

Strategic National Risk Assessment

Resource for Planners

**Unclassified Findings and
Consolidated Technical Appendices**

Compilation 17 July 2015



FEMA

SNRA Working Paper

This consolidation of the SNRA 2011 and 2015 unclassified technical documentation into a single integrated volume was prepared by the SNRA project team to make the SNRA supporting documentation easier to understand and use. It is not part of the documentation of record. Please refer to the June 2015 SNRA Findings, Technical Appendix, and Working Papers, and the classified SNRA Technical Report for the documentation of record of the 2015 SNRA.

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Introduction

The SNRA was executed by the DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate (DHS/NPPD) Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) in calendar year 2011, and updated by FEMA National Integration Center (NIC) in 2015.

The Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) was coordinated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Program Executive Office (PEO) on behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security in support of Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8. Representatives of the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, as well as other members of the Federal interagency, supported this effort.

This volume documents the technical approach and findings from the SNRA. The methodology, event-specific data and assumptions used to generate frequency, impact, and risk estimates have not yet undergone formal review. As such, all findings reported here should be considered provisional. The use of Federal interagency data sources or subject matter expertise should not be interpreted as reflecting formal concurrence from participating agencies.

It is important to note that the SNRA is a *strategic* national risk assessment. As such, it does not present a full view of the risk facing local communities. To fully support preparedness planning, it is necessary to both consider national and regional risks, many of which differ from region to region. The SNRA is best used as one of many strategic-level inputs to planning and risk management activities.

Inquiries about PPD-8 should be directed to FEMA via email at PPD8-NationalPreparedness@fema.dhs.gov.

Cover image courtesy of the NASA's Visible Earth Project. Data and image by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and NOAA National Geophysical Data Center.

Strategic National Risk Assessment

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(THIRA, drivers/evolving threats, climate change, authorities)

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* Page numbers seem off because the Introduction page is page 1.

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Where to find things

This page summarizes the June 2015 draft SNRA Findings document (pp. F-1 – F-26), and identifies where to go for more detail.

Summary of findings¹

These summarize the Findings
so look there first

The SNRA includes a comparison of risks for potential incidents in terms of the likelihood and impacts of threats and hazards, and an analysis of the uncertainty associated with those incidents. The assessment finds that a wide range of threats and hazards pose a significant risk to the Nation.

- Natural hazards, including hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, droughts, wildfires, winter storms, and floods, present a significant and varied risk across the country.
- A virulent strain of pandemic influenza could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans, affect millions more, and result in economic loss. Additional human and animal infectious diseases, including those previously undiscovered, may present significant risks.
- Technological and accidental hazards, such as transportation system failures, dam failures, or chemical substance spills or releases, have the potential to cause extensive fatalities and have severe economic impacts, and the likelihood of occurrence may increase due to aging infrastructure.
- Damage to the electric grid from a space weather event or a deliberate attack could cause cascading impacts through other infrastructure systems, with the potential for loss of life and economic disruption.
- Terrorist organizations or affiliates may seek to acquire, build, and use weapons of mass destruction. Conventional terrorist attacks, including those by “lone actors” employing physical threats such as explosives, and armed attacks, present a continued risk to the Nation.

These findings derive from the comparative (quantitative) analysis of the SNRA, which is documented in the first two sections which follow.²

Additional SNRA findings, based upon analysis documented in the third section,³ concern the national risk environment which forms the context for these threats and hazards.

Where to go
for more
detail

Comparative
Risk
(main part)
&
Reference
(appendices
A-L)

Context
(appendices
M-Q)

¹ The complete documentation of the SNRA consists of the 2015 SNRA Findings (pp. F-1 – F-26 following), which this page summarizes; the 2015 SNRA Technical Appendix, draft date 26 May 2015, and the 2011 SNRA Unclassified Documentation of Findings, draft date 29 May 2015, the two documents which this volume consolidates into one; the 2011 unclassified public SNRA, dated December 2011; and the classified SNRA Technical Report, dated September 2013. The complete technical documentation of the classified SNRA Technical Report includes the technical documentation of the DHS/NPPD 2010 Risk Analysis Process for Informed Decision-making (RAPID) engine and the technical reports, appendices, and annexes of the DHS/S&T Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) and its component assessments.

² Comparative Risk, including reference appendices specific to the comparative analysis (pp. 3-458).

³ Appendices M-Q (Context) pp. 459-494.

- The top threats and hazards of greatest concern across jurisdictions as reported through the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process, including floods, utility interruptions, chemical hazmat releases, cyber attacks, and explosives attacks, have remained largely consistent from 2012 to 2014.⁴
- Demographic shifts and potential future challenges including climate change, global food and water insecurity, and homegrown violent extremists, among other evolving threats and factors relevant to national preparedness, have the potential to shape the national risk environment in coming years.⁵
- Climate change is expected to act as a hazard multiplier for many current threats and hazards, and in some cases will introduce more hazards to communities. The effects of climate change may cascade into a number of areas that are not directly weather related, affecting population shifts, public health, resources, and local economies.⁶

These findings supported the development (2011) and revision (2015) of the core capabilities articulated in the National Preparedness Goal. The following document consolidates the unclassified technical and supporting documentation for these findings as analyzed by the 2011-2015 SNRA.⁷

Threat and hazard identification⁸

The threat and hazard identification process of the SNRA highlighted a number of additional threats and hazards, including:

- Natural hazards including heat waves, plant disease, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, antibiotic resistance and other emerging infectious diseases;
- Technological/accidental hazards including industrial accidents resulting in fires/explosions, migrant surges, catastrophic oil spills, and pipeline failures;
- Cross-cutting hazards such as electric grid failures from natural and accidental causes, and fires resulting in urban conflagration; and
- Cyber-attacks, which could have their own catastrophic impacts and could initiate other hazards, such as power grid failures, financial system failures, and data breaches that amplify the potential impact of cyber-attacks.

These threats and hazards were analyzed qualitatively, and without comparison with other events. These studies are documented separately as SNRA working papers.

SNRA 2015
Working
Papers
(separate)**

** Included in this pdf
binder, following
page 494

⁴ Appendix M (National Risk), p. 461.

⁵ Appendix N (Drivers and Evolving Threats), p. 464.

⁶ Appendix O (Climate Change), p. 472.

⁷ Four qualitative risk summary sheets from 2011 (tsunami, volcano, cyber attack against data, cyber attack against physical infrastructure), not otherwise reproduced in the consolidated documentation, are also included in this volume (Appendix J2, p. 409).

⁸ Table 4, pp. 14-15.

Classification

This document is unclassified in its entirety.

Frequency, fatality, injury/illness, and economic impact data for CBRN events are classified. Frequency and impact data for all other adversarial, natural, and accidental hazards, as well as social displacement and environmental impact estimates for the CBRN events, are unclassified and included here.

While this document retains unclassified discussions of the methods used to obtain the data and findings for the CBRN events, their omission makes this document an incomplete picture of the full SNRA and the national risk picture which it describes. This absence must be kept in mind while reading the following pages.

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Errata

Known errata – Findings

Page	Errata
F-11, 13	Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail) should be in table 1, not 2
F-17	“SNRA participants identified a number of additional threats and hazards...” should omit “(Table 2)” [combustible/flammable rail accidents were analyzed quantitatively with the events in table 1]
F-5	Footnote 5, last item “; the...” should be “; and the...”
F-10, 13	Footnotes 18, 21, 22 (animal disease, tsunami, volcano): “...event, defined as...” should be “...event, which may be defined as...”
F-10	Footnote 18: “...for all animal disease threats to the U.S. expansion of...” should capitalize “Expansion” [new sentence]
F-15	1 st paragraph, last sentence should be “More specifically, the SNRA asked...”

Known errata – Technical Appendix

Page	Not affecting data or top numbers
203	Effect on Electricity Supply 3 rd paragraph should begin “One core reason is that the grid it is the only subsector that <u>itself</u> needs to be functional in order for any permanent damage to it to be repaired.”
210	FEMA (2011b) Federal Interagency Response Plan should be abbreviated FIRP, not FIOP
338	Note 30 omits ATF/BJS/FBI sources: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal Bureau of Investigation (1998). FBI Bomb Data Center: 1998 Bombing Incidents. General Information Bulletin 98-1. 1988-1998 tabulation, p. 7. At https://www.hsl.org/?view&did=458703 (checked 16 September 2016). • Bureau of Justice Statistics (2003). Bombing incidents known to police by type of incident and device, value of property damage, and outcome of incident, United States, 1973-1999. Table 3.170 p. 337, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics. At http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t3170.pdf (checked 16 September 2016).
362	Explosives Terrorism Attack data table, 10/12/1984 PR attack should be 12/10/1984 (Dec. 10)


The following known errata will affect top level estimates when corrected, but not enough to change relative risk rankings or findings.

Event	Affecting data and/or top numbers
Aircraft as a Weapon	Data table, 9/11 and 2010 Austin attack: Perpetrator fatalities included in error. Correction will affect best and high fatality estimates.
Aircraft as a Weapon	Data table, 9/11: Non-NYC fatalities omitted by error. Correction will affect best and high fatality estimates.
Explosives Terrorism	Data table: 11/27/1981 PR (electric grid) bombings should be removed (double counting with Physical Attack on Power Grid event). Correction will affect best estimate frequency.
Hurricane	Only U.S. mainland hurricanes are included, omitting Puerto Rico and other non-CONUS. Correction will affect all estimates.

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Notes

Notes





Findings

Strategic National Risk Assessment

9 June 2015



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Introduction

Our Nation faces a wide range of risks, from terrorism and disease to natural hazards and a changing climate. Risk is the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated impacts.¹ The Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) provides general context and key findings related to threats and hazards posing significant risks to the United States.² Managing these risks is a shared responsibility that depends on unity of effort among whole community³ partners.

The SNRA supports a risk-based, all-hazards strategy for preparedness as directed by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) and the continued implementation of the National Preparedness System.⁴ This Assessment also supports other risk assessment efforts conducted by whole community partners as appropriate, to include the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) process.

The SNRA⁵ benefits whole community partners by providing:

- A risk-based foundation for the Goal and the National Preparedness System;
- Support for capabilities-based planning, training, exercises, and evaluation across all mission areas of Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery;
- The ability for whole community partners to share common understanding and awareness of national threats and hazards and the resulting risks to support decision making and help ensure they are ready to act and can do so independently and collaboratively; and
- A set of findings and common descriptions of threats and hazards,⁶ allowing partners in preparedness and resiliency to establish a shared understanding of risk across the homeland security enterprise and work more collaboratively.

¹ DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010 edition.

² The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) makes a helpful distinction between ‘contingent’ risks, those which have a definite beginning and end, and ‘persistent’ risks which are a part of the steady state national risk background. The scope of the 2015 SNRA approximately coincides with the space of homeland security contingent risks, with some exceptions, notably including climate change. The SNRA is a continuing stand-alone assessment conducted in support of the implementation of the National Preparedness System; in its role as a DHS assessment, it complements other DHS studies for the purpose of informing DHS strategic planning.

³ For the purposes of this document, whole community partners include: individuals, communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and all levels of government (local, regional/metropolitan, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and Federal).

⁴ The National Preparedness System outlines an organized process for everyone in the whole community to move forward with their preparedness activities and achieve the National Preparedness Goal.

⁵ The SNRA refers to the complete documentation from 2011 and 2015, which includes: 2015 SNRA Findings (this document), the Draft 2015 SNRA Technical Appendix, the Draft SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings; the 2011 Unclassified SNRA (public version; December 2011); the Draft 2011 Classified SNRA Technical Report.

⁶ The scope of the 2015 SNRA approximately coincides with the space of homeland security contingent risks, with some exceptions, notably including climate change.

The first iteration of the SNRA was accomplished in 2011 to inform the development of the National Preparedness Goal (the Goal)⁷. The 2015 update to the SNRA, similar to the 2011 iteration, provides a strategic view of risk to support the whole community's collective understanding of the range of threats, hazards, and related challenges facing the Nation.⁸ However, the 2015 SNRA builds upon the first SNRA to provide greater visibility of long-term risk trends that affect national preparedness. The 2015 SNRA estimates national-level risks over the next three to five years and identifies evolving trends, drivers, and conditions, including climate change, that could impact national preparedness needs beyond the five-year period.

⁷ The National Preparedness Goal (2011) is “a secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”

⁸ The scope of the 2015 SNRA approximately coincides with the space of homeland security contingent risks, with some exceptions, notably including climate change.

Overview

The SNRA is a process implemented by the Federal Government to identify the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the Nation⁹ and provide necessary context for those threats and hazards to support national preparedness planning. The SNRA informs and supports the National Preparedness Goal, the National Preparedness System, which is based on “*Identifying and Assessing Risk*”¹⁰, the National Preparedness Report (NPR)¹¹, and other efforts throughout the whole community to enhance security and resiliency. Whole community partners use risk assessments to inform efforts to build and sustain capabilities, including planning, training, and exercises.

The 2015 SNRA process reviewed the national risk environment and included the following:

- A revisit and refresh of the 2011 SNRA analysis and findings;
- Expansion of the quantitative evidence base of the 2011 SNRA, which included additional threats and hazards;
- An examination of the potential impacts of climate change upon national preparedness;
- A review of evolving threats to the Nation; and
- Qualitative analysis of additional threats and hazards.

The SNRA findings include:

- Natural hazards, including hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, droughts, wildfires, winter storms, and floods, present a significant and varied risk across the country.
- A virulent strain of pandemic influenza could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans, affect millions more, and result in economic loss. Additional human and animal infectious diseases, including those previously undiscovered, may present significant risks.
- Technological and accidental hazards, such as transportation system failures, dam failures, or chemical substance spills or releases, have the potential to cause extensive fatalities and have severe economic impacts, and the likelihood of occurrence may increase due to aging infrastructure.
- Damage to the electric grid from a space weather event or a deliberate attack could cause cascading impacts through other infrastructure systems, with the potential for loss of life and economic disruption.

⁹ The scope of the 2015 SNRA approximately coincides with the space of homeland security contingent risks, with some exceptions, notably including climate change.

¹⁰ Whole community partners currently identify and assess risk through the THIRA process at the jurisdictional level and the SNRA identifies and assess risk at the national-level. Jurisdictional partners include states, territories, tribal governments and urban areas. FEMA Regions also conduct the THIRA process on an annual basis.

¹¹ The intent of the NPR is to provide the Nation—not just the Federal Government—with practical insights on core capabilities that can inform decisions about program priorities, resource allocation, and community actions.

- Terrorist organizations or affiliates may seek to acquire, build, and use weapons of mass destruction. Conventional terrorist attacks, including those by “lone actors” employing physical threats such as explosives, and armed attacks, present a continued risk to the Nation.

The threat and hazard identification process of the SNRA highlighted a number of additional threats and hazards, including:

- Natural hazards including heat waves, plant disease, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, antibiotic resistance and other emerging infectious diseases;
- Technological/accidental hazards including combustible/flammable cargo rail accidents, industrial accidents resulting in fires/explosions, migrant surges, catastrophic oil spills, and pipeline failures;
- Cross-cutting hazards such as electric grid failures from natural and accidental causes, and fires resulting in urban conflagration; and
- Cyber-attacks, which could have their own catastrophic impacts and could initiate other hazards, such as power grid failures, financial system failures, and data breaches that amplify the potential impact of cyber-attacks.

While the SNRA represents a significant step toward understanding the Nation’s threats and hazards, it contains data limitations and assumptions that will require additional study, review, and revision.

Strategic National Risk Assessment Scope

The SNRA evaluated risks from known threats and hazards with the potential to significantly impact the Nation's security and resilience.¹² It assesses contingency events with defined beginning and endpoints, rather than persistent, steady-state risks.¹³ SNRA participants—Federal agencies, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, and the Intelligence Community, among others—developed a list of national-level threats and hazards (Tables 1 and 2) for consideration in the SNRA. The events are grouped into three categories: (1) natural hazards; (2) technological/accidental hazards; and (3) adversarial, human-caused threats/hazards.

To accomplish the 2015 SNRA, participants reviewed the unclassified publicly disseminated 2011 SNRA findings and determined whether or not their departments and agencies possessed data that would change the findings from the 2011 SNRA, and/or identify new threats and hazards to those identified in 2011. In addition, the participants conducted research and analysis on available data sets,¹⁴ to develop a baseline understanding of which national-level threats and hazards pose the greatest concern to the Nation. SNRA participants developed or updated risk summary sheets for quantitatively assessed risks (identified in Table 1); or conducted a concise qualitative literature review for those risks where data was not available to complete a quantitative assessment (identified in Table 2).

For the purposes of the quantitative assessment, SNRA participants identified thresholds of impact¹⁵ necessary to create a national-level event.

- These thresholds were informed by subject matter expertise and available data.
- For some events, economic impacts were used as thresholds, while for others, fatalities or injuries/illnesses were deemed more appropriate as the threshold to determine a national-level event. In no case, however, were economic and casualty thresholds treated as equivalent to one another (i.e., dollar values were not assigned to fatalities).
- Event descriptions in Table 1 that do not explicitly identify a threshold signify that no minimum impact threshold was employed. This allows the assessment to include threats and hazards for which the psychological impact could cause it to become a national-level event, even though it may result in a low number of casualties or a small economic loss.¹⁶

¹² The scope of the 2015 SNRA approximately coincides with the space of homeland security contingent risks, with some exceptions, notably including climate change.

¹³ DHS studies persistent risks and their entire risk space, which is reflected in the 2014 QHSR.

¹⁴ Specific data sets and sources are cited in the SNRA supporting documentation.

¹⁵ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences.’ This term is retained only where it is specific to a technical meaning differing from impacts, but otherwise ‘impact’ is the term used by the 2015 project. Impact categories are defined in the 2015 SNRA risk summary sheets and the 2011 SNRA Documentation of Findings. Thresholds identified are addressed in the 2011 SNRA Documentation of Findings and the 2015 SNRA Technical Appendix.

¹⁶ An example would be a dirty bomb that resulted in low to no fatalities but resulting in nationwide psychological stress and/or shock.

The threats and hazards identified by SNRA participants are presented in Tables 1-3.

- Table 1 lists the threats and hazards that were analyzed within the quantitative and comparative framework established by the 2011 SNRA.
- Table 2 lists threats and hazards that were identified by SNRA participants as relevant to national preparedness, but which did not have sufficient likelihood or impact data for comparative analysis with the threats and hazards of Table 1. These hazards were studied qualitatively.
- Table 3 lists cross-cutting hazards, new to the SNRA in 2015, including failures of the electric grid and urban fires. These are cross-cutting hazards, as they are both stand-alone events in the SNRA, and are also identified as second-order effects of other threats and hazards in the SNRA. Since the SNRA methodology applied to the events of Table 1 requires threats and hazards to be mutually exclusive in scope (to avoid double counting of risk), these cross-cutting hazards also required separate treatment.

With the exception of climate change, only events with a distinct beginning and end, and those with an explicit nexus to homeland security missions, were included. This approach excluded:

- Political, economic, and societal trends that may contribute to a changing risk environment, but are not related to national preparedness (e.g., economic trends);²⁵ and
- Chronic societal concerns, such as illicit drugs, and those that are generally not related to national preparedness, such as cancer or car accidents.

Table 1: Threats and Hazards Quantitatively Assessed in the SNRA

Threat/Hazard Type	Threat/Hazard Description and Impact Threshold
Natural	
Animal Disease Outbreak ¹⁸	An unintentional introduction of the foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus into the domestic livestock population in a U.S. state
Drought*	A drought occurs in the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$1 billion ¹⁹

¹⁷ The SNRA project reviewed and analyzed authoritative U.S. Government studies of trends of direct relevance to national preparedness.

¹⁸ The above event description describes the actual scenario modeled in 2011 for the SNRA. It represents a specific scenario of a more general SNRA hazard event, defined as: “An unintentional introduction of an animal disease into the domestic livestock or poultry population occurs in the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 million.” FMD was selected as a representative proxy for all animal disease threats to the U.S. expansion of the underlying data set to include additional animal diseases is a priority for the next iteration of the SNRA.

¹⁹ Thresholds in the SNRA were designed by participants to capture exceptional events which rise above the national risk baseline: thresholds in Table 1 generally represent the best possible compromise between this intention and the constraints of data availability. Uniformity in thresholds across similar events was attempted where possible, but was not always possible. For example, many of the natural disaster hazards share a threshold of \$100 million, while drought, winter storms, and space weather have a \$1 billion threshold. For drought and winter storms, a higher threshold was required to capture only those exceptional drought and storm events that rise above the normal national risk baseline: multiple instances of droughts and winter storms causing direct economic damages in the

Threat/Hazard Type	Threat/Hazard Description and Impact Threshold
Earthquake	An earthquake occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 million
Flood	A flood occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 million
Human Pandemic Outbreak***	A severe outbreak of pandemic influenza with a 25 percent gross clinical attack rate spreads across the U.S. populace
Hurricane	A tropical storm or hurricane impacts the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses of greater than \$100 million
Space Weather***	The sun emits bursts of electromagnetic radiation and energetic particles causing utility outages and damage to infrastructure in the U.S., resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$1 billion
Tornado**	A single tornado or a tornado outbreak occurs in the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 million
Wildfire	A wildfire occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 million
Winter Storm*	A winter storm event occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses of \$1 billion or greater
Technological / Accidental	
Biological Food Contamination	Accidental conditions where introduction of a biological agent (e.g., <i>Salmonella</i> , <i>E. coli</i> , botulinum toxin) into the food supply results in 100 hospitalizations or greater and a multistate response
Chemical Substance Spill or Release	Accidental conditions where a release of a large volume of a chemical acutely toxic to human beings (a toxic inhalation hazard, or TIH) from a chemical plant, storage facility, or transportation mode results in either one or more off-site fatalities, or one or more fatalities (either on- or off-site) with off-site evacuations or sheltering-in-place
Dam Failure	Accidental conditions where dam failure and inundation in the U.S. result in one fatality or greater
Radiological Substance Release	Accidental conditions where reactor core damage in the U.S. causes release of radiation
Transportation System Failure*	Accidental conditions where a bridge failure occurs within the U.S., resulting in one fatality or greater ²⁰

hundreds of millions occur every year in the Nation. Space weather events are also constant occurrences: a higher threshold was required to capture events surpassing the “100-year storm,” which the electric power industry has suggested would cause direct economic loss in the billions of dollars, at minimum.

²⁰ The scope of the Transportation System Failure hazard is determined by the data that was actually used as the basis for the quantitative estimates of likelihood and impacts. The unclassified data available for the 2015 SNRA consisted of bridge failure data.

Threat/Hazard Type	Threat/Hazard Description and Impact Threshold
Human Caused / Adversarial	
Aircraft as a Weapon***	A hostile non-state actor(s) crashes a commercial or general aviation aircraft into a physical target within the U.S. causing at least one fatality or injury other than or in addition to the attacker(s), in an act characterized by the U.S. Government as terrorist in nature
Armed Assault***	A hostile non-state actor(s) uses assault tactics to conduct strikes on vulnerable target(s) within the U.S. resulting in at least one fatality or injury other than or in addition to the attacker(s), in an act characterized by the U.S. Government as terrorist in nature
Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and releases a biological agent against an outdoor, indoor, or water target, directed at a concentration of people within the U.S.
Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and disperses a biological or chemical agent into food supplies within the U.S. supply chain
Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and releases a chemical agent against an outdoor, indoor, or water target, directed at a concentration of people using an aerosol, ingestion, or dermal route of exposure
Explosives Terrorism Attack***	An act of terrorism using one or more explosive or incendiary devices against people or property within the U.S.
Nuclear Terrorism Attack	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires an improvised nuclear weapon through manufacture from fissile material, purchase, or theft, and detonates it within a major U.S. population center
Physical Attack on the Power Grid*	A hostile non-state actor(s) causes physical damage to an aspect of the power grid resulting in a loss of power in one or more metropolitan areas for three or more hours
Radiological Terrorism Attack	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires radiological materials and disperses them through explosive or other means (e.g., a radiological dispersal device or RDD) or creates a radiation exposure device (RED)
*	New in SNRA 2015
**	New in SNRA 2015: Added 2012
***	Revised in SNRA 2015

Table 2: Threats and Hazards Qualitatively Identified in the SNRA

Threat/Hazard Type	Threat/Hazard Description
Natural	
Antibiotic Resistance*	Antibiotic-resistant pathogens, or “superbugs,” have acquired mutations resulting in the reduction or elimination of the effectiveness of antibiotics
Emerging Infectious Diseases Other than Influenza*	Newly recognized diseases or known “re-emerging” or “resurgent” diseases that may have been previously controlled but are now reappearing with increasing occurrence, or threaten to increase over previously endemic levels or new populations or geographic areas—this also includes pathogens that have developed new attributes such as increased resistance or virulence

Threat/Hazard Type	Threat/Hazard Description
Heat Wave*	A period of elevated temperature with an identifiable beginning and end occurs in the U.S. resulting in fatalities
Plant Disease*	A major outbreak of a plant pathogen or pest occurs in the U.S. resulting in significant direct economic losses
Tsunami ²¹	A tsunami with a wave of approximately 50 feet impacts the Pacific Coast of the U.S.
Volcanic Eruption ²²	A volcano in the Pacific Northwest erupts impacting the surrounding areas with lava flows and ash and areas east with smoke and ash
Technological / Accidental	
Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)*	Accidental conditions where a fire or an explosion of combustible or flammable substances transported by rail occurs within the U.S., resulting in fatalities
Industrial Accident (Fire/Explosion)*	A technological accident of an industrial nature, involving an industrial site or production facility (e.g., factories) that results in a fire or explosion
Migrant Surge/Mass Migration ^{*31}	A concentrated flow or surge of migrants into the U.S. across maritime or land borders occurs
Oil Spill*	An oil spill of national significance requiring contingency/surge operations to mitigate
Pipeline Failure*	Accidental conditions where a failure or an explosion of hazardous substances transported by pipeline occurs within the U.S. resulting in fatalities
Human Caused / Adversarial	
Cyber-Attack	A cyber attack resulting in substantial harm to persons or critical infrastructure, significant data breaches, or the erosion of U.S. national security.
*	New in SNRA 2015
**	New in SNRA 2015: Added 2012
***	Revised in SNRA 2015

²¹ The above event description describes the actual scenario modeled in 2011 for the SNRA project. It represents a specific scenario of a more general SNRA hazard event, defined as: “A tsunami impacts the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 million.” As the extent to which the SNRA-modeled scenario represents the total risk to the Nation of tsunamis could not be determined by the 2011 or 2015 SNRA participants, it was qualitatively analyzed and not compared with other threat or hazard events within the SNRA methodological framework.

²² The above event description describes the actual scenario modeled in 2011 for the SNRA project. It represents a specific scenario of a more general SNRA hazard event, defined as: “A volcanic eruption occurs in the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 million.” As the extent to which the SNRA-modeled scenario represents the total risk to the Nation of volcanic eruptions could not be determined by the 2011 or 2015 SNRA participants, it was qualitatively analyzed and not compared with other threat or hazard events within the SNRA methodological framework.

²³ Migrant Surge/Mass Migration falls within the class of human-caused unintentional events, which the 2015 SNRA labels Technological/Accidental for consistency with the 2011 SNRA.

Table 3: Cross-Cutting Threats and Hazards Identified for Study in the SNRA

Threat/Hazard Type	Threat/Hazard Description
Electric Grid Failure (Natural/Accidental) (Cross-Cutting)*	Electrical grid failure and loss of power meeting the grid disturbance reporting thresholds of the U.S. Department of Energy, of natural or accidental (non-adversarial) cause
Urban Fire/Conflagration*	Accidental or other incident triggered conditions where normal firefighting capabilities are significantly degraded, and an urban area becomes engulfed in a conflagration
*	New in SNRA 2015
**	New in SNRA 2015: Added 2012
***	Revised in SNRA 2015

The Current National Risk Environment

Analytic Approach

The quantitative analysis of the SNRA drew data and information from a variety of sources, including existing U.S. Government models and assessments, historical records, structured analysis, and judgments of experts from different disciplines. The information was used to assess the risk of identified incidents as a function of frequency²⁴ and impacts. More specifically, asking:

- With what frequency is it estimated that an event will occur?
- What are the impacts of the event(s) if it does occur?

Frequency was estimated as the potential number of occurrences or attacks, per year, which met or exceeded the established threshold²⁵ for the event. For the majority of events (including threats with unclassified analyses in the 2015 SNRA), frequency estimates were based on statistical analysis of historic data, or directly from historical data where extensive records were available.²⁶ Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) adversarial/human-caused frequencies were estimated primarily using elicitation from subject matter experts.²⁷

The SNRA examined the impacts associated with six categories of harm: loss of life, injuries and illnesses, direct economic costs, social displacement, psychological distress, and environmental impact. This multifaceted view of potential impacts draws attention to the broad and often interdependent effects of incidents that require whole community preparation and cooperation across the homeland security enterprise. For instance, fostering resilient communities relates to both mitigating human and economic impacts and addressing the psychological and social distress caused by the incident. Similarly, other types of resilience involve withstanding environmental and infrastructure degradations to ensure continued delivery of essential services.

The SNRA relied on the best available quantitative estimates of frequency and impact from existing U.S. Government assessments, peer-reviewed literature, and expert judgment. Where sufficient quantitative information was not available, events were assessed qualitatively. The estimates of the frequency and impacts for each of the events considered were compared where appropriate. No effort was made to create a single “risk judgment” for any event type, because it was deemed infeasible to aggregate all impact types into a single metric. Instead, the assessment treated impact categories separately (e.g., economic impacts are reported separately from fatality impacts). This allowed stakeholders to apply their own expert judgments to the findings and decide how those findings should inform core capabilities in the Goal.

²⁴ Frequency was used in the SNRA to capture likelihood because some events have the potential to occur more than once a year.

²⁵ When interpreting the frequency results, it is important to consider that the frequency data in the SNRA is directly related to the threshold included in each national-level event definition. For example, the results for floods indicate that floods causing greater than \$100 million in direct economic losses are estimated to occur with a frequency between once every two years and ten times per year, with a best estimate of four times per year.

²⁶ SNRA analysts examined the data sets for a particular event and identified how many incidents within the scope of the event occurred at or above the established threshold per year.

²⁷ Expert elicitations for adversarial/human caused frequencies were accomplished for the classified SNRA.

All sources and estimates were documented to promote credibility, defensibility, and transparency within the assessment. Uncertainty in frequency and impacts was explicitly included in the analysis by representing low and high bounds in addition to best estimates. Examples of sources of uncertainty include incomplete knowledge of adversary capabilities and intent, variability in possible event severity and location, and lack of historical precedence.

The assessment was performed at a strategic national-level and provides the ability to draw rough comparisons and identify broad differences in risk across the quantitatively assessed events—within an order of magnitude. Given the uncertainty inherent in assessing risks at a national-level and the lack of information about some of the events included—many of which are likely to occur very infrequently—the assessment was designed to avoid false precision. Instead, the assessment identifies only those differences in risk that are still significant despite the associated uncertainties.

The analysis of available information—even if that analysis is imprecise and contains a wide degree of uncertainty—supports better decision making, as long as key limitations and assumptions are noted. Participants designed the SNRA to capture the best information available regarding homeland security risks to inform the Goal and supporting preparedness efforts. There are two additional considerations for preparedness partners:

- This is a *strategic* national risk assessment. The SNRA addresses national risk based on total impacts to the Nation, not limited by geographic boundaries. As such, it does not present a full view of the risk facing communities. To complement preparedness planning, it is also necessary to consider local, regional/metropolitan, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area variations in risk.
- Given the emphasis in PPD-8 on contingency events with defined beginning and endpoints (e.g., hurricanes, terrorist attacks), the current SNRA does not explicitly assess persistent, steady-state risks like border violations, illegal immigration,²⁸ drug trafficking, and intellectual property violations, which are important challenges for DHS and the homeland security enterprise.

Findings

The results of the 2015 SNRA include a comparison of risks for potential incidents of the threats and hazards listed in Table 1, in terms of the likelihood (calculated as a frequency, i.e., number of events per year) and impacts of threats and hazards, and an analysis of the uncertainty associated with those incidents. The 2011 assessment found that a wide range of threats and hazards pose a significant risk to the Nation, affirming the need for an all-threats/hazards, capability-based approach to preparedness planning. The 2015 review of the publicly disseminated 2011 SNRA findings validated the diverse picture of national risks and affirmed the doctrine established by the 2011 Goal. The SNRA findings include:

- Natural hazards, including hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, droughts, wildfires, winter storms, and floods, present a significant and varied risk across the country.

²⁸ Migrant surges across land or sea borders are included in the 2015 SNRA (Table 2).

- A virulent strain of pandemic influenza could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans, affect millions more, and result in economic loss. Additional human and animal infectious diseases, including those previously undiscovered, may present significant risks.
- Technological and accidental hazards, such as transportation system failures, dam failures, or chemical substance spills or releases, have the potential to cause extensive fatalities and have severe economic impacts, and the likelihood of occurrence may increase due to aging infrastructure.
- Damage to the electric grid from a space weather event or a deliberate attack could cause cascading impacts through other infrastructure systems, with the potential for loss of life and economic disruption.
- Terrorist organizations or affiliates may seek to acquire, build, and use weapons of mass destruction. Conventional terrorist attacks, including those by “lone actors” employing physical threats such as explosives, and armed attacks, present a continued risk to the Nation.

These findings supported the development and the refinement of the core capabilities in the 2015 revision of the Goal. In addition to the above findings articulated in the Goal, the 2015 SNRA reaffirmed that:

- Many events have the potential to occur more than once every 10 years, meaning that the Nation’s preparedness will likely be tested in this decade;
- Although historic events provide a useful perspective on homeland security risks, the changing nature of society and the risk landscape means that the Nation must also be prepared for new hazards and threats or for events that result in greater impacts than have occurred in the past;
- Within an all-hazards preparedness context, particular events that present risk to the Nation—such as nuclear attacks or chemical releases—require additional specialized response activities; and
- Some events, such as explosives attacks or earthquakes, generally cause more localized impacts, while other events, such as human pandemics, may cause impacts that are dispersed throughout the Nation, thus creating different types of impacts for preparedness planners to consider.

SNRA participants identified a number of additional threats and hazards (Table 2), including:

- Natural hazards including heat waves, plant disease, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, antibiotic resistance and other emerging infectious diseases;
- Technological/accidental hazards including combustible/flammable cargo rail accidents, industrial accidents resulting in fires/explosions, migrant surges, catastrophic oil spills, and pipeline failures; and
- Cyber-attacks, which could have their own catastrophic impacts and could initiate other hazards, such as power grid failures, financial system failures, and data breaches that amplify the potential impact of cyber-attacks.

These threats and hazards were analyzed qualitatively and without comparison with other events. The SNRA process also included examination of cross-cutting hazards such as failures of the electric grid and urban fires as both stand-alone events and as second-order effects of other threats and hazards.²⁹ These could not be analyzed in a quantitative comparative fashion because of their cross-cutting impacts across multiple threats and hazards.

Additional natural, technological/accidental, or human-caused hazards can also pose a risk to jurisdictions across the country and should be considered, as appropriate, in preparedness planning. Non-influenza diseases with pandemic potential and other animal diseases should also be considered. In addition, assessment participants identified a number of events for possible inclusion in future iterations of the SNRA, including utility interruptions more generally than electric power (gas, telecommunications and water); electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) attacks; explosives and other conventional attacks caused by non-terrorist actors, and threats of explosive attacks; and terrorist attacks using drones.

²⁹ Examination of cross-cutting hazards is valid so long as this overlap is clearly understood and communicated, and so long as double counting by aggregating hazards overlapping in scope is avoided.

Drivers and Evolving Threats

The 2015 SNRA included research on evolving threats, building off of previous Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) strategic foresight research and additional U.S. Government reviews of evolving threats relevant to national preparedness. Certain threats and hazards frequently appeared in documents across governmental, intergovernmental, non-profit, and academic sources as potentially growing issues of concern for the U.S. as a whole and the world in the near-term and long-term. Of these, the SNRA analysis identified the following trends as having the strongest evidence for impacting national preparedness in the future.

Demographic Shifts in the U.S. and Potential Future Challenges

Over the next four decades, the U.S. population may undergo significant demographic changes that will have ramifications for the country economically, politically, and socially. Internal migratory shifts will shape the country demographically and could have wide ranging ramifications, as more Americans are living in metropolitan and coastal regions.³⁰ Changes to the climate and sea level rise could make homes and businesses congregated along coastal areas more prone to flooding. In addition, more concentrated populations could make evacuations more difficult, strain access to medical resources, and increase stress on aging critical infrastructure.³¹

Food and Water Insecurity

Climate change, global population growth, and economic development have the potential to create water and food insecurity in the coming decades. Food and water insecurity have the possibility of affecting the U.S. domestically and its relationships with numerous countries. Over the course of the next 10 years, many countries important to U.S. national security will experience water problems causing instability in those regions of the world.³² As demand for these critical resources grow, global supplies may be insufficient to meet the demand.

Homegrown Violent Extremists

The terrorist threat to the Nation remains significant and continues to evolve. Individuals (lone offenders) and small groups acting on their own initiative are a tenacious threat and difficult to counter.³³ In recent years, the adept use of media by new groups has created unprecedented opportunities for their organizations to reach potential recruits and influence people.³⁴ Social media and the Internet have the potential to play a critical role in the immediate future in

³⁰ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Strategic Foresight Initiative*, January 2012, p. 8.

³¹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, “U.S. Demographic Shifts: Long-term Trends and Drivers and Their Implications for Emergency Management, *Strategic Foresight Initiative White Papers*, May 2011, p. 5, <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/103600>.

³² National Intelligence Council, *Global Water Security*, February 2, 2012, p. iii.

³³ Department of Homeland Security, *2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, p. 18.

³⁴ Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Current Terrorist Threat to the United States, Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2015.

radicalizing and mobilizing homegrown extremists towards violence.⁴³ Homegrown violent extremists are a persistent threat to the country.³⁶

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Jerome P. Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2013; James R. Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 11, 2014; Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, p. 19; William L. Painter, Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 113th Congress, Congressional Research Service, September 23, 2013; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Strategic Foresight Initiative, January 2012, p. 9; Government Accountability Office, Strategic Plan 2014–2019, p. 100; Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Current Terrorist Threat to the United States, Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2015.

Climate Change and National Preparedness

Scientific evidence indicates the climate is changing and significant economic, social, and environmental impacts are expected as a result. Climate change is an increasingly significant factor in assessing and managing risks and vulnerabilities to extreme events. Over the past 50 years, much of the U.S. experienced increases in prolonged periods of excessively high temperatures, heavy precipitation, and, in some regions, severe floods and droughts.³⁷ The best available scientific data indicates these trends will continue and will likely have further cascading effects on human health, infrastructure, and the economy.³⁸

Primary Impacts

The impacts of climate change will vary across the Nation, but the following are examples of critical anticipated shifts in the frequency, intensity, and/or geographic range of natural hazards:

- Increasing heavy precipitation events will contribute to flash floods and urban floods.³⁹
- Average global sea level has risen by approximately eight inches since reliable record keeping began in 1880 and is projected to rise another one to four feet by 2100.⁴⁰
- Western forests in the U.S. will be more frequently affected by large and intense fires.⁴¹
- The frequency and intensity of heat waves will continue to increase.⁴²
- Higher temperatures cause faster evaporation rates, which may lead to drought conditions even when there is no decrease in precipitation.⁴³
- Over the last three to five decades, the heaviest rainfall events have become heavier and more frequent,⁴⁴ and these are projected to continue in most of the U.S.;⁴⁵ and
- Although many contributing factors make hurricanes difficult to predict, most models project an overall increase in the frequency of the strongest (Category 4 and 5) hurricanes by the end of the century.⁴⁶

Due to the complexity of climatological forecasting and the myriad anticipated impacts, some uncertainty remains about the magnitude and types of future changes to natural hazards. It is clear, however, that increasing frequency, intensity, and impacts of hazards due to climate

³⁷ NCA3 Highlights,” *Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment: Highlights*” <http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/Highlights>, Pg. 24

³⁸ NCA3 Highlights, Pgs. 12–14

³⁹ U.S. Third National Climate Assessment (NCA3), “*Climate Change Impacts in the United States The Third National Climate Assessment*,” U.S. Global Change Research Program, May 2014 <http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report>, Pg. 75

⁴⁰ NCA3, Pg. 66

⁴¹ NCA3, Pg. 192

⁴² NCA3, Pg. 64

⁴³ NCA3 Highlights, Pg. 24

⁴⁴ NCA3 Highlights, Pg. 25

⁴⁵ NCA3, Pg. 37

⁴⁶ NCA3, Pg. 41

change may render historical risk profiles outdated, and, therefore, they may no longer be an adequate measure for identifying and addressing future risks.

Secondary Impacts

As climate change alters the natural hazard risk environment, secondary risk and vulnerability effects are likely. The social and health-related impacts of climate change will likely be more concentrated in communities already facing economic or health-related challenges.⁴⁷

Agricultural pressures associated with climate change may lead to rising food prices,⁴⁸ which in turn can contribute to food insecurity. More frequent heat waves, worsening air quality, and more favorable growing conditions for common allergens may increase chronic heat-, respiratory-, and allergy-related conditions.⁴⁹

Future climate extremes may strain the reliability of critical infrastructure and availability of key resources, forcing the whole community to reconsider current and future resource needs.

Degraded natural barriers such as salt marshes, reefs, mangrove forests, and barrier islands have a reduced capacity to buffer coastal infrastructure from extreme events like floods and storms.

Even outside of coastal areas, climate change is expected to have a profound impact on the Nation's infrastructure, including a reduction in the reliability and capacity of transportation infrastructure and systems,⁵⁰ which are critical to lifesaving response efforts and disaster recovery.

The economic ramifications of climate change can affect resources and response capabilities at all levels of government. There has been a sizeable upward trend in the number of storm events causing large financial and other losses in the U.S.,⁵¹ though this trend can be attributed to increases in property values at risk in addition to increases in storm activity. In addition to a rising economic toll of disaster response, the underlying drivers of local economies could be significantly altered as climate zones suitable for agricultural production and climate-driven tourism shift.⁵² Such economic impacts have the potential to ripple across the Nation. For example, ports are deeply interconnected with inland areas through the goods imported and exported each year.⁵³ Their exposure to sea level rise is not just a concern for coastal communities, but has far-reaching implications for the Nation's economy as a whole.

Net Impacts

Climate change is expected to act as a hazard multiplier for many current threats and hazards, and in some cases will introduce new hazards to communities. The effects of climate change may cascade into a number of areas that are not directly weather related, affecting population shifts, public health, resources, and local economies. In other words, although a changing climate is not a threat or hazard unto itself, its impacts should be considered throughout risk analyses and

⁴⁷ NCA3 Pgs. 228–229

⁴⁸ NCA3, Pg. 228

⁴⁹ NCA3, Pg. 222

⁵⁰ NCA3 Highlights, Pg. 40

⁵¹ NCA3, Pg. 65

⁵² NCA3. Pgs. 334–339

⁵³ NCA3, Pg. 590

future decision making processes in all five mission areas—Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.

Threats and Hazards of Greatest Concern by Whole Community Partners

The SNRA also supports the integration of other risk assessment efforts, including the THIRA processes occurring at multiple jurisdictional levels.⁵⁴ THIRAs from 2012 through 2014 were reviewed to identify the threats and hazards of greatest concern to urban areas, states, territories, and tribes across the Nation. The 2014 THIRA analysis highlighted five threats and hazards frequently selected by a wide range of urban areas, states, tribal nations, and territories: Flood, Utility Interruption, Hazmat Release—Chemical, Cyber Attack, and Explosive Devices (see Figure 1). Flood, the most frequently identified hazard, was included by 64 percent of all contributing jurisdictions as a hazard of greatest concern.




Figure 1: Most Frequently Identified Threats and Hazards in 2014 Jurisdictional THIRAs⁵⁵

Year-over-year analysis indicates that the top five threats and hazards of greatest concern across jurisdictions remained largely consistent from 2012 through 2014, though in a slightly different order each year. In addition to the top five, other frequently identified threats and hazards throughout the three THIRA iterations include transportation accidents, human pandemic, and earthquakes. This reinforces that jurisdictions' perception of risk has not changed much since 2012. The 2015 SNRA participants reviewed this data to identify potential national-level risks not previously identified in the 2011 SNRA.

Figure 2 depicts the top 25 threats and hazards identified by all reporting jurisdictions across all groups (i.e., natural, technological, and human-caused) by year for 2012 and 2013.

⁵⁴ The THIRA process is completed by urban areas, states, tribal nations, territories, and the FEMA Regions.

⁵⁵ While these findings do show trends across several different perspectives, they are not intended to create a ranking of threats and hazards. Likewise, they are not intended to be representative of all possible threats and hazards within the jurisdictions, as many jurisdictions utilize varying approaches to selecting threats and hazards for inclusion in their THIRAs.




Figure 2: Top 25 Most Frequently Identified Threats and Hazards of Concern by Jurisdictions in 2012 and 2013⁵⁸

⁵⁶ While these findings do show trends across several different perspectives, they are not intended to create a ranking of threats and hazards. Likewise, they are not intended to be representative of all possible threats and hazards within the jurisdictions, as many jurisdictions utilize varying approaches to selecting threats and hazards for inclusion in their THIRAs.

Final Notes

The SNRA process provides a broad analysis of the risks from the varied threats and hazards faced by the Nation. This assessment finds that a wide range of threats and hazards pose a significant threat to the Nation, affirming the need for an all-threats/hazards, capability-based approach to preparedness. The SNRA is designed to inform prioritization and tradeoff decisions by enabling the analysis of which capabilities are likely to have an impact at reducing identified high-risk events. Using the SNRA, the whole community can better understand which scenarios are more likely to impact them, what the consequences would be, and what risks merit special attention.

The SNRA process will continue to be implemented in support of the National Preparedness Goal, the National Preparedness System, and the all-hazards, capability-based planning approach to national risk management. Although the development and update of the SNRA are important steps, further analysis through the implementation of regional- and community-level risk assessments will help communities better understand their risks and form a foundation for their own security and resilience. The Nation's preparedness is dependent on whole community partners understanding the risks they face across all levels of government. In conjunction with local, regional/metropolitan state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and Federal partners, the SNRA process will be further implemented and refined in order to serve as a unifying national risk profile helping to facilitate preparedness efforts across the Nation.



Comparative Risk

Strategic National Risk Assessment
Comparative Analysis

Comparative Analysis

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Consolidated technical appendices

The Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) was designed, led, and executed in 2011 by the DHS Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA), on behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security, to inform the development of the National Preparedness Goal (Goal). The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) updated the SNRA in 2015 in support of Goal revision efforts and its statutory mission. The Federal interagency, the National Labs, scholars from the U.S. risk technical community, and experts, analysts, and leaders from all parts of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supported and contributed to these efforts.

The remaining three parts of this document consolidate into one volume those parts of the 2011-2015 unclassified technical documentation of the SNRA that directly informed the June 2015 SNRA Findings and the revised Goal. Four qualitative risk summary sheets from 2011, not otherwise reproduced in the consolidated documentation, are also included.

Executive Summary

This document highlights unclassified findings from the Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) and provides technical documentation of its data sources and methodology.

- The SNRA was developed in support of Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8 and the implementation of the risk-based, all-hazards strategy for national preparedness directed by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA).
- PPD-8 directs national preparedness to be based on core capabilities supporting “the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.”

Classified findings regarding the CBRN adversarial events are not provided in the following pages. For these findings, please see the classified SNRA Technical Report.¹

Analytic Approach

The comparative methodology of the SNRA is built on the estimation of frequencies and impacts of a set of national-level events with the potential to test the Nation’s preparedness and responds specifically to the question: *With what frequency is it estimated that an event will occur and what are the impacts of an event if it does occur?* Annualized loss estimates, constructed by multiplying these estimates of frequency and impact, are used as a measure of risk.

Key Findings

The assessment finds that a wide range of threats and hazards pose a significant risk to the Nation, affirming the need for an all-threats/hazards, capability-based approach to preparedness planning. Many events are estimated to have the potential to happen more than once every 10 years, meaning that it is likely that the Nation’s preparedness will be tested in this decade.


Of the natural hazard and accidental events, as shown in Table 1 below, two threat/hazard events in the SNRA stand out for their generally high risk profiles across many impact categories: *pandemic influenza outbreaks* and *hurricanes*.

- Human pandemic influenza is assessed to dominate the fatality and injury/illness risk of all the non-adversarial events in the SNRA. *The pandemic influenza scenario assessed in the SNRA has more fatality risk and injury/illness risk, at the best estimate, than every other measured natural-hazard or accidental event in the SNRA combined.*
- The direct economic and social displacement risks of *space weather* may also rank with pandemics and hurricanes, but these risks are highly uncertain.

There is a substantial amount of uncertainty concerning the likelihood, and in some cases the impacts, of the threats and hazards examined in the SNRA.

Critical areas for future study in the SNRA include the risk associated with cyber events and a number of additional hazards identified by SNRA participants. Data and resource limitations prevented the risk of these events from being assessed quantitatively in the SNRA.

¹ All frequency estimates and fatality, injury/illness, economic, and top level (low/best/high) psychological distress estimates for the chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) events are classified at the SECRET or SECRET//NOFORN level. All other data, including all social displacement and environmental impact estimates, are unclassified without caveats.

Table 1: Comparative Risk in the SNRA - Non-CBRN Attack Events

Insufficient quantitative data to support comparisons to other events		Risk estimates are classified	
	Antibiotic Resistance		Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)
	Emerging Infectious Disease (non-Influenza)		Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)
	Heat Wave		Chemical/Biological Food Terrorism Attack
	Plant Disease		Nuclear Terrorism Attack
	Tsunami		Radiological Terrorism Attack
	Volcanic Eruption		
	Industrial Accident (Fire/Explosion)		
	Migrant Surge/Mass Migration		
	Oil Spill		
	Pipeline Failure		
	Cyber Attacks		

Table 2: Threats and Hazards Assessed in the SNRA

	Threat/Hazard	Threat/Hazard Description
Natural	Animal Disease Outbreak	An unintentional introduction of the foot-and-mouth disease virus into the domestic livestock population in a U.S. state
	Drought	A drought occurs in the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$1 billion
	Earthquake	An earthquake occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 million
	Flood	A flood occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 million
	Human Pandemic Outbreak	A severe outbreak of pandemic influenza with a 25 percent gross clinical attack rate and spreads across the U.S. populace
	Hurricane	A tropical storm or hurricane impacts the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses of greater than \$100 million
	Space Weather	The sun emits bursts of electromagnetic radiation and energetic particles causing utility outages and damage to infrastructure in the U.S., resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$1 billion
	Tornado	A single tornado or a tornado outbreak occurs in the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 million
	Wildfire	A wildfire occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 million
	Winter Storm	A winter storm event occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses of \$1 billion or greater
Technological/ Accidental	Biological Food Contamination	Accidental conditions where introduction of a biological agent (e.g., <i>Salmonella</i> , <i>E. coli</i> , botulinum toxin) into the food supply results in 100 hospitalizations or greater and a multi-state response
	Chemical Substance Spill or Release	Accidental conditions where a release of a large volume of a chemical acutely toxic to human beings (a toxic inhalation hazard, or TIH) from a chemical plant, storage facility, or transportation mode results in either one or more offsite fatalities, or one or more fatalities (either on- or offsite) with offsite evacuations/shelter-in-place
	Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)	Accidental conditions where a fire or an explosion of combustible or flammable substances transported by rail occurs within the U.S., resulting in one fatality or greater
	Dam Failure	Accidental conditions where dam failure and inundation in the U.S. results in one fatality or greater
	Radiological Substance Release	Accidental conditions where reactor core damage in the U.S. causes release of radiation
	Transportation System Failure	Accidental conditions where a bridge or tunnel failure occurs within the U.S., resulting in one fatality or greater
Adversarial/ Human-Caused	Aircraft as a Weapon	A hostile non-state actor(s) crashes a commercial or general aviation aircraft into a physical target within the U.S. causing at least one fatality or injury other than or in addition to the attacker(s), in an act characterized as terrorist in nature by the U.S. Government
	Armed Assault	A hostile non-state actor(s) uses assault tactics to conduct strikes on vulnerable target(s) within the U.S. resulting in at least one fatality or injury other than or in addition to the attacker(s), in an act characterized as terrorist in nature by the U.S. Government
	Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and releases a biological agent against an outdoor, indoor, or water target, directed at a concentration of people within the U.S.
	Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and disperses a biological or chemical agent into food supplies within the U.S. supply chain
	Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and releases a chemical agent against an outdoor, indoor, or water target, directed at a concentration of people using an aerosol, ingestion, or dermal route of exposure
	Explosives Terrorism Attack	An act of terrorism using one or more explosive or incendiary devices against people or property within the U.S.
	Nuclear Terrorism Attack	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires an improvised nuclear weapon through manufacture from fissile material, purchase, or theft, and detonates it within a major U.S. population center
	Physical Attack on the Power Grid	A malicious actor causes physical damage to an aspect of the power grid resulting in a loss of power in one or more metropolitan areas for three or more hours
	Radiological Terrorism Attack	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires radiological materials and disperses them through explosive or other means (e.g., a radiological dispersal device or RDD) or creates a radiation exposure device (RED)

Table 3: SNRA Data Sources

Threat/Hazard	Frequency	Fatalities and Injuries/Illnesses	Direct Economic Loss	Social Displacement
Animal Disease	USDA Economic Research Service modeling & DHS/OHA and DHS/S&T subject matter expertise			SME estimates via DHS Centers of Excellence
Drought	Historic data compiled from NOAA National Climactic Data Center (NCDC)			SNRA project team assumption of 0 displaced
Earthquake	Historic data compiled from the Center for Science and Technology Policy Research at University of Colorado-Boulder & FEMA HAZUS modeling			Historic data from EM-DAT disaster database
Flood	Historic data compiled from NOAA National Climactic Data Center (NCDC) and FEMA HAZUS modeling			Historic data from EM-DAT disaster database
Human Pandemic Outbreak	CDC analysis of historic record	CDC subject matter expertise	SNRA project analysis using CDC modeling	SNRA project team assumption of 0 displaced
Hurricane	Historic data compiled from NOAA, the Center for Science and Technology Policy Research at University of Colorado-Boulder & FEMA HAZUS modeling			Historic data from EM-DAT disaster database
Space Weather	Expert estimates from the literature (range)	Epidemiological studies of 2003 East Coast Blackout	Expert estimates from the literature (range)	SME estimates via DHS Centers of Excellence
Tornado	Historic data compiled from the NOAA/National Weather Service (NWS) Storm Prediction Center (SPC)			Not assessed
Wildfire	Historic data compiled from Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States (SHELDUS) – University of South Carolina			Historic data from EM-DAT disaster database
Winter Storm	Historic data compiled from NOAA National Climactic Data Center (NCDC)			Not assessed
Biological Food Contamination	CDC Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD) and FDA / USDA subject matter expertise	Open source historic examples	SME estimates via DHS Centers of Excellence	
Chemical Substance Spill or Release	DOT Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and EPA Risk Management Program (RMP) incident databases			
Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)	DOT Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) incident database			
Dam Failure	Historic data compiled by DHS Dams Sector	U.S. Bureau of Reclamation modeling	SME estimates via DHS Centers of Excellence	
Radiological Substance Release	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license renewal applications		SME estimates via DHS Centers of Excellence	
Transportation System Failure	Historic data compiled by Structures Group, Cambridge University Department of Engineering		SNRA project team assumption of 0 displaced	
CBRN Terrorism Attacks	DHS/S&T Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA)		SME estimates via DHS Centers of Excellence	
Armed Assault	Historic data published by FBI	SNRA project team analysis based upon historic data	SNRA project team assumption of 0 displaced	
Aircraft-as-a-Weapon	Historic data published by FBI	Open source historic data (Aircraft impacts)	Historic data and insurance models	Open source historic data
Explosives Terrorism Attack	Historic data published by FBI	Open source historic data	Insurance models and SNRA project team analysis	Open source historic data
Physical Attack on the Power Grid	Published power industry incident reports	Epidemiological studies of 2003 East Coast Blackout	DHS/NPPD analysis for SNRA project	Not assessed for all estimates
Impact Type	Impact Specific Subject Matter Expert Data Sources (All Provided 2011)			
Social Displacement	University of Maryland, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism & Responses to Terrorism (START) (2011) Institute for Alternative Futures (2011) University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, Center for Biosecurity (2011)			
Psychological Distress	National Center for Disaster Mental Health Research (2011) University of California-Irvine, Department of Psychology and Social Behavior (2011) Carnegie Mellon University, Dept. of Social & Decision Sciences, Dept. of Engineering & Public Policy (2011) University of Maryland, START (2011) DHS/S&T Human Factors Division (2011) ²			
Environmental Impacts	Environmental Protection Agency (2011)			

² DHS/S&T Resilient Systems Division (RSD) is the organizational successor to Human Factors Division. The 2015 SNRA did not perform new elicitations for the psychological distress metric.

Overview

The Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) was conducted to inform the national risk-based, all-hazards strategy for preparedness directed by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) and Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8): National Preparedness.

- PKEMRA directs the Administrator, FEMA to “develop and coordinate the implementation of a risk-based, all-hazards strategy for preparedness that builds those common capabilities necessary to respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters while also building the unique capabilities necessary to respond to specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk³ to our Nation.”
- PPD-8 directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a National Preparedness Goal (Goal) to identify the core capabilities needed for the “systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.”

On behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security, the DHS Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) designed and executed a strategic national risk assessment to inform the 2011 development of the Goal and the core capabilities. FEMA National Integration Center (NIC), PPD-8 Program Executive Office (PEO), updated the SNRA in 2015 to inform the refresh of the Goal and associated planning frameworks. The Federal interagency, the National Labs, scholars from the U.S. risk technical community, and experts, analysts, and leaders from all parts of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supported and contributed to these efforts.

The assessment was used:

- To identify high risk factors that supported development of the core capabilities and capability targets in the National Preparedness Goal;
- To support the development of collaborative thinking about strategic needs across prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery requirements; and
- To promote the ability for all levels of government to share common understanding and awareness of national threats and hazards and resulting risks so that they are ready to act and can do so independently but collaboratively.

The subsequent pages provide an overview of the findings and the analytic approach used to conduct the SNRA. It should be emphasized, however, that although the SNRA is a significant step toward the establishment of a national risk baseline, it contains data limitations and assumptions that will require additional study, review, and revision as the National Preparedness System is further developed. These limitations are discussed below, and future iterations of the assessment are expected to reflect an enhanced methodology and improved data sets.

Classified findings regarding the CBRN events are not provided in the following pages. For these findings, please see the classified SNRA Technical Report.⁴

³ The DHS Lexicon defines risk as the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences [impacts]. Available from <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexicon-2010.pdf>.

⁴ All frequency estimates for the adversarial events and fatality, injury/illness, economic, and top level (low/best/high) psychological distress estimates for the chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) events are classified at the SECRET or SECRET//NOFORN level. All other data, including all social displacement and environmental impact estimates, are unclassified without caveats.

SNRA Comparative Analysis Scope

To inform homeland security preparedness and resilience activities, the SNRA evaluated the risk from known threats and hazards that have the potential to test the Nation's preparedness.

SNRA participants—including Federal agencies, DHS Components, and the intelligence community, among others—developed a list of national-level events corresponding to these threats and hazards (Table 2 above) for assessment in the SNRA. The events are grouped into three categories: 1) natural hazards; 2) technological/accidental hazards; and 3) adversarial, human-caused threats/hazards.

For the purposes of the assessment, DHS analysts identified thresholds of impact necessary to create a national-level event. These thresholds were informed by subject matter expertise and available data, and are shown in Table 2 of this report.

- For some events, economic impacts were used as thresholds, while for others, fatalities or injuries/illnesses were deemed more appropriate as the threshold to determine a national-level incident.
- In no case, however, were economic and casualty thresholds treated as equivalent to one another (i.e. dollar values were not assigned to fatalities).

Event descriptions in Table 2 that do not explicitly identify a threshold signify that no minimum impact threshold was employed. This allows the assessment to include events for which the psychological impact of an event could cause it to become a national-level event even though it may result in a low number of casualties or a small economic loss.

With the exception of climate change, only events having both a distinct beginning and end and an explicit nexus to homeland security missions were included. This approach excluded:

- Persistent, steady-state risks such as border violations and drug trafficking which fall within the homeland security mission space, but which do not have a defined beginning and end point;
- Chronic societal concerns, which can represent a large fraction of fatality, economic, and other risks for an average American, such as cancer or car accidents, but which are generally not related to national preparedness;
- Political, economic, environmental, and societal trends that may contribute to a changing risk environment but are not related to national preparedness (e.g. economic trends). These trends will be important to include in future iterations of a national risk assessment, however.

The SNRA examines climate change, and certain drivers and evolving threats, as they are relevant to shaping the national preparedness risk space of the future. These are presented in Appendices M-O.

Risk management is essential for homeland security leaders in prioritizing competing requirements and enabling comprehensive approaches to measure performance and detail progress.

DHS Risk Management Fundamentals, 2011

The SNRA participants identified the 25 events listed in Table 2 as those with the potential to pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation. These form the analytic basis of the SNRA.

Table 2 is not a complete list of risks that exist. SNRA participants identified 12 additional threats and hazards which could not be comparatively assessed in the 2011-15 SNRA cycle, including ten which were treated qualitatively (Table 5) and two which cut across other SNRA hazard categories (Table 6). These will be assessed in follow-on SNRA project work in support of the National Preparedness System.

Additional natural, technological/accidental, or human-caused hazards can also pose a risk to jurisdictions across the country and should be considered, as appropriate, in preparedness planning. Non-influenza diseases with pandemic potential and other animal diseases should also be considered. In addition, assessment participants identified a number of events for possible inclusion in future iterations of the SNRA, including utility interruptions more generally than electric power (gas, telecommunications and water); electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) attacks; explosives and other conventional attacks caused by non-terrorist actors, and threats of explosive attacks; and terrorist attacks using drones.

New & Updated National-Level Risks in 2015

The 2015 SNRA project used the methodology developed in 2011 with minimal modifications in order to maintain comparability of new and revised material with the risks researched in 2011.

- SNRA 2015 partners reviewed the publicly disseminated findings from the 2011 SNRA⁵ for accuracy and relevancy. The review focused on updating data for existing threats and hazards that would substantially change the 2011 public findings, and identifying new national-level risks.
- The 2015 project team analyzed quantitative data to update existing threat and hazard data and associated 2011 SNRA findings, and facilitated the qualitative identification of new threats and hazards.

New threats and hazards were identified from several sources, including events identified but not pursued in 2011, events identified for the 2012-2013 Homeland Security National Risk Characterization (HSNRC),⁶ foreign national risk assessments, the National Preparedness Reports and associated data calls, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) data, and other data sets as appropriate.

- Comparatively assessed risks new to the SNRA included tornadoes (assessed in 2012), combustible/flammable (rail) cargo accidents, physical attacks on the electric grid, drought, winter storm, and transportation systems failure.
- Updated comparative assessments included human pandemic (new CDC data), space weather (qualitatively treated in 2011), and aircraft-as-a-weapon, armed assault, and explosives terrorism attacks (unclassified open-source analyses replacing classified analyses).

The complete list of updated and new risks identified by SNRA partners in 2015 is provided in Table 4 below.

⁵ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011, December). The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach toward a Secure and Resilient Nation (public summary). At <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.pdf>.

⁶ The HSNRC was a collaborative effort of the DHS analytic enterprise to expand the 2011 SNRA risk knowledge base to additional threats and hazards, and to adapt the SNRA to the information needs of DHS strategic planning.

Table 4: New and Updated National-Level Risks for 2015

Quantitatively Assessed Threats and Hazards		Qualitative Narratives Supporting Threat and Hazard Identification
	Drought*	Antibiotic Resistance*
	Human Pandemic Outbreak***	Emerging Infectious Disease (non-Influenza)*
	Space Weather*** ⁷	Heat Wave*
	Tornado**	Plant Disease*
	Winter Storm*	Industrial Accident (Fire/Explosion)*
	Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)*	Migrant Surge/Mass Migration*
	Transportation Systems Failure*	Oil Spill*
	Aircraft as a Weapon*** ⁸	Pipeline Failure*
	Armed Assault*** ⁹	Cyber Attacks [†]
	Explosives Terrorism Attack*** ¹⁰	Electric Grid Failure (Natural/Accidental) (Cross-Cutting)*
	Physical Attack on the Power Grid*	Urban Fire/Urban Conflagration (Cross-Cutting)*
		Evolving Threats*
		Climate Change*

* New in SNRA 2015

*** Revised in SNRA 2015

a New quantitative analysis; previously qualitative

** New in SNRA 2015: Added 2012

† Revised taxonomy

b New unclassified analysis; previously classified

⁷ Previously qualitative.⁸ New unclassified analysis; previously classified.⁹ New unclassified analysis; previously classified.¹⁰ New unclassified analysis; previously classified.

Analytic Approach

The SNRA drew data and information from a variety of sources, including existing U.S. Government models and assessments, historical records, structured analysis, and judgments of experts from different disciplines. The information was used to assess the risk of identified incidents as a function of frequency¹¹ and impacts.¹² More specifically, the SNRA asks:

- With what frequency is it estimated that an event will occur?
- What are the impacts of the event(s) if it does occur?

Annualized loss estimates, constructed by multiplying these estimates of frequency and impact, are a straightforward measure of risk.¹³ This annualized loss approach was chosen because it allowed a straightforward construction of risk for all events, even those for which minimal data existed.

A quantitative risk assessment methodology is a set of methods, principles, or rules for assessing risks based on the use of numbers where the meanings and proportionality of values are maintained inside and outside the context of the assessment.

'Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodology', DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010

Measures of Risk

Homeland security hazards are dissimilar in important ways. Some hazards, such as natural disasters, have a long historical record. Others, including terrorist attacks, have a limited or nonexistent historical record and are initiated by adaptive adversaries who have the ability to respond to our defensive posture. Still other hazards, such as technological accidents, may have been subject to multi-jurisdictional regulations aimed at risk reduction for many years, but are only recently being analyzed in the context of national preparedness. In addition, these disparate types of hazards often have varied and unexpected impacts on society and security when they do occur.

Different impacts can result from homeland security hazards, including health and safety, economic, environmental, and social impacts. Indeed, a recent National Research Council (NRC) Report¹⁴ recommended that DHS risk assessments “should consider a full range of public health, safety, social, psychological, economic, political, and strategic outcomes.” An assessment using only some of these impacts (e.g., solely those easy to quantify) would not reflect the full impact on the U.S. and resulting comparisons across hazards would be biased and less informative.

The NRC’s Review recommended against aggregating these impacts (and risks) into a single metric in a strategic assessment that includes both terrorism and natural disasters, given the current capabilities of risk science. In accordance with the NRC’s recommendation, the

¹¹ Frequency was used in the SNRA to capture likelihood because some events have the potential to occur more than once a year. Frequency is defined in the DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010 edition, as the “number of occurrences of an event per defined period of time or number of trials.”

¹² The term “impact” is used in the 2015 SNRA synonymously with the term “consequence”, used in the 2011 iteration. Consequence is defined in the DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010 edition, as the “effect of an event, incident, or occurrence.”

¹³ Risk is defined in the DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010 edition, as the “potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and associated consequences.”

¹⁴ National Research Council (2010). *Review of the Department of Homeland Security's approach to risk analysis*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

methodology reports each type of risk separately, as many strategic decisions can be informed without aggregation. Instead, the assessment treated impact categories differently and allows stakeholders in the National Preparedness System to apply their own expert judgments to the findings and the implications of those findings on core capability targets.

The SNRA examined the risks associated with six categories of harm: loss of life, injuries and illnesses, direct economic costs, social displacement, psychological distress, and environmental impact. Each impact, when combined with the frequency of the threat/hazard event, produces a different type of risk, such as fatality risk, injury and illness risk, and direct economic risk. This multi-faceted view of potential impacts draws attention to the broad and often interdependent effects of incidents that require whole-of-community preparation and cooperation across the homeland security enterprise. For instance, community resilience relates to both mitigating human and economic impacts and addressing the psychological and social distress caused by the incident within the community. Similarly, other types of resilience involve withstanding environmental and infrastructure degradations to ensure essential services continue to be delivered.

The SNRA relied on the best available quantitative estimates of frequency and impacts from existing Government models and assessments, peer-reviewed literature, and expert judgment. Where sufficient quantitative information was not available or additional research is warranted, events were assessed semi-quantitatively or qualitatively. The estimates of the frequency and impacts for each of the events were compared where appropriate.

The SNRA used the following approaches to estimate frequency and impact:

Frequency

In order to apply a consistent methodology across all SNRA event types, frequency was selected as a metric for the likelihood of event occurrence. Frequency was estimated as the potential number of occurrences or attacks, per year, which met or exceeded the established threshold¹⁵ for the event. For the majority of events, frequency estimates were based on statistical analysis of historic data, or directly from historical data where extensive records were available.¹⁶ For the 2015 SNRA, these included new unclassified analyses of the conventional (non-CBRN and non-cyber) terrorist attack events of the 2011 SNRA, together with a new adversarial event, Physical Attack on the Power Grid. Chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) adversarial/human-caused frequencies were estimated primarily using elicitation from subject matter experts.¹⁷

Frequency ranges included in the SNRA for adversarial/human-caused events are estimates of the frequency of successful attacks. Where subject matter expert judgment was used to determine frequency of successful attacks, adversary intent and capability were considered implicitly by the

¹⁵ When interpreting the frequency results, it is important to consider that the frequency data in the SNRA is directly related to the threshold included in each national-level event definition. For example, the results for floods indicate that floods causing greater than \$100 million in direct economic losses are estimated to occur with a frequency between once every two years and ten times per year, with a best estimate of four times per year.

¹⁶ SNRA analysts examined the data sets for a particular event and identified how many incidents within the scope of the event occurred at or above the established threshold per year.

¹⁷ Subject matter expert (SME) elicitation was a component of modeling frequency in the Terrorism Risk Assessments, the DHS/Directorate of Science & Technology (S&T) models leveraged for the classified CBRN risk information in the SNRA. The outputs from these models were converted to equivalent units of successful events per year for comparison to the frequencies of natural and technological hazards drawn from the historical record.

SME estimation of the frequency of rare, adversarial/human-caused events is challenging, and SME frequency judgments in the SNRA reflect significant uncertainty. As with all data in the SNRA, these SME frequency judgments should be interpreted as order of magnitude estimates for the purposes of comparison.

experts, but were not explicitly quantified or characterized. Attack initiations may occur with higher frequency than the ranges provided.

Fatalities

For events that have occurred in the past, the expected number of fatalities was estimated primarily from the historical record. For events that have never occurred (primarily in terrorism), impacts were estimated using data from previous government risk assessments, which rely on models and simulations.

Injuries and Illnesses

Injuries and illnesses were estimated similarly to fatalities. However, this category mixed permanent debilitating injuries (such as those resulting from chemical accidents) with temporary illnesses (such as those resulting from pandemic influenza). Therefore, the injury and illness impacts should be considered in context with the types of injuries and illnesses likely to result from each hazard.

Direct Economic Loss

Direct economic losses were estimated similarly to fatalities. Direct economic losses were defined to include decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction costs, lost spending due to fatalities, medical costs, and business interruptions. Due to constraints on the time available to execute the SNRA and the community's lack of a broadly agreed upon method for calculating indirect and induced economic impacts, these impacts, which are often larger than direct losses, are not included in this assessment.

- Indirect economic impacts include costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the industries impacted by the direct costs. Induced costs include those incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries.
- Induced costs can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.

Attempts were made to assess direct economic losses as comparably as possible across the range of event types in the SNRA; however, data availability made this challenging.

- For example, direct economic losses from certain natural hazards (including wildfires and floods) primarily reflect property and crop losses only, as business interruption estimates were not available. However, property/crop losses were judged to be the dominant component of the direct economic impacts for these events and therefore to be representative of the direct losses, within the precision of the SNRA.
- Further, some sources of direct economic impact data for the SNRA, such as DHS/S&T's 2011 Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA), include some types of substitution effects and other offsetting activity in their reported estimates of the net direct economic impacts from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism attacks. Such substitution effects would be expected to reduce the reported estimates for events for

which they represented a significant contribution in the calculation of direct economic loss relative to events for which they did not.

The comparability of economic impact estimates in the SNRA is an important area for future study.

Social Displacement

The number of people forced to leave their home for a period of two days or longer was used as a measure of social displacement. Estimates of displacement were obtained from open source social science literature and emergency management databases for historical events and from relevant models for events with limited historic precedence. The measure of social displacement used in the SNRA does not capture the significant differences between short-term evacuation and long-term permanent relocation, which is a limitation of the current analysis.¹⁸

Psychological Distress

Experts in the psychosocial impacts of disasters consulted for the SNRA recommended that *significant and/or prolonged psychological distress* caused by national-level events would be the most meaningful psychological metric for strategic capabilities planning and national preparedness. These experts recommended a methodology to assess significant distress which reflected empirical findings indicating that the psychological impacts of a disaster may follow from the other types of impacts being assessed in the SNRA. Specifically, the experts recommended a consequence index¹⁹ which was a function of the SNRA estimates for deaths, injuries, and displacement related to each national-level event. This approach represents the first attempt to include psychological impacts in a DHS strategic, national-level risk assessment. Additional analysis is required to verify and validate the approach used, and experts consulted about psychological impacts emphasized caution in the application of the SNRA's measure of psychological distress and the need for additional research.²⁰

Environmental Impact

For the purposes of the SNRA, environmental risk was defined as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.²¹ Environmental effects within urban areas and all human health effects were not included within the scope of this environmental risk assessment, because these impacts were already addressed separately in the other impact analyses for the SNRA. In 2011, an *ad hoc* group of experts from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) judged the relative environmental impact of each national-level event by selecting one of four categories of severity: *de minimis* (or minimal),

¹⁸ The SNRA measure also does not make a distinction between voluntary or involuntary displacement, displacement to emergency shelters as opposed to friends, relatives, or hotels, or displacement within as opposed to outside of a hazard-affected area. These distinctions can be of equal or greater importance to emergency managers, community planners, or other personnel or organizations with mass care planning responsibilities.

¹⁹ The consequence index used in the SNRA for psychological distress is analogous to a risk index, an approach which allows multiple factors which affect the level of risk to be incorporated into a single numerical score for the level of risk. For more information, see: International Standards Organization (2009). *Risk management – risk assessment techniques* (ISO 31010).

²⁰ The Department of Homeland Security and its partner organizations leveraged previously funded social and behavioral science research to better understand how to anticipate, prepare for, counteract, and mitigate the effects of terrorist acts, natural disasters, and technological accidents. Additional research is required to further explore psychosocial factors that enable resilience and affect recovery in individuals, organizations, communities, and at the societal level.

²¹ This definition is aligned with the EPA's definition of environmental risk. Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2012). Terminology Services. Retrieved from <http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAters/terms.html>.

low, moderate, and high. In doing so, the experts considered the areal extent of the impact, the potential for adverse consequences, and the severity of adverse consequences.²²

Documentation

All sources and estimates were documented to promote credibility, defensibility, and transparency within the assessment. Additional information on data sources and methods for frequency and impacts is available in the appendices of this document.

Interpretation of SNRA Results

The targeted precision of the SNRA comparative analysis is an order-of-magnitude. The results of an order-of-magnitude estimate are intended to be accurate only within a factor of 10, a level of precision which is often sufficient to inform strategic decisions. Scientists and engineers often use order-of-magnitude estimates to quickly develop an understanding of the main factors and relationships in a system before undertaking a more detailed study. This level of precision is particularly appropriate to strategic all-hazard risk assessments, since the frequencies and impacts of the hazards considered differ by many orders-of-magnitude. In many cases, available information regarding a particular hazard was more precise than an order of magnitude, and this higher-fidelity information was retained in the SNRA.

Uncertainty in frequency and impacts was explicitly included in the analysis by representing low and high bounds in addition to the best estimates. Examples of sources of uncertainty include incomplete knowledge of adversary capabilities and intent, uncertainty in the effectiveness of countermeasures, variability in possible event severity and location, or lack of historical precedence.

The SNRA captures uncertainty in various ways, depending on the data source. For frequencies derived from the historical record, upper and lower bounds are estimated using the historic maximum number of occurrences per year and the longest time gap between historic occurrences. For frequencies derived from expert elicitation, the uncertainty is captured using structured techniques to determine the 5th and 95th percentile confidence intervals. For impacts derived from the historical record, upper and lower bounds are estimated from past events. For impacts derived from previous terrorism risk assessments, 5th and 95th percentile confidence intervals were estimated which take into account terrorist capabilities and preferences in weapon and target selection.

Given the uncertainty inherent in assessing risks at a national level and the lack of information about some of the events included, the SNRA was designed to avoid false precision. Instead, the assessment identifies only those differences in risk that are still significant despite the associated uncertainties. If a strategic decision depends on a precise separation of hazards of similar risk, a more detailed assessment would be needed.

Participants designed the SNRA to capture the best information the Nation has about homeland security risks to support the development of the National Preparedness Goal, while recognizing the limitations of conducting such analysis in a shortened time frame.

Limitations in addition to the ones discussed above include:

²² The resulting comments and rankings have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group.

- The SNRA is a *strategic* national risk assessment. As such, it does not present a full view of the risk facing local communities. To fully support preparedness planning, it is necessary to both consider national and regional risks, many of which differ from region to region. Further, it is important to recognize that frequencies represent possible occurrences anywhere in the Nation and do not occur with equivalent frequency in any individual location.
- Only events having both a distinct beginning and end and an explicit nexus to homeland security missions were included. This approach excluded persistent, steady-state risks such as drug trafficking, cancer, or car accidents which can represent a larger fraction of risk for individuals and communities than many events considered in the SNRA.
- The comparisons of relative risk between hazard events in the following pages and charts do not include many risks which meet the above criteria and which could significantly challenge national preparedness. These include hazards not included in the first iterations of the SNRA, such as ice storms and strategic nuclear attacks, and hazards identified in the SNRA which could not be treated quantitatively, such as cyber events and heat waves.²³ As the SNRA is intended to be used as a comparative treatment of risks within its scope, these absences must be kept in mind while reading or using its charts and findings.

SNRA 2015 Updates

The 2015 SNRA project used the methodology developed in 2011 with minimal modifications in order to maintain comparability of new and revised material with the risks researched in 2011.

Significant portions of the quantitative SNRA methodology, including but not limited to its measurement of psychological and social impacts, were newly developed for the 2011 SNRA and have not received full peer and stakeholder (public) review. For all but the specific uses for which the SNRA was commissioned in 2011 and 2015, the methodology, analysis, and findings of the SNRA remain provisional pending this review, and should be treated as such.

