer].[carnary].[buf].[h].[v]...Low addr]
```

#### Position-Independent-Executable

#### GCC options:

-pie, it would randomize the .text segment

```
Example:
                                                             Turn off ASI R
void* getEIP () {
  return builtin return address(0);
                                  root@sl13:/tmp# echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize va space
                                  root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out
                                  retaddr: 0xb7fff50a
                                  root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out
                                                                       Turn on ASLR
int main(int argc, char** argv){
                                  retaddr: 0xb7fff50a
                                  root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out
  printf("retaddr: %p\n",getEIP());
                                  retaddr: 0xb7fff50a
  return 0;
                                  root@sl13:/tmp# echo 2 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
                                  root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out
                                  retaddr: 0xb77d450a
                                  root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out
                                  retaddr: 0xb780c50a
retaddr: 0xb78d950a
                                  root@sl13:/tmp# ./a.out
                                  retaddr: 0xb786850a
retaddr: 0xb77a450a
                                  root@sl13:/tmp#
retaddr: 0xb776350a
```

# Other mitigation in GCC

GCC options:

-FORTIFY\_SOURCE, prevent string format vulnerability

-z nostack, non-executable stack

-z relro, -z relro -z now, read-only relocation – it's a hardening option for GOT

## Bypass these mitigations

#### Reference:

Scraps of notes on remote stack overflow exploitation, Phrack Issue 67

http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=67&id=13&mode=txt

Bypassing PaX ASLR protection, Phrack Issue 59 http://phrack.org/issues.html?issue=59&id=9&mode=txt

The Art Of ELF: Analysis and Exploitations http://fluxius.handgrep.se/2011/10/20/the-art-of-elf-analysises-and-exploitations

A Eulogy for Format Strings http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=67&id=9&mode=txt

#### Network

Network policy:

Tcp wrapper, it's userspace implementation of host-based networking ACL. It's easy to use:

/etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny



iptables/netfilter, SuSEFirewall or your own policies? It's only 5-tuple matters.

Do you really need IDS(Snort, BRO) or layer-7 classifier(I7, opendpi)?

## grsecurity

#### Confinement



Why do we need grsecurity/SELinux/Smack/Apparmor? 0Day attack mitigation?

Apparmor, whitelist-based policy. Example:

/home/shawn/a.out {
 #include <abstractions/base>



/home/shawn/a.out mr, /home/shawn/hello r, /home/shawn/world w, network stream,

## cat /proc/security

#### Security is NOT:

- \* Security is NOT installing a firewall
- \* Security is NOT a Product or Service
- \* Security is Not a Product; It's a Process

#### Security is:

- \* Security is a Process, Methodology, Costs, Policies and People
- \* Security is only as good as your "weakest link"
- \* Security is 24x7x365 ... constantly ongoing .. never ending

#### Conclusion:

\* Hardening should be part of your security process

# Why exploit

- \* Motivation
- \* Fun? To some hackers, hacking is part of their life. They can't live without hacking. They are happy with joy while writing exploit...
- \* Profit? Money, of course. White hat working for commercial company. Black hat?
  - \* Both White and Black are possible to sale


White Hat


exploit in underground.

#### Hacker ethic?

- \* For further reading/hacking.
- \* Book
  - \* The HACKER Ethic and the Spirit of Information Age
- \*Documentary film
  - \* Revolution OS
- \* The best security ezine
  - \* Phrack







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### Questions?

#### Download examples:

https://github.com/citypw/citypw-SCFE/tree/master/security

Thanks!

Drop me a line if you want:

<Shawn the R0ck, citypw@gmail.com>

#### Reference

SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 SP3 Security and Hardening:

https://www.suse.com/documentation/sles11/single

Phrack:

http://phrack.org/