- Experts and agencies across the Federal Government contributing to the 2011 SNRA generally participated on the assumption that it was intended as a rapid initial survey for the specific and limited purpose of informing the 2011 National Preparedness Goal, which would be substantially revised and developed in subsequent iterations. Many of these rapidly developed contributions have been retained in the 2015 SNRA without revision due to factors unrelated to the original 2011 project plan.
- Because of this use beyond the purpose and timescale for which they were contributed, they should not be taken as reflective of the rigor of the work the original contributors would have provided for a work of greater permanence and wider impact than the 2011 SNRA as originally contemplated. **Their inclusion is the sole responsibility of the SNRA 2015 project team.**

For its comparative quantitative analysis, the 2015 SNRA retains the methodology developed for the 2011 SNRA without substantial modification.

- Many apparent limitations of this methodology were recognized by the Department at the time of the first iteration of the SNRA, and additional limitations have been identified from

²³ Chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attacks treated by the SNRA but leveraging classified data are also omitted from quantitative comparisons in this unclassified document. The classified SNRA documentation should be consulted for these adversarial risks, and their absence from the charts and comparisons of relative risk in the following pages should also be kept in mind.

reviews by Federal partners since 2011. However, these reviews have been limited to a very small portion of those partners with sufficient clearances to see the SNRA methodology, data, and findings as a whole. They do not include the U.S. risk technical community, or the vast majority of the SNRA's stakeholders and their elected representatives in Congress and state, local, tribal, and territorial governments.

- As critical review by these communities constitutes the basis of the legitimacy of the SNRA as a scientific assessment and as a national risk assessment, the SNRA project team determined that it did not have the scientific authority to make substantive changes to the 2011 methodology without the authoritative guidance of the feedback that only this broad review can provide.

The 2015 SNRA does include substantial new work. However, to the extent that any parts of this work may represent extensions to the 2011 methodology, they should be understood as proposals requiring broader review as opposed to unilaterally decided changes. In addition to the 2011 findings reaffirmed by 2015 PPD-8 and SNRA participants, findings derived from a number of approaches newly developed for the 2015 SNRA were used to inform the 2015 revisions to the Goal. For other purposes, however—as with all SNRA content and methods—this new work and the findings derived from it should be considered as provisional pending full peer and stakeholder review.

Comparative Risk - Detailed Findings

The results of the SNRA include a comparison of risks for potential incidents in terms of the likelihood (estimated as a frequency, i.e., number of events per year) and impacts of threats and hazards, as well as an analysis of the uncertainty associated with those incidents.

Risk is the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences.

'Risk', DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010

The assessment finds that a wide range of threats and hazards pose a significant risk to the Nation, affirming the need for an all threats/hazards, capability-based approach to preparedness planning. Many events are estimated to have the potential to happen more than once every 10 years, meaning that it is likely that the Nation's preparedness will be tested in this decade.

Key findings are discussed below.

High Risk Events

Of the non-CBRN attack²⁴ events, the threat/hazard events that are estimated to have generally high risk across many impact categories in the SNRA are pandemic influenza outbreaks and hurricanes (see Table 1 above). Space weather may pose comparable or greater risk to hurricanes on some impact axes, but this is highly uncertain.

To identify these high risk events, the results for each type of risk (estimated as an annualized loss) were considered independently and not aggregated. Events which were estimated to have high risk in each impact category, taking into account uncertainty and the quality of the underlying data, were identified. The events identified above are those which were identified as high risk across the majority of impact types.

- Pandemic influenza is estimated to be the highest risk event of all the non-adversarial events in the SNRA for fatality, illness/injury, and psychological distress risk, and is near the top for direct economic risk. At the best estimate, it has more fatality and injury/illness risk than every other natural hazard or accident in the SNRA combined. It is estimated to have no social displacement risk and relatively low environmental risk.
- Hurricanes are the highest direct economic risk at the best estimate, with the possible exception of space weather. Hurricanes also present the highest social displacement risks to the Nation of all the non-adversarial events included in the SNRA, coupled with relatively high psychological distress and environmental risks. Though not amongst the largest fatality and injury/illness risks within this set, hurricanes do carry some risk in these dimensions.
- The risks to the Nation posed by space weather are clouded with uncertainty.²⁵ However, the SNRA cannot rule out the possibility that space weather may rank with hurricanes in the top tier of direct economic and social displacement risks to the Nation.

²⁴ Classified data and analyses suitable for the comparison of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attack threats within the fully quantitative framework of the SNRA may be found in the classified SNRA Technical Report.

²⁵ Technical experts are strongly divided between experts who believe that a severe solar storm would most likely shut down the electric grid for days, and others who believe that it would most likely shut down large portions of the grid for months to years. As there is little middle ground between them, low and high impact estimates for this event in the SNRA represent not the endpoints of a range bounding a best estimate, but two alternate best estimates with the uncertainty being over which set of experts is correct. See the Space Weather risk summary sheet.

When considering the high risk events listed above, it is important to consider that many hazards have the potential to be catastrophic, and many additional natural and accidental hazards in the SNRA pose significant risk to the Nation.

It is also important to note that this identification process considered each type of risk equally (i.e., fatality and economic risks are equally important to flagging events as “high risk” in this process); however, decision-makers may weigh each type of risk differently, depending on their risk tolerances and the decision context. Further, risk is not the only consideration for capability development and prioritization, and events identified here as high risk are not necessarily those for which the risks are most easily or inexpensively mitigated; additional information about the cost of preparedness capabilities and their effectiveness at reducing risk is necessary for making resource allocation prioritization decisions.

Additional findings specific to each risk type are discussed below. Supplementary information about the data sources and methods used to estimate frequencies and impacts is provided in the event risk summary sheets.

Human Pandemic Influenza Outbreaks Present Risk to the U.S.

The most salient finding identified within the SNRA is the dominance of the fatality risk and injury/illness risk associated with a human pandemic influenza outbreak, when compared with every other natural and accidental hazard and non-CBRN²⁶ adversarial threat not only individually, but also in sum. The pandemic influenza outbreak event considered in the SNRA has more fatality risk and injury/illness risk, at the best estimate, than every other measured natural, unintentional, or non-CBRN adversarial hazard event in the SNRA combined.

- The SNRA considers a pandemic influenza outbreak with a 25% gross clinical attack rate²⁷ and a case fatality rate of up to 0.5%, similar to the 1957 flu pandemic.²⁸ A pandemic of this type is expected to occur once every 10 to 60 years and cause more than a hundred thousand fatalities. For comparison, deaths in the United States from annual seasonal influenza are on the order of 40,000 each year.

The pandemic influenza scenario and data sources were determined in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The pandemic scenario selected for the SNRA is moderate relative to the characteristics of recent influenza pandemics. For example, the three major influenza pandemics of the 20th century (1918, 1957, and 1968) had gross clinical attack rates (adjusted to current population) of 24% to 34% of the population; therefore, the 25% attack rate assumed for the SNRA scenario is conservative. Further, the 1957 flu pandemic had a relatively low case fatality rate of less than 0.5%, in contrast to the 1918 Spanish influenza which had a much higher case fatality rate of between 2.5% and 10%.²⁹

²⁶ Classified data and analyses suitable for the comparison of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attack threats within the fully quantitative framework of the SNRA may be found in the classified SNRA Technical Report.

²⁷ The gross clinical attack rate is the fraction of a population that becomes clinically ill from influenza during the pandemic.

²⁸ Reed et al (2013, January). Novel framework for assessing epidemiologic effects of influenza epidemics and pandemics; and Technical Appendix. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 19(1) 85–91, at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124_article; Technical Appendix at <http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124-techapp1>.

²⁹ Reed et al (2013), *op cit.*

Figure 1: Dominance of Human Pandemic Influenza Outbreak Over All Other Non-CBRN Hazards - Fatality Risk and Injury/Illness Risk




Figure 1 illustrates the relative amount of fatality risk and illness/injury risk, at the best estimate, associated with the SNRA human pandemic influenza outbreak event relative to other natural hazard and accident events in the SNRA. The area of the shapes in the figure represents the relative amount of risk.

Figure 2: Best Estimates of Risk in the Unclassified SNRA Events




Figure 2 depicts the best estimates of the fatality and direct economic risk for the SNRA's quantitatively assessed natural hazards and accidents, as measured by the product of the best estimates of frequency and fatalities given occurrence (Figure 2a, fatality risk) or the product of the best estimates of frequency and direct economic impacts given occurrence (Figure 2b, direct economic risk). Although it is not the one largest or dominant contributor to direct economic risk among threat/hazard events as it is for human fatality and illness/injury risk, the pandemic influenza outbreak scenario ranks with the most catastrophic natural disaster events assessed in the SNRA.

When interpreting Figure 3, it is important to remember that there is significant uncertainty in the frequencies and impacts associated with many events assessed in the SNRA.

Significant Risks May Be Masked By Limited Data

In the course of conducting the SNRA, a number of threats and hazards identified by SNRA participants (Table 5) were not comparatively assessed because of limited quantitative data availability. The SNRA is therefore unable to comment on the relative risk associated with these events, some of which are qualitatively believed to have potential for significant impact. These events include cyber attacks, tsunamis, volcanoes, antibiotic resistance, emerging infectious diseases other than influenza, plant disease, heat waves, industrial accidents, mass migration events, oil spills, and pipeline failures. Characterizing these risks is a continuing interest of FEMA and the interagency.

Table 5: Threats and Hazards Requiring Further Study

Threat/Hazard Type	Threat/Hazard Description
Antibiotic Resistance	Antibiotic-resistant pathogens, or “superbugs,” have acquired mutations resulting in the reduction or elimination of the effectiveness of antibiotics
Emerging Infectious Diseases Other than Influenza	Newly recognized diseases or known “re-emerging” or “resurgent” diseases that may have been previously controlled but are now reappearing with increasing occurrence, or threaten to increase over previously endemic levels or new populations or geographic areas—this also includes pathogens that have developed new attributes such as increased resistance or virulence
Heat Wave	A period of elevated temperature with an identifiable beginning and end occurs in the U.S. resulting in fatalities
Plant Disease	A major outbreak of a plant pathogen or pest occurs in the U.S. resulting in significant direct economic losses
Tsunami*	A tsunami with a wave of approximately 50 feet impacts the Pacific Coast of the U.S.
Volcanic Eruption*	A volcano in the Pacific Northwest erupts impacting the surrounding areas with lava flows and ash and areas east with smoke and ash
Industrial Accident (Fire/Explosion)	A technological accident of an industrial nature, involving an industrial site or production facility (e.g., factories) that results in a fire or explosion
Migrant Surge/Mass Migration	A concentrated flow or surge of migrants into the U.S. across maritime or land borders occurs
Oil Spill	An oil spill of national significance requiring contingency/surge operations to mitigate
Pipeline Failure	Accidental conditions where a failure or an explosion of hazardous substances transported by pipeline occurs within the U.S. resulting in fatalities
Cyber Attack**	A cyber attack resulting in substantial harm to persons or critical infrastructure, significant data breaches, or the erosion of U.S. national security

* SNRA 2011 national-level event, qualitatively treated: risk summary sheet reproduced in this volume (Appendix J2).

** Treated as two national-level events in SNRA 2011, Cyber Attack against Data [Cyber Event affecting Data] and Cyber Attack against Physical Infrastructure [Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure], but not included in full comparative assessment (classified frequency quantitatively assessed, but consequences not quantitatively assessed). Cyber attacks under an expanded taxonomy are treated in the Cyber Scoping Study for the 2015 SNRA. The risk summary sheets for the 2011 cyber attack events are reproduced in this volume (Appendix J2).

Of the events listed in Table 5, cyber events are the most challenging to consider in the current SNRA framework which focuses on high-impact events with defined beginning and endpoints. It is clear that while a cyber event could result in high-impact and widespread consequences with cascading effects, cyber risks are most prominently persistent threats which require significant focus on an ongoing basis. Cyberspace has become inseparable from our daily lives. And while this increased connectivity has led to remarkable transformations and global advances across society, the corollary of this openness and connectivity is that it has also increased the complexity of the risks we face as a nation. Future efforts to expand the SNRA to include cyber events will pay particular attention to the overall national impact of both high-frequency, low-consequence cyber events and lower-frequency, higher-consequence events.

Significant Risks May Be Masked By Risk Taxonomy

How the risk space is divided can mask risks that are subsumed in other counted risks. Because the SNRA methodology requires threats and hazards to be mutually exclusive in scope, risks which cut across its taxonomy are less visible, or not visible. Table 6 lists cross-cutting hazards, new to the SNRA in 2015, including failures of the electric grid and urban fires. These are cross-cutting hazards, as they are both stand-alone events in the SNRA, and are also identified as second-order effects of other threats and hazards in the SNRA.


Table 6: Cross-Cutting Threats and Hazards Identified for Study in the SNRA

Threat/Hazard Type	Threat/Hazard Description
Electric Grid Failure (Natural/Accidental) (Cross-Cutting)	Electrical grid failure and loss of power meeting the grid disturbance reporting thresholds of the U.S. Department of Energy, of natural or accidental (non-adversarial) cause
Urban Fire/ Conflagration (Cross-Cutting)	Accidental or other incident triggered conditions where normal firefighting capabilities are significantly degraded, and an urban area becomes engulfed in a conflagration

Fatality Risk

Fatality risk was estimated for each threat/hazard event by multiplying the best estimate of the frequency by the best estimate of the resulting injuries/illnesses given occurrence. Figure 3 presents a visual depiction of fatality risk across the SNRA-assessed accidental, natural, and non-CBRN adversarial hazard events.

Figure 3: Fatality Risk



Note that all comparative statements are made within the set of natural and accidental hazards, and conventional-attack adversarial threats, which were analyzed at an unclassified level for the 2015 SNRA. Classified data and analyses suitable for the comparison of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attack threats within the fully quantitative framework of the SNRA may be found in the classified SNRA Technical Report.

As discussed above, the pandemic influenza outbreak event considered in the SNRA has greater fatality risk, at the best estimate, than every other measured natural or technological hazard in the SNRA combined.

- The SNRA considers a pandemic influenza outbreak with a 25 percent gross clinical attack rate³⁰ and similar case fatality rate to the 1957 flu pandemic. A pandemic of this type is expected to occur once every 10 to 60 years and cause more than a hundred thousand fatalities.³¹ For comparison, deaths in the United States from annual seasonal flu are on the order of 40,000 each year.

Compared with hazards such as hurricanes or floods, pandemic influenza is a higher consequence, lower likelihood event. In other words, pandemic influenza is driven to be a high fatality risk by its significant expected impacts given occurrence, rather than its frequency.

At the best estimate, earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes, closely followed by large winter storms, are estimated to pose less fatality risk than a pandemic influenza outbreak by a factor of a hundred or more, but may nonetheless pose relatively high risk when uncertainty is taken into account. Aircraft-as-a-weapon attacks also fall within an order of magnitude of fatality risk; however, the uncertainties in the assessed risk of this type of attack are dominated by uncertainty in models and assumptions, as compared to natural hazards with detailed historical records.

The other natural, accidental, and adversarial threats and hazards considered in the 2015 SNRA ranked behind these hazards. However, in many cases this result is strongly conditioned on the data and assumptions which the SNRA relied upon to model the risk of these events in the next 3-5 years. These include the majority of the accidental and technological hazards.

Substantial uncertainty also attaches to the health impacts of long-term (weeks to months, or years) electric power outages covering large regions. This uncertainty is relevant to the fatality risk from a catastrophic space weather incident or a physical attack on the electric grid which result in such outages. The SNRA estimates for the fatality (and illness/injury) impacts of these events are deliberately selected to be modest, because of the paucity of peer-reviewed studies of long-term grid outage health effects from any cause which would be needed to support higher estimates.

By comparison with pandemic influenza and every other natural and technological hazard quantitatively assessed by the SNRA, foot-and-mouth disease has considerably less fatality risk than other types of events in the SNRA. Although an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the United States has the potential to have considerable impact on livestock and the agricultural economy, it poses little health risk to humans. By definition, the SNRA Drought hazard event also has zero human health and safety impacts, as these are considered within the scope of the SNRA Heat Wave event.³²

Insufficient data (immediately capable of meaningful comparison with the other SNRA threats and hazards in the manner above) about the fatality risk associated with cyber attacks, tsunamis, volcanoes, antibiotic resistance, emerging infectious diseases other than influenza, plant disease, heat waves, industrial accidents, mass migration events, oil spills, or pipeline failures was collected during the SNRA to support quantitative comparisons to other threat/hazard events. For this reason, these events are not displayed in Figure 3.

³⁰ The gross clinical attack rate is the fraction of a population that becomes clinically ill from influenza during the pandemic.


³¹ Reed et al (2013, January). Novel framework for assessing epidemiologic effects of influenza epidemics and pandemics; and Technical Appendix. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 19(1) 85–91, at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124_article; Technical Appendix at <http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124-techapp1>.

³² The Heat Wave hazard is currently addressed with a qualitative treatment in the SNRA (SNRA Working Papers). However, substantial quantitative research has been completed (see working paper) and it is expected to be added to the quantitative data set of the SNRA before the next full iteration of the SNRA.

Injury/Illness Risk

Note that all comparative statements are made within the set of natural and accidental hazards, and conventional-attack adversarial threats, which were analyzed at an unclassified level for the 2015 SNRA. Classified data and analyses suitable for the comparison of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attack threats within the fully quantitative framework of the SNRA may be found in the classified SNRA Technical Report.

Figure 4: Injury/Illness Risk



Injury/illness risk was estimated for each threat/hazard event by multiplying the best estimate of the frequency by the best estimate of the resulting injuries/illnesses given occurrence. Figure 4 presents a visual depiction of injury/illness risk across SNRA-assessed events.

A pandemic influenza outbreak with a 25 percent gross clinical attack rate and similar case fatality rate to the 1957 flu pandemic has vastly more injury and illness risk, at the best estimate, than every other measured natural or technological hazard in the SNRA combined (see Figure 5). However, pandemic influenza illnesses are different than most of the other injuries and illnesses in the SNRA, in that most victims who become ill but do not die are likely to recover fully and have no lasting physical impact on their lives.

After pandemic influenza, there are several events that cluster together with a factor of 100 to 1,000 times smaller injury/illness risk than pandemic, but which also are estimated to pose significant illness/injury risk relative to other non-adversarial events in the SNRA, at the best

estimate. These events include accidental biological food contamination, earthquakes, hurricanes, winter storms, and tornadoes. In contrast to pandemic influenza, many of those injured or struck ill by these events may face chronic health problems for years after the initial event.

Floods are estimated to pose less illness/injury risk, at the best estimate, than the events listed above, but may pose relatively high risk when uncertainty is taken into account. Explosives attacks, aircraft as a weapon, chemical accidents, dam failures, and wildfires also pose injury risks comparable with floods.

Foot-and-mouth disease poses little to no health risk to humans.³³

Insufficient data (immediately capable of meaningful comparison with the other SNRA threats and hazards in the manner above) about the injury/illness risk associated with cyber attacks, tsunamis, volcanoes, antibiotic resistance, emerging infectious diseases other than influenza, plant disease, heat waves, industrial accidents, mass migration events, oil spills, or pipeline failures was collected during the SNRA to support quantitative comparisons to other threat/hazard events. For this reason, these events are not displayed in Figure 4.

Direct Economic Risk

Note that all comparative statements are made within the set of natural and accidental hazards, and conventional-attack adversarial threats, which were analyzed at an unclassified level for the 2015 SNRA. Classified data and analyses suitable for the comparison of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attack threats within the fully quantitative framework of the SNRA may be found in the classified SNRA Technical Report.

Direct economic risk was estimated for each threat/hazard event by multiplying the best estimate of the frequency times the best estimate of the resulting direct economic losses given occurrence.

No single threat/hazard event dominates direct economic risk among the natural and technological hazards of the SNRA to the extent that pandemic influenza outbreaks dominate the fatality and injury/illness risk. However, of the natural, accidental, and non-CBRN adversarial hazards considered in the 2015 SNRA, natural hazards as a whole dominate direct economic risk. Every one of the natural hazard events ranks above each of the accidental and non-CBRN adversarial threats and hazards considered in the SNRA, at the best estimate.

The risks to the Nation posed by space weather are clouded with great uncertainty. This question is a polarizing topic among technical experts in the space weather risk community: there is a stronger divergence of expert opinion regarding this risk than for any other accidental or natural hazard treated in the SNRA. For this reason, the SNRA does not present a best estimate of direct economic impact.

As the SNRA does report a best estimate of likelihood—the 1 in 150 year frequency (1/600 – 1/70 year range) which experts of both opinions agree upon for the likelihood of a ‘Carrington event’ (despite their disagreement over the likely impacts of such a storm)—it is possible to estimate direct economic risk for each of these possible magnitudes of impact. For these most rare and severe events which all experts agree are capable of causing direct economic loss to the


³³ As noted above, injury and illness impacts of drought/heat events are considered within the scope of the SNRA heat wave event, currently under analysis for a planned inter-revision addition to the SNRA data set.

Comparative Risk - Detailed Findings

U.S. in the billions of dollars or more,³⁴ experts believe that a rare space weather event will either cause catastrophic economic loss exceeding \$1 trillion dollars; or it will cause slightly above average economic loss as compared to the other natural hazards studied in the SNRA (Figure 5).

- The low estimate for economic loss (\$6 billion) would rank space weather among the lowest direct economic risks among the natural hazards in the SNRA.
- The high estimate for economic loss (\$2 trillion) would rank space weather among the highest direct economic risks among the natural hazards in the SNRA.

Figure 5: Direct Economic Risk



Part of the purpose of the SNRA is to help planners and emergency managers prioritize among different threats and hazards, each of possibly catastrophic potential, by resolving some of the uncertainty about the relative likelihood of catastrophic outcomes. Having some likelihood information allows planners to ‘reasonably rule out’ a large number of possible but extremely unlikely catastrophic hazard scenarios in order to focus on the much smaller subset of

³⁴ The 2015 Space Weather event is harmonized to the \$1 billion threshold used for some other super-mundane natural hazards in the SNRA for this reason.

catastrophic hazard scenarios which, however uncertain, cannot be so ‘reasonably ruled out’ as extremely unlikely. The SNRA cannot rule out the possibility that space weather may actually pose a very small direct economic risk, in comparison with other threats and hazards. However, the SNRA also cannot rule out the possibility that space weather may rank with the highest direct economic risks of all the unclassified threats and hazards in the SNRA.

Of hazards possessing an undisputed best estimate, hurricanes and drought pose the largest direct economic risk of natural and technological hazards in the SNRA at the best estimate, given the precision of the SNRA, although there is considerable uncertainty (see Figure 5).

Droughts meeting a threshold of \$1 billion or more of direct economic loss were treated as a hazard event in the SNRA. The ubiquity of drought as a recurring and often normal condition of many U.S. climactic regions necessitated a higher threshold than most other natural disaster events (Table 2) to capture only those events which could be considered exceptions to the norm.³⁵

Other SNRA events that pose the same order of magnitude of direct economic risk at the best estimate as hurricanes, drought, and possibly space weather are pandemic influenza outbreaks, foot-and-mouth disease, earthquakes, winter storms, tornadoes, and floods.

- For many high-impact disasters such as hurricanes and floods, mitigation strategies resulting from advanced warning, such as advance evacuations from areas expected to be impacted, have reduced human health risks over time. However, the physical destruction from natural disasters, combined with their frequency, results in direct economic risk comparable to that of large-scale no-notice disasters such as earthquakes and tornadoes.
- Winter storms are an annually recurring natural hazard for many climactic regions of the Nation, but are no less costly for their regularity. As with drought and space weather, the SNRA set a \$1 billion threshold for winter storms, differing from the \$100 million threshold set for many other natural disasters, to capture only exceptionally destructive winter storm incidents. However, the comparatively high frequency of even these major storm events—which the Nation experiences once every other year, on the average—place their direct economic risk in the top rank of the hazards considered in the SNRA.
- The direct economic risk associated with a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United States is driven by the immediate reduction in international trade which would occur given an outbreak as well as disease control and eradication efforts. Given the value placed on FMD-free status, a confirmed case of FMD in the U.S. would result in an immediate restriction of exports. The current control strategy in U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regulations to regain FMD-free status is to cull all infected and susceptible animals.^{36,37} The APHIS Administrator has discretion to examine other options based on the size of the outbreak.

³⁵ The resulting set of historical drought incidents posed a mean direct economic loss equal to that of earthquakes, but this is a coincidental artefact of thresholds: earthquakes of \$100 million or greater are considered in the SNRA. If only earthquakes meeting a \$1 billion direct economic loss threshold were considered, the resulting best estimate (average) would be higher than that of the SNRA Drought hazard event (Figure I.2, Tables K.1, K.4). However, the difference in annualized direct economic risk would be similar.

³⁶ U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (2011). Title 9, Section 53.4. *Destruction of animals*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title9-vol1/pdf/CFR2011-title9-vol1-sec53-4.pdf>.

³⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office (2002, July). *Foot and mouth disease: To protect U.S. livestock, USDA must remain vigilant and resolve outstanding issues* (GAO-02-808). Retrieved from <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02808.pdf>.

Events which are assessed to pose relatively low direct economic risk in the SNRA, at the best estimate, in comparison with the other non-adversarial hazards include non-CBRN terrorism attacks and industrial/technological accidents of all kinds. Of these, aircraft as a weapon, explosives terrorism attacks, and accidental radiological substance releases (nuclear power plant accident) have the potential for very high direct economic impacts. However, for explosives terrorism attacks these high estimates are based upon insurance models of very catastrophic attacks, orders of magnitude above the historic average costs of explosives terrorism attacks in the U.S. For accidental radiological substance release, the direct economic impacts associated with an incident are highly dependent upon the assumed decontamination standard.

It is important to note that none of the above risk estimates include indirect or induced economic costs, which have the potential to be as large or greater than the direct economic impacts.


Social Displacement Risk

Note that all comparative statements are made within the set of natural and accidental hazards, and conventional-attack adversarial threats, which were analyzed at an unclassified level for the 2015 SNRA. Classified data and analyses suitable for the comparison of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attack threats within the fully quantitative framework of the SNRA may be found in the classified SNRA Technical Report.

Low, best, and high estimates of social displacement conditional upon event occurrence are unclassified for all events in the SNRA. However, as social displacement *risk* represents the product of these impact measures with estimated frequencies of event occurrence which are classified for all adversarial SNRA events, only the natural, technological, and non-CBRN adversarial hazards are discussed below.³⁸

SNRA threats and hazards show a much clearer striation of risk levels, when compared at the best estimate, for social displacement risk than for other impact axes (Figure 6).

³⁸ The social displacement metric was new to the 2011 SNRA. Because of this lack of prior use, many of the estimates gathered or assessed by the 2011 project were judged to be of comparably lower fidelity than the fatality, illness/injury, or direct economic impact data. For the 2015 SNRA, more granular data obtained for the unclassified hazards, including adversarial threats having new unclassified analyses, was judged to provide a sufficient basis for the full quantitative treatment of social displacement risk. It should be stressed that this is the judgment of the 2015 project team, and differs from that of the project team which designed and executed the 2011 SNRA.



Hurricanes dominate social displacement risk, among the natural, accidental, and non-CBRN attack hazards considered in this unclassified documentation of the SNRA. However, the high estimate for space weather³⁹ is within an order of magnitude of the best estimate for hurricanes.

Space weather displacement risk depends upon many unknowns, and is clouded with uncertainty. Expert opinions suggest the social displacement risk for space weather will either be catastrophic or negligible, depending on underlying assumptions and the effects of space weather to the Nation's power grid.

Floods, wildfires, and possibly space weather pose social displacement risk an order of magnitude below hurricanes, at the best estimate. Earthquakes follow an order of magnitude below these three (i.e. 100 times less than hurricanes), at the best estimate.

Hurricanes, floods, and wildfires are relatively high frequency and result in moderate to high social displacement. These natural hazard events possess significant displacement risk in part because of advance warning of the event and evacuations to safer locations. Displacement from earthquakes represents people forced to leave their homes due to damage or destruction caused by the event: it is more likely to be longer term, or permanent.

³⁹ There is a stronger divergence of expert opinion regarding the likely impacts of this risk than with any other accidental or natural hazard treated in the SNRA. Because of this, other than environmental impacts the SNRA makes no single best estimate for space weather on any impact measure.

Pandemic influenza outbreaks were estimated to pose minimal social displacement risk, because displacement due to hospitalizations was not included in the social displacement impact assessment. Drought, transportation systems (bridge) failure, armed assault, physical attacks on the power grid, and combustible/flammable cargo accident (rail) were also assessed to have zero displacement impacts, and hence zero displacement risk, at the best estimate.

Note that there is a significant difference between short-term evacuations up to a week and longer term permanent relocation—a distinction that is not made in the SNRA.⁴⁰ As such, caution is advised when interpreting the social displacement risks in Figure 6.

Insufficient data about the social displacement risk associated with winter storms, tornadoes, cyber attacks, tsunamis, volcanoes, antibiotic resistance, emerging infectious diseases other than influenza, plant disease, heat waves, industrial accidents, mass migration events, oil spills, or pipeline failures was collected during the SNRA to support quantitative comparisons to other threat/hazard events. For this reason, these events are not displayed in Figure 6.

Psychological Distress Risk

Note that all comparative statements are made within the set of natural and accidental hazards, and conventional-attack adversarial threats, which were analyzed at an unclassified level for the 2015 SNRA. Classified data and analyses suitable for the comparison of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attack threats within the fully quantitative framework of the SNRA may be found in the classified SNRA Technical Report.


Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as inputs.⁴¹ More details regarding the SNRA psychological distress impact analysis and the limitations of this analysis are available in Appendix G.

Psychological distress risk was estimated in a semi-quantitative manner using a risk matrix displayed in Figure 7 below. To our knowledge, the SNRA was the first systematic effort to compare psychological impacts and risks from national-level events; as such, additional research into the psychological impacts of disasters is required to improve the understanding of these impacts at a strategic, national level to permit better estimates of expected loss.

⁴⁰ The SNRA measure also does not make a distinction between voluntary or involuntary displacement, displacement to emergency shelters as opposed to friends, relatives, or hotels, or displacement within as opposed to outside of a hazard-affected area. These distinctions can be of equal or greater importance to emergency managers, community planners, or other personnel or organizations with mass care planning responsibilities.

⁴¹ The index approach currently does not include a component for translating economic losses into psychological distress. If estimates of homes destroyed and jobs lost (rather than overall direct economic impacts) are obtained as impact estimates for various national-level events, it would be possible to capture financial loss as part of the equation for psychological distress in future iterations of the SNRA.

Figure 7: Psychological Distress Risk



How to read this chart: This is a plot of psychological distress risk, as drawn from the best estimates of frequency and psychological distress. Higher risk threat/hazard events tend toward the upper right of the chart, lower risk ones towards the lower left. One threat/hazard event can be said to be higher risk than another when it is both higher frequency AND higher impact. The color coding of the threat/hazard events corresponds to the hazard type: [adversarial events](#), [technological/accidental hazards](#), and [natural disasters](#). Psychological distress likelihood and impacts for CBRN attacks are classified, and are not displayed on this chart. Drought had a psychological distress impact of zero, as it had no assessed fatality, injury/illness, or displacement impacts.

Two events were estimated to have relatively high psychological distress risk compared with other non-terrorism related hazards: pandemic influenza outbreaks and hurricanes. These findings are driven by the underlying method used to estimate significant distress in the SNRA, which heavily weighted contributions from events' fatalities and injuries/illnesses, as well as social displacement to a lesser extent. As discussed above, pandemic influenza dominates the fatality and injury/illness risk, while hurricanes pose a significant social displacement risk. Because the equation used to represent significant distress considers each of these impact types, events that are high risk in these three categories will correspondingly pose relatively high psychological distress risk.

Other events that are not estimated to pose the highest psychological distress risks among the non-adversarial hazards, but which are still noteworthy, include floods and wildfires, and possibly space weather.

Drought had zero psychological distress impacts at the best estimate because of its zero human health and displacement impacts, and is not displayed in Figure 7.

Insufficient data about the psychological distress risk associated with winter storms, tornadoes, physical attacks on the power grid, cyber attacks, tsunamis, volcanoes, antibiotic resistance,

emerging infectious diseases other than influenza, plant disease, heat waves, industrial explosions, mass migration events, oil spills, or pipeline failures was collected during the SNRA to support quantitative comparisons to other threat/hazard events. For this reason, these events are not displayed in Figure 7.

Environmental Risk

Note that all comparative statements are made within the set of natural and accidental hazards, and conventional-attack adversarial threats, which were analyzed at an unclassified level for the 2015 SNRA. Classified data and analyses suitable for the comparison of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attack threats within the fully quantitative framework of the SNRA may be found in the classified SNRA Technical Report.

Since environmental impacts are measured on a four-level ordinal scale (minimal, low, moderate, high), estimating environmental risk is not as straightforward as for other types of risk. While the environmental impact estimates themselves were provided by subject matter experts, analysts' judgments were used to choose events with high combinations of environmental impact and frequency. The lack of quantitative environmental risk estimates necessitates a subjective judgment of high risk events; this is an area of the SNRA recognized for future improvement.

- Estimates of environmental impacts conditional upon event occurrence are unclassified for all events in the SNRA, and may be found in Appendix H. As environmental risk represents the product of these impact measures with estimated frequencies of event occurrence which are classified for CBRN adversarial SNRA events, only natural and technological hazards are discussed below. Comparative analysis among all SNRA events based on environmental impacts alone, independently of frequency of occurrence, is presented in Appendix H.


Three threat/hazard events among the natural and technological hazards are estimated to have relatively high environmental risk due in part to their high frequency: floods, hurricanes, and accidental chemical substance releases (toxic inhalation hazards). These events were judged to be of high environmental risk because they were judged to result in the most significant environmental impacts (moderate, at the best estimate) of the events with the highest frequency estimates in the SNRA (greater than one event per year, at the best estimate).

No other natural, technological, or non-CBRN adversarial hazards were assessed to have a high environmental impact and hence high environmental risk at the best estimate, although some were assessed to have the potential to have high adverse impacts on the environment at the second best estimate (Appendix H).

Space weather was judged to have *de minimis* (minimal) environmental risk because of its assessed *de minimis* adverse environmental impact, at the best estimate. If a space weather event affecting physical infrastructure were to result in extended power outages, the potential for environmental impacts would increase to low/moderate as chemical and treatment plants failed.⁴²

⁴² For the 2015 SNRA, these may more appropriately correspond to the low and high estimate scenarios respectively on other impact axes, resulting in a dual estimate situation as well for environmental impacts. However, as these estimates were previously elicited the 2015 project team chose not to make adjustments to their presentation as given in the 2011 SNRA.

Figure 8: Environmental Risk



How to read this chart: This is a plot of environmental risk, as drawn from the best estimates of frequency and environmental impact. Higher risk threat/hazard events tend toward the upper right of the chart, lower risk ones towards the lower left. One threat/hazard event can be said to be higher risk than another when it is both higher frequency AND higher impact. The color coding of the threat/hazard events corresponds to the hazard type: **adversarial events**, **technological/accidental hazards**, and **natural disasters**. As the likelihoods and hence the environmental risk of **adversarial events** are classified, the unclassified environmental impacts of adversarial events are displayed without likelihood information.

Insufficient data about the environmental risk associated with winter storms, tornadoes, physical attacks on the power grid, cyber attacks, tsunamis, volcanoes, antibiotic resistance, emerging infectious diseases other than influenza, plant disease, heat waves, industrial accidents, mass migration events, oil spills, or pipeline failures was collected during the SNRA to support quantitative comparisons to other threat/hazard events. In addition, the 2015 change in scope of the Explosives Terrorism Attack event made it unclear whether the Low/Moderate judgment of the 2011 subject matter experts would still apply. For this reason, these events are not displayed in Figure 8.

Risks Requiring Additional Study

While the analysis of all events in the SNRA would benefit from additional research and deliberate, long-term study, the threats and hazards identified in tables 2 and 3 of the 2015 SNRA Findings document were judged to have insufficient quantifiable data to estimate frequency and impacts. The SNRA project team recommends these events for future study during the next iteration of the SNRA.

Cyber attacks were determined to be highly uncertain risks in the SNRA, as the risk from these events is difficult to quantify.⁴³ The 2015 iteration of the SNRA did not quantitatively assess cyber attacks. Given the significant changes in the cyber national risk environment since 2011, the DHS/National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Office of Cyber & Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) conducted an extensive scoping analysis of the national cyber risk environment for the 2015 SNRA project. The revised taxonomy of this study is being adapted for use in other preparedness related assessments, and will guide revisions to the SNRA 2011 cyber risk analysis in follow-on SNRA project work.

⁴³ A major achievement of the 2011 SNRA was the determination of quantitative frequency distributions for cyber attacks against data systems and against physical infrastructure by subject matter expert elicitation under formal protocols (see Appendices B and M, SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings [unclassified methodology], and Appendix B of the classified SNRA Technical Report). However, quantified impacts [consequences] associated with these frequencies could not be determined.

Risk Information by Hazard Area

Natural Hazards Discussion

Drought

Drought is a normal part of virtually all climates. It is caused by a deficiency of precipitation and can be aggravated by other factors such as high temperatures, high winds, and low relative humidity. The severity of a drought depends not only on its duration, intensity, and geographic extent, but also on the regional water supply demands made by human activities and vegetation.

Drought differs from other natural hazards considered in the SNRA in that the onset and end of a drought can be difficult to determine. The effects of a drought accumulate slowly and may linger even after the apparent termination of an episode. Additionally, drought impacts are spread over a larger geographic area.

During severe droughts, agricultural crops do not mature, wildlife and livestock are undernourished, land values decline, and unemployment increases. Droughts can cause a shortage of water for human and agricultural consumption, hydroelectric power, recreation, and navigation. Water quality may decline, and the number and severity of wildfires may increase. While the U.S. Department of Agriculture has primary responsibility for agricultural risk management and drought mitigation, in recent drought events these knock-on impacts to critical infrastructure (National Protection and Programs Directorate), navigable inland waterways (U.S. Coast Guard), and wildfire management (U.S. Fire Administration, FEMA) have engaged multiple DHS assets as part of the U.S. Government's total risk management and mitigation efforts.

Earthquakes

According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), there are two primary areas with the highest probability of seismic impacts that could significantly impact the U.S.: California and the New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) in the central United States.⁴⁴ Because scientists cannot yet make precise predictions of their date, time, and place, earthquake forecasts are presented in the form of probabilities. According to the Southern California Earthquake Center, the chance of having one or more magnitude 6.7 or larger earthquakes in California over the next 30 years is 99.7 percent. For powerful quakes of magnitude 7.5 or greater, there is a 37 percent chance that one or more will occur in the next 30 years in southern California.⁴⁵ For the NMSZ, scientists estimate that the probability of a magnitude 6.0 or larger earthquake occurring in within any 50 year period is 25-40 percent.⁴⁶ While California and the NMSZ have the highest probability of significant impacts, earthquakes have the potential to occur throughout the United States, and for this reason a threshold of \$100 million in direct economic losses was used to characterize the frequency and impacts of earthquakes in the SNRA, regardless of geographic location.

⁴⁴ United States Geological Survey (2008). *United States national seismic hazard maps*. Available from <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazards/products/conterminous/2008/>.

⁴⁵ Southern California Earthquake Center (2012). Uniform California Earthquake Rupture Forecast (UCERF). Retrieved from <http://www.scec.org/ucerf/>.

⁴⁶ Central United States Earthquake Consortium (n. d.). New Madrid Seismic Zone. Retrieved from <http://www.cusec.org/earthquake-information/new-madrid-seismic-zone.html>.

The range of potential loss and damage can be extremely high. Structural damage in the form of cracked or unstable foundations, damage to support beams, broken connections in walls or floors, and collapsed tiers can severely hamper rescue efforts. Further, damage to transportation networks like bridges and roads would slow down rescue work, construction repair teams, and disaster relief efforts. The blockages of waterways would also reduce the viability of major shipping channels. Specific to the NMSZ, interruption of oil, natural gas, electricity and water delivery is likely for the region affected as well as more distant places like New England. All of these large systems could further be affected by factors such as population density, building codes, and time of the event.

Unlike some natural disasters, there is no warning before an earthquake. This lack of a warning system makes mitigation strategies like evacuation unlikely. Therefore, options like building codes and retrofitting older structures are necessary to minimize consequences.

Floods

Floods are one of the most common hazards in the United States. Their effects can be local, impacting a neighborhood or community, or large, affecting entire river basins and multiple states.⁴⁷ For the purpose of the SNRA, a national-level flood is defined as a flood producing direct economic loss in excess of \$100 million dollars using data from 1993 to 2005. All hurricanes were removed from flood events to avoid over-reporting flooding already captured in the hurricane data.

Similar to hurricanes, fatality risk from floods is relatively small due to advanced warning and effective evacuation. Economic impacts from floods are significant, however. The historical average and maximum direct economic damage from a national-level flood in the SNRA analysis were \$740 million and \$16 billion respectively (see Table 1 in Appendix E). It is also important to note that the SNRA used historical data to estimate flood risk. A number of trends could increase flood risk in the future, including greater economic development and population growth in high-risk areas, lack of adequate flood insurance coverage, and climate change.

Hurricanes

Hurricanes are estimated to present the largest direct economic and social displacement risks to the Nation of all the natural and technological hazards included in the SNRA, coupled with relatively high psychological distress and environmental risks. Though not among the largest, hurricanes do carry some fatality and injury/illness risk.

- For the purpose of the SNRA, a national-level hurricane is defined as a hurricane producing direct economic loss in excess of \$100 million dollars.

Over 50 percent of U.S. citizens live in coastal communities, a 45 percent increase from 1970, and this number is expected to grow another 10 percent by 2020.⁴⁸ As more people move to coastal communities that experience hurricanes, population and economic growth in these areas increases societal vulnerability to extreme weather. A recent study on hurricane damage suggests that “potential damage from storms is growing at a rate that may place severe burdens on society.

⁴⁷ Federal Emergency Management Agency (2011, November 9). Flood. Retrieved from <http://www.fema.gov/hazard/flood/>.

⁴⁸ National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2012). State of the coast. Retrieved from <http://stateofthecoast.noaa.gov/population/welcome.html>.

Avoiding huge losses will require either a change in the rate of population growth in coastal areas, major improvements in construction standards, or other mitigation actions.”⁴⁹

Economic losses from hurricane impacts vary depending on characteristics of the area being impacted (e.g., density, building features, wind building codes, land use, and evacuation plans/execution), as well as the size and strength of the storm itself. For example, Hurricane Andrew (1992) was a fast-moving, compact but strong Category 5 storm that heavily impacted a small area in South Florida, while Hurricane Katrina (2005) was a lesser Category 3 storm that impacted a very large area. Hurricane Irene (2011), by contrast, was an even weaker storm but also impacted a very large area. All three storms created considerable losses though the specific nature of their impacts were different. Preparedness efforts for hurricanes will need to account for both potential storm strength and breadth of impact area.

Space Weather

The term “space weather” refers to the variable conditions on the Sun, throughout space, and in the Earth’s magnetic field and upper atmosphere that can influence the performance of space-borne and ground-based technological systems and endanger human life or health. A solar storm can disrupt satellite operations, communications, navigation, and electric power distribution grids. The greatest potential social and economic impacts, and the greatest uncertainties about these impacts and their likelihood, relate to the unknown physical effects of a rare but intense “Carrington Event” solar storm on the electric grid. The long power lines that link users throughout the Nation are susceptible to electric currents induced by the dramatic changes in high-altitude ionospheric currents that occur during geomagnetic storms. Surges in power lines from induced currents can cause massive network failures, and may cause permanent damage to transformers and to multimillion-dollar equipment in power generation plants.⁵⁰ Many uncertainties surround the likelihood and likely impacts of intense solar storms, but the key uncertainty is whether or not such large-scale permanent physical damage will occur.

The SNRA considers an approximately 1 in 150 year space weather event, the best estimate of the current consensus model for the recurrence likelihood of a Carrington Event.^{51,52,53} The uncertainty in impact is reflected in the gulf between the low and high impact scenarios in the SNRA. These respectively correspond to a large-scale but temporary (restoration in days) grid failure not resulting in transformer damage, and a large-scale grid failure resulting in permanent damage to key transformers centered on the Washington DC – New York City Eastern Seaboard corridor.⁵⁴ The low-impact scenario resembles the 2003 East Coast Blackout in economic, human health, and social impacts⁵⁵—\$6 billion in direct economic loss (business interruption,

⁴⁹ Pielke, R. J., Landsea, C., Collins, D., Saunders, M., and Musulin, R. (2008). Normalized hurricane damage in the United States: 1900-2005. *Natural Hazard Review*, 9(1), 29-42.

⁵⁰ Adapted, with interpolations, from pp. iii, 16, National Space Weather Program (NSWP) (2010, June), National Space Weather Program Strategic Plan: at <http://www.ofcm.gov/nswp-sp/fcm-p30.htm>.

⁵¹ North American Electric Reliability Corporation [NERC] (2014, April 21). Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description. Project 2013-03, GMD Mitigation Standard Drafting Team: at http://www.nerc.com/comm/PC/Geomagnetic%20Disturbance%20Task%20Force%20GMDTF%202013/Benchmark_GMD_EventMay2_clean.pdf (p. 9).

⁵² Lloyd's (2013). Solar Storm Risk to the North American Electric Grid. Produced by Lloyd's and AER [Atmospheric and Environmental Research, Inc]: at www.lloyds.com/~media/lloyds/reports/emerging%20risk%20reports/solar%20storm%20risk%20to%20the%20north%20american%20electric%20grid.pdf (p. 6).

⁵³ Love, Jeffrey J. (2012, May 18). Credible occurrence probabilities for extreme geophysical events: earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, magnetic storms. *Geophysical Research Letters* 39 L10301: at <https://geomag.usgs.gov/downloads/publications/2012GL051431.pdf> (1/153 years, $-Dst \geq 1760$ nT).

⁵⁴ The NYC-DC corridor is the highest risk region of the U.S. for electric grid damage from induced ground currents, due to a combination of geophysical (magnetic latitude, coastal proximity, ground conductivity) factors and physical characteristics of the electric grid. Lloyd's, *op. cit.*

⁵⁵ North American Electric Reliability Corporation [NERC] (2012, February). Effects of geomagnetic disturbances on the bulk power system; accessed at <http://www.nerc.com/files/2012GMD.pdf>.

spoiled food) due to the unexpected interruption in power, and dozens of fatalities and hundreds of illnesses and injuries from the consequent failure of lifeline systems.^{56,57,58} The high-impact scenario corresponds to an outage affecting 40 million people for a period of 16 days to 2 years, resulting in \$2.5 trillion in direct economic loss,⁵⁹ human health impacts scaled up accordingly, and potentially millions of people displaced if the outage occurs in severely cold weather. Because of the extreme polarization in expert opinion, the SNRA does not make a central estimate of impacts but treats the low and high impacts as low and high best estimates respectively.

Because the SNRA is directed to inform preparedness planning and its analysis cannot rule out either scenario as the more likely outcome of a 1/150 Carrington-level solar storm, the high best estimate impacts are used as the best estimates of impact in the risk comparisons of Table 1 and the written analysis.

Tornadoes

On average, there are 1,300 tornadoes that strike the United States each year, of which an average of 140 (or approximately 10%) are significant (rated as EF2 or higher on the enhanced Fujita scale [EF scale]).⁶⁰ Tornadoes are more common in the United States than in any other country because of the interactions between cold fronts coming from Canada that collide with warm fronts that hit the central United States via the Gulf of Mexico. This collision generally centers over the central and southeastern portions of the United States, and there is a higher frequency of tornadoes that strike these regions. Nevertheless, tornadoes occurred in all 50 states, the District of Columbia,⁶¹ and Puerto Rico between 1996 and 2011.

For the purposes of the SNRA, only tornado events that resulted in \$100 million or more in direct economic damage were analyzed. It is common for more than one tornado to spawn from a storm cell, so tornadoes that met a temporal and spatial threshold were aggregated into tornado events. Data from 1996 to 2011 was used to aggregate tornadoes into tornado events in the SNRA because it provided the most complete record of fatalities, injuries and direct economic impacts. Using the aggregation methodology, there were 46 tornado events analyzed for the SNRA that occurred from 1996-2011, of which 44 were outbreaks that included more than one tornado.

Technology has played an increasingly important role in preparing for, mitigating, and responding to tornadoes. Through radar advancements, scientists have lengthened the average lead time before a storm. Tornado warnings can then be disseminated via multiple methods, including radio, television, the Internet, social media and mobile devices. Nevertheless, despite

⁵⁶ Direct economic impact estimated using FEMA's Cost-Benefit Analysis (BCA) estimate of the per capita per day direct economic impact from electric power loss (FEMA (2011, December), FEMA Benefit-Cost Analysis Re-engineering (BCAR): Development of Standard Economic Values, Version 6.0) and approximately 50 million U.S. persons without power for an average of one day (SNRA project team estimate based upon outage information of the 2003 incident, e.g. Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ELCON) (2004), The economic impacts of the August 2003 blackout, <http://www.elcon.org/Documents/EconomicImpactsOfAugust2003Blackout.pdf>).

⁵⁷ Anderson et al (2012). Lights out: Impact of the August 2003 power outage on mortality in New York, NY. *Epidemiology* 23(2) 189–193.

⁵⁸ Lin et al (2011, May). Health impact in New York City during the Northeastern Blackout of 2003. *Public Health Reports* v 126(3) 384–393; accessed at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3072860/>.

⁵⁹ Lloyd's, *op. cit.* Note that the SNRA uses \$2 trillion as the direct economic value as an estimate of costs accumulated in the first year (most impact estimates in the SNRA are first-year accumulated, for internal consistency) on the assumption that the majority of the total costs over two years of the high estimate of \$2.5 trillion (2011 dollars: \$2.6 trillion in 2013 dollars in source) accumulate in the first year, and rounding to one significant figure.

⁶⁰ This is based on the number of tornadoes per year from 1996 – 2011. All calculations are taken from the NOAA National Weather Storm Service Storm Prediction Center (SPC) database. NOAA NWS SPC (2012). *SPC Tornado, Hail, and Wind Database Format Specification*. Retrieved June 22, 2012 from <http://www.spc.noaa.gov/wcm/#data>.

⁶¹ On September 24, 2001, a tornado originated in Virginia and passed through Washington, DC.

better communication and detection capabilities, tornadoes still pose a significant threat to the United States. One trend noted in the research is the geographic shift of tornado prevalence toward the Southeastern states. This is important because the mid-Southeastern states (such as Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee)⁶² are more densely populated than traditional tornado alley areas like the rural regions of Oklahoma or Texas. The increased population density, and in particular mobile home density, could result in an increase in fatalities, injuries and economic impacts in the future.⁶³

Wildfires

Wildfires, as evidenced by the historical record, do not have the same potential for causing catastrophic loss of life as other natural-hazard events: the last time a wildfire killed hundreds of people in the United States was 1918.⁶⁴ Rather, most of their potential harm comes from the economic damage they can cause, largely by direct destruction of property, and their capacity to significantly challenge local and federal response efforts.⁶⁵ For this reason, an economic threshold of \$100 million in direct losses is used to define a national-level wildfire in the SNRA. It is not uncommon for a wildfire to spread to and threaten a large geographic area, requiring a month or more of federally-supported firefighting efforts to successfully contain and extinguish the threat.⁶⁶

The historical period of 1990-2009, selected by the SNRA team because of the completeness and uniformity of available historical data,⁶⁷ shows a sharp increase in the frequency and severity of super-catastrophic wildfires affecting human populations in the United States compared with prior years.⁶⁸ Two possible drivers of this trend are the unintended consequences of long-term changes in forest management practices intended to reduce the threat of wildfires, but which many scholars argue have had the opposite effect,⁶⁹ and the spread of wildfire-favoring intensive grass species in the Western United States in recent decades.⁷⁰ Two other drivers which have been identified as responsible for this upward trend in frequency and impact on human populations are population growth in vulnerable areas⁷¹ and the early effects of climate change,⁷²

⁶² Parisi, T. (2008, February 8). *Deadly Storms Underscore New Research Finding*. Retrieved September 12, 2012, from NIU News: Media Relations and Internal Communications: <http://www.niu.edu/PubAffairs/RELEASES/2008/feb/tornado.shtml>.

⁶³ Dixon, P.G., Mercer, A.E., Choi, J. & Allen, J.S. (2011, April). Tornado Risk Analysis: Is Dixie Alley an Extension of Tornado Alley? *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society*, 92, 433-441.

⁶⁴ National Interagency Fire Center (n.d.). Historically significant wildland fires. Retrieved from http://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_histSigFires.html.

⁶⁵ National Interagency Fire Center (n.d.). Total Wildland Fires and Acres (1960-2009). Retrieved from http://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_totalFires.html; U.S. Fire Administration (2002). Fires in the wildland/urban interface. *Topical Fire Research Series*, 2(16). Retrieved from <http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/tfrs/v2i16.pdf>; U.S. Fire Administration (2001). Wildland fires: A historical perspective. *Topical Fire Research Series*, 1(3). Retrieved from http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/statistics/v1i3_508.pdf; Western Forestry Leadership Coalition (2010). The true cost of wildfire in the western U.S. Retrieved from http://www.wflcenter.org/news_pdf/324_pdf.pdf.

⁶⁶ See note 65.

⁶⁷ Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute (2011). The Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States (SHELDUS), version 8.0 [online database]. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina. Available from <http://www.sheldus.org>.

⁶⁸ See notes 71 - 73.

⁶⁹ U.S. Fire Administration (2002). Fires in the wildland/urban interface. *Topical Fire Research Series*, 2(16). Retrieved from <http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/tfrs/v2i16.pdf>; Westerling, A. L., Hidalgo, H. G., Cayan, D. R., & Swetnam, T. W. (2006). Warming and earlier spring increase western U.S. forest wildfire activity. *Science*, 313(5789), 940-943. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencemag.org/content/313/5789/940.full.pdf>.

⁷⁰ Balch et al (2013). Introduced annual grass increases regional fire activity across the arid western USA (1980-2009). *Global Change Biology*, 19(1), 173-183.

⁷¹ U.S. Fire Administration (2002). Fires in the wildland/urban interface. *Topical Fire Research Series*, 2(16). Retrieved from <http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/tfrs/v2i16.pdf>.

⁷² Committee on America's Climate Choices, National Research Council (2011). *America's Climate Choices*. Washington, DC: National Academies Press. Available from <http://dels.nas.edu/Report/Americas-Climate-Choices/12781>; U.S. Global Change Research Program (2009). *Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States*, p 82. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Available from <http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf>; U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research (2008). *The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the*

drivers shared with the potential increase in risk of floods and hurricanes. As these common drivers are expected to continue to increase, there is a substantial likelihood that the overall risk to populated regions in the U.S. from wildfires will continue to increase in coming years.⁷³

Winter Storms

Severe winter storms, including strong winds, ice storms, extremely cold temperatures, and heavy snow, are some of the most familiar major hazards for communities in the Midwest and Northeastern United States. However, nearly the entire United States is considered at risk for severe winter storms, although the degree of exposure depends on normal severity of local winter weather. While regions where such weather is rare tend to be disrupted more severely than regions where it occurs frequently, experience has shown that no area can fully prepare for severe winter storms. The past two decades have seen many severe winter events forecast days in advance and for which local citizens and communities made substantial preparation, but which nonetheless paralyzed multi-state regions for a week or more.

Winter storms can spawn other natural hazards, such as severe thunderstorms, tornadoes, and extreme winds. Along with the direct effects of winter storms, these can disrupt commerce and transportation and often result in loss of life due to hypothermia or accidents, particularly road accidents. Over 70 percent of U.S. roads are located in snowy regions that annually receive more than five inches average snowfall, and 70 percent of the U.S. population lives in these regions. Snow, sleet, and ice cause 580,000 crashes, 180,000 injuries, and 2,200 deaths on U.S. roadways each year.⁷⁴ While state and local agencies annually spend more than \$2.3 billion on snow and ice control operations, snow and ice removal from roads and highways is difficult when accumulations build faster than equipment can clear.

Heavily populated areas are particularly impacted when severe winter storms disrupt communication and power due to downed distribution lines. Debris associated with heavy icing may impact utility systems and transportation routes. Secondary and cascading hazards from severe winter storms can include power outages, downed trees and power transmission lines, civilian and emergency responder communications disruptions and outages, road closures from snow, ice, downed trees, utility poles, and electrical power lines, public transportation disruptions and closures, school and government closures, and water distribution problems and flood hazards. Thousands of families and vulnerable citizens without power, heat, or communications may need to relocate to temporary shelters and warming centers.

Because of the large annual costs of winter weather events occurring on a regular basis in the United States, the SNRA applied a \$1 billion threshold for aggregated winter storm incidents to be included in the event data set rather than the \$100 million threshold applied to most other natural disaster events.

⁷³ United States (Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.3). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture. Available from <http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf>; Westerling, A. L., Hidalgo, H. G., Cayan, D. R., & Swetnam, T. W. (2006). Warming and earlier spring increase western U.S. forest wildfire activity. *Science*, 313(5789), 940-943. Retrieved from <http://www.sciencemag.org/content/313/5789/940.full.pdf>.

⁷⁴ Federal Emergency Management Agency (2011). Strategic Foresight Initiative project papers, including *Summary of Findings, U.S. Demography Shifts, and Climate Change*. At http://www.fema.gov/about/programs/oppa/strategic_foresight_initiative.shtm#3.

⁷⁴ DoT FHWA (2013), *Snow and Ice, op cit.*; and DoT FHWA (2013, July 2), *How do weather events impact roads?* [electronic resource]. FHWA Road Weather Management Program Office of Operations: at http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/weather/q1_roadimpact.htm (retrieved January 2014), as cited in FEMA (2013), with corrected total accident number (snow, sleet, slush, and ice related accidents only).

Human and Animal Disease Discussion

Pandemic Influenza Outbreak

A pandemic influenza outbreak with similar characteristics to the 1957 pandemic flu is estimated to present the largest risk to the Nation of the natural and technological hazard events included in the SNRA for fatality, illness/injury, and psychological distress risk, and has relatively high direct economic risk. At the best estimate, it has more fatality and injury/illness risk than every other natural or accidental hazard in the SNRA combined (see Figures 1 and 2). However, pandemic influenza illnesses are different than most of the other injuries and illnesses in the SNRA, in that most victims who become ill but do not die are likely to recover fully and have no lasting economic impact on their lives. Pandemic influenza poses no social displacement risk⁷⁵ and relatively low environmental risk.

Despite advances in medical care over the last 50 years, pandemic influenza events, such as the flu of 1957, are nevertheless assessed to have the potential to produce large numbers of fatalities and illnesses (and therefore economic impacts) in the United States. Influenza pandemics are caused by a family of influenza viruses that are usually transmitted from person to person through aerosolized virus-containing droplets generated by coughing or sneezing, or through interaction with contaminated surfaces.^{76,77} Influenza viruses infect humans by binding to, and invading, epithelial cells in the nose, throat, and mouth – this attachment and invasion is facilitated by a particular virus protein on its surface, called Hemagglutinin, or “HA”. Once the viruses hijack cells’ internal machinery to make copies of themselves, those new virus copies escape the human cell to continue the infection via another virus surface protein called Neuraminidase, or “NA”. These two virus proteins, along with others, determine a particular strain’s ability to invade and escape cells, and form the basis for the “H” and “N” influenza strain designations. For example, the “swine flu” pandemic of 2009 had HA and NA proteins both of type one, and was designated H1N1. In contrast, the 1957 flu was an H2N2 influenza strain since its HA protein was type two, and its NA protein was type two.

At a high level, there are two important rates associated with an influenza pandemic that determine its impact. The first is the overall gross clinical “attack” rate, which is defined as the fraction of the population that becomes clinically ill from influenza during the pandemic. While it varies by age, typically the overall attack rate for seasonal influenza each year is between 5% and 20% of the population of the United States.^{78,79,80,81} In contrast, the three influenza pandemics of the 20th century (1918, 1957, and 1968) had gross clinical attack rates (adjusted to current population) of 24% to 34% of the population,^{82,83,84,85,86} a significant increase over the

⁷⁵ Hospitalizations due to pandemic influenza were not considered displacement for the purposes of the SNRA. The direct economic loss estimates account for the cost of medical care.

⁷⁶ Kramer, A., Schewebke, I., & Kampf, G. (2006). How long do nosocomial pathogens persist on inanimate surfaces? A systematic review. *BMC Infectious Diseases*, 6, 130.

⁷⁷ Jones, R. M. & Adida, E. (2011). Influenza infection risk and predominant exposure route: Uncertainty analysis. *Risk Analysis*, 31(10), 1622-1631.

⁷⁸ Bridges, C. B., Thompson, W. W., Meltzer, M. I., Reeve, G. R., Talamonti, W. J., Cox, N. J., et al. (2000). Effectiveness and cost-benefit of influenza vaccination of healthy working adults: a randomized control trial. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 282(13), 1655-63.

⁷⁹ Edwards, K. M., Dupont, W. D., Westrich, M. K., Plummer, W. D., Palmer, P. S., & Wright, P. F. (1994). A randomized control trial of cold-adapted and inactivated vaccines for the prevention of influenza A disease. *Journal of Infectious Disease*, 169, 68-76.

⁸⁰ Keitel, W. A., Cate, T. R., Couch, R. B., Huggins, L. L., & Hess, K. R. (1997). Efficacy of repeated annual immunization with inactivated influenza virus vaccines over a five year period. *Vaccine*, 15(10), 1114-1122.

⁸¹ Neuzil, K., Zhu, Y., Griffin, M., Edwards, K. M., Thompson, J., Tollefson, S., et al. (2002). Burden of interpandemic influenza in children younger than 5 years: a 25-year prospective study. *Journal of Infectious Disease*, 185, 147-152.

⁸² Brundage, J. F. (2006). Cases and deaths during pandemic influenza in the United States. *American Journal of Preventative Medicine*, 31(3), 252-256.

yearly seasonal rates. Given this range of observed clinical attack rates for recent influenza pandemics (24% to 34%), the 25% attack rate assumed for the SNRA scenario is conservative.

The second important rate affecting the impact of an influenza pandemic is the case fatality rate, or CFR, defined as the proportion of people with influenza illness who die. The 1957 Flu was assessed to be a “Category 2” pandemic on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) Pandemic Severity Index.⁸⁷ The 1957 Flu had a CFR of 0.1-0.3% in contrast to the 1918 Spanish Flu which had a CFR of 2.04%.⁸⁸

Beyond the attack rate and the CFR, there are a number of drivers that explain why pandemic influenza is a significant risk, the first being influenza virus biology and ecology. Since an influenza strain’s ability to invade, reproduce in, and escape human cells depends in part on the particular H and N surface proteins as well as other proteins, variations in them can determine how quickly an influenza outbreak spreads, and is a factor along with others in the case fatality rate and other aspects of the pandemic.^{89,90} In addition to contributing to transmissibility, the large amount of variability and frequency of mutations in the influenza H/N proteins accounts for much of the lack of immunity within the general population. This lack of immunity is by far the largest driver of the high illness/fatality statistics from a scientific standpoint.

An additional driver for pandemic influenza’s risk is the fact that vaccine production for an emerging pandemic influenza strain currently takes a significant amount of time (planning estimates are on the order of several months,⁹¹ with the actual experience of H1N1 in 2009 being about a year to produce sufficient vaccine to protect the entire nation⁹²). This fact means that other control measures such as isolation of symptomatic individuals and identifying and quarantining their contacts are important components of a pandemic response prior to vaccine availability.⁹³ However, recent research and epidemiological modeling indicates that the biggest determinant of the success of these control measures (even more than the virus’s inherent transmissibility) is the degree to which the particular pandemic strain can be transmitted by individuals who have the virus but are not yet symptomatic.⁹⁴ If individuals can unknowingly spread the virus, while they themselves do not have symptoms, then the effectiveness of these control measures will be reduced. Consequently, direct estimation of the degree of asymptomatic

⁸³ Davis, L. E., Caldwell, G. C., Lynch, R. E., & Bailey, R. E. (1970). Hong Kong influenza: The epidemiologic features of a high school family study analyzed and compared with a similar study during the 1957 Asian influenza epidemic. *American Journal of Epidemiology*, 92, 240-257.

⁸⁴ Elveback, L. R., Fox, J. P., & Ackerman, E. (1976). An influenza simulation model for immunization studies. *American Journal of Epidemiology*, 103, 152-165.

⁸⁵ Longini, I. M., Ackerman, E., & Elveback, L. R. (1978). An optimization model for influenza A epidemics. *Mathematical Biosciences*, 38, 141-157.

⁸⁶ Sharrr, R. G. (1969). National influenza experience in the USA, 1968-1969. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 41, 361-366.

⁸⁷ U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2008). *Guidance on allocating and targeting pandemic influenza vaccine*. Retrieved from <http://www.flu.gov/individualfamily/vaccination/allocationguidance.pdf>.

⁸⁸ Reed et al (2013, January). Novel framework for assessing epidemiologic effects of influenza epidemics and pandemics; and Technical Appendix. Emerging Infectious Diseases 19(1) 85-91, at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124_article; Technical Appendix at <http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124-techapp1>.

⁸⁹ Connor, R. J., Kawaoka, Y., Webster, R. G., & Paulson, J. C. (2004). Receptor specificity in human, avian, and equine H2 and H3 influenza virus isolates. *Virology*, 205, 17-23.

⁹⁰ Van Doremalen N., Shelton H., Roberts K. L., Jones, I. M., Pickles, R. J., et al. (2011). A single amino acid in the HA f pH1N1 2009 influenza virus affects cell tropism in human airway epithelium, but not transmission in ferrets. *PLoS One*, 6(10), e25755.

⁹¹ World Health Organization (2009, August 9). Pandemic influenza vaccine manufacturing process and timeline: Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 briefing note 7. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/notes/h1n1_vaccine_20090806/en/index.html.

⁹² President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2010, August). *Report to the President on reengineering the influenza vaccine production enterprise to meet challenges of pandemic influenza*. Retrieved from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST-Influenza-Vaccinology-Report.pdf>.

⁹³ Homeland Security Council (2005). *National strategy for pandemic influenza*. Retrieved from <http://www.flu.gov/planning-preparedness/federal/pandemic-influenza.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Fraser, C., Riley, S., Anderson, R. M., & Ferguson, N. M. (2004). Factors that make an infectious disease outbreak controllable. *Proceedings of the National Academies of Science*, 101(16), 6146-6151.

and presymptomatic transmissibility is important during pandemic influenza outbreaks to guide response. New epidemiological analysis of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic and other recent research appears to indicate that presymptomatic transmission can in fact occur, as early as a day before the onset of symptoms;^{95,96,97} however, other previous research has been inconclusive regarding this important aspect of the virus's transmissibility.⁹⁸

Since it is not feasible to prevent the emergence of new strains of influenza that could give rise to a potentially high-consequence pandemic, mitigation options generally fall into three categories, the "pillars" of the 2005 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza:⁹⁹ preparedness, surveillance and detection, and response and containment. The strategy notes that a foundation of influenza preparedness is vaccination, similar to seasonal influenza. However, given the time required for vaccine development, and the limited advanced warning for a pandemic strain's emergence, vaccination alone is not sufficient to limit the impact of a pandemic. However, coupled with new approaches for decreasing the time for vaccine development,¹⁰⁰ early detection and surveillance can limit the spread of the pandemic and increase the time available for vaccine production and distribution. Finally, containment and effective public health response can limit fatalities and economic impacts through sufficient public health surge capacity for severe influenza cases, and through other containment measures to limit or slow the spread of disease.

While influenza was the only type of pandemic outbreak considered in the SNRA, a number of biological agents are currently known to have the potential for epidemic or pandemic outbreaks that produce significant human health and economic impacts. Zoonotic agents (agents that usually infect animals, but that can infect humans as well) and new emerging infectious disease agents that are unanticipated may present significant risks as well. Recent examples of emerging diseases are the emergence of Ebola virus in 1976 in which the index case was thought to have become infected from bats in the Zaire cotton factory in which he worked,¹⁰¹ and the SARS coronavirus originating in Asia which nearly became a pandemic in 2002 and 2003.¹⁰²

Animal Disease Outbreak

The SNRA included an unintentional introduction of the foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus into a single dairy cattle herd in California. FMD is one of the most devastating diseases affecting cloven-hoof animals such as cattle, swine, sheep and deer. The virus is highly contagious and robust, with seven types and more than 80 sub-types, and vaccination for one type does not confer immunity to the others. While there are no significant human health implications of FMD, an outbreak of the disease can have important economic consequences. In 2001, the United Kingdom suffered one of the largest FMD epidemics in a developed country in

⁹⁵ Gu, Y., Komiya, N., Kamiya, H., Yasui, Y., Taniguchi, K., & Otabe, N. (2011). Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 transmission during presymptomatic phase, Japan. *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, 17(9), 1737-1739.

⁹⁶ Dawood, F. S., Jain, S., Finelli, L., Shaw, M. W., Lindstrom, S., Garten, R. J., et al. (2009). Emergence of a novel swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) virus in humans. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 360, 2605-2615.

⁹⁷ Carrat, F., Vergu, E., Ferguson, N. M., Lemaitre, M., Cauchemez, S., Leach, S., et al. (2008). Time lines of infection and disease in human influenza: A review of volunteer challenge studies. *American Journal of Epidemiology*, 167, 775-785.

⁹⁸ Patrozou, E. & Mermel, L. A. (2009). Does influenza transmission occur from asymptomatic infection or prior to symptom onset? *Public Health Reports*, 124(2), 193-196.

⁹⁹ Homeland Security Council (2005). *National strategy for pandemic influenza*. Retrieved from <http://www.flu.gov/planning-preparedness/federal/pandemic-influenza.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰ President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2010, August). *Report to the President on reengineering the influenza vaccine production enterprise to meet challenges of pandemic influenza*. Retrieved from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST-Influenza-Vaccinology-Report.pdf>.

¹⁰¹ Pourrut, X., Kumulungui, B., Wittman, T., Moussavou, G., Delicat, A., Yaba, P., et al. (2005, June). The natural history of Ebola virus in Africa. *Microbe and Infection / Institut Pasteur*, 7(7-8), 1005-1014.

¹⁰² Chan-Yeung, M. & Xu, R. H. (2003, November). SARS: epidemiology. *Respirology*, 8(Suppl.), S9-S14.

several decades. Approximately seven million animals were culled, and the outbreak devastated the nation's farming industry. It is estimated that the outbreak cost the UK an estimated \$11.9-\$18.4 billion, including \$4.8 billion in losses to agriculture, the food industry and the public sector, \$4.2-\$4.9 billion in lost tourism and \$2.9-\$3.4 billion in indirect losses.¹⁰³ As noted in the Findings section, a confirmed case of FMD in the U.S. would result in an immediate restriction of exports. The current control strategy in U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Inspection Service (APHIS) regulations to regain FMD-free status is to cull all infected and susceptible animals.^{104,105}

¹⁰³ Carpenter, T.E. O'Brien, J.M. Hagerman, A.D. McCarl, B.A. (2011). Epidemic and economic impacts of delayed detection of foot-and-mouth disease: A case study of an outbreak in California. *Journal of Veterinary Diagnostic Investigation*, 23, 26-33.

¹⁰⁴ U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (2011). Title 9, Section 53.4. *Destruction of animals*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved from <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title9-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title9-vol1-sec53-4.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Government Accountability Office (2002, July). *Foot and mouth disease: To protect U.S. livestock, USDA must remain vigilant and resolve outstanding issues* (GAO-02-808). Retrieved from <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02808.pdf>.

Technological and Accidental Hazards Discussion

Accidental Biological Food Contamination

The SNRA included an analysis of an accidental introduction of a biological agent (e.g., *Salmonella*, *E. coli*, botulinum toxin) into the food supply (e.g., milk, meat, vegetables, processed food) that results in harm to the public. The analysis utilized data from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC's) Foodborne Outbreak Online Database¹⁰⁶ to identify accidental food contamination events. Most foodborne outbreaks are investigated by the state, local, territorial, and tribal health departments where the outbreak occurs. Outbreak information is then reported to the CDC by the public health agency that conducted the investigation. The SNRA analysis used CDC correction factors to account for known underreporting and underdiagnosis of food contamination.¹⁰⁷

Public health consequences of biological food contamination can be mitigated by identifying and recalling the contaminated food product. Recalls and lost sales, in addition to the immediate costs associated with medical care, drive the direct economic impacts of a biological food contamination event.¹⁰⁸ Further economic damage may be incurred by industry due to uncertainty in determining the correct product as the source of the outbreak. For example, in 2008, a *Salmonella* outbreak was erroneously blamed on tomatoes early in the investigation before jalapeño and serrano peppers were identified as the cause. As a result of the initial misidentification, the tomato industry was severely impacted even though all tomatoes tested negative for *Salmonella*. Economic estimates of losses to the tomato industry exceeded \$100 million in Florida and almost \$14 million in Georgia.^{109,110}

Accidental Chemical Substance Spill or Release

The potentially catastrophic consequences of a worst-case scenario accidental spill or release of a highly toxic chemical substance have been frequently studied: models of a release of a highly toxic gas such as chlorine in a densely populated area have projected thousands, even hundreds of thousands of casualties.¹¹¹ There have been historical examples of high-consequence releases of chemical substances, including the 1984 Union Carbide accident in India which killed thousands of people in the nearby city of Bhopal, and the massive casualty figures from uses of chlorine and other toxic gases as a deliberate weapon of war.¹¹² However, these consequence

¹⁰⁶ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2012). Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD). Retrieved from <http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks/>.

¹⁰⁷ Scallan, E., Hoekstra, R. M., Angulo, F. J., Tauxe, R. V., Widdowson, M. A., Roy, S. L., et al. (2011). Foodborne illness acquired in the United States – major pathogens. *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, 17(1), 7-15.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2007, July 18). An overview of the CARVER Plus Shock Method for food sector vulnerability assessments. Retrieved from <http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Carver.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ Produce Safety Project (2008, November 17). Breakdown: Lessons to be learned from the 2008 *Salmonella* Saint Paul outbreak. Georgetown University. Available from <http://www.producessafetyproject.org/reports?id=0001>.

¹¹⁰ Center for Agribusiness and Economic Development (2008, July). *Economic impact of Georgia tomato production value losses due to the U.S. Salmonella outbreak* (Center Report CR-08-17). University of Georgia. Retrieved from <http://www.caed.uga.edu/publications/2008/pdf/CF-08-17.pdf>.

¹¹¹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2005). *National Planning Scenario #8: Chlorine; Risk Management Solutions* (2004). *Catastrophe, injury, and insurance: the impact of catastrophes on workers compensation, life, and health insurance*, pp. 54-59. Retrieved from http://www.rms.com/Publications/Catastrophe_Injury_Insurance.pdf; Branscomb, L. M., Fagan, M., Auerswald, P., Ellis, R. N., & Barcham, R. (2010, February). *Rail transportation of toxic inhalation hazards: policy responses to the safety and security externality* (Discussion Paper 2010-01). Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Available from <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Rail-Transportation-of-Toxic-Inhalation-Hazards-Final.pdf>. A significant counterexample is Chang, Y. S., Samsa, M. E., Folga, S. M., & Hartmann, H. M. (2007, November). *Probabilistic consequence model of accidental or intentional chemical releases* (ANL/DIS-08/3). Decision and Information Sciences Division, Argonne National Laboratory. Retrieved from <http://www.anl.gov/pubs/61981.pdf>.

¹¹² Branscomb et al, note 111 above; Pastel, Ross, What we have learned about mass chemical disasters. *Psychiatric Annals*, (11), 754-765. Retrieved from <http://www.psychiatricannalsonline.com/showPdf.asp?rID=24853>. A significant historical counterexample is the 1979 Mississauga accident.

models do not attempt to estimate the likelihood of an accident causing fatalities on such a scale to occur in the United States. Because no national-scale quantitative risk assessments of fixed chemical plants and storage facilities were available, the SNRA analysis utilized 1994–2010 historical accident data reflecting higher-probability but lower-consequence accidents in the U.S. to derive the findings for chemical accidents at fixed facilities.¹¹³ Although chemical accidents in the transportation sector have been extensively and quantitatively modeled on a national scale,¹¹⁴ it appears that no quantitative national risk assessment for catastrophic accidents in the fixed sector has been completed for the U.S.¹¹⁵

Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)

Recent rail accidents involving combustible/flammable cargoes such as Bakken crude oil have raised concerns about this hazard among many people in the United States.¹¹⁶ Increases in the volume of Bakken crude oil transported by rail coupled with high profile accidents like the 2014 Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, Canada accident, have been major factors in driving this concern and risk perception.¹¹⁷ The Lac-Mégantic accident, which resulted in 47 fatalities, represents an actual worst-case scenario involving combustible/flammable rail cargoes.¹¹⁸ However, as with many risks, the perception of risk may differ from the actual probability and likely impacts of risk. For example, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) data from 1980 through 2014 that was leveraged for the 2015 SNRA contains only four accidents in the United States involving at least one fatality, and none of these resulted in more than one fatality.¹¹⁹ For each of the impact measures studied in the 2011–15 SNRA, the results of the SNRA analysis indicated an extremely low risk associated with combustible/flammable cargoes transported by rail.

However, it is unclear to what extent this conclusion reflects the true risk to the U.S. of this hazard in the next 3 to 5 years, and to what extent it reflects limitations of the methodology applied to this event—event scoping, measures, and use of historic data for the SNRA’s analysis. Given these assumptions and constraints the analysis is sound, and its description and results may be found in the hazard risk summary sheet and in the charts and tables of this document.

¹¹³ From the EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP) accident data for chemical accidents at fixed facilities, and the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) accident data for chemical accidents during transportation by road, rail, air, water, or pipeline, in both cases limited to casualties and economic damages directly caused by a toxic inhalation hazard gas (and excluding flammable and explosive materials such as gasoline, propane, and ammonium nitrate). RMP data is publicly available at <http://www.rtknet.org>. PHMSA data is publicly available at <https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch>.

¹¹⁴ See for instance Raj, P. K. (1988, November). *A risk assessment study on the transportation of hazardous materials over the U.S. railroads* (DOT/FRA/ORD-88/14). Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation. Retrieved from <http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/research/ord8814.pdf>; Raj, P. K., and Turner, C. K. (1993, May 15). *Hazardous material transportation in tank cars: Analysis of risks – Part 1* (DOT/FRA/ORD-92/34). Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation. Retrieved from <http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/Research/ord9234.pdf>; Brown, D. F., Dunn, W. E., & Policastro, A. J. (2000, December). *A national risk assessment for selected hazardous materials in transportation* (ANL/DIS-01-1). Decision and Information Sciences Division, Argonne National Laboratory. Retrieved from <http://www.ipd.anl.gov/anlpubs/2001/01/38251.pdf>. Vanderbilt Center for Transportation Research (2012). Intermodal GIS network risk assessment. Vanderbilt University. Retrieved from http://www.vanderbilt.edu/vector/?page_id=340.

¹¹⁵ Fullwood, R. R. (2000). Probabilistic Safety Assessment in the Chemical and Nuclear Industries. Woburn, MA: Elsevier; Mannan, S. (Ed.). (2005). Lees’ Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (3rd ed.). Burlington, MA: Elsevier.

¹¹⁶ Pipeline & Gas Journal. (2014). Rail transportation of oil: A growing congressional safety concern [Online document]. *Pipeline & Gas Journal*, 241. Retrieved from <http://pipelineandgasjournal.com/rail-transportation-oil-growing-congressional-safety-concern>; Nader: Bakken oil-related railroad accidents are “national emergency” [Web page]. Retrieved from <http://kfgo.com/news/articles/2015/feb/18/nader-bakken-oil-related-railroad-accidents-are-national-emergency>.

¹¹⁷ The train accident in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, Canada resulted in 47 fatalities, and the destruction of 40 buildings and 53 vehicles. Transportation Safety Board of Canada. (2013). *Railway investigation report R13D0054: Runaway and main-track derailment*. Retrieved from <http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054.pdf>

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ 2012 – 2014 data was collected from the U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) website (<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch>) using the Incidents Reports Database Search function. 1980 – 2011 data was archival data collected by RMA for the original SNRA.

However, because the SNRA project team believes 1) that the effects of these recognized limitations upon the final reported estimates for this hazard event may be significant and 2) that these limitations cannot be understood without the context of the complete data and analysis presented in this document, this hazard is not reported among the comparatively analyzed threats and hazards in the SNRA 2015 public Findings. To better understand the risk from this hazard, the SNRA project team recommends further analysis that includes all factors included in the PHMSA data.

Dam Failure

In a recent report on the progress of the National Dam Safety Program, FEMA noted that, “while the data reveal encouraging trends in many areas, the larger picture of dam safety remains problematic at best.”¹²⁰ Many Americans are living below structurally deficient high-hazard potential dams whose failure would cause loss of human life. They are, for the most part, unaware of the risk, and unaware of the existence or lack of existence of plans to evacuate them to safety in the event of a failure.¹²¹ The Interagency Committee on Dam Safety classifies dams whose failure would cause loss of human life as “high-hazard potential”, and dams whose failure would result in no probable loss of life but could cause economic loss, environmental damage, or other impacts as “significant-hazard potential”. The number of high-hazard potential dams in the U.S. is currently about 13,000, with more than 3,300 high and significant dams located within one mile of a downstream population center and more than 2,400 located within two miles.¹²²

A significant factor influencing loss of life to dam failure is the suddenness of the dam collapse and the magnitude of the emergency planning and preparedness required for such an incident. Deaths on a massive scale may result if an evacuation cannot be quickly implemented to move people above inundation levels. The loss of life from dam collapse can be reduced if decision making for protective actions is informed by risk management, alert and notification systems are robust and timely, the public is educated and prepared to mobilize, evacuation is preplanned, and citizens are not unable to evacuate due to traffic congestion.

Data provided to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Dam Safety Program Management Tools (DSPMT) indicate that progress is being made in increasing the percentage of state-regulated high-hazard potential dams (an increase from 32 percent in 1999 to 51 percent in 2006) and that states are continuing to increase their inspections of dams. State dam safety programs are continuing to improve through assistance from the National Dam Safety Program and the Interagency Committee on Dam Safety, and such progress is crucial as the Federal Government owns or regulates only about 5 percent of dams in the United States.¹²³

Accidental Radiological Substance Release

Though anticipated to be unlikely (see Table B1, Appendix B), an accidental radiological release from a nuclear power plant accident or public exposure to lost or stolen radioactive sources could produce significant public health and economic impacts. Given the severe consequences of a large, radiological release from a power plant, the SNRA analysis focused on nuclear power plant accidents. A national-level power plant accident is defined as any accident that damages

¹²⁰ Federal Emergency Management Agency (2009, February). *Dam safety in the United States: A progress report on the National Dam Safety Program* (FEMA Publication No. P-759), p. 5.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Association of State Dam Safety Officials (2012). Dam Safety 101. Available from <http://www.damsafety.org>.

¹²³ See note 120.

the reactor core. The risk to the public and environment is highly dependent on radiation containment and the location of the reactor.¹²⁴

Should the unlikely event of an accident occur, the consequences caused by a nuclear release would be mitigated through several preparedness strategies. Monitoring systems would help individuals in the designated evacuation zone evacuate to the recommended safe distance. Regular testing of monitoring and warning systems ensures that they are functioning properly when an event occurs. In addition, medical countermeasures in the form of potassium iodide tablets are currently distributed to all individuals working or residing within 10 miles of nuclear power plants.¹²⁵ Taken shortly after a radioactive release, potassium iodide has some protective effect against thyroid cancer resulting from exposure to any radioactive iodine released in the accident. Finally, evacuation and safe routes are identified and communicated in nuclear power plant communities, and exercises are regularly conducted to test and refine planning for many communities.

Transportation System Failure

Transportation infrastructure is broadly distributed, but the health of the system can be monitored by the state of disrepair and trends of failures of bridges and tunnels. Bridges and tunnels are necessary means to overcome obstacles and are inherently more vulnerable and consequential than the roads that they connect.

Infrastructure owners and operators sometimes struggle to raise the funds for proper maintenance and repairs of structures and equipment, leading to an increasing risk of infrastructure failure. The U.S. transportation network includes reliance on key infrastructure nodes such as bridges and tunnels that are aging. In some cases these nodes are at risk of failure due to conditions exceeding design specifications. Such failures result in increased costs for repair or rebuild and increased transportation expenses for those normally using the lost connection, and often entail delays for emergency response. In rare instances these infrastructures may come under extreme loads, creating situations where high numbers of casualties could occur from their catastrophic failure.

The SNRA Transportation Systems Failure data set includes historical incidents of automotive, rail, and pedestrian bridge collapses in the United States. While bridge failures represent a subset of all mass transportation risk, there is a larger amount of data on bridge failures compared with tunnel and other transportation infrastructure, and bridges were considered sufficiently representative of a larger trend of changing conditions in critical infrastructure for the purposes of the SNRA.¹²⁶ The 25 road, rail, and pedestrian bridge failures which occurred in the United States between 1964 and 2007 and which resulted in fatalities¹²⁷ were used as the basis for the

¹²⁴ While the SNRA analysis did not explicitly consider the risk of cascading events such as the Fukushima disaster in Japan (i.e., an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear release happening concurrently), the frequency of core damage failure caused by external events (fire, seismic events, floods, high winds) is included in some of the publicly-available nuclear power plant license renewal applications used as data sources in the SNRA. The license renewal applications are available from the public website of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at <http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html>.

¹²⁵ Marburger, J. H. (2008, January 22). *Decision on delegation of section 127(f) of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002*. [Decision memorandum]. Washington, DC: Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President. Retrieved from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/ki-memo-2008.pdf>.

¹²⁶ The SNRA project team obtained studies and data on transportation tunnel failures, but judged them insufficient to support defensible unclassified quantitative estimates. Future iterations of the national risk assessment will include tunnel failures within the transportation systems failure event.

¹²⁷ Imhof, Daniel, and University of Cambridge (2012). BridgeForum Bridge Failure Database [electronic resource]. Structures Group, University of Cambridge Department of Engineering, adapted from Imhof, Daniel (2005), Risk Assessment of Existing Bridge Structures [dissertation], abstract at <http://www-civ.eng.cam.ac.uk/abstract/Imhofabs.html>. Database at <http://www.bridgeforum.org/dir/collapse/country/United%20States.html> (accessed December 13, 2012).

frequency, fatalities, injuries, and social displacement estimates of the SNRA. Direct economic loss estimates were also taken from the historical literature.

Adversarial Events: Conventional

Aircraft as a Weapon

Terrorists have long viewed aviation as a target for attack and exploitation. Successful attacks in the air domain can inflict mass casualties and grave economic damage, and attract significant public attention. Historically, large passenger aircraft have been at the greatest risk to terrorism, whether bombings, taking of hostages, traditional hijacking, and attack using human-portable surface-to-air missiles. Aircraft have also been used as weapons against targets on the ground, most notably but not limited to the attacks of September 11, 2001.¹²⁸

For this incident, the SNRA only considered the risk of aircraft being used as a kinetic mode of attack (e.g. a 9/11 style attack) rather than the risk of an improvised explosive device (IED) being detonated on an aircraft. The latter risk is considered under the explosives incident category in the SNRA.

In the 2011 SNRA, frequency estimates for this event were classified, and the majority of the impact estimates (fatalities, illnesses/injuries, economic loss) were unclassified but For Official Use Only (FOUO). The 2015 SNRA replaced this analysis with a fully unclassified analysis based upon historical data and insurance industry estimates. All frequency and impact estimates for this event in the 2015 SNRA are unclassified without caveats.

Armed Assault

To capture the range of terrorist attacks with small arms from small-scale shooter incidents to large-scale assault/siege-type attacks like the 2008 complex attack in Mumbai, India, historical incidents of successful armed assault attacks, involving the use of firearms but excluding biological and chemical weapons, were included in the data set used to determine fatality and injury estimates. As with the 2011 SNRA, only incidents resulting in one or more injury or fatality were included; however, both threshold and reported estimates included fatalities and injuries excluding the attacker(s).

For the SNRA, frequency, fatality, and injury estimates of a hostile, non-state actor(s) using assault tactics to conduct strikes on vulnerable target(s) was estimated using historical data published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), supplemented with data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).¹²⁹ To reflect the range of impacts historically evidenced as possible for this kind of attack, high estimates were based upon the 2005 assault and siege of the children's school in Beslan, Russia. Direct economic damage estimates were calculated based upon studies of medical costs of violent attacks in the literature and business interruption costs adapted from studies of the aftermath of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing.¹³⁰ Persons displaced from their homes were estimated to be zero for all incidents.

In the 2011 SNRA, frequency estimates for this event were classified, and the majority of the impact estimates (fatalities, illnesses/injuries, economic loss) were unclassified but For Official

¹²⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2007, March 26). *National Strategy for Aviation Security*. At <http://www.dhs.gov/publication/national-strategy-aviation-security>.

¹²⁹ The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information on terrorism events around the world (including domestic, transnational, and international incidents) from 1970 to 2010. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and—when identifiable—the group or individual responsible. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) (2011, July). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Available from <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>.

¹³⁰ Only businesses in the immediate 12-block exclusion zone were studied as an analog to the expected/typical aftermath of a conventional-attack terrorist attack in the U.S., not the citywide shutdown which was considered an exceptional occurrence less likely to recur.

Use Only (FOUO). All frequency and impact estimates for this event in the 2015 SNRA are unclassified without caveats.

Explosives Terrorism Attack

Terrorism attacks using explosives are a recurring threat to the American public, most recently from the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing attack. Explosive devices can come in many forms, ranging from a small pipe bomb to a sophisticated device capable of causing massive damage and loss of life. Explosives can be carried or delivered in a vehicle; carried, placed, or thrown by a person; delivered in a package; or concealed on the roadside.¹³¹ The reliability and availability of needed components and materials make it likely that explosives will remain a major part of terrorists' inventory in the future. For the 2015 SNRA, the fatality/injury threshold of the 2011 SNRA was broadened to include all terrorist explosive or incendiary attacks in the homeland, similar to the CBRN events, to explore the less-noticed but higher-frequency explosives attacks not resulting in human injuries relevant to the information needs of the 2015 revision of the National Preparedness Goal.

The SNRA analyzed the risk of a hostile non-state actor(s) successfully deploying a man-portable explosive device such as an improvised explosive device (IED), vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), or vessel IED, or incendiary devices, in the U.S. against a concentration of people and/or structures. Bombings of aircraft (as opposed to use of an airplane as a weapon which was treated separately) were also included within the scope of the Explosives Terrorism Attack event.

For the SNRA, frequency, fatality, and injury estimates of a hostile, non-state actor(s) using assault tactics to conduct strikes on vulnerable target(s) were estimated using historical data published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).¹³² Direct economic damage estimates for incidents of corresponding scope to this historical incident set were calculated based upon studies of medical costs of violent attacks in the literature, business interruption costs from the aftermath of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing,¹³³ and insurance industry models. To reflect the potential range of impacts from a catastrophic terrorist bombing using conventional explosives, high estimates were taken from historical near-miss accidents and insurance models. Persons displaced from their homes were estimated to be zero for the majority of incidents except for the Oklahoma City bombing which displaced 400 people.

In the 2011 SNRA, frequency estimates for this event were classified, and the majority of the impact estimates (fatalities, illnesses/injuries, economic loss) were unclassified but For Official Use Only (FOUO). All frequency and impact estimates for this event in the 2015 SNRA are unclassified without caveats.

Physical Attack on the Power Grid

The SNRA studied physical attacks on the electric grid resulting in outages of three hours or more to a major metropolitan area. Experience with grid failures from a localized physical event, such as a tree falling on a transmission line, which impacted large numbers of customers suggests that a deliberately targeted physical attack may have the potential to cause similar

¹³¹ National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004). IED attack: improvised explosive devices. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/ied-attack-fact-sheet>.

¹³² Federal Bureau of Investigation (2006). Terrorism 2002-2005. Counterterrorism Division, FBI: at <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005>.

¹³³ Only businesses in the immediate 12-block exclusion zone were studied as an analog to the aftermath of most conventional-attack terrorist attacks in the U.S., not the citywide shutdown which was considered an exceptional occurrence less likely to recur.

impacts. Compounded with this sense of vulnerability is the long history, in the U.S. and other countries, of small-scale attacks on physical grid elements by threat actors ranging from bored gun-shooters to full-fledged politically motivated terrorists.¹³⁴

From 2011 to 2014, there were 322 reported incidents of alleged or confirmed sabotage, physical attack and vandalism to different parts of U.S. utilities.¹³⁵ These cases represented about 35 percent of all incidents reported to the U.S. Department of Energy that posed a risk to the grid.¹³⁶ Most had little effect,¹³⁷ but some resulted in measureable impacts. The well-known incident at the Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) Company's Metcalf Transmission Substation outside of San Jose, California, for example, had widely reported estimates of \$15 million in damages and the potential for more serious impacts because the PG&E Metcalf substation provides power to California's Silicon Valley.¹³⁸

The SNRA estimated frequency for this event based upon historical incident data publicly reported by the U.S. Department of Energy and the FBI,¹³⁹ and impacts from a range of scenarios based upon the Metcalf incident (physical damage) and the 2003 East Coast Blackout. All frequency and impact estimates for this event are unclassified without caveats.

¹³⁴ Due to similar definitions and timeframe for data submission by owners and operators, sabotage, physical attack and vandalism were included in the scope of this event for the SNRA. The scope of this event included all hostile non-state actors, regardless of motive.

¹³⁵ OE-417 filings 2011-14, U.S. Department of Energy (see below). OE-417 filings are considered emergency forms. Depending on the specific circumstances, they must be filed either within one hour or six hours of the incident.

¹³⁶ Other incident types include weather and natural disasters, fuel supply deficiency, and operator actions.

¹³⁷ For over 100 incidents representing 1/3 of reported physical attacks, the impacts were listed as unknown. This analysis presumes that there were no impacts from these incidents. For many other incidents, it was reported that there was no load shedding or loss of power to customers, so these are presumed to have had little-to-no effect.

¹³⁸ Baker, David (2014, September 11). "FBI: Attack on PG&E South Bay substation wasn't terrorism." *San Francisco Chronicle*.

¹³⁹ U.S. Department of Energy (current [24 May 2015]): Electric Disturbance Events (OE-417), Office of Energy Delivery & Energy Reliability: at <http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/oe417.aspx>. Federal Bureau of Investigation (1982), FBI analysis of claimed terrorist incidents in the U.S. 1981, pp 29-30: at <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/120256NCJRS.pdf>.

Adversarial Events: CBRN

Overview¹⁴⁰

The SNRA leveraged the 2011 DHS Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) for likelihood and fatality, illness/injury, and economic loss estimates for the five CBRN national-level events. The ITRA is designed to generate customized reports to inform multiple decision contexts, including differing thresholds and splits or aggregations by specific agents or targets. For the purposes of the SNRA, the DHS Directorate of Science & Technology (S&T) provided data to the 2011 SNRA project corresponding to the scope of the five CBRN events as defined in the SNRA. Chemical and biological attacks on the food supply chain were split out from the ITRA chemical and biological attack events and combined into a single SNRA event.

All likelihood and impact estimates derived from the ITRA, the psychological distress estimates derived from the ITRA fatality and injury/illness data, and comparative risk judgments are classified at the SECRET//NOFORN level and may be found in the classified SNRA Technical Report. The methodology and analysis of the ITRA are described in detail in the technical reports of the ITRA and its three component assessments, the Biological Terrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA), the Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA), and the Radiological/Nuclear Terrorism Risk Assessment (RNTRA). The TRAs leverage a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodology of substantial complexity and maturity which is difficult to treat fairly in a compact manner, and thus the methodological discussion for these events is limited to the key parameters needed for a reviewer with the appropriate clearances to replicate the SNRA's quantitative estimates from the ITRA computational engine. Detailed discussion of the PRA methodology and its adaptation for DHS's terrorist risk assessments may be found in the unclassified literature.¹⁴¹

The SNRA's social displacement and environmental impact estimates are unclassified and non-FOUO for all events and are included here in full. However, since the SNRA defines the *risk* corresponding to a measure of impact to be the product of these impacts with event frequencies, all of which are classified for adversarial events, risk judgments and visualizations comparing the adversarial events among themselves or with other events are classified at the SECRET or SECRET//NOFORN level and may be found in the classified SNRA Technical Report.

Nuclear Terrorism Attack

The SNRA leveraged the 2011 DHS Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) to estimate the risk from nuclear terrorism attacks. Specifically, the SNRA included analysis of a nuclear attack in which a hostile non-state actor(s) acquires an improvised nuclear weapon through manufacture from fissile material, purchase, or theft, and detonates it. Nine U.S. cities were considered in calculating the frequency and impacts of the attack. The cities were chosen to sample a variety of locations and population densities and included New York, Washington, Houston, and Miami. Impacts of the attack were evaluated for four yields across the nine cities

¹⁴⁰ Additional discussion of the classified data sources of the SNRA is provided in Appendix L.

¹⁴¹ See Ezell et al (2010, April), Probabilistic risk analysis and terrorism risk, *Risk Analysis* 30(4) 575-589; and pp 101-104, Gerstein, Daniel M. (2009), *Bioterror in the 21st Century: Emerging Threats in a New Global Environment*, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD. While somewhat dated, the most comprehensive and critical review remains National Research Council (2008), *Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: a call for change*, National Academies Press, Washington DC.

and were evaluated 12 times throughout the year to sample atmospheric conditions at detonation.¹⁴²

A successful nuclear attack would cause substantial fatalities, injuries, and infrastructure damage from the heat and blast of the explosion, and significant radiological consequences from both the initial nuclear radiation and the radioactive fallout that settles after the initial event. A nuclear detonation in a modern urban area would impact the medical system more than any disaster previously experienced by the Nation.¹⁴³ An electromagnetic pulse from the explosion could also disrupt telecommunications and power distribution. Significant economic, social, psychological, and environmental impacts would be expected.¹⁴⁴

Nuclear explosions are classified by yield, or the amount of energy they produce, relative to how many tons of TNT would be needed to produce an equivalent explosive yield. Strategic nuclear weapon systems held by state actors deliver weapons with yields in the multi-hundred kilotons to megaton (1,000 kiloton) range. Generally, when considering nuclear explosion scenarios perpetrated by terrorists, experts assume a low-yield nuclear device detonated at ground level, where low yield in this context ranges from fractions of a kiloton (kT) to 10 kT.¹⁴⁵ A terrorist attack could be carried out with an improvised nuclear device (IND), which is a crude nuclear device built from the components of a stolen weapon or from scratch using nuclear material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium).

The primary obstacle to a terrorist IND attack is limited access to weapon-grade nuclear materials: highly enriched uranium, plutonium, and stockpiled weapons are carefully inventoried and guarded. Nuclear attack is also impeded because:

1. Building nuclear weapons is difficult—general principles are available in open literature, but constructing a workable device requires advanced technical knowledge in areas such as nuclear physics and materials science.
2. Crude nuclear weapons are typically very heavy, ranging from a few hundred pounds to several tons, and are difficult to transport, especially by air. Specially designed small nuclear weapons, including the so-called “suitcase nuclear weapons” are much lighter, but they are difficult to acquire and to construct.¹⁴⁶

Radiological Terrorism Attack

The SNRA leveraged the 2011 DHS Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) to estimate the risk from radiological terrorism attacks. The analysis only included data for successful attacks (e.g. detonation of the device or successful spread into the food or water system). Failed attacks, whether from interdiction during the fabrication and assembly of the dispersal device, interdiction during travel to United States, or failure of the dispersal device, were not included in this analysis.

¹⁴² U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011, October 24). *2011 Radiological/Nuclear Terrorism Risk Assessment (RNTRA)*, Vol. 1. (Reference is SECRET//NOFORN: Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED.)

¹⁴³ National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness and Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats (2010, June). *Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation* (2nd ed), p. 81.

¹⁴⁴ National Academies, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2005). Nuclear attack. Fact sheet for the public (series, Communicating in a Crisis). Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/prep_nuclear_fact_sheet.pdf via <http://www.ready.gov> (checked April 2015).

¹⁴⁵ It should be noted that if a state-built weapon were available to terrorists, the presumption of low yield may no longer hold. NSS (2010) *op cit*, p. 15.

¹⁴⁶ National Academies & DHS (2004). Nuclear attack public fact sheet, *op. cit.*

Radiological devices used for terrorism may include radiological dispersal devices (RDD) and radiological exposure devices (RED). The principal type of RDD is a “dirty bomb” that combines a conventional explosive with radioactive material. A second type involves radioactive material dispersed in air or water by other mechanical means, such as a water spray truck, a crop duster, or manually spread. An RED may comprise a powerful radioactive source hidden in a public place, such as a trash receptacle in a busy train or subway station, to expose passers-by to a potentially significant dose of radiation.¹⁴⁷

It is very difficult to design an RDD that would deliver radiation doses high enough to cause immediate health effects or fatalities in a large number of people. Most injuries from a dirty bomb would probably occur from the heat, debris, and force of the conventional explosion used to disperse the radioactive material, affecting individuals close to the site of the explosion. At the low radiation levels expected from an RDD, the immediate health effects from radiation exposure would likely be minimal.¹⁴⁸ Subsequent decontamination of the affected area could involve considerable time and expense. A dirty bomb could have significant psychological and economic effects.¹⁴⁹

Most radiological devices would have very localized effects, ranging from less than a city block to several square miles. Factors determining the area of contamination would include the amount and type of radioactive material, the means of dispersal, the physical and chemical form of the radioactive material (for example, material dispersed in the form of fine particles may be carried by the wind over a relatively large area), local topography and location of buildings, and local weather conditions.¹⁵⁰

Preparedness and effectiveness of response teams will play a significant role in mitigating the consequences caused by an RDD attack. Early identification of a radiological attack is important in determining whether or not to evacuate the area or shelter in place and the size of the area requiring cordonning.

Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)

The SNRA leveraged the 2011 DHS Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) in order to estimate risk from non-food biological terrorism attacks.

The SNRA considered the risk from a non-food biological attack in which a hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and releases a biological agent against an outdoor, indoor, or water target with a concentration of people within the United States. Frequency estimates for this event only include data for successful attacks (e.g., detonation of a device or release of an agent). Examples of failed attacks not included in the SNRA include interdiction during the fabrication and assembly of the dissemination device, interdiction during travel to the United States, or failure of the dissemination device.

Biological agents can be isolated from sources in nature, acquired from laboratories or a state bioweapons stockpile, or synthesized or genetically manipulated in a laboratory. Potential dissemination mechanisms of a biological agent by terrorists include aerosol dissemination from

¹⁴⁷ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2006, October). OSC Radiological Response Guidelines. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. EPA; at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/nsfweb/foscr/ASTFOSCRSeminar/References/EnvResponsePapersFactSheets/OSCRadResponseGuidelines.pdf> (retrieved April 2013).

¹⁴⁸ National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004). Radiological attack: dirty bombs and other devices. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/radiological-attack-fact-sheet> via <http://www.ready.gov>.

¹⁴⁹ EPA (2006) OSC Radiological Response Guidelines, *op. cit.*

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

sprayers or other devices outdoors or through the ventilation system of a building, subway, or airplane, human carriers, insects or other animal vectors, or physical distribution through the U.S. Mail or other means. Biological agents include transmissible agents that spread from person to person (e.g. smallpox, Ebola) or agents that may cause adverse effects in exposed individuals but which do not make these individuals contagious (e.g. anthrax, botulinium toxin).¹⁵¹

Unlike a nuclear or chemical attack, a biological attack may go undetected for hours, days, or potentially weeks (depending on the agent) until humans, animals, or plants show symptoms of disease. If there are no immediate signs of the attack as with the anthrax letters, a biological attack will probably first be detected by local health care workers observing a pattern of unusual illness, or by early warning systems that detect airborne pathogens. There may be uncertainties about crucial facts such as the exact location or extent of the initial release, the type of biological agent used, and likelihood of additional releases. The exact infectious dose (the number of organisms needed to make one sick, referred to as dose response) and the long-term health consequences for those who survive exposure are key scientific knowledge gaps for many biological agents: while approximate ranges and prognoses for humans have been extrapolated from animal studies, they comprise additional uncertainties which may complicate the public health response to a biological attack.¹⁵²

Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)

The SNRA leveraged the 2011 DHS Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) in order to estimate risk from non-food chemical terrorism attacks.

The SNRA considered the risk from a non-food chemical attack in which a hostile non-state actor(s) releases a chemical agent against an outdoor, indoor, or water target with a concentration of people within the United States. Frequency estimates for this event only include data for successful attacks (e.g. detonation of a device or release of an agent). Examples of failed attacks not included in the SNRA include interdiction during the fabrication and assembly of the dissemination device, interdiction during travel to the United States, or failure of the dissemination device.

Chemical agents can be acquired from a variety of different sources (e.g., chlorine, mustard gas, sarin) and disseminated in various modes. Potential delivery mechanisms of a chemical agent by terrorists include building ventilation systems, misting or aerosolizing devices, passive release (container of chemical left open), explosives, improvised devices combining readily available chemicals to produce a dangerous chemical, or sabotage of industrial facilities or vehicles containing chemicals.¹⁵³

According to the 2010 Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA), exposure to a chemical threat can result in health effects within a matter of minutes. This stands in contrast to many biological scenarios, and significantly impacts the risk reduction potential that exists in the chemical scenarios where casualties can occur rapidly after exposure. For chemicals with a delayed symptom onset, the 2010 CTRA identified related critical issues, including the timeliness of event detection and the logistics associated with successfully delivering medical countermeasures to exposed victims. These scenarios continue to be good candidates for risk

¹⁵¹ National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004). Biological attack: human pathogens, biotoxins, and agricultural threats. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/biological-attack-fact-sheet> via <http://www.ready.gov>.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004). Chemical attack: warfare agents, industrial chemicals, and toxins. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/chemical-attack-fact-sheet> via <http://www.ready.gov>.

management effort because improvements in event detection time or in medical countermeasure delivery were assessed to have the potential to significantly reduce chemical terrorism risk.¹⁵⁴

Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack

The SNRA also examined a national-level event involving successful chemical/biological attacks targeting food within the U.S. supply chain. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) extracted data from the 2011 DHS Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA)¹⁵⁵ for chemical and biological attacks on food and beverage targets for analysis as a national-level event in the SNRA distinct from attacks on non-food targets.¹⁵⁶

Chemical and biological weapons differ in potential toxicity, specificity, speed of action, duration of effect, controllability, and residual effects.¹⁵⁷ Children, the elderly, pregnant women, and immune-compromised individuals are particularly susceptible to the adverse effects of a chemical/biological food contamination.¹⁵⁸

A terrorist attack on the Nation's food supply chain using chemical or biological agents may initially be indistinguishable from an unintentional food contamination. Depending on the type of agent used in the attack, it could take several days for individuals to show symptoms and possibly weeks before public health, food, and medical authorities suspect terrorism as the source.¹⁵⁹ In 1984 members of the Rajneeshees, a religious community in an accelerating political dispute with the Oregon county where they had established their commune, deliberately contaminated salad bars at eight county restaurants with *Salmonella* bacteria, infecting or sickening 751 people and hospitalizing 45.¹⁶⁰ However, deliberate contamination was not identified until a year later, when the commune collapsed and criminal investigations into its other activities uncovered its clandestine biological laboratories.^{161,162}

Population exposure can be limited with fast and accurate identification of the agent and vehicle (water, milk, lettuce, etc.) utilized to target the food supply system. A prepared public communications plan will assist in further limiting the spread while also mitigating the economic losses associated with falsely identifying the food contaminant.

¹⁵⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2010, May). *Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA): Full report*. (Reference is SECRET: Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED.)

¹⁵⁵ DHS Directorate of Science & Technology (2011), Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (reference is SECRET//NOFORN).

¹⁵⁶ The scope of the SNRA chemical/biological food contamination event (e.g. the portions of the ITRA event tree for which the event's data were calculated) included water products (i.e. bottled water) distributed through the food consumer supply chain, but all other attacks against water targets (e.g. piped water) were included with the chemical and biological non-food attacks.

Attacks on agriculture were excluded from all events. While intentional attacks on agriculture were prioritized for inclusion in the SNRA as a national-level event corresponding to the unintentional Animal Disease event, data comparability challenges prevented the use of ITRA data on agricultural targets in the first SNRA.

¹⁵⁷ United Nations (1970). Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use, p. 12. Report of the Secretary-General, UN Publication no. E.69.I.24. Reprinted by Ballantine Books, 1970.

¹⁵⁸ FEMA (2008), *op. cit.*

¹⁵⁹ Federal Emergency Management Agency (August 2008), Food and Agricultural Incident Annex, p. 2, at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_FoodAgricultureIncidentAnnex.pdf (retrieved January 2015).

¹⁶⁰ This was to test a plan to poison the county water supply on Election Day, to suppress voter turnout and enable the group to take over the county board by electing their own candidates. Török et al (1997, August 6). A large community outbreak of Salmonellosis caused by intentional contamination of restaurant salad bars. *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)* 278(5) 389-395; at http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/forensic_epidemiology/Additional%20Materials/Articles/Torok%20et%20al.pdf (retrieved May 2014). Although unsuccessful in identifying deliberate action as the cause of the poisoning, CDC and FBI investigations following the incident may have deterred the group from carrying out their planned Election Day attack in November. Sobel et al (2002, March 9). Threat of a biological attack on the US food supply: the CDC perspective. *Lancet* 359(9309) 874-880.

¹⁶¹ Török et al, *op. cit.*

¹⁶² Carus, W. Seth (2001, February). Bioterrorism and biocrimes: the illicit use of biological agents since 1900. Pages 50-58. National Defense University; at http://www.ndu.edu/centercounter/full_doc.pdf (retrieved March 2013). Agents experimented with included *Salmonella typhimurium*, the variant which was used in the salad bar attacks, *Salmonella typhi* which causes hepatitis and typhoid fever, *Giardia*, HIV, and multiple chemical and pharmaceutical poisons. *Giardia lamblia* was to be introduced into the county water supply via dead rats and beavers, which carry the parasite (p. 54).

Notes

The SNRA findings detailed above provide a broad analysis of the risks from the varied threats and hazards faced by the Nation. As noted above, the assessment finds that a wide range of threats and hazards pose a significant threat to the Nation, affirming the need for an all-threats/hazards, capability-based approach to preparedness planning. Many opportunities exist to implement broad preparedness strategies that cut across many different threats and hazards. It is also important to keep in mind that within an all-hazards preparedness context, particular events which present risk to the Nation—such as nuclear attacks or chemical releases—require additional specialized response activities.

Impacts and Future Uses

The SNRA supports a risk-based, all-hazards strategy for preparedness as directed by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA), and the continued implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8): National

Preparedness. The SNRA is used to prioritize preparedness activities at the national level, inform the National Preparedness Goal (the Goal) and the National Preparedness System, and support other risk assessment efforts conducted by the whole community.

The SNRA served as an integral part of the 2011 development and 2015 update of the National Preparedness Goal, assisting in identification and refinement of the core capabilities and establishing a risk-informed foundation for the National Preparedness System.

The SNRA provides an understanding of the risks that pose the greatest challenge to the Nation's security and resilience. This understanding is crucial for preparedness planning and prioritization at all levels of government and the whole community. It enables:

- A shared understanding of threats and hazards for which communities should prepare
- A prioritization of the incidents that may pose the greatest negative impact to communities and thus require preparedness
- Support for capabilities-based planning, training, exercises, and evaluation across all mission areas of Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery

The SNRA is designed to inform prioritization and tradeoff decisions by enabling the analysis of which capabilities are likely to have an impact at reducing identified high-risk events. Using the SNRA, the whole community can better understand which scenarios are more likely to impact them, what the consequences would be, and what risks merit special attention.

The SNRA process will continue to be implemented in support of the National Preparedness Goal, the National Preparedness System, and the all-hazards, capability-based planning approach to national risk management. In conjunction with local, regional/metropolitan, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and Federal partners, the SNRA process will be further implemented and refined in order to serve as a unifying national risk profile helping to facilitate preparedness efforts across the Nation.

...A quantitative methodology uses numbers in a way that allows for the consistent use of values outside the context of the assessment.

*'Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodology',
DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010*



Reference

Strategic National Risk Assessment
Comparative Analysis

Comparative Analysis: Reference Appendices

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Appendix A: Data Visualization in the SNRA


The main body and appendices of this document include two types of quantitative charts: bar plots and scatter plots. Bar plots are used when analyzing a single type of information (such as frequency or impact, but not both at the same time), and scatter plots are used to analyze two types of information simultaneously (such as frequency and fatalities).

Bar Plots

On a bar plot, each bar represents a single threat/hazard event. Bars that are located toward the top of the chart are larger in the plotted quantity than points at the bottom. Each bar is a visual representation of the uncertainty in the value of the plotted quantity for a specific threat/hazard event. As illustrated in Figure A1, three points characterize each bar: (1) the best estimate of the plotted quantity, represented by a vertical stripe; (2) the high estimate of the plotted quantity, represented by the right end of the bar; and (3) the low estimate of the plotted quantity, represented by the left end of the bar. When two bars overlap (meaning that one can draw a vertical line that intersects both bars), then there is some uncertainty as to which of the two quantities is larger. The larger the degree of overlap, the more uncertain it is which quantity is larger.

Each bar plot included in this report is constructed using a logarithmic horizontal axis. This means that each vertical background line denotes a change in the plotted quantity (whether frequency or impact) by a factor of ten. As a result, the difference between the left and the right of the SNRA bar plots can be quite large, even factors of thousands or millions. Logarithmic axes allow quantities that differ by very large ratios to be plotted on the same chart, and straightforwardly compared.


Figure A1: Example Bar Plot



Scatter Plots

On a scatter plot, each point, with crosshairs, represents a single threat/hazard event. Since frequency (events per year) is the vertical axis, events that are higher frequency tend toward the top of the plot. Similarly, events with higher impact tend toward the right of the plot. This is illustrated in Figure A2.

Figure A2: Example Scatter Plot




The vertical line of the crosshair denotes the uncertainty in frequency and the horizontal line denotes the uncertainty in impact (consequence). The interpretation of the crosshairs depends on how the data was gathered for that particular threat/hazard event and is guided by the text that accompanies each scatter plot: “Frequency and consequence estimates are correlated at the mean where denoted by a solid circle at the intersection of the ranges; those with an open circle are not necessarily correlated at the intersection. No correlation should be assumed for arbitrary frequency-consequence pairings within the uncertainty of any national-level event without additional review of the underlying data. Note that high frequency estimates are rarely, if ever, correlated with high consequence estimates.”

Like the bar plots, scatter plots are constructed using logarithmic axes. However, in contrast to the bar plots, the scatter plots are logarithmic in both the vertical and horizontal axes. Scatter plots have an additional useful interpretation when they are constructed with logarithmic frequency and impact axes: the highest risk national level events congregate in the upper right hand corner and the lowest risk events in the lower left. The diagonal background lines, drawn in the upper left to lower right direction, represent lines of constant risk, as illustrated in figure A3. This means that two national level events that fall on the same line have a similar level of risk.¹ The diagonal lines are drawn to differentiate between factors of ten in risk. This means that if there are two national level events that fall on adjacent diagonal lines, the one on the higher diagonal line has ten times as much risk as the one on the lower diagonal line. The lines act

¹ This interpretation depends on a particular definition of risk, and does not account for differing risk preferences.

multiplicatively, meaning that if one event falls exactly on a diagonal line and a second event falls two lines below it, the first event has one hundred times more risk than the second.

Figure A3: Interpreting Risk Results in Scatter Plots



The uncertainty in the frequencies and impacts complicates this discussion. Even if a crosshair is centered on a line, it does not imply that the national level event has exactly that amount of risk. If the frequency and impact data is correlated for that particular national level event, the best estimate of risk is likely near the intersection point. If the data are uncorrelated, the estimated risk is likely to appear somewhere in the crosshairs, but it is unclear exactly where.

Appendix B: Frequency Assessment

Overview

In order to apply a consistent methodology across all SNRA event types, frequency was selected as a metric for the likelihood of event occurrence. Frequency was estimated as the potential number of occurrences or attacks, per year, which met or exceeded the established threshold for the event.

- For the majority of events, frequency estimates were based on statistical analysis of historic data, or directly from historical data where extensive records were available.¹ For the 2015 SNRA, these included new unclassified analyses of the conventional (non-CBRN and non-cyber) terrorist attack events of the 2011 SNRA, as well as a new adversarial event (Physical Attack on the Power Grid).
- CBRN adversarial/human-caused frequencies were estimated primarily using elicitation from subject matter experts.²

Frequency ranges included in the SNRA for adversarial/human-caused events are estimates of the frequency of successful attacks.

- For the CBRN attack events, where subject matter expert judgment was used to determine frequency of successful attacks, adversary intent and capability were considered implicitly by the experts, but were not explicitly quantified or characterized.
- Attack initiations may occur with higher frequency than the ranges provided.

When interpreting the frequency results presented below, it is important to consider that the frequency data in the SNRA is directly related to the threshold included in each national-level event definition. For example, the results for floods indicate that *floods causing greater than \$100 million in direct economic losses* are estimated to occur with a frequency between once every two years and ten times per year, with a best estimate of four times per year. For reference, the full threat and hazard definitions, including thresholds, can be found in Table 2 of the main report.

Major Findings

Many events are estimated to have the potential to happen more than once every 10 years, meaning that it is likely that the Nation's preparedness will be tested in this decade.

¹ SNRA project analysts examined the data sets for a particular event and identified how many incidents within the scope of the event occurred at or above the established threshold per year. For events with extensive (at least 5–10) incidents captured by the threshold and temporal scope of the event data set, low and high frequencies in most cases represent the inverse of the longest gap between incidents, and the most incidents in one year respectively. For events with fewer incidents, low and high estimates generally represent the 5th and 95th percentile of the frequency distribution estimated using methods developed for the risk analysis of rare events (in most cases, the Poisson distribution corresponding to the number of observations).

² Subject matter expert (SME) elicitation was a component of modeling frequency in the Terrorism Risk Assessments, the DHS/Directorate of Science & Technology (S&T) models leveraged for the classified CBRN risk information in the SNRA. The 2011 SNRA additionally leveraged SME elicited frequencies from elicitations conducted for the DHS/Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) 2010 Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision-making (RAPID) (aircraft as a weapon, explosives terrorism attack) model, and direct elicitations conducted by the SNRA project team in July 2011 (armed assault and cyber attacks); these were replaced with unclassified information in 2015. In all cases, the outputs from these models/elicitations were converted to equivalent units of successful events per year for comparison to the frequencies of natural and technological hazards drawn from the historical record.

SME estimation of the frequency of rare, adversarial/human-caused events is challenging, and SME frequency judgments in the SNRA reflect significant uncertainty. As with all data in the SNRA, these SME frequency judgments should be interpreted as order of magnitude estimates for the purposes of comparison.

By their best estimates, the most frequent natural and technological hazard events in the SNRA are explosives terrorism attacks (including incendiary attacks), floods, tornado events/outbreaks, hurricanes, and accidental chemical substance releases (toxic inhalation hazards), which are expected to occur a few times per year. However, other events have the potential to occur at least this frequently, when uncertainty is considered.

The most frequent threat/hazard event in the 2015 SNRA is explosives terrorism attacks. This may seem surprising, at first. However, this frequency reflects the choice of threshold.

- For the 2015 SNRA, the threshold for explosives terrorism attacks was set to be the occurrence of an event (an explosives or incendiary attack, designated as terrorist by the U.S. Government³), similar to the CBRN events. Federal partner participants in the 2015 SNRA selected this threshold to capture the set of explosives and incendiary attack incidents most relevant to the planning and preparedness questions involved with the 2015 revision of the National Preparedness Goal.
- Bombings occur with a much higher frequency in the United States than may be generally realized, with more than a thousand every year in the last years that the FBI reported complete statistics (see Explosives Terrorism Attack risk summary sheet). As large as it may appear, the set of terrorism-designated incidents included in the primary data set leveraged by the 2015 SNRA represents only a tiny subset of these.⁴

Of the non-adversarial events with frequency data of sufficient quality upon which to base comparisons, the least frequent hazard, a very severe (Carrington level⁵) space weather event, has a best estimate of frequency of approximately 1 in 150 years. However, because of the limited observational evidence for solar storms of this magnitude, the uncertainties are very broad around this best estimate.

³ The terrorism designation is in part a constraint originating in the best available data, the FBI historical statistical reviews of terrorism in the United States (see the Explosives Terrorism Attack risk summary sheet).

⁴ Note that in the case of explosives attacks, lowering the threshold does not substantially affect the risk on the metrics measured by the SNRA. For example, a much larger number of zero-injury attacks are captured, increasing the counted frequency; however, the average number of fatalities and injuries decrease in proportion, resulting in little or no change in injury or fatality risk.

⁵ See Space Weather risk summary sheet, Appendix J.

Figure B1: Frequency by Threat/Hazard Event




Table B1: SNRA Frequency Data and Sources

Threat/Hazard Type	Frequency Estimate (number of events per year)			Source Information
	Low	Best	High	
Animal Disease Outbreak	0.04	0.1	0.1	Estimates provided by DHS Office of Health Affairs subject matter experts. These estimates only reflect the likelihood of an outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD).
Drought	0.50	0.63	1.0	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between drought events causing greater than \$1 B in damages (low), the mean frequency of drought events causing greater than \$1 B in damages (best), and the greatest number of drought events causing greater than \$1 B in damages within one year (high) from the U.S. historic events between 1980-2014. ¹
Earthquake	0.11	0.27	2	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between earthquakes causing greater than \$100 M in damages (low), the mean frequency of earthquakes causing greater than \$100 M in damages (best), and the greatest number of earthquakes causing greater than \$100 M in damages within one year (high) from the U.S. historic events between 1906-2005. ²
Flood	0.5	4	10	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between floods causing greater than \$100 M in damages (low), the mean frequency of floods causing greater than \$100 M in damages (best), and the greatest number of floods causing greater than \$100 M in damages within one year (high) from the U.S. historic events between January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2005. ³
Human Pandemic Outbreak	0.017	0.033	0.10	Estimates provided by CDC subject matter experts, informed by the historic frequency of influenza pandemics since 1729. ⁴
Hurricane	0.33	1.9	7	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between hurricanes causing greater than \$100 M in damages (low), the mean frequency of hurricanes causing greater than \$100 M in damages (best), and the greatest number of hurricanes causing greater than \$100 M in damages within one year (high) from the U.S. historic events between 1970-2010. ⁵
Space Weather	0.0017	0.0067	0.014	Best estimate frequency represents a return period of 1/153 years (rounded to 1/150 years) for a Carrington class space weather event based upon the assumption of a random (Poisson) process and one observation in 153 years. Low and high one year frequency estimates represent the 1 standard deviation (68.3%) confidence interval around this best estimate. ⁶
Tornado	0.0024	0.005	0.0074	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between tornadoes causing greater than \$100 M in damages (low), the mean frequency of tornadoes causing greater than \$100 M in damages (best), and the greatest number of tornadoes causing greater than \$100 M in damages within one year (high) from the U.S. historic events between 1996-2011. ⁷
Wildfire	0.2	0.8	3	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between wildfires causing greater than \$100 M in damages (low), the mean frequency of wildfires causing greater than \$100 M in damages (best), and the greatest number of wildfires causing greater than \$100 M in damages within one year (high) from the U.S. historic events between 1990-2009. ⁸
Winter Storm	0.13	0.56	2	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between winter storm (blizzard, ice storm, freeze) events causing greater than \$1 B in damages (low), the mean frequency of winter storm events causing greater than \$1 B in damages (best), and the greatest number of winter storm events causing greater than \$1 B in damages within one year (high) from the U.S. historic events between 1980-2014. ⁹
Biological Food Contamination	0.20	0.64	1.2	Historic events in the CDC's Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD) which were multistate outbreaks requiring greater than 100 hospitalizations formed the data set. Frequency estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between outbreaks (low), the mean frequency of the outbreaks (best), and the greatest number of outbreaks within one year (high). Years included in FOOD include 1998-2008. ¹⁰
Chemical Substance Spill or Release	0.61	1.6	5	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between accident events (low), the mean frequency of the accident events (best), and the greatest number of accidents within one year (high) within the U.S. historic data set used for the SNRA analysis. ¹¹
Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)	0.039	0.11	0.22	Low, best, and high frequencies represent the 5th, mean, and 95th percentile of the uncertainty distribution for frequency of accidents involving combustible and/or flammable cargo transported by rail where the ignition or explosion caused one or more fatalities, based upon the assumption of a random (Poisson) process and four observations in 35 years within the U.S. historic data set used for the SNRA analysis. ¹²

Appendix B: Frequency Assessment

Threat/Hazard Type	Frequency Estimate (number of events per year)			Source Information
	Low	Best	High	
Dam Failure	0.17	0.54	3	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between dam failures causing 1 fatality or greater (low), the mean frequency of dam failures causing 1 fatality or greater (best), and the greatest number of dam failures causing 1 fatality or greater within one year (high) from the U.S. historic events during the time period from 1960-2009. ¹³
Radiological Substance Release	0.0062	0.0093	0.014	Estimates are drawn from core damage failure frequencies in the license renewal applications available on the public website of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ¹⁴
Transportation System Failure	0.17	0.57	2	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between bridge failures causing 1 fatality or greater (low), the mean frequency of bridge failures causing 1 fatality or greater (best), and the greatest number of bridge failures causing 1 fatality or greater within one year (high) from the U.S. historic events during the time period from 1964-2007. ¹⁵
Aircraft as a Weapon	0.036	0.13	0.27	Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile of the uncertainty distribution for the frequency of events for aircraft as a weapon attacks, based upon historic data: historical incidents described by the FBI as terrorist incidents 1992-2014. ¹⁶ For this event in the SNRA, frequency estimates only include data for attacks resulting in one or more injuries or fatalities other than the attacker(s).
Armed Assault	0.11	0.48	3	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between attacks (low), the mean frequency of attacks (best), and the greatest number of attacks within one year (high) from U.S. historic assaults and armed attacks indiscriminate in nature, designated as terrorist incidents by the FBI between 1980-2012. ¹⁷ For this event in the SNRA, frequency estimates only include data for attacks resulting in one or more injuries or fatalities other than the attacker(s).
Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile frequency of events matching the SNRA definition of biological terrorism attacks (non-food) in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Frequency estimates in the SNRA only include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent. ¹⁸
Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile frequency of events matching the SNRA definition of chemical terrorism attacks (non-food) in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Frequency estimates in the SNRA only include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent.
Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile frequency of events matching the SNRA definition of chemical/biological food contamination terrorism attacks in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Frequency estimates in the SNRA only include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent.
Explosives Terrorism Attack	0.72	7.0	25	Estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years between attacks (low), the mean frequency of attacks (best), and the greatest number of attacks within one year (high) from U.S. historic explosives/incendiary attacks designated as terrorist incidents by the FBI between 1980-2005. ¹⁹ For this event in the SNRA, frequency estimates only include data for successful attacks, e.g. deployment of a device, not preventions.
Nuclear Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile frequency of events matching the SNRA definition of nuclear terrorism attacks in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Frequency estimates in the SNRA only include data for successful attacks, e.g., detonation of a device.
Physical Attack on the Power Grid	0.013	0.25	1	Low estimate based on one incident of a terrorist attack in the United States causing significant power outage to a metropolitan area in the 80 year period 1936 - 2014. ²⁰ Best and high estimates, based on data from Department of Energy's OE-417 Filings from 2011-2014. ²¹ Best estimate, 1 attack reporting both demand loss and customers affected in 4 years; high estimate, 4 attacks in 4 years reporting customers affected but demand loss unknown.
Radiological Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile frequency of events matching the SNRA definition of radiological terrorism attacks in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Frequency estimates in the SNRA only include data for successful attacks, e.g., detonation of a device or radiation exposure.

¹ National Climactic Data Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2015), Billion-dollar U.S. weather/climate disasters 1980-2013: at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events>.

² The U.S. historic earthquake record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained from the published report by Vranes, K. and Pielke, R. (2009). Normalized earthquake damage and fatalities in the United States: 1900-2005. *Natural Hazards Review* 10(3), 84:101.

³ The U.S. historic flood record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained by aggregating flood losses reported by NOAA's National Climactic Data Center (NCDC). Modern flood reporting by NOAA relies on many individual reports that assess damages in a specific area of responsibility. A large scale flood, for example, can result in dozens or hundreds of damage entries that assess damages for specific geographic regions. As flooding passes down the Mississippi, for example, the affected areas can pass from region to region. To capture the transient and distributed nature of flood events, individual flood loss reports were aggregated based on distance and time. Flood damage reports that occurred within 100 miles of one another and within plus or minus one calendar day are aggregated into composite flood events. The composite flood events above the \$100 Million (2011 dollar) threshold were used for reporting frequency, fatality, injury, and direct economic loss estimates in the SNRA. All hurricanes were removed from flood events to avoid double-counting flooding damages included in the SNRA hurricane analysis.

⁴ Potter, C. W. (2001). A history of influenza. *Journal of Applied Microbiology*, 91, 572-579.

⁵ The U.S. historic hurricane record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained from the ICAT Damage Estimator (<http://www.icatdamagestimator.com>), which uses a methodology for computing economic losses similar to that published by Pielke, R.J., Gratz, J., Landsea, C., Collins, D., Saunders, M., and Musulin, R. (2008). Normalized hurricane damage in the United States: 1900-2005. *Natural Hazards Review* 9(1), 29-42.

⁶ Love, Jeffrey J. (2012, May 18). Credible occurrence probabilities for extreme geophysical events: earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, magnetic storms. *Geophysical Research Letters* 39 L10301: at <https://geomag.usgs.gov/downloads/publications/2012GL051431.pdf>. Note that these estimates rely on a frequentist interpretation of probability, as opposed to the Bayesian treatment used more generally for rare event frequencies in the SNRA: this model was selected based upon its citation by experts on both sides of the highly polarized space weather risk community.

⁷ The U.S. historic tornado record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was compiled from the online database of the Storm Prediction Center (SPC) of the National Weather Service (NWS), a division of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). From 1996 to 2011 (prior to 1996 the economic damages figures in the database had been reported in semi-quantitative bins rather than as estimates in millions of dollars, so to ensure consistency the SNRA project team used data from 1996 onward only) there were 46 tornado events which met this criterion. Of these 46 events, 44 were outbreaks which included more than one tornado. These multi-tornadic outbreak events were determined using a clustering routine (written in MATLAB) to aggregate fatality, injury, and economic consequences which occurred within one day and 150 miles of at least one other tornado. The one-day window accounts for a 47 hour and 59 minute maximal span of time: for example, the day window would associate a tornado which struck at 00:00 on January 1, 2011 with another tornado which struck at 23:59 on January 2, 2011. Duplicate database entries for the same tornado funnel (as opposed to tornadoes determined to be clustered in the same storm system), which occurred when a single tornado crossed state lines, were consolidated to single multi-state records and partial reports were eliminated prior to running the data through the clustering algorithm. The clustering was done because DHS is responsible for responding to a single destructive event which may span multiple counties and states, without separating out damage that comes from individual storms in the same storm system.

⁸ The U.S. historic wildfire record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was compiled from the SHELDUS database (Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute (2011). The Spatial Hazards Events and Losses Database for the United States, Version 8.0 [Online Database]. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina. Available from <http://www.sheldus.org>). SHELDUS breaks down wildfire events into separate counties, and sometimes breaks down single wildfires in the same location into separate fires with overlapping date ranges, dividing casualty and damages between them to avoid double-counting. Where this was obviously done (fires reported by counties in the same state having the same time range, or reported in the same city with overlapping or continuously adjacent time ranges) the separately reported portions of a single fire event were consolidated into single events. All wildfires (after consolidation) above the \$100 Million threshold in 2011 dollars (a CPI multiplier of 1.0464 was used to convert the December 2009 values given in SHELDUS v8.0 to May 2011 values) from 1970-2009 were used in the SNRA analysis.

⁹ National Climactic Data Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2015), Billion-dollar U.S. weather/climate disasters 1980-2013: at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events>.

¹⁰ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD) is available online at <http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks>.

¹¹ The set of historic chemical substance release events used for analysis in the SNRA were those which met either of the following criteria: 1) at least one “public” fatality, defined as one fatality other or in addition to an employee fatality, caused by the hazardous material; 2) at least one fatality of any kind caused by the hazardous material, plus a reported evacuation or shelter-in-place order. This set came from the set of all reported toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) incidents reported 1994-2010 to either the EPA's Risk Management Program (RMP) accident database for fixed industrial producers and consumers of the listed toxic chemicals above given threshold limits, or to the Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Substances Administration (PHMSA)'s database of road, rail, water, and air transportation accidents.

¹² Incident data published by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) for the years 1980-2014: at <https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>. Rail incidents only, hazard class codes 1.1, 1.2, 1.4 (all subclasses), 1.5, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2, 2.1, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4.

¹³ Historic data for U.S. dam failures were provided by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation via the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection Dams Sector Branch. Dam failures which were caused by cascading events (e.g., a failing dam upstream) were combined into single events.

¹⁴ The best estimate for frequency uses a simulation of the expected core damage frequencies and expected consequences obtained from the license renewal applications for a number of individual reactors available from the public website of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory commission at <http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html>. The data from the license renewal applications is used to perform cost/benefit analyses on reactor upgrades and the baseline data was not developed for use in a general risk assessment. Currently, this is the most recently publicly available data and adequate for order of magnitude estimates in the SNRA. An alternative analysis was also conducted using fatality, injury, and core damage frequency data from NUREG-1150, and the best estimates from this analysis were within an order of magnitude of the results obtained using data from license renewal applications (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1990). *NUREG-1150 Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants*. Washington, DC: U.S. NRC). The low frequency estimate is the 5th percentile of the core damage frequencies, taking into account variability across the different reactors and the uncertainty of a single reactor. Note that this frequency incorporates the uncertainty and variability of the expectation and does not directly correspond to the Low consequence values. The high frequency estimate is the 95th percentile of the core damage frequencies, taking into account variability across the different reactors and the

uncertainty of a single reactor. This does not correspond to the High consequence values which have likelihoods one to two orders of magnitude lower than the Best CDF value.

¹⁵ Imhof, Daniel, and University of Cambridge (2012). BridgeForum Bridge Failure Database [electronic resource]. Structures Group, University of Cambridge Department of Engineering, adapted from Imhof, Daniel (2005), Risk Assessment of Existing Bridge Structures [dissertation], abstract at <http://www-civ.eng.cam.ac.uk/abstract/Imhofabs.html>. Database at <http://www.bridgeforum.org/dir/collapse/country/United%20States.html>. The 25 incidents causing fatalities are a subset of 71 total U.S. bridge failure incidents from 1964-2007 in these sources.

¹⁶ 5th, mean, and 95th percentile of the uncertainty distribution for frequency for aircraft as a weapon attacks treated as a Poisson process: gamma(3,23) posterior from gamma(1,0) prior updated with two event counts in 23 years (01/01/1992-12/31/2014) described as terrorist acts by the FBI (FBI (2006), Terrorism 2002-2005, <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005>; for 2012 attack on IRS building, FBI (2011, September), Terrorism (special issue), *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 80(9), <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/september-2011/September-2011-leb.pdf>).

¹⁷ FBI (2006), Terrorism 2002-2005, <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005>; for 2006-2012 attacks, FBI (2011, September), Terrorism (special issue), *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 80(9), <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/september-2011/September-2011-leb.pdf>. These attacks included shootings and one vehicle attack (assault on crowd with vehicle as opposed to explosive or other deadly weapon), and indiscriminate as to target (i.e. terrorist assassination attacks were excluded).

¹⁸ Examples of failed attacks not considered in the SNRA frequency estimates include interdiction during the fabrication and assembly of the dispersal device, interdiction during travel to the United States, or failure of the dissemination device.

¹⁹ FBI (2006), Terrorism 2002-2005, <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005>.

²⁰ Macheteros attack on San Juan, Puerto Rico electric substations 11/27/1981. Pp 29-30, Federal Bureau of Investigation (1982), FBI analysis of claimed terrorist incidents in the U.S. 1981, Terrorist Research and Analytical Center, FBI: at <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/120256NCJRS.pdf>; Thomas, Jo (1981, November 28), Puerto Rico terrorist group takes responsibility for blackout, *New York Times* 29 November 1981: at <http://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/29/us/puerto-rico-terrorist-group-takes-responsibility-for-blackout.html>. Note that the scope of this event is not limited to terrorist attacks.

²¹ 2011 through 2015 provided the most complete data for which physical attacks were tracked. OE-417 data are available at www.oe.netl.doe.gov/oe417.aspx. Sabotage, physical attack and vandalism were considered physical attacks for purposes of this analysis, due to similar definitions and timeframe for OE-417 data submission by owners and operators. Note that the scope of this event is not limited to terrorist attacks.

Appendix C: Fatality Impact Assessment

Overview

For events that have occurred in the past, the number of fatalities was estimated primarily from the historical record. For events that have never occurred, primarily but not limited to the chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) adversarial events,¹ impacts were estimated using data from previous DHS risk assessments which rely on models and simulations.

When interpreting the fatality results presented below, it is important to consider that the impact data in the SNRA is directly related to the threshold included in each threat/hazard event definition. For example, the results for floods indicate that *floods causing greater than \$100 million in direct economic losses* are estimated to cause between 0 and 25 fatalities, with a best estimate of 3 fatalities. For reference, the full threat/hazard event definitions, including thresholds, can be found in Table 2 of the main report.

In many cases, the high estimates for fatalities in the SNRA were constructed from either historic maximums (e.g. natural hazards) or the 95th percentile of a modeled distribution (e.g. CBRN terrorism events). Thus, the high estimates associated with each threat/hazard event may not be reflective of the fatalities which may occur from a “worst-case scenario”. Additional analysis is necessary to better characterize the “worst-case” upper bounds for fatalities associated with each threat/hazard event.

Major Findings

- At the best estimate, a pandemic influenza outbreak with a 25% gross clinical attack rate and a case fatality rate similar to the 1957 flu pandemic is estimated to result in the most fatalities, given occurrence, of any event among the non-CBRN threats and hazards considered by the SNRA. Such a pandemic influenza outbreak is estimated to cause between 77,000 and 230,000 fatalities, with a best estimate of 150,000 fatalities.
- With the exception of a pandemic influenza outbreak, earthquakes are assessed to have the largest expected impacts per occurrence of the natural hazards, at the best estimate. The expected fatalities due to an earthquake are assessed to be of a comparable order of magnitude (hundreds of fatalities) as potential aircraft-as-a-weapon attacks and accidental radiological substance releases, at the best estimate.
- A widespread, long-term electric power outage, such as an outage caused by a space weather event which resulted in the physical destruction of many electric transformers, could result in thousands of fatalities or more, depending on the extent, duration, and time of year of the power outage. The 2003 Northeast Blackout, used as the model for the low impact scenario of the SNRA space weather event, caused approximately 100 fatalities in New York City alone.² The SNRA high estimate of fatalities is scaled up from this figure to a longer outage in proportion to person-days of lost power, but only in part because of the very large uncertainties surrounding the health impacts of a very long-term power outage affecting millions of people in the U.S. For this reason, the SNRA’s high estimate of 2,000 fatalities

¹ Fatality estimates for the CBRN events are classified at the SECRET or SECRET//NOFORN level.

² This total, representing excess fatalities, is substantially larger than initial counts of fatalities (fewer than a dozen). Anderson et al (2012). Lights out: Impact of the August 2003 power outage on mortality in New York, NY. *Epidemiology* 23(2) 189-193.

likely understates the number of fatalities consequent to such an event, possibly by orders of magnitude.³

- Explosives (including incendiary) terrorism attacks have a very low expected value of fatalities per occurrence.
 - However, this is in part because this event in the 2015 SNRA includes any designated terrorist attack regardless of impacts, similar to the attack-only threshold of the CBRN terrorist events. As a result, the expected values of impacts are low because they represent averages of a large set with many zero-impact incidents.
 - The high estimate represents scenarios, such as the foiled al-Qaeda plots to simultaneously bomb multiple passenger aircraft, which are possible and plausible but which have not yet occurred. Such an attack could kill thousands of people. However, the likelihood of occurrence of these catastrophic scenarios relative to other explosives attacks remains unknown.
- Winter storms, hurricanes, tornadoes, and dam failure incidents meeting the threshold criteria of their respective SNRA events cause fatalities in the dozens, on average, but have the potential to cause hundreds of fatalities in exceptional instances.
- Biological food contamination, transportation systems failures (bridge failures), wildfires, chemical accidents, and floods meeting the threshold criteria of their respective SNRA events have the potential to cause fatalities in the dozens in exceptional instances, but average fewer than a dozen fatalities per occurrence.
- Armed assault attacks also average fewer than a dozen fatalities per incident. However, rare instances such as the 2008 Mumbai attack (used as the model for the armed assault National-level Event in the 2011 SNRA) and the 2005 Beslan attack, used as the high estimate for this event in the 2015 SNRA, demonstrate the potential for infantry-style team assaults to cause fatalities in the hundreds.
- The potential for a rail accident involving flammable or explosive cargoes to cause mass fatalities has attracted greater national attention in recent years. For this reason, the 2015 project added combustible/flammable cargo rail accidents to the SNRA's comparative assessment.
 - However, application of the same methods (historical incident analysis limited to the recent past) used for the majority of the other SNRA accidental hazards resulted in estimates indicating minimal fatality risk from this hazard. It is unclear to what extent this reflects a limitation of the method (i.e. that it may not be the appropriate method for this particular hazard), versus a counter-intuitive but important finding.
 - Because of this uncertainty the 2015 SNRA project team reports these results in its comparative analysis, but recommends additional study using more sophisticated modeling and methods.⁴

³ Because of the polarization of opinion in the expert community, the SNRA does not make a middle best estimate for space weather impacts (with the exception of environmental impacts). Because neither of the low or high estimates can be ruled out as the more reasonable likely outcome, the 2015 SNRA treats the high best estimate as the best estimate in discussions directed to preparedness planning.

⁴ Such as the full probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) methodologies used for the radiological accident and the classified CBRN analyses in the SNRA., which were developed for the quantitative risk analysis of very rare events.

- Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is assessed to have no potential of causing human fatalities. FMD affects livestock but poses no health risk to humans.^{5,6}

Additional Information

Fatality information of sufficient quality upon which to base comparisons could not be found for every threat and hazard event identified in the 2011 and 2015 iterations of the SNRA (Table 5, Table 6, main report). Work on these events continues.

⁵ FMD was selected as a exemplary or proxy disease representing the larger class of animal diseases. Other animal diseases can pose a health hazard to humans, in particular zoonotic diseases such as avian influenza. FMD has been known to cause human health effects, but only in very rare incidents.

⁶ The SNRA Drought hazard event causes no fatalities by construction, as human health impacts are considered to be within the scope of a planned Heat Wave hazard event (quantitative analysis in progress: individual event analysis was completed for the 2015 SNRA, but time constraints prevented the fully comparative analysis with other hazards). Agricultural economic impacts of drought/heat wave events are considered under the Drought event, with human health and physical property-damage impacts considered as heat wave impacts to avoid double counting between hazards.

Figure C1: Fatalities by Threat/Hazard Event



Table C1: SNRA Fatality Data and Sources

Threat/ Hazard Type	Fatality Estimates			Source Information
	Low	Best	High	
Animal Disease Outbreak	0	0	0	There are no significant human health implications of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD), the animal disease considered in the SNRA.
Drought	0	0	0	Zero fatalities by construction. The SNRA treated drought and heat waves as distinct hazards, and considered human health impacts from overlapping wave/drought incidents as effects of heat waves as opposed to drought.
Earthquake	0	370	8,900	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high fatalities from earthquakes causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1906-2011. ¹
Flood	0	3	25	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high fatalities from floods causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2005. ²
Human Pandemic Outbreak	77,000	154,000	230,000	Fatality estimates provided by CDC assuming a 25% gross clinical attack rate, using case fatality rates associated with the 1957 flu pandemic. ³
Hurricane	0	26	1,200	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high fatalities from hurricanes causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1970-2010. ⁴
Space Weather	90	N/A	2,000	Low estimate reflects the number of excess fatalities from the 2003 East Coast Blackout New York City, ⁵ representing a low best estimate scenario of large-scale but temporary grid failure. ⁶ High best estimate, extrapolation of the fatalities from the low scenario in proportion to person-days without power and an SNRA project team assumption of one month average outage per person having disruptive effects. ⁷ The SNRA did not make a middle best estimate for fatalities.
Tornado	0	22	320	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high values of fatalities from tornado events causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1996-2011. ⁸
Winter Storm	0	50	270	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high values of fatalities from snowstorm, blizzard, ice storm, and freeze events causing greater than \$1 B in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1980-2013. ⁹
Wildfire	0	5	25	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high fatalities from wildfires causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1990-2009. ¹⁰
Biological Food Contamination	0	11	42	Estimates were obtained from historic events in the CDC's Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD) which were multistate outbreaks requiring greater than 100 hospitalizations. Years included in FOOD include 1998-2008. ¹¹
Chemical Substance Spill or Release	1	5	25	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high fatalities reported per incident within the U.S. historic data set used for the SNRA analysis. ¹²
Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)	1	1	1	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high injuries from accidents involving U.S. rail cars with combustible or flammable cargoes resulting in 1 fatality or greater during the time period from 1980-2014. ¹³
Dam Failure	1	17	170	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high fatalities from U.S. dam failures causing 1 fatality or greater during the time period from 1960-2009. ¹⁴

Appendix C: Fatality Impact Assessment

Threat/Hazard Type	Fatality Estimates			Source Information
	Low	Best	High	
Radiological Substance Release	0	230	2,200	Estimates are drawn from the historic case of Three Mile Island as well as license renewal applications available on the public website of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ¹⁵
Transportation System Failure	1	9	47	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high fatalities from U.S. bridge failures causing 1 fatality or greater during the time period from 1960-2009. ¹⁶
Aircraft as a Weapon	2	290	2,800	Fatality estimates constructed from SNRA project team analysis of historic events in which aircraft intentionally or unintentionally crashed into buildings or crowds of people. The 9/11 attacks in New York are used as a maximum case. The analysis does not take into account higher-consequence events which have not yet occurred.
Armed Assault	0	2	330	Low and best estimates correspond to the low and average fatalities reported per incident from U.S. historic assaults and armed attacks indiscriminate in nature and resulting in one or more fatalities or injuries other than the attacker(s), designated as terrorist incidents by the FBI between 1980-2012. ¹⁷ High estimate of fatalities comes from the 2005 school assault in Beslan, Russia. ¹⁸ Counts exclude attacker fatalities.
Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile fatalities associated with events matching the SNRA definition of biological terrorism attacks (non-food) in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Fatality estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent.
Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile fatalities associated with events matching the SNRA definition of chemical terrorism attacks (non-food) in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Fatality estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent.
Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile fatalities associated with events matching the SNRA definition of chemical/biological food contamination terrorism attacks (non-food) in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Fatality estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent.
Explosives Terrorism Attack	0	1	3,700	Low and best estimates correspond to the low and average fatalities reported per incident from U.S. historic explosives/incendiary attacks designated as terrorist incidents by the FBI between 1980-2005. ¹⁹ High estimate of fatalities is the average of the potential fatalities estimated from three historical failed mass bombing attacks as given by the public unclassified literature. ²⁰ For this event in the SNRA, fatality estimates only include data for successful attacks, e.g. deployment of a device, not preventions. Counts exclude attacker fatalities.
Nuclear Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile fatalities associated with events matching the SNRA definition of nuclear terrorism attacks in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Fatality estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., detonation of a device.
Physical Attack on the Power Grid	0	0	90	Low estimate, zero by assumption. High estimate reflects the number of fatalities estimated from the 2003 East Coast Blackout, used as the representative scenario for high estimates on all impact scales, as reflected by recent epidemiological studies of the effects of the disaster in New York City. ²¹ Best estimate is scaled to the high estimate in proportion to the person-days without power between the best impact estimate representative scenario. ²²
Radiological Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile fatalities associated with events matching the SNRA definition of radiological terrorism attacks in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Fatality estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., detonation of a device or radiation exposure.

¹ The U.S. historic earthquake record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained from the ICAT Damage Estimator (<http://www.icatdamageestimator.com>), which uses a methodology for computing normalized fatality and economic losses similar to that published by Vranes, K. & Pielke, R. (2009). Normalized Earthquake Damage and Fatalities in the United States: 1900-2005. *Natural Hazards Review* 10(3): 84:101. Normalized fatality estimates take into account changes in population densities, community wealth, mitigation factors

(such as improved building codes and emergency response), and inflation. A 1% annual mitigation factor was used, as described in Vranes and Pielke (2009).

² The U.S. historic flood record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained by aggregating flood losses reported by NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). Modern flood reporting by NOAA relies on many individual reports that assess damages in a specific area of responsibility. A large scale flood, for example, can result in dozens or hundreds of damage entries that assess damages for specific geographic regions. As flooding passes down the Mississippi, for example, the affected areas can pass from region to region. To capture the transient and distributed nature of flood events, individual flood loss reports were aggregated based on distance and time. Flood damage reports that occurred within 100 miles of one another and within plus or minus one calendar day were aggregated into composite flood events. The composite flood events above the \$100 Million (2011 dollar) threshold were used for reporting frequency, fatality, injury, and direct economic loss estimates in the SNRA. All hurricanes were removed from flood events to avoid double-counting flooding damages included in the SNRA hurricane analysis.

³ Expert judgments provided by CDC subject matter experts to the SNRA project. Fatality low, best, and high estimates were calculated using an attack rate of 25%, a U.S. population of 307 million, and a case fatality rate of 0.1%–0.3% (best: 0.2%). Reed et al (2013, January). Novel framework for assessing epidemiologic effects of influenza epidemics and pandemics; and Technical Appendix. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 19(1) 85–91, at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124_article; Technical Appendix at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124_techapp1.pdf. All of the estimates are given absent any intervention (i.e., before interventions are applied or attempted).

⁴ U.S. historic hurricane record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained from the ICAT Damage Estimator (<http://www.icatdamageestimator.com>), which uses a methodology for computing economic losses similar to that published by Pielke, R.J., Gratz, J., Landsea, C., Collins, D., Saunders, M., and Musulin, R. (2008). Normalized hurricane damage in the United States: 1900–2005. *Natural Hazards Review* 9 (1), 29–42. Fatality estimates are based directly upon the historic record, published by Blake, E.S., Landsea, C.W., and Gibnew, E.J. (2011, August). *The deadliest, costliest, and most intense United States tropical cyclones from 1851–2010 (and other frequently requested hurricane facts)*. Miami, FL: National Climatic Data Center, National Hurricane Center.

⁵ Excess fatalities in New York City, which bore the brunt of the outage. Anderson et al (2012). Lights out: Impact of the August 2003 power outage on mortality in New York, NY. *Epidemiology* 23(2) 189–193.

⁶ Most likely worst-case scenario cited by the power industry's 2012 review, p. 85, representing a large-scale reactive power collapse not resulting in permanent damage to electric transformers. North American Electric Reliability Corporation [NERC] (2012, February). Effects of geomagnetic disturbances on the bulk power system: at <http://www.nerc.com/files/2012GMD.pdf>.

⁷ SNRA project team assumption based upon extrapolation of the 2003 East Coast Blackout (50 million people assumed out of power for average of 1 day) to the Lloyd's high estimate scenario of 40 million people out of power from 16 days to up to two years. Lloyd's (2013) Solar Storm Risk to the North American Electric Grid, produced by Lloyd's and AER [Atmospheric and Environmental Research, Inc]: at <http://www.lloyds.com/~media/lloyds/reports/emerging%20risk%20reports/solar%20storm%20risk%20to%20the%20north%20american%20electric%20grid.pdf>. Because of the multiple uncertainties involved, the SNRA project team made the assumption of one month average outage having disruptive effects (i.e. the 16 days plus two weeks in addition) for a scaling estimate of 1.2 billion person-days, or 24 times that of the East Coast Blackout. This factor was applied to the 90 fatalities of the low estimate, for a lower-bound estimation of a true high estimate of 2,000 fatalities (rounded to one significant figure). Although the initial health impacts of a large-scale, sudden blackout may subside in initial days as affected populations adapt to life without power, the exhaustion of fuel and lifeline resources and impacted supply chains for critical goods may result in significantly compounded total population health impacts days or weeks into the blackout. The SNRA high estimate thus almost certainly represents a substantial under-representation of the true numbers of fatalities which may be expected from a catastrophic, multi-state extended power outage disaster.

⁸ The U.S. historic tornado record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was compiled from the online database of the Storm Prediction Center (SPC) of the National Weather Service (NWS), a division of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). From 1996 to 2011 (prior to 1996 the economic damages figures in the database had been reported in semi-quantitative bins rather than as estimates in millions of dollars, so to ensure consistency the SNRA project team used data from 1996 onward only) there were 46 tornado events which met this criterion. Of these 46 events, 44 were outbreaks which included more than one tornado. These multi-tornadic outbreak events were determined using a clustering routine (written in MATLAB) to aggregate fatality, injury, and economic consequences which occurred within one day and 150 miles of at least one other tornado. The one-day window accounts for a 47 hour and 59 minute maximal span of time: for example, the day window would associate a tornado which struck at 00:00 on January 1, 2011 with another tornado which struck at 23:59 on January 2, 2011. Duplicate database entries for the same tornado funnel (as opposed to tornadoes determined to be clustered in the same storm system), which occurred when a single tornado crossed state lines, were consolidated to single multi-state records and partial reports were eliminated prior to running the data through the clustering algorithm. The clustering was done because DHS is responsible for responding to a single destructive event which may span multiple counties and states, without separating out damage that comes from individual storms in the same storm system. The 14% of U.S. tornado events from 1996 to 2001 which are captured by the \$100 M threshold are responsible for 72% of total fatalities, 58% of total injuries and 75% of total economic damage from all U.S. tornadoes in this timeframe.

⁹ Winter Storm and Freeze events as reported by the Billion Dollar Disaster List of NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). NCDC (2015). Billion-dollar U.S. weather/climate disasters 1980–2013: at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events>.

¹⁰ The U.S. historic wildfire record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was compiled from the SHELDUS database (Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute (2011). The Spatial Hazards Events and Losses Database for the United States, Version 8.0 [Online Database]. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina. Available from <http://www.sheldus.org>). SHELDUS breaks down wildfire events into separate counties, and sometimes breaks down single wildfires in the same location into separate fires with overlapping date ranges, dividing casualty and damages between them to avoid double-counting. Where this was obviously done (fires reported by counties in the same state having the same time range, or reported in the same city with overlapping or continuously adjacent time ranges) the separately reported portions of a single fire event were consolidated into single events. All wildfires (after consolidation) above the \$100 Million threshold in 2011 dollars (a CPI multiplier of 1.0464 was used to convert the December 2009 values given in SHELDUS v8.0 to May 2011 values) from 1970–2009 were used in the SNRA analysis.

¹¹ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD) is available online at <http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks>. Reported fatalities were adjusted to account for underreporting or underdiagnosis using the latest multipliers published by the CDC (a factor of 2 for fatalities). The low, best, and high fatality estimates represent the low, average, and high adjusted fatalities in the set of outbreaks meeting the multistate and 100+ reported hospitalizations thresholds. Scallan, E., Hoekstra, R. M., Angulo, F. J., Tauxe, R. V., Widdowson, M. –A., Roy, S. L., et al. (2011). Foodborne illness acquired in the United States – major pathogens. *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, 17(1), 7–15. Available from URL: <http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/17/1/7.htm>. Accessed on 22 August 2011.

¹² The set of historic chemical substance release events used for analysis in the SNRA were those which met either of the following criteria: 1) at least one “public” fatality, defined as one fatality other or in addition to an employee fatality, caused by the hazardous material; 2) at least one fatality of any kind caused by the hazardous material, plus a reported evacuation or shelter-in-place order. This set came from the set of all reported toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) incidents reported 1994-2010 to either the EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP) accident database for fixed industrial producers and consumers of the listed toxic chemicals above given threshold limits, or to the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Substances Administration (PHMSA)’s database of road, rail, water, and air transportation accidents.

¹³ Incident data published by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) for the years 1980-2014: at <https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>. Rail incidents only, hazard class codes 1.1, 1.2, 1.4 (all subclasses), 1.5, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2, 2.1, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4.

¹⁴ Historic data for U.S. dam failures were provided by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation via the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection Dams Sector Branch. Dam failures which were caused by cascading events (e.g., a failing dam upstream) were combined into single events.

¹⁵ The low estimate of zero fatalities is drawn from the Three Mile Island core meltdown (Perham, C. (1980, October). EPA’s Role at Three Mile Island. Retrieved from <http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/topics/tmi/02.html>.) The best estimate for fatalities uses a simulation of the expected core damage frequencies and expected consequences obtained from the license renewal applications for a number of individual reactors available from the public website of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at <http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html>). The data from the license renewal applications is used to perform cost/benefit analyses on reactor upgrades and the baseline data was not developed for use in a general risk assessment. Currently, this is the most recently publicly available data and adequate for order of magnitude estimates in the SNRA. An alternative analysis was also conducted using fatality, injury, and core damage frequency data from NUREG-1150, and the best estimates from this analysis were within an order of magnitude of the results obtained using data from license renewal applications (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1990). *NUREG-1150 Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants*. Washington, DC: U.S. NRC). The expected consequences are weighted by the likelihood of a core damage accident for each reactor using a Crystal Ball simulation to determine the best fatality estimate. The high consequence estimates also come from the license renewal applications; these consequences correspond to the highest consequence scenarios outlined in the report. These usually involve a large, early release and assume that there is not enough time for successful evacuation. The frequency of these events is typically one-to-two orders of magnitude less than the frequency of any core damage event. Note that the frequency values reported in the previous section do not correspond to the high and low fatality estimates. The fatality estimates include latent cancer fatalities: deaths resulting from cancer that become active after a latent period following exposure to radiation.

¹⁶ Imhof, Daniel, and University of Cambridge (2012). BridgeForum Bridge Failure Database [electronic resource]. Structures Group, University of Cambridge Department of Engineering, adapted from Imhof, Daniel (2005), Risk Assessment of Existing Bridge Structures [dissertation], abstract at <http://www-civ.eng.cam.ac.uk/abstract/Imhofabs.html>. Database at <http://www.bridgeforum.org/dir/collapse/country/United%20States.html>. The 25 incidents causing fatalities are a subset of 71 total U.S. bridge failure incidents from 1964-2007 in these sources.

¹⁷ FBI (2006), Terrorism 2002-2005, <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005>; for 2006-2012 attacks, FBI (2011, September), Terrorism (special issue), *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 80(9), <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/september-2011/September-2011-leb.pdf>. These attacks included shootings and one vehicle attack (assault on crowd with vehicle as opposed to explosive or other deadly weapon), and indiscriminate as to target (i.e. terrorist assassination attacks were excluded).

¹⁸ Official figures, Russian Government 334 fatalities and 810 non-fatal injuries include victims and response personnel (civil and military), but does not include the hostage-takers. RT (2014, September 1). 3 days in hell: Russia mourns Beslan school siege victims 10 years on. *Russia Today* [electronic resource]: at <http://rt.com/news/183964-beslan-school-hostage-crisis/>.

¹⁹ FBI (2006), Terrorism 2002-2005, <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005>.

²⁰ These were three failed al-Qaeda bombings: the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, had the attempt to collapse a tower been successful (FBI (2008), Lundberg); the failed 2006 plot to simultaneously target seven transatlantic aircraft (FBI (2011)); and the failed 1995 plot simultaneously targeting 11 transpacific aircraft, known as the “Bojinka plot” (NYT (1996)). Numbers represent the number of fatalities from the 2001 World Trade Center attack, from one tower (Lundberg) and the passenger capacity of Boeing 747 or 777 class aircraft for the aircraft plots. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (2008, February 26), FBI 100: First strike: Global terror in America [electronic resource], http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608; FBI (2011, September), Terrorism (special issue): *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 80(9), <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/september-2011/September-2011-leb.pdf>; Lundberg, Russell (2013, September), Comparing Homeland Security Risks Using a Deliberative Risk Ranking Methodology: dissertation, RAND Pardee Graduate School, http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD319.html: Explosives Attack risk summary sheet.

²¹ Anderson et al (2012). Lights out: Impact of the August 2003 power outage on mortality in New York, NY. *Epidemiology* 23(2) 189-193.

²² Best estimate impact scenario, 6.5 million person-days: 3 hour outage at peak hours, median U.S. large urban area (median population [2,138,460], top 50 Large Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2010 Census). High estimate impact scenario approximates the 2003 East Coast Blackout as 50 million U.S. residents without power for an average of 1 day (50 million person-days).

Appendix D: Injury/Illness Impact Assessment

Overview

Injuries and illnesses were estimated similarly to fatalities. For events that have occurred in the past, the number of injuries and/or illnesses was estimated primarily from the historical record. For events that have never occurred, primarily but not limited to the chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear (CBRN) adversarial events,¹ impacts were estimated using data from previous DHS risk assessments which rely on models and simulations.

It is important to note that this impact category mixed permanent debilitating injuries (such as those resulting from chemical accidents) with temporary illnesses (such as those resulting from pandemic influenza). Therefore, the injury and illness impacts should be considered in context with the types of injuries and illnesses likely to result from each hazard.

When interpreting the injury/illness results presented below, it is important to consider that the impact data in the SNRA is directly related to the threshold included in each threat/hazard event definition. For example, the results for wildfires indicate that *wildfires causing greater than \$100 million in direct economic losses* are estimated to cause between 0 and 190 injuries, with a best estimate of 63 fatalities. For reference, the full threat/hazard event definitions, including thresholds, can be found in Table 2 of the main report.

In many cases, the high estimates for injuries/illnesses in the SNRA were constructed from either historic maximums (e.g. natural hazards) or the 95th percentile of a modeled distribution (e.g. CBRN terrorism events). Thus, the high estimates associated with each threat/hazard event may not be reflective of the injuries/illnesses which may occur from a “worst-case scenario”. Additional analysis is necessary to better characterize the “worst-case” upper bounds for injuries/illnesses associated with each threat/hazard event.

Major Findings

- At the best estimate, a pandemic influenza outbreak with a 25% gross clinical attack rate and a case fatality rate similar to the 1957 flu pandemic is estimated to result in the most injuries/illnesses given occurrence of any of the non-CBRN events in the SNRA by more than a factor of one hundred. Such a pandemic influenza outbreak is estimated to cause between 61 million and 110 million illnesses, with a best estimate of 77 million illnesses. These estimates are given absent any intervention (i.e., before interventions are applied or attempted).
- After pandemic influenza, the non-CBRN events in the SNRA with the highest expected injuries/illnesses (at the best estimate) given occurrence include accidental food contamination and earthquakes, on the order of tens of thousands of injuries or illnesses.
- Injuries and illnesses due to an extended electric power outage—carbon monoxide poisoning, traffic accidents, falls, exposure (heat injury, severe frostbite, hypothermia)—from a catastrophic space weather event could also number in the thousands or greater. These power-outage-related causes of injury are also significant factors driving potential injuries from winter storms and hurricanes to the thousands or tens of thousands.

¹ Injury and illness estimates for the CBRN events are classified at the SECRET or SECRET//NOFORN level.

- Similar factors drive expected and potential injuries/illnesses from a deliberate physical attack on the power grid. The differences in expected and/or potential injury/illness magnitude between this and other SNRA events involving loss of electric power are due in part to different modeling assumptions. Uncertainties in potential impacts from power grid attacks and space weather events are very large, due to lack of historical precedent in this country.
- All natural, accidental, and conventional-attack adversarial hazard events in the SNRA are expected to result in non-zero injuries/illnesses, at the best estimate, with the exceptions of drought (human health impacts are excluded from the scope of this event by construction to permit separate analysis of heat waves as a distinct hazard) and foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), which affects livestock but poses no health risk to humans.

Additional Information

Injury/illness information of sufficient quality upon which to base comparisons could not be found for every threat and hazard event identified in the 2011 and 2015 iterations of the SNRA (Table 5, Table 6, main report). Work on these events continues.

Figure D1: Injuries/Illnesses by Threat/Hazard Event



How to Read this Chart

The length of each bar denotes the range between the Low and High estimates, or the amount of uncertainty surrounding the Best Estimate. The vertical slide marker on each bar denotes that Best Estimate.



Table D1: SNRA Injury/Illness Data and Sources

Threat/Hazard Type	Injury/Illness Estimates			Source Information
	Low	Best	High	
Animal Disease Outbreak	0	0	0	There are no significant human health implications of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD), the animal disease considered in the SNRA.
Drought	0	0	0	Zero injuries or illnesses by construction. The SNRA treated drought and heat waves as distinct hazards, and considered human health impacts from overlapping wave/drought incidents as heat wave effects as opposed to drought.
Earthquake	0	8,700	210,000	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high injuries from earthquakes causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1906-2011. ¹
Flood	0	95	4,500	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high injuries from floods causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2005. ²
Human Pandemic Outbreak	62,000,000	77,000,000	110,000,000	Illness estimates provided by CDC assuming a 25% gross clinical attack rate, using the case fatality rate associated with the 1957 flu pandemic. ³
Hurricane	0	650	30,000	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high injuries from hurricanes causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1970-2010. ⁴
Space Weather	400	N/A	10,000	Low estimate reflects the number of excess hospitalizations for complications of respiratory illnesses in New York City for August 14-15 attributed to the loss of electric power, ⁵ representing a low best estimate scenario of large-scale but temporary grid failure. ⁶ High best estimate, extrapolation from the low scenario in proportion to person-days without power and an SNRA project team assumption of one month average outage per person having disruptive effects. ⁷ The SNRA did not make a middle best estimate for injuries/illnesses.
Tornado	0	250	3,100	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high values of injuries from tornado events causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1996-2011. ⁸
Wildfire	0	63	190	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high injuries from wildfires causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1990-2009. ⁹
Winter Storm	0	1,700	14,000	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high values of injuries from snowstorm, blizzard, ice storm, and freeze events causing greater than \$1 B in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1980-2013. ¹⁰
Biological Food Contamination	200	17,000	45,000	Estimates obtained from historic events in the CDC's Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD) which were multistate outbreaks requiring greater than 100 hospitalizations. Years included in FOOD include 1998-2008. ¹¹
Chemical Substance Spill or Release	0	60	790	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high injuries/illnesses reported per incident within the U.S. historic data set used for the SNRA analysis. ¹²
Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)	0	20	52	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high injuries from U.S. rail accidents involving combustible or flammable cargoes resulting in 1 fatality or greater during the time period from 1980-2014. ¹³
Dam Failure	0	50	3,000	Estimates correspond to reported injuries from U.S. dam failures causing 1 fatality or greater during the time period from 1960-2009, for which injury reporting was available. ¹⁴
Radiological Substance Release	0	240	2,300	Estimates are drawn from the historic case of Three Mile Island as well as license renewal applications available on the public website of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ¹⁵
Transportation System Failure	0	9	145	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high injuries due to U.S. bridge failures causing 1 fatality or greater during the time period from 1960-2009. ¹⁶

Threat/Hazard Type	Injury/Illness Estimates			Source Information
	Low	Best	High	
Aircraft as a Weapon	3	640	2,800	Injury estimates constructed from SNRA project team analysis of historic events in which aircraft intentionally or unintentionally crashed into buildings or crowds of people. The 9/11 attacks in New York are used as a maximum case. The analysis does not take into account higher-consequence events which have not yet occurred.
Armed Assault	0	6	810	Low and best estimates correspond to the low and average injuries reported per incident from U.S. historic assaults and armed attacks indiscriminate in nature and resulting in one or more fatalities or injuries other than the attacker(s), designated as terrorist incidents by the FBI between 1980-2012. ¹⁷ High estimate of injuries comes from the 2005 school assault in Beslan, Russia. ¹⁸ Counts exclude attacker injuries.
Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile injuries/illnesses associated with events matching the SNRA definition of biological terrorism attacks (non-food) in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Injury/illness estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent.
Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile injuries/illnesses associated with events matching the SNRA definition of chemical terrorism attacks (non-food) in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Injury/illness estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent.
Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile injuries/illnesses associated with events matching the SNRA definition of chemical/biological food contamination terrorism attacks in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Injury/illness estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent.
Explosives Terrorism Attack	0	11	4,500	Low and best estimates correspond to the low and average non-fatal injuries reported per incident from U.S. historic explosives/incendiary attacks designated as terrorist incidents by the FBI between 1980-2005. ¹⁹ High estimate of injuries represents the total civilian injuries from the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy Nairobi, Kenya. ²⁰ For this event in the SNRA, injury estimates only include data for successful attacks, e.g. deployment of a device, not preventions. Counts exclude attacker injuries.
Nuclear Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile injuries/illnesses associated with events matching the SNRA definition of nuclear terrorism attacks in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Injury/illness estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., detonation of a device.
Physical Attack on the Power Grid	0	2	400	Low estimate, zero by assumption. High estimate reflects the number of injuries estimated from the 2003 East Coast Blackout, used as the representative scenario for high estimates on all impact scales, as reflected by recent epidemiological studies of the effects of the disaster in New York City. ²¹ Best estimate is scaled to the high estimate in proportion to the person-days without power between the best impact estimate representative scenario. ²²
Radiological Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile injury/illness estimates associated with events matching the SNRA definition of radiological terrorism attacks in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Injury/illness estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., detonation of a device or radiation exposure.

¹ The U.S. historic earthquake record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained from the ICAT Damage Estimator (<http://www.icatdamageestimator.com>), which uses a methodology for computing normalized fatality and economic losses similar to that published by Vranes, K. & Pielke, R. (2009). Normalized Earthquake Damage and Fatalities in the United States: 1900-2005. *Natural Hazards Review* 10(3): 84:101. Normalized fatality estimates take into account changes in population densities, community wealth, mitigation factors (such as improved building codes and emergency response), and inflation. A 1% annual mitigation factor was used, as described in Vranes & Pielke (2009). Since published normalized injury estimates were not available, a linear multiplier of fatalities was used; this was deemed of sufficient precision for the purposes of the SNRA. The linear model assumed 23.5 injuries per fatality, based on New Madrid Seismic Zone estimates published by Elnashai et al. (2009), *Impact of New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquakes on the Central USA, Vol. 1. Mid America Earthquake Center: University of Illinois*. Available online at: <https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/14810>.

² The U.S. historic flood record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained by aggregating flood losses reported by NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). Modern flood reporting by NOAA relies on many individual reports that assess damages in a specific area of responsibility. A large scale flood, for example, can result in dozens or hundreds of damage entries that assess damages for specific geographic regions. As flooding passes down the Mississippi, for example, the affected areas can pass from region to region. To capture the transient and distributed nature of flood events, individual flood loss reports were aggregated based on distance and time. Flood damage reports that occurred within 100 miles of one another and within plus or minus one calendar day were aggregated into composite flood events. The composite flood events above the \$100 Million (2011 dollar) threshold were used for reporting frequency, fatality, injury, and direct economic loss estimates in the SNRA. All hurricanes were removed from flood events to avoid double-counting flooding damages included in the SNRA hurricane analysis.

³ Expert judgments provided by CDC subject matter experts to the SNRA project. Illness low, best, and high estimates correspond to a U.S. population of 307 million and attack rates of 20%, 25%, and 35% respectively. All estimates are given absent any intervention (i.e., before interventions are applied or attempted). The attack rate is the percentage of population that becomes clinically ill due to influenza: clinical illness is defined as a case of influenza that causes some measurable economic impact, such as one-half day of work lost or a visit to a physician's office.

⁴ U.S. historic hurricane record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained from the ICAT Damage Estimator (<http://www.icatdamageestimator.com>), which uses a methodology for computing economic losses similar to that published by Pielke, R.J., Gratz, J., Landsea, C., Collins, D., Saunders, M., and Musulin, R. (2008). Normalized Hurricane Damage in the United States: 1900-2005. *Natural Hazards Review* 9: 29-42. Injury/illness estimates were produced for each hurricane based on a linear model relating fatalities to injury and illness. The model is derived from Hurricane Andrew in 1992; the CDC published injury/illness and fatality estimates for 19 parishes during Andrew and there were approximately 25 injuries to every fatality in the study group (CDC (1993). Injuries and Illnesses Related to Hurricane Andrew – Louisiana, 1992. *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR)*, 42, 243-246.). It is important to note that evacuees can travel hundreds of miles before receiving medical attention, making it difficult to account for the number of storm-related injuries (Faul, M., Weller, N. F., and Jones, J. A. (2011, September). Injuries after Hurricane Katrina among Gulf Coast Evacuees Sheltered in Houston, Texas. *Journal of Emergency Nursing*, 37 (5), 460-468.

⁵ Lin et al (2011, May). Health impact in New York City during the Northeastern Blackout of 2003. *Public Health Reports* v 126(3) 384-393: at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3072860/>.

⁶ Most likely worst-case scenario cited by the power industry's 2012 review, p. 85. North American Electric Reliability Corporation [NERC] (2012, February). Effects of geomagnetic disturbances on the bulk power system: at <http://www.nerc.com/files/2012GMD.pdf>.

⁷ SNRA project team assumption based upon extrapolation of the 2003 East Coast Blackout (50 million people assumed out of power for average of 1 day) to the Lloyd's high estimate scenario of 40 million people out of power from 16 days to up to two years. Lloyd's (2013) Solar Storm Risk to the North American Electric Grid, produced by Lloyd's and AER [Atmospheric and Environmental Research, Inc]: at www.lloyds.com/~media/lloyds/reports/emerging%20risk%20reports/solar%20storm%20risk%20to%20the%20north%20american%20electric%20grid.pdf. Because of the multiple uncertainties involved, the SNRA project team made the assumption of one month average outage having disruptive effects (i.e. the 16 days plus two weeks in addition) for a scaling estimate of 1.2 billion person-days, or 24 times that of the East Coast Blackout. This factor was applied to the 400 injuries/illnesses of the low estimate, for a lower-bound estimation of a true high estimate of 10,000 injuries/illnesses (rounded to one significant figure). Although the initial health impacts of a large-scale, sudden blackout may subside in initial days as affected populations adapt to life without power, the exhaustion of fuel and lifeline resources and impacted supply chains for critical goods may result in significantly compounded total population health impacts days or weeks into the blackout. The SNRA high estimate thus almost certainly represents a substantial under-representation of the true numbers of injuries/illnesses which may be expected from a catastrophic, multi-state extended power outage disaster.

⁸ The U.S. historic tornado record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was compiled from the online database of the Storm Prediction Center (SPC) of the National Weather Service (NWS), a division of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). From 1996 to 2011 (prior to 1996 the economic damages figures in the database had been reported in semi-quantitative bins rather than as estimates in millions of dollars, so to ensure consistency the SNRA project team used data from 1996 onward only) there were 46 tornado events which met this criterion. Of these 46 events, 44 were outbreaks which included more than one tornado. These multi-tornadic outbreak events were determined using a clustering routine (written in MATLAB) to aggregate fatality, injury, and economic consequences which occurred within one day and 150 miles of at least one other tornado. The one-day window accounts for a 47 hour and 59 minute maximal span of time: for example, the day window would associate a tornado which struck at 00:00 on January 1, 2011 with another tornado which struck at 23:59 on January 2, 2011. Duplicate database entries for the same tornado funnel (as opposed to tornadoes determined to be clustered in the same storm system), which occurred when a single tornado crossed state lines, were consolidated to single multi-state records and partial reports were eliminated prior to running the data through the clustering algorithm. The clustering was done because DHS is responsible for responding to a single destructive event which may span multiple counties and states, without separating out damage that comes from individual storms in the same storm system. The 14% of U.S. tornado events from 1996 to 2001 which are captured by the \$100 M threshold are responsible for 72% of total fatalities, 58% of total injuries and 75% of total economic damage from all U.S. tornadoes in this timeframe.

⁹ The U.S. historic wildfire record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was compiled from the SHELDUS database (Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute (2011). The Spatial Hazards Events and Losses Database for the United States, Version 8.0 [Online Database]. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina. Available from <http://www.sheldus.org>). SHELDUS breaks down wildfire events into separate counties, and sometimes breaks down single wildfires in the same location into separate fires with overlapping date ranges, dividing casualty and damages between them to avoid double-counting. Where this was obviously done (fires reported by counties in the same state having the same time range, or reported in the same city with overlapping or continuously adjacent time ranges) the separately reported portions of a single fire event were consolidated into single events. All wildfires (after consolidation) above the \$100 Million threshold in 2011 dollars (a CPI multiplier of 1.0464 was used to convert the December 2009 values given in SHELDUS v8.0 to May 2011 values) from 1970-2009 were used in the SNRA analysis.

¹⁰ Injuries based upon a multiplier to fatalities for events in the primary data set: Winter Storm and Freeze events as reported by the Billion Dollar Disaster List of NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC): NCDC (2015), Billion-dollar U.S. weather/climate disasters 1980–2013: at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events>. Since the Billion Dollar Disaster List does not provide injury estimates, these were taken from corresponding event reports in the NCDC StormData database, the primary data source for the Billion Dollar Disaster List, adjusted by multipliers: 1) Where StormData reported injuries and both sources reported fatalities, the BDL/StormData fatality ratio for each incident was applied to the StormData reported injuries to estimate total injuries; 2) Where StormData reported injuries but BDL did not report fatalities, the average BDL/StormData fatality ratio (6.46) was applied to the StormData reported injuries to estimate total injuries; 3) Where StormData did not report injuries but BDL reported fatalities, the average StormData injury/fatality ratio (26.5) was applied to the BDL fatality estimates to estimate total injuries. These incidents included all incidents prior to 1993. StormData event types: Blizzard, Extreme Cold/Wind Chill,

Frost/Freeze, Heavy Snow, Ice Storm, Lake-Effect Snow, Winter Storm, Winter Weather, Winter Weather/Mix. StormData events: Incidents having beginning dates within the ranges reported by Billion Dollar List, for states or regions listed/not excluded by the Billion Dollar List description. National Weather Service (2007, August 17), Storm Data Preparation (Instruction 10-1605), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; at <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/sym/pd01016005curr.pdf>; StormData: <http://www.nedc.noaa.gov/stormevents/>.

¹¹ The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD) is available online at <http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks>. Reported illnesses were adjusted to account for underreporting or underdiagnosis using the latest multipliers published by the CDC (26.1 for *STEC O157 [E. coli]*, 29.3 for *Salmonella spp., nontyphoidal*, 2.1 for *Listeria monocytogenes*). Scallan, E., Hoekstra, R. M., Angulo, F. J., Tauxe, R. V., Widdowson, M. –A., Roy, S. L., et al. (2011). Foodborne illness acquired in the United States – major pathogens. *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, 17(1), 7-15. Available from URL: <http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/17/1/7.htm>. Accessed on 22 August 2011.

¹² The set of historic chemical substance release events used for analysis in the SNRA were those which met either of the following criteria: 1) at least one “public” fatality, defined as one fatality other or in addition to an employee fatality, caused by the hazardous material; 2) at least one fatality of any kind caused by the hazardous material, plus a reported evacuation or shelter-in-place order. This set came from the set of all reported toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) incidents reported 1994-2010 to either the EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP) accident database for fixed industrial producers and consumers of the listed toxic chemicals above given threshold limits, or to the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Substances Administration (PHMSA)’s database of road, rail, water, and air transportation accidents.

¹³ Incident data published by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) for the years 1980-2014: at <https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>. Rail incidents only, hazard class codes 1.1, 1.2, 1.4 (all subclasses), 1.5, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2, 2.1, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4.

¹⁴ Historic data for U.S. dam failures were provided by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation via the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection Dams Sector Branch. Dam failures which were caused by cascading events (e.g., a failing dam upstream) were combined into single events. Injuries were not reported in this dataset and were obtained separately for a limited set of dam failures. Of this set, the low number of injuries was 2 (Bergeron Pond Dam failure, New Hampshire, 1996; <http://www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcsupply/6newhamp.html>) and the high number of injuries was 3000 (Canyon Lake Dam, South Dakota, 1972; [http://www.damsafety.org/media/Documents/PRESS/US_FailuresIncidents\(1\).pdf](http://www.damsafety.org/media/Documents/PRESS/US_FailuresIncidents(1).pdf)). It was assumed that a reasonable low estimate for injuries was 1 and the high estimate of 3000 was used. The best estimate used in the SNRA is the geometric mean of the low and high estimates. Injury reports for additional dams suggest that such an assumption may be warranted; reports of injuries numbering less than 10 were found for some dam failures, as well as reports of injuries greater than 800 for other dam failures.

¹⁵ The low estimate of zero injuries/illnesses is drawn from the Three Mile Island core meltdown (Perham, C. (1980, October). EPA’s Role at Three Mile Island. Retrieved from <http://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/history/topics/tmi/02.html>.) The best estimate for injuries/illnesses uses a simulation of the expected core damage frequencies and expected consequences obtained from the license renewal applications for a number of individual reactors available from the public website of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at <http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html>). The data from the license renewal applications is used to perform cost/benefit analyses on reactor upgrades and the baseline data was not developed for use in a general risk assessment. Currently, this is the most recently publicly available data and adequate for order of magnitude estimates in the SNRA. An alternative analysis was also conducted using fatality, injury, and core damage frequency data from NUREG-1150, and the best estimates from this analysis were within an order of magnitude of the results obtained using data from license renewal applications (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1990). *NUREG-1150 Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants*. Washington, DC: U.S. NRC). The expected consequences are weighted by the likelihood of a core damage accident for each reactor using a Crystal Ball simulation to determine the best injury/illness estimate. The high consequence estimates also come from the license renewal applications; these consequences correspond to the highest consequence scenarios outlined in the report. These usually involve a large, early release and assume that there is not enough time for successful evacuation. The frequency of these events is typically one-to-two orders of magnitude less than the frequency of any core damage event. Note that the frequency values reported in a previous section do not correspond to the high and low injury/illness estimates. The injury/illness estimates include latent cancer morbidities.

¹⁶ Imhof, Daniel, and University of Cambridge (2012). BridgeForum Bridge Failure Database [electronic resource]. Structures Group, University of Cambridge Department of Engineering, adapted from Imhof, Daniel (2005), Risk Assessment of Existing Bridge Structures [dissertation], abstract at <http://www-civ.eng.cam.ac.uk/abstract/Imhofabs.html>. Database at <http://www.bridgeforum.org/dir/collapse/country/United%20States.html>. The 25 incidents causing fatalities are a subset of 71 total U.S. bridge failure incidents from 1964-2007 in these sources.

¹⁷ FBI (2006), Terrorism 2002-2005, <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005>; for 2006-2012 attacks, FBI (2011, September), Terrorism (special issue), *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin* 80(9), <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/september-2011/September-2011-leb.pdf>. These attacks included shootings and one vehicle attack (assault on crowd with vehicle as opposed to explosive or other deadly weapon), and indiscriminate as to target (i.e. terrorist assassination attacks were excluded).

¹⁸ Official figures, Russian Government. 334 fatalities and 810 non-fatal injuries include victims and response personnel (civil and military), but does not include the hostage-takers. RT (2014, September 1). 3 days in hell: Russia mourns Beslan school siege victims 10 years on. *Russia Today* [electronic resource]: at <http://rt.com/news/183964-beslan-school-hostage-crisis/>.

¹⁹ FBI (2006), Terrorism 2002-2005, <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005>.

²⁰ Federal Bureau of Investigation (unknown date), East African Embassy Bombings [electronic resource]: at <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings-1998> (checked 6 June 2015).

²¹ Lin et al (2011, May). Health impact in New York City during the Northeastern Blackout of 2003. *Public Health Reports* v 126(3) 384-393: at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3072860/>.

²² Best estimate impact scenario, 6.5 million person-days: 3 hour outage at peak hours, median U.S. large urban area (median population [2,138,460], top 50 Large Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2010 Census). High estimate impact scenario approximates the 2003 East Coast Blackout as 50 million U.S. residents without power for an average of 1 day (50 million person-days).

Appendix E: Direct Economic Impact Assessment

Overview

The direct economic losses associated with each threat/hazard event were estimated in the SNRA. Direct costs include:

- **Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction (DDP):** The value or replacement cost of physical buildings, infrastructure, building contents, vehicles, and other physical property directly destroyed by the attack. This includes decontamination, if any, and debris removal costs.
- **Business Interruption:** Business interruption costs caused directly by the incident or the immediate investigation, as opposed to shock, substitution, or second-order effects on the economy.
- **Medical Costs:** Cost of medical care to injured, including those who become fatalities.
- **Lost Demand from Fatalities:** A loss in spending of \$42,500 was estimated for each fatality.^{1,2}

For each threat or hazard, an attempt was made to assess each of the above types of direct costs. In some cases, this was not possible or it was judged that one type of direct costs would dominate the others such that the other types of direct costs were assumed to be negligible. In other cases, economic analysis from previous assessments or studies was leveraged for the SNRA even though the methodology for calculating direct costs differed somewhat from what is listed above. Details of the assumptions and approach used to estimate direct costs for each threat/hazard event are provided in Table E1.

Direct economic losses alone do not represent the full picture of the economic impacts to the Nation from a disaster or attack. Indirect and induced economic losses can be substantially larger than the direct economic losses that occur in the aftermath of an event.

- **Indirect economic costs** include costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the industries impacted by the direct costs. Indirect costs also include positive offsets due to increased spending within sectors impacted by the direct costs.³
- **Induced economic costs** include costs incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries. Induced impacts can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.

¹ Midpoint of the median \$35,000-\$50,000 bracket for household earning value. DHS Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA) 2008, Appendix E2.7: Economic Consequences, p. E2.7-34. (Appendix reference is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED.)

² No economic value was assigned to a human life (or injury) in itself as a Value of Statistical Life, because this is a value judgment which differs from person to person, and because it would represent double counting with these impacts counted separately. The lost contribution to the national economy as spending was captured, but capped at one year for consistency with the DHS Terrorism Risk Assessments.

³ These may include the waste management, environmental consulting, mortuary services, and medical industries, among others.

Due to time and resource constraints on the execution of the SNRA, indirect and induced economic impacts, which are often larger than direct losses, are not included in this assessment. This is a serious limitation that will be corrected in a future iteration of the SNRA.

When interpreting the direct economic loss results presented below, it is important to consider that the impact data in the SNRA is directly related to the threshold included in each threat/hazard event definition. For example, the results for wildfires indicate that *wildfires causing greater than \$100 million in direct economic losses* are estimated to cause between \$100 million and \$3 billion in direct losses, with a best estimate of \$800 million.

- Awareness of the relevant thresholds is particularly important when making comparisons between similar events having different thresholds. For example, many of the natural hazard events have minimum thresholds of \$100 million. For some natural hazard events added or quantitatively studied in the 2015 SNRA, namely space weather, drought, and winter storms, a minimum threshold of \$1 billion was set in order to capture exceptional events.
- This difference makes the minimum and best estimate impacts for these events substantially higher in comparison with other natural hazards having the lower threshold by construction, as their data sets do not include incidents or scenarios with direct economic impacts less than \$1 billion. For this reason, caution is urged in the interpretation of the comparative results described below.

For reference, the full threat/hazard event definitions, including thresholds, can be found in Table 2 of the main report.

In many cases, the high estimates for direct economic losses in the SNRA were constructed from either historic maximums (e.g. natural hazards) or the 95th percentile of a modeled distribution (e.g. terrorism events). Thus, the high estimates associated with each threat/hazard event may not be reflective of the direct economic losses which may occur from a “worst-case scenario”. Additional analysis is necessary to characterize the “worst-case” upper bounds for direct economic losses associated with each threat or hazard.

Major Findings

When considering the SNRA economic findings, it is important to remember that the direct economic losses are often smaller than the indirect and induced economic losses that occur in the aftermath of an event. The direct economic losses alone do not represent the full picture of the economic impacts to the Nation given the occurrence of a national-level event.

- The event among the non-CBRN threats and hazards considered by the SNRA having the potential for the highest direct economic losses given occurrence is a 1/150 year “Carrington Event” space weather event. The likely impacts of such an event are disputed, with a strong polarization of expert opinion. For this reason, the SNRA does not make a (middle) best estimate of direct economic impacts for this hazard but considers each of the low and high estimates as low and high best estimates respectively.
 - The low best estimate for direct economic loss (\$6 billion) represents the possible outcome of a wide-spread but temporary electric outage, similar to the 2003 Northeast Blackout, lasting days at most and not resulting in permanent damage to key electric transformers.

- The high best estimate for economic loss (\$2 trillion) represents the high end of an insurance industry model of a space-weather induced outage affecting the Northeast New York City-Washington DC corridor and causing destruction of multiple key electric transformers. 20 to 40 million people would be without power for 16 days (minimum estimated time to install existing spare transformers) to 1-2 years.
- Given the preparedness planning purposes of the SNRA, space weather is ranked in this discussion and the following chart by the high best estimate. Unlike other events having a middle best estimate the SNRA cannot rule out either the low or the high best estimate of direct economic loss (and other impacts) as the most likely outcome of a Carrington event, so both must be considered by planners using the SNRA for guidance. Space weather is therefore ranked by the high best estimate as the scenario having the greater planning burden (more severe consequences from an incorrect assumption of the other estimate as the primary basis for planning factors).
- Following space weather at its high best estimate, the event among the non-CBRN threats and hazards treated by the SNRA having the highest expected direct economic losses given occurrence is a pandemic influenza outbreak with a 25% gross clinical attack rate and a case fatality rate similar to the 1957 flu pandemic.
 - Such a pandemic influenza outbreak is estimated to cause between \$71 billion and \$180 billion in direct economic losses, with a best estimate of \$110 billion.
 - Other events have the potential to result in comparable losses given occurrence, notably earthquakes and hurricanes. However, the expected (average) losses, given occurrence, of these events rank an order of magnitude behind those of the SNRA pandemic scenario.⁴
- Many events in the SNRA have best estimates for direct economic losses on the order of \$10 billion, including foot-and-mouth disease, drought, earthquakes, accidental radiological substance releases, hurricanes, winter storms, and aircraft-as-a-weapon attacks. However, the uncertainty and variability associated with the direct economic losses for each of these events varies significantly.
- The following events have best estimates for direct economic losses which are \$1 billion or less, with associated high estimates less than \$20-25 billion: wildfires, floods, tornadoes, transportation systems failures (bridge failures), physical attacks on the power grid, accidental chemical substance releases (toxic inhalation hazards), explosives terrorism attacks, combustible/flammable rail cargo accidents, and armed assault attacks. Even though these events are estimated to have comparatively lower direct economic losses given occurrence, extreme cases of these events could still result in relatively significant losses.

Additional Information

Direct economic loss information of sufficient quality upon which to base comparisons could not be found for every threat and hazard event identified (Table 5, Table 6, main report) or assessed (dam failure, accidental biological food contamination) in the SNRA.

- *Dam Failure:* Additional analysis is required to estimate the direct economic impacts of dam failure. Studies of some specific dams have estimated economic impacts given failure in the

⁴ This order of magnitudis does not substantially change if the threshold for these events is raised from \$100 million to \$1 billion.

hundreds of millions to billions of dollars, but these estimates may not be representative of U.S. dams more broadly.

- *Accidental Biological Food Contamination:* Additional analysis is required to estimate the direct economic impacts of accidental biological food contamination. Estimates for lost productivity and medical costs in the CDC's Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD) range from \$3-11 million, but business interruption costs could be found only for the 2006 *E. coli* – spinach outbreak (\$61.4 million).

Work on these events continues.

Figure E1: Direct Economic Loss by Threat/Hazard Event



Table E1: SNRA Direct Economic Loss Data and Sources

Threat/Hazard Type	Direct Economic Loss (2011\$ Millions)			Source Information
	Low	Best	High	
Animal Disease Outbreak	2,300	15,200	69,000	Direct economic cost estimate informed by a case study of the impacts of an introduction of the disease into dairy herds in California. ¹
Drought	2,000	8,700	38,000	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high values of direct economic costs from drought events causing greater than \$1 B in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1980-2013. ²
Earthquake	107	8,700	105,000	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high direct economic losses from earthquakes causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1906-2011. ³
Flood	104	740	16,000	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high direct economic losses from floods causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2005. ⁴
Human Pandemic Outbreak	71,000	110,000	180,000	Direct economic cost estimates including hospitalization costs and lost days from work estimated using the CDC FluWorkLoss and DHS RAPID 2010 economic model inputs, corresponding to a CDC modeled pandemic scenario assuming a 25% gross clinical attack rate and the case fatality rate associated with the 1957 flu pandemic. ⁵
Hurricane	100	5,700	92,000	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high direct economic costs from hurricanes causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1970-2010. ⁶
Space Weather	5,700	N/A	2,000,000	Low best estimate corresponds to the estimated direct economic costs of the 2003 Northeast Blackout, used as a scenario representative of a large-scale power outage caused by a large solar storm resulting in (temporary) reactive grid collapse. The high best estimate corresponds to estimated first-year costs of a power outage affecting 40 million people for 16 days to 2 years due to permanent destruction of power transformers from a Carrington-class (1/150 year) storm. ⁷ The 2015 SNRA did not estimate a middle best estimate figure for space weather impacts.
Tornado	100	450	4,700	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high direct economic losses from tornado events causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1996-2011. ⁸
Wildfire	100	900	2,800	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high economic costs from wildfires causing greater than \$100 M in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1990-2009. ⁹
Winter Storm	1,000	3,100	9,000	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high values of direct economic costs from snowstorm, blizzard, ice storm, and freeze events causing greater than \$1 B in damages from the U.S. historic events between 1980-2013. ¹⁰
Biological Food Contamination	N/A	N/A	N/A	Additional analysis is required to estimate the direct economic impacts of accidental biological food contamination. Estimates for lost productivity and medical costs in the CDC's Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD) range from \$3-11 Million, ¹¹ but business interruption costs could only be found for the 2006 <i>E. Coli</i> – spinach outbreak (\$61.4 M). ¹²
Chemical Substance Spill or Release	0.04	14	330	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high direct economic loss reported per incident within the U.S. historic data set used for the SNRA analysis. ¹³
Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)	0.043	0.90	2.9	Estimates correspond to the low, average, and high direct economic costs from accidents involving U.S. rail cars with combustible or flammable cargoes resulting in 1 fatality or greater during the time period from 1980-2014. ¹⁴
Dam Failure	N/A	N/A	N/A	Additional analysis is required to estimate the direct economic impacts of dam failure. Studies of some specific dams have estimated economic impacts in the hundreds of millions to billions of dollars, but may not be representative of the full set of dams in the U.S. ¹⁵
Radiological Substance Release	7,500	8,600	16,000	Estimates are drawn from the historic case of Three Mile Island as well as license renewal applications available on the public website of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ¹⁶

Threat/Hazard Type	Direct Economic Loss (2011\$ Millions)			Source Information
	Low	Best	High	
Transportation System Failure	0.25	200	6,400	Low estimate, low end estimate for generic replacement cost for a state/federal bridge, National Weather Service reporting guidance. ¹⁷ Best estimate, average replacement cost for bridges from a set of historical bridge failure incidents. ¹⁸ High estimate, estimated replacement cost for the Oakland Bay Bridge. ¹⁹
Aircraft as a Weapon	4.0	2,500	27,000	Direct economic loss estimates constructed from SNRA project team analysis of historic events in which aircraft intentionally or unintentionally crashed into buildings or crowds of people. Low and best estimates, insurance industry models scaled in proportion to total fatalities (used as an empirical estimator, not an equivalence); high estimate, insurance industry estimate of the property damage and direct business interruption costs of the 9/11 attacks in New York. The analysis does not take into account higher-consequence events which have not yet occurred. ²⁰
Armed Assault	0.061	0.51	78	Direct economic loss estimates from historic incident set used for fatality and injury calculation. Business interruption costs estimated by scaling in proportion to total fatalities and injuries to the business interruption costs in the twelve block immediate exclusion (investigation) zone in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing attack. ²¹
Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile direct economic costs associated with events matching the SNRA definition of biological terrorism attacks (non-food) in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Direct economic cost estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent. ²²
Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile direct economic costs associated with events matching the SNRA definition of chemical terrorism attacks (non-food) in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Direct economic cost estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent.
Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile direct economic costs associated with events matching the SNRA definition of chemical/biological food contamination terrorism attacks in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Direct economic cost estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., release of an agent.
Explosives Terrorism Attack	0.043	3.4	20,000	Low estimate, per-incident average property damage from 1988-98 published FBI U.S. bombing incident statistics. ²³ Best estimate, average from historic incident set used for fatality and injury calculation scaled by per-casualty average property damage from same FBI statistics, and per-casualty average business interruption costs from the immediate 12-block exclusion zone following the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. ²⁴ High estimate, published insurance models. ²⁵
Nuclear Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile direct economic costs associated with events matching the SNRA definition of nuclear terrorism attacks in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Direct economic cost estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., detonation of a device.
Physical Attack on the Power Grid	15	46	5,700	Low estimate, damage estimate from 2013 California (Metcalf) sniper attack on electric power transformers. Best estimate, same plus business interruption costs of a peak-demand time three hour electric power outage for a median U.S. city. High estimate, estimated business interruption costs from the regional 2003 East Coast Blackout. ²⁶
Radiological Terrorism Attack				Data reflects the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile injury/illness estimates associated with events matching the SNRA definition of radiological terrorism attacks in the 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. Direct economic cost estimates in the SNRA include data for successful attacks, e.g., detonation of a device or radiation exposure.

¹ Carpenter, T. E., O'Brien, J. M., Hagerman, A. D., McCarl, B. A. (2011). Epidemic and economic impacts of delayed detection of foot-and-mouth disease: A case study of an outbreak in California. *Journal of Veterinary Diagnostic Investigation*, 23, 26-33. The direct economic impact of an FMD outbreak will come from an immediate reduction in lost international trade as well as disease control and eradication efforts, which can include the cost of: maintenance of animal movement controls, control areas, intensified border inspections, vaccines, depopulation, carcass disposal, indemnification to farmers for losses, and disinfection and decontamination efforts.

² Economic loss from Drought and Heat Wave/Drought events as reported by the Billion Dollar Disaster List of NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). NCDC (2015). Billion-dollar U.S. weather/climate disasters 1980–2013: at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events>. For Drought/Heat Wave events, NCDC reported costs include both crop damage and property damage (e.g. warped rails): the SNRA project team made the assumption that crop loss costs dominated total reported economic costs to the extent that any difference would not register within the order of magnitude degree of precision of the SNRA. Business interruption losses are not explicitly included in the SNRA Drought direct economic loss estimate; additionally, since human fatalities and injuries/illnesses are excluded from the SNRA Drought event by construction (to prevent double counting with an SNRA Heat Wave hazard event, in progress), direct economic costs associated with these impacts also are not included in the SNRA Drought direct economic totals. For NCDC economic methodology, see Smith et al (2013, June), U.S. billion-dollar weather and climate disasters: Data sources, trends, accuracy and biases; *Natural Hazards* 67(2) 387–410: at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/docs/smith-and-katz-2013.pdf>.

³ The U.S. historic earthquake record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained from the ICAT Damage Estimator (<http://www.icatdamageestimator.com>), which uses a methodology for computing normalized fatality and economic losses similar to that published by Vranes, K. & Pielke, R. (2009). Normalized Earthquake Damage and Fatalities in the United States: 1900-2005. *Natural Hazards Review* 10(3), 84-101. Normalized fatality estimates take into account changes in population densities, community wealth, mitigation factors (such as improved building codes and emergency response), and inflation. A 1% annual mitigation factor was used, as described in Vranes & Pielke (2009).

⁴ The U.S. historic flood record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained by aggregating flood losses reported by NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). Modern flood reporting by NOAA relies on many individual reports that assess damages in a specific area of responsibility. A large scale flood, for example, can result in dozens or hundreds of damage entries that assess damages for specific geographic regions. As flooding passes down the Mississippi, for example, the affected areas can pass from region to region. To capture the transient and distributed nature of flood events, individual flood loss reports were aggregated based on distance and time. Flood damage reports that occurred within 100 miles of one another and within plus or minus one calendar day were aggregated into composite flood events. The composite flood events above the \$100 Million (2011 dollar) threshold were used for reporting frequency, fatality, injury, and direct economic loss estimates in the SNRA. All hurricanes were removed from flood events to avoid double-counting flooding damages included in the SNRA hurricane analysis.

⁵ CDC physical scenario (case fatality rate [CFR] 0.1%-0.3%, best 0.2%, attack rate 25% [low 20%, high 35%], and a U.S. population of 307 million), expert judgments provided by CDC subject matter experts to the SNRA project based upon historical parameters as studied by Reed et al (2013, January), Novel framework for assessing epidemiologic effects of influenza epidemics and pandemics, and Technical Appendix: *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 19(1) 85–91, http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124_article, <http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124-techapp1.pdf>. Number of hospitalizations estimated as 11% of fatalities, midpoint of the middle (Scale 4)-level scenario of the CDC's current pandemic classification model (Meltzer et al, in press, based on Reed et al (2013)), cost per hospitalization \$21,154, the average cost of influenza-related hospitalizations from the RAPID model (based on a five day hospitalization cost of 2005\$18,367 from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS), Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality [<http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/nisoverview.jsp>]). Business interruption costs, represented by the cost of workdays lost: Number of workdays lost, estimated from physical parameters with the linear model of FluWorkLoss ($250.0 \times \text{CFR} + 1.192$, determined empirically), CDC (2006), FluWorkLoss 1.0 [computer file]: <http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/tools/fluworkloss.htm>; Cost per workday lost, $(1/365) \times \text{U.S. average annual output per worker of } \$144,654$, IMPLAN (2011) value for the average annual output per employee across all economic sectors (RAPID II standard value). One year lost spending on the national economy per fatality, \$42,500, for consistency with other SNRA events (midpoint of the median U.S. household income bracket, 2008 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment [DHS Science & Technology Directorate]). These parameters were applied to the low/best/high fatalities and illnesses to obtain low/best/high direct economic impact estimates. The Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision Making (RAPID) 2010 (or RAPID II) was a strategic level, DHS-wide process to assess risk and inform strategic planning priorities developed by the DHS Office of Risk Management & Analysis (National Protection & Programs Directorate). The RAPID engine is a suite of computational tools for calculating human and economic measures of risk and the relative effectiveness of different DHS programs in risk reduction. Like the SNRA it is a quantitative tool for calculating and comparing risks in the homeland security mission space with each other, but unlike the SNRA it is designed for additionally calculating the comparative effectiveness of different programs in buying down risk. RAPID is presently retained by the DHS Office of Policy.

⁶ The U.S. historic hurricane record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was obtained from the ICAT Damage Estimator (<http://www.icatdamageestimator.com>), which uses a methodology for computing economic losses similar to that published by Pielke, R.J., Gratz, J., Landsea, C., Collins, D., Saunders, M., and Musulin, R. (2008). Normalized hurricane damage in the United States: 1900-2005. *Natural Hazards Review* 9: 29-42. Historic economic damage estimates were updated to a 2011 base year by taking into account changes in populations, building structures, and infrastructure. These estimates potentially include indirect economic losses. There is not a clear disambiguation for economic loss estimates as there is no readily available record for each loss estimate. Due to this ambiguity, economic loss estimates have the potential to be biased high.

⁷ The low estimate of \$5.7 billion is based on the inflation-adjusted estimate of the 2003 Northeast Blackout using FEMA's Benefit-Cost Analysis guidance on the economic impact of electricity outages, using an assumption of 50 million persons without power for an average of one day. The 2003 blackout has been previously cited by the electric industry (NERC (2012)) as a model for a scenario of electric grid collapse caused by a solar storm not resulting in permanent transformer damage (i.e. the grid shuts down and is able to be restarted within days), and is the lowest estimate of solar storm consequences located in the literature. The high estimate is based on the inflation-adjusted value of \$2.51 trillion (2011 USD) of the high end of the scenario set modeled by Lloyd's (2013), rounded down to \$2 trillion to represent uncertainty in the range of potential true impacts (rounding to one significant figure) and to represent the losses accumulated in the first year (rounding down). The physical correlate of this high end estimate is 40 million people in the DC-New York City corridor out of power from 16 days to 2 years (i.e. 2 years to restore power to the last person). Power restoration curves following a disaster are typically sinusoidal or logarithmic (Executive Office of the President (2013) p 21): restoration is faster nearer the beginning, and longer for the remaining tail at the end. However, even a linear restoration function (constant restoration rate) results in 75% of the total person-days out of power accumulating in the first year, resulting in a low bounding estimate of \$1.88 trillion of the total \$2.51 trillion estimated costs (the Lloyd's model proportions costs to total person-days without power, Lloyd's (2013) p. 17) accumulating in year 1. Lloyd's (2013) Solar Storm Risk to the North American Electric Grid, produced by Lloyd's and AER [Atmospheric and Environmental Research, Inc]: at www.lloyds.com/~media/lloyds/reports/emerging%20risk%20reports/solar%20storm

[%20risk%20to%20the%20north%20american%20electric%20grid.pdf](#); North American Electric Reliability Corporation [NERC] (2012, February), Effects of geomagnetic disturbances on the bulk power system, <http://www.nerc.com/files/2012GMD.pdf>; Executive Office of the President (2013, August), Economic benefits of increasing electric grid resilience to weather outages, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/08/f2/Grid%20Resiliency%20Report_FINAL.pdf.

⁸ The U.S. historic tornado record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was compiled from the online database of the Storm Prediction Center (SPC) of the National Weather Service (NWS), a division of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). From 1996 to 2011 (prior to 1996 the economic damages figures in the database had been reported in semi-quantitative bins rather than as estimates in millions of dollars, so to ensure consistency the SNRA project team used data from 1996 onward only) there were 46 tornado events which met this criterion. Of these 46 events, 44 were outbreaks which included more than one tornado. These multi-tornadic outbreak events were determined using a clustering routine (written in MATLAB) to aggregate fatality, injury, and economic consequences which occurred within one day and 150 miles of at least one other tornado. The one-day window accounts for a 47 hour and 59 minute maximal span of time: for example, the day window would associate a tornado which struck at 00:00 on January 1, 2011 with another tornado which struck at 23:59 on January 2, 2011. Duplicate database entries for the same tornado funnel (as opposed to tornadoes determined to be clustered in the same storm system), which occurred when a single tornado crossed state lines, were consolidated to single multi-state records and partial reports were eliminated prior to running the data through the clustering algorithm. The clustering was done because DHS is responsible for responding to a single destructive event which may span multiple counties and states, without separating out damage that comes from individual storms in the same storm system. The 14% of U.S. tornado events from 1996 to 2001 which are captured by the \$100 M threshold are responsible for 72% of total fatalities, 58% of total injuries and 75% of total economic damage from all U.S. tornadoes in this timeframe.

⁹ The U.S. historic wildfire record for events causing greater than \$100 Million in damages was compiled from the SHELDUS database (Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute (2011). The Spatial Hazards Events and Losses Database for the United States, Version 8.0 [Online Database]. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina. Available from <http://www.sheldus.org>). SHELDUS breaks down wildfire events into separate counties, and sometimes breaks down single wildfires in the same location into separate fires with overlapping date ranges, dividing casualty and damages between them to avoid double-counting. Where this was obviously done (fires reported by counties in the same state having the same time range, or reported in the same city with overlapping or continuously adjacent time ranges) the separately reported portions of a single fire event were consolidated into single events. All wildfires (after consolidation) above the \$100 Million threshold in 2011 dollars (a CPI multiplier of 1.0464 was used to convert the December 2009 values given in SHELDUS v8.0 to May 2011 values) from 1970-2009 were used in the SNRA analysis. Economic losses reported in SHELDUS include property and crop losses. These were judged to dominate any business interruption, medical costs, or loss in spending due to fatalities.

¹⁰ Winter Storm and Freeze events as reported by the Billion Dollar Disaster List of NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). NCDC (2015). Billion-dollar U.S. weather/climate disasters 1980–2013: at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events>. For economic methodology, see Smith et al (2013, June), U.S. billion-dollar weather and climate disasters: Data sources, trends, accuracy and biases; *Natural Hazards* 67(2) 387–410: at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/docs smith-and-katz-2013.pdf>.

¹¹ The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD) is available online at <http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks>. Estimates were obtained from historic events in FOOD which were multistate outbreaks requiring greater than 100 hospitalizations. Years included in FOOD include 1998–2008. To compute lost productivity due to illness and medical costs, the USDA's Economic Research Service's Foodborne Illness Cost Calculator was used, with the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) set to \$0. (<http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FoodBornIllness>; accessed on 19 August 2011.)

¹² Arnade, C., Calvin, L., & Kuchus, F. (2010, March). *Consumers' response to the 2006 foodborne illness outbreak linked to spinach*. United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Available from: <http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/March10/Features/OutbreakSpinach.htm>. Accessed on 19 August 2011.

¹³ The set of historic chemical substance release events used for analysis in the SNRA were those which met either of the following criteria: 1) at least one “public” fatality, defined as one fatality other than or in addition to an employee fatality, caused by the hazardous material; 2) at least one fatality of any kind caused by the hazardous material, plus a reported evacuation or shelter-in-place order. This set came from the set of all reported toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) incidents reported 1994–2010 to either the EPA's Risk Management Program (RMP) accident database for fixed industrial producers and consumers of the listed toxic chemicals above given threshold limits, or to the Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Substances Administration (PHMSA)'s database of road, rail, water, and air transportation accidents. Direct economic damages which fixed facilities are required to report, and update for accuracy, to the RMP database are property damage to equipment or the facility itself, and all known or readily knowable property damage outside the facility. Direct economic damages which transport carriers are required to report to the PHMSA transportation database are the value of the material (spilled chemical) which was lost, physical damage sustained by the carrier (vehicles or other cargo), damage caused to public or private property, the dollar value of the response cost, and the dollar value of any remediation and clean-up cost. These damages do not include business interruption costs, medical or insurance costs, or litigation or settlement costs not overlapping with the costs listed above. The SNRA project team added medical cost estimates (\$6,600 per injury/illness) and the loss in demand due to fatalities (\$42,000 per fatality) to the direct economic costs above for consistency with the terrorism events. Business interruption costs were not considered in this analysis but judged to be low relative to the included costs.

¹⁴ Incident data published by the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) for the years 1980–2014: at <https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>. Rail incidents only, hazard class codes 1.1, 1.2, 1.4 (all subclasses), 1.5, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2, 2.1, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4. PHMSA reported economic costs include the dollar value of the material lost, carrier damage, public and private property damage, response cost, and remediation cleanup costs, corresponding to decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction (DDP) costs in the SNRA (<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/Documents/DataDictionary.pdf>). Medical costs of \$6,600 per injury corresponding to average medical costs from chemical injuries as treated by the SNRA accidental chemical substance spill or release event were used as a reasonable approximation to average medical costs from injuries due to flammable or explosive substances, within the order of magnitude precision of the SNRA. One year lost spending of \$42,500 per fatality (this is lost economic activity, not an equivalence) applied as with other SNRA events. Business interruption costs, which may be the dominant component of direct economic loss from this kind of railcar accident, could not be determined within the time frame of the 2015 SNRA project: these will be further examined in a future iteration or follow-on work.

¹⁵ Examples of studies of the direct economic consequences of dam failure include: estimates ranging from \$400 M to \$2.9 B for failures of the Miller Dam and Mansfield Dam in Austin, Texas (Texas Colorado River Floodplain Association, *Creating a Disaster-Resistant Lower Colorado River Basin*, Section 15); estimates ranging from \$78 M to \$1.3 B for the failure of dams in Northeastern Idaho (*Regional All-Hazards Mitigation Plan for Northeastern Idaho*); and an estimate of approximately \$20 B for a catastrophic failure of the Hills Creek Dam in Oregon (Goettel, K. A. (2001). *Regional All Hazard Mitigation Master Plan for Benton, Lane, and Linn Counties, Phase Two*. Prepared for the Benton County Project Impact and the Oregon Cascades Regional Emergency Management Coordinating Council).

¹⁶ The best estimate for direct economic loss uses a simulation of the expected core damage frequencies and expected consequences obtained from the license renewal applications for a number of individual reactors available from the public website of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at <http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/renewal/applications.html>. The data from the license renewal applications is used to perform cost/benefit analyses on reactor upgrades and the baseline data was not developed for use in a general risk assessment. Currently, this is the most recently publicly available data and adequate for order of magnitude estimates in the SNRA. The expected consequences are weighted by the likelihood of a core damage accident for each reactor using a Crystal Ball simulation to determine the best direct economic loss estimate. The low and high consequence estimates also come from the license renewal applications; these consequences correspond to the most frequent types of core damage accidents in each report and the highest consequence scenarios outlined in each report, respectively. For the low estimates, the economic costs are mostly fixed values associated with business interruption and are consistent with the \$1B in decontamination costs from the shutdown of Reactor 2 at Three Mile Island (14-Year Cleanup at Three Mile Island Concludes. *New York Times*, August 15, 1993). The highest consequence scenarios usually involve a large, early release and assume that there is not enough time for successful evacuation. The frequency of these events is typically one-to-two orders of magnitude less than the frequency of any core damage event. Note that the low and high frequency estimates for this event do not respectively correspond to the high and low direct economic loss estimates: uncertainties in frequency and impacts are independent variables in the SNRA methodology.

¹⁷ Property damage, generic cost estimate for state-federal bridge loss, NWS StormData preparation guide for reporting damages from natural disasters (p. B-2: Low end of \$250K-\$750K range selected for SNRA low estimate). National Weather Service (2007, August 17), Storm Data Preparation (Instruction 10-1605), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; at <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/sym/pd01016005curr.pdf>. This estimate does not include the other components of SNRA direct economic loss, such as business interruption.

¹⁸ Estimate is based on information from multiple sources: (a) Padgett, J., DesRoches, R., Nielson, B., Yashinsky, M., Kwon, O., Burdette, N., and Tavera, E. (2008), "Bridge Damage and Repair Costs from Hurricane Katrina." *J. Bridge Eng.*, 13(1), 6–14, January/February 2008, http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~jp7/Padgett_JBE_Jan08_Bridge_Damage_and_Repair_Costs_from_Hurricane_Katrina_PUBLISHED.pdf; (b) Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT), "I - 5 Skagit River Bridge – Estimate of the Direct Cost of Closure", http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/983F3385-A349-4372-9493-1C21E033DEC0/0/SkagitRiverBridge_DirectCost_1082013.pdf; (c) Minnesota DOT (2007, September 4), "Economic Impacts of the I-35W Bridge Collapse," <http://www.dot.state.mn.us/i35wbridge/rebuild/pdfs/economic-impacts-from-deed.pdf>; (d) Pioneer Press, "The Design for the I-35W Replacement Bridge is Unveiled," http://www.twincities.com/ci_7122021.

¹⁹ Based upon the replacement cost of the Oakland Bay Bridge. Cuff, Dennis (2014, September 8). Cost of Bay Bridge demolition rises amid complication. *Oakland Tribune*. [\$6.4 billion cost was for replacement: demolition cost estimate cited in article, \$271 million.] Bay Area Toll Authority (2015). Bridge facts: San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge [dynamic resource]: <http://bata.mtc.ca.gov/bridges/sf-oak-bay.htm> (retrieved 13 April 2015).

²⁰ Low and best estimates, proxy estimates for property damage including structure, contents, and aircraft hull loss costs and direct business interruption costs were taken from the insurance model in Carroll et al (2007). These were applied as multipliers of \$1.20 million DDP and \$0.723 million direct business interruption per fatality. Note that this is an empirical estimator – a means for estimating certain direct economic costs on the assumption of positive correlation with fatalities as a measure of the destructiveness of the incident – not an equivalence (i.e. not a dollar value placed upon a fatality). Fatalities rather than total casualties were used to scale costs because the correspondence of reported injuries in the SNRA data set and the injuries classed by severity of the insurance model was unclear. One year lost spending on the national economy was estimated as \$42,500 per fatality, as with other SNRA events. High estimate, historical property damage and direct business interruption cost estimates from Hartwig (2013). Medical costs for gunshot wounds (excluding lost labor productivity costs) in the U.S. (Corso et al (2007) were used as a proxy for the medical costs of aircraft as a weapon attacks. Carroll et al (2005, October), Distribution of losses from large terrorist attacks under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, RAND Corporation; at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG427.html>; Corso et al (2007, June), Medical costs and productivity losses due to interpersonal and self-directed violence in the United States, *American Journal of Preventative Medicine* 32(6) 474-482; Hartwig et al (2013, June), Terrorism risk: a constant threat - Impacts for property/casualty insurers, Insurance Information Institute; at http://www.iii.org/white_papers/terrorism-risk-a-constant-threat-2013.html.

²¹ Direct economic losses were assumed to be dominated by cost elements other than property damage, since the historical data set was dominated by shootings with few incidents of associated explosives use. Business interruption costs were estimated from the \$10 million lost business costs to the approximately 500 businesses in the 12-block immediate impact area of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing that was restricted for approximately one week of investigation. Exclusion zone 12 blocks, with 500 businesses, Luna (2013); cost to businesses in exclusion zone for one week restrictions \$10 million, Dedman et al (2013). Costs of the citywide lockdown and law enforcement deployment were excluded from the estimate here, because they are not characteristic of the aftermath of most terrorist attacks in this country. Direct property damage costs were also excluded, since these were specific to the bomb attack. These were scaled to the number of total casualties (fatalities + injuries) on the assumption that direct impacts on business activity in the vicinity may be approximated in proportion to total casualties, as an indicator of the total scale of the incident and subsequent investigation footprint. An average medical cost of \$5,200 per fatality and \$24,000 per non-lethal injury was applied, based upon the average medical costs for gunshot injuries due to deliberate assault or homicide in the U.S. (Corso et al (2007)): these were judged to be most representative of injuries due to other extreme violence and were used for each of the conventional terrorism events of the 2015 SNRA. Luna, Taryn (2013, April 27), Back Bay businesses affected by bombings are eligible for federal loans, *Boston Globe* [Boston.com]; at <http://www.boston.com/business/news/2013/04/26/back-bay-businesses-affected-bombings-are-eligible-for-federal-loans/BRSPuC0GboxQWAACyCgI/story.html>; Dedman et al (2013, April 30), Adding up the financial costs of the Boston bombings, *NBC News*: http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/29/17975443-adding-up-the-financial-costs-of-the-boston-bombings?lite; Corso et al (2007, June), Medical costs and productivity losses due to interpersonal and self-directed violence in the United States, *American Journal of Preventative Medicine* 32(6) 474-482.

²² Direct costs in the 2011 ITRA include business interruption costs, DDP costs, medical costs, and lost demand from fatalities.

²³ Total 2011-dollar adjusted property damages (\$1.061 billion) 1988-1988 divided by total number of bombing incidents (25,065), including actual, attempted, and [1998 reporting only] accidental explosive and incendiary U.S. incidents, published FBI statistics. FBI Bomb Data Center (1998), 1997 Bombing Incidents, <http://www.depts.ttu.edu/museumttu/disasters/us%20response%20files/SupportDocs/FBI%20reports/1997bombrep.pdf>; 1998 Bombing Incidents, <https://web.archive.org/web/20120608024053/http://library.sau.edu/bestinfo/Majors/Criminal/Bomb.pdf>.

²⁴ Estimate based upon per-casualty average property damage of all U.S. bombings 1988-1998, FBI (1998, 1999), for decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction (DDP); per-casualty proportion of \$10 million direct business interruption costs to the businesses in the twelve block immediate exclusion (investigation) zone in the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing attack, Luna (2013), Dedman et al (2013); medical costs, medical costs for gunshot injuries per fatality and per non-fatal injury, Corso et al (2007); one year lost spending to the national economy per fatality, \$42,500, SNRA 2015 standard (this does not represent a value of statistical life (VSL)). The U.S. historical gunshot injury costs were judged to be most representative of injuries due to other extreme violence and were used for each of the conventional terrorism events of the 2015

SNRA. FBI Bomb Data Center (1998, 1999), 1997 Bombing Incidents, <http://www.depts.ttu.edu/museumttu/disasters/us%20response%20files/SupportDocs/FBI%20reports/1997bombrep.pdf>; 1998 Bombing Incidents, <https://web.archive.org/web/20120608024053/http://library.sau.edu/bestinfo/Majors/Criminal/Bomb.pdf>. Luna, Taryn (2013, April 27), Back Bay businesses affected by bombings are eligible for federal loans, *Boston Globe* [Boston.com]: at <http://www.boston.com/business/news/2013/04/26/back-bay-businesses-affected-bombings-are-eligible-for-federal-loans/BRSPuC0GboxQWAACyCggl/story.html>; Dedman et al (2013, April 30), Adding up the financial costs of the Boston bombings, *NBC News*: http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/29/17975443-adding-up-the-financial-costs-of-the-boston-bombings?lite; Corso et al (2007, June), Medical costs and productivity losses due to interpersonal and self-directed violence in the United States, *American Journal of Preventative Medicine* 32(6) 474-482.

²⁵ Property damage plus business interruption, average of four truck bomb scenarios (property damage costs reported by this model [RMS] include physical property damage and direct business interruption as defined by the SNRA) excluding workers' compensation cost estimates, from Kunreuther et al (2014, July), TRIA After 2014: Examining Risk Sharing Under Current and Alternative Designs, Wharton Risk Center. University of Pennsylvania, http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/library/TRIA-after-2014_full-report_WhartonRiskCenter.pdf. Medical and lost-spending costs were calculated as in the low and best estimate, using the high estimate fatalities and injuries as input.

²⁶ Metcalf transformer damage cost of \$15 million, Baker, David: "FBI: Attack on PG&E South Bay substation wasn't terrorism," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 11 September 2014. Business interruption costs estimates based on person-days lost electric power, using \$114.39 (2011 inflation adjusted from \$106.27) per capita per day lost economic activity cost, FEMA Benefit-Cost Analysis methodology. Best estimate impact scenario, 6.5 million person-days: 3 hour outage at peak hours, median U.S. large urban area (median population [2,138,460], top 50 Large Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2010 Census). High estimate impact scenario approximating the 2003 East Coast Blackout, 50 million U.S. residents without power for an average of 1 day (50 million person-days).

Appendix F: Social Displacement Impact Assessment

All social displacement impact estimates in the SNRA are unclassified.

Overview

In the SNRA, social displacement is defined as the number of people forced to leave their home for a period of two days or longer due to a threat/hazard event. For many events, displacement estimates are calculated from incident-level displacement data in a similar manner as the fatality, injury/illness, and direct economic estimates for these incident-data based analyses: these were obtained by SNRA project team research and by FEMA technical modeling staff. Additional displacement estimates were obtained by research staff at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START),¹ who consulted the open social sciences literature and various open source databases for historical events and relevant models providing analysis and results comparable to the threat/hazard events described in the SNRA.

In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Risk Management (RMA), in partnership with the DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD),² utilized START's network of experts for advice on social displacement data and metrics. Experts advised that displacement is a reasonable first proxy for many additional social impact metrics, while also noting the importance of accounting for the time dimension in displacement. There is a significant difference between short-term evacuation for a week versus longer-term permanent relocation, and the SNRA displacement measure of number of people displaced currently does not differentiate between these two types of displacement.³ Because of this, the experts emphasized extreme caution in using these social impact results, particularly when this metric is being considered in isolation.

The SNRA social displacement analysis presented below was conducted to support the 2011 development and the 2015 update of the National Preparedness Goal. The resulting data have not undergone extensive review by any Federal Agency, and have not been extensively verified and validated by social sciences academic researchers. For these reasons these results, as with all results in the SNRA, should be considered provisional pending full peer and stakeholder review.

Major Findings

- The highest potential for adverse social displacement results from nuclear attack and hurricane events.
- There is substantial uncertainty about the social displacement that would be caused by a space weather event. Since a space weather event has the potential to significantly disrupt the

¹ START is a Department of Homeland Security University Center of Excellence that focuses on social and behavioral aspects of terrorism, natural disasters, and technological accidents, and the social, behavioral, cultural and economic factors influencing responses to and recovery from catastrophes. Based at the University of Maryland, START supports research efforts of leading social scientists at more than 50 academic and research institutions.

² DHS/S&T Resilient Systems Division (RSD) is the current (2015) organizational successor to Human Factors Division.

³ The SNRA measure also does not make a distinction between voluntary or involuntary displacement, displacement to emergency shelters as opposed to friends, relatives, or hotels, or displacement within as opposed to outside of a hazard-affected area. These distinctions can be of equal or greater importance to emergency managers, community planners, or other personnel or organizations with mass care planning responsibilities.

electric grid, communications and GPS services, and damage critical infrastructure (i.e., power transformers), the affected areas are essentially out of commission, leaving the population(s) literally and figuratively “in the dark”. If the outage is only temporary, affected populations will most likely remain in their homes. However, if the outage lasts weeks or more and occurs in very hot or very cold weather, large numbers of people could seek emergency shelter or relocate to stay with friends or relatives elsewhere in the U.S.

- Estimates for displacement due to a nuclear terrorism attack range from 330,000 to 3 million, and are informed by published evacuation/shelter-in-place estimates for a detonated 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device. Hundreds of thousands of people in the affected area may seek shelter in safe areas or shelter-in-place in their residence as the plume moves across the region, and many more may self-evacuate from major urban areas. Chemical, radiological, and biological terrorism attacks may also cause significant displacement: this is dependent upon agent, dispersal mechanism, and target location.
- Conventional terrorism attacks (e.g., explosives and armed assaults) are judged to have minimal or no displacement at the best estimate. However, historical exceptions are known where attacks have substantially impacted residential areas, notably the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing which left 400 people homeless and the evacuations from Lower Manhattan following the aircraft attacks on the World Trade Center.⁴
- Hurricanes have the potential to displace millions of people from their homes for two days or longer, but much of this displacement is proactive short-term evacuation intended to prevent loss-of-life or injuries, in addition to the long-term or permanent displacement caused by the destruction of housing. Many of the natural hazard and technological/accidental hazard events, including earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, volcanoes, and dam failure, also have the potential to cause long-term/permanent displacement in addition to temporary evacuations.

Displacement due to natural hazards is better understood overall than displacement from adversarial or accidental events, but recent natural hazards (i.e., Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike) have demonstrated the lack of available, high quality social science research focusing on the social consequences of these types of catastrophes and how to best mitigate them.

Given the diversity of hazards and the range of communities in the United States, it will remain difficult to predict with absolute certainty how a specific event will affect a specific community. It is, however, both possible and necessary to improve our understanding of the social impacts of events and to use this knowledge to inform risk assessment and management strategies.


Additional Information

Displacement information of sufficient quality upon which to base comparisons could not be found for every threat and hazard event identified (Table 5, Table 6, main report) or assessed (tornadoes, winter storms) in the SNRA.

Work on these events continues.

⁴ U.S. Department of Justice (2000, October), Responding to terrorism victims: Oklahoma City and beyond, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs: report no. NCJ 183949: at <http://ojp.gov/ovc/pdftxt/NCJ183949.pdf>; Farfel et al (2008), An overview of 9/11 experiences and respiratory and mental health conditions among World Trade Center Health Registry enrollees, *Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine* 85(6) 880-909: at http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/296/art%253A10.1007%252Fs11524-008-9317-4.pdf?auth66=1416256452_f460c5e0562e2774a162e6b277f1de8c&ext=.pdf.

Figure F1: Social Displacement by Threat/Hazard Event



How to Read this Chart

The length of each bar denotes the range between the Low and High estimates, or the amount of uncertainty surrounding the Best Estimate. The vertical slide marker on each bar denotes that Best Estimate.

Best Estimate

Low

High

Table F1: SNRA Social Displacement Data and Sources

Threat/Hazard Type	Displacement Estimate			Source Information
	Low	Best	High	
Animal Disease Outbreak	1	1,000	N/A	Low estimate assumed to be zero. Best estimate: Expert judgment. Those working on or near farms may be asked to relocate to reduce the chance of transmitting foot-and-mouth disease to other livestock. High estimate not available.
Drought	0	0	0	SNRA project team assumption.
Earthquake	160	27,000	2,000,000	Low and best estimates reflect historic low and average reports of "total affected" for earthquakes causing greater than \$100 M in economic damage as recorded in EM-DAT during the time period 1970-2011. ¹ High estimate: Expert judgment provided by FEMA.
Flood	150	29,000	200,000	Estimates reflect historic low, average, and high reports of "total affected" for floods causing greater than \$100 M in economic damage as recorded in EM-DAT during the time period 1970-2011. ¹
Human Pandemic Outbreak	0	0	0	Negligible displacement assumed. Hospitalizations of 2 days or greater are not counted as displacement in this assessment.
Hurricane	430	520,000	5,000,000	Estimates reflect historic low, average, and high reports of "total affected" for hurricanes causing greater than \$100 M in economic damage as recorded in EM-DAT during the time period 1970-2011. ¹
Space Weather	0	N/A	40,000,000	Low estimate based on 2003 Northeast Blackout (assumption of 0 displaced). High estimate reflects the number of people (40 million) and duration without power (16 days to 2 years) of the SNRA high impact scenario ² under conditions not permitting residents to stay in their homes for two weeks, such as severe cold weather.
Tornado	N/A	N/A	N/A	Additional analysis is required to determine displacement estimates for tornado events.
Wildfire	770	110,000	640,000	Estimates reflect historic low, average, and high reports of "total affected" for wildfires causing greater than \$100 M in economic damage as recorded in EM-DAT during the time period 1991-2011. ¹
Winter Storm	N/A	N/A	N/A	Additional analysis is required to determine displacement estimates for winter storm events.
Biological Food Contamination	0	400	950	Low estimate assumed to be zero. Best estimate: Expert judgment. High estimate based on historic case study of <i>E. coli</i> in town water supply. ³
Chemical Substance Spill or Release	0	255	5,400	Low, best, and high estimates obtained from analysis of the EPA Risk Management Program and the DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Substance Management Agency databases for the defined national-level event. ⁴
Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)	0	0	0	No incidents in the set of 1980-2014 historic incidents of combustible/flammable rail events resulting in fatalities resulted in evacuations of 48 hours or more.
Dam Failure	1	500	250,000	Low estimate assumed to be 1 (minimal). Best estimate computed as the geometric mean of the low and high estimate. High estimate informed by published displacement estimates for the Hills Creek Dam in Oregon and the Folsom Dam in California. ⁵
Radiological Substance Release	76,000	150,000	500,000	Low and best estimates reflect published estimates of displacement from the Three Mile Island incident. ⁶ High estimate reflects published estimates of displacement from the Chernobyl incident. ⁷
Transportation System Failure	0	0	0	SNRA project team assumption. Data set studied included U.S. historic bridge failures causing one or more fatalities.

Threat/Hazard Type	Displacement Estimate			Source Information
	Low	Best	High	
Aircraft as a Weapon	0	3,000	32,000	Displacement estimates constructed from SNRA project team analysis of historic events in which aircraft intentionally or unintentionally crashed into buildings or crowds of people. The 9/11 attacks in New York are used as a maximum case. ⁸ The analysis does not take into account higher-consequence events which have not yet occurred.
Armed Assault	0	0	0	Displacement estimates from historic incident set used for fatality and injury calculation. Displacement for each of these attacks was assumed to be 0 by the SNRA project team: all attacks occurred in public places rather than private homes or residential neighborhoods.
Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)	0	1,800	N/A	Low estimate assumed to be zero. Best estimate: Historical displacement due to a natural outbreak is used as a proxy estimate for a small-scale, deliberate dissemination of a contagious agent. ⁹ High estimate not available.
Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)	0	100,000	700,000	Low estimate assumed to be zero. Best estimate: Estimated evacuation and dispersal number for a chemical attack (blister agent) aimed at a large gathering such as a football game. ¹⁰ High estimate: Estimated evacuation and dispersal number for a chemical attack (industrial chemicals) where a terrorist uses explosive devices aimed at a petroleum plant. ¹¹
Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack	0	N/A	N/A	Low estimate assumed to be zero. Best and high estimates not available. Experts judged that displacement is likely to be minimal.
Explosives Terrorism Attack	0	2	400	Low, average, and high numbers of persons displaced from U.S. historic explosives/incendiary attacks designated as terrorist incidents by the FBI between 1980-2005. ¹² With the exception of the Oklahoma City bombing which represents the high estimate, ¹³ displacement for each of these attacks was assumed to be 0 by the SNRA project team.
Nuclear Terrorism Attack	330,000	2,000,000	3,000,000	Low, high, and best estimates are informed by published evacuation/shelter-in-place estimates for a detonated 10 kiloton improvised nuclear device. ¹⁴
Physical Attack on the Power Grid	0	0	0	SNRA project team assumption. The high impact scenario for this SNRA event was represented by the 2003 1-3 day Northeast Blackout: defensible estimates for persons displaced from their homes for 2 or more days could not be determined.
Radiological Terrorism Attack	25,000	50,000	100,000	Low, best, and high estimates are informed by published evacuation/shelter-in-place estimates for a radiological dispersal device (RDD). ¹⁵

¹ Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (2011). EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. [Data file]. Brussels: Université Catholique de Louvain. Available from <http://www.emdat.be>. EM-DAT, an emergency events database maintained by the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters with support from USAID, provides estimates of the “total number affected” by disaster events. The “total affected” measure includes the number of people needing immediate assistance, which can include displacements and evacuations; the number of people needing immediate assistance for shelter; and the number of people injured. Because EM-DAT includes injuries in the “total affected” measure, there is potential for double-counting between the SNRA injury and displacement estimates for this event. However, displacement due to natural disasters is typically significantly greater than the number of injuries, so using EM-DAT’s “total affected” measure was judged to provide an estimate of social displacement of sufficient precision for the SNRA. Note that the low estimate may be biased low due to incomplete reporting of displacement and evacuations in EM-DAT.

² Lloyd's (2013) Solar Storm Risk to the North American Electric Grid, produced by Lloyd's and AER [Atmospheric and Environmental Research, Inc]: at www.lloyds.com/~media/lloyds/reports/emerging%20risk%20reports/solar%20storm%20risk%20to%20the%20north%20american%20electric%20grid.pdf.

³ Contamination of the water by *E. coli* in the Ontario community of Kashechewan forced the evacuation of the town. Source: Virchez, J. & Brisbois, R. (2007). A historical and situational summary of relations between Canada and the First Nations: The case of the community of Kashechewan in Northern Ontario. *Revista Mexicana de Estudios Canadienses (nueva época), otoño-invierno*, 014, 87-100. Note that contamination of the food supply is likely to cause minimal displacement (see Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack estimate).

⁴ The set of historic chemical substance release events used for analysis in the SNRA were those which met either of the following criteria: 1) at least one “public” fatality, defined as one fatality other than or in addition to an employee fatality, caused by the hazardous material; 2) at least one fatality of any kind caused by the hazardous material, plus a reported evacuation or shelter-in-place order. This set came from the set of all reported toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) incidents reported 1994-2010 to either the EPA's Risk Management Program (RMP) accident database for fixed industrial producers and consumers of the listed toxic chemicals above given threshold limits, or to the Department of Transportation's

Pipeline and Hazardous Substances Administration (PHMSA)'s database of road, rail, water, and air transportation accidents. For consistency with the other national-level events, reported numbers of total people evacuated were counted only for those events where the reported total evacuation time (PHMSA) or total release duration of the toxic chemical (RMP) was 48 hours or more. Since evacuations may last longer (to ensure the released chemical has fully dissipated) or shorter (when they begin after a delay from the onset of the toxic leak) than the chemical release duration, the events from the RMP database meeting this criterion may be somewhat more or fewer than the ones counted here; but given that these are variations in hours compared with the minimum inclusion of two days, a substantial deviation is unlikely. It is important to note that there is international precedent for displacement in the hundreds of thousands, including the chlorine leakage caused by a railroad accident in Mississauga, Canada, and the explosion at a Union Carbide plant and subsequent release of methylisocynate (MIC) in Bhopal, India (Soffer, Y., Schwartz, D., Goldberg, A., Henenfeld, M., & Bar-Dayan, Y. (2008). Population evacuations in industrial accidents: A review of the literature about four major events. *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine*, 23(3), 276-281.)

⁵ Source for Hills Creek Dam: Oregon Partnership for Disaster Resilience. (2009, October). *Eugene/Springfield multi-jurisdictional natural hazards mitigation plan: Prepared for the cities of Eugene and Springfield, Oregon*. Retrieved from: http://www.eugene-or.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_2_355923_0_0_18/NHMP09.pdf. Source for Folsom Dam: Ayyaswamy, P., Hauss, B., Hseih, T., Moscati, A., Hicks, T. E., & Okrent, D. (1974, March). *Estimates of the Risks Associated with Dam Failure* (UCLA-ENG-7434). Los Angeles, CA: UCLA School of Engineering and Applied Science.

⁶ Sources for the low and best estimates of displacement due to Accidental Radiological Substance Release are: Cutter, S. & Barnes, K. (1982). Evacuation Behavior and Three Mile Island. *Disasters*, 6(2): 116-124; and Soffer, Y., Schwartz, D., Goldberg, A., Henenfeld, M., & Bar-Dayan, Y. (2008). Population Evacuations in Industrial Accidents: A Review of the Literature about Four Major Events. *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine*, 23(3), 276-281.

⁷ Soffer, Y., Schwartz, D., Goldberg, A., Henenfeld, M., & Bar-Dayan, Y. (2008). Population Evacuations in Industrial Accidents: A Review of the Literature about Four Major Events. *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine*, 23(3), 276-281.

⁸ Extrapolated from data provided by the 25% of Lower Manhattan residents responding to the World Trade Center Health Registry Survey. 61% of respondents evacuated their homes, of whom 91.2% had not returned to their homes by September 13: this proportion was extrapolated to the 57,511 total resident population of Lower Manhattan. Farfel et al (2008). These evacuating residents represented a small fraction of the 1 million people (the SNRA 2011 high estimate) who left Lower Manhattan on September 11, the majority of whom were returning to homes elsewhere. The SNRA 2015 best estimate of 32,000 is on the order of the SNRA 2011 best estimate of 50,000 (SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings, Appendix F).

⁹ The best estimate of displacement for a Biological Terrorism Attack is based on the number evacuated in East Timor in 1999 during a natural outbreak of tuberculosis. Source: Connolly, Maire (1999). Communicable Disease Surveillance and Control in East Timor. Geneva: World Health Organization. Retrieved from <http://www.who.int/disasters/repo/7839.doc>. Subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA noted that this estimate is arbitrary given the large range of potential biological attack scenarios; the high estimate could be significantly higher than the best estimate provided if there is a need to decontaminate a large area.

¹⁰ Bea, Keith (2005, March 10). *National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress*. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² FBI (2006), Terrorism 2002-2005, <http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005>.

¹³ U.S. Department of Justice (2000, October). Responding to terrorism victims: Oklahoma City and beyond. Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs: report no. NCJ 183949. At <http://ojp.gov/ovc/pdftxt/NCJ183949.pdf>.

¹⁴ Davis, Tracy C. (2007). *Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense*. Durham NC: Duke University Press; Meade C., Molander R. C. (2006). *Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy. Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf; National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness and Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats (2010). *Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation* (2nd ed.). Retrieved from <http://www.remm.nlm.gov/PlanningGuidanceNuclearDetonation.pdf>.

¹⁵ Worcester, Maxim (2008). *International Terrorism and the Threat of a Dirty Bomb*. Berlin: Institute Für Strategie- Politik-Sicherheits-und Wirtschaftsberatung. Available from <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=46567>.

Appendix G: Psychological Distress Impact Assessment

Overview

Substantial academic research has been conducted on the psychological impacts of disasters.^{1,2,3,4} This research primarily has focused on individual, family, and community impacts rather than the strategic, national-level impacts of interest in this assessment. However, the results have provided a scientific basis for preliminary methodologies for estimating psychological impacts in the SNRA.

For the 2011 SNRA, the DHS Office of Risk Management (RMA), in partnership with DHS Science and Technology (S&T) Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division (HFD),⁵ consulted with several nationally recognized academic researchers investigating psychosocial impacts of disasters and terrorism, including the effects on public health, civil society, and public trust. These experts recommended a methodology to assess psychological distress which would permit comparison across threats and hazards included in the SNRA.

Experts recommended that *significant and/or prolonged psychological distress* caused by national-level events would be the most meaningful psychological metric for strategic capabilities planning and national preparedness. *Fear* is pervasive during the initial impact of a disaster. It is natural and normal, virtually universal, and not harmful within limits (although it can have more serious and lasting consequences under certain conditions). In contrast, the concept of *distress* goes beyond the reactions experienced only at the time of disaster impact. Past research has documented a wide range of psychosocial impacts, including various psychological problems such as depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); physical health problems, such as sleep disruption, somatic complaints, and impaired immune function; chronic problems in living, such as troubled interpersonal relationships and financial stress; and resource loss, such as declines in perceived control and perceived social support. The field of disaster behavioral health often distinguishes between *distress* and *disorder*, the latter of which refers to specific criterion-based conditions that may require professional intervention. *Distress* is a broader outcome, referring to a combination of cognitive, behavioral, and emotional reactions that do not necessarily conform to specific diagnostic criteria but nonetheless are serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. For the SNRA psychological impacts index, experts focused on distress rather than disorder, and used labels such as “significant” or “prolonged” distress to indicate that they would not include mild distress, such as would be expected in any person who has experienced a stressful event.

Prevalence estimates of distress (and disorder) vary markedly across studies. About 10% of the time, there is little or only very fleeting distress. About 50% of the time, distress is common, but

¹ Bonanno, G. A., Brewin, C. R., Kaniasty, K., & La Greca, A. M. (2010). Weighing the costs of disaster: consequences, risks, and resilience in individuals, families, and communities. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, 11(1), 1-49.

² Norris, F. H., & Wind, L. (2009). The experience of disaster: trauma, loss, adversities, and community effects. In Neria, Y., Galea, S., & Norris, F. (Eds.), *Mental Health and Disasters* (pp. 29-44). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

³ Norris, F. H., Friedman, M. J., Watson, P. J., Byrne, C. M., Diaz, E., & Kaniasty, K. (2002). 60,000 disaster victims speak: Part I. An empirical review of the empirical literature, 1981-2001. *Psychiatry*, 65, pp. 207-239.

⁴ Norris, F. H., Friedman, M. J., & Watson, P. J. (2002). 60,000 disaster victims speak: Part II. Summary and implications of the disaster mental health research. *Psychiatry*, 65, 240-260.

⁵ DHS/S&T Resilient Systems Division (RSD) is the current (2015) organizational successor to Human Factors Division.

rates of psychopathology are below 25%. About 40% of the time, distress is common with rates of psychopathology at 25% or greater. Published studies are biased toward more devastating events and vulnerable populations, and thus an interpretation that 40% of disasters have severe consequences for 25% or more of the population may not be fully justified. However, because the threat/hazard events included in the SNRA all have the potential to be severe, this broad summary conclusion may be reasonable.

One challenging aspect of assessing psychological distress in the SNRA is the requirement to estimate the impacts of specific threat/hazard events. Existing research on psychological impacts is not well-aligned with a focus on specific events or hazards. In general, researchers have learned that the type of event is not as important as it was once assumed to be in disaster mental health. What matters most is the scope and severity of an event, i.e., the prevalence of serious stressors that place great demands on the coping ability of the public. Disaster-related stressors that matter for mental health can be grouped into four broad categories: trauma, loss, ongoing adversities, and event familiarity/dread. The primary sources of trauma are threat to life, injury, and exposure to horrible sights, smells, and sounds. The primary sources of loss are property damage, such as to homes and vehicles, financial loss, and declines in psychosocial resources. Deaths cause both trauma and loss for survivors. Ongoing adversities include the challenges of living in damaged housing and communities, dealing with insurance companies and aid, or being displaced. Displacement causes both losses and adversities. Event familiarity/dread captures the intangible, subjective aspects of disaster exposure. All other things being equal, human-caused disasters, especially when intentional, are generally believed to be more distressing than others. Disasters that are followed by uncertainty regarding unseen consequences or fear of recurrence likewise are more distressing.

Such empirical findings indicate that the psychological impacts of a disaster may follow from the other types of impacts (consequences) being assessed in the SNRA. To apply this working knowledge, a consequence index⁶ for significant psychological distress was proposed by the experts that used the SNRA estimates for deaths, injuries, and displacement related to each threat/hazard event. To reflect the empirical findings that losing a loved one is the most severe stressor, followed by injury, followed by displacement, the following formula for a Significant Distress Index was proposed:

$$N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 N_F + N_I + \frac{1}{2} N_D)$$

N_{SD} : number of persons with significant distress

N_F : number of fatalities

N_I : number of injuries/illnesses

N_D : number of people displaced

C_{EF} : Event Familiarity Factor

This formula suggests that, on average, there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. Note also that an Event Familiarity Factor is applied as an attempt to capture the extent to which psychosocial impacts

⁶ The consequence index used in the SNRA for psychological distress is analogous to a risk index, an approach which allows multiple factors which affect the level of risk to be incorporated into a single numerical score for the level of risk. For more information see: Information Standards Organization (2009). Risk management – risk assessment techniques (ISO 31010).

might be exacerbated by an event entailing an ongoing threat with uncertainty about long term effects, that is unfamiliar, or that people dread. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the 2011 SNRA. Thus unfamiliar events (terrorism events, earthquake, chemical or radiological substance release, etc.) are weighted to have more psychological impacts compared to more familiar events (pandemic, flood, hurricane, etc.).

Uncertainty in the significant psychological distress caused by an event is captured by applying the formula to low, best and high estimates of deaths, injuries, and number displaced. Thus the formulaic approach yields a low-best-high index estimate for significant psychological distress. In addition, experts recommended that events scoring higher than 1,000,000 on this index could be considered to result in “high” psychological distress; events scoring between 50,000 to 1,000,000 on this index could be considered to result in “moderate” psychological distress; and events scoring less than 50,000 on this index could be considered to result in “low” psychological distress, in a relative sense.

Limitations

The methodological approach for psychological distress used in the SNRA represents a first attempt to include psychological impacts in a strategic, national-level risk assessment focused on national preparedness. While this approach is straightforward and transparent, it also has important limitations that should be considered when interpreting the psychological distress results:

- Time limitations for completing the SNRA did not allow for a thorough investigation of the structural form of the equation used for computing psychological distress or weights used in the equation. Additional analysis is required to verify and validate this approach, and the sensitivity of the results to the selection of weights in the formula should also be explored. The resulting data and initial analysis have not undergone extensive review by any Federal agency, and have not been extensively verified and validated by the broader community of academic researchers focused on psychosocial effects of disasters.
- Experts consulted about the SNRA psychological impacts measures have emphasized *extreme caution* in using these psychological impact results. A collection of articles published in a September 2011 special issue of the journal *American Psychologist*⁷ relates a succession of mistakes in dealing with psychosocial effects after the attacks. Experts greatly overestimated the number of people in New York who would suffer lasting emotional distress from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and therapists used methods to soothe victims that later proved to be harmful to some.^{8,9}
- Experts consulted about the SNRA psychological impacts measures have emphasized *extreme caution* in using these psychological impact results. A collection of articles published in a September 2011 special issue of the journal *American Psychologist*¹⁰ relates a

⁷ Special issue: “9/11: Ten Years Later.” (2011, September 6). *American Psychologist*, 66(6). Available from <http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/special/4016609.aspx>.

⁸ Carey, B. (2011, July 28). Sept. 11 revealed psychology’s limits, review finds. *The New York Times*, A18. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/health/research/29psych.html>.

⁹ Cohen Silver, R. (2005, November 10). Psychological Responses to Natural and Man-made Disasters. *The role of social science research in disaster preparedness and response: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Research of the Committee of Science, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Session* (24-463PS). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

¹⁰ Special issue: “9/11: Ten Years Later.” (2011, September 6). *American Psychologist*, 66(6). Available from <http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/special/4016609.aspx>.

succession of mistakes in dealing with psychosocial effects after the attacks. Experts greatly overestimated the number of people in New York who would suffer lasting emotional distress from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and therapists used methods to soothe victims that later proved to be harmful to some.^{11,12}

- Quantitative assessments of psychological factors generally involve an extreme level of complexity requiring specific controls. The methodological approach for psychological distress used in the SNRA does not include controls for factors such as preexisting psychological conditions, gender, age, culture, or other significant factors.
- The index approach currently does not include a component for translating economic losses into psychological distress. If estimates of homes destroyed and jobs lost (rather than overall direct economic losses) are obtained as impact estimates for various threat/hazard events, it would be possible to capture financial loss as part of the equation for psychological distress in future iterations of the SNRA.
- The current social displacement measure (counting people as displaced if they are forced to leave home for two or more days) does not differentiate between short term displacement (i.e., short term evacuation) and long term permanent displacement (i.e., the home is destroyed). Ideally, the psychological impact index would differentiate these two types of displacement, because the long term displacement is much more impactful for “significant distress” and “prolonged distress” psychological impacts.¹³
- The duration of distress is an important factor which is not considered in the current approach. Most people do recover over time, although individuals vary greatly in the speed with which they rebound. Empirical evidence suggests that four out of five people with significant disaster-related distress will recover. In combination with the formula used, this means that the experts consulted estimated that there is 1 psychological casualty (i.e., a person with serious and prolonged distress) for each life lost, for every 5 injuries, and for every 10 displacements.

The Department of Homeland Security and its partner organizations are funding social and behavioral science research to better understand how to anticipate, prepare for, counteract, and mitigate the effects of terrorist acts, natural disasters, and technological accidents. This research is intended to explore psychosocial factors that enable resilience and affect recovery in individuals, organizations, communities, and at the national level. Additional results and new insights for preparedness are expected in coming years.

The SNRA approach represents the first attempt to include psychological impacts in a DHS strategic, national-level risk assessment. However, the approach and inputs have not been extensively verified and validated by the broader community of academic researchers focused on psychosocial effects of disasters. As with all of the methodology and analysis developed for the SNRA, the psychological distress estimates should be considered provisional pending full peer and stakeholder review.

¹¹ Carey, B. (2011, July 28). Sept. 11 revealed psychology’s limits, review finds. The New York Times, A18. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/health/research/29psych.html>.

¹² Cohen Silver, R. (2005, November 10). Psychological Responses to Natural and Man-made Disasters. *The role of social science research in disaster preparedness and response: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Research of the Committee of Science, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Session* (24-463PS). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

¹³ The SNRA measure also does not make a distinction between voluntary or involuntary displacement, displacement to emergency shelters as opposed to friends, relatives, or hotels, or displacement within as opposed to outside of a hazard-affected area. These distinctions can be of equal or greater importance to emergency managers, community planners, or other personnel or organizations with mass care planning responsibilities.

Major Findings

- Event preparedness and evacuation planning can reduce “significant distress” by reducing injuries. However, it is difficult to plan capabilities to address long term social displacement when events such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, dam failures, etc. cause loss of homes.
- Experts commented that preparedness and resilience of individuals and communities can be improved over time. As noted, roughly 20% of the exposed population will still experience “prolonged distress” due to an event, but this percentage can be reduced, perhaps down to 5% to 10%, with good community preparedness and resilience. Ongoing social science research will assist federal, state, and local government in better understanding and investing in preparedness and resilience capabilities.

Events Added in the 2015 SNRA

The subject matter expert elicitations for Event Familiarity Factors for the SNRA national-level events took place in 2011. To permit comparability of events added subsequent to 2011 on the psychological distress axis, SNRA 2015 project analysts assigned provisional factors to new events by following the pattern of the original expert judgments.

Table G1: Provisional Assignment of Event Familiarity Factors to New Hazard Events¹⁴

Event Characteristic	EFF (C _{EF})	New Threat/Hazard Events
CBRN terrorist attacks	1.3	
Conventional terrorist attacks other than gun attacks (Explosives, Aircraft as a Weapon)	1.2	
Conventional terrorist attacks primarily using firearms (Armed Assault)	1.1	
Accidents involving toxic substances, such as poison gas, evoking particular dread (Chemical, Radiological Substance Release)	1.1	
Other unintentional disasters of human origin (Biological Food Contamination, Dam Failure)	1.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail) ▪ Transportation System Failure
Earthquakes	1.1	
All other natural hazards, including disease	1.0	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Drought ▪ Tornado ▪ Winter Storm

¹⁴ The Physical Attack on the Power Grid event did not have a sufficiently unambiguous analogy to one or more existing SNRA events for a provisional assignment of Event Familiarity Factor.

Figure G1: Psychological Distress by Threat/Hazard Event



How to Read this Chart

The length of each bar denotes the range between the Low and High estimates, or the amount of uncertainty surrounding the Best Estimate. The vertical slide marker on each bar denotes that Best Estimate.

Best Estimate



Table G2: SNRA Psychological Distress Data

Threat/Hazard Type	Event Familiarity Factor	Significant Distress Index			Notes/Comments
		Low	Best	High	
Animal Disease Outbreak	1.0	N/A	500	N/A	Only a best estimate is available because of the underlying displacement data.
Drought	N/A	0	0	0	Drought impacts did not include fatalities, injuries/illnesses, or displacement, the inputs to the SNRA psychological distress index.
Earthquake	1.1	90	27,000	1,400,000	
Flood	1.0	75	15,000	110,000	
Human Pandemic Outbreak	1.0	61,000,000	78,000,000	110,000,000	
Hurricane	1.0	220	260,000	2,500,000	
Space Weather	1.0	850	N/A	20,000,000	No middle best estimate impacts were estimated for the space weather event.
Tornado	1.0*	N/A	N/A	N/A	Event Familiarity Factor, provisional assignment by SNRA 2015 project team by analogy with other natural hazards. Psychological distress estimates could not be calculated in the absence of displacement data.
Wildfire	1.0	390	55,000	250,000	
Winter Storm	1.0*	N/A	N/A	N/A	Event Familiarity Factor, provisional assignment by SNRA 2015 project team by analogy with other natural hazards. Psychological distress estimates could not be calculated in the absence of displacement data.
Biological Food Contamination	1.0	200	17,000	46,000	
Chemical Substance Spill or Release	1.1	6	230	4,000	
Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)	1.0*	5	25	59	Event Familiarity Factor, provisional assignment by SNRA 2015 project team by analogy with other accidents not involving substances of particular dread.
Dam Failure	1.0	6	390	130,000	
Radiological Substance Release	1.1	42,000	82,000	290,000	
Transportation System Failure	1.0*	5	150	3,600	Event Familiarity Factor, provisional assignment by SNRA 2015 project team by analogy with other accidents not involving substances of particular dread.
Aircraft as a Weapon	1.2	18	4,000	39,000	

Appendix G: Psychological Distress Impact Assessment

Threat/Hazard Type	Event Familiarity Factor	Significant Distress Index			Notes/Comments
		Low	Best	High	
Armed Assault	1.1	0	18	2,800	
Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)	1.3				
Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)	1.3				
Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack	1.3				
Explosives Terrorism Attack	1.2	0	21	39,000	
Nuclear Terrorism Attack	1.3				
Physical Attack on the Power Grid	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	An Event Familiarity Factor could not be unambiguously determined for this event. ¹⁵
Radiological Terrorism Attack	1.3				

¹⁵ Unlike other SNRA events added after 2011, this event did not have an unambiguous analogy to other existing SNRA events.

Appendix H: Environmental Impact Assessment

Note that all comparative statements refer to unclassified assessed impacts, not risks which are in part derived from classified frequency information for the CBRN events.

Environmental impact estimates for events added since 2011 were not determined by the 2015 SNRA project, due in part to time and resource constraints.

Overview

In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an *ad hoc* group of environmental experts to develop environmental impact estimates for the first SNRA. The group of experts included representation from the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management. The resulting comments and rankings have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group.

For the purposes of the SNRA, environmental risk was defined as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.¹ Environmental effects within urban areas and all human health effects were not included within the scope of this environmental risk assessment, because these impacts were already addressed separately in the other impact analyses for the SNRA.

EPA experts judged the relative environmental impact of each national-level event by selecting one of four categories of severity: *de minimis* (or minimal), low, moderate, and high. In doing so, the experts considered the areal extent of the impact, the potential for adverse consequences, and the severity of adverse consequences. The four categories of severity used in the SNRA allow for a relative comparison of environmental impacts between events, but do not provide absolute estimates of impacts for use outside the context of this assessment.

For each event, EPA experts provided a best estimate and a secondary estimate. This was done to capture variability in the potential location of the event, how it might unfold, and/or its areal extent, as well as uncertainty about the adverse environmental impacts associated with the event.

The estimates provided in this environmental impact assessment were developed using rudimentary assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables, such as chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence and toxicity (both chronic and acute), or infectivity.

Major Findings²

- Nuclear terrorism attacks and volcanic eruptions³ were assessed to have high potential for adverse environmental impacts relative to other events, at the best estimate. Both events have

¹ This definition is aligned with the EPA's definition of environmental risk. Accessed at: <http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAters/terms.html>.

² This section refers to four events—volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, cyber attacks against data, and cyber attacks against physical infrastructure—which the 2011 SNRA identified but for which defensible estimates on other axes (frequency and/or impacts) permitting comparison with other SNRA events could not be found. These, along with other qualitatively addressed events, are not otherwise discussed in this 2015 document: please see the SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings for further discussion of these events. (A fifth event qualitatively analyzed in the 2011 SNRA, space weather, was quantitatively analyzed in 2015 and is discussed elsewhere in this document.)

³ See SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings.

in common the potential to disrupt ecosystems over a large area through either airborne nuclear fallout or volcanic ash. The experts used their second choice to mark the chemical terrorism attack (non-food), accidental chemical substance release, accidental radiological substance release, hurricane, earthquake, and tsunami⁴ events as having the potential for high environmental impacts. Of all the events, only nuclear terrorism attacks were judged as high environmental impact events with minimal uncertainty.

- Multiple events were judged to have *de minimis* potential for adverse environmental impacts at the best estimate, including armed assaults, cyber attacks affecting data, cyber attacks affecting physical infrastructure,⁵ and space weather events. Of these, armed assaults and cyber attacks affecting data were judged to have *de minimis* impacts with high certainty. If the space weather event or cyber attack against physical infrastructure were to result in extended power outages, the potential for environmental impacts would increase to low/moderate as chemical and treatment plants failed.
- Many terrorism events, with the exception of nuclear and chemical terrorism attacks, are judged to have low or *de minimis* potential for adverse environmental impacts at the best estimate. This is primarily driven by the relatively low areal extent of many terrorism events when compared to natural disasters, especially outside urban areas.
- The meteorological/geological natural hazard events were judged to have moderate or high potential for adverse environmental impacts at the best estimate, with the exception of space weather. This is driven by the potential for large areal extent.
- All events in the technological/accidental hazards category, including biological food contamination, chemical substance release, dam failure, and radiological substance release, were judged to have moderate environmental impacts at the best estimate.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

Table H1: SNRA Environmental Impact Data and Comments

Threat/Hazard Type	Best Estimate	Second-Best Estimate	Comments	
Animal Disease Outbreak	Low	Moderate	Depends upon the acreage required for disposal of infected carcasses. There is some potential for introduction into wild animal populations, which could lead to re-introduction into crop animal species from the wild animals and greater economic losses.	
Drought	N/A	N/A	Not assessed in 2011.	
Earthquake	Moderate	High	Debris, devastation, and resulting chemical/contaminant releases have the potential to impact large areas.	
Flood	Moderate	Moderate	Flooding of agricultural areas is a typical impact. The severity of the impact depends upon whether there is release of contaminants from urban areas.	
Human Pandemic Outbreak	Low	Moderate	Impacts become moderate in cases where the pandemic is significant enough that environmental protection resources are diminished (e.g., garbage collection is halted due to sanitation workers not working due to illness or concern about becoming ill).	
Hurricane	Moderate	High	Hurricanes can cause ecological impacts, beach erosion, nutrient loading, chemical contamination, salt water intrusion into fresh water bodies, and removal of plants leading to erosion. Large areas can experience impacts.	
Space Weather	<i>De minimis</i>	Moderate	Depends upon duration of power outage. For a short outage (day to few days), the impact would be relatively minimal. If a power outage persisted for weeks, then there is potential for failure of backup systems. Once backup systems (diesel fuel delivery, etc.) fail, treatment plants and chemical plants failing could have a significant impact. The difference between this event and the Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure event is that a space weather event would most likely affect a much greater geographic area and has the potential for a longer duration.	
Tornado	N/A	N/A	Not assessed in 2011.	
Wildfire	Low	High	Many wildfires have low long-term effects on ecosystems and can provide longer-term benefits such as reseeding of plants and assisting the growth of forested areas. If the wildfire threatens an urban U.S. setting, the fire could envelop oil/chemical storage tanks and cause widespread release of such materials, resulting in high environmental impacts.	
Winter Storm	N/A	N/A	Not assessed in 2011.	
Biological Food Contamination	Moderate	Low	Moderate, but could be low if the specific event involves a biological agent with a low probability of impacting native species. Moderate impacts would most likely result from either waste disposal (e.g., disposing of food supply that had become contaminated) or dissemination of an infectious agent through some type of accidental application (e.g., pesticide application in crops). If the agent just affects people, the environmental/ ecological impact would be low.	
Chemical Substance Spill or Release	Moderate	High	Widespread release of an acutely toxic compound would result in moderate impacts. Could impact tens to thousands of acres with lethal material. Release of acutely toxic materials in a low-populated area would lead to greater ecological damage than a release in an urban area. The more persistent the chemical, the greater the impact. There is a potential for water contamination, which could elevate this to a high impact.	
Combustible/ Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)	N/A	N/A	Not assessed in 2011.	
Dam Failure	Moderate	Moderate	Water released could impact a significant area, but the duration of impact would likely be relatively short term, with a year or more for recovery.	
Radiological Substance Release	Moderate	High	Nuclear power plant disruption (e.g., Fukushima) could cause radioactive airborne releases that could travel for large distances and settle into down-range eco-systems, with possible disruptions. In addition, releases into water bodies may have impacts on aquatic life.	
Transportation System Failure	N/A	N/A	Not assessed in 2011. ¹	

Appendix H: Environmental Impact Assessment

Threat/Hazard Type	Best Estimate	Second-Best Estimate	Comments
Aircraft as a Weapon	Low	Moderate	Low; one airplane could cause tens of acres of environmental impact of a limited duration, likely within an urban environment. Could be moderate depending upon the target (e.g., a chemical plant).
Armed Assault	<i>De minimis</i>	<i>De minimis</i>	Minimal environmental impact.
Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)	Low	Low	Depends upon agent and persistence, but potential for environmental consequences is low given focus on human disease. Highest environmental consequences would be an incident resulting in an increase in animal disease. Disposal of contaminated waste could result in higher consequences.
Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)	Moderate	High	Aquatic run-off could disseminate a persistent chemical and increase the impact on the environment, depending upon the chemical. Toxicity, spread, and persistence of chemical agent would be the defining characteristics that change the impacts from moderate to high (or low).
Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack	Low	Moderate	Since the effect is directed toward humans, this should have low impact. If introduced into an agricultural setting, there could be impact on the local ecosystem. There could be a waste disposal issue, and depending upon the contaminant and the volume of material this could be significant.
Explosives Terrorism Attack	N/A	N/A	The environmental impact estimates elicited for the Explosives Terrorism Attack event in 2011 were tied to the scope of the event, which was substantially revised in 2015. ²
Nuclear Terrorism Attack	High	High	High, due to duration, size of affected area, and toxicity. A large, dirty device detonated in a metropolitan area could create a large fallout trail of highly persistent material. There may be high levels of fallout material for dozens of miles, and outside the city limits. The long-term environmental impact may be moderate; the isotopes could be remediated, and if the area is zoned off-limits for human use (similar to Chernobyl), there is potential for the environment to return to a state that is more pristine than the initial state.
Physical Attack on the Power Grid	N/A	N/A	Not assessed in 2011.
Radiological Terrorism Attack	Low	Moderate	Likely low, given the relatively low toxicity of the likely materials and the relatively low area for dispersion. Moderate if there is fallout outside the urban area.

¹ Transportation System Failure, defined as “Abrupt or emerging conditions where design flaws or use in excess of engineered lifespan of a major bridge structure lead to physical failure”, was initially identified as an SNRA national-level event in 2011 but tabled because of challenges finding defensible data (on the non-environmental impact axes) within the highly compressed timeframe of the 2011 project. Because of this, preliminary environmental impact assessments for this event were assessed by the EPA SMEs in July 2011, but were not confirmed in October 2011 when the impact assessments for the 2011 SNRA events were revised. The preliminary best and second-best estimates for this event were *De minimus* and Moderate respectively, with discussion “Likely de minimus. However, there is potential for railcars or semi-trucks carrying toxic materials to crash/derail due to the bridge collapse, resulting in releases of those toxic materials into the environment, including waterways.”

² The best and second-best environmental impact estimates assessed for the Explosives Terrorism Attack national-level event in 2011 were Low and Moderate respectively, similar to those of an aircraft-as-a-weapon or a radiological dispersal device (dirty bomb) attack, but these judgments were tied to explosives and incendiary attacks causing a minimum of one human injury or fatality. The 2015 change in threshold to any terrorist (as designated by the FBI) explosive or incendiary attack brought potentially less destructive incidents within the scope of the event, such that 90% of the incidents in the data set defining the 2015 Explosives Terrorism Attack threat event did not result in human injury or fatality. However, this change also increased the proportion of incendiary (arson) attacks and attacks targeting physical infrastructure as opposed to concentrations of people in the incident data set. Because of these substantial differences in scope, a new elicitation would be required to obtain defensible environmental impact estimates for the event as revised in 2015.

Appendix I: Thresholds in the SNRA

National-Level Events

To inform homeland security preparedness and resilience activities, the SNRA evaluated the risk from known threats and hazards that have the potential to significantly impact the Nation's homeland security. These included natural hazards, technological/accidental hazards, and adversarial, human-caused threats/hazards.

For assessment in the SNRA, participating stakeholders—including Federal agencies, DHS Components, and the intelligence community, among others—developed these threats and hazards into a list of *national-level events*¹ having the potential to test the Nation's preparedness.

For the purposes of the assessment, DHS analysts identified thresholds of consequence (impact)² necessary to create a national-level event (threat/hazard event). These thresholds were informed by subject matter expertise and available data, and are given in Table 2 at the front of this report.

The selection of appropriate thresholds for each event was among the most significant challenges for the SNRA project.

- As the Nation's preparedness may be challenged by events having impacts across any or all of the consequence categories of the SNRA, it is not possible to identify any one generic consequence threshold capable of adequately capturing this distinction for all the hazards in the SNRA.
- Wherever possible, common thresholds across multiple events were sought to minimize the total number of different threshold criteria needed to define the set of national-level events as a whole. However, the unique impacts of each event, and in many cases data availability,³ precluded the assignment of every event to a larger, harmonized-threshold class.

Since there is no one objective or context-independent answer to this question, these determinations ultimately came down to the best, but human, judgment of the SNRA project team.

- For some events, economic impacts were used as thresholds. For others, fatalities or injuries/illnesses were deemed more appropriate as the threshold to determine a national-level incident.

¹ The 2015 SNRA refers to the SNRA's elements of analysis simply as “threats and hazards” where it will not cause confusion. The 2011 term “national-level event” is used in instances where the specific historical or technical meaning given this term by the 2011 SNRA is indicated.

² The 2015 SNRA uses “impact” in place of “consequence” where it will not cause confusion. The 2011 term “consequence” is used in instances where needed to avoid duplication, refer to its historical use in the 2011 SNRA, or reference its specific technical meaning in the field of risk analysis.

This section refers to the specific historical context of both the 2011 and 2015 projects, and so both terms are used as appropriate.

³ Stakeholders sometimes note that many of the SNRA's thresholds tend to be on the low side compared with what many people consider to be a truly catastrophic event (for instance, the threshold of NOAA's Billion Dollar Disaster List). As noted below, a low choice of threshold may not appreciably affect a best estimate *risk* calculated by multiplying the average likelihood and consequence measure of a set of events. However, it can significantly depress best estimate consequences when they are calculated as an average of the set of events, and the low and high consequence estimates when they are calculated as percentiles of the distribution defined by the set.

For many events, however, limited quantitative data comprised a significant constraint on the range of thresholds which could be practically selected in the SNRA. Although the high-consequence ‘tail’ of more catastrophic incidents may be of greater interest for many purposes, the higher the threshold selected to isolate these incidents the sparser becomes the data set used to determine the estimates characterizing the event. By including more historical incidents or modeled data points within the scope of an event, lower thresholds maximize the data fidelity of the set used to determine quantitative estimates and hence the defensibility of these estimates.

The 2015 SNRA departed from the harmonized thresholds for particular groups of event (in particular the \$1 billion threshold for drought, winter storms, and space weather, and the differing impact thresholds among the adversarial events) developed by the 2011 SNRA. Addressing the issues created by this variation is the first priority for follow-on SNRA project work.

- In no case, however, were economic and casualty thresholds treated as equivalent to one another (i.e., dollar values were not assigned to fatalities).

Event descriptions in Table 2 that do not explicitly identify a threshold signify that no minimum impact threshold was employed. This allows the assessment to consider events for which the psychological impact of an event could cause it to become a national-level event even though it may result in a low number of casualties or a small economic loss.

- For example, any terrorist attack resulting in the successful release or detonation of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon, even if it resulted in no fatalities or injuries, would be considered a national-level event for the purposes of the SNRA.
- By contrast, a much higher threshold was set for the accidental Biological Food Contamination event, requiring a multi-state outbreak resulting in 100 or more hospitalizations⁴ for an incident to be considered a national-level event. Unintentional food poisoning is estimated to cause 3,000 deaths, 128,000 hospitalizations, and 48 million illnesses every year in this country.⁵ However, the very ubiquity of this hazard makes it such a part of the background level of risk addressed by steady-state national capabilities that only the largest and most consequential outbreaks were considered to rise to a level of impact characteristic of a national-level event.⁶

Assessed best estimates of annualized *risk*, when calculated by multiplying the average likelihood and average impacts (consequences) of a set of incidents,⁷ may be relatively insensitive to threshold choices. However, this is not generally true for the best estimates of *likelihood* and *impact* individually reported by the SNRA, or for those high estimates of impact which represent percentiles of a distribution. These differences can have significant implications for risk communication, and are discussed at further length below.

Best Estimates in the SNRA

The best estimates of impact measures in the SNRA were assessed by different methods, depending on the particular impact type and event.

Social displacement best estimates, with a few exceptions, were chosen according to the best judgment of subject matter experts and analysts who conducted the research for these estimates. The qualitative environmental impact estimates represent subject matter expert judgment. Some of the SNRA national level events leverage subject matter expert judgment for their best estimates on other impact metrics as well.

For most events in the SNRA, best estimates for fatality, injury/illness, and direct economic impact measures represent the weighted average consequences over a distribution of possible

⁴ Note that neither of these two criteria, nor the successful-release criterion of the CBRN terrorist attack events, directly corresponds to measures of consequence used by the SNRA. These further illustrate the difficulty of capturing the factors elevating an incident to the level of a ‘national-level event’ capable of challenging national preparedness by some single, simple and uniform quantitative measure.

⁵ U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2011). *CDC Estimates of Foodborne Illness in the United States*.

⁶ Since this highly restrictive definition excludes all but a very few incidents of this type, the SNRA’s reported consequence estimates for accidental food contamination are lower than these annual national totals by two orders of magnitude. This discrepancy may give the appearance that the SNRA substantially understates the risks from a well known hazard. The reason for this apparent discrepancy is that the SNRA attempts to capture not the annual death toll of known and constant hazards which are handled by steady-state capabilities, but the small set of exceptional incidents having disproportionate potential to cause harm and disruption because steady state capabilities are not prepared to handle them. For the accidental food contamination event, such incidents comprise only a very small subset of all such accidents, even of those causing injury, illness, and death, occurring every day in this country.

⁷ Or modeled scenarios corresponding to points on a modeled distribution (with ‘average’ consequence represented by a conditional probability-weighted average consequence given attack [WACPA]).

consequences, given an event occurrence. Weighted average consequence is a measure of the average impact (number of fatalities, illnesses/injuries, or cost) across a set of scenarios.

- For estimates derived from a data set of historical incidents, the weighted average is simply the average of the set.
- For estimates derived from modeled distributions, weighted average consequences are constructed by weighting each scenario in the set by its relative likelihood, such that more probable scenarios have greater influence on the mean impact.⁸

When a set of incidents (or a modeled distribution) chosen to represent a national-level event has consequences distributed over several orders of magnitude—that is, there are many small-consequence incidents and a few very large-consequence incidents—a best estimate of risk that is calculated by multiplying an average likelihood of occurrence by a weighted average consequence is relatively insensitive to the choice of minimum threshold that is used to define the national-level event.

- As a concrete illustration, a set of historical incidents for a set defined by a threshold of 1 or more fatalities might have ten incidents with fatalities {1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 5, 9, 200}, occurring over ten years. The average frequency of occurrence is 1 per year (10 in 10 years = 1/year). The average of the set is 22.5 fatalities. Then the best estimate fatality risk would be 1 event/year × 22.5 average fatalities/incident = 22.5 fatalities/year.
- Selecting a different threshold of 100 fatalities will reduce the set to only one member, {200}. Because only one incident in ten years is counted instead of ten, the likelihood (1 in 10 years = 0.1 incidents/year) of this set is one-tenth of what it was before. However, the average of this new set is 200 fatalities. The best estimate risk would then be 0.1 incident/year × 200 average fatalities/incident = 20 fatalities per year. This is similar to the calculated risk of the original set, even though it is defined by a much higher threshold.⁹


To help illustrate this concept, figures I.1 and I.2 display the SNRA fatality and direct economic risk charts, but with adjusted thresholds for some events.¹⁰

- In figure I.1, each of the adversarial events with distributed human health impact data—Explosives Terrorism Attack, Armed Assault, and Aircraft as a Weapon—is displayed with estimates corresponding to a threshold of one or more fatalities, similar to the accidental hazards. The Explosives Terrorism Event crosshair shifts to the down and right, illustrating a low-probability, high-impact hazard rather than the high-frequency, low-impact hazard it appears to be when charted with the lower threshold of the occurrence of a terrorist attack regardless of impact. However, its fatality *risk*, both absolute and relative to the other SNRA

⁸ Description of weighted average consequence adapted from the 2011 ITRA, page 2-7. DHS Directorate of Science & Technology (2011), Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (reference is SECRET//NOFORN; extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED).

⁹ It is worth noting that the annualized risk is actually *higher* for the set having a lower threshold. Lower minimum thresholds only add more incidents to the set being counted as a whole. This counterintuitive property is generically true for any annualized risk measure calculated in this manner.


¹⁰ The estimates displayed in this chart were obtained by repeating the same operations described in the risk summary sheets on the set of incidents in Table K.2 which met the higher-impact threshold. Low and best estimate fatality or direct economic impacts were obtained as the minimum and average of the qualifying set of incidents; high estimates, in some cases the high of a set and in others a historically observed or near-miss maximum outside the set, were unchanged. Low, best, and high frequency estimates were the inverse of the longest inter-arrival time, the average frequency over the observation period (the observation period of the original data set, also reported in Table K.2), and the most incidents in one year (or the inverse of the shortest inter-arrival time) in the qualifying set of incidents for all events with the exception of floods, tornadoes, and wildfires. For these events, the best estimate frequency was the average frequency calculated in the same fashion. However, the low and high frequencies represent the central 90 percent confidence range (frequentist interpretation) of the Poisson distribution for the number of observations above \$1 billion for each event because of the small number of observations for these events above this threshold (4 each for Wildfire and Tornado, 5 for Flood) in the SNRA historical incident data set. These intervals were determined in the same manner as the exceedance curve in figure I.3 (footnote 14).

Figure I.1. Fatality Risk of Non-CBRN Adversarial Events with a 1 Fatality Threshold

hazards, is unchanged because the only alteration to the data is the removal of a large number of zero-fatality events: the crosshair stays on the same diagonal. The Armed Assault event, because it possesses a threshold of at one or more injuries or fatalities other than the attacker(s), changes relatively less because the majority of incidents captured in the SNRA data set resulted in fatalities. The Aircraft as a Weapon event shows no change, because all the incidents in its data set also cause fatalities.

- Figure I.2 displays in a similar fashion the \$100 million threshold natural hazard events—earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and wildfires—given the same \$1 billion threshold as the 2015 added hazards (drought, winter storm, space weather). The higher-threshold versions shift slightly from the constant-risk diagonal, because instead of shedding zero-impact events which add nothing to the impact of the set as a whole each of these events lose a substantial number of historical incidents causing from \$100 million to \$1 billion in direct economic loss. Hazards which characteristically have more frequent, lower-impact occurrences, including floods and tornadoes, shift downward and to the right by a larger extent than hazards for which the relative occurrence of billion-dollar disasters is of comparable or greater frequency compared with disasters in the \$100 million-\$1 billion range. However, for each of these hazards the shift in diagonal position indicating product risk is small, for in each case—including floods and tornadoes—the overall direct economic risk is dominated by the few most destructive events in the total set of historical incidents.

Approximate top level numbers which may be used for an alternative SNRA comparative analysis using these harmonized thresholds are provided in table K.4, Appendix K).

Figure I.2. Direct Economic Risk of Natural Hazards with a \$1 Billion Threshold

While resourcing decisions often use best-estimate annualized risk as a primary measure of comparison, operational planning and policy decisions must consider a more complex picture of risk which focuses on measures of likelihood and consequence separately. This is especially true for decisions taken from a preparedness standpoint. Continuing the example above, front-line stakeholders must be able to effectively respond to both the frequent 1 fatality incidents and the rare 200 fatality catastrophe, not the 22.5 average fatality incident which is never seen. For such decisions, the use of a weighted average may be misleading.

For hazards dominated by a large number of low-consequence incidents and a relatively smaller number of very high-consequence incidents, the average-consequence best estimates may mask the low and high consequence scenarios which will be of most interest to decision-makers in many contexts. Communicating information about higher and lower consequence scenarios is one of the reasons for the SNRA's emphasis on representing variability and uncertainty in its estimates.

Variability and Uncertainty in the SNRA

The SNRA reports both high and low bounds, in addition to best estimates, as part of its treatment of uncertainty in frequency and impact. Uncertainty in the SNRA includes both uncertainty in our *knowledge* about an event, and *variability* over a known range or distribution of impacts for an event.^{11,12} This distribution, if known, may indicate the relative probabilities of different impacts should an incident of this type occur. However, it is insufficient to definitively predict what the magnitude of the *next* incident will be.

Examples of sources of uncertainty include incomplete knowledge of adversary capabilities and intent, uncertainty in the effectiveness of countermeasures, variability in possible event severity and location, and lack of historical precedence.

The SNRA captures uncertainty in various ways, depending on the data source:

- For frequencies derived from the historical record, upper and lower bounds are estimated using the historic maximum number of occurrences per year and the longest time gap between historic occurrences.
- For frequencies derived from expert elicitation, uncertainty is captured using structured techniques to determine the 5th and 95th percentile confidence intervals.¹³
- For impacts derived from the historical record, upper and lower bounds are estimated from the highest and lowest impacts in the observed set of past events.
- For impacts derived from previous terrorist risk assessments, 5th and 95th percentile confidence intervals were estimated, which take into account terrorist capabilities and preferences in weapon and target selection.

In many cases, the high estimates for impact measures in the SNRA were constructed from either historic maximums (e.g., natural hazards) or the 95th percentile of a modeled distribution (e.g., terrorism events). These measures were chosen for defensibility, and for consistency with common practice of reporting the 95th percentile as a “reasonable worst-case scenario” useful for many decision contexts.

However, this reporting choice means that the high estimates associated with each national-level event may not be reflective of the impacts which may occur from what would be considered a “worst-case scenario” in other decision contexts. For planning purposes, in particular, it may be important to recognize that impacts of events have a small probability of being higher than the estimates of impacts reported in the SNRA. By definition, there is a 5% chance that the impacts given an attack or incident could be higher than an estimate drawn from the 95th percentile.

To help illustrate this concept, Figure I.3 displays an alternate visualization of the fatality impact data for the SNRA natural hazard events taken as a whole, incorporating the full range of impacts reflected by the data.¹⁴

¹¹ These two types of uncertainty are sometimes referred to as epistemic (knowledge) uncertainty, and aleatory (probabilistic) uncertainty.

¹² This description is something of an oversimplification for explanatory purposes. For events such as natural hazards where the range of frequencies come from a well-defined historical record and represent the observed variability in timing between successive incidents (inter-arrival times), reported frequency ranges represent variability (the measure from the data set) as much as uncertainty in our knowledge (of how representative the historical data set will be of similar events over the next 3-5 years [the timeframe of the SNRA]).

¹³ It is important to note that, however they are determined, low and high frequency estimates do not correspond to the low and high consequence estimates. In other words, the high frequency is not the expected frequency of an incident occurring which results in the high consequences on one or more metrics.


Figure I.3: Natural Hazard Risk: Probability of Exceedance given Event Occurrence (Fatalities)

Figure I.3 displays a set of *exceedance curves*. These represent the estimated frequency with which a natural hazard event, given occurrence, will¹⁵ be equal to or greater than the corresponding impact according to this model.¹⁶ The middle curve represents the best estimate (expected) exceedance curve, while the surrounding curves represent the uncertainty. The violet crosshairs indicate the 50th percentile (median), 95th percentile, and 99th percentile of impacts, in this case fatalities.

- The 50th percentile disaster, on the best estimate (middle) curve, corresponds to three fatalities. This means, given the occurrence of a natural hazard incident from the set of events meeting the thresholds of inclusion for the SNRA (e.g. an earthquake, flood, hurricane, tornado, or wildfire causing \$100 million or greater or a drought, space weather event, or

¹⁴ Note that all charted uncertainties correspond to the 90% Poisson confidence interval for the corresponding number of events, plotted as ratios of the central estimate, following the convention of WASH-1400 chapter 6 (footnote 16). This includes the point scenario events (Pandemic, Space Weather, Animal Disease); although low and high likelihood estimates were provided by the same methods as the best estimate for these events, their comparability with the 90% Poisson interval used for historical incident data points was unknown and so the best estimate likelihood was used uniformly, including the largest-fatality point (Pandemic).

¹⁵ All instances of “will” in the following mean “according to this model, will”. Additionally, all statements in the following refer only to the best estimate (red) exceedance curve, and do not account for the model uncertainties represented in part by the orange lines, nor to the substantial additional uncertainties deriving from the many significant limitations of the SNRA method and data set.

¹⁶ This type of exceedance curve, where the event is assumed to have already occurred (the total probability is normalized to 100%), is called a conditional cumulative distribution function (CCDF). Exceedance curves can also show the absolute likelihood of an event of a particular magnitude (or greater) occurring: these are sometimes referred to as F-N curves. A good example of exceedance curves used in a context similar to that of the SNRA may be found in chapter 6 of the 1975 Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), also referred to as the Rasmussen Report. Rasmussen, Norman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1975, October). *Reactor Safety Study: An assessment of accident risks in U.S. commercial nuclear power plants*. WASH-1400 (NUREG 75/014). Available at <http://teams.epris.com/PRA/Big%20List%20of%20PRA%20Documents/WASH-1400/02-Main%20Report.pdf>.

winter storm causing \$1 billion or greater of direct economic damage, or a pandemic or animal disease event on the scale of the SNRA best-estimate scenarios), 50% of these incidents will result in zero, one, or two fatalities, and 50% will result in three or more, at the best estimate.

- Although not marked on the chart, one fatality is approximately the 35th percentile on the best estimate curve. This means that while 65% of the natural disaster events exceeding the direct economic thresholds in the SNRA will result in one or more human fatalities, 35%—more than a third—will result in no human fatalities at all, at the best estimate.
- The 95th percentile disaster in terms of fatalities is 50, on the best estimate curve. This means that 95 out of a hundred such disasters (95%) will result in 49 or fewer fatalities, but five out of a hundred (5%) will result in 50 or more, at the best estimate.
- The 99th percentile disaster on the best estimate curve is approximately five hundred fatalities.¹⁷ This means that 99 out of every 100 such disasters will result in fewer than 500 fatalities. However, one in a hundred such disasters will result in 500 fatalities or more, at the best estimate.¹⁸
- Other percentiles corresponding to specific impact thresholds (i.e. 10, 100, 1,000) may be read by drawing crosshairs centered on the red exceedance curve: after drawing a vertical line from the impact (horizontal) axis, the horizontal crosshair will indicate the corresponding percentile on the likelihood (vertical) axis.

These curves are normalized to relative frequencies (a maximum of 100%) to illustrate the use of percentiles for reporting impact estimates in the SNRA, and to illustrate how different selections of percentile can result in seemingly dramatically different “reasonable worst-case” scenarios being reported from the same underlying data.

These relative frequencies can be converted to absolute frequencies (actual number of events occurring per year) by multiplying by 10.9, the total annual frequency of occurrence of this set of events as a whole. In other words, the Nation may expect to be challenged by an average of nearly a dozen natural disaster incidents (including human pandemics) meeting the minimum threshold of the SNRA every year, or about one every month on the average. More than a third of these will result in no human fatalities at all. However, half will result in three or more, five of every hundred will result in more than 50, and one of every hundred will result in 500 fatalities or greater, at the best estimate.

As noted above, high estimates of impacts for many events in the SNRA correspond to the 95th percentile.¹⁹ However, significant dialogue within the preparedness community is needed to define the level of potential impacts for which the community should be planning. The SNRA is the first U.S. national all-hazards risk assessment reporting its findings as quantitative and directly comparable measures of risk: among its contributions are a methodology and an initial data set which make it possible to ask this question, and see what different answers would look like. One such choice of levels, determined by the data and reporting thresholds selected for the

¹⁷ Within the degree of precision of the data set (260 points) and the numerical interpolation of the charted curve.

¹⁸ The data points in this 1% include the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, Hurricane Katrina, and the Human Pandemic Influenza Outbreak scenario (Appendix K).

¹⁹ For individual natural hazard events leveraging finite data sets, high estimates also correspond to the highest percentile of each event’s data set. For example, the high value of a set of twenty data points also represents the 95th exceedance percentile of that set (the top 5% or top 1/20th), and the high value of a set of fifty data points represents the 98th exceedance profile (the top 2%) of that set.

first iteration of the SNRA, may be seen in the visual depictions of the SNRA's likelihood and impact estimates presented throughout this report.

However, it is only one such choice, and one which was primarily motivated by data availability and past practice in the Department which led the execution of the first SNRA. Many other choices are possible, and equally valid. These considerations pertain not just to the internal math and methodology of the SNRA, but political, normative, and practical considerations determined by the larger context for which the SNRA was commissioned and used. Different users and use contexts of the SNRA and its data will have different needs.

Appendix J: Risk Summary Sheets

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Overview

For each threat or hazard event,¹ the research, assumptions, and data which were used to produce the low, best, and high estimates of likelihood and measures of impact² were documented in an event-specific risk summary sheet by the SNRA project team. Summary sheets with common reporting formats to document staff research and analysis of individual hazards have been used by past comparative risk assessments. This is because of their utility in guiding research efforts to identify data capable of being expressed in terms of a predetermined set of measures designed to be comparable across all events.³

The risk summary sheets shared a standardized data table format to facilitate the comparability and harmonization of estimates across diverse events (Tables J1-J3). This table specified the categories, types, and most importantly the metrics which were to be used to measure likelihood and each type of impact (consequence). Each of these was baked into the table to ensure that what the numbers meant would be communicated with them.

2011 risk summary sheets

Because of the heterogeneity and roughness of these internal risk summary sheets, the 2011 sheets were not originally included with the 2011-12 review drafts of the SNRA technical report. For this reason, these risk summary sheets are essentially the staff research notes of the 2011 SNRA project team. At the time of their finalization, they were not contemplated as potential parts of the ultimate SNRA documentation for external stakeholders. They are highly heterogeneous in style, format, depth, and approach. No attempt has been made to standardize them beyond correcting typos, clarifying obscure points, and fixing or completing missing documentation such as incomplete footnotes, broken links, or omitted sources. The reader should expect such variations and use these sheets as supplementary documentation to the main report as needed, rather than as polished products intended to stand on their own.

2015 additions/revisions

Risk summary sheets added or revised in 2012 (Tornado) or 2015 are marked with a lower tab.

By contrast with the 2011 project, the 2015 project treated the SNRA risk summary sheets as the primary documentation of the additions and revisions of the 2015 project. This was because the

¹ The term ‘National-level Event’ developed by the 2011 project to denote the SNRA elements of analysis (which had no pre-existing word) is generally replaced with ‘threat/hazard’ in the 2015 SNRA. As the latter terms are commonly used for a multiplicity of meanings including in risk analysis, the word ‘event’ is frequently coupled with or used in place of these terms for clarity. The 2011 risk summary sheets’ terminology has not yet been updated for this compilation, because each use will require case by case evaluation of whether updating the terminology will result in changes in meaning.

² The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March]. On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it may cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

³ Lundberg, Russell (2013, September). Comparing homeland security risks using a deliberative risk ranking methodology. Dissertation, Pardee RAND Graduate School, RAND document RGSD319; at http://www.rand.org/about/people/l/lundberg_russell.html#publications. Willis et al (2012). Comparing security, accident, and disaster risks to guide DHS strategic planning. *Current Research Synopses* paper 43, RAND Corporation, and the National Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE), University of Southern California. Near-final draft versions of the ten risk summary sheets in the back of Dr Lundberg’s dissertation were kindly provided to the SNRA project by RAND in early 2011 to assist in project formulation. Lundberg’s dissertation research paralleled (and in a number of ways went further than) the SNRA project: it is the only other current comparative U.S. national risk assessment and is comparable to the SNRA in scope, methodological approach, and source research.

The risk summary sheet documentation has been used in the past for comparative ecological risk assessments in particular: see Willis et al (2004, April), Ecological risk ranking: development and evaluation of a method for improving public participation in environmental decision making, *Risk Analysis* 24(2) 363-78; Florig et al (2001), A deliberative method for ranking risks (Parts I, II), *Risk Analysis* 21(5) 913-937; and Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2012), Terms of Reference, Risk-based Assessment of Climate Change Impacts and Risks on the Biological Systems and Infrastructure within Fisheries and Oceans Canada’s Mandate: http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/csas-ssca/Schedule-Horaire/2012/11_15-17-eng.html (electronic resource: retrieved July 2013). See Lundberg (2013) for additional discussion of risk summary sheets in comparative risk assessment.

2015 project was intended only as a light ‘refresh’ of the 2011 project, without revision of the core methodology which other parts of this document describe.

However, the reader should not expect poetry or technical brilliance from the new or revised work in the following. Like the 2011 risk summary sheets in their final form, they are functional documents intended to communicate to the reader 1) the SNRA numbers for that threat or hazard, and 2) how the numbers were gotten. As such, they get the job done.

Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear (CBRN) risk summary sheets

Few significant changes have been made to the remaining 2011 summary sheet drafts for the natural and accidental hazards. The summary sheets for the remaining (CBRN) adversarial events with classified data required substantial rewriting to remove For Official Use Only text.⁴ For the most part, however, these U//FOUO portions were provided as general overview and background text for the different events rather than SNRA-specific analysis or explanation of data origins. These extended overview and background portions were removed wholesale, and replaced with text content from DHS and USG documents prepared with the same purpose but for the public.

The primary documentation of how the (classified) quantitative frequency, fatality, injury/illness, and economic damage estimates for the five CBRN terrorist attack events were obtained are the reports of the 2011 Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA), and the Biological, Chemical, and Radiological-Nuclear Terrorism Risk Assessments (BTRA, CTRA, RNTRA) which the ITRA integrates and harmonizes. Because of the great complexity of these computational engines, other than the unclassified event overviews and documentation for the social displacement, psychological distress, and environmental impact measures, the summary sheets for these events include only those parameters needed to validate or replicate the SNRA’s results using the ITRA engine.

All frequency estimates for the adversarial events, including the 2011 elicited frequencies for the cyber events, and all the fatality, injury/illness, and economic impact estimates for the five CBRN events are classified SECRET or SECRET//NOFORN.⁵ For these data, the reader is directed to the appendices of the classified SNRA Technical Report.

⁴There are also classified versions of the risk summary sheets, but as these exist on compartmented systems only the FOUO versions were needed for this section.

⁵No quantitative fatality, injury/illness, or economic impact estimates were determined for the cyber events.

Table J1: SNRA 2011 Risk Summary Sheet Data Table variant 1**TABLE OF FINDINGS**

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
C O N S E Q U E N C E	Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities		
		Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses		
	Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars		
		Indirect Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars		
	Social	Social Displacement	Number of Displaced from Homes for ≥ 2 Days		
	Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins		
LIKELIHOOD	Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins		
	Frequency of Events	Number per Unit of Time			

Table J2: SNRA 2011 Risk Summary Sheet Data Table variant 2**TABLE OF FINDINGS****Table 1: National level Event Frequency**

Frequency of National-level Events (direct economic consequences greater than \$100M, derived from the U.S. historical events between ... and ...)	Historical maximum number per year	
	Historical average frequency (calculated from interarrival times)	
	Historical lowest frequency (calculated from interarrival times)	

Table 2: Consequence Estimates

Consequences of National-level Events (direct economic consequences greater than \$100M, derived from the U.S. historical events between ... and ...)	Fatalities	Historical minimum	
		Historical average	
		Historical maximum	
	Injuries	Historical minimum	
		Historical average	
		Historical maximum	
	Direct Economic Damage	Historical minimum	
		Historical average	
		Historical maximum	
	Social Displacement (the number of people forced to leave home for a period of 2 days or longer)	Low estimate per event	
		Best estimate per event	
		High estimate per event	

Table J3: SNRA 2015 Risk Summary Sheet Data Table (June 2015)**Data Summary**

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities			
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses			
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)			
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days			
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins			
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins			
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year			

Animal Disease Outbreak

An unintentional introduction of the foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) virus into the domestic livestock population in a U.S. state.

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	0 ¹		
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses			
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	\$2.3 Billion	\$15.2 Billion	\$69.0 Billion
Social	Social Displacement ²	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0	1,000	N/A ³
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ⁴	Moderate ⁵		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year ⁶	0.04	0.1	0.1

Event Background

Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is one of the most devastating diseases affecting cloven-hoof animals such as cattle, swine, sheep and deer. The viral disease is highly contagious, with 7 types and more than 80 sub-types, and vaccination for one type does not confer immunity to the others. Additionally, the FMD virus can survive freezing temperatures but not temperatures above 50 degrees Celsius.⁷ Thus far, a pan-viral vaccination that would protect against all types has not been developed. FMD is easily transmitted and spreads rapidly through respiration and through contact with milk, semen, blood, saliva and feces. Pigs are particularly efficient amplifiers of the disease as they shed large amounts of virus into the air, while cattle are highly susceptible to the airborne-transmitted virus, owing to the large lung capacity and high volumes of air these animals respire. The FMD virus remains viable for long periods of time in both animate and inanimate objects and can be spread by contact with:

¹ There are no significant human health implications resulting from a foot and mouth disease outbreak.

² See discussion.

³ A high estimate was not determined.

⁴ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories.

⁵ Floods were given a best estimate of “Low.” Experts indicated that the impacts could be higher depending on the acreage required for disposal of infected carcasses. Additionally, there is some potential for contamination to spread into wild animal populations.

⁶ Estimates provided by subject matter experts from the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), DHS.

⁷ United States General Accounting Office, July 2002; Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues; GAO-02-808; at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02808.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2013).

Animal Disease Outbreak

- Animals
- Animal products, such as meat, milk, hides, skins and manure
- Transport vehicles and equipment
- Clothes and shoes
- Hay, feed and other veterinary biologics
- Human nasal passages and skin

While there are no significant human health implications of FMD, an outbreak of the disease can have important economic impacts. FMD is found in 60 percent of the world's countries and is endemic in many countries in South America, Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The international community values products that come from FMD-free countries and typically restricts trade in FMD-susceptible products from endemic countries or those affected by an ongoing outbreak. The Office International des Epizooties (OIE), an intergovernmental organization comprised of 158 member countries, was established in 1924 to guarantee the sanitary safety of world trade by developing rules for international trade in animals and animal products. OIE classifies member countries, or zones within countries, as being FMD-free with or without vaccination; the U.S. currently does not vaccinate for FMD and maintains an FMD-free without vaccination status. When an outbreak of FMD occurs in an FMD-free without vaccination country, OIE standards require that country wait 3 months after the last reported case of FMD when a "stamping out" approach has been used for eradication to apply for reinstatement of FMD-free status. If vaccination is used in the eradication process, the country cannot apply for reinstatement of FMD-free status until 3 months after the last vaccinated animal is slaughtered, or 6 months if the animal(s) are vaccinated and not slaughtered. In all cases, serological surveillance evidence must be submitted to prove the disease has been eradicated.

Given the value placed on FMD-free status, a confirmed case of FMD in the U.S. would result in an immediate restriction of exports. The current control strategy (9 CFR 53.4 Destruction of Animals with FMD) in USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) regulations to regain FMD-free status is to stamp out, or cull all infected and susceptible animals.⁸ The APHIS Administrator has discretion to examine other options based on the size and/or extent of an outbreak.

Assumptions

Economic Impact

For this scenario, a potential introduction of the disease in California is considered. Although limited to one state, a single case of FMD can be considered a national-level event with repercussions across the country.

Carpenter et al⁹ studied epidemic and economic impacts of FMD virus spread and control using epidemic simulation and economic optimization models. The simulated index herd was a single 2,000 cow dairy herd located in California. Although the initial infection was presumed to come from an FMD infected feral swine, similar results would come from any single infected animal introduced to the herd. Disease spread was limited to California, but economic impacts,

⁸ United States General Accounting Office, July 2002; Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues; GAO-02-808; at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02808.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2013).

⁹ Carpenter, T.E. O'Brien, J.M. Hagerman, A.D. McCarl, B.A. Epidemic and economic impacts of delayed detection of foot-and-mouth disease: a case study of an outbreak in California. *Journal of Veterinary Diagnostic Investigation*, 23, 26-33 (2011); at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21217024>, <http://vdi.sagepub.com/content/23/1/26.long> (accessed 10 March 2013).

including international trade effects, were felt throughout the U.S. There were five separate index detection delays examined, ranging from 7 to 22 days, with 100 iterations each. This led to a median economic impact estimated at \$2.3-\$69.0 billion, depending on the number of days delay until detection of disease. The “Low” and “High” estimates on economic burden are extrapolated from these numbers. Similarly direct costs and indirect costs are calculated from these totals. The indirect costs may be significantly higher given the variability in the potential costs listed above. The best case estimate is based on a detection delay of 14 days. This number is extremely difficult to estimate since the actual time from infection to diagnosis is impossible to ascertain.

The direct economic impact of an FMD outbreak will come from an immediate reduction in lost international trade as well as disease control and eradication efforts, which include the cost of:

- Maintenance of animal movement controls
- Control areas
- Intensified border inspections
- Vaccines
- Depopulation
- Carcass disposal
- Indemnification to farmers for losses
- Disinfection and decontamination efforts

Indirect costs can include:

- Impacts on local economies
- Loss in upstream/downstream industries
- Reduction in visitorship and tourism loss
- Treatment of groundwater or other environmental remediation necessitated by carcass disposal or burning
- Land value implications on animal disposal property
- Changes in livestock and meat industry structure
- Short term adjustments in meat consumption based on real or uncertain information¹⁰

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- For the Animal Disease national-level event, the SNRA project team assumed a low estimate for social displacement of zero.¹¹
- The best estimate of 1,000 was provided by subject matter experts from National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).¹² Experts noted that those working on or near farms may be asked to relocate to reduce the chance of transmitting foot-and-mouth disease to other livestock.

¹⁰ Hagerman, USDA Office of Economic Research Services, unpublished.

¹¹ Farm animals removed for euthanization as part of control efforts are not included in the SNRA’s measure of social displacement.

¹² START is a Department of Homeland Security University Center of Excellence that focuses on social and behavioral aspects of terrorism, natural disasters, and technological accidents, and the social, behavioral, cultural and economic factors influencing responses to and recovery from catastrophes.

Animal Disease Outbreak

- A high estimate for social displacement was not determined for this event.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on significant distress and prolonged distress, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.¹³ The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹⁴ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “Low.” Experts indicated that the consequences could be higher depending on the acreage required for disposal of infected carcasses. Additionally, there is some potential for contamination to spread into wild animal populations.

Potential Mitigating Factors

In the event that an FMD outbreak does occur in the U.S., there are four possible strategies for control and eradication of FMD in domestic livestock in the event of an outbreak. Each is supported by critical activities that include surveillance, biosecurity, decontamination,

¹³ A Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Animal Disease Outbreak was given a C_{EF} of 1.0.

The numerical estimates calculated from this formula are reported in Appendix G. The semi-quantitative risk matrix is discussed in the Findings (Psychological Distress Risk).

¹⁴ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11–32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

epidemiological activities, movement control, and communication. These four strategies are recognized by the OIE in Article 8.5.47 of the Terrestrial Animal Health Code (2010):¹⁵

- Stamping out or slaughter of all clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals.
- Stamping out, modified with emergency vaccination-to-slaughter, which includes slaughter of all clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, with subsequent slaughter of vaccinated animals.
- Stamping out modified with emergency vaccination-to-live, which includes slaughter of all clinically infected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals, without subsequent slaughter of vaccinated animals.
- Vaccinate-to-live without stamping out. Vaccination used without slaughter of infected animals or subsequent slaughter of vaccinated animals.

Many factors will be considered when determining whether a particular response strategy would be appropriate and advantageous. While no factor will independently dictate a response strategy, or a decision to employ emergency vaccination, there are many factors that will influence the decision of whether to vaccinate or not. Factors will include:¹⁶

- Disruptions to interstate commerce
- Disruptions to international trade
- Acceptance of response strategy or strategies
- Scale of outbreak
- Rate of outbreak spread
- FMD vaccine availability
- Resources available to implement response strategies

Additional Relevant Information

Similar to estimating the economic implications, establishing the frequency of an occurrence of FMD is difficult. An outbreak of FMD has not occurred in the U.S. since 1929, so any estimate of frequency or impact can only be based on data from other countries where recent outbreaks have occurred, as well as estimates based on models from current U.S. industry information. The United States has experienced nine known outbreaks of FMD from its first occurrence in 1870 to its final eradication in 1929, indicating a low frequency estimate of approximately 0.04, or 9 events in 235 years in the U.S.^{17,18} The highest frequency of occurrence is an estimation based on the recent outbreaks during the previous decade in the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea. DHS Office of Health Affairs experts estimate a high frequency of once per decade, or 0.1 in a

¹⁵ Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness & Response Plan (FAD PReP)/Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan (The Red Book) USDA Animal and Plant Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS). Chapter 5, General FMD Response, November 2010 draft, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/acah/downloads/documents/FMD_Response_Plan_November_2010_FINAL.pdf; Chapter 4, FMD Response Goals and Strategy, updated (June 2012) draft citing 2011 OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code, at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/fmd_responseplan.pdf.

¹⁶ Ready Reference Guide to Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Response and Emergency Vaccination Strategies, USDA APHIS Veterinary Services, 7/27/2011; incorporated as section 4.4.1 (General Factors that Influence the Response Strategy) of Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness & Response Plan (FAD PReP)/Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan (The Red Book) USDA Animal and Plant Inspection Service (USDA-APHIS), June 2010; at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/emergency_management/downloads/fmd_responseplan.pdf.

¹⁷ Foot and Mouth Disease Factsheet. American College of Veterinary Pathologists, July 2012; at <http://www.acvp.org/media/factsheet/FootMouth.cfm> (accessed 10 March 2013).

¹⁸ Foot and Mouth Disease: A threat to U.S. agriculture. Congressional Research Service, RS-20890, April 16, 2001; at <http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS20890.pdf> (accessed 10 March 2013).

Animal Disease Outbreak

given year. Since FMD is a highly communicable disease that is resilient and easily obtained, the SNRA project team selected 0.1 in a given year as the best estimate for this event.

While there is no historical data from the U.S. from which to estimate the cost of an FMD outbreak, there have been several outbreaks in other countries in the past decade which emphasize the severity of the impact. Examples of outbreaks include the following:

- In 2001, the United Kingdom (UK) suffered one of the largest FMD epidemics to occur in a developed country in several decades. Approximately 7 million animals were culled and their corpses burned on pyres. The outbreak devastated the nation's farming industry and cost the UK an estimated \$11.9-\$18.4 billion, including \$4.8 billion in losses to agriculture, the food industry and the public sector, \$4.2-\$4.9 billion in lost tourism and \$2.9-\$3.4 billion in indirect losses.¹⁹
- The FMD outbreak in South Korea that occurred in late 2010 and ended in April of 2011 is estimated to have cost that country over \$2.6 billion U.S. dollars and resulted in the loss of 3.47 million livestock.²⁰
- Japan suffered a similar outbreak in 2010, which cost an estimated \$3.14 billion U.S. The Japan and South Korea outbreaks are believed to have been caused by the same FMD virus serotype. The source of the Japan outbreak is believed to be contaminated wheat straw imported from China.²¹

¹⁹ Carpenter, T.E. O'Brien, J.M. Hagerman, A.D. McCarl, B.A. Epidemic and economic impacts of delayed detection of foot-and-mouth disease: a case study of an outbreak in California. *Journal of Veterinary Diagnostic Investigation*, 23, 26-33 (2011); full text <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21217024>, <http://vdi.sagepub.com/content/23/1/26.long> (accessed 10 March 2013).

²⁰ 'South Korea reports another FMD case'. Xinhua [China Radio International], April 20, 2011. At <http://english.cri.cn/6966/2011/04/20/2821s633266.htm> (accessed 10 March 2013).

²¹ APHIS Evaluation of the Foot and Mouth Disease Status of Japan. Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA, April 1, 2011. At http://www.r-calfusa.com/Animal_Health/110401APHISJapanFMDEvaluation.pdf (accessed 10 March 2013).

Drought

A drought occurs in the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$1 billion.

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	0 ¹		
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses			
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011) ²	\$2 Billion	\$8.7 Billion	\$38 Billion
Social	Social Displacement ³	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0 ⁴		
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	0 ⁵		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins	N/A ⁶		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year ⁷	0.50	0.63	1.0

This table shows the minimum, average, and maximum values for frequencies and impacts associated with the direct impacts of national-level droughts.⁸ The event set evaluated was from 1980 to 2014 and contained a total of 22 droughts that met the \$1 billion threshold. This analysis did not specifically include consideration for climate scenarios often associated with drought events (e.g. heat waves, reduction in precipitation and snowpack).

Event Background

The SNRA Drought National-level Event was originally developed by the DHS Office of Policy for the 2012–13 Homeland Security National Risk Characterization (HSNRC) project, a

¹ There are no significant human health implications resulting from a drought in the United States. To avoid double counting of impacts between hazard events, for drought and heat wave incidents which overlapped in time or which were reported together in historical data sets the SNRA counted human fatalities and injuries under the Heat Wave event, while direct economic losses were counted under the Drought event. As both property damage (e.g., damage to physical infrastructure) and crop damage were reported by the primary data sources used for these events in the 2015 SNRA as combined totals, this raises the possibility of over-reporting the direct economic losses for Drought. Non-crop damages to physical infrastructure by heat events can be substantial. However, previous DHS analysis conducted for the 2013 Homeland Security National Risk Characterization (HSNRC) Drought National-level Event indicated that these property damage costs were generally insignificant in comparison to the economic value of lost crops which were orders of magnitude greater.

² Low, best, and high estimates for direct economic loss are the historical minimum, average, and maximum for the event set. Adjusted from 2014 dollars of NCDC source to 2011 dollars for comparison with existing SNRA events.

³ See discussion.

⁴ See text for further description.

⁵ No reported human health or displacement impacts. (The SNRA Psychological Distress Index is calculated from fatality, injury/illness, and displacement estimates. For Drought/Heat Wave events, non-economic impacts were reported under the Heat Wave event.)

⁶ Environmental impact estimates were elicited from subject matter experts in 2011, prior to the addition of the Drought hazard event (2015).

⁷ Historical lowest, average, and maximum number of events per year (calculated from inter-arrival times).

⁸ Direct economic loss data was gathered from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)'s National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) Billion Dollar Disaster List.

Drought

cooperative effort of the DHS analytic enterprise, to expand the 2011 SNRA risk knowledge base to additional threats and hazards relevant to national preparedness. The HSNRC data and analysis were updated and revised by Argonne National Laboratory in support of the 2015 SNRA.

The National Weather Service (NWS) defines drought as a deficiency in precipitation over an extended period, usually a season or more, resulting in a water shortage causing adverse impacts on vegetation, animals, and/or people. Drought is a temporary aberration from normal climatic conditions; thus it can vary significantly from one region to another.⁹ It is a normal, recurrent feature of climate that occurs in virtually all climate zones. However, drought conditions can be caused by human interaction with the natural world.

Drought characteristics include large-scale drying trends in precipitation, streamflow, and soil moisture fields. The impacts of a drought result from the interplay between the natural event (less precipitation than expected) and the demand people place on the water supply.

While droughts and heat waves can occur at the same time, they are separate meteorological events and are treated as separate hazard events in the SNRA.

The duration of droughts can vary greatly. For instance, there are cases when drought conditions develop relatively quickly and last a very short period of time, exacerbated by extreme heat and/or wind, and there are other cases when drought spans multiple years, or even decades.

Drought differs from other natural hazards in at least two significant ways:

- The onset and end of a drought can be difficult to determine. The effects of a drought can accumulate slowly, and may linger even after the apparent termination of an episode.
- Unlike most natural hazards, drought impacts are less obvious, and are spread over a larger geographic area.

During severe droughts, agricultural crops do not mature, wildlife and livestock are undernourished, land values decline, and unemployment increases. Droughts can cause a shortage of water for human and agricultural consumption, hydroelectric power, recreation, and navigation. Water quality may decline and the number and severity of wildfires may increase.¹⁰

Assumptions

- For the purpose of the SNRA, a national-level drought is defined as a drought producing direct economic loss in excess of \$1 billion dollars.
- A 35-year time period, from Jan 1, 1980 to Dec 31, 2014, was used to estimate the inter-arrival rates/frequencies and impacts for droughts exceeding the \$1 billion threshold. A full list of aggregated drought events used for this report is located in Table 1.
- The Data Summary table reports the maximum, average, and minimum frequency with which such droughts occurred in the United States, and the maximum, average and minimum impacts for fatalities, injuries, and direct economic losses associated with droughts in the data set.

⁹ National Weather Service (2008, May). Drought: Public Fact Sheet. At <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/brochures/climate/DroughtPublic2.pdf> (retrieved December 2012).

¹⁰ This section is substantially adapted from Chapter 15 of Federal Emergency Management Administration (1997), Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (MHIRA): A Cornerstone of the National Mitigation Strategy. FEMA Mitigation Directorate. At <https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/7251?id=2214> (retrieved April 2013).

- Mean global drought conditions were not directly considered in this assessment. The focus of this analysis was limited to the climatic regions within the contiguous United States.

Frequency

For purposes of the SNRA, drought risk is based on historical weather and climate disasters reported by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)'s National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) for the Billion Dollar Disaster List.¹¹ The best-estimate frequency is the average frequency of occurrence of droughts in the selected 35-year period. The low frequency is the inverse of the longest inter-arrival time in the data set (the longest number of years that two droughts are spaced apart); the high frequency is the inverse of the shortest inter-arrival time in the data set (the shortest number of years that two incidents are spaced apart).

Health and Safety

There were no fatalities or illness/injuries directly linked to the droughts in this data set.¹² In the developed world, widespread drought-related deaths are rare in the modern era. However, increasing drought conditions in developed countries such as the United States can have significant direct and indirect impact to food supplies which may put populations at risk.¹³

Economic Impacts

Direct Economic Impacts

Direct economic impacts as defined in the SNRA include decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction costs including property (structure, contents, physical infrastructure, and other physical property) and crop damage; one year's lost spending due to fatalities; medical costs; and business interruption directly resulting from the impacts of an event. The direct economic loss estimates of the Billion Dollar Disaster List were used for the 2015 SNRA without modification because of the close similarity of its direct economic loss estimation methodology with that of the SNRA.¹⁴

In performing these disaster cost assessments, NCDC gathers the statistics from a wide variety of sources.¹⁵ The total estimated costs of these events are the costs in terms of dollars that would not have been incurred had the event not taken place. Insured and uninsured losses are included in damage estimates. Sources include the NWS, FEMA, U.S. Department of Agriculture, other U.S. Government agencies, individual state emergency management agencies, state and regional climate centers, media reports, and insurance industry estimates.¹⁶

¹¹ NCDC (2015). Billion-dollar U.S. weather/climate disasters 1980–2013. NOAA: at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events>.

¹² To avoid double counting of impacts between hazard events, for drought and heat wave incidents which overlapped in time or which were reported together in historical data sets the SNRA counted human fatalities and injuries under the Heat Wave event, while direct economic losses were counted under the Drought event.

¹³ Franke, R. W.; Chasin B. H. Seeds of famine: Ecological destruction and the development dilemma in the West African Sahel. Rowman/Allanheld: Totowa, New Jersey, 1980.

¹⁴ Smith et al (2013, June). U.S. billion-dollar weather and climate disasters: Data sources, trends, accuracy and biases. *Natural Hazards* 67(2) 387-410. At <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/docs smith-and-katz-2013.pdf> (retrieved 18 January 2014).

¹⁵ In 2012, NCDC reviewed its methodology how it develops Billion-dollar Disasters and examined possible inaccuracy and biases in the data sources and methodology used in developing the loss assessments. As a result, NCDC temporarily rounded their loss estimates to the nearest billion dollars while implementing the newest research to define uncertainty and confidence intervals surrounding these loss estimates. The current methodology for the production of this loss data set is described in Smith et al (2013), *op. cit.* This document highlights its strengths and limitations including sources of uncertainty and bias. The Insurance Services Office/Property Claims Service, the FEMA National Flood Insurance Program and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's crop insurance program are key sources of quantified disaster loss data, among others. The methodology uses a factor approach to convert from insured losses to total direct losses, one potential limitation.

¹⁶ NCDC (2015). Billion-dollar disaster list, Overview: <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/overview>.

Drought

For the NCDC source list, economic drought damages were inflated to a 2014 dollar value using average changes in the Consumer Price Index. In total, 22 droughts exceeding the \$1 billion threshold are aggregated in the findings of this report. Low, best, and high estimates for direct economic loss are the historical minimum, average, and maximum for the event set, adjusted to 2011 dollars for comparison with the existing SNRA data set.¹⁷

The total loss for the 22 events was \$201 billion (see Table 1 for a full breakdown of cost per event). The historical high for economic losses was the 1988 drought at \$38 billion [2014 \$40 billion], which was rated as one of the nation's worst in the past 100 years. The 1988 drought impacted large portions of the U.S. with very severe losses to agriculture and related industries. Barge traffic on the lower Mississippi River was stopped during June and July 1988 as a result of record low flows caused by drought conditions throughout most of the Mississippi Basin.¹⁸ Five separate drought events (1993, 1996, 2005, 2006, and 2014) all reported the historical low for economic loss at \$2 billion. The average economic impact is \$8.7 billion [2014 \$9.1 billion] per event. The largest gap between drought events of two years occurred twice during the event set—between 1980 and 1983, and again between 1993 and 1996.

Indirect Economic Impacts¹⁹

Direct economic losses alone do not represent the full picture of the economic impacts to the Nation from a disaster or attack. Indirect and induced economic losses can be substantially larger than the direct economic losses that occur in the aftermath of an event.

- **Indirect economic impacts** include costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the industries impacted by the direct costs. Indirect impacts also include positive offsets due to increased spending within sectors impacted by the direct costs.²⁰
- **Induced economic impacts** include those incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries. Induced impacts can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.

Highly mature economic models exist for calculating estimates of indirect and induced economic losses for natural disasters, human and animal pandemics, technological accidents, terrorist attacks, and cyber events. However, there is at present no generally agreed or practical method for translating estimates produced by these disparate models into a single measure which can be meaningfully compared across all of the threats and hazards of the SNRA in a defensible fashion. Because such a measure would yield data of great value for multiple purposes beyond the context of the SNRA and similar assessments, it has been among the highest risk research priorities for DHS and its academic Centers of Excellence for over a decade. Should these efforts prove successful in coming years, the next iteration of the SNRA will include comparisons of total economic loss to the Nation across all of its threats and hazards.

¹⁷ CPI-U 2014–2011, 0.950.

¹⁸ Chagnon, Stanley A. (1989, September). The 1988 drought, barges, and diversion. *Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society* 70(9) 1092-1104; available at <http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/abs/10.1175/1520-0477%281989%29070%3C1092%3ATBAD%3E2.0.CO%3B2> (accessed on March 25, 2015).

¹⁹ The SNRA's taxonomy of indirect and induced economic impacts comes from the DHS Terrorism Risk Assessments and so is retained here for consistency across DHS assessments. However, both combined will be referred to as 'indirect economic impacts' where it is not expected to impede clarity.

²⁰ These may include the waste management, environmental consulting, mortuary services, and medical industries, among others.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. By this measure, social displacement was assessed to be zero as a result of national level droughts.²¹

Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as permanent migration due to job loss or lack of opportunities from a hazard such as drought are not captured through this measure. For instance, during the Dust Bowl in the 1930's, millions of people migrated from the drought areas, often heading west, in search of work.²²

Psychological Impacts

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on significant distress and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs.²³

Fatalities and injuries associated with historical heat wave/drought events were counted under the Heat Wave event by definition, and as noted above the assessed displacement was zero. As the SNRA psychological distress index is derived from the human health and displacement impact estimates, this measure reflects *de minimus* psychological distress impacts for the SNRA 2015 Drought event.

Environmental Impacts

The environmental impact estimate, which was assessed for the 23 original national-level events of the 2011 SNRA by subject matter experts from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), could not be assessed for the Drought event which was added to the SNRA in calendar year 2015. A future iteration of the SNRA will assess the environmental impacts of this event.

Potential Mitigating Factors

According to the National Drought Mitigation Center, studies over the past century have shown that meteorological drought is never the result of a single cause. It is the result of many causes, often synergistic in nature.

Scientists do not know how to predict drought a month or more in advance for most locations. Predicting drought depends on the ability to forecast two fundamental meteorological parameters, precipitation and temperature. Historical record reinforces that climate is inherently variable, and anomalies of precipitation and temperature may last from several months to several decades. How long they last depends on air-sea interactions, soil moisture and land surface processes, topography, internal dynamics, and the accumulated influence of dynamically unstable weather systems at the global scale.²⁴

²¹ For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. To estimate social displacement for the SNRA, U.S. drought data from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) maintained by the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters with support from the United States Agency for International Development, provides estimates of the “total number affected” by disaster events. The data from EM-DAT suggest that there were no displacements as a direct result of drought events.

²² Reported by the National Drought Mitigation Center, <http://drought.unl.edu/DroughtBasics/DustBowl/DroughtintheDustBowlYears.aspx>.

²³ See Appendix G for references and additional discussion of the SNRA Psychological Distress metric.

²⁴ National Drought Mitigation Center is based in the School of Natural Resources at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln; <http://drought.unl.edu/Home.aspx>.

Drought**Additional Relevant Information**

Although a variety of weather related phenomena have the potential to cause great economic and personal losses in the US, drought has historically had the greatest impact on the largest number of people. On a broad scale, the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by unusual wetness with short periods of extensive droughts, the 1930s and 1950s were characterized by prolonged periods of extensive droughts with little wetness, and the first decade of the 2000s saw extensive drought and extensive wetness.

Table 1: Drought Events²⁵

Event	Begin Date	End Date	DE \$B ²⁶ (2014)	Summary
Western Drought 2014	01/01/14	12/31/14	\$2	Severe drought CA, TX, OK. ²⁷
Western/Plains Drought/Heat Wave Spring-Fall 2013	03/01/13	11/30/13	\$11	Moderate to extreme drought AZ, CA, CO, IA, ID, IL, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, NM, NV, OK, OR, SD, TX, UT, WA, WI, WY. ²⁸
U.S. Drought/Heatwave 2012	01/01/12	12/31/12	\$31	Moderate to extreme drought CA, NV, ID, MT, WY, UT, CO, AZ, NM, TX, ND, SD, NE, KS, OK, AR, MO, IA, MN, IL, IN, GA. ²⁹
Southern/Plains/Southwest Drought Spring-Summer 2011	03/01/11	08/31/11	\$13	Drought and heat wave conditions created major impacts across Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, southern Kansas, and western Louisiana. ³⁰
Southwest/Great Plains Drought 2009	01/01/09	12/31/09	\$4	Drought conditions with agricultural losses during much of the year across parts of the Southwest, Great Plains (TX, OK, KS, CA, NM, AZ), largest losses TX and CA.
U.S. Drought 2008	01/01/08	12/31/08	\$8	Severe drought and heat caused agricultural losses across a large portion of the U.S. Record low lake levels also occurred in areas of the southeast.
Western/Eastern Drought/Heat Wave Summer-Fall 2007	06/01/07	11/30/07	\$3	Severe drought with periods of extreme heat over ND, SD, NE, KS, OK, TX, MN, WI, IA, MO, AR, LA, MS, AL, GA, NC, SC, FL, TN, VA, WV, KY, IN, IL, OH, MI, PA, NY. ³¹
Midwest/Plains/Southeast Drought Spring-Summer 2006	03/01/06	08/31/06	\$2	Rather severe localized drought causes significant crop losses (especially for corn and soybeans) in the states of AR, IL, IN, MO, OH, and WI.
Midwest Drought Spring-Summer 2005	03/01/05	08/31/05	\$2	Rather severe localized drought causes significant crop losses (especially for corn and soybeans) in the states of AR, IL, IN, MO, OH, and WI.
Western/Central Drought/Heat Wave Spring-Fall 2003	03/01/03	11/30/03	\$6	2003 drought across western and central portions of the U.S. with losses to agriculture.
U.S. Drought Spring-Fall 2002	03/01/02	11/30/02	\$11	Moderate to extreme drought over large portions of 30 states, including the western states, the Great Plains, and much of the eastern U.S.
Western/Central/Southeast Drought/Heat Wave, Spring-Fall 2000	03/01/00	11/30/00	\$7	Western/Central/Southeast Drought/Heatwave.
Eastern Drought/Heat Wave Summer 1999	06/01/99	08/31/99	\$3	Very dry summer and high temperatures, mainly in eastern U.S., with extensive agricultural losses.
Southeast Drought/Heat Wave Summer 1998	06/01/98	08/31/98	\$6	Severe drought and heat wave from Texas/Oklahoma eastward to the Carolinas.
Southern Plains Drought Spring-Summer 1996	03/01/96	08/31/96	\$2	Severe drought in agricultural regions of southern plains--Texas and Oklahoma most severely affected.
Southeast Drought/Heat Wave Summer 1993	06/01/93	08/31/93	\$2	Drought and heat wave across Southeastern U.S.
U.S. Drought Spring-Summer 1991	03/01/91	08/31/91	\$5	Drought conditions over parts of the West, Central and eastern U.S. most affected the states IL, IN, KS, MN, OH, OR, PA, SD, and WA.
Northern Plains Drought Summer-Fall 1989	06/01/89	11/30/89	\$4	Severe summer drought over much of the northern plains with significant losses to agriculture.
U.S. Drought/Heat Wave Summer 1988	06/01/88	08/31/88	\$40	1988 drought across much of the U.S., very severe losses to agriculture and related industries. Combined direct & indirect deaths due to heat stress estimated at 5,000.
Southeast Drought/Heat Wave Summer 1986	06/01/86	08/31/86	\$4	Severe summer drought in parts of the southeastern U.S. with severe losses to agriculture.
Southeast Drought Summer 1983	06/01/83	08/31/83	\$6	1983 flash drought in the southeastern U.S. with losses to agriculture, most notably corn and soybeans.
Central/Eastern Drought/Heat Wave Summer-Fall 1980	06/01/80	11/30/80	\$29	Central & eastern U.S. drought/heat wave damaged agriculture & related industries. Combined direct & indirect deaths due to heat stress estimated at 10,000.

²⁵ Table based on information reported by NOAA's NCDC. This table reflects the 2014 dollars reported by the NOAA source. The final SNRA estimates in the Data Summary table are converted to 2011 dollars for comparison with existing SNRA events (CPI 2014–2011, 0.950).

²⁶ Direct economic loss. Cost estimates are rounded to nearest billion-dollars. Ongoing research is seeking to define uncertainty and confidence intervals around the cost of each event.

²⁷ Historic drought conditions affected majority of CA for all of 2014 making it the worst drought on record for the state. Surrounding states and parts of TX, OK also experienced continued severe drought conditions. Continuation of drought conditions that have persisted for several years.

²⁸ The 2013 drought slowly dissipated from the historic levels of the 2012 drought, as conditions improved across many Midwestern and Plains states. However, moderate to extreme drought did remain or expand into western states. In comparison to 2011 and 2012 drought conditions, the U.S. experienced only moderate crop losses across the central agriculture states.

²⁹ The 2012 drought is the most extensive drought to affect the U.S. since the 1930s. Moderate to extreme drought conditions affected more than half the country for a majority of 2012. Costly drought impacts occurred across the central agriculture states resulting in widespread harvest failure for corn, sorghum and soybean crops, among others. The associated summer heatwave also caused 123 direct deaths, but an estimate of the excess mortality due to heat stress is still unknown.

³⁰ In Texas and Oklahoma, a majority of range and pastures were classified in "very poor" condition for much of the 2011 crop growing season.

³¹ Severe drought with periods of extreme heat over most of the southeast and portions of the Great Plains, Ohio Valley, and Great Lakes area, resulting in major reductions in crop yields, along with very low stream-flows and lake levels.

Drought

Earthquake

An earthquake occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 Million.

Data Summary

Table 1 shows the minimum, average, and maximum values for frequencies and impacts of national level earthquakes. Note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Table 1

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities ¹	0	370	8,900
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses ¹	0	8,700	210,000
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011) ¹	\$110 Million	\$8.7 Billion	\$105 Billion
Social	Social Displacement ²	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days ³	160	27,000	2 Million
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ⁴	High ⁵		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year ⁶	0.11	0.27	2

Event Description and Analytical Methods

For planning purposes, a national-level earthquake is defined as an earthquake producing direct economic loss in excess of \$100 million dollars. The historical record of U.S. earthquakes during the 105-year time period from 1906 to 2011 was used estimate the interarrival rates/frequencies and impacts for earthquakes exceeding the \$100 million threshold. To provide an accurate assessment for current year planning, historic damage estimates have been updated to estimate impacts for a 2011 base year. Economic and health & safety impacts, derived directly from historic record, are updated based on changes in populations, building structures, and

¹ Low, best, and high estimates for fatalities, injuries and illnesses, and direct economic loss are the historical minimum, average, and maximum for each impact type in the event set. Extremal events for one impact type may but generally do not correspond to those for other impact types.

² See discussion in text.

³ See Social Displacement section in this summary sheet for details.

⁴ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories. Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'best' estimate.

⁵ Earthquakes were given a best estimate of 'High' with a second best estimate of 'Moderate'. Experts assessed that the debris, devastation, and resulting chemical/contaminant releases which may be caused by an earthquake would have the potential to impact large areas.

⁶ Historical lowest, average, and maximum number of events per year (calculated from interarrival times).

Earthquake

infrastructure. In total, 27 earthquakes⁷ exceeding the \$100 million threshold are aggregated in the findings of this report. The full list of national level earthquakes is located in Table 4.

Table 1 reports the maximum, average, and minimum frequency with which such earthquakes occurred in the United States, as well as the maximum, average, and minimum fatalities, injuries, and direct economic losses associated with earthquakes in the set. The oldest event included is the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and the most recent is the 2003 Paso Robles/San Simeon earthquake.

To obtain impact estimates, normalized fatality and economic loss estimates for United States historic earthquakes reported by Vranes and Pielke (2009) were used.⁸ Normalization of impacts from historic record to present day values is performed by estimating changes in impact levels due to changes in population densities, community wealth, mitigation factors, and inflation. For most historic events, the present day community, with modern day structures and infrastructure, has a greater financial value than the community at the time of an event. Population densities have also changed. As the population increases, so too do the fatality and injury estimates for a given event. These increases, however, are offset, at least partially, by improving mitigation strategies. Improved building codes and emergency response substantially decrease the impacts caused by modern earthquakes. The impact estimates reported by Vranes and Pielke (2009) take into account the changes in mitigation strategies, population densities and wealth profiles when normalizing loss estimates to a 2005 base year. Because of the substantial changes in mitigation factors over the historical time period analyzed, a mitigation strategy was used in the normalization routine to relate loss rates to the year an event occurred. Three alternative mitigation rates were published by Vranes and Pielke (2009): no mitigation, a 1% per annum loss mitigation rate and a 2% per annum loss mitigation rate. The 2% mitigation rate was shown to have a lower correlation when compared to damage estimates normalized by magnitude and inflation⁹ than the 1% mitigation rate; therefore, the 1% mitigation rate was chosen as the best available impact normalization factor available for the purposes of this analysis. In other words, the normalized losses were reduced by 1% for each year since the event occurred. The CPI deflator was used to convert reported economic loss estimates from 2005 to 2011 dollars; for fatality estimates, the 2005 base year was maintained. For more detailed information on the normalization routine and raw event data used in this report, please refer to Vranes and Pielke (2009).

Normalized estimates were not available for injuries. To estimate injuries, a linear model was generated that relates normalized fatalities to injuries based on the ratio of injuries to fatalities for a New Madrid event as reported by Elnashai, *et al.*¹⁰ The linear model produces a multiplier that models the correlation between fatalities and injuries. Based on the New Madrid event estimates, a multiplier of 23.5 injuries per fatality was utilized in this report.

Low, best and high estimates were developed in the following manner from the normalized impact estimates and historic record. For fatalities, injuries and economic loss, the low estimate is the smallest impact for events that exceed \$100 million. For economic loss, \$107 million

⁷ The April 1946 earthquake near Unimak Island, Hawaii resulting in a tsunami causing twelve fatalities and \$200 million in inflation-adjusted property damage was excluded from the set to avoid double-counting with the Tsunami event.

⁸ Vranes, K. and Pielke, R. (2009). Normalized Earthquake Damage and Fatalities in the United States: 1900-2005. *Natural Hazards Review* 10(3): 84-101.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 90.

¹⁰ Elnashai, A.S., Jefferson, T., Cleveland, L. J., and Gress, T. (2009) Impact of New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquakes on the Central USA, Vol. 1. 2009 Mid-America Earthquake Center: University of Illinois. Available online at <https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/14810>. Accessed September 28, 2011.

(1992 Ferndale/Fortuna/Petrolia, California earthquake) is the smallest normalized historic loss that exceeded \$100 million. Six historic events exceeding the economic threshold did not result in any fatalities and, consequently, were not estimated to cause any injuries resulting in a minimum for both fatalities and injuries of zero. For event frequency, the low estimate is derived from the greatest time gap, t_{\max} , between two events. The greatest gap occurs between the 1906 San Francisco and the 1915 El Centro earthquakes. This nine year time lapse between national level earthquakes results in an interarrival frequency of 0.11, or $1/t_{\max}$.

The best estimate is the average impact for events that exceed \$100 million. The average economic impact is \$8.7 billion per event. On average, 370 fatalities occur per event. An average of 8,700 injuries per event is using the multiplier technique described above. The average time between national level events is 3.7 years, resulting in 0.27 events expected per year. An estimate of the average annual loss for each impact type (e.g., fatalities per year or economic loss per year) can be obtained by multiplying the average frequency by the average impact in a category. The average annual fatality and economic losses for the set of 27 historic events analyzed are approximately 100 fatalities per year and approximately \$2.3 billion per year. The average annual economic loss estimate computed using this subset of events is 50% less than FEMA's average annual loss estimate of \$5.3 billion for the full set of earthquake hazards, computed using HAZUS modeling.¹¹ More information about the FEMA average annual loss estimate is provided below.

The meanings of the high estimates for impact and frequency differ. For impacts, the high estimates reflect the largest losses seen within the set of national level event earthquakes, i.e., those above the \$100 million economic loss threshold. The high fatality estimate, for example, is the normalized estimate for the 1906 San Francisco earthquake of approximately 9,000 fatalities if it were to happen in the present day; this is the highest normalized fatality estimate for the events included in the analysis. A high estimate of 210,000 injuries per event is using the multiplier technique described above. The high estimate for frequency is the maximum number of times an earthquake resulting in losses greater than \$100 million has occurred in a calendar year, or 2 times per year.

It is important to note that the frequency estimates reported here differ from probabilities. The frequency of a national-level earthquake can be greater than one, while a probability cannot. Additionally, while the average estimates for impacts and frequency are correlated and approximate the average annual loss when multiplied together, the maximum and minimum historical values for impact and frequency are uncorrelated and do not have meaning when multiplied together.

Expected Loss versus Return Period


Major earthquakes are commonly evaluated based on return period and expected loss. The return period vs. loss is an important perspective when evaluating historic data. The 105-year range used for impacts in Table 1 does not provide a record of all possible impacts. Low frequency events have the capacity to eclipse the greatest damage reports from historic events. Earthquake modeling can be used to estimate losses for events with limited historical precedence in the modern era. Figure 1 relates modeled earthquake economic losses to the annual probability of

¹¹ FEMA Publication 366: Hazus-MH Estimated Annualized Earthquake Losses for the United States, April 2008.

Earthquake

exceedance.¹² It is important to note that this is a modeled estimate, not actualized measured events.

Figure 1: Probability of Exceeding Direct Economic Losses



Social Displacement Estimates

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of 2 days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

Social displacement estimates for national-level earthquakes were constructed from multiple data sources. The high estimate was provided by subject matter experts at FEMA and informed by experience with Hazus modeling as well as studies such as the analysis by Elnashai *et al.* (2009) of the number of people displaced from their homes and/or without electricity for greater than 3 days due to an earthquake in the New Madrid Seismic Zone.¹³ The order of magnitude of the SNRA high estimate for the number of people displaced from home for 2 days or greater was validated for this earthquake event by a subject matter expert affiliated with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), who noted that “displacement in millions due to fires, damaged critical infrastructure, damaged residential areas” was plausible for the scenario of a 7.8 magnitude earthquake occurring on the San Andreas fault in the Los Angeles metropolitan area studied by the U.S. Geological Survey

¹² Source: Modeling done by FEMA HAZUS contract support for the SNRA project team.

¹³ Elnashai, A.S., Jefferson, T., Cleveland, L. J., and Gress, T. (2009) Impact of New Madrid Seismic Zone earthquakes on the Central USA, Vol. 1. 2009 Mid-America Earthquake Center: University of Illinois; at: <https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/14810>. Accessed on: September 28, 2011.

(USGS).¹⁴ As a further validation point, note that displacement due to a 1906 San Francisco earthquake repeating itself in modern times were reported by Kircher *et al.* (2006) to be approximately 400,000-600,000 people due to damaged residences.¹⁵ The latter estimates are likely to underestimate the SNRA social displacement metric because the study did not account for the effects of fires or damage to transportation and utility systems on displacement.

Low and best estimates for social displacement were constructed in an ad-hoc manner by examining published reports of displacement in the recent U.S. historic earthquake record. The low estimate is the minimum of the social displacement estimates reported below, and the best estimate is the average value of the social displacement estimates reported below. This approach, while resulting in crude estimates, was chosen so that the low and best estimates were a reflection of the best available recent historic data. The low estimate reflects the observed occurrence of earthquakes which cause more than \$100M in losses while having relatively minor impact on human populations. The best estimate begins to approach the same order of magnitude of social displacement as observed from the two most costly U.S. earthquakes of the past 40 years (the 1981 Loma Prieta earthquake and the 1994 Northridge earthquake).

Table 2: Social Displacement Estimates

Date	Earthquake Name/Location	Displacement Estimate	Source
10/1/1987	Whittier, Los Angeles, Calif.	9,000	¹⁶
10/18/1989	Loma Prieta, SF Bay Area, Calif.	32,500	¹⁷
6/28/1992	Landers, Calif.	750	¹⁸
1/17/1994	Northridge, Calif.	120,000	¹⁹
2/28/2001	Seattle area, Wash.	400	²⁰
12/22/2003	San Robles, Calif.	160	²⁰

Note that the best estimate of social displacement is not necessarily correlated to the best estimate of frequency reported in Table 1. Also note that historic estimates reported in the table above are likely underestimates of social displacement as defined for the SNRA, because they are predominantly based upon permanent destruction of housing and may not include temporary displacement.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality

¹⁴ USGS Circular 1324. (2008). The ShakeOut Earthquake Scenario – A Story that Southern Californians are Writing; at: <http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1324/c1324.pdf>. Accessed September 28, 2011.

¹⁵ Kircher, C.A., Seligson, H.A., Bouabid, J., and Morrow, G.C. (2006). When the Big One Strikes Again – Estimated Losses due to a Repeat of the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake. *Earthquake Spectra* 22(82): 8297-8339.

¹⁶ Whitter Daily News (2011). Whitter Narrows Earthquake: 20 Years Later. Article date 9/28/2011. At <http://www.whittierdailynews.com/earthquake> (accessed March 2013).

¹⁷ U.S. Geological Survey (1998). The Loma Prieta, California Earthquake of October 17, 1989 - Building Structures. USGS Professional Paper 1552-C; <http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/pp1552/pp1552c/1552c.pdf> (accessed March 2013). Notes 13,000 uninhabitable housing units; assumed 2.5 people per household.

¹⁸ John A. Martin & Associates (unknown date). The Landers/Big Bear Earthquakes of June 28, 1992. At http://www.johnmartin.com/earthquakes/eqshow/lan_0000.htm (accessed March 2013).

¹⁹ USGS (1998), *op cit.* Notes 48,000 uninhabitable housing units; assumed 2.5 people per household.

²⁰ EM-DAT, number of “total affected”. EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels (Belgium). Accessed on September 28, 2011. The number of “total affected” includes injuries, people needing immediate assistance for shelter, and people needing immediate assistance, including displacements and evacuations. The inclusion of injuries in this metric makes it imperfect for use in the SNRA; it is used for earthquake events when better estimates of displacement could not be found.

Earthquake

of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.²¹ The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impacts

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)²² as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “moderate.” Debris, devastation, and chemical or contaminant releases from damaged facilities have the potential to impact large areas.

Assumptions

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate health and safety impacts caused by an earthquake event:

- Earthquake mitigation has improved by 1% annually.
- A linear multiplier of fatalities is sufficient for estimating the injuries associated with earthquakes to the desired precision of the SNRA (i.e., within an order of magnitude).
- The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate direct economic impacts caused by an earthquake event:

²¹ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: earthquakes were given a C_{EF} of 1.1.

The numerical estimates calculated from this formula are reported in Appendix G. The semi-quantitative risk matrix is discussed in the Findings (Psychological Distress Risk).


²² The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11–32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

- Indirect losses included in historic records do not significantly bias direct economic loss estimates.
- Correcting for inflation only from 2005-2011 does not significantly bias direct economic estimates. (Published normalized economic losses incorporating population, wealth, and mitigating factors were only available through 2005.)

Potential Mitigating Factors

The following key factors can mitigate the potential impacts caused by earthquakes: population and wealth/assets density, land use, construction type and quality, adherence to building codes in design, level of preparedness and awareness in dealing with disasters, and the potential/extent for liquefaction.

Figure 2: Peak Acceleration With 10 Percent Probability of Exceedance in 50 Years



Additional Relevant Information

Figure 2 shows, from a national perspective, the probability that ground motion would reach a certain level during an earthquake. The data show peak horizontal ground acceleration (the fastest measured change in speed for a particle at ground level that is moving horizontally due to an earthquake) with a 10 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years. The map was compiled by the USGS Geologic Hazards Team.

As shown in Figure 2, the areas with the highest probability of seismic impacts in the U.S. are in western California, with moderate probability across larger areas of the western U.S., the Midwest, and around Charleston, SC.


In 2008, FEMA estimated average annualized losses from earthquakes for the entire nation by state. The estimated average annualized loss (AAL) addresses risk by estimating the probability of loss occurring in the study area (largely a function of building construction type and quality). By annualizing estimated losses, the AAL factors in historic patterns of frequent, smaller events

Earthquake

with infrequent but larger events to provide a balanced presentation of risk. The AAL analysis yielded an estimate of the national AAL of \$5.3 billion per year. This estimate does not include lifeline infrastructure losses or indirect (long-term) economic losses, and is therefore, a minimum estimate of the potential losses. Moreover, the estimate represents a long-term average and actual losses in any single year may be much larger or smaller.

The annualized loss ratio (ALR) represents the AAL as a fraction of the replacement value of the local inventory. The ALR gauges the relationship between average AAL and replacement value. This ratio can be used as a measure of vulnerability in the areas and, because it is normalized by replacement value, it can be directly compared across different geographic units such as metropolitan areas or counties.

Figure 3: Hazus-MH Annualized Earthquake Loss Ratios (AELR) by State



Source: FEMA, April 2008²³


Figure 3 depicts the resulting state ALRs from this study, which helps to illustrate a national perspective of those areas more vulnerable to potential earthquake impacts. The states shown in dark red (Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada and Utah) have the highest expected ALRs among all states and therefore have a higher likelihood of experiencing earthquake losses in any given year. Florida, North Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin and Michigan have the lowest ALRs and are therefore least likely to experience earthquake losses when compared with the rest of the nation.

Figure 4 shows the annualized earthquake losses (AEL) by metropolitan area. Table 3 shows the top 7 metropolitan areas vulnerable to earthquake losses, as ranked using AEL. Of these 7 vulnerable areas, 5 are located in California.

²³ FEMA Publication 366: Hazus-MH Estimated Annualized Earthquake Losses for the United States, April 2008.

Table 3: Top 7 Metropolitan Areas Vulnerable to Earthquake Losses

Order	Metropolitan Area	AEL (\$ Million)
1	Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA	1,312.3
2	San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA	781.0
3	Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA	396.5
4	San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA	276.7
5	Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA	243.9
6	San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA	155.2
7	Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA	137.1

Figure 4: Hazus-MH Annualized Earthquake Loss (AEL) by Metropolitan AreaSource: FEMA, April 2008²³

Earthquake

Table 4: Earthquakes with 2011 damage estimates in excess of \$100 million. Year, location, and current year (2011) damage estimates highlighted in blue.

Original Source ²⁴	Date	Year	City/place name	State	FIPS	Deaths	Event-year property damage	Inflation-only adjustment	Normalized damages with 1% mitigation	Proportional fatalities	Prop. fatalities 1% mitigation
ACC	4/18/1906	1906	San Francisco	CA	6901	3,000	524,000,000	8,941,736,986	\$104,905,367,626	24,062	8,896
EM-DAT	6/22/1915	1915	El Centro	CA	6025	6	1,000,000	14,598,047	\$131,076,352	33	13
EM-DAT	10/11/1918	1918	Mona Passage	PR	72000	116	29,000,000	261,566,935	\$1,943,953,812	331	138
NGDC-s	4/21/1918	1918	San Jacinto/Riverside County	CA	6065	0	200,000	1,803,910	\$193,990,095		0
EM-DAT	6/29/1925	1925	Santa Barbara	CA	6083	13	8,000,000	74,247,020	\$1,371,950,746	98	44
ACC	3/11/1933	1933	Long Beach	CA	6902	116	39,250,000	495,767,829	\$7,565,220,534	737	358
NGDC-s	10/31/1935	1935	Helena	MT	30049	2	6,000,000	70,378,531	\$512,380,253	6	3
NGDC-s	10/19/1935	1935	Helena	MT	30049	3	11,250,000	132,000,000	\$960,000,000	9	5
EM-DAT	5/19/1940	1940	El Centro/Imperial Valley	CA	6025	9	6,000,000	69,000,000	\$392,000,000	12	6
ACC	4/13/1949	1949	Puget Sound/Olympia	WA	53067	8	52,500,000	359,951,841	\$3,403,585,667	41	24
NGDC-s	11/18/1949	1949	Terminal Island	CA	6902	0	9,000,000	61,706,030	\$414,893,442		0
NGDC-s	8/15/1951	1951	Terminal Island	CA	6902	0	3,000,000	18,982,899	\$109,913,608		0
ACC	8/22/1952	1952	Kern County/Bakersfield	CA	6029	2	20,000,000	124,417,934	\$662,071,491	6	4
ACC	7/21/1952	1952	Kern County/Bakersfield	CA	6029	14	55,000,000	342,149,318	\$1,820,696,601	44	26
EM-DAT	8/18/1959	1959	Hebgen Lake	MT	30031	28	26,000,000	140,472,170	\$706,863,603	85	54
NGDC-s	3/28/1964	1964	Prince William Sound/Anchorage	AK	2099	131	540,000,000	2,735,575,437	\$11,213,495,628	332	220
ACC	4/29/1965	1965	Seattle	WA	53999	7	20,250,000	100,744,986	\$299,194,941	13	9
NGDC-s	10/2/1969	1969	Santa Rosa	CA	6097	1	8,000,000	36,000,000	\$120,000,000	2	2
ACC	2/9/1971	1971	San Fernando	CA	6902	65	539,500,000	2,092,109,007	\$5,083,948,997	114	81
NGDC-s	10/15/1979	1979	Imperial Valley	CA	6025	0	30,000,000	67,881,448	\$129,806,214		0
ACC	10/1/1987	1987	Whittier/Los Angeles	CA	6902	8	354,000,000	542,215,449	\$795,888,336	10	9
hybrid	10/18/1989	1989	Loma Prieta/San Francisco	CA	6901	62	5,750,000,000	8,206,000,000	\$10,485,000,000	71	60
ACC	6/28/1992	1992	Landers/Yucca Valley	CA	6071	3	100,000,000	129,782,948	\$202,144,394	4	3
ACC	4/25/1992	1992	Ferndale/Fortuna/Petrolia	CA	6023	0	66,000,000	85,656,746	\$106,971,740		0
ACC	1/17/1994	1994	Northridge/Los Angeles	CA	6902	60	47,350,000,000	58,814,639,537	\$78,235,199,499	69	62
ACC	2/28/2001	2001	Seattle/Tacoma/Olympia	WA	53999	1	2,000,000,000	2,189,728,415	\$2,378,245,427	1	1
ACC	12/22/2003	2003	Paso Robles/San Simeon	CA	6079	2	300,000,000	316,390,574	\$328,283,332	2	2

²⁴ Original source cited by Vranes and Pielke (2009), *op. cit.*, from which this table was taken.

Flood

A flood occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 Million.

Data Summary

Table 1 shows the minimum, average, and maximum values for frequencies and impacts of national level floods. Note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Table 1

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities ¹	0	3	25
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses ¹	0	95	4,520
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011) ¹	\$104 Million	\$740 Million	\$16 Billion
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days ²	150	29,000	200,000
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ³	Moderate ⁴		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year ⁵	0.5	4	10

Event Background

Floods are one of the most common hazards in the United States. Their effects can be local, impacting a neighborhood or community, or large, affecting entire river basins and multiple states.⁶ For the purpose of the SNRA, a national-level flood is defined as a flood producing direct economic loss in excess of \$100 million dollars. Economic loss reported here is a combination of property and crop damage. A 13 year time period, from Jan-1-1993 to Dec-31-2005, was used to estimate the interarrival rates/frequencies and impacts for floods exceeding the \$100 million threshold. A full list of aggregated flood events used for this report is located in Table 2. Table 1 reports the maximum, average, and minimum frequency with which such floods occurred in the

¹ Low, best, and high estimates for fatalities, injuries and illnesses, and direct economic loss are the historical minimum, average, and maximum for each impact type in the event set. Extreme events for one impact type may but generally do not correspond to those for other impact types.

² Low, average, and high reported “total affected” for floods causing greater than \$100M in economic damage as recorded in the EM-DAT database during the time period 1970-2011. See Social Displacement section in this summary sheet for details.

³ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories. Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘best’ estimate.

⁴ Floods were given a best estimate of ‘Moderate’. The experts assessed that flooding of agricultural areas is a typical impact. The severity of the impact depends upon whether there is release of contaminants from urban areas.

⁵ Historical lowest, average, and maximum number of events per year (calculated from interarrival times).

⁶ FEMA.gov: Flood, March 2011. <http://www.fema.gov/hazard/flood/>.

Flood

United States, and the maximum, average and minimum impacts for fatalities, injuries, and direct economic losses associated with floods in the set.

This flood risk summary is based on aggregating flood losses reported by NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC).⁷ Modern flood reporting by NOAA relies on many individual reports that assess damages in a specific area of responsibility. A large scale flood, for example, can result in dozens or hundreds of damage entries that assess damages for specific geographic regions. The reason for this is that damage estimates are recorded by individuals with specific areas of responsibility. As flooding passes down the Mississippi, for example, the affected areas can pass from region to region. To capture the transient and distributed nature of flood events, individual flood loss estimates were aggregated based on proximity and time. Flood damage reports that occur within 100 miles of one another and within plus or minus one calendar day are aggregated into composite flood events. The composite flood events above the \$100 million threshold are used for reporting of national level event statistics in Tables 1 and 2 of this report. All hurricanes were removed from flood events to avoid over reporting flooding captured in the hurricane risk summary sheet.

Low, average and high impact estimates were developed in the following manner. For fatalities, injuries and economic loss, the low estimate is the smallest impact for events that exceed \$100 million. For event frequency, the low estimate is the lowest number of events recorded in a year. The average frequency is the expected number of events in a given year. Similarly, the average for fatalities, injuries/illness, and economic damage are the expected value for each given the occurrence of a national level flood. The maximum frequency is the maximum number of national-level floods recorded in a single year. The maximum for fatalities, injuries/illness, and economic damage is the greatest value produced by a single storm in each impact category.

It is important to note that the frequency estimates reported here differ from probabilities. The frequency of a national-level flood can be greater than one, while a probability cannot. Additionally, while the average estimates for impacts and frequency are correlated and approximate the average annual loss when multiplied together, the maximum and minimum historical values for impact and frequency are uncorrelated and do not have meaning when multiplied together.

Economic flood damages were inflated to a 2011 dollar value using average changes in the Consumer Price Index. The historical maximum for fatalities was the Great October Flood of 1998 in West Texas with an estimated 25 deaths. Several floods within the time period exceeded \$100 million in economic damages without any reported loss of life or injury. In total, 37 floods exceeding the \$100 million threshold are aggregated in the findings of this report. For economic loss, \$104 million⁸ is the smallest historic loss that meets the \$100 million threshold. Twenty three historic events exceeding the economic threshold did not record any fatalities. The greatest gap between flood events occurs between 1998 and 2000. This two year time lapse between national level events results in an interarrival frequency of 0.5, or $1/t_{\max}$.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure

⁷ NOAA NCDC Storm Events Database, available by ftp from <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/stormevents/ftp.jsp> (current URL: database downloaded by SNRA project team from NCDC for analysis September 2011, URL updated 3/16/2013).

⁸ 5/8/1993: Heavy rain in parts of Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Texas.

of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

To estimate social displacement for the SNRA, U.S. flood event data from EM-DAT was used to approximate the number of people forced to leave home for two days or greater. EM-DAT, an Emergency Events Database maintained by the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters with support from USAID,⁹ provides estimates of the “total number affected” by disaster events. Data on “total number affected” for U.S. flood events from 1970-2011 listed in EM-DAT as causing \$100M or greater in damages are listed in Table 3. This data covers a longer historic time period than the flood data used for the economic analysis and the EM-DAT events listed may not match the events listed in Table 2 exactly due to differences in damage reporting between the two databases.¹⁰ The low, high, and average of the “total affected” data in Table 3 are used as the social displacement estimates for floods in the SNRA.

The “total affected” measure includes the number of people needing immediate assistance, which can include displacements and evacuations; the number of people needing immediate assistance for shelter; and the number of people injured. Because EM-DAT includes injuries in the “total affected” measure, there is potential for double-counting between the SNRA injury and displacement estimates for this event. However, displacement due to floods is typically significantly greater than the number of injuries, so using EM-DAT’s “total affected” measure was judged to provide an estimate of social displacement of sufficient precision for the SNRA. Note that the low estimate may be biased low due to incomplete reporting of displacement and evacuations in EM-DAT.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.¹¹ The numerical outputs of this index

⁹ EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels (Belgium) [official citation]. EM-DAT is maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the School of Public Health of the Université Catholique de Louvain located in Brussels, Belgium (<http://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions>), and is supported by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID (http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance). See Criteria and Definition, <http://www.emdat.be/criteria-and-definition>, EMDAT Data Entry Procedures, at <http://www.emdat.be/source-entry>, and EMDAT Glossary, at <http://www.emdat.be/glossary> for details of criteria, thresholds, and methodology for the EM-DAT database.

¹⁰ The historical flood incidents in Table 4 were paired with corresponding historical incidents in Table 3 for the purpose of determining a unique set of records with all impact numbers, where available, for the SNRA core data set (Appendix K). However, this identification occurred after 2011, and Table K2 was not included in the SNRA data or documentation reviewed by FEMA and the interagency, or in classified versions of the SNRA Technical Report.

¹¹ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: floods were given a C_{EF} of 1.0.

The numerical estimates calculated from this formula are reported in Appendix G. The semi-quantitative risk matrix is discussed in the Findings (Psychological Distress Risk).

Flood

formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹² as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “moderate.” Flooding of agricultural areas is a typical impact of large scale flooding. The severity of the impact depends upon whether there is release of contaminants from urban areas.

Potential Mitigating Factors

Flood risk is typically based on history, combined with a number of factors such as rainfall, river-flow and tidal-surge data, topography, flood control measures, and changes due to building and development.

Assumptions

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate health and safety impacts for this event:

- Historical flood events from 1993-2005 are representative of current flood risk.¹³
- Aggregations of individual reports for flood deaths/injuries represent the actual deaths/injuries from historic flood events to sufficient precision for purposes of the SNRA. These fatality and injury reports are potentially biased low compared to published reports due to underreporting in the NOAA database.

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate economic impacts for this event:

- Property and flood loss dominate the direct economic losses, such that business interruptions, medical costs, and loss of spending due to fatalities can be neglected.

¹² The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

¹³ Flood event records for 2006 – present are also available from NOAA, but in a different format than the records used for this summary sheet. These records will be included in future analysis.


The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate social displacement for this event:

- Numbers displaced by floods sufficiently dominate injuries that EM-DAT's total-affected measure may be considered an approximate measure of social displacement.

Expected Wind Damage Versus Return Period

Results reported in Tables 1 and 2 capture actual flood events. An additional perspective into flood damage is a loss exceedance probability shown in Figure 1. The 13-year range used for impacts in Tables 1 and 2 does not provide record of all possible impacts. Low frequency events have the capacity to eclipse the greatest damage reports from historic events. Figure 1 provides a loss exceedance probability for flood damages in a given year. It is important to note that this loss is an annualized number for the entire country, not specific flood events.

Figure 1: Annual Probability of Exceeding Direct Economic Losses¹⁴



Additional Relevant Information

In 2010, FEMA used default analyses to estimate average annualized losses for flood for the entire nation by state. The estimated average annualized loss (AAL) addresses risk by estimating the probability of the loss occurring in the study area (largely a function of building construction type and quality). By annualizing estimated losses, the AAL factors in historic patterns of frequent, smaller events with infrequent but larger events to provide a balanced presentation of risk. The AAL analysis yielded an estimate of the national AAL of approximately \$55 billion per year.

The annualized loss ratio (ALR) represents the AAL as a fraction of the replacement value of the local inventory. The ALR gauges the relationship between AAL and replacement value. This ratio can be used as a measure of vulnerability in the areas and, because it is normalized by


¹⁴ Modeling done by FEMA HAZUS-MH contract support for the SNRA project team.

Flood

replacement value, it can be directly compared across different geographic units such as metropolitan areas or counties.

Figure 2 depicts the resulting state ALRs from this study, which helps to illustrate from a national perspective those areas that are more vulnerable to potential flood impacts. The states shown in dark red (Florida, Louisiana and West Virginia) have the highest expected ALRs among all states and therefore have a higher likelihood of experiencing flood losses in any given year.

Figure 2: Annualized Loss Ratios by State



Source: FEMA, June 2011¹⁵

¹⁵ FEMA: HAZUS Average Annualized Flood Loss for the Contiguous United States, DRAFT June 2011.

Table 2: Flood Events

Description:	Date	Fatal	Injured	Econ Loss
Heavy rain in parts of OK, AR, and TX.	5/8/1993	5	0	\$103,635,700
Extensive flooding due to 4 to 8 inches of rain in South Central Kansas.	5/8/1993	0	0	\$157,000,000
Flooding in OK.	5/8/1993	0	0	\$157,000,000
Great Flood of 93.	8/31/1993	0	0	\$15,700,000,000
Steady rains in and around Springfield MO.	9/24/1993	1	0	\$119,013,850
Flooding in SC and TN.	3/27/1993	3	0	\$238,068,000
Heavy rains resulted in flash floods in PA and NY.	8/18/1994	3	6	\$111,766,500
Texas flooding.	10/16/1994	15	0	\$399,146,400
Flooding in Kern, Los Angeles and San Diego CA.	1/10/1995	0	0	\$166,135,000
Flooding from Kern to Tulare CA.	3/1/1995	0	0	\$168,072,000
Salinas River flooding in Monterey County CA.	3/10/1995	0	0	\$447,000,000
Rain combined with snow melt caused flooding from VA to NY.	1/18/1996	22	1	\$475,800,480
Melting snow and rain caused northern Oregon river flooding.	2/6/1996	7	0	\$576,000,000
Record breaking rainfall fell over parts of north central and northeast Illinois.	7/17/1996	0	0	\$111,888,000
Heavy thunderstorms in PA.	7/19/1996	2	1	\$326,160,000
Damages in CA from rain combined with snow melt in the Sierra Nevada.	1/1/1997	3	52	\$1,635,600,000
Melting snow and heavy rain in Southern Oregon.	1/1/1997	0	0	\$126,900,000
Flooding from excessive rain in KY, OH, and WV.	3/1/1997	10	3	\$153,368,520
Record 24 hour rainfall in Jefferson County, KY.	3/1/1997	2	0	\$296,100,000
Sheyenne River flooding in ND.	4/8/1997	0	0	\$5,428,500,000
Severe flash floods in MN and WI. Milwaukee Co. WI was extensively damaged.	6/20/1997	0	6	\$141,751,530
Heavy rains resulting in flash floods in multiple counties of CO.	7/28/1997	5	40	\$289,162,800
Large hail, strong winds and torrential rain hammered central CO.	8/11/1997	0	0	\$180,480,000
A slow moving Nor'easter battered eastern VA.	2/4/1998	0	0	\$104,250,000
Powerful El Nino-fed Pacific storm struck southern and central CA.	2/23/1998	5	3	\$152,316,200
A slow moving weather system dumped large amounts of rain on AL.	3/8/1998	4	0	\$165,389,150
An intense gulf storm dumped up to 14 inches of rain in AL and southwest GA.	3/8/1998	1	1	\$543,490,000
Nearly six inches of rain in western counties of FL.	3/10/1998	0	0	\$510,130,000
Agricultural damage due to a large Southern Sierra Nevada snow melt.	6/1/1998	0	0	\$139,556,000
Sustained flooding through parts of East Central OH.	6/26/1998	10	0	\$281,502,800
A series of slow moving thunderstorms moved through WI.	8/5/1998	2	5	\$114,410,900
The Great October Flood in west Texas.	10/17/1998	25	4520	\$559,266,500
Flooding from Devils Lake in ND.	8/5/1998	0	0	\$136,000,000
Heavy rainfall in Jefferson and Franklin county MO.	5/7/2000	2	0	\$132,660,000
Heavy thunderstorms in MN produced record rainfall amounts.	6/19/2000	0	0	\$147,840,000
Thunderstorms with near torrential downpours in NJ.	8/12/2000	0	0	\$237,996,000
Massive rainfall southwest FL, from low pressure system ahead of TS Leslie.	10/3/2000	0	0	\$1,254,000,000
Flooding from rapid snow melt and rain.	4/1/2001	3	1	\$256,000,000
Severe flash flooding in WV and VA.	7/8/2001	1	0	\$280,748,800
High water in Columbia AR.	10/11/2001	0	0	\$153,606,400
Flash floods in KY, VA, and WV.	5/2/2002	4	0	\$141,233,400
Heavy rainfall caused the Roseau River to overflow the dikes of Roseau.	6/10/2002	0	0	\$252,000,000
Heavy rains caused flooding in several counties of MS.	4/6/2003	2	0	\$325,683,090
Flooding TN, GA and AL, most severe damage in Jefferson County AL.	5/5/2003	3	6	\$1,474,800,000
Thunderstorm generated flash floods throughout OH.	7/21/2003	5	0	\$288,261,570
A stationary front caused widespread flooding over Southeast Michigan.	5/23/2004	0	0	\$120,000,000
Scattered to widespread heavy rains across south-central and southeast WI.	6/1/2004	0	0	\$301,860,000
A stalled storm system dumped rain throughout many portions of UT.	1/10/2005	1	6	\$348,000,000
Widespread flooding in several CA counties due to heavy rainfall.	12/30/2005	0	0	\$476,298,320

Table 3: Social Displacement and Damage Estimates from EM-DAT

Start (DD/MM/YY)	End (DD/MM/YY)	Location ¹	EM-DAT Total Affected	EM-DAT Est. Damage (US\$ Million)
09/06/1972	09/06/1972	Rapid City (South Dakota) ...	3,000	120
22/07/1977	22/07/1977	Johnstown (Pennsylvania)	2,700	200
19/02/1980	19/02/1980	South California	106,000	350
06/01/1993	20/01/1993	California, Arizona, Neva ...	6,000	100
28/02/1993	28/02/1993	N/A	5,200	190
24/06/1993	23/08/1993	Oklahoma, Minnesota, Wis ...	31,000	12,000
17/10/1994	23/10/1994	Houston, Galveston (Texas ...	14,070	700
07/05/1995	13/05/1995	Louisiana (New Orleans)	20,000	3,000
28/11/1995	10/12/1995	Washington, Oregon	15,000	100
15/01/1996	21/01/1996	Nevada, Arizona, New Mexi ...	200,000	700
07/02/1996	13/02/1996	Washington, Oregon, Idaho ...	24,900	500
27/12/1996	03/01/1997	Washington, Oregon, Nevad ...	18,100	1,500
01/01/1997	07/02/1997	Nevada, Idaho, California ...	125,000	1,500
17/04/1997	07/05/1997	Grand Forks, Fargo	50,400	5,000
25/07/1997	01/08/1997	Fort Collins (Northern Co ...	424	100
07/03/1998	13/03/1998	S Alabama, N and C Georgi ...	18,000	270
13/06/1998	17/06/1998	Iowa, Indiana, , Illinois ...	1,000	201
24/06/1998	01/07/1998	Kansas, IA, MO, Illinois, ...	14,000	469
23/05/2000	23/05/2000	Franklin, Jefferson, Gasc ...	300	100
12/08/2000	14/08/2000	Morris (Sussex county, Ne ...	175	166
30/06/2002	23/07/2002	New Braunfels, Bandera, U ...	144,000	1,000
05/07/2003	21/07/2003	Carroll, Adams, Cass, How ...	1,200	106
07/01/2005	11/01/2005	La Conchita, Ventura coun ...	508	200
17/02/2005	23/02/2005	Los Angeles, region (Cali ...	150	250
31/12/2005	18/01/2006	Napa, Sonoma, Mendocino, ...	3,600	245
04/04/2006	17/04/2006	Amador, Calaveras, Fresno ...	600	259
25/06/2006	01/07/2006	Maryland, Pennsylvania, N ...	65,000	1,000
16/08/2007	27/08/2007	Illinois, Colorado, Mich ...	2,840	700
24/03/2009	20/04/2009	North Dakota, Minnesota	5,060	166
20/09/2009	21/09/2009	Douglas, Floyd, Carroll, ...	3,000	500

*Note: EM-DAT data from June 2008 Midwest floods is not included because “total affected” estimate (11 million) is a large outlier which could not be independently validated against news reports.

¹ EM-DAT truncates long fields.

Human Pandemic Outbreak

A severe outbreak of pandemic influenza with a 25% gross clinical attack rate spreads across the U.S. populace.

Table 1A. Pandemic: SNRA Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities ¹	77,000	154,000	230,000
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses ²	62 Million	77 Million	110 Million
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011) ³	\$71 Billion	\$110 Billion	\$180 Billion
	Indirect Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)		N/A	
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days		0 ⁴	
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins		See text	
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ⁵		Low ⁶	
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number per Year		See Table B	

Table 1B. Conditional and Absolute Likelihood Ranges for Pandemic Relative Severity

Frequency of All Influenza Pandemics			Low	Best	High
Absolute Likelihood (Number Per Year) ⁷			0.017	0.033	0.10
Conditional Likelihood of Severity, Given Pandemic Occurrence	Mild	Low	0.10	0.0017	0.0033
		High	0.30	0.0051	0.0099
	Middle	Low	0.50	0.0085	0.0165
		High	0.80	0.0136	0.0264
	Severe/Worst Case	Low	0.10	0.0017	0.0033
		High	0.10	0.0017	0.0033
			Absolute Likelihood by Relative Severity		

¹ Fatality low, best, and high estimates were calculated using an attack rate of 25%, a U.S. population of 307 million, and a case fatality rate of 0.1%–0.3% (best: 0.2%). Reed et al (2013, January). Novel framework for assessing epidemiologic effects of influenza epidemics and pandemics; and Technical Appendix. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 19(1) 85–91, at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124_article; Technical Appendix at <http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/19/1/12-0124-techapp1.pdf> (retrieved June 2013).

² Illness low, best, and high estimates correspond to a U.S. population of 307 million and attack rates of 20%, 25%, and 35% respectively.

³ Sum of estimated hospitalization costs, business interruption from workdays lost, and one year's lost spending per fatality. See Direct Economic Impact for details.

⁴ Social displacement was assumed to be zero for the Human Pandemic Outbreak national-level event.

Human Pandemic Outbreak

Event Background

There have been eight naturally caused influenza pandemics (including pandemics subsequently deduced to have been caused by influenza virus) since 1729.⁸ Thus, the historic frequency is once every 10 to 60 years. New influenza viruses that affect humans can emerge and spread rapidly. Influenza pandemics can occur at any time due in part to the following factors: the quality and scope of epidemiological and laboratory resources to identify and diagnose viruses with pandemic potential—both in the United States and globally; the complex reassortment of new influenza viruses between animal and human hosts; potential lack of antibody resistance to new influenza virus strains in the population at large; potential resistance of new influenza virus strains to available antiviral medications; time needed to identify, develop, produce, and distribute an effective pandemic influenza vaccine; and countermeasure resources in the U.S. and globally to mitigate the transmission of a pandemic virus.

⁵ In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories.

⁶ Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The experts provided a best estimate of ‘Moderate’ for a pandemic scenario with severe social impacts and a second best estimate of ‘Low’ for a less severe pandemic scenario (see Environmental Impacts). The SNRA used ‘Low’ as the best estimate and ‘Moderate’ as the second best estimate for the Pandemic national-level event, because the final numbers on other impact scales defined a scenario with social impacts corresponding to the less severe as opposed to the more severe pandemic scenario.

⁷ The SNRA data tables are presented differently for Pandemic than for other national-level events to address partner risk communication concerns that are specific for pandemic influenza. The same information is presented as in other data tables, but additional information is also presented.

The frequency estimates (0.017/year, 0.033/year, 0.10/year) in the top row of Table 1A represent the likelihood of occurrence of the set of influenza pandemic events as a whole, not the conditional or absolute likelihoods of occurrence of the low, best, and high impact estimates in particular. (Low, best, and high impact estimates also do not necessarily correlate with each other across impact metric, e.g. the high estimates of fatalities, illnesses, and direct economic impacts do not necessarily correlate together in a single scenario.) The overall frequency of occurrence of an event and the conditional probabilities of an incident having low, moderate, or high impacts are independent variables. The top row frequency estimates are the low, best, and high frequencies indicated on the SNRA’s comparative charts.

The approximate likelihoods of the ‘mild’ (10-30%), ‘middle’ (50-80%), and ‘severe/worst case’ (~10%) scenarios as described under “Additional Relevant Information” given occurrence of an influenza pandemic in the set as a whole, are listed in the first vertical column to the left. Similarly to the frequency of occurrence of pandemics as a whole, these conditional likelihoods have substantial uncertainties associated with them, and so are represented as ranges. Given the occurrence of an influenza pandemic, these represent the probabilities that the pandemic will be ‘mild’, ‘middle’, or ‘severe/worse case’. Note that the designation ‘mild’ is strictly relative: the least severe historical instance of a ‘mild’ pandemic, the 2009 H1N1 influenza, killed more Americans than any other natural or accidental hazard incident or modeled scenario in the SNRA data set. Note also that these three categories do not correspond to the low, best, and high impact estimates of the SNRA Pandemic event as given in Table 1A—the SNRA low, best, and high impact estimates reflect a broad 1957-like pandemic scenario, and the range of impacts described by the SNRA scenario straddle the boundary of the ‘mild’ and ‘middle’ categories described in Table 1B and “Additional Relevant Information.” The range of impacts for the SNRA Pandemic event correspond to a high-‘mild’ to a ‘middle’ scenario.

The absolute frequency of each of the ‘mild’, ‘middle’, and ‘worse case’ scenarios described under “Additional Relevant Information” would be the product of the 0.017 – 0.10/year absolute frequency of the Pandemic event as a whole and their approximate conditional likelihoods of 10-30%, 50-80%, and 10% respectively, or 0.002-0.03, 0.008-0.08, and 0.002-0.01/year. These are presented in the body of Table 1B. Because of the multiple uncertainties involved with pandemic likelihoods, only the ranges (the high and low of each product) are considered to be informationally meaningful: these are colored in violet.

For additional detail, see “Additional Relevant Information” and associated discussion.

⁸ Different authors have different lists of which influenza years they consider to have been pandemics, but most modern writers’ lists of likely influenza pandemics in the past three centuries include from about 8 to 12 events in total (when the 2009 H1N1 pandemic is included). Serological studies—blood tests to characterize antigens to surface proteins of influenza viruses a person may have been exposed to in his/her lifetime—have been successfully used to determine the serotypes (combinations of particular H and N surface proteins) of influenza outbreaks back to around 1900. However, making a determination of which historical outbreaks before that point were pandemics by the modern virological definition from past writers’ observations indicative of a new influenza serotype (e.g., cross-continent spread, patterns of residual immunity from previous outbreaks) involves a great deal of inference and human judgment. Potter C. W. (2001, October), A history of influenza. *Journal of Applied Microbiology* 91(4) 572–579; Taubenberger et al (2009, April), Pandemic influenza—including a risk assessment of H5N1, *Revue Scientifique et Technique (Rev. Sci. Tech.)* 28(1) 187–202, at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2720801/> (accessed March 2013); Patterson, Karl D. (1986), Pandemic Influenza, 1700-1900: A study in historical epidemiology, Rowman & Littlefield, publishers; Dowdle, W. R. (1999), Influenza: A virus recycling revisited. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 77(10) 820–828; at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2557748/> (accessed April 2013); Morens et al (2010, November), Historical thoughts on influenza viral ecosystems, or behold a pale horse, dead dogs, failing fowl, and sick swine. *Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses* 4(6) 327-337, at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3180823/> (accessed May 2013).

Assumptions

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate health and safety impacts caused by a pandemic event:

- The scenario is based on a U.S. population of approximately 307 million.
- Likelihood, fatality, and illness best estimates and ranges were provided to the SNRA project team by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
- These experts stress that it is impossible to predict the timing or severity of the next pandemic.
- All of the estimates are given absent any intervention (i.e., before interventions are applied or attempted).⁹
- The modeled National-level Event is based on assuming a 25% attack rate¹⁰ and death rates associated with a scenario modeled on a 1957-scale pandemic if it were to occur in today's population.^{11,12}

Frequency

Low (1/60 years), best (1/30 years), and high (1/10 years) frequency estimates reflect the historic frequency of influenza pandemics of natural origin since 1729 of once every 10 to 60 years, averaging 1 in 30 years. These correspond to the absolute likelihood of the set of pandemics as a whole: the conditional likelihood of pandemic scenarios of different severities given occurrence of a pandemic event is discussed under "Additional Relevant Information".

Fatalities and Illnesses

Fatality low, best, and high estimates were calculated using an attack rate of 25%, a U.S. population of 307 million, and a case fatality rate of 0.1%–0.3% (best: 0.2%).¹³ Illness low, best, and high estimates correspond to the same U.S. population and attack rates of 20%, 25%, and 35% respectively.¹⁴

Comparisons to other estimates of health and safety impacts: Large uncertainties dominate any estimate of the human impacts of the next influenza pandemic.

⁹ See "Potential Mitigating Factors."

¹⁰ The attack rate is the percentage of population that becomes clinically ill due to influenza. Clinical illness is defined as a case of influenza that causes some measurable economic impact, such as one-half day of work lost or a visit to a physician's office.

¹¹ Reed et al (2013), *op. cit.*

¹² Medical technologies to improve survival probabilities in the elderly and health-compromised populations most at risk of dying from influenza have advanced in past decades. However, the larger fraction of these high-risk subpopulations in today's U.S. population—due in large part to these same advances—means that total fatalities from an influenza pandemic of similar virulence could be much higher today than in 1957. Melzer et al (1999). The economic impact of pandemic influenza in the United States: priorities for intervention, *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 5(5) 659-671, at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2627723/>; with Appendix II, from <http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/5/5/99-0507-techapp2.pdf> (accessed April 2013); Zimmerman et al (2010, September 7), Prevalence of high risk indications for influenza vaccine varies by age, race, and income, *Vaccine* 28(39) 6470–77, at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2939262/> (retrieved 17 June 2013).

The SNRA project team is not aware of any longitudinal study looking at the proportion of high-risk populations defined in comparable terms. However, the scale of this increase is apparent in studies of the U.S. populations covering shorter time periods. One illustration of this is the increase of the overall percentage of the U.S. population at high risk from complications of influenza from 15.5% to 20% in the five year period 1973–1978: Table 12, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress (1981, December), Cost Effectiveness of Influenza Vaccination. NTIS order #PB82-178492, also at <http://ota.fas.org/reports/8112.pdf>.

¹³ Melzer et al, Standardizing scenarios to assess the need to respond to an influenza pandemic, *Clinical Infectious Diseases* [forthcoming]; Reed et al (2013), *op. cit.*

¹⁴ The 15%/25%/35% attack rate range used in CDC community planning tools (e.g., FluWorkLoss) was truncated below at 20% to correspond to the lowest U.S attack rate of the naturally occurring influenza pandemics of the last century (19.9% for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic: Table D.4, technical appendix, Reed et al (2013)). Although lower attack rates are reported for other historical pandemics these are reported only as the lower end of a range: the 19.9% attack rate is presented as a single estimate for the 2009 pandemic).

Human Pandemic Outbreak

- Severity of virus: Although useful indications of the potential range of impacts may be inferred from records of the historical variability of the influenza virus (Figures 1, 2), patterns deduced from the historical record have been insufficient in themselves for constructing predictive models for the severity of the next pandemics.¹⁵ Many planning scenarios model experts' best judgment of a 'most representative' scenario, such as the 1957-scale pandemic model used for the SNRA and many other planning scenarios in this country; others model a 1918-scale pandemic as a maximal scenario for planning purposes.¹⁶ Current U.S. Government guidance is to plan to both a 'moderate' 1957/1968-style pandemic and a 'severe' 1918-style pandemic to ensure preparedness for a range of impacts.¹⁷
- Mitigation measures: In addition to the inherent characteristics of the virus, the actual impacts of a future pandemic will also depend upon the availability, speed of deployment, and effectiveness of medical and non-medical measures to mitigate disease spread and lethality. Despite extensive study in the literature,¹⁸ the extent to which the effects of the next pandemic will be mitigated in practice is dominated by open questions (see Potential Mitigating Factors).

Direct Economic Loss

Direct economic impacts as defined in the SNRA include decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction costs including property (structure, contents, physical infrastructure, and other physical property) and crop damage; one year's lost spending due to fatalities; medical costs; and business interruption directly resulting from the impacts of an event. For the 2015 SNRA, direct economic impacts were calculated based upon previous work done for the DHS RAPID model.^{19,20} This method was used, because it aligned better to the harmonized SNRA definition of direct economic impact than that used for the 2011 SNRA; however, given the 2015 SNRA fatality and illness inputs, both methods gave similar results (see below).

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate economic impacts caused by a pandemic event:

¹⁵ Dowdle, W. R. (1999). Influenza A virus recycling revisited. *Bulletin of the World Health Organization* 77(10) 820–828; at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2557748/> (accessed April 2013).

¹⁶ National Infrastructure Simulation & Analysis Center (NISAC), for the Office of Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2007, October 10), National Population, Economic, and Infrastructure Impacts of Pandemic Influenza with Strategic Recommendations; also the 'high' scenario of the 2005 HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan (p. 18), and the 'high' and conservative fatalities planning factors of the UK Pandemic Influenza Strategy 2011 (pp. 16–17, 20–25) (overall, the UK strategy stresses a range of scenarios similar to HHS recommendations). Department of Health, United Kingdom (2011, November 10), UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011, at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/responding-to-a-uk-flu-pandemic> (accessed June 2013); U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2005, November), HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, at <http://www.flu.gov/planning-preparedness/federal/hsspandemicinfluenzaplans.pdf> (accessed April 2013).

¹⁷ HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, *op cit.*; U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC Resources for Pandemic Flu [Web portal], <http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/> (accessed June 2013).

¹⁸ Longini et al (2004, April 1). Containing pandemic influenza with antiviral agents. *American Journal of Epidemiology* 159(7) 623–633; Miller et al (2008, August 1). Prioritization of influenza pandemic vaccination to minimize years of life lost. *Journal of Infectious Diseases* 198(3) 305–311; Perloft et al (2010, January 15). Health outcomes and costs of community mitigation strategies for an influenza pandemic in the United States. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 50(2) 165–174; Meltzer et al (1999), *op cit.*; NISAC (2007), *op cit.*; Office of Technology Assessment (1981), *op cit.*; CDC (2011, May 10). Ten Great Public Health Achievements – United States, 2001–2010. *Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report (MMWR)* 60(19) 619–623; CDC (2011, September 30), Notice to Readers: Revised Estimates of the Public Health Impact of 2009 Pandemic Influenza. *MMWR* 60(38) 1321; Atkins et al (2011, September). Estimating effect of antiviral drug use during pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak, United States. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 17(9) 1591–1598.

¹⁹ The Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision Making (RAPID) 2010 (or RAPID II) was a strategic level, DHS-wide process to assess risk and inform strategic planning priorities developed by the DHS Office of Risk Management & Analysis (National Protection & Programs Directorate). The RAPID engine is a suite of computational tools for calculating human and economic measures of risk and the relative effectiveness of different DHS programs in risk reduction. Like the SNRA it is a quantitative tool for calculating and comparing risks in the homeland security mission space with each other, but unlike the SNRA it is designed for additionally calculating the comparative effectiveness of different programs in buying down risk. RAPID is presently maintained by the DHS Office of Policy.

²⁰ Note that the following is *based on* work done in developing the RAPID model, not the model itself. Common inputs include average hospitalization costs and direct business interruption costs per workday lost.

- All of the estimates are given absent any intervention (i.e., before interventions are applied or attempted).
- All estimates were converted to 2011 dollars for comparison with the existing events of the SNRA.
- **Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction costs** were assumed to be negligible in comparison with the other components of the SNRA direct economic loss measure for the Pandemic event.²¹
- **Medical Costs:** The SNRA project team made the assumption that hospitalizations would dominate the medical costs for the Pandemic event. A fatality/hospitalization ratio of 11%, the midpoint of the middle (Scale 4)-level scenario of CDC's current pandemic classification model²² was applied to the low, best, and high fatality estimates.²³ The resulting estimates of numbers hospitalized were multiplied by \$21,154, the average cost of influenza-related hospitalizations from the RAPID model adjusted to 2011 dollars, to obtain total estimated hospitalization costs.^{24,25}
- **Business Interruption** costs for the SNRA were estimated based on the workdays lost due to illnesses, including caregiver absences from work due to ill family members. The CDC FluWorkLoss model was used to estimate workdays lost for the SNRA.²⁶ FluWorkLoss is highly customizable to input assumptions and values.²⁷ However, for a given set of input assumptions, the output average total workdays lost per illness is a linear function of Case Fatality Rate (CFR) independent of attack rate, total fatalities, or pandemic duration. The relationship²⁸ corresponding to the FluWorkLoss default assumptions was used to estimate total workdays lost for each of the low/best/high fatality and illness scenarios. These totals, converted to total work-years lost,²⁹ were multiplied by the U.S. average annual output per worker of \$144,654³⁰ to produce estimates of total business interruption directly caused by a pandemic event.

²¹ This assumption may not hold true for an extremely severe pandemic causing social disruption on the scale of the 1918 pandemic: see Environmental Impact section below, discussion of Moderate impact estimate.

²² Scales as in Reed et al (2013).

²³ A constant ratio was used because the correlation of this measure to other measures across different scale scenarios was unknown: the different severity measures of the Reed model are used as inputs to determine a severity level and do not represent a prediction that these scenarios will be correlated in a real world pandemic event. As a sensitivity analysis, a functional relationship between this ratio and case fatality rates at the boundaries of each scenario (e.g. 0.05% CFR and 6.5% fatality/hospitalized ratio at the scale 2–scale 3 boundary) of (fatality/hospitalized) = 0.0374 ln(CFR) + 0.3516 [$R^2 = 0.9986$] was assumed and applied to the low/best/high fatality-illness scenarios to obtain fatality/hospitalized ratios of 9.3%, 11.9%, and 13.4% respectively. This resulted in total direct economic impacts of \$74/\$112/\$172 billion respectively, compared with \$71/\$114/\$180 billion total direct economic impacts of the final SNRA 2015 estimates.

²⁴ Similarly to the DHS Terrorism Risk Assessments, RAPID estimates of hospitalization costs were derived from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS), Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and are based on a five-day hospitalization (\$18,367 in \$2005). HCUP Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS). Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) 2005. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD; <http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/nisoverview.jsp>.

²⁵ Low/best/high estimates 700,000/1.4 million/2.091 million hospitalizations and \$14.8/\$29.6/\$44.2 billion total medical costs from hospitalization.

²⁶ U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2006). FluWorkLoss 1.0 [computer file]. At <http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/tools/fluworkloss.htm> (retrieved 5 April 2013).

²⁷ Dhankhar et al (2006, September 29). FluWorkLoss: Software to estimate the impact of an influenza pandemic on work day loss [manual]. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. At http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/tools/downloads/fluworkloss_manual_102306.pdf (retrieved 5 April 2013).

²⁸ Total workdays lost/illness = 250.0×CFR + 1.192.

²⁹ Using relationship of 240 workdays/work-year (RAPID II standard value).

³⁰ Annual output per worker is taken from IMPLAN (2011) values for the average annual output per employee across all economic sectors (RAPID II standard value).

Human Pandemic Outbreak

- Lost Demand from Fatalities:** To estimate the costs of lost demand from deaths, the SNRA project team multiplied the number of deaths listed in the Data Summary Table by \$42,500, the same figure used across the SNRA 2011 events.³¹

Table 2: SNRA 2015 Direct Economic Loss Calculations

Parameters	Low	Best	High
Fatalities	77,000	154,000	230,000
Illnesses	61,400,000	76,800,000	107,000,000
<hr/>			
Factors	Low	Best	High
Decontamination/disposal/physical destruction (DDP)	\$0	\$0	\$0
Business interruption: Cost of workdays lost	\$53,364,548,000	\$78,270,471,000	\$125,769,360,000
Medical: Cost of hospitalizations	\$14,808,081,000	\$29,616,162,000	\$44,231,930,000
One year lost spending per fatality	\$3,272,500,000	\$6,545,000,000	\$9,775,000,000
<hr/>			
	Low	Best	High
Total Direct Economic Loss	\$71,445,129,000	\$114,431,633,000	\$179,776,290,000

Comparisons to other estimates of economic impact: The economic loss model used by the 2011 SNRA included medical costs and a partial valuation of lost productivity due to time off work. Additionally, approximately 83% of the economic impacts from the 2011 model were associated with the value of lost productivity due to premature death, a component not included in the SNRA 2015 direct economic loss metric. However, when adjusted for the updated fatality/illness inputs of the 2015 SNRA, the 2011 model has a best estimate of \$116 billion, with a range of \$53 to \$157 billion. Although calculated by different loss estimation methods, these estimates closely coincide with those of the 2015 SNRA (\$114 billion, with a range of \$71 to \$180 billion).

In comparison to the 1957-scale scenario estimates of the 2015 SNRA, a 2006 study of the potential economic impact of an influenza pandemic gave an estimate of impact for a “mild” pandemic of 0.8% of global GDP, equivalent in the U.S. to approximately \$117.6 billion.³² Although calculated with a different methodology, this estimate is also within the range given in the “Data Summary” for the 1957 scenario.

A Congressional Budget Office (CBO)³³ study of a 1918-type outbreak scenario, assuming two million deaths, estimated that such a pandemic would cause the U.S. GDP (\$14.7 trillion) to decrease by 4.25%—equivalent to \$625 billion. This is above the range included in the Table, but it represents a comparatively less likely worst case scenario. The CBO’s “mild” pandemic scenario, equivalent to the 1968 and 1957 pandemics, assumed 100,000 might die, and cause an impact of about 1 percent of GDP (\$147 billion). A detailed Canadian study³⁴ estimated that a

³¹ The SNRA and RAPID models use this figure to maintain comparability with the economic methodology of the 2008 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA 2008) from which they derive. \$42,500 represents the midpoint (the expected value of a linear uniform distribution over the interval) of the \$35,000–\$50,000 median household income band in 2011. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2008). Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: pp. E2.7–34. (BTRA assessment in its entirety is SECRET; Referenced appendix is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED.)

³² McKibbin WJ and Sidorenko AA. Global macroeconomic consequences of pandemic influenza. Lowry Institute Analyses paper. Lowry Institute for International Policy. Feb. 2006.

³³ Congressional Budget Office (2006, July: updated/corrected from December 2005). A potential influenza pandemic: an update on possible macroeconomic effects and policy issues. At <http://www.cbo.gov/publication/17785> (accessed April 2013).

³⁴ James S and Sargent T. The economic impact of an influenza pandemic. Economic Analysis and Forecasting Division, Department of Finance – Canada. (unpublished paper) May 2006.

1918-type pandemic would reduce the Canadian economy by a maximum of 1.1% GDP—equivalent in the U.S. to US \$161.7 billion.

Social Displacement

Social displacement was assumed to be zero for the Human Pandemic Outbreak national-level event.³⁵

Note that hospitalization is not counted as social displacement for the purposes of the SNRA, since it would result in double counting with illnesses. Social distancing, quarantine, large-scale telework, and children and family staying home or college students returning home as a result of school closures are also not counted as social displacement, because they result in more people staying home rather than leaving home.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on significant distress and prolonged distress, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event.³⁶ The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs. A multiplicative factor elicited (in 2011) from subject matter experts (SMEs) weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.

The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by SMEs consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement).

- In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long-term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by SMEs for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Human Pandemic Outbreak was given a C_{EF} of 1.0.

- Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.³⁷

³⁵ For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. This measure does not capture the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction. However, this distinction is less relevant for events with zero displacement on either measure.

³⁶ See Appendix G for references and additional discussion of the SNRA Psychological Distress metric.

³⁷ Page 57.

Environmental Impact

In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event in the first iteration of the SNRA. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)³⁸ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- The experts provided a best estimate of ‘Moderate’ for a pandemic scenario with severe social impacts and a second best estimate of ‘Low’ for a less severe pandemic scenario.
- The 2015 SNRA reports the ‘Low’ environmental impact judgment as the best estimate for the Pandemic event because the social impacts of the best estimate scenario, as defined by the best estimates on other impact axes, correspond to the less severe pandemic scenario. The 2015 SNRA reports ‘Moderate’ as the second best judgment, because it describes the environmental impacts of a more severe pandemic scenario.
- Experts identified the impacts of a larger pandemic scenario as “Moderate” due to the potential for resources to be pulled from environmental protection activities, thereby allowing impacts to cascade and cause environmental impacts. If the pandemic were large enough, environmental protection could be deemphasized in order to divert resources towards higher priority response efforts, and impacts could be increased as service providers are afflicted with the pandemic (e.g., waste disposal efforts could be halted if workers require treatment).

Potential Mitigating Factors

Numerous medical and non-medical measures for mitigating the human impacts of an influenza pandemic, including social distancing, school closing, antiviral medications, antibiotics for secondary bacterial infections, and targeted vaccines, are known and would be expected to be deployed, at least in part. These measures’ efficacy for those individuals who directly receive them is clearly indicated by the evidence in the literature. However, there is no consensus in the literature on what proportional or percentage reductions in total national fatalities and illnesses could be expected under the constraints and conditions of an actual pandemic.³⁹ Estimates of percentage reductions (mitigation effectiveness) in the literature range from 1.6%⁴⁰ to 96%⁴¹ for fatalities and 6%⁴² to 99%⁴³ for illnesses respectively.

³⁸ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11–32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

³⁹ E.g. not everyone who is sick can afford going to the doctor or antiviral prescriptions; research and production times needed to mass produce vaccines targeted to the pandemic virus may delay their mass availability until after the pandemic’s peak.

⁴⁰ CDC (2011, May 10). Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States, 2001–2010. *Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report (MMWR)* 60(19) 619–623, at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6019a5.htm?s_cid=mm6019a5_w; CDC (2011, September 30), Notice to Readers: Revised Estimates of the Public Health Impact of 2009 Pandemic Influenza. *MMWR* 60(38) 1321, at <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6038a7.htm> (accessed June 2013).

The appropriate factor for converting the currently unmitigated impact numbers to mitigated equivalents is not known. However, recent CDC studies of the 2009–10 H1N1 pandemic suggest that any adjustment for mitigation under real-world societal and economic conditions would not substantially shift the numbers reported here.⁴⁴

Additional Relevant Information

The probability of impact due to a pandemic has two parts: the probability of a pandemic (any type) occurring, and then, once it has occurred, the severity of impact (essentially, the conditional probability that the “mild,” “middle,” or “worst case” scenario occurs).

Probability of a pandemic occurring: From 1729 through 2009 there have been 8–12 influenza pandemics (including pandemics subsequently deduced to have been caused by influenza virus).⁴⁵ They have thus historically occurred with a frequency of once every 10 to 60 years.

Probability of severity (probability of “mild,” “middle,” or “worst case” occurring once pandemic has started): The 1918 pandemic appears to have caused an exceptionally high case fatality rate. Such a pandemic could, in theory, reoccur but historically has only occurred once in approximately 8–12 pandemics. This historical frequency gives an approximately 10% chance that the next pandemic will be a 1918-type pandemic. Similarly, a “mild” pandemic, such as the 2009 pandemic, has only occurred once in 8–12 pandemics since 1700 and also has an approximate 10% probability of occurring. If one includes both the 1957 and 1968 pandemics as examples of “mild” impact pandemics, then the probability that such a scenario will occur rises to 30%. The probability of a “middle” scenario occurring is the residual after accounting for the probabilities of both “worst case” and “mild” scenarios (range for a “middle”: 50%–80%).

Visualizing the time series of influenza pandemics, 1700–present

Quantitative study of mortality from historical influenza pandemics has focused almost entirely on the twentieth century. However, sufficient data on prior events exist for researchers to depict time series of historical pandemics over longer periods for mortality in selected populations. While differences in base population,⁴⁶ health, counting measures, and population age structures prevent precise comparisons, such estimates can be nonetheless arrayed together to get a rough picture of the historical variability of the influenza virus in terms of its effects on the human population (Figure 1).⁴⁷ The exceptional scale of the 1918–20 pandemic compared with other pandemics is immediately apparent.

⁴¹ Proportion of attack and mortality rates in the anticipated scenario to rates in the Baseline scenario, figure 3-1, p. 17. National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) (2007, October 10). National Population, Economic, and Infrastructure Impacts of Pandemic Influenza with Strategic Recommendations. Office of Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

⁴² CDC (2011), Ten Great Public Health Achievements, *op cit*; CDC (2011), Revised Estimates, *op cit*.

⁴³ NISAC (2007), *op cit*.

⁴⁴ CDC (2011, May 10, September 30) *op cit*; Atkins et al (2011, September). Estimating effect of antiviral drug use during pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak, United States. *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 17(9) 1591–1598; at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/17/9/11-0295_article.htm (accessed June 2013).

⁴⁵ Potter (2001), Taubenberger et al (2009), Patterson (1986), Dowdle (1999), *op. cit.* Different authors count different events as pandemic or non-pandemic events. However, but most events on different authors’ lists overlap, as does the 8 to 12 total number with different authors’ pandemic event counts when the 2009 H1N1 pandemic is included.


⁴⁶ 1729–1890 estimates are for England and Wales; 1918–present are for the U.S. (sources below).

⁴⁷ The eight pandemics of natural origin are the list of Potter (2001), *op cit*. Note that these eight pandemics will differ from the pandemic lists of many of the sources from which the chart data come, especially those of older sources.

Note that uncertainties reported in the data sources below are suppressed in the Figure for clarity of presentation.

Pre-1918: Estimates for the population of England and Wales, Eichel, Otto R. (1922, December). The long-time cycles of pandemic influenza. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 18(140) 446–454; available via JSTOR Early Journals Free Content at <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2276917> (accessed June 2013). 1729–33 (90/100,000) is the sum of Eichel’s lines for 1729 (30–45) and 1733 (45–60); 1781–82, for 1782 (15); 1832–33, for 1833 (45–60); 1889–90 (74/100,000), for 1889 (16) and 1890 (58). The midpoints of the dashed-line uncertainty ranges reported by Eichel were used as ‘best estimates’ (e.g. 37.5 + 52.5 = 90; 15; 52.5). Extrapolated to today’s U.S. population without additional adjustments for factors

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increasing or decreasing fatality rates compared with the past, these pandemics would have equivalent fatalities: 1729-33, 276,300; 1781-82, 46,050; 1832-33, 161,200; 1889-90, 522,000.

1918-20, 1957-58, 1968-69: Historical fatalities, National Institutes of Health, 2011. *Timeline of human flu pandemics* [electronic resource]. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, January 14, 2011; at <http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/flu/research/pandemic/pages/timelinehumanpandemics.aspx> (accessed March 2013). U.S. population, for population fatality rate: United States population including Armed Forces abroad, Table I: National Center for Health Statistics (1999). *Vital Statistics of the United States: 1999 Mortality Technical Appendix*. At <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/vsus/ta.htm> (accessed April 2013). Extrapolated to today's U.S. population without additional adjustments for factors increasing or decreasing fatality rates compared with the past, these pandemics would have equivalent fatalities: 1918, 2.0 million; 1957, 125,900; 1968, 52,200.

2009-10: Fatalities (12,470 total), best estimate, Centers for Disease Control (2010, May 4), Updated CDC estimates of 2009 H1N1 influenza cases, hospitalizations and deaths in the United States, April 2009–April 10, 2010 [electronic resource]: at http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/pdf/CDC_2009_H1N1_Est_PDF_May_4_10_fulltext.pdf (accessed April 2013); Shresta et al (1999, January 1), Estimating the burden of 2009 pandemic influenza (H1N1) in the United States (April 2009–April 2010), *Clinical Infectious Diseases* 52(S1) S75-82; at http://cid.oxfordjournals.org/content/52/suppl_1/S75.full.pdf+html (retrieved April 2014).

Influenza pandemics: Historical range of impacts

Each of the population attack rate (25%) and the case fatality rate (0.2%) selected as the basis of the best estimate pandemic scenario in the SNRA represents the geometric midpoint of the corresponding range (attack rate 20%⁴⁸–31.6%⁴⁹, CFR 0.02%⁵⁰–2.0%⁵¹) observed in the influenza pandemics of the past century in the U.S. This suggests a logarithmic distribution on each axis of impact.

To represent a broader range of pandemic impacts beyond the comparatively narrow range of the SNRA Pandemic scenario and to permit comparisons and aggregations with other SNRA events, the uncertainty in each of these two parameters was represented by a log-uniform distribution over the historically observed intervals presented above. As fatalities represent the product of these two parameters (Table 3), the distribution of fatalities is given by the product of these two distributions (Table 4).⁵²

Table 3: Fatalities,⁵³ Distribution Construction⁵⁴

CFR	Population Attack Rate				
	20.0%	22.4%	25.1%	28.2%	31.6%
0.020%	12,280	13,754	15,411	17,315	19,402
0.036%	22,104	24,756	27,741	31,167	34,924
0.063%	38,682	43,324	48,546	54,542	61,118
0.11%	67,540	75,645	84,763	95,231	106,713
0.20%	122,800	137,536	154,114	173,148	194,024
0.36%	221,040	247,565	277,405	311,666	349,243
0.63%	386,820	433,238	485,459	545,416	611,176
1.12%	687,680	770,202	863,038	969,629	1,086,534
2.00%	1,228,000	1,375,360	1,541,140	1,731,480	1,940,240

⁴⁸ The 2009 pandemic (19.9%), Reed et al (2013).

⁴⁹ 1918 pandemic, U.S., best estimate historical fatalities of 675,000 (NIH (2011), *op. cit.*) divided by case fatality rate of 2.04% (Reed et al (2013)), 33,088,000 illnesses; divided by 1918 U.S. population of 104,550,000 (Vital Statistics of the United States (1999), *op. cit.*).

⁵⁰ 2009 pandemic, U.S., 12,219 best estimate fatalities (CDC (2010)) divided by 61,093,000 estimated illnesses from 19.9% population attack rate (Reed et al (2013)).

⁵¹ 1918 pandemic, U.S., 2.04% CFR (Reed et al (2013)).

⁵² Two log-uniform distributions, $U(20\%, 31.6\%) \times U(0.020\%, 2.0\%)$. Note that distributions such as these are not intended to represent known likelihoods of the occurrence of incidents of particular magnitudes: they are constructed to represent our uncertainty in the likely distribution of magnitudes for a hazard. In this case, since we do not know much about the true distribution other than the extremes which have been observed and our observation that more events have occurred between these extremes than at them, uniform distributions are the most accurate representation of our state of knowledge. The observation that events that have occurred between these extremes have tended to cluster nearer the lower end, and the span of orders of magnitude for CFR indicate that log-uniform distributions are a more appropriate model than linear uniform distributions.

⁵³ Product times 2009 U.S. population of 307 million (for consistency with primary estimates).

⁵⁴ Discretized (constructed in steps), five points for attack rate and nine points for CFR (an odd number of each was selected to ensure the central value [the SNRA best estimate] would be represented as a point in the set). Because the endpoints of the nominal ranges are included, the actual ranges are slightly broader than these ($U(18.9\%, 33.5\%) \times U(0.015\%, 2.7\%)$).

Human Pandemic Outbreak**Table 4: Pandemic, Modeled Distribution⁵⁵**

CFR	Attack rate	Fatalities	Illnesses	Direct economic loss (2011\$ billion)	Probability of exceedance (fatalities)
20.0%	0.020%	12,300	61,400,000	54.3	0.989
22.4%	0.020%	13,800	68,800,000	60.9	0.967
25.1%	0.020%	15,400	77,200,000	68.3	0.944
28.2%	0.020%	17,300	86,500,000	76.6	0.922
31.6%	0.020%	19,400	97,000,000	85.9	0.900
20.0%	0.036%	21,800	61,400,000	56.8	0.878
22.4%	0.036%	24,500	68,800,000	63.7	0.856
25.1%	0.036%	27,400	77,200,000	71.4	0.833
28.2%	0.036%	30,800	86,500,000	80.0	0.811
31.6%	0.036%	34,500	97,000,000	89.7	0.789
20.0%	0.06%	38,800	61,400,000	62.4	0.767
22.4%	0.06%	43,500	68,800,000	70.0	0.744
25.1%	0.06%	48,800	77,200,000	78.4	0.722
28.2%	0.06%	54,700	86,500,000	87.9	0.700
31.6%	0.06%	61,400	97,000,000	98.6	0.678
20.0%	0.11%	69,100	61,400,000	72.4	0.656
22.4%	0.11%	77,400	68,800,000	81.2	0.633
25.1%	0.11%	86,800	77,200,000	91.0	0.611
28.2%	0.11%	97,300	86,500,000	102	0.589
31.6%	0.11%	109,000	97,000,000	114	0.567
20.0%	0.20%	123,000	61,400,000	89.6	0.544
22.4%	0.20%	138,000	68,800,000	100	0.522
25.1%	0.20%	154,000	77,200,000	113	0.500
28.2%	0.20%	173,000	86,500,000	126	0.478
31.6%	0.20%	194,000	97,000,000	142	0.456
20.0%	0.36%	218,000	61,400,000	119	0.433
22.4%	0.36%	245,000	68,800,000	134	0.411
25.1%	0.36%	274,000	77,200,000	150	0.389
28.2%	0.36%	308,000	86,500,000	168	0.367
31.6%	0.36%	345,000	97,000,000	188	0.344
20.0%	0.63%	388,000	61,400,000	170	0.322
22.4%	0.63%	435,000	68,800,000	190	0.300
25.1%	0.63%	488,000	77,200,000	213	0.278
28.2%	0.63%	547,000	86,500,000	239	0.256
31.6%	0.63%	614,000	97,000,000	268	0.233
20.0%	1.12%	691,000	61,400,000	257	0.211
22.4%	1.12%	774,000	68,800,000	288	0.189
25.1%	1.12%	868,000	77,200,000	323	0.167
28.2%	1.12%	973,000	86,500,000	362	0.144
31.6%	1.12%	1,090,000	97,000,000	406	0.122
20.0%	2.00%	1,230,000	61,400,000	408	0.100
22.4%	2.00%	1,380,000	68,800,000	457	0.078
25.1%	2.00%	1,540,000	77,200,000	513	0.056
28.2%	2.00%	1,730,000	86,500,000	575	0.033
31.6%	2.00%	1,940,000	97,000,000	644	0.011


⁵⁵ Median (the SNRA best estimate) and approximate 5th and 95th percentile intervals are highlighted.

This model was constructed so that the uncertainties in our knowledge of the conditional distribution of pandemic impacts can be represented in calculations comparing or combining human pandemic risk with other risks in the SNRA, as opposed to the use of point estimates or a narrowly defined scenario. However, a surprising and somewhat disturbing outcome is how closely this model parallels the actual historical variability of the influenza virus, in terms of fatalities projected to the U.S. population of today, over its known 300-year history (Figure 2).

The historical data (projected to current U.S. population) of Figure 1 is depicted in Figure 2 as an exceedance curve in semi-logarithmic space. When viewed on a logarithmic scale, the 1918 pandemic appears less exceptional compared with the other historical influenza pandemics of natural origin of the past three centuries.⁵⁶

While multiple factors affecting both likelihood and impacts substantially differ between the present day and the past, this comparative view can be useful for understanding the inherent variability of the influenza virus.

Figure 2: Fatalities, Historical and Modeled⁵⁷



⁵⁶ The logarithmic form of the best fit line, for both the theoretical and the historical distribution, is reflective of a single log-uniform distribution rather than a product. This is because the range for CFR (a power of 100 from end to end) is so much larger than the range of attack rates (a power of 2) that it effectively determines the shape of the product distribution.

⁵⁷ Historical incidents are identified by color to indicate data source or type. Blue, U.S. data 1918-present. Red, population fatality rates for England and Wales from Eichel (1922) *op. cit.*, original source the English Bills of Mortality 1729-1833. Purple, 1889-90 pandemic, population fatality rates for U.S. and European cities, predominantly European, applied to U.S. population: mean population fatality rate of 170/100,000 reported for major European and U.S. cities, Valleron et al (2010, May 11), Transmissibility and geographic spread of the 1889 influenza pandemic, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U.S.A.* 107(19) 8778-81, including Supporting Information files: at <http://www.pnas.org/content/107/19/8778.long> (accessed April 2013); 1890 U.S. population, U.S. Census Office (1896), Report on Vital and Social Statistics of the United States at the Eleventh Census: 1890, Part 1 – Analysis and Rate Tables, U.S. Department of the Interior: at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/vsus/vsus_1890_1938.htm (accessed June 2013). The pink data point with asterisk represents the accidental pandemic of 1977-78: Fatalities (860 total) in 1977-78 U.S. influenza season attributed to the ‘frozen virus’ A/USSR/90/77 (H1N1): Table 4, 1977 H1 excess fatalities (both age groups): Thompson et al (2009, February). Estimates of US influenza-associated deaths made using four different methods. *Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses* 3(1) 37-49; at <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1750-2659.2009.00073.x/pdf> (accessed April 2013). This is the only reference known to the SNRA project

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team which separates out fatalities attributed to each of the influenza virus strains circulating in 1977-78 (some other references appear to but in fact double count H1 and H2 fatalities). The returned virus primarily affected persons born after 1950, so mortality from H1N1 was low compared with the more lethal seasonal strain H3N2 (this pattern continued until a new H1N1 strain, directly descended from the 1918 virus, entered the human population in the 2009 pandemic).

For origin of A/1977/USSR, Chakraverty et al (1982, August), The return of the historic influenza A H1N1 virus and its impact on the population of the United Kingdom, *Journal of Hygiene* (London/Cambridge) 89(1) 89-100; Kendal et al, 1978, Antigenic similarity of influenza A (H1N1) viruses from epidemics in 1977-1978 to "Scandinavian" strains isolated in epidemics of 1950-1951, *Virology* 89 632-636; Kilbourne, Edwin D. (2006, January). Influenza pandemics of the 20th century, *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 12(1) 9-14; Nelson et al (2008), Multiple reassortment events in the evolutionary history of H1N1 influenza A virus since 1918, *PLoS Pathogens* 4(2) e1000012; Taubenberger et al (2006, January), 1918 influenza: the mother of all pandemics, *Emerging Infectious Diseases* 12(1) 15-22; Worobey, Michael (2008, April), Phylogenetic evidence against evolutionary stasis and natural abiotic reservoirs of influenza A virus, *Journal of Virology* 82(7) 3769-3774.

Hurricane

A tropical storm or hurricane impacts the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses of greater than \$100 Million.

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities ¹	0	26	1,200
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses ¹	0	650	30,000
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011) ¹	\$100 Million	\$5.7 Billion	\$92 Billion
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days ²	140	520,000	5 Million
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ³	High ⁴		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year ⁵	0.33	1.9	7

Event Background

For the purpose of the SNRA, a national-level hurricane is defined as a hurricane producing direct economic loss in excess of \$100 million dollars. Economic damages reported here are a combination of coastal flooding and wind damage generated by hurricanes and tropical storms. A 40 year time period, from 1970 to 2010, was used to estimate the interarrival rates/frequencies and impacts for hurricanes exceeding the \$100 million threshold. While accurate hurricane damages have been recorded since before 1900, mitigation and evacuation strategies have significantly changed since the turn of the 20th century, substantially lowering hurricane impacts. To capture a representative subset for current hurricane impacts, only storms recorded after 1970 were used for this report. Table 1 reports the maximum, average, and minimum frequency with which such hurricanes occurred in the United States, and the maximum, average and minimum

¹ Low, best, and high estimates for fatalities, injuries and illnesses, and direct economic loss are the historical minimum, average, and maximum for each impact type in the event set. Extreme events for one impact type may but generally do not correspond to those for other impact types.

² Low, average, and high reported “total affected” for hurricanes causing greater than \$100M in economic damage as recorded in the EM-DAT database during the time period 1970-2011. See Social Displacement section in this summary sheet for details.

³ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories. Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘best’ estimate.

⁴ Hurricanes were given a best estimate of ‘High’, with a second best estimate of ‘Moderate’. The experts assessed that hurricanes can cause ecological impacts, beach erosion, nutrient loading, chemical contamination, salt water intrusion into fresh water bodies, and removal of plants leading to erosion. Large areas can experience impacts.

⁵ Historical low, average, and maximum number of events per year (calculated from interarrival times).

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impacts for fatalities, injuries, and direct economic losses associated with hurricanes in the set. A list of all hurricanes with accompanying economic impacts and fatalities is shown in Table 2.

Low, average and high estimates were developed in the following manner from the normalized impact estimates and historic record. For fatalities, injuries and direct economic loss, the low estimate is the smallest impact for events that exceed \$100 million. For event frequency, the low estimate is derived from the greatest time gap, t_{\max} , between years with national level events. The average frequency is the expected number of events in a given year. Similarly, the average for fatalities, injuries/illness, and direct economic loss are the expected value for each measure given the occurrence of a national level hurricane. The maximum frequency is the maximum number of national level hurricanes recorded in a single year. The maximum for fatalities, injuries/illness, and direct economic loss is the greatest value produced by a single storm in each impact category.

It is important to note that the frequency estimates reported here differ from probabilities. The frequency of a national-level hurricane can be greater than one, while a probability cannot. Additionally, while the average estimates for impacts and frequency are correlated and approximate the average annual loss when multiplied together, the maximum and minimum historical values for impact and frequency are uncorrelated and do not have meaning when multiplied together.

Fatalities

Fatality estimates are based directly on the historic record (Blake, Landsea, & Gibney, August 2011). The historical maximum for fatalities was Katrina in 2005 with an estimated 1,200 deaths.⁶ Several storms within the 40 year time period exceeded \$100 million in economic damages without causing any loss of life. While several storms have zero recorded fatalities, fatality estimates were not always available for events with less than 25 fatalities. In the case where records were not available, fatality estimates were apportioned as percentages of yearly hurricane fatalities based on economic damages. The average of all national level hurricanes was then used to produce the historical average of 26 fatalities per storm. The table of national level hurricanes, Table 2, contains a total of 2016 fatalities from 78 distinct events.

Injuries and Illnesses

Injury/illness estimates were produced for each hurricane based on a linear model relating fatalities to injuries and illness. The model is derived from Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (CDC, 1993). A model was needed because accurate injury and illness estimates were not readily available for most hurricanes. Fatality, injury and illness statistics are available for regional hospitals and mobile clinics, but these reports do not provide comprehensive estimates for hurricane related injuries. Evacuees can travel hundreds of miles (Faul, Weller, & Jones, September 2011) before receiving medical attention creating a difficult task when accounting for the number of storm related injuries. The CDC, however, has published injury/illness and fatality estimates for 19 parishes during Hurricane Andrew (CDC, 1993) that the SNRA project team used to model a multiplier for estimating total injuries. There were approximately 25 injuries to

⁶ Note that fatality and economic damage estimates can differ across sources, including official U.S. Government sources, depending upon different definitions of what is counted. The fatality estimate of 1,200 for Hurricane Katrina was the latest official estimate of the National Hurricane Service for fatalities directly caused by the hurricane as of August 2011, as reported in the primary source used for fatality data by the SNRA (Blake and Landsea, p. 5). Counts of all fatalities including indirect fatalities can total 1,833, the current official estimate for all fatalities, or higher.

every fatality within the study group. The multiplier was applied to the fatality estimates to obtain injury/illness estimates for hurricane impacts.

Economic Loss

To provide an accurate assessment for current year planning, historic economic damage estimates have been updated to a 2011 base year. Economic and health & safety impacts, derived directly from historic record, are updated based on changes in populations, building structures, and infrastructure. These damage estimates are published by ICAT and available via the internet.⁷ A full description of methods used in economic loss normalization is documented by Pielke (Pielke Jr., Gratz, Landsea, Collins, Saunders, & Musulin, 2008). In total, 78 hurricanes exceeding the \$100 million threshold are aggregated in the findings of this report. These estimates potentially contain indirect economic losses. There is not a clear disambiguation for economic loss estimates as there is no readily available record for each loss estimate. Due to this ambiguity, economic loss estimates have the potential to be biased high by as much as 20 percent.

For economic loss, \$100 million (1993 Hurricane Emily) is the smallest normalized historic loss that meets the \$100 million threshold. Twelve historic events exceeding the economic threshold did not result in any fatalities and, consequently, were not estimated to cause any injuries/illness resulting in a minimum for both fatalities and injuries/illness of zero. The greatest gap occurs between 1985 and 1988. This three year time lapse between national level events results in an interarrival frequency of 0.33, or $1/t_{\max}$.

The average economic impact is \$5.7 billion per event. On average, 26 fatalities occur per event with an average of 650 injuries per event. The average time between national level events is approximately six months, resulting in 1.9 events expected per year. An estimate of the average annual loss for each impact type (e.g., fatalities per year or economic loss per year) can be obtained by multiplying the average frequency by the average impact in a category. The average annual fatality and economic losses for the set of 78 historic events analyzed are approximately 26 fatalities per year and approximately \$5.7 billion per year.

⁷ ICAT damage estimates are available at <http://www.icatdamageestimator.com>. Accessed September 16, 2011.

Hurricane**Table 2: National Level Hurricane Events from 1970 to 2010**

STORM NAME	CURRENT DAMAGE (\$ 2011)	Year	Yearly Fatalities ⁸	Event Fatalities (Estimated if < 25)	STORM NAME	CURRENT DAMAGE (\$ 2011)	Year	Yearly Fatalities ⁹	Event Fatalities (Estimated if < 25)
Hermine	\$250,000,000	2010	13	12	Beryl	\$180,000,000	1994	38	3
Hanna	\$170,000,000	2008	41	0	Gordon	\$1,230,000,000	1994	38	16
Fay	\$590,000,000	2008	41	1	Alberto	\$1,290,000,000	1994	38	20
Dolly	\$1,080,000,000	2008	41	2	Emily	\$100,000,000	1993	4	2
Gustav	\$4,220,000,000	2008	41	7	Andrew	\$66,770,000,000	1992	26	26
Ike	\$19,600,000,000	2008	41	31	Bob	\$3,620,000,000	1991	16	16
Ernesto	\$550,000,000	2006	0	0	Marco	\$210,000,000	1990	13	13
Cindy	\$360,000,000	2005	1225	0	Jerry	\$210,000,000	1989	56	1
Dennis	\$2,670,000,000	2005	1225	2	Chantal	\$280,000,000	1989	56	1
Rita	\$11,330,000,000	2005	1225	8	Allison	\$1,680,000,000	1989	56	4
Wilma	\$26,210,000,000	2005	1225	16	Hugo	\$18,320,000,000	1989	56	51
Katrina	\$92,050,000,000	2005	1225	1200	Gilbert	\$200,000,000	1988	6	5
Charley	\$120,000,000	2004	60	0	Bob	\$120,000,000	1985	30	0
Gaston	\$160,000,000	2004	60	0	Danny	\$160,000,000	1985	30	0
Jeanne	\$9,350,000,000	2004	60	8	Gloria	\$520,000,000	1985	30	1
Frances	\$12,310,000,000	2004	60	11	Kate	\$1,270,000,000	1985	30	2
Charley	\$18,520,000,000	2004	60	16	Gloria	\$2,490,000,000	1985	30	6
Ivan	\$18,480,000,000	2004	60	25	Elena	\$4,340,000,000	1985	30	9
Claudette	\$250,000,000	2003	24	1	Juan	\$4,560,000,000	1985	30	11
Isabel	\$4,820,000,000	2003	24	22	Diana	\$370,000,000	1984	4	4
Isidore	\$480,000,000	2002	9	2	Alicia	\$9,670,000,000	1983	22	22
Lili	\$1,210,000,000	2002	9	6	Dennis	\$140,000,000	1981	0	0
Gabrielle	\$390,000,000	2001	45	2	Allen	\$2,060,000,000	1980	2	2
Allison	\$8,330,000,000	2001	45	43	David	\$980,000,000	1979	22	1
Dennis	\$270,000,000	1999	62	2	David	\$1,570,000,000	1979	22	1
Irene	\$1,430,000,000	1999	62	9	Claudette	\$1,710,000,000	1979	22	3
Floyd	\$7,700,000,000	1999	62	50	Frederic	\$12,640,000,000	1979	22	17
Earl	\$150,000,000	1998	23	0	Amelia	\$190,000,000	1978	36	36
Frances	\$970,000,000	1998	23	3	Belle	\$570,000,000	1976	9	9
Bonnie	\$1,440,000,000	1998	23	4	Eloise	\$6,230,000,000	1975	21	21
Georges	\$4,100,000,000	1998	23	14	Subtrop 1 1974	\$130,000,000	1974	1	0
Danny	\$200,000,000	1997	4	4	Carmen	\$1,140,000,000	1974	1	1
Josephine	\$310,000,000	1996	36	1	Delia	\$300,000,000	1973	5	5
Bertha	\$610,000,000	1996	36	3	Agnes	\$20,300,000,000	1972	122	122
Fran	\$7,260,000,000	1996	36	32	Ginger	\$190,000,000	1971	8	0
Jerry	\$110,000,000	1995	29	0	Edith	\$310,000,000	1971	8	1
Erin	\$820,000,000	1995	29	3	Fern	\$480,000,000	1971	8	1
Erin	\$830,000,000	1995	29	3	Doria	\$2,400,000,000	1971	8	6
Opal	\$7,490,000,000	1995	29	23	Celia	\$6,850,000,000	1970	11	11

Social Displacement

To estimate social displacement for the SNRA, U.S. hurricane event data from the international disaster database EM-DAT¹⁰ was used to approximate the number of people forced to leave home for two days or greater. EM-DAT provides estimates of the “total number affected” by

⁸ Fatalities due to all hurricanes in same year.

⁹ Fatalities due to all hurricanes in same year.

¹⁰ EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels (Belgium) [official citation]. EM-DAT is maintained by the World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters ([CRED](#)) at the School of Public Health of the Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium (<http://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions>), and is supported by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID (http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/). See Criteria and Definition, <http://www.emdat.be/criteria-and-definition>, EMDAT Data Entry Procedures, at <http://www.emdat.be/source-entry>, and EMDAT Glossary, at <http://www.emdat.be/glossary/> for details of criteria, thresholds, and methodology for the EM-DAT database.

disaster events. The national-level hurricane events for which EM-DAT data on “total number affected” was available are listed in Table 3 below. (EM-DAT data was available for approximately one-third of the national-level hurricane events identified from the historic record.) The low, high, and average of the “total affected” data in Table 3 are used as the social displacement estimates for hurricanes in the SNRA.

The “total affected” measure includes the number of people needing immediate assistance, which can include displacements and evacuations; the number of people needing immediate assistance for shelter; and the number of people injured. Because EM-DAT includes injuries in the “total affected” measure, there is potential for double-counting between the SNRA injury and displacement estimates for this event. However, displacement due to hurricanes is typically significantly greater than the number of injuries, so using EM-DAT’s “total affected” measure was judged to provide an estimate of social displacement of sufficient precision for the SNRA. Note that the low estimate may be biased low due to incomplete reporting of displacement and evacuations in EM-DAT.

Table 3: Social Displacement

Storm Name	Current Damage (\$2011)	Category	Year	EMDAT Total Affected
Alberto	\$1,290,000,000	TS	1994	20,022
Allison	\$8,330,000,000	TS	2001	172,000
Andrew	\$66,770,000,000	5	1992	250,055
Bob	\$3,620,000,000	2	1991	1,200
Bonnie	\$1,440,000,000	2	1998	17,000
Charley	\$18,520,000,000	4	2004	30,000
Charley	\$120,000,000	1	2004	545
Elena	\$4,340,000,000	3	1985	1,000,000
Erin	\$830,000,000	1	1995	6,000
Ernesto	\$550,000,000	TS	2006	140
Fay	\$590,000,000	TS	2008	400
Floyd	\$7,700,000,000	2	1999	3,000,010
Fran	\$7,260,000,000	3	1996	4,000
Frances	\$12,310,000,000	2	2004	5,000,000
Georges	\$4,100,000,000	2	1998	5,127
Gustav	\$4,220,000,000	2	2008	2,100,000
Hugo	\$18,320,000,000	4	1989	25,000
Ike	\$19,600,000,000	2	2008	200,000
Isabel	\$4,820,000,000	2	2003	225,000
Isidore	\$480,000,000	TS	2002	13,200
Jeanne	\$9,350,000,000	3	2004	40,000
Katrina	\$92,050,000,000	3	2005	500,000
Opal	\$7,490,000,000	3	1995	78,000
Rita	\$11,330,000,000	3	2005	300,000
Wilma	\$26,210,000,000	3	2005	30,000

*Note: EM-DAT estimate for TS Frances (1998) was not included because it only includes injuries, not displacement.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the

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scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.¹¹ The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹² as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “moderate.” Hurricanes can cause ecological impacts, beach erosion, nutrient loading, chemical contamination, salt water intrusion into fresh water bodies, and removal of plants leading to erosion. Large areas can experience impacts.

Expected Wind Damage Versus Return Period


The results reported in Tables 1 and 2 capture both wind and coastal flooding. An additional perspective into hurricane damage is the effect of wind damage alone. Figure 1 provides a loss exceedance probability for wind related hurricane damages in addition to damages from the top 11 hurricane wind events.

¹¹ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: hurricanes were given a C_{EF} of 1.0.

The numerical estimates calculated from this formula are reported in Appendix G. The semi-quantitative risk matrix is discussed in the Findings (Psychological Distress Risk).

¹² The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11–32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

Figure 1: Probability of Exceeding Direct Economic Losses¹³

Additional Relevant Information

Figure 2 depicts the likelihood that a tropical storm or hurricane would affect the area sometime during the Atlantic hurricane season. This figure was created by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Hurricane Research Division using data from 1944 to 1999 and counting hits when a storm or hurricane was within approximately 100 miles (165 kilometers) of each location.

As shown in Figure 2, the probability of potential impact varies across the U.S. coastline. Portions of the North Carolina Outer Banks have the same probability of occurrence (42 to 48 percent) as South Florida and southern Louisiana. Parts of the southeastern U.S. coastline as well as the Florida panhandle and portions of the Texas coastline have a lower probability of occurrence, in the 24 to 36 percent range. The northeastern U.S. coastline has the lowest probability, in the 12 to 24 percent range. The ranges provided in the "Data Summary" on Page 1 reflect the range of probability from a national perspective.

The probability of storm occurrences will vary significantly based on the return interval for different categories of magnitude. The probability of less intense storms (lower return periods) is higher than more intense storms (higher return periods).

In 2007, FEMA estimated average annualized losses for hurricane wind for the nation by state. The estimated average annualized loss (AAL) addresses the key idea of risk: the probability of the loss occurring in the study area (largely a function of building construction type and quality). By annualizing estimated losses, the AAL factors in historic patterns of frequent, smaller events


¹³ Graphical output of modeling done by HAZUS-MH contract support and provided to the SNRA project team.

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with infrequent but larger events to provide a balanced presentation of the event risk. The AAL analysis, which only considered those 22 states and the District of Columbia that are susceptible to the hurricane wind hazard, yielded an estimate of the national AAL of \$11.1 billion per year. This estimate does not include storm surge, lifeline infrastructure losses or indirect (long-term) economic losses, and is therefore a minimum estimate of the potential losses. Moreover, the estimate represents a long-term average and actual losses in any single year may be much larger or smaller. It is important to recognize that the nationwide losses are the result of averaging losses caused by hurricanes occurring in different parts of the nation in different years.

The annualized loss ratio (ALR) represents the AAL as a fraction of the replacement value of the local inventory. The ALR gauges the relationship between average AAL and replacement value. This ratio can be used as a measure of vulnerability in the areas and, because it is normalized by replacement value, it can be directly compared across different geographic units such as metropolitan areas or counties.

Figure 3: Hazus-MH Hurricane Wind Annualized Loss Ratios by State




Source: FEMA, September 2007¹⁴

Figure 3 shows the resulting state ALRs from this study,¹⁵ which helps to illustrate from a national perspective those areas that are more vulnerable to potential hurricane wind impacts. Based on this data, Florida has the highest expected ALR among all states exposed to hurricane winds and therefore has the highest likelihood of experiencing losses due to hurricane wind in any given year. Other high potential loss states include Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama and South Carolina. Table 4 ranks states according to hurricane wind AAL and ALR.

¹⁴ Estimated annualized hurricane wind losses for the United States calculated September 2007 using HAZUS-MH, and provided to the SNRA project team by FEMA.

¹⁵ FEMA 610: HAZUS-MH Estimated Annualized Hurricane Wind Losses for the United States, draft September 2007 (pre-publication draft, no corresponding publication in FEMA Library).

Figure 2: Empirical Probability of a Named Hurricane or Tropical Storm

Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration¹⁶

¹⁶ Available through NOAA, National Weather Service, Tropical Cyclone Climatology; at <http://www.prh.noaa.gov/cphc/pages/FAQ/Climatology.php> (accessed 3/16/2013).

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Order	State	AHL (\$ K)	Order	State	AHLR (\$ Million)
1	Florida	5,610,000	1	Florida	5,660
2	Texas	1,450,000	2	Louisiana	3,560
3	Louisiana	889,000	3	Hawaii	2,520
4	New York	505,000	4	Mississippi	1,600
5	Massachusetts	430,000	5	Rhode Island	1,510
6	Hawaii	335,000	6	Texas	1,170
7	Alabama	303,000	7	South Carolina	1,160
8	North Carolina	262,000	8	Alabama	1,120
9	South Carolina	247,000	9	Massachusetts	875
10	Mississippi	210,000	10	Connecticut	728
11	New Jersey	194,000	11	North Carolina	622
12	Connecticut	187,000	12	New York	357
13	Georgia	125,000	13	New Hampshire	320
14	Rhode Island	113,000	14	Delaware	310
15	Virginia	72,500	15	New Jersey	307
16	Pennsylvania	34,100	16	Georgia	262
17	Maryland	31,000	17	Maine	224
18	New Hampshire	25,000	18	Virginia	174
19	Maine	17,800	19	Maryland	91
20	Delaware	17,300	20	District of Columbia	45
21	District of Columbia	2,160	21	Vermont	43
22	Vermont	1,560	22	Pennsylvania	42
23	West Virginia	792	23	West Virginia	7

Source: FEMA, September 2007¹⁷**Bibliography**

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¹⁷ Estimated Annualized Hurricane Loss (AHL) and Annualized Hurricane Loss Ratios (AHLR) calculated September 2007 using HAZUS-MH, provided to the SNRA project team by FEMA and rounded to three significant figures.

Space Weather

The Sun emits bursts of electromagnetic radiation and energetic particles causing utility outages and damage to infrastructure in the United States, resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$1 billion.¹

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do **not** correspond to the low and high impacts. Low and high impacts are correlated between the fatalities, injuries and illnesses, direct economic loss, and (for low estimates) social displacement. The high estimate of social displacement represents a subset of the high estimate scenario on other impact scales. For environmental impacts, the best estimate corresponds to the low and the second best to the high estimates respectively on other impact scales.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best ²	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	90 ³	N/A ²	2,000 ⁴
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	400 ⁵	N/A ²	10,000 ⁶
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars	\$5.7 Billion ⁷	N/A ²	\$2 Trillion ⁸
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0	N/A ²	40 million ⁹
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ¹⁰	<i>De minimus</i> (Best); Moderate (Second Best) ¹¹		
LIKELIHOOD ¹²	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year ¹³	1/600 years	1/150 years	1/70 years

¹ The term “space weather” describes phenomena taking place in the near-Earth environment, primarily due to influences of the solar magnetic field. The largest space weather events are geomagnetic “storms” that are caused by huge magnetic eruptions from the Sun called “coronal mass ejections” or CMEs. Such eruptions are usually accompanied by bursts of X-ray photons (“solar flares”) and energetic particles that can have prompt effects on the Earth’s atmosphere.

² Best estimates for fatalities, injuries and illnesses, direct economic loss, and social displacement were not calculated for this event.

³ The low estimate for fatalities is informed by the excess fatalities in New York City attributed to the loss of electric power in the 2003 Northeast Blackout (Anderson et al (2012)) and not directly caused by the space weather itself. This event is used as a proxy for the low economic impact scenario because it is cited by the electric industry (NERC (2012)) as a model for a scenario of electric grid collapse caused by a solar storm not resulting in permanent transformer damage (i.e. the grid shuts down and is able to be restarted within days). The scope of the study was limited to the 8 million residents of New York City out of the 50 million who lost power nationwide.

⁴ SNRA project team assumption based upon extrapolation of the 2003 East Coast Blackout (50 million people assumed out of power for average of 1 day) to the Lloyd’s high estimate scenario of 40 million people out of power from 16 days to up to two years (Lloyd’s (2013)). Because of the multiple uncertainties involved, the SNRA project team made the assumption of one month average outage having disruptive effects (i.e. the 16 days plus two weeks in addition) for a scaling estimate of 1.2 billion person-days, or 24 times that of the East Coast Blackout. This factor was applied to the 90 fatalities of the low estimate, for a lower-bound estimation of a true high estimate of 2,000 fatalities (rounded to one significant figure). Although the initial health impacts of a large-scale, sudden blackout may subside in initial days as affected populations adapt to life without power, the exhaustion of fuel and lifeline resources and impacted supply chains for critical goods may result in significantly compounded total population health impacts days or weeks into the blackout. The SNRA high estimate thus almost certainly represents a substantial under-representation of the true numbers of fatalities which may be expected from a catastrophic, multi-state extended power outage disaster. However, the SNRA project team judged that it would be more misleading and unrepresentative of the uncertainties in potential impacts of a space weather event to report no high estimate at all, rather than reporting a high estimate that itself is deeply uncertain.

⁵ The low estimate for injuries and illnesses is informed by the excess hospitalizations for complications of respiratory illnesses in New York City for August 14-15 attributed to the loss of electric power in the 2003 Northeast Blackout (Lin et al (2011)) minus the three fatalities due to respiratory illness of Anderson et al (2012), on the assumption that these deaths were most likely pronounced in hospital. This epidemiological study examined hospitalizations for respiratory, cardiovascular, and renal diseases: only respiratory diseases showed statistically significant hospitalizations over prior year averages (from a subset with comparable temperature ranges) of the same days in August. Other studies have examined excess hospitalizations

Event Description

The Sun emits bursts of electromagnetic radiation and energetic particles at an intensity that saturates the G-5 level on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)'s Geomagnetic Storm Space Weather Scale.¹⁴ The storm is greater than solar storms observed in North America in the past three decades, reaching to the northern tier of the United States (approximately 50° geomagnetic latitude). Such a storm is potentially strong enough to cause widespread and prolonged electric utility outages, and it may be strong enough to cause significant damage to communications and navigation satellite infrastructure. Although the likelihood of such an event may be difficult to study because of its rarity and limited historical data, strong space weather events have happened in the past—most recently with a near-miss in July 2012¹⁵—and could theoretically cause widespread, lasting damage to our electric power supply system.

for severe diarrheal illnesses caused by eating spoiled meat products due to loss of refrigeration [Marx et al (2006)] and other measures of increased burdens on emergency responders and the hospital system in New York City due to the blackout [Prezant et al (2005)] but did not provide quantitative estimates which could be extracted for this summary sheet. The 2003 Blackout is used as a proxy for the low economic impact scenario because it is cited by the electric industry (NERC (2012)) as a model for a scenario of electric grid collapse caused by a solar storm not resulting in permanent transformer damage (i.e. the grid shuts down and is able to be restarted within days). The scope of the study was limited to the 8 million residents of New York City out of the 50 million who lost power nationwide.

⁶ Scaled in a similar fashion to the high estimate of fatalities: see note to fatality high estimate above.

⁷ The low estimate of \$5.7 billion represents the low end of the economic impact estimate and is based on the inflation-adjusted estimate of the 2003 Northeast Blackout using FEMA's Benefit-Cost Analysis guidance on the economic impact of electricity outages [FEMA 2011], using an assumption of 50 million persons without power for an average of one day. The 2003 blackout has been previously cited by the electric industry (NERC (2012)) as a model for a scenario of electric grid collapse caused by a solar storm not resulting in permanent transformer damage (i.e. the grid shuts down and is able to be restarted within days), and is the lowest estimate of solar storm impacts located in the literature.

⁸ Lloyd's (2013) pg. 6. The inflation-adjusted value of \$2.51 trillion (2011 USD) is rounded down to \$2 trillion to represent uncertainty in the range of potential true impacts (rounding to one significant figure) and to represent the losses accumulated in the first year (rounding down) of the Lloyd's high end scenario of 40 million people out of power from 16 days to 2 years (i.e. 2 years to restore power to the last person). Power restoration curves following a disaster are typically sinusoidal or logarithmic (Executive Office of the President (2013) p 21): restoration is faster nearer the beginning, and longer for the remaining tail at the end. However, even a linear restoration function (constant restoration rate) results in 75% of the total person-days out of power accumulating in the first year, resulting in a low bounding estimate of \$1.88 trillion of the total \$2.51 trillion estimated costs (the Lloyd's model proportions costs to total person-days without power, Lloyd's (2013) p. 17) accumulating in year 1.

⁹ Based upon the high end of Lloyd's (2013) scenario of 20 to 40 million people without power for 16 days to 1-2 years. It is possible for many or nearly all of 40 million people without power under circumstances where essential societal lifelines are functioning to stay in their homes for an outage of up to two weeks, even in temperate conditions. However, this may not hold true for a long-term, very extensive power outage affecting total regions and survival lifelines: the high estimate of displacement reflects this possibility.

¹⁰ In 2011, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event in the 2011 SNRA. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories. Experts provided both first (Best) and second choice (Second Best) categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'Best' estimate.

¹¹ Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as "de minimis" or none. Experts indicated environmental/ecological effects would likely depend on duration of outages. For one day to a few days, the damage would be relatively minimal/de minimis (this is in the scope of typical power outages due to snowstorms, rain, and other natural disasters). If the outage persisted for weeks, then there is the potential for backup systems to fail. If backup systems (such as diesel fuel delivery) failed, then the lack of power to treatment plants and chemical plants could have a massive impact. A space weather event would most likely affect a large geographic area in addition to having the potential for a longer duration.

¹² Note that low and high likelihoods do NOT correspond to low and high impacts. Low, best, and high likelihoods represent the low, best, and high estimates for the likelihood of occurrence of the set of scenarios or incidents captured within the scope (as defined by the event thresholds and other elements of the event description) of the SNRA hazard event as a whole. Low and high estimates of impact (fatalities, direct economic loss, and so on) are provided to represent a range of impacts that could result, given the occurrence of an incident within the scope of the event. When considered as variables defined by these reported and depicted ranges, likelihood and each impact represent independent variables within the SNRA methodology.

¹³ Low, best, and high one year frequency estimates come are those of Love (2012), cited by NERC (2014) (p. 9) as the probability model for a Carrington-level storm. The best estimate of frequency corresponds to a return period of 153 years, rounded to 150 years in the data table. The low and high estimates of 1/600 years and 1/70 years represent the 1 standard deviation (68.3%) confidence interval as cited by NERC. The Lloyd's study uses the same probability model.

¹⁴ Geomagnetic storms, solar flares, and solar energetic particles are classified by NOAA's Space Weather Prediction Center on scales ranging from 1 to 5, in analogy to the hurricane and tornado magnitude scales.

¹⁵ Phillips (2014). A powerful CME—potentially as strong as, if not stronger than, the Carrington event—passed through the Earth's orbit on July 23, 2012. The Earth was not there when it happened, so there were no impacts. NASA had a record of it because the storm cloud hit the STEREO-A spacecraft.

Event Background

“Space weather” refers to variations in the space environment between the sun and Earth. In more common contexts, space weather refers to the phenomenon where emissions from the sun—such as solar flares¹⁶ and coronal mass ejections (CME)¹⁷—affect the Earth and its surrounding space with geomagnetic storms. There have been several key events that are widely discussed in the space weather literature. Two of them in particular are referenced throughout this assessment:

- **Carrington Event:**

The Carrington Event is frequently referenced in space weather literature. From August 28 to September 2, 1859 the U.S. experienced the “most extreme space weather events in recorded history. Looking at four key measures of geomagnetic storm strength (sudden ionospheric disturbance, solar wind, geomagnetic storm and aurora), it is the only event that appears within the top five events in each category.”¹⁸ The probability model cited by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) estimates a return period of approximately 150 years for Carrington-level storms, but with a wide range of uncertainty (range 1/70–1/600 years).¹⁹ Because of the existence in the literature of recent peer-reviewed U.S. impact models for this return period and storm magnitude,²⁰ the SNRA space weather scenario focuses on a Carrington-level storm.

- **Quebec Storm:**

The March 13–14, 1989 geomagnetic storm is one of the most well-known storms because of its impact on the electricity grid. It collapsed the Hydro-Quebec power grid and resulted in the loss of power for more than six million people for nine hours. It also tripped equipment and nearly collapsed other parts of the Eastern interconnection of the U.S. electric grid.²¹ The sources used for the primary estimates in the SNRA estimate an approximately 1/50 year frequency (range 1/30–1/100 years) for a Quebec-level storm.²²

Space weather events have occurred throughout human history, but they were not recorded until human technology advanced to the point of developing systems that could be affected by geomagnetic and electrical disturbances. The Carrington Event in 1859 resulted in an observable solar flare that disrupted telegraph communications. Research has been done to study how geomagnetic-induced currents affect electric power disturbances. Based on statistical analysis, researchers concluded that roughly four percent of all insurance claims related to electric power

¹⁶ A solar flare is an intense burst of radiation from the sun. It comes from the release of magnetic energy and is associated with sunspots.

¹⁷ The corona is the outer solar atmosphere and is structured by strong magnetic fields. Where these fields are closed, often above sunspot groups, the confined solar atmosphere can suddenly and violently release bubbles of gas and magnetic fields, and these are called coronal mass ejections.

¹⁸ Lloyd’s (2013) 6.

¹⁹ NERC (2014) 9, Love (2012).

²⁰ Lloyd’s (2013), Wei et al (2013). An input-output analysis (Schulte in den Bäumen (2014)) estimates U.S. costs of \$2.65 billion from a Quebec-level storm (and \$1.2 trillion for a Carrington event assuming recovery within five months), but the correspondence of this cost to direct economic impacts as considered in the SNRA are unclear. A 1990 Oak Ridge National Laboratory calculation (Barnes et al (1990)) estimates a range of \$3.042–\$6.100 billion (\$5.2–\$10.5 billion in 2011 USD) direct economic losses to the U.S. for a Quebec-level storm occurring at peak power which damages four transformers and blacks out the northeastern U.S. for 16–48 hours. However, this study is not as recent as Lloyd’s (2013). Swiss Re reports estimates of \$200–500 million of economic loss to Europe for a Quebec-level storm affecting that continent (and \$129–\$164 billion in impacts to the U.S. and Canada for a Carrington level event resulting in a 3-week blackout) from a transparent economic model reported in sufficient detail to replicate (Swiss Re (2012), Swiss Re (2014)). However, the Swiss Re figures were not used for primary estimates in the SNRA because they could be found only in presentations (slide decks) and conditional probabilities for the different scenarios among them were unclear.

²¹ Lloyd’s (2013) 7.

²² Lloyd’s (2013) 4, NERC (2014), Love (2012).

disturbances in North America could be attributed directly to space weather, equating to 500 insurance claims per year.²³

While research has suggested that space weather affects the electric grid, there is still a great deal of debate and uncertainty across the scientific, regulatory, policy, and infrastructure operator communities regarding the likelihood that a solar storm could cause significant damage to critical infrastructure, and the extent and duration of that impact. There are two schools of thought on the potential impacts of space weather events:

- One perspective forecasts a cataclysmic scenario of half the Nation's electric grid out of commission for up to a decade.²⁴ This is because geomagnetic storms can induce currents in the electric power grid that can last for hours, exciting voltages in an electric power transformer core and magnetically saturating the device. The electromagnetic charge overwhelms the transformer core, melting the copper windings, leading to failure. The transformers cannot be repaired, but rather would need to be replaced, which could take several months to years. The impacts to the national and global economies would be as severe as any economic challenge faced by the U.S. in the past, or greater.²⁵
- The other approach asserts that a true reasonable worst-case scenario could look more like the large-scale but temporary August 2003 blackout in the Eastern U.S. and Canada²⁶ (which was caused by a computer error, not a solar storm). Such a blackout impacting a large portion of the United States would be a genuine disaster, but manageable in a way that the high-end scenario would not be.²⁷ One reason for this is that coronal mass ejections (CME) are not no-notice events, and this allows operators time to adapt and mitigate the potential effects. Even during the Carrington event in 1859, which is the basis for much of the concern, scientists noticed the solar flare associated with the CME about 18 hours prior to its arrival. Generally, the CMEs leave the sun at varying speeds and interact with the constant electrically-charged solar wind that travels to the Earth at about 250 meters per second. The estimated time from when a CME-event occurs and its arrival at Earth ranges from about 15 hours to several days.²⁸

For the purposes of this assessment, each methodological perspective is taken as one of the endpoints to represent the full span of uncertainty around likelihood between them.

Direct environmental and health effects from space weather are minimal, as damage occurs mainly through the medium of disruption of technology. However, our society's dependence on technology, in particular refrigeration²⁹ and electric-powered medical devices,³⁰ mean that there could be significant impacts on health (fatalities, injuries, and illnesses) depending on the severity of a solar storm and its impact on power generation and communications.

²³ Schrijver et al (2014). For this statistical analysis, the researchers studied 11,242 insurance claims from 2000 through 2010 for equipment losses and related business interruptions in North American commercial organizations that are associated with damage to, or malfunction of, electrical and electronic equipment.

²⁴ Note, although this assessment uses the 1/150 year return period, there are other experts who suggest the return period may be even more frequent. For additional information, see National Academies (2008) pp 77–79 (John Kappenman's presentation); Metatech (2010) pp 3–22–3–29.

²⁵ Moran (2014).

²⁶ NERC (2012) pp 16–24, 46, 69, 85; Pulkkinen (2012).

²⁷ Mark Lauby, NERC, written submission in Attachment A, FERC (2012). NERC notes that its 2012 conclusion that the most likely outcome of a severe space weather disaster would be a reactive voltage collapse is based on its genuine belief rather than an attempt to dismiss the issue: NERC and the industry regard the possibility of a reactive voltage collapse as unacceptable and are taking action to prevent and mitigate such an event (same reference).

²⁸ NERC (2011) 4.

²⁹ Marx (2006).

³⁰ Anderson et al (2012), Lin (2011), Prezant (2005).

Technologies that can be directly affected by extreme space weather include the electric power, spacecraft, aviation, and Global Positioning System (GPS)-based positioning industries. Within the last 30 years, space weather events (of magnitudes below the threshold of the National-Level Event as defined here) have disrupted all of these technologies. Severe storms could result in additional consequences for numerous systems that rely on the electrical grid.

Another factor to consider is the possibility that a localized impact to transformers in one region could also result in a national event if their failure were to disrupt one of the major U.S. grid interconnections. In this situation, “the total number of damaged transformers is less relevant for prolonged power outage than their concentration. The failure of a small number of transformers serving a highly populated area is enough to create a situation of prolonged outage.”³¹

Considering the impacts on society and population, the Lloyd’s study concluded that the highest risk of solar storm induced power outages was the Washington D.C. – New York City corridor, on the Eastern Seaboard. Additional highly vulnerable areas included the Midwest (due to latitude) and along the Gulf Coast (due to ground conductivity and coast effects).³²

The potential for loss of life *directly* attributed to a solar storm event is believed to be low compared to some other hazard events. Any deaths occurring in large numbers would be caused by the loss of electricity and the resulting cascading effects on other critical infrastructures. Examples include the following:

- The loss of electricity could cause mass transit and passenger rail control systems to fail, potentially causing accidents with fatalities.
- Water shortages may be caused by the failure of electrical pumps to convey water. Power loss at purification plants could lead to acute exposure to toxicants or disease. By extension, firefighters would not have access to water to put out fires, and hospitals would not have access to water to take care of at-risk patients.
- Even in the low-end scenario, the number of fatalities, injuries and illnesses may be expected to reach the dozens or hundreds due to power losses causing the failure of important systems: home medical devices, refrigeration units, and (in a hot summer or cold winter) air conditioning and electric heating systems.

The injury and fatality estimates of this event come from epidemiological studies of excess fatalities and hospitalizations in New York City during the 2003 East Coast blackout.³³ Although the eight million population of New York City represents a sixth of the 50 million people affected in the U.S. and Canada, many of these hospitalizations and fatalities were attributed to sociological aspects (higher proportion of home medical devices, failure of water pressure and difficulty of response to high-rise buildings without power) that are particular to densely populated urban areas: thus although these numbers understate the true totals, they are likely closer to them than a straight proportion would suggest (and in any case, are likely to be at least within an order of magnitude). In short, injury, illness or death in mass numbers would likely only be caused by the resulting impact on lifeline functions by a geomagnetic event on critical infrastructure—not directly by the space weather event itself.³⁴

³¹ Lloyd’s (2013) pg. 13.

³² Lloyd’s (2013) pp 10–11.

³³ Anderson et al (2012), Lin (2011).

³⁴ OECD (2011) p.25.

Assumptions

Like other natural hazards, changes in the occurrence or severity of solar storms are magnified by the way our society's vulnerability to them has changed in recent decades. Due to an increasing critical dependency on the satellite, navigation, and extra-high-voltage (EHV) electric transmission systems, the impact of a Carrington-sized event today would not simply be a display of nature, but could represent a catastrophe. Although there is some uncertainty in the frequency of occurrence of severe space weather, the dominant uncertainties lie in the potential impacts. These knowledge gaps come from 1) the fact that these critical systems have not yet been tested by a real event, 2) the destructive testing necessary to narrow the uncertainties around their true vulnerability has been too costly to undertake, and 3) the speed with which the national economy—possibly handicapped by the loss of critical electric and communications infrastructure—would be able to restore substantial losses to them is unknown.

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate economic impacts resulting from a space weather event across the following types of infrastructure:

Effects on GPS services:

Direct estimates of the potential cost of a loss or degradation of GPS services from a severe space weather event were not found. However, the total economic benefit of GPS services to users (i.e., not counting sales of GPS devices) has been estimated at \$28–51 billion per year.³⁵ Space weather can create microwave emissions that can act as “natural jamming”³⁶ of GPS singles for about an hour. During the length of a geomagnetic storm, GPS may be unavailable because of interference in the L band. Organizations that rely on GPS for location and timing signals may experience significant disruption.³⁷

Effects on Aviation:

A severe event might force the rerouting of hundreds of flights not just over the pole but also across Canada and the northern U.S.³⁸ These adverse conditions could last for a week.³⁹ A National Weather Service (NWS) study estimated the cost of such diversions as approximately \$100,000 per flight.⁴⁰ In addition, GPS-based air navigation could be disrupted. The Federal Aviation Administration’s GPS-based Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) was disabled for 30 hours during the severe space weather events of October–November 2003.

Effect on Cellular Communications:

Loss of GPS timing signals of greater than two hours may negatively impact cellular and public safety radio base stations’ ability to work together. For example, “these base stations would be unable to hand off calls to another base station for mobile users moving between coverage areas, and users near the edge of coverage areas may experience interference from adjacent base stations or loss of service.”⁴¹

³⁵ Pham (2011).

³⁶ Cerruti et al (2008).

³⁷ MacAlester et al (2014).

³⁸ National Academies (2008) pp 50-52.

³⁹ Odenwald et al (2008).

⁴⁰ NOAA (2004) 17.

⁴¹ MacAlester et al (2014).

Effects on Satellites:

Exposure of spacecraft to energetic particles during solar energetic particle events and radiation belt enhancements can cause temporary operational anomalies, damage critical electronics, degrade solar arrays, and blind optical systems such as imagers and star trackers.⁴² In addition to direct effects of radiation, the expansion of the Earth's atmosphere from a superstorm will cause atmospheric drag on low Earth orbit satellites.⁴³ In January 1994, Telesat's Anik E1 and E2 telecommunications satellites were affected by a space weather event; E2 required six months to repair at a cost of \$50–70 million. The U.S. Department of Defense has estimated that solar disruptions to government satellites currently cost about \$100 million per year.⁴⁴ A study by Odenwald and Green⁴⁵ estimated total costs due to satellite damage and loss of satellite services at \$20–70 billion for a severe event.

Effects on Public Safety Telecommunications:

The vast majority of public safety radio communications, including line-of-sight VHF air-to-ground communications used for search and rescue and HF groundwave transmissions out to 10–60 miles, should not be affected.⁴⁶ It is possible, however, that cellular base stations—including public safety radio base station antennas—that face the sun could experience increased noise from solar radio bursts at dawn and dusk.⁴⁷

Effect on Electricity Supply:

The effects on the electricity sector could be the most severe from an extreme space weather event, with estimates ranging from billions to trillions of dollars. However, since there is an order of magnitude of difference between the low and high estimate, it is important to be aware that there is significant uncertainty about how much damage an extreme space weather event would do to the physical grid infrastructure, which would determine the duration of an outage. Experts are conflicted on what the impacts of space weather may be.

A low impact scenario which caused a large-scale power collapse of large portions of the national grid but little to no permanent destruction of electric transformers could look like mass blackouts of past experience, such as the August 2003 Northeast Blackout. However, destruction of key transformers or large numbers of transformers could have significantly more complicated impacts. If there was a prolonged outage for months or even years, this could significantly impact the national economy. The electrical grid is essential to supporting the national economy and our way of life, and unlike the other critical infrastructure sectors and subsectors which could be (and routinely are⁴⁸) impacted in some way by solar storms, the uncertain risk to the electric grid has been a recurrent focus of discussions about solar storm risk.

One core reason is that the grid is the only subsector that needs to already be substantially functional in order for any permanent damage to be repaired. If there is a collapse of the grid due to widespread damage to electric transformers, it could severely compromise the Nation's ability to manufacture the replacement transformers needed to get the grid back online. This chicken-

⁴² National Academies (2008) p. 1.

⁴³ Royal Academy (2013) 35.

⁴⁴ *Supra* note 42.

⁴⁵ *Supra* note 42.

⁴⁶ MacAlester et al (2014).

⁴⁷ Royal Academy (2013).

⁴⁸ Odenwald et al (2008) communicate estimates that, as normal background noise, sub-catastrophic solar storms cost the Nation about \$450-500 million per year through disruptions to the electric grid's normal operation (a proportion of the \$500 million cited for the 19 month period from June 1 2000 to December 31 2001) and damage to USG -owned satellites (\$100 million per year, Defense Department estimate).

and-egg dependence not only exponentially increases the time needed to replace physically damaged core equipment, but it can also leave the grid in a crippled state that is out of proportion to the actual extent of the damage. Furthermore, knock-on or cascading effects of the electrical outage on other sectors of the economy would also then continue for the same, disproportionately extended period of time.

Although not analyzed within this assessment, in the event of a widespread persistent loss of power supply, there could be significant psychological impacts through job loss and displacement from uninhabitable areas, and the businesses (such as gas stations and grocery stores) that are able to function may not be able to accept any form of payment other than cash.

Frequency

Low, best, and high one year frequency estimates are those of Love (2012), cited by NERC as the probability model for a Carrington-level storm. The best estimate of frequency corresponds to a return period of 153 years, rounded to 150 years in the data table. The low and high estimates of 1/600 years and 1/70 years represent the 1 standard deviation (68.3%) confidence interval as cited by NERC. The Lloyd's study uses the same probability model.⁴⁹

Health & Safety Impacts

The low estimates for fatalities and illnesses come from epidemiological studies of excess fatalities and hospitalizations in New York City during the August 2003 Northeast Blackout. The fatalities are on the order of 100, much larger than the eleven directly attributed to the blackout in its immediate aftermath.⁵⁰ Since the approximately eight million residents of New York City represent a fraction of the 50 million US customers who actually lost power, they represent a lower bound to the true total; however, since the fatalities and illnesses in NYC had much to do with local factors such as high-rise buildings (failure of water pressure, Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) difficulty reaching people on high stories) and being an urban center (older people dependent on home respirators living near a high concentration of world-class hospitals), the true national totals are probably less than seven times the NYC figures, which a proportional scale-up by population would suggest. However, the August 2003 blackout lasted two days, so the potential for fatalities could also increase exponentially in areas with far longer outages. No data could be found to fully calculate these particular impacts of long-term, prolonged blackouts.

The high estimates represent an extrapolation of these known effects to longer blackouts, which required a scaling assumption by the SNRA 2015 project team. The health impacts of the low scenario were scaled up in proportion to the total person-days without power of the 2003 Northeast Blackout (50 million people assumed out of power for average of one day), to the Lloyd's high estimate scenario of 40 million people out of power from 16 days to up to two years. Because of the multiple uncertainties involved, the SNRA 2015 project team made the assumption of one month average outage having disruptive effects (i.e. the 16 days plus two weeks in addition) for a scaling estimate of 1.2 billion person-days, or 24 times that of the East Coast Blackout. This factor was applied to the 90 fatalities of the low estimate, for a lower-bound estimation of a true high estimate of 2,000 fatalities (rounded to one significant figure).

⁴⁹ Most SNRA events having a defined frequency distribution cite the 5th and 95th percentiles as the low and high estimates (Appendices B and I), following customary practice in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). (For the Love model, the 5th and 95th annual frequencies are 1/3,000 years and 1/51 years respectively.) For the space weather event, the SNRA project team judged that maintaining consistency with the electric power industry source was a higher priority for risk communication purposes.

⁵⁰ Minkel (2008).

Although the initial health impacts of a large-scale, sudden blackout may subside in initial days as affected populations adapt to life without power, the exhaustion of fuel and lifeline resources and impacted supply chains for critical goods may result in significantly compounded total population health impacts days or weeks into the blackout. The SNRA 2015 high estimate thus almost certainly represents a substantial under-representation of the true numbers of fatalities which may be expected from a catastrophic, multi-state extended power outage disaster. However, the SNRA 2015 project team judged that it would be substantially more misleading and unrepresentative of the uncertainties in potential impacts of a space weather event to report no high estimate at all, rather than reporting a high estimate that itself is deeply uncertain.

One health impact not projected is the impact of increased radiation on the health and safety of airline pilots, crew members and passengers due to a major space weather event. Most flights in the U.S. to expose crew members and passengers to cosmic radiation well above what is experienced on the surface. Dose rates can increase by 10 times or more: exposures depend upon the altitude and latitude of the flight path (polar routes are irradiated most), as well as solar activity. A particularly strong solar storm can boost radiation levels 100 times.⁵¹ However, prior warning of solar storms allow polar flights to be rerouted—the Federal Aviation Administration can issue solar radiation alerts so that pilots know to fly at lower elevations or avoid Polar Regions—and so this particular societal risk is primarily factored in as the increased economic costs from rerouting flights rather than the health impacts to passengers that are averted by this mitigation measure. While a risk, the marginal impacts of increased solar radiation are difficult to quantify—especially when they are in the context of long-term, regular exposure that the aforementioned groups already regularly experience. Therefore, no health impacts can be directly attributed to impacts from space weather in this iteration of the SNRA.

Economic Impacts

The economic impacts to the nation are dominated by the estimates of possible damage to the electric sector. Although existing estimates of the range of possible damage to the transportation, communications, and government facilities sectors are described below and could be quite substantial, their contribution does not register within the single order of magnitude of the total economic damage estimates.

Transportation Sector: Aviation

Aviation	Low	Best	High
Direct Economic Loss	\$500,000	\$1.3 Million	\$3.5 Million

In 2008, the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies hosted a two-day workshop on the societal impacts of space weather.⁵² The NRC workshop report notes that thirteen air carriers flew a total of 7,300 flights over polar regions in 2007, of which United Airlines alone flew 1,800.⁵³ Although the NOAA report on the solar storms of October–November 2003⁵⁴ notes that two U.S. carriers fly polar routes,⁵⁵ the other carrier and its total number of flights is not given, so with the understanding that the true figure will be

⁵¹ Phillips (2013).

⁵² National Academies (2008).

⁵³ National Academies (2008) pp 50–51 [panel].

⁵⁴ 2003 saw a significant number of solar storms which did not cause widespread electric outages, in addition to the August 2003 electric outage cited as a model for a solar-storm caused outage but which was not itself caused by a solar storm: it is easy to get these mixed up.

⁵⁵ NOAA (2004) p 18.

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underestimated, the 2007 United Airlines total is used as a proxy for the annual total of all U.S.-flagged air traffic over the poles, giving a daily average of 4.9 (rounded to 5.0) U.S.-flagged polar flights. The NRC report also notes that a severe solar storm can cause hazardous conditions requiring rerouting of polar flights for several days,⁵⁶ and Odenwald et al note that these disruptions may last for up to a week.⁵⁷ For a broad range, the SNRA project team selected one day as the minimum polar air disruption time and one week as the maximum. The estimates in the above table were found by using the average cost of \$100,000 for the rerouting of a polar flight given by the NOAA study;⁵⁸ these estimates are factored in as direct economic loss.

Communications and Government Facilities Sectors: Satellites and GPS

Satellites	Low	Best	High
Direct Economic Loss	\$50 Million		\$68 Billion

The low end estimate of \$50 million damage (repair costs) to the Telsat Anik E2 satellite damaged by the 1994 solar storm cited by the NRC report⁵⁹ is taken as the low estimate for direct economic loss. Odenwald et al (2005)'s estimates of \$24 billion in direct property damage (replacement costs) and \$44 billion in business interruption costs (lost transponder revenue) for a solar storm three times that of the 1859 Carrington event in magnitude were summed for the high estimate of direct economic loss.

Indirect economic loss consequent to this direct damage was not estimated. Direct and indirect losses due to physical damage to or service interruption of the GPS satellite system in particular are excluded from the above;⁶⁰ no estimates for these are included here.

Energy Sector⁶¹

Electric Grid	Low	Best	High
Direct Economic Loss	\$5.7 Billion		\$2 Trillion

The potential impacts on the grid and the economic impacts of an outage are heavily debated in the space weather community. One of the main uncertainties is whether there will be disruptions to the transformers. The *Solar Storm Risk to the North American Electrical Grid* report published by Lloyd's in 2013 noted that "large amounts of geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) flowing through the power grid can damage power transformers and/or lead to voltage collapse, resulting in widespread power outages."⁶² Indeed, Lloyd's further concluded that even if a few transformers were damaged (10–20) it could cause significant regional power disruptions.⁶³

For the low estimate in this assessment, the G-5 storm disrupts the electric grid and overloads the system, causing widespread outages across the Eastern and Pacific Northwest interconnections and leaving 50 million people without power for a day. Therefore, the low estimate is informed

⁵⁶ National Academies (2008) pp 50–51.

⁵⁷ Odenwald et al (2008).

⁵⁸ NOAA (2004) p 17.

⁵⁹ National Academies (2008) p 25.

⁶⁰ Odenwald et al (2005) pp 15–16.

⁶¹ A note on the methodologies—in order to inform this assessment, this analysis is based on two separate benefit-cost analysis (BCA) models. The low estimate is informed by the FEMA BCA guidance released in 2011 and the high estimate is informed by the BCA used within the Lloyd's report. This decision was made because of the understanding that there are different BCA considerations for short term (day) electricity outages than there would be for long-term (year) outages. For additional information on the methodologies, see FEMA (2011) and Lloyd's (2013).

⁶² Lloyd's (2013) pg. 6 (see also Molinski et al (2000)).

⁶³ Lloyd's (2013) pg. 6.

by the Northeast Blackout in 2003, previously cited by the electric power industry⁶⁴ as a model for the reasonable-worst-case scenario of an electric grid collapse caused by a 1/100 year solar storm: it is the lowest estimate of solar storm impacts located in the literature. The low estimate of \$5.7 billion represents the low end of the economic impact estimate and is based on the inflation-adjusted estimate⁶⁵ of the 2003 Northeast Blackout using FEMA's Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) guidance on the economic impact of electricity disruption from outages.^{66,67}

The high estimate for economic impact⁶⁸ is the high end of the estimate provided by Lloyd's in their 2013 report. Using a benefit cost analysis approach that evaluates the residential, commercial, and industrial costs from an electrical service disruption,⁶⁹ The Lloyd's study estimated that 20–40 million people could be affected for anywhere from 16 days to 1–2 years, and it concludes the economic costs could range from \$0.6–\$2.6 trillion.⁷⁰ While there is considerable debate within the space weather community about the feasibility of such an event, if one considers the catastrophic scenario⁷¹ described in the Lloyd's report and by experts like John Kappenman in which tens of millions of people do not have power for months or even years, economic losses in the trillions of dollars for such an event⁷² are reasonable and possibly understated.⁷³

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on significant distress and prolonged distress, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event.⁷⁴ The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs. A multiplicative factor elicited⁷⁵ from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.

⁶⁴ NERC (2012).

⁶⁵ FEMA (2011). According to FEMA's BCA methodology, the impacts of electricity disruption on economic activity are estimated to cost \$114.39 per capita per day in direct economic costs (adjusted for inflation in 2015 terms). (This reflects the component for Impact on Economic Activity, \$106.27 in 2010 USD; the Impact on Residential Consumers component of \$24.58 is not included.)

⁶⁶ See also the SNRA 2015 Risk Summary Sheet on Physical Attack on the Power Grid.

⁶⁷ It is worth noting that after the Northeast Blackout, the Department of Energy released an after action report that cites the Electricity Consumers Resource Council (ECRC) estimate of \$4–\$10 billion of total economic loss from the blackout of the 2003 Northeast Blackout. In addition, other methodologies can be used to determine the economic cost, but these figures take into account some indirect as well as direct costs. Using a proportional relationship between electricity consumption and national GDP, one calculation of the impacts of the 2003 blackout showed that “50 million people were without electric power for a day, and so it [is] estimated to have cost \$5.6 billion, which is within the range of [other, more complex] estimates that have been published.” Zimmerman (2005) 17–18.

⁶⁸ Due to a widespread and long-term electric outage because of the long replacement-time of critical equipment (up to 365 critical Extra-High Voltage [EHV] electric transformers).

⁶⁹ Lloyd's (2013) pg. 17. The research assumes a linear relationship with time and electric power consumption: \$2.00/kWh, \$19.38/kWh, and \$8.40/kWh for residential, commercial, and industrial customers, respectively. A factor of 1.31 accounts for inflation from 2001 to 2013.

⁷⁰ Lloyd's (2013) pg. 6.

⁷¹ 130 million people without power in a way similar to the 2003 blackout, but widespread destruction of transformers and the long replacement times (the 18 months under ordinary circumstances is lengthened by a crippled national industrial base as a result of the extensive damage to the grid) prolongs the outage from three days to several years.

⁷² Extrapolating the cost estimate (approximately \$5.7 billion) of the 2003 East Coast Blackout which affected approximately 50 million people for an average of 1 day to 365 days results in \$2.1 trillion. The high estimate from Lloyd's assumes more rapid power restoration, but higher economic impacts per unit of power lost.

⁷³ Continued loss of nearly all the infrastructure dependent upon electric power would most likely have a negative impact on normal consumer spending, and there are other factors such as food spoilage, and regional economic collapse from business closures. All of this would likely represent a substantial fraction of the Nation's annual gross domestic product.

⁷⁴ See Appendix G of the SNRA draft Unclassified Documentation of Findings for references and additional discussion of the SNRA Psychological Distress metric.

⁷⁵ The elicitations were performed in 2011 for the first iteration of the SNRA, which included space weather as a National-level Event. These elicitations were not repeated in 2015.

The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement).

- In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long-term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Space Weather was given a C_{EF} of 1.0.

- Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.⁷⁶

Environmental Impacts

In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event in the 2011 SNRA. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agents, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)⁷⁷ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “de minimus” or none. Experts indicated environmental/ecological effects would likely depend on duration of outages. For one day to a few days, the damage would be relatively minimal/de minimus (this is in the scope of typical power outages due to snowstorms, rain, and other natural disasters). If the outage persisted for weeks, then there is the potential for backup systems to fail. If backup systems (such as diesel fuel delivery) failed, then the lack of power to treatment plants and chemical plants could have a massive impact. A space weather event would most likely affect a large geographic area in addition to having the potential for a longer duration.

⁷⁶ Please reference the 2015 detailed findings for Psychological Distress in this document.

⁷⁷ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11–32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

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Tornado

A tornado event (either a single tornado or a cluster of tornadoes that form during a single storm system) occurs in the United States resulting in direct economic losses of or greater than \$100 Million. The methodology for determining clusters can be found below.

Data Summary^{1,2}

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities ³	0	22	316
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses ³	0	247	3,125
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011) ³	\$103 Million ⁴	\$450 Million	\$4.7 Billion
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	N/A		
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins	N/A ⁵		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year ⁶	0.63	2.9	7

Event Description

The most destructive and deadly tornadoes occur from supercells – which are rotating thunderstorms with a well-defined radar circulation called a mesocyclone (supercells can also produce damaging hail, severe non-tornadic winds, unusually frequent lightning, and flash floods).⁷ Although tornadoes appear throughout the world, the continental United States is subjected to more tornado events than any other country. On average, there are 1,300 tornadoes that hit the United States each year, of which an average of 140 (or approximately 10%) are significant (rated as EF2 or higher on the enhanced Fujita scale).⁸ Tornadoes are more common in the United States than in any other country because of the interactions between cold fronts coming from Canada that collide with warm fronts that hit the central United States via the Gulf

¹ The data reported in this table represent historical U.S. tornado data. The SNRA project team used historical data from the Storm Prediction Center (SPC) online database. The SPC is a division of the National Weather Service (NWS), which is a part of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

² Social displacement, psychological distress, and environmental impacts of tornado outbreaks were not assessed for the Tornado event. Expert elicitation and research for these metrics were completed during the main project phase of the SNRA (summer-fall 2011) before the tornado event was added in 2012. These measures will be assessed in the next iteration of the SNRA.

³ Low, best, and high estimates for fatalities, injuries and illnesses, and direct economic loss come from the low, average, and high values of the set of events meeting a \$100 million threshold of direct economic cost. This set came from the National Weather Service's Storm Prediction Center database on tornadoes ranging from 1996 – 2011. For further details see Assumptions sections below.

⁴ This is the low estimate when the \$100 million threshold is applied.

⁵ Environmental impact estimates were elicited from subject matter experts in 2011, prior to the addition of the Drought hazard event (2015).

⁶ Frequency estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years of the longest interval between accident events (low), the mean frequency of the accident events (best), and the greatest number of accidents within one year (high) of the set described in note 1 above.

⁷ (Edwards, The Online Tornado FAQ, 2012)

⁸ This is based on number of tornadoes per year from 1996 – 2011. All calculations are taken from the SPC database.

Tornado

of Mexico. This collision generally centers over the central and southeastern portions of the United States, and there is a higher frequency of tornadoes that strike these regions. Nevertheless, tornadoes occurred in all 50 states, the District of Columbia⁹ and Puerto Rico between 1996 and 2011.

For the purposes of the Strategic National Risk Assessment, the SNRA team analyzed tornado events that resulted in \$100 million or more in economic damage. From 1996 to 2011, there were 46 tornado events that met this criterion. Of these 46 events, 44 were outbreaks that included more than one tornado. These outbreaks were determined using a clustering method to aggregate the fatality, injury and economic impacts of tornadoes that occurred within one day and 150 miles of at least one other tornado.

The economic threshold highlights 46 events during the time frame. Figure 1 outlines data on the tornado events that met the criteria of the \$100 million threshold.


Methodology

Note that the tornadoes captured by this threshold represent only 14% of all tornadoes in the data set. However, those 14% of tornadoes are responsible for 72% of all fatalities, 58% of all injuries and 75% of all economic damage from all tornadoes during the 1996 – 2011 timeframe (see Figure 1).

When appropriate (i.e., when temporal and spatial criteria were met) individual tornadoes were clustered into multi-tornadic outbreak events. This was done because DHS is responsible for responding to a single destructive event, without separating out damage that comes from different tornadoes. The SNRA team chose to cluster tornadoes using spatial and temporal clustering, as this facilitated analysis on the aggregated total of fatalities, injuries and economic damage caused by tornadoes in a storm system, not just an individual storm. Through the use of this threshold, the SNRA team was able to capture the most damaging and dangerous storms from the data set.

⁹ On September 24, 2001, a tornado originated in Virginia and passed through Washington DC. The individual entry for DC was removed during data consolidation. The tornado ID number is 11594 (entry in the NOAA SPC database is 2001 – 451).

Figure 1. Percentage of tornadoes in the data set that meet the threshold and the proportion of associated impacts within and outside of the threshold



In order to cluster the tornadoes, the team created a model that clusters tornado events if certain criteria are met. The data set has been programmed to cluster tornadoes if they meet the following two conditions: 1) the events fall within a one day window^{10,11} and 2) the events are located within 150 miles of another event.¹²

It is important to note that the SNRA team elected to not make the Enhanced Fujita (EF) Scale (formerly known as the Fujita (F) Scale) rating a threshold for clustering. A powerful storm (EF4 – EF5) could hit a forest or a field, causing relatively little damage. At the same time, a weak storm (EF0 – EF2) could cause significant economic damage or loss of life if it struck a densely populated area. Due to the inconsistency, the SNRA team felt it was important to include all tornadoes regardless of the EF scale rankings in the data set.

¹⁰ All units of time have been converted to central standard time (CST).

¹¹ The day window accounts for a 47 hour and 59 minute span of time. For example, a day window would associate a tornado that struck at 00:00 on January 1, 2011 and one that struck at 23:59 on January 2, 2011.

¹² An event was spatially associated with a previous event if it comes within 150 miles of the path taken by the previous event.

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During this risk assessment, temporally and spatially associated events were identified as “tornado clusters.” There are two main reasons why the SNRA team created a model to cluster tornadoes as opposed to relying on external sources:

- A specific definition of a tornado cluster (also referred to as a tornado outbreak) is not available for guidance in the meteorological literature. There is an ongoing debate in the field regarding the definition of an outbreak, as storm systems can spawn tornadoes over a broad array of time and space.¹³ Without a concrete definition, the SNRA team determined that it needed to create the clustering model internally.
- Since the historical data in the data set is arranged by individual tornadoes, and it does not group tornadoes by storm system, the entire data set had to be clustered before tornado clusters could be identified. Without the historical data on storm cells and their production of tornadoes, the decision was made to infer when tornadoes were associated with one another through the time and distance conditions.

The specific spatial and temporal parameters in the clustering algorithm were calibrated using publicly available news and weather reports published on days of tornado outbreaks. Before clustering the data, the SNRA team checked its main data source, the National Weather Service’s (NWS) Storm Prediction Center (SPC) database, for consistency. Several adjustments were incorporated in the SNRA data set:

- The database contained multiple reports for the same tornado. This occurred when a single tornado would cross state lines. The reports were consolidated to reflect an accurate picture of the path and damage of the single tornado. The partial reports were eliminated prior to running the data through the clustering model.
- In 1996, NOAA began to track the economic damage caused by a storm by millions of dollars. Previously, the data had been semi-quantitatively binned by the order of magnitude of the losses. In order to ensure accuracy and consistency, the SNRA team decided to use data from 1996 – 2011.
- The SNRA team combined the Property Damage field and the Crop Damage field to create a Total Damage Field. This historic data was used as an estimate of Total Direct Economic Losses. However, it does not include losses due to business interruptions, medical costs, or loss in spending due to fatalities. These other types of direct economic impacts due to tornadoes were assumed to be small relative to property and crop losses.

To create the clustering model, a program was written by the SNRA team using MATLAB. The base of the program was previous work that was done to support research into clusters of floods for the SNRA. The following parameters were built into the model and used to define the criteria for each cluster:

- **Spatial** – Distance window of 150 miles from any point along the tornado path¹⁴
- **Temporal** – Time window of 1 day

¹³ Available definitions that are spatially precise may be nebulous in time, or vice versa. Moreover, many historical attempts to define the term “tornado outbreak” have failed to account for the spatial outliers, far removed from tornado clusters but within the same time domain. (Edwards, Thompson, Crosbie, & Hart, 2004)

¹⁴ To judge the distance, the SNRA project team used several data fields from the SPC database. First, using the starting and ending latitude and longitude, one can establish the exact origin and termination points of the tornado. For the purposes of the analysis, the algorithm uses the midpoint C of a straight line between the starting point A and terminating point B. If two tornadoes were within 150 miles AND one day of each other at points A, B, or C, they would be clustered.

- Year span: 1996 – 2011

The steps performed by the clustering algorithm proceeded as follows:

- Step 1: The areas of each tornado are calculated by finding all points within 150 miles from starting point A, ending point B, and midpoint C.¹⁵
- Step 2: Starting with a single tornado, the algorithm clusters any matching tornadoes with the original tornado based on whether the matching tornadoes meet the spatial and temporal criteria.
- Step 3: The algorithm loops over the newly identified tornado cluster (the original tornado and matching tornadoes) to find any other tornadoes that now match any portion of the cluster based on the spatial and temporal criteria.
- Step 4: New clusters are created as the data loops over the data set.
- Step 5: The data loop continues until all tornadoes are sorted into a cluster.¹⁶
- Step 6: The clusters are analyzed by the SNRA team.

The final data set that was put into the clustering model included individual tornadoes that occurred in the United States¹⁷ from 1996 to 2011. The SNRA team analyzed 20,755 tornadoes that occurred during this timeframe. Using the clustering methodology, the final number of tornado clusters was 4,597. Of these clusters, 2,206 clusters represented more than one tornado while the remainders were individual tornadoes that did not cluster with any other tornadoes in the data set. Once the clusters were formed, they were extracted and analyzed in Microsoft Excel using advanced database tools. In Microsoft Excel, the \$100 million threshold was applied. Of the 2,206 clusters established, 46 clusters were analyzed as SNRA level events (Tables 1, 2).

Table 1. Results for Tornado Events Resulting in \$100 Million or More in Economic Damage

Number of Events	46
Number of Tornadoes	2,813
Number of Fatalities	1,025
Number of Injuries	11,367
Total Economic Damage	\$20.7 billion ¹⁸
Proportion of Tornadoes Above the Threshold from the Entire Data Set	14%
Proportion of Fatalities Represented From Entire Data Set	72%
Proportion of Injuries Represented From Entire Data Set	58%
Proportion of Economic Damage Represented From Entire Data Set	75%
Number of Outbreaks (More than One Tornado per Event)	44
Number of Individual Storms	2
Average Number of Storms per Outbreak	64 ¹⁹

¹⁵ The average path length of a tornado in the data set is 3 miles and the average maximum width is 113 yards. Due to the short average path length and width, the starting, ending and midpoint were assumed to be sufficient points of measurement from which the 150 mile distance is determined.

¹⁶ Note that a single tornado can be its own cluster if no other tornadoes in the data set meet the spatial and temporal criteria.

¹⁷ Geographically, the data set spanned all 50 U.S. states as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia.

¹⁸ The economic damage of the tornadoes in the threshold totaled \$20,721,128,120.

¹⁹ The average number is found by dividing the total number of tornadoes that were part of an outbreak (2811) by the number of outbreaks (44).

Tornado

Table 2. SNRA Tornado Clusters

Start Date	End Date	States Affected (primary or all)	Fatalities	Injuries	Economic	Number of Tornadoes in Cluster	Max EF Scale
4/18/1996	4/20/1996	IL, IN, KY	1	118	\$141,559,990	75	3
4/21/1996	4/22/1996	OK, AR	4	112	\$220,328,680	33	3
5/27/1996	5/28/1996	KY	0	11	\$145,888,600	15	4
5/25/1997	5/28/1997	TX	28	35	\$182,873,600	95	5
7/2/1997	7/2/1997	MI	2	98	\$178,990,000	15	3
2/2/1998	2/2/1998	FL	0	0	\$310,693,200	6	2
2/22/1998	2/23/1998	FL	42	259	\$147,982,920	11	3
3/29/1998	3/29/1998	MN	1	2	\$221,931,600	16	3
4/8/1998	4/8/1998	AL, FL	35	286	\$418,554,000	9	5
4/15/1998	4/16/1998	TN, KY, AR	12	152	\$210,204,360	58	5
5/31/1998	6/4/1998	NY, PA	3	189	\$163,645,920	72	4
1/21/1999	1/22/1999	TN, AR	9	162	\$122,322,150	129	4
4/9/1999	4/9/1999	OH	4	67	\$121,837,500	8	4
5/3/1999	5/5/1999	OK, TX, KS	47	861	\$1,882,923,300	107	5
8/11/1999	8/11/1999	UT	1	80	\$229,500,000	1	2
3/12/2001	3/12/2001	TX	0	0	\$387,350,000	1	1
9/24/2001	9/24/2001	MD	2	59	\$133,579,870	8	4
10/9/2001	10/9/2001	OK	0	10	\$128,351,280	19	3
4/28/2002	4/28/2002	MD, OH	3	143	\$230,312,500	21	4
11/9/2002	11/11/2002	OH, MS, TN, AL, OH, PA	32	284	\$200,260,000	77	3
5/4/2003	5/11/2003	OK, TN, MO, IL, KS, KY	36	605	\$1,027,066,760	315	4
9/15/2004	9/18/2004	VA, GA, FL	7	41	\$102,474,470	118	3
4/6/2005	4/6/2005	MS	0	10	\$599,850,350	23	3
11/6/2005	11/6/2005	KY	24	243	\$103,201,000	3	3
4/2/2006	4/2/2006	AR, KY, TN, IL	27	348	\$214,368,000	67	3
4/7/2006	4/8/2006	TN, AR, GA, KY	10	144	\$116,824,960	55	3
2/2/2007	2/2/2007	FL	21	76	\$235,444,320	4	3
3/1/2007	3/2/2007	AL, GA	19	97	\$449,241,120	35	4
5/4/2007	5/9/2007	KS	14	89	\$289,417,320	139	5
2/5/2008	2/6/2008	TN, MS, AL, AR, KY	44	286	\$407,381,520	85	4
5/10/2008	5/11/2008	OK, AR, GA, MO	24	400	\$215,957,040	72	4
5/22/2008	5/24/2008	CO, KS	3	87	\$163,545,200	113	4
5/25/2008	5/25/2008	IA	9	73	\$106,229,760	8	5
4/9/2009	4/10/2009	AR	3	44	\$162,021,300	23	3
4/10/2009	4/10/2009	TN, GA, SC	2	102	\$132,940,500	63	4
4/23/2010	4/25/2010	LA	10	202	\$451,956,790	37	4
6/3/2010	6/6/2010	IL, MI, OH	8	75	\$277,366,640	51	4
7/22/2010	7/23/2010	IA	0	0	\$773,813,250	3	1
12/30/2010	12/31/2010	OK, MO, IL	9	29	\$113,346,350	25	3
4/4/2011	4/4/2011	MS	0	3	\$508,137,000	20	2
4/14/2011	4/16/2011	AL, AR, MS, OK	12	107	\$155,469,000	116	3
4/16/2011	4/16/2011	NC	24	456	\$401,266,000	54	3
4/22/2011	4/28/2011	AL, GA, MS, TN, VA	316	3125	\$4,676,142,000	382	5
5/20/2011	5/26/2011	MO, OK, IL, AR, KS	173	1545	\$2,839,996,000	188	5
5/21/2011	5/23/2011	MN, WI	1	52	\$190,982,000	34	2
6/1/2011	6/1/2011	MA	3	200	\$227,600,000	4	3

Assumptions

The SNRA team used the following assumptions to estimate impacts caused by a tornado event:

- For the purposes of this assessment, tornado clusters are determined through spatial and temporal clustering. The distance threshold is 150 miles and the time threshold is one day. All economic estimates were inflation-adjusted to 2011 dollars.
- The decision to analyze tornado events from 1996 to 2011 was made because the historical data consistently measured the direct economic costs of tornadoes from 1996 to the present.²⁰
- The direct economic damages include losses to both property and crops.²¹
- Social displacement, psychological distress, and environmental impacts will be assessed in a future iteration of the SNRA.²²

Event Background

Individual Storms:

Single tornadoes have the potential to cause a large loss of life. On May 22, 2011, the deadliest single tornado to strike the United States since 1947 tore through Joplin, MO (population 50,000). The tornado was rated as a strong EF5, and there was extensive loss of life, injuries, economic loss and psychological impacts. NOAA's SPC registered 158 fatalities and 1,150 injuries that were directly related to the single tornado. The final economic cost of the Joplin tornado was found to be \$2.8 billion.^{23,24} As a result of the tornado, the governor of Missouri issued a State of Emergency due to the loss of critical infrastructure in the city and the need to rapidly deploy federal, state and local resources in response to the disaster. The Joplin tornado was the most significant tornado in a tornado outbreak which spanned May 20 to May 26, 2011. This storm system crossed the Midwest and into the Ohio River Valley, spawning 188 tornadoes across 21 states, in total. This outbreak caused 173 fatalities, 1,545 injuries and \$2.84 billion worth of damage.²⁵

The Joplin Tornado is also significant because of the damage done to critical infrastructure. City officials as well as local, state and federal emergency managers had to work to restore basic utilities and healthcare capabilities to the city while also clearing debris.²⁶ FEMA reported that it had provided an estimated \$174 million in federal assistance provided through various programs to aid the recovery.²⁷

The Joplin Tornado was the most significant tornado to strike the United States from 1996 – 2011, but it is worth noting that severe storms (defined as EF4 – EF5) are rare. Out of 20,755 individual storms analyzed by the SNRA team from 1996 – 2011, there were only 112 other

²⁰ Prior to 1996, the SPC database used a logarithmic scale to provide a range of estimated loss. According to the information sheet that accompanies the database, it was “a categorization of tornado damage by dollar amount (0 or blank-known; 1=<\$50, 2=\$50-\$500, 3=\$500-\$5,000, 4=\$5,000-\$50,000; 5=\$50,000-\$500,000, 6=\$500,000-\$5,000,000, 7=\$5,000,000-\$50,000,000, 8=\$50,000,000-\$500,000,000, 9=\$5,000,000,000.)” (NOAA NWS SPC, 2012)

²¹ The SPC began separating crop and property damage in 2007. Where available, the fields have been combined to reflect the direct economic damages.

²² The Tornado national-level event was added to the SNRA in calendar year 2012, subsequent to the main project phase of the SNRA in summer-fall 2011 when the expert elicitation and research for the social displacement, psychological distress, and environmental impact measures were completed. These measures will be assessed for all events in the next iteration of the SNRA.

²³ (Storm Prediction Center Warning Coordination Meteorologist, 2011)

²⁴ (The Associated Press, 2012)

²⁵ (Storm Prediction Center Warning Coordination Meteorologist, 2011)

²⁶ (State Emergency Management Agency, 2011)

²⁷ (FEMA, 2011)

Tornado

severe tornadoes (0.54% of the total number of tornadoes).²⁸ These 112 severe storms were responsible for a significant share of damage. From 1996 to 2011, severe storms resulted in 45% of the total amount of damage. They were also responsible for 52% of the total number of fatalities and 41% of the total number of injuries. This suggests that even though the frequency per year is low, the risk of severe storms is high.

However, even significant storms (rated EF2 to EF3) are responsible for a large portion of the damage from tornadoes, mainly because there are significantly more EF2 and EF3 storms. From 1996 to 2011, 10% of all tornadoes were rated as EF2 to 3 (compared to 0.54% of severe storms at EF4 to 5). The 2,144 EF2 and EF3 tornadoes were responsible for 37% of the total amount of damage. The significant storms caused 43% of the total number of fatalities and 48% of the total number of injuries. Even though the majority of tornadoes are weak (there were 18,499 EF0 and EF1 tornadoes, or 89% of all tornadoes in the data set), the majority of the damage from tornadoes comes from significant and severe storms.

Tornado Clusters:

While powerful storms like the Joplin tornado do pose a significant threat, they very rarely appear alone.²⁹ By clustering tornadoes, the SNRA team was able to gain a clearer picture of the regional impact of storm systems that hit vulnerable areas. This clustering method illuminated information from serious outbreaks, such as the outbreak that occurred from April 22 – 28, 2011. In April 2011, the United States was hit by an unprecedented number of tornadoes. There were 752³⁰ tornadoes reported during the month of April alone, and this significantly outpaced the previous record of 540³¹ tornadoes in May 2003. From April 22 – 28, there were 382 tornadoes that struck 21 states, resulting in 316 fatalities, 3125 injuries and \$4.7 billion in damage. The most significant and deadly tornadoes struck Alabama, Mississippi and Tennessee from April 26 – April 28. Of the 316 fatalities, 234 were in Alabama, 32 were in Tennessee, 31 were in Mississippi, 15 were in Georgia, and 4 were in Virginia.

This outbreak ranks with the 1974 Super Tornado Outbreak [as the most severe outbreak to strike the United States since 1950, when the data was consistently measured] and resulted in more deaths than the 1965 Palm Sunday Outbreak.³² According to the service assessment released by the NWS:

The deadliest part of the outbreak was the afternoon and evening of April 27, when a total of 122 tornadoes resulted in 313 deaths across central and northern Mississippi, central and northern Alabama, eastern Tennessee, southwestern Virginia, and northern Georgia... there were 15 violent (Enhanced Fujita Scale 4 or 5) tornadoes reported. Eight of the tornadoes had path lengths in excess of 50 miles.³³

The service assessment conducted in-depth research into why the fatality numbers were so high during this outbreak. Contributing factors to the high number of casualties included:

²⁸ From 1996 – 2011, there were 99 EF 4 tornadoes (or 0.48% of the data set) and 13 EF 5 tornadoes (or 0.06% of the data set).

²⁹ In fact, as noted above, the Joplin tornado appeared as part of a cluster. The SNRA project team chose to highlight it because of its infamy and its severe consequences.

³⁰ Based on data from the SPC database. NOAA released the tornado count of 751 tornadoes for the month of April 2011 in its Special Report, but there was a discrepancy between the number of tornadoes (752 in SPC database and 751 in the special report). Therefore, the SNRA team used the SPC database figures. (National Climatic Data Center, 2011)

³¹ Based on data from the SPC database. NOAA released the tornado count of 542 tornadoes for the month of May 2003 in its Special Report, but there was a discrepancy between the number of tornadoes (540 in SPC database and 542 in the special report). Therefore, the SNRA team used the SPC database figures. (National Climatic Data Center, 2011)

³² (National Weather Service, 2011)

³³ (National Weather Service, 2011)

- A large number of rare, long-track, violent tornadoes
- Tornado tracks intersecting densely populated areas
- Damage to warning dissemination sources
- Individuals in the affected areas who did not respond to warnings until confirmed by more than one communication source
- People in the paths of the storms who waited for visual confirmation before taking protective action
- The rapid pace of the storms, which moved at 45-70 mph, giving people who waited for secondary confirmation a smaller window of time in which to take shelter
- Residences that did not have adequate storm shelters³⁴

The large number of severe tornadoes played a crucial role in the high fatality rate. As Kevin Simmons and Daniel Sutter explain,

...insuring residents receive a warning and take shelter in an interior bathroom or closet will not prevent fatalities because these rooms often fail to protect residents from an EF4 or EF5 tornado. In addition, the longer a tornado remains on the ground, more structures and people are placed at risk. To address this threat, engineers have developed safe rooms and underground shelters capable of protecting residents from even the strongest tornadoes. When a significant event occurs, there is enhanced interest and some political pressure to increase the use of shelters. However, violent tornadoes are just too rare to make hardening millions of homes in tornado-prone states cost effective.³⁵

According to the data clustered by the SNRA model, there were 12 EF4 tornadoes and 4 EF5 tornadoes during the outbreak, or 4% of the 382 tornadoes in the outbreak.³⁶ These violent tornadoes were responsible for 277 fatalities (or 88% of fatalities), 2675 injuries (or 86% of injuries), and \$4.2 billion in damage (or 90% of damage).


The prevalence of severe storms during this outbreak led to widespread damage. The combination of high fatalities along with the damage to critical infrastructure such as the electricity grid prompted governors in several states (Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee and Oklahoma) to declare a State of Emergency.

³⁴ (National Weather Service, 2011)

³⁵ (Simmons & Sutter, 2012)

³⁶ There were 382 tornadoes clustered in this outbreak. 4% of the storms were violent (EF4 – EF5).

Figure 2 - The Southern U.S. on 27 April 2011 (NASA Earth Observatory, 2011)



Additional Relevant Information

The Enhanced Fujita (EF) Scale:

In 2007, NOAA began to classify tornado damage using the Enhanced Fujita scale (EF scale). The previous Fujita (F) scale “did not include damage indicators (DIs) and did not provide a method to correlate construction quality with the observed variability in damage resulting from similar wind speeds. Therefore, in 2004 the EF Scale ratings were adopted and provide a more rigorous and defensible metric for the severity of tornadoes.”³⁷ The EF scale allows for a

...more precise and robust way to assess tornado damage than the original [Fujita scale]. It classifies F0-F5 damage as calibrated by engineers and meteorologists across 28 different types of damage indicators (mainly various kinds of buildings, but also a few other structures as well as trees). The idea is that ... a tornado scale needs to take into account the typical strengths and weaknesses of different types of construction. This is because the same wind does different things to different kinds of structures. In the EF scale, there are different, customized standards for assigning any given F rating to a well built, well anchored wood-frame house compared to a garage, school, skyscraper, unanchored house, barn, factory, utility pole or other type of structure.³⁸

³⁷ (Mitigation Assessment Team Report, 2012)

³⁸ (Edwards, Thompson, Crosbie, & Hart, 2004)

Table 3 – Fujita Scale Conversion (Mitigation Assessment Team Report, 2012)

Fujita Scale Converted to EF Scale			
F0	45–78	EF0	65–85
F1	79–117	EF1	86–110
F2	118–161	EF2	111–135
F3	162–209	EF3	136–165
F4	210–261	EF4	166–200
F5	262–317	EF5	Over 200

mph = miles per hour; EF = Enhanced Fujita

At this point in time, NOAA has not gone back to reassess the previous Fujita scale classifications for tornadoes, making the assumption that the Fujita scale data is aligned as closely as possible with the EF scale. The SNRA team agreed with this assertion.

Geographic Shifts in Tornado Prevalence

“Tornado Alley” has long been a colloquial term to describe the most tornado prone regions in the United States, which can “shift dramatically across the space between the Rocky and Appalachian Mountains.”³⁹ Tornadoes have occurred in every state as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico since 1996, and during the 1996 – 2011 timeframe, there were on average 406 tornadoes per state. The District of Columbia had the lowest number of tornadoes with only one tornado reportedly passing through DC, while Texas had the highest proportion of tornadoes with 2,282. This is in large part due to its juxtaposition between the Great Plains and the Gulf of Mexico, as well as its large geographic size.

Meteorologists are researching an eastward shift in the number of tornadoes.⁴⁰ Walker Ashley, a meteorologist at Northern Illinois University, notes that the increased number of tornadoes in the mid-south states (particularly Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi and Arkansas) from 1996 into the 2000s pose a threat to residents of those states. He argues that “while the ‘tornado alley’ region of the Great Plains boasts the most frequent occurrence of tornadoes, most tornado fatalities occur in the nation’s mid-South region, which includes parts of Arkansas, Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi.”⁴¹ There are a number of factors that make the mid-southern states vulnerable to tornadoes:⁴²

- Mobile home density. The NIU meteorologist Walker Ashley noted 44 percent of all fatalities during tornadoes occur in mobile homes, compared to 25 percent in permanent houses. The southeast United States has the highest percentage of mobile-home stock compared with any other region east of the Continental Divide. “Mobile homes make up 30 to 40 percent of the housing stock in some counties in the deep South,” Ashley said. “By far, mobile homes are the most vulnerable structures in a tornadic situation.”
- Nighttime tornadoes. The southeast United States has a higher likelihood of killer nighttime tornadoes. Most states within this region have greater percentages of tornado fatalities occurring at night than other states. “I just completed another study that shows tornadoes from the midnight to sunrise period are 2.5 times as likely to kill as daytime events,” Ashley said.

³⁹ (Dixon, Mercer, Choi, & Allen, 2011)

⁴⁰ This eastward shift into the mid-southern states is subjectively defined as “Dixie Alley.” See Dixon, Mercer, Choi, & Allen, 2011.

⁴¹ (Parisi, 2008)

⁴² The following factors are based on analysis done prior to 2008.

Tornado

Further, nocturnal tornadoes are more difficult to spot, and people are more likely to be asleep when warnings are issued.

- Forested areas. Whereas regions within the Great Plains by definition are lacking in tree cover, the mid-South region is more forested, leading to reduced visibility both for the public and spotters.⁴³
- Early season storms. Storms that occur before the national peak in the severe storm season, which spans May and June, may catch people off guard during a tornado event.
- Complacency. In contrast to other parts of the country, the South lacks a focused “tornado season,” which can lead to complacency. “In the South, people think tornado alley is where you get tornadoes,” Ashley said. “That sort of perception also leads to complacency, which in turn leads to higher fatality rates.” He points out that Oklahoma is known worldwide for the frequency of its tornadoes. Yet the state has fewer fatalities than Arkansas, Alabama and Mississippi.⁴⁴

Advanced Warning Systems

Technology has played an increasingly important role in preparing for, mitigating to, and responding to tornado disasters. The increased use of radar has caused a surge in the number of tornadoes identified by the NWS. Today, the Doppler radar is widely used, and NOAA estimates that it provides on average an 11 minute lead time on tornado formation and can predict with a high level of accuracy where a tornado will strike.⁴⁵ Scientists are currently developing the next generation of weather radars by “adapting phased array technology, currently used on Navy ships, for use in weather forecasting. Phased array technology is expected to lengthen the average lead time for tornado warnings from 12 minutes to 20 minutes.”⁴⁶

According to the NWS, there are several steps of identification before information is disseminated to the public. When there are favorable conditions “for severe weather to develop, a severe thunderstorm or tornado **WATCH** is issued. Weather Service personnel use information from weather radar, spotters, and other sources to issue severe thunderstorm and tornado **WARNINGS** for areas where severe weather is imminent.”⁴⁷ Once the conditions justify the issuance of a tornado watch or a tornado warning, information is disseminated to “local radio and television stations and are broadcast over local NOAA Weather Radio stations serving the warned areas. These warnings are also relayed to local emergency management and public safety officials who can activate local warning systems to alert communities.”⁴⁸

Due to the advancement in technology, affected individuals may receive tornado watch and warning information via the radio, television, cellular phones, internet and/or social media sites. The modernization of warning dissemination is taking place in both the public sector (with FEMA and NWS leading the initiative for tornadoes) and the private sector (with local news and media outlets enhancing dissemination capabilities).⁴⁹

⁴³ Storm spotters play an important role in identifying tornadoes. Over 30 years ago, the National Weather Service (NWS) developed SKYWARN, a program that “encourages communities to develop a network of trained storm spotters who provide detailed reports of dangerous weather conditions to their local emergency management agency and to the NWS.” (National Weather Service, 2012)

⁴⁴ (Parisi, 2008)

⁴⁵ (NOAA National Severe Storms Laboratory, 2012)

⁴⁶ (NOAA National Severe Storms Laboratory, 2012)

⁴⁷ (National Weather Service, 2012)

⁴⁸ (National Weather Service, 2012)

⁴⁹ (Coleman, Knupp, Spann, Elliott, & Peters, 2011)

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Tornado

Wildfire

A wildfire occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 Million.

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	0	5	25
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	0	63	187
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	\$104 Million	\$900 Million	\$2.8 Billion
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	770	110,000	640,000
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ¹	High ²		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	0.2	0.8	3

Event Background

Since 1970, wildfires have destroyed more than 10,000 homes and 20,000 other structures across the nation. Fire suppression has cost government agencies in excess of \$20 billion and the insurance industry \$6 billion in restitution.³ Severe wildfire events have the potential to create great economic losses—from hundreds of millions of dollars to the three California wildfires in 1991, 1993, and 2003, each of which caused damages greater than \$2 billion.⁴

Wildfires are a frequent event in the United States: some 1,570,000 wildfires were reported for the 20 year period 1990-2009, consuming a total of 94,000,000 acres⁵ and 110 human lives.⁶ Only a small proportion of these are large enough to overwhelm local fire-fighting capabilities.⁷ Although the vast majority of large wildfires occur in sparsely populated regions of the United

¹ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories.

² Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘Best’ estimate.

³ Zane et al. for National Center for Environmental Health. 2007. Wildfire-related deaths—Texas, March 12–20, 2006. <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5630a1.htm>.

⁴ See Table 1.

⁵ As compiled from National Interagency Fire Center, Total Wildland Fires and Acres (1960-2009), http://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_totalFires.html.

⁶ As compiled from the SHELDUS database http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvriapps/sheldus_setup/sheldus_login.aspx.

⁷ Brush, Grass, and Forest Fires. Ahrens, Marty, 2010, National Fire Protection Association, pp 11, 15: <http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files//PDF/OS.BushGrassForest.pdf>; analysis of SHELDUS database.


Wildfire

States—a disproportionate share of the very largest wildfires by acres burned occur in Alaska⁸—it is at the “wildland/urban interface,” where the wilderness meets new urban and suburban areas of high population densities, that the wildfires of greatest destructiveness in terms of human life and economic damage occur.⁹ Overall, although wildfire frequency has decreased in the last 200 years, the severity of wildfires has increased, and the overall risk to life and property of wildfires in the U.S. is increasing.¹⁰ In particular, the frequency and economic costs of the very largest wildfires considered here show a sharp increase around 1990.¹¹

For even the most catastrophic wildfires in the United States, the numbers of dead and injured tend to be relatively small. No wildfire causing human deaths on a catastrophic scale in the United States has occurred since 1918, when a brush fire engulfed 38 towns across Minnesota, killing 450 people.¹² Since then, the largest death tolls have not numbered more than 30 from a single incident—for the majority of massive wildfires in recent decades, potentially affected populations receive sufficient advanced warning that no human deaths occur.

The health risk of wildfires is largely dependent on the population in the impacted area as well as the speed and intensity with which the fire moves through those areas.¹³ Wildfires can increase eye and respiratory illnesses related to fire-induced air pollution. Wildfires can also result in direct and indirect deaths caused by direct contact with the wildfire or wildfire product (e.g., smoke or superheated air) or from indirect contact with a wildfire product (e.g., smoke that caused poor visibility resulting in a car crash).¹⁴

Figure 1. Wildfires Greater than 250 Acres, 1980-2003¹⁵



⁸ National Interagency Fire Center, 1997-2009 Large Fires (100,000+ acres), http://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_lgFires.html.

⁹ Fires in the wildland/urban interface, U.S. Fire Administration 2002, at <http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/tfrs/v2i16.pdf>; quoting Ainsworth et al, Natural History of Fire and Flood Cycles, University of California-Santa Barbara 1955, and ‘History of fire’, National Park Service.

¹⁰ Wildfire hazards – a national threat. Fact sheet 2006-3015, U.S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior, 2006; available at <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3015/2006-3015.pdf>.

¹¹ Analysis of SHELDUS database.

¹² National Interagency Fire Center, Historically significant wildland fires: http://www.nifc.gov/fireInfo/fireInfo_stats_histSigFires.html.

¹³ U.S. Climate Change Science Program. 2008. Analyses of the effects of global change on human health and welfare and human systems: A Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research. Gamble J.L. ed, Ebi et al authors, U.S. EPA.

¹⁴ Zane et al. for National Center for Environmental Health. 2007. Wildfire-related deaths—Texas, March 12-20, 2006. <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5630a1.htm>.

¹⁵ Wildfire Hazards – A National Threat. U.S. Geological Survey fact sheet 2006-3015, Feb 2006, available at <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/3015/2006-3015.pdf>.

Assumptions

The estimates provided above are based on historical examples of major wildfires in the United States. The dataset that was considered comprises all wildfires with reported total economic damage of \$100 million or greater (in 2011 dollars) which occurred from 1990 to 2009.¹⁶

Fatalities and Injuries

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate health and safety impacts caused by a wildfire event:

- In order to produce the summary figures in the “Data Summary,” all “Low,” “Best,” and “High,” estimates for human deaths and injuries are calculated from the dataset of catastrophic wildfires selected according to the economic cutoff of \$100M minimum (see Table 1). The set chosen by this economic measure captured the range of the scenarios most catastrophic in numbers of dead and injured for all historical wildfires in the United States since 1990. To compute “Low”, “Best”, and “High” estimates for fatalities and injuries the historical low, average, and high values of the 1990-2009 dataset were used.
- The best-estimate frequency is the average frequency of occurrence of this set of wildfires in the selected twenty-year period. The low frequency is the inverse of the longest time interval between wildfires in this set (in days, measured from fire begin day); the high frequency is the greatest number of fires which occurred in one year (four, in 2006).

Economic Loss

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate economic impacts caused by a wildfire event:

- Since total monetary losses appeared more representative of the geographic spread of wildfires and the relative difficulty of fighting them than the number of dead and injured, the former were used to select a set of national-level events having the capability to overwhelm local emergency response efforts.
- All “Low,” “Best,” and “High,” estimates are calculated from historical data of property damage and crop damage, comprising all U.S. wildfires between 1990 and 2009 meeting a cutoff of \$100 million dollars total cost adjusted to 2011 dollars (Table 1).¹⁷ As the frequency and severity in economic impacts caused by large wildfires were seen to have sharply increased after 1990, the dataset was restricted to this date range to be more representative of present-day conditions.
- Estimates of total losses for wildfires can vary greatly between sources. One of the reasons for this is that different types of economic cost—the cost of suppressing the fire, private property damage, crop damage, costs incurred for environmental remediation, and the indirect business-interruption costs due to lost economic productivity, economic activity, and

¹⁶ As compiled from the SHELDUS database, http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvriapps/sheldus_setup/sheldus_login.aspx. SHELDUS breaks down wildfire events into separate counties, and sometimes breaks down single wildfires in the same location into separate fires with overlapping date ranges, dividing casualty and damages between them to avoid double counting. Where this was obviously done (fires reported by counties in the same state having the same time range, or reported in the same city with overlapping or continuously adjacent time ranges) the separately reported portions of a single fire event were consolidated into single events.

All wildfires (after consolidation) above the \$100 million threshold in 2011 dollars (a CPI multiplier of 1.0464 was used to convert the December 2009 values given in SHELDUS to May 2011) from 1970 follow after these endnotes. As noted in the “Assumptions” section, only the data points from 1990 on were used for analysis.

¹⁷ Available at http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvriapps/sheldus_setup/sheldus_login.aspx.

tax revenue—are accounted for or missing from cost tallies for different major wildfires, even within the same source. In general, for the type of wildfire considered here, which has a direct impact on human populations, the total damages enumerable as property and crop damage are substantially larger than the pure costs of suppressing the fire, and also tend to be substantially larger than the second-order indirect costs of lost economic activity and demand due to business interruption, injuries and fatalities, and loss of tax revenue base.¹⁸ Hence the total reported property and crop damages used here for calculating economic loss estimates are believed to capture the dominant portion of the total economic losses from this type of wildfire.¹⁹

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

To estimate social displacement for the SNRA, U.S. wildfire event data from the international disaster database EM-DAT²⁰ was used to approximate the number of people forced to leave home for two days or greater. EM-DAT's public interface reports estimates for "total number affected" by disaster events: these data are listed in Table 1 for the seven wildfire events in the main historical data set for which it was available.²¹ The low, high, and average of the "total affected" data in Table 1 are used as the social displacement estimates for wildfires in the SNRA.

The "total affected" measure includes the number of people needing immediate assistance, which can include displacements and evacuations; the number of people needing immediate assistance for shelter; and the number of people injured. Because EM-DAT includes injuries in the "total affected" measure, there is potential for double-counting between the SNRA injury and displacement estimates for this event. However, displacement due to wildfires is typically significantly greater than the number of injuries, so using EM-DAT's "total affected" measure was judged to provide an estimate of social displacement of sufficient precision for the SNRA.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this

¹⁸ Western Forestry Leadership Coalition 2010. The true cost of wildfire in the western U.S. At http://www.wflecenter.org/news_pdf/324_pdf.pdf. The SHELDUS database attempts to provide some consistency between reports by relying on two U.S. Government sources (the National Climatic Data Center and the U.S. Fire Administration (<http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvri/products/sheldusmetadata.aspx#6>), and by including property and crop damage estimates only.

¹⁹ Note that the damages to crops and private property considered here to be direct damages—since they represent the property and crops directly damaged or consumed by the wildfire—are usually referred to as 'indirect' costs in studies of the economic damages of wildfires. This is because 'direct' costs are by convention limited to the cost of fire suppression, and all damage caused by the wildfire is considered as 'indirect' or 'additional' costs (see for instance the reference above).

²⁰ EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels. EM-DAT is maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the School of Public Health of the Université Catholique de Louvain located in Brussels, Belgium (<http://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions>), and is supported by the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID (http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/). See Criteria and Definition, <http://www.emdat.be/criteria-and-definition>, EMDAT Data Entry Procedures, at <http://www.emdat.be/source-entry>, and EMDAT Glossary, at <http://www.emdat.be/glossary/> for details of criteria, thresholds, and methodology for the EM-DAT database.

²¹ In addition to these, the Old Topanga fire had an EM-DAT Total Affected count of 130. This was excluded from the SNRA data set as being either a clear undercount (a fire causing \$2 B of damages would be expected to destroy hundreds or thousands of homes) or a count of injuries rather than homeless.

index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.²² The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)²³ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- The EPA experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “High.” Experts made this estimate given the assumption that the wildfire threatens an “urban U.S. setting,” as the fire could envelop oil, chemical, or other hazardous storage tanks and cause widespread release of such materials. However, many wildfires would have low longer-term effects on eco-systems and, in fact, provide longer-term benefits including re-seeding of certain plants and assisting the growth of forested areas. Thus, this scenario could quite conceivably be scored as “Low” or “De Minimus (None)” if the wildfire does not occur in an urban U.S. setting.²⁴

Potential Mitigating Factors

The primary drivers of increased impacts associated with wildfires appear to be the high proportion of new home construction in high-risk regions adjacent to or intermixed with wildlands,²⁵ long-term changes in forest management practices,²⁶ and early effects of climate

²² The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA; wildfires were given a C_{EF} of 1.0.

The numerical estimates calculated from this formula are reported in Appendix G. The semi-quantitative risk matrix is discussed in the Findings (Psychological Distress Risk).

²³ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March]. On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

²⁴ The best and second best estimates were switched by the SNRA project team in October 2011, subsequent to the reporting of the SNRA results to FEMA, in response to stakeholder feedback focusing on the longer-term environmental effects associated with the experts’ “Low” judgment.

²⁵ Fires in the wildland/urban interface, U.S. Fire Administration 2002, at <http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/tfrs/v216.pdf>; quoting Wildland Fire Preparedness/Education Partnership, Firewise Colorado, February 2001.

Wildfire

change.²⁷ These three trends most converge in California, where the data show that two-thirds of the most catastrophic (by cost) wildfires of the last twenty years have occurred.²⁸

Additional Relevant Information

The frequency of catastrophic fires, such as those listed in Table 1, depends upon the threshold used to select which fires will be on the list. The economic cutoff of \$100M resulted in a set of major wildfires which have occurred with an average historical frequency of slightly less than once per year in the 1990-2009 time period (0.8 per year to be precise). Wildfires causing 500 million dollars or greater in damages occur about one every other year (0.45/year); the most catastrophic wildfires, causing \$2 billion or more in damages, occur about one every four years (0.25/year).

Table 1. U.S. wildfires causing ≥ \$100 million in direct economic damages, 1970-2009²⁹

Begin	End	Location	State	Name (if any)	Fatal	Injured	Total damage (2011 dollars)	EM-DAT Tot.Aff
9/25/70	9/29/70	LA/San Diego	CA	Laguna Fire	9	770	\$1,288,741,000	
8/8/77	8/8/77	Monterey	CA		0	0	\$1,182,055,000	
10/20/91	10/20/91	Oakland	CA	Oakland Hills Fire	25	150	\$2,803,063,000	
10/26/93	10/31/93	Sacramento	CA		0	89	\$514,587,000	
10/27/93	11/4/93	Los Angeles	CA	Old Topanga Fire	6	187	\$2,221,587,000	
5/31/98	7/30/98	Central Florida	FL		0	150	\$261,731,000	
7/1/98	7/10/98	Central Florida	FL		0	65	\$523,462,000	40,124
8/2/98	8/30/98	Chelan	WA		0	0	\$123,978,000	
5/4/00	5/31/00	Los Alamos	NM	Cerro Grande	0	0	\$1,966,720,000	25,400
9/29/00	9/30/00	Tehama	CA		0	0	\$717,197,000	
6/17/03	7/15/03	Pima	AZ	Rodeo-Chediski Fire	0	0	\$161,404,000	1,269
10/25/03	11/5/03	San Diego	CA	Cedar Fire	22	157	\$2,572,317,000	27,104
3/12/06	3/18/06	Carson	TX		12	8	\$107,289,000	
4/11/06	4/13/06	Wheeler	TX		0	2	\$103,553,000	
6/24/07	6/30/07	Alpine	CA	Alpine Fire	0	3	\$544,127,000	768
10/21/07	10/31/07	San Diego County	CA		10	132	\$748,175,000	640,064
11/15/08	11/19/08	Sacramento	CA		0	0	\$156,960,000	55,000

²⁶ Fires in the wildland/urban interface, U.S. Fire Administration 2002, <http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/tfrs/v2i16.pdf>; Westerling et al 2006, Warming and earlier spring increase western U.S. forest wildfire activity, *Science* 313(5789) pp 940-943, <http://www.sciencemag.org/content/313/5789/940.full.pdf>.

²⁷ National Academy of Sciences, America's Climate Choices, 2011, p 19, at <http://dels.nas.edu/Report/Americas-Climate-Choices/12781>; Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States, U.S. Global Change Research Group, p 82, at <http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf>; Ryan et al, The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, Land Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity in the United States, U.S. Department of Agriculture Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.3 (2008), sections 3.1-3.2, at <http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf>; Westerling et al 2006, Warming and earlier spring increase western U.S. forest wildfire activity, *Science* 313(5789) pp 940-943, at <http://www.sciencemag.org/content/313/5789/940.full.pdf>.

²⁸ For wildfires above \$100 M reported total cost.

²⁹ Dataset used for analysis excluded the two fire events before 1990.

Winter Storm

A winter storm event occurs resulting in direct economic losses of \$1 billion or greater.¹

Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	0 ²	50 ³	270 ⁴
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses ⁵	0	1,700	14,000
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011) ⁶	\$1 Billion	\$3.1 Billion	\$9 Billion
	Indirect Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)		N/A	
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days		N/A	
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins		N/A	
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins		N/A	
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	0.125	0.56	2

Event Background⁷

The SNRA Winter Storm national-level event was originally developed by the DHS Office of Policy for the 2012–13 Homeland Security National Risk Characterization (HSNRC) project.⁸ The original HSNRC data and analysis were expanded and revised for the 2015 SNRA by project staff from Argonne National Laboratory and FEMA.

The 2015 SNRA considered winter storms, including blizzards, snow storms, and ice storms, together with freezes and other periods of unusual and extremely cold temperatures hazardous to life and agriculture, within the scope of this event.⁹

¹ For the purposes of the SNRA, the Winter Storm event includes snow storms, ice storms, freezes and other periods of extremely and exceptionally cold temperatures, and heavy snowfalls, but excludes snowmelt induced flooding which is counted in the SNRA Flood event.

² Minimum fatalities of the 19 billion dollar winter storm events in Table 2.

³ Average number of fatalities in the 19 winter storm events in Table 2.

⁴ Highest number of fatalities in the 19 winter storm events in Table 2.

⁵ Estimated from NCDC Billion Dollar Disaster List, which does not report injuries or illnesses, by applying injury/fatality ratios from NCDC StormData events corresponding to the winter storm events of the primary data set. See Injuries for details.

⁶ Low, average, and high reported direct economic loss of the 19 winter storm events in Table 2, converted from reported (2014) dollars to 2011 dollars.

⁷ This section is substantially adapted from National Weather Service (2008, June), *Winter storms: the deceptive killers*, at http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/winter/resources/Winter_Storms2008.pdf; National Weather Service (2003), *All about winter storms*; at <https://web.archive.org/web/20040214012848/http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/brochures/wintstm.htm> (retrieved January 2014); Chapter 7, Federal Emergency Management Agency (1997), Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (MHIRA): A Cornerstone of the National Mitigation Strategy; FEMA Mitigation Directorate, at <https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/7251?id=2214> (retrieved April 2013); and Federal Emergency Management Agency (2013, April 26). Emergency preparedness: secondary hazards associated with severe winter weather. Trend analysis, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS), at <https://www.llis.dhs.gov/content/emergency-preparedness-secondary-hazards-associated-severe-winter-weather> (retrieved January 2014).

⁸ The HSNRC was a collaborative effort of the DHS analytic enterprise to expand the 2011 SNRA risk knowledge base to additional threats and hazards, and to adapt the SNRA to the information needs of DHS strategic planning. The HSNRC title for this event is Extreme Cold/Winter Weather.

⁹ Snowmelt-induced flooding is treated within the scope of the SNRA Flood event.

Winter Storm

Extreme cold and winter weather events produce extremely high winds that can create blizzard conditions with wind driven snow, drifting, and dangerous wind chills. Heavy snow accumulations can immobilize a region and paralyze a city, strand motorists, stop the flow of supplies, and disrupt emergency services. Heavy snows can also create the opportunity for avalanches in mountainous regions. Heavy ice accumulations can bring down trees, utility poles and lines and communication towers. Extreme cold temperatures can cause potentially life-threatening conditions such as hypothermia and frostbite. These below-freezing temperatures can damage vegetation and crops and cause water pipes to burst. The melting of significant snow accumulations and ice flow can produce major widespread flooding of rivers and low areas, resulting in potential environmental impacts and substantial damage to property, businesses, transportation infrastructure, and farmland.

Winter storms can be snowstorms and other types of weather associated with winter storms that can be extremely hazardous. These include storms with strong winds, ice storms, extremely cold temperatures, and heavy snow.

- **Storms with strong winds:** Winter storms can be accompanied by strong winds creating blizzard conditions with blinding wind-driven snow, severe drifting, and dangerous wind chill. Strong winds with these intense storms and cold fronts can knock down trees, utility poles, and power lines. Storms near the coast can cause coastal flooding and beach erosion as well as sink ships at sea.
- **Ice storms:** Heavy accumulations of ice can bring down trees and topple utility poles and communication towers. Ice can disrupt communications and power for days while utility companies repair extensive damage. Even small accumulations of ice can be extremely dangerous to motorists and pedestrians. Bridges and overpasses are particularly dangerous because they freeze before other surfaces.
- **Extreme cold:** Exposure to cold can cause frostbite or hypothermia and become life-threatening. Infants and elderly people are most susceptible. What constitutes extreme cold varies in different parts of the country.
 - In the South, near freezing temperatures are considered extreme cold. Freezing temperatures can cause severe damage to citrus fruit crops and other vegetation. Pipes may freeze and burst in homes that are poorly insulated or without heat.
 - In the North, below zero temperatures may be considered as “extreme cold.” Long cold spells can cause rivers to freeze, disrupting shipping. Ice jams may form and lead to flooding.
- **Heavy snow storms:** Heavy snow can immobilize a region and paralyze a city, stranding commuters, closing airports, stopping the flow of supplies, and disrupting emergency and medical services. Accumulations of snow can cause roofs to collapse and knock down trees and power lines. Homes and farms may be isolated for days and unprotected livestock may be lost. In the mountains, heavy snow can lead to avalanches. The cost of snow removal, repairing damages, and the loss of business can have severe economic impacts on cities and towns.¹⁰

¹⁰ Adapted from National Weather Service (2008, June). *Winter storms: the deceptive killers*, at http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/winter/resources/Winter_Storms2008.pdf; and National Weather Service (2003) All about winter storms; at <https://web.archive.org/web/20040214012848/http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/brochures/wintstm.htm> (retrieved January 2014).

Winter storms are known to spawn other natural hazards, such as severe thunderstorms, tornadoes, and extreme winds. These effects disrupt commerce and transportation and often result in loss of life due to accidents or hypothermia. Vulnerable populations such as the elderly and homeless may have adverse health effects if exposed to the elements for extended periods of time. In addition to the impacts on transportation, power transmission, communications, agriculture, and people, severe winter storms can cause extensive coastal flooding, erosion, and property loss.

Winter storms and blizzards originate as mid-latitude depressions or cyclonic weather systems, sometimes following the meandering path of the jet stream.¹¹ A blizzard combines heavy snowfall, high winds, extreme cold, and ice storms. The origins of the weather patterns that cause severe winter storms, such as snowstorms, blizzards, and ice storms are primarily from four sources in the continental U.S.


- In the northwestern states, cyclonic weather systems from the North Pacific Ocean or the Aleutian Island region sweep in as massive low-pressure systems with heavy snow and blizzards.
- In the Midwestern and Upper Plains states, Canadian and Arctic cold fronts push ice and snow deep into the interior region and, in some instances, all the way down to Florida.
- In the Northeast, lake-effect snowstorms develop from the passage of cold air over the relatively warm surfaces of the Great Lakes, causing heavy snowfall and blizzard conditions.
- The eastern and northeastern states are affected by extra-tropical cyclonic weather systems in the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico that produce snow, ice storms, and occasional blizzards.

Nearly the entire United States, except the extreme southern states, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the U.S. Pacific territories is considered at risk for severe winter storms. The degree of exposure depends on the normal severity of local winter weather. In particular, Alaska, the Northeast, and the upper Midwest tend to be more susceptible than others to severe winter storms. Generally, these regions are more prepared for severe winter weather. Areas where such weather is rare, such as the extreme South, are disrupted more severely than are regions that experience severe weather more frequently.

¹¹ Bryant, Edward (1991), Natural Disasters: Cambridge University Press, New York; as cited by FEMA (1996).

Winter Storm

Figure 1: Extent of the Continental U.S. Receiving 5 or More Inches Annual Snowfall¹²



However, experience has shown that no area can fully prepare for severe winter storms. The past two decades have seen many severe winter events forecast days in advance and for which individuals and communities made substantial preparation, but which nonetheless paralyzed multi-state regions for a week or more.

Heavily populated areas are particularly impacted when severe winter storms disrupt communication and power due to downed distribution lines. Snow and ice removal from roads and highways is difficult when accumulations build faster than equipment can clear. Debris associated with heavy icing may impact utility systems and transportation routes.

Secondary and cascading hazards from severe winter storms may include:

- **Power outages:** Power outages can negatively impact response operations by forcing emergency operations centers to operate on standby power and generators. Power outages can also hinder distribution of food, water, and fuel supplies, cause chaos in transportation and response coordination facilities such as airports and train stations, and lead to loss of lives in hospitals and nursing homes.
- **Downed trees and power transmission lines:** In addition to being a hazard in themselves, downed trees and power lines are underlying causes of other secondary hazards such as power outages, road closures, debris removal issues, and restoration challenges.
- **Responder communications issues:** Winter storm emergencies can increase response operations' need for key communication systems such as landlines and battery powered radios at the same time as burdening and disrupting them.
- **Phone service outages:** These include landline outages due to downed telephone wires and drained batteries for wireless personal communication devices due to extended power outages.

¹² U.S Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) (2013, July 2). *Snow and Ice* [electronic resource]. FHWA Road Weather Management Program Office of Operations: at http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/weather/weather_events/snow_ice.htm (retrieved January 2014).

- **Road closure:** In most cases, road closure is due to snow and ice built up on primary and secondary roads, but roads may also be closed due to downed trees or tree branches, utility poles, and electrical lines. Over 70 percent of U.S. roads are located in snowy regions that annually receive more than 5 inches average snowfall. Further, approximately 70 percent of the U.S. population lives in these regions. Each year, state and local agencies spend more than \$2.3 billion on snow and ice control operations. In addition to their direct effects on the local population and economy, road closures can hinder response operations.¹³
- **Public transportation closure:** Snow clearing operations, downed trees and wires, landslides, and overall dangerous conditions can impede public transit.
- Need for **public shelters and warming centers:** Demand for shelters usually increases significantly during larger-scale, prolonged events. Shelters provide cots, food, water, and sometimes shower facilities, and serve as places to gather information, charge electronics, and pick up supplies. Local communities frequently rely on non-governmental organizations to establish and manage shelters. However, communities may not always have a sufficient number of pre-identified sheltering locations, and temporary ad-hoc shelters established as a result often lack emergency power and trained personnel.
- Extensive power outages combined with extreme cold temperatures can also necessitate the opening of designated warming stations. Warming stations provide temporary relief from the cold and can be used to distribute hot meals, provide information, and stage transportation to overnight shelters. Schools, churches, libraries, and public and private community centers can serve as warming stations. Warming station management can include challenges such as ensuring sufficient staffing, understanding roles and responsibilities, having safe transportation to and from the stations, having emergency power, and coordinating delivery of supplies.
- **School, government, and public services closure:** Dangerous weather conditions, snow accumulation, and loss of power are the most frequent reasons determining school closure. However, schools may also be closed in order to be used as emergency shelters. Snow and ice storms affecting the National Capital Region can force closure of Federal Government offices in the Washington, DC area, affecting the entire country.
- **Water distribution issues:** Power loss and burst pipes can cause issues with water distribution and force families to seek alternative shelter to flooded homes or homes without water. Other challenges include providing water to shelters, distribution points, and livestock. Public education on water safety and maintaining or restoring water systems is especially important for winter storms, as power outages can prevent customers from following boil-water and other safety notices. In the aftermath of especially widespread or destructive storms, the state National Guard may be called on to provide water buffaloes for portable water distribution points, in addition to distributing other essential items and assisting in emergency operations and critical infrastructure restoration.

The primary data source for the SNRA Winter Storm event is the Billion-Dollar Disaster List of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Climatic Data Center

¹³ DOT FHWA (2013), *Snow and Ice*, as cited in FEMA (2013). Snow, sleet, and ice cause 580,000 crashes, 180,000 injuries, and 2,200 deaths on U.S. roadways each year. DoT FHWA (2013), *Snow and Ice*, and DoT FHWA (2013, July 2), *How do weather events impact roads?* [electronic resource], FHWA Road Weather Management Program Office of Operations, http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/weather/q1_roadimpact.htm (retrieved January 2014) (cited figures include snow, sleet, slush, and ice -related accidents only).

Winter Storm

(NCDC).¹⁴ Between the years of 1980 and 2013, there were 19 winter storm, ice storm, freeze, and cold wave incidents identified by NOAA as meeting the billion-dollar threshold of the SNRA event (Table 2).¹⁵ There were 945 fatalities and \$58 billion dollars' damage (\$2011) as a result of these extreme events.

Snow flooding incidents were not included within the SNRA Winter Storm data set to avoid double counting with the SNRA Flood event which includes these incidents within its scope.¹⁶ In addition, flood caused fatalities and economic impacts were subtracted from the reported total fatalities and economic impacts of the January 1996 Blizzard/Flood incident prior to calculations.¹⁷

Assumptions

The threshold for this event was set at \$1 billion of direct economic loss. This difference from the \$100 million direct economic loss per occurrence threshold used for other SNRA natural hazards was intentional. While the majority of other SNRA natural hazard incidents are exceptional events by their inherent nature, the regular recurrence of winter storms and freezes as a normal feature of the national risk background required a higher threshold than other hazards in order to capture only those incidents which are exceptions to the norm.

- The Billion-Dollar Disaster List of the NOAA NCDC was used for the identification of extreme cold, freeze, and winter storm events from 1980 to 2013.

Frequency

Low, best, and high estimates of annual frequency represent the inverse of the longest time between incidents in the data set (1/8 years), the average frequency (19 incidents in 34 years, 01/01/1980–12/31/2013), and the maximum number of incidents in 1 year (2).

Fatalities

Low, best, and high estimates of fatalities per occurrence are the minimum (0), average, and maximum fatalities reported by the Billion-Dollar Disaster List (BDL).

Injuries

The BDL¹⁸ does not report injury estimates. Proxy estimates of persons injured were constructed from raw data reported to the NCDC StormData database for winter storm/ice storm/freeze incidents¹⁹ corresponding in temporal and spatial scope to those reported by BDL from 1993 onward.²⁰ Where both sources reported non-zero fatalities, the totals from StormData records were substantially lower than those of BDL, indicating underreporting or a distinction between

¹⁴ National Climatic Data Center (2015). Billion-dollar U.S. weather/climate disasters 1980-2013: <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/overview>.

¹⁵ An additional incident from 2014 is reported, but final cost estimates in the primary source were not yet available for 2014 incidents at the conclusion of the SNRA 2015 analysis (April 2015). For this reason, the observation period used as the basis for the frequency estimates of the SNRA Winter Storm event is limited to 1980–2013.

¹⁶ Snowmelt induced floods can have catastrophic impacts of their own: the SNRA project team identified nine such incidents among the incidents reported on the Billion -Dollar Disaster List.

¹⁷ See footnotes to this incident, Table 2.

¹⁸ Note that this is a convenience abbreviation used here: it is not a term used outside of the context of the SNRA.

¹⁹ Blizzard, Extreme Cold/Wind Chill, Frost/Freeze, Heavy Snow, Ice Storm, Lake-Effect Snow, Winter Storm, Winter Weather, Winter Weather/Mix.

²⁰ Incidents having beginning dates between the dates specified by BDL. Spatial scope of selection is indicated in the above table. StormData reports for the specified hazards begin 1/1/1993.

direct and indirect fatalities.^{21,22} The SNRA project team made the assumption that winter storm, ice storm, and cold wave injuries would generally scale to fatalities (both direct and indirect), while fatalities and injuries from a freeze event would, unless reported otherwise, generally be zero as freeze events primarily damage crops.

- Where StormData reported injuries and both sources reported fatalities, the BDL/StormData fatality ratio for each incident was applied to the StormData reported injuries to estimate total injuries.
- Where StormData reported injuries but BDL did not report fatalities, the average BDL/StormData fatality ratio (6.46) was applied to the StormData reported injuries to estimate total injuries.
- Where StormData did not report injuries but BDL reported fatalities, the average StormData injury/fatality ratio (26.5) was applied to the BDL fatality estimates to estimate total injuries. These incidents included all incidents prior to 1993.²³

Table 1: Injury Estimates Construction

Begin Date	Type	Storm Data Fatal	BDL Fatal	Under-count ratio	Storm Data Injured	Injured (adjusted)	Included/Excluded
3/11/1993	Blizzard	36	270	7.5	428	3,200	All but TX
1/17/1994	Cold Wave	0	70		0	1,850 ²⁴	All
2/8/1994	Ice Storm	1	9	9	1600	14,400	Listed states
1/1/1996	Blizzard	33	154	4.7	186	870	All
1/5/1998	Ice Storm	2	16	8	2	16	Listed states
12/20/1998	Freeze	2	0		0	0	CA only
1/1/1999	Winter Storm	15	25	1.7	91	150	All
1/13/1999	Winter Storm	0	0		75	480 ²⁵	Listed states + DC
1/11/2007	Freeze	0	1		0	0	CA only
4/4/2007	Freeze	0	0		0	0	Listed states
2/1/2011	Blizzard	1	36	36	0	950 ²⁶	All
	Total	90			2,382		
			Average	6.46			

²¹ Although both are NCDC products, BDL uses StormData reporting as one of many inputs. Smith et al (2013, June), U.S. billion-dollar weather and climate disasters: Data sources, trends, accuracy and biases; *Natural Hazards* 67(2) 387–410: at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/docs smith-and-katz-2013.pdf> (retrieved 18 January 2014).

²² StormData preparers report both direct and indirect fatalities and injuries, but only direct fatalities and injuries are represented in the numerical fields. A direct fatality or injury is defined as a fatality or injury directly attributable to the hydro-meteorological event itself, or impact by airborne/falling/moving debris—the weather event or its debris are the active agent of harm. Indirect fatalities/injuries occur in the vicinity or aftermath of a weather event, but are not directly caused by the event. Examples of direct fatalities and injuries include exposure, hypothermia, and injuries from collapsed roofs under heavy snow. Examples of indirect injuries and fatalities include heart attacks from overexertion, vehicle accidents, and carbon monoxide poisoning caused by improvised or improperly vented heating devices. Pp. 9–10, and sections on hazard classes listed in footnote 19: National Weather Service (2007, August 17), Storm Data Preparation (Instruction 10-1605), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; at <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/sym/pd01016005curr.pdf> (retrieved 5 March 2014). Indirect fatalities and injuries usually make up the largest proportion of fatalities and injuries from winter storm, cold weather, and ice storm events. FEMA (2013); Iqbal et al (2012, September), National carbon monoxide poisoning surveillance framework and recent estimates, *Public Health Reports* 127(5) 486–96; at <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3407848/pdf/phr127000486.pdf> (retrieved 7 October 2014); Hamilton, Janice (1998, February 24), Quebec's Ice Storm '98: "all cards wild, all rules broken" in Quebec's shell-shocked hospitals, *Canadian Medical Association Journal [CMAJ/JAMC]* 158(4) 522–524.

²³ A ratio of 40 persons ill per fatality from expert estimation/rule of thumb alternatively could be applied. Changnon, Stanley A. (1999, February). January 1999 Blizzard: Impacts of the New Year's 1999 Blizzard in the Midwest. National Climatic Data Center, NOAA at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/extremes/1999/january/blizzard99.html> (retrieved 13 April 2014).

²⁴ Applying average StormData ratio 26.5 injuries/fatality to BDL fatalities to estimate total injuries (StormData reported 0 injured).

²⁵ Applying average fatality undercount ratio of 6.46 (90 reported StormData fatalities/581 reported BDL fatalities) to reported StormData injuries.

²⁶ Applying average StormData ratio 26.5 injuries/fatality to BDL fatalities to estimate total injuries (StormData reported 0 injured).

Winter Storm

Economic Impacts

Direct Economic Impacts

Direct economic impacts as defined in the SNRA include decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction costs including property (structure, contents, physical infrastructure and other physical property) and crop damage; one year's lost spending due to fatalities; medical costs; and business interruption directly resulting from the impacts of an event. The direct economic loss estimates of the BDL were used for the 2015 SNRA without modification because of the close similarity of its direct economic loss estimation methodology with that of the SNRA.²⁷

In performing these disaster cost assessments, the NCDC gathers the statistics from a wide variety of sources.²⁸ The total estimated costs of these events are the costs in terms of dollars that would not have been incurred had the event not taken place. Insured and uninsured losses are included in damage estimates. Sources include the National Weather Service, FEMA, U.S. Department of Agriculture, other U.S. Government agencies, individual state emergency management agencies, state and regional climate centers, media reports, and insurance industry estimates.²⁹ Given the threshold of \$1 billion events, the best estimate was \$3 billion with low and high estimates at \$1 billion and \$9 billion dollars, respectively.

Indirect Economic Impacts³⁰

Direct economic losses alone do not represent the full picture of the economic impacts to the Nation from a disaster or attack. Indirect and induced economic losses can be substantially larger than the direct economic losses that occur in the aftermath of an event.

- Indirect economic impacts include costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the industries impacted by the direct costs. Indirect impacts also include positive offsets due to increased spending within sectors impacted by the direct costs.³¹
- Induced economic impacts include those incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries. Induced impacts can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.

Highly mature economic models exist for calculating estimates of indirect and induced economic losses for natural disasters, human and animal pandemics, technological accidents, terrorist attacks, and cyber events. At present, there is no generally agreed upon or practical method for

²⁷ Smith et al (2013, June). U.S. billion-dollar weather and climate disasters: Data sources, trends, accuracy and biases. *Natural Hazards* 67(2) 387–410. At <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/docs.smith-and-katz-2013.pdf> (retrieved 18 January 2014).

²⁸ In 2012, NCDC reviewed its methodology how it develops Billion-dollar Disasters and examined possible inaccuracy and biases in the data sources and methodology used in developing the loss assessments. As a result, NCDC temporarily rounded their loss estimates to the nearest billion dollars while implementing the newest research to define uncertainty and confidence intervals surrounding these loss estimates. The current methodology for the production of this loss data set is described in Smith et al (2013). This document highlights its strengths and limitations including sources of uncertainty and bias. The Insurance Services Office/Property Claims Service, FEMA's National Flood Insurance Program and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's crop insurance program are key sources of quantified disaster loss data, among others. The methodology uses a factor approach to convert from insured losses to total direct losses, one potential limitation.

²⁹ National Climatic Data Center; <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/overview>.

³⁰ The SNRA's taxonomy of indirect and induced economic impacts comes from the DHS Terrorism Risk Assessments and so is retained here for consistency across DHS assessments. However, both combined will be referred to as 'indirect economic impacts' where it is not expected to impede clarity.

³¹ These may include the waste management, environmental consulting, mortuary services, and medical industries, among others.

translating estimates produced by these disparate models into a single measure which can be meaningfully compared across all of the threats and hazards of the SNRA in a defensible fashion. Because such a measure would yield data of great value for multiple purposes beyond the context of the SNRA and similar assessments, it has been among the highest risk research priorities for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its academic Centers of Excellence for over a decade. Should these efforts prove successful in coming years, the next iteration of the SNRA will include comparisons of total economic loss to the Nation across all of its threats and hazards.

Social Displacement

The impacts of extreme cold/winter weather in North American climate regions are comparatively minor, in the sense of permanent disruption to life for most individuals and communities. Impacts generally include closed business and schools along with decreased travel. With the exception of homes destroyed by collapsed roofs or storm-induced flooding, long-term social displacement resulting from this threat is rare.

The SNRA project team was not able to find defensible estimates for persons displaced from home for two or more days corresponding to the historical data set of winter storm events used for the other impact estimates. Determining such estimates is a priority for the next update of the SNRA.

Psychological Impacts

The SNRA metric of psychological distress uses the fatality, injury/illness, and social displacement estimates as inputs (Appendix G). As social displacement estimates could not be determined for the Extreme Cold/Winter Weather event, the psychological distress impact measure could not be calculated.

Environmental Impact

The environmental impact estimate, which was assessed for the 23 original national-level events of the 2011 SNRA by subject matter experts from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), could not be assessed for the winter weather event which was added to the SNRA in calendar year 2015. A future iteration of the SNRA will assess the environmental impacts of this event.

Potential Mitigating Factors

Mitigation efforts to reduce the frequency severity of extreme cold/winter weather are related to a reduction in the burning of hydrocarbons through a decreased global dependence on fossil fuels. These mitigation efforts are focused on reduced occurrence and decreased severity rather than individual measures that can be taken to reduce extreme cold/winter weather mortality (e.g., limiting exposure to the elements, using safer heating devices). At present, emergency planning efforts to ensure vulnerable populations are cared for during extreme cold/winter weather events will limit health-related illnesses and fatalities from exposure.

Winter Storm**Table 2: Winter Storm Eventsⁱ**

Begin Dateⁱⁱ	End Date	Fatal	Injuredⁱⁱⁱ	DE \$B^{iv} (2014)	Description
01/08/82	01/16/82	85	2,250	2	Midwest/Southeast/Northeast Winter Storm/Coldwave—January 1982: Winter storm and coldwave affect numerous states (AL, AR, CT, DE, FL, GA, IA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MA, MD, ME, MI, MN, MO, MS, NC, ND, NH, NJ, NY, OH, OK, PA, RI, SC, TN, TX, VA, VT, WI, WV) across the Midwest, Southeast, and Northeast.
12/24/83	12/25/83	0	0	5	Florida Freeze—December 1983: Severe freeze central/northern Florida.
01/19/85	01/22/85	150	4,000	2	Winter Damage, Cold Wave—January 1985: Extreme cold and winter storms in the Southeast, South, Southwest, Northeast, Midwest, and North.
01/20/85	01/22/85	0	0	3	Florida Freeze—January 1985: Severe freeze central/northern Florida.
12/21/89	12/26/89	100	2,700	1	Winter Damage, Cold Wave, Frost—December 1989: Northeast, Southeast hit by winter storms.
12/23/89	12/25/89	10	270	4	Florida Freeze—December 1989: Severe freeze damages citrus crops across central/northern Florida.
12/18/90	12/25/90	0	0	6	California Freeze—December 1990: Severe freeze in the Central and Southern San Joaquin Valley caused the loss of citrus, avocado trees, and other crops in many areas. Several days of subfreezing temperatures occurred, with some valley locations in the teens.
12/10/92	12/13/92	19	500	4	Nor'easter—December 1992: Slow-moving storm batters northeast U.S. coast, New England hardest hit.
03/11/93	03/14/93	270	3,200	9	Storm/Blizzard—March 1993: Storm of the Century hits entire eastern seaboard with tornadoes (FL), high winds, and heavy snows (2–4 feet).
01/17/94	01/20/94	70	1,859	2	Winter Damage, Cold Wave—January 1994: Winter storm affects Southeast and Northeast.
02/08/94	02/13/94	9	14,400	5	Southeast Ice Storm—February 1994: Intense ice storm with extensive damage in portions of TX, OK, AR, LA, MS, AL, TN, GA, SC, NC, and VA.
01/01/96	01/31/96	154 ^v	870	4 ^{vi}	Blizzard [Blizzard/Flood]—January 1996: Very heavy snowstorm (1–4 feet) over Appalachians, Mid-Atlantic, and Northeast [followed by severe flooding in parts of same area due to rain and snowmelt].
01/05/98	01/09/98	16	16	2	Northeast Ice Storm—January 1998: Intense ice storm hits Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and New York, with extensive forestry losses.
12/20/98	12/28/98	0	0	4	California Freeze—December 1998: A severe freeze damaged fruit and vegetable crops in the Central and Southern San Joaquin Valley. Extended intervals of sub 27°F temperatures occurred over an 8-day period.
01/01/99	01/04/99	25	150	1	Winter Storm—January 1999: South, Southeast, Midwest, Northeast affected by damaging winter storm.
01/13/99	01/16/99	0	480	1	Central and Eastern Winter Storm—mid-January 1999: Winter storm affecting the Central and Eastern states including IL, IN, OH, MI, WV, VA, MD, PA, NJ, NY, MA, CT, VT, NH and ME.
01/11/07	01/17/07	1	0	2	California Freeze—January 2007: Widespread agricultural freeze—for nearly 2 weeks in January, overnight temperatures over a good portion of California dipped into the 20s, destroying numerous agricultural crops; with citrus, berry, and vegetable crops most affected.
04/04/07	04/10/07	0	0	2	Spring Freeze—April 2007: Widespread severe freeze over much of the east and Midwest (AL, AR, GA, IL, IN, IA, KS, KY, MS, MO, NE, NC, OH, OK, SC, TN, VA, WV), causing significant losses in fruit crops, field crops (especially wheat), and the ornamental industry. Temperatures in the teens/20s accompanied by rather high winds nullified typical crop-protection systems.
02/01/11	02/03/11	36	950	2	Groundhog Day Blizzard—February 1–3, 2011: A large winter storm impacted many central, eastern and northeastern states. The city of Chicago was brought to a virtual standstill as between 1 and 2 feet of snow fell over the area.

ⁱ Winter Storm and Freeze events as reported by the Billion Dollar Disaster List of NOAA's National Climatic Data Center (NCDC). NCDC (2015). Billion-dollar U.S. weather/climate disasters 1980–2013: at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events> [dynamic resource: table represents data current as of 3 April 2015]. This table reflects the 2014 dollars reported by the NOAA source. The final SNRA estimates in the Data Table summary are converted to 2011 dollars for comparison with existing SNRA events (CPI 2014–2011, 0.950).

ⁱⁱ Dates as reported by Web version (4/3/2015) of Billion Dollar Disaster List (static pdf version, <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events.pdf> [retrieved 3 April 2015] does not list exact dates for all incidents).

ⁱⁱⁱ Proxy estimates constructed from corresponding incidents 1993–2011 in the StormData database and ratios between BDL and StormData reported fatalities to account for underreporting and differing reporting of direct/indirect fatalities and injuries.

^{iv} Direct economic loss. Costs adjusted to 2014 dollars: Cost estimates are rounded to nearest billion-dollars. Ongoing research is seeking to define uncertainty and confidence intervals around the cost of each event.

^v Flood fatalities are backed out to avoid double counting with the SNRA Flood event. Of the 187 total fatalities reported by NCDC, 154 were reported as due to blizzard and winter conditions, and 33 as due to flooding. Lott et al (1996, April). The winter of '95–96: a season of extremes. Pp. 3–4. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climatic Data Center, technical report 96-02: at <http://www1.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/techrepts/tr9602/tr9602.pdf> (retrieved 13 April 2014).

^{vi} Lott et al (1996) do not split out flood economic damages. The direct economic losses reported from the corresponding incident in the SNRA flood data set (see Flood risk summary sheet), snowmelt flood VA-NY start date 1/18/1996: USD2011 \$475,800,500 inflated to 2014 dollars [\$500, 843,000] rounded to nearest billion to maintain one significant figure of primary NCDC source used for this summary sheet) were subtracted from the NCDC reported \$5 billion total damage to avoid double counting with the SNRA flood event.

Biological Food Contamination

Accidental conditions where introduction of a biological agent (e.g., *Salmonella*, *E.coli*, botulinum toxin) into the food supply results in 100 hospitalizations or greater and a multi-state response. This event does not include food contamination caused by malicious acts.

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities ¹	Number of Fatalities	0	11	42
	Injuries and Illnesses ²	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	200	17,000	45,000
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	N/A ³		
Social	Social Displacement ^{4,5}	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0	400	950
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact ⁶	Qualitative Bins ⁷	Moderate ⁸		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events ⁹	Number of Events per Year	0.2	0.64	1.2

Event Background

The risk data estimated for this summary sheet are applicable to a contamination event (or a series of interconnected events) where a biological agent is accidentally or unintentionally

¹ Low, average, and high adjusted fatalities of the set of multistate outbreaks with 100 or more reported hospitalizations between 1998 and 2008 from the CDC FOOD database. Reported fatalities were multiplied by a factor of 2 to compensate for underreporting (see text).

² Low, average, and high adjusted illnesses from the set of events described in note 1. Reported illnesses were multiplied by the CDC's recommended multipliers (see Table 2 below) to compensate for underdiagnosis and underreporting.

³ The SNRA project team judged that the single data point calculated (see text) was insufficient to determine a representative range of economic impact estimates for this event.

⁴ The SNRA measure of Social Displacement is the number of people displaced from their homes for two or more days.

⁵ Low and best estimates of 0 and 400 respectively reflect expert judgment. The high estimate of 950 is a judgment based on a historic incident where contamination of the water by *E. coli* in the Ontario community of Kashechewan forced the evacuation of the town (see discussion for references).

⁶ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories.

⁷ In 2011, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories. Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'best' estimate.

⁸ Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'Best' estimate.

⁹ Frequency estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years of the longest interval between accident events (low), the mean frequency of the accident events (best), and the greatest number of accidents within one year (high) of the set described in note 1 above.

Biological Food Contamination

introduced into the U.S. food supply resulting in national level public health impacts and product recalls. This event may include contamination of domestic food products, international food imports, or food products or ingredients that are utilized as a component of a supply chain. Such an incident may span multiple months as the investigation on the disease agent or contaminant is identified through laboratory analysis and traced to the product origin. This assessment only addresses outbreaks that result directly in harm to human health, and does not assess the impacts of crop or animal diseases, such as Foot and Mouth Disease in cattle, which could have catastrophic effects on the Nation. Nor does it address intentional contamination of the food supply by a terrorist; that risk is captured in a different National Level Event.

Data from the CDC's Foodborne Outbreak Online Database (FOOD)¹⁰ were used to identify events that rose to a level of national significance. Data in FOOD come from CDC's national Foodborne Disease Outbreak Surveillance System database. Most foodborne outbreaks are investigated by the state, local, territorial, and tribal health departments where the outbreak occurs. Outbreak information is then reported to CDC by the public health agency that conducted the investigation. CDC is only directly involved in outbreak investigations that involve more than one state, or are particularly large, or when the state or local health department requests assistance. Because of this only multistate outbreaks that resulted in reported hospitalizations of more than 100 persons were considered to be National Level Events. There have been seven such events between 1998 and 2008, the years included in FOOD.

The best-estimate frequency is the average frequency of occurrence of this set of events in the selected eleven year period. The low frequency is the inverse of the longest time interval between outbreaks in this set (5 years); the high frequency is the greatest number of outbreaks which occurred in one year (two, in 2006).

Assumptions

Fatalities and Illnesses

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate health and safety impacts resulting from an accidental biological food contamination event:

- Outbreaks included in FOOD report a number of illnesses and fatalities. These reported numbers are known to be low because they do not account for underreporting or underdiagnosis. Consequently, the reported numbers were adjusted using the latest multipliers provided by the CDC.¹¹
- Fatalities were increased by a factor of two, while illnesses were increased with the following multipliers:

¹⁰ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Foodborne Outbreak Online Database. Atlanta, Georgia: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Available from URL: <http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneoutbreaks>. Accessed 08/17/2011.

¹¹ Scallan E, Hoekstra RM, Angulo FJ, Tauxe RV, Widdowson M-A, Roy SL, et al. Foodborne illness acquired in the United States—major pathogens. *Emerging Infectious Diseases*. Volume 17 Number 1 January 2011. Available from URL: <http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/17/1/7.htm>. Accessed on 08/22/2011.

Table 1: Multipliers Used to Adjust Reported Illnesses

Pathogen	Multipliers	
	Underreporting	Underdiagnosis
STEC O157 (<i>E. Coli</i>)	1.0	26.1
<i>Salmonella</i> spp., nontyphoidal	1.0	29.3
<i>Listeria Monocytogenes</i>	1.0	2.1

- The “Low,” “Best,” and “High” values of illnesses and fatalities are populated with the minimum, mean, and maximum of these adjusted values.

Table 2: Reported and Adjusted Values for SNRA Events

Outbreak	Reported Illnesses	Adjusted Illnesses	Reported Fatalities	Adjusted Fatalities
1998 <i>Lysteria</i> -Hot Dog	101	212	21	42
2004 <i>Salmonella</i> -Roma Tomato	429	12,570	0	0
2006 <i>E. Coli</i> -Spinach	238	6,212	5	10
2006 <i>Salmonella</i> -Peanut Butter	715	20,950	9	18
2007 <i>Salmonella</i> -Pot Pie	401	11,749	3	6
2008 <i>Salmonella</i> - Jalapeno/Serrano Peppers	1,535	44,976	2	4
2008 <i>Salmonella</i> -Peanut Butter	716	20,979	9	18

Economic Loss

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate economic impacts resulting from an accidental biological food contamination event:

- For each of the seven outbreaks, the costs of lost productivity due to illness as well as medical costs were calculated using the USDA Economic Research Service’s Foodborne Illness Cost Calculator,¹² with the Value of Statistical Life reset to \$0.

Table 3: Economic Impact (Adjusted to 2010 USD)

Outbreak	Lost Productivity & Medical Costs	Business Interruption Costs	Total
1998 <i>Lysteria</i> -Hot Dog	N/A		
2004 <i>Salmonella</i> -Roma Tomato	\$4.2 Million		
2006 <i>E. Coli</i> -Spinach	\$6.0 Million	\$61.4 Million ¹³	\$67.4 Million
2006 <i>Salmonella</i> -Peanut Butter	\$4.7 Million		
2007 <i>Salmonella</i> -Pot Pie	\$3.6 Million		
2008 <i>Salmonella</i> Jalapeno/Serrano Peppers	\$11.0 Million		
2008 <i>Salmonella</i> -Peanut Butter	\$5.7 Million		

Business interruption costs could be determined for only one event. However, its magnitude indicated that the unknown business interruption cost estimates for other events were likely to

¹² United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Foodborne Illness Cost Calculator. Available from URL: <http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FoodBorneIllness>. Accessed on 08/19/2011.

¹³ United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Consumers’ Response to the 2006 Foodborne Illness Outbreak Linked to Spinach. Available from URL: <http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/March10/Features/OutbreakSpinach.htm>. Accessed on 08/19/2011.

Biological Food Contamination

dominate total direct costs. As a representative range of total costs could not be determined for additional data points, the SNRA project team elected not to report economic impacts for the Biological Food Contamination event.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- Social displacement estimates for the accidental Biological Food Contamination event were provided by staff researchers and subject matter experts at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).¹⁴
- The low and best estimates of 0 and 400 respectively reflect expert judgment. The high estimate of 950 is a judgment based on a historic incident where contamination of the water by *E. coli* in the Ontario community of Kashechewan forced the evacuation of the town.¹⁵

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.¹⁶ The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

¹⁴ START is a Department of Homeland Security University Center of Excellence that focuses on social and behavioral aspects of terrorism, natural disasters, and technological accidents, and the social, behavioral, cultural and economic factors influencing responses to and recovery from catastrophes.

¹⁵ Contamination of the water by *E. coli* in the Ontario community of Kashechewan forced the evacuation of the town. Source: Virchez, Jorge, and Ronald Brisbois. 2007. "A Historical and Situational Summary of Relations between Canada and the First Nations: The case of the Community of Kashechewan in Northern Ontario." *Asociacion Mexicana de Estudios sobre Canada*, AC. 87-100. Note that contamination of the food supply is likely to cause minimal displacement.

¹⁶ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: accidental Biological Food Contamination was given a C_{EF} of 1.0.

The numerical estimates calculated from this formula are reported in Appendix G. The semi-quantitative risk matrix is discussed in the Findings (Psychological Distress Risk).

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., as chemical or biological agents, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹⁷ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “Moderate.” Moderate impacts would most likely result from either waste disposal (e.g., disposing of the contaminated food supply) or dissemination of an infectious agent through some type of accidental application (e.g., pesticide application on crops). In either event, the result could be the introduction of a non-native pathogen into native species, thus causing extinction and permanent change to the ecosystem if disseminated over a wide geographic area. If the agent infects only humans, the environmental/ecological risk would be “Low.” There may also be increased environmental/ecological risk if the food production cycle were disrupted. Changing the mechanisms of food production could increase the environmental/ecological risk.

Potential Mitigating Factors

The impacts caused by an accidental introduction of an infectious agent into the food supply can be mitigated through several preparedness strategies. Effective investigative capability, early warning systems and emergency information dissemination are necessary to rapidly detect contamination, locate its source and notify the public of the event and necessary safety measures. Monitoring and warning systems should be regularly tested to ensure that they are functioning properly when an event occurs. Further, a properly prepared and deployed response team could potentially aid in containing the spread of the contamination.

¹⁷ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

Biological Food Contamination

Chemical Substance Release

Accidental conditions where release of a large volume of a chemical acutely toxic to human beings (a toxic inhalation hazard, or TIH) from a chemical plant, storage facility, or transportation mode results in either one or more offsite fatalities, or one or more fatalities (either on- or offsite) with offsite evacuations/shelter-in-place. This event does not include releases caused by malicious acts.

Data Summary¹

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities ²	1	5	25
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses ²	0	57	790
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011) ²	\$43,000	\$14 Million	\$330 Million
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days ²	0	260	5,400
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ³	Moderate ⁴		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year ⁵	0.61	1.6	5

Event Background

The dominant risk to human beings from accidental chemical releases is from an accidental release of a highly toxic gas, or toxic inhalation hazard (TIH), in a densely populated area.⁶ The 1984 accidental release of toxic methyl isocyanate gas from the Union Carbide chemical plant in

¹ The data reported in this table represent historical U.S. accident data. This data is not representative of either the likelihood or the impacts of a catastrophic, mass-casualty chemical accident of a magnitude which has not yet occurred in the United States. The SNRA project team used historic data because a defensible estimate for the likelihood of a catastrophic accident could not be determined. For additional discussion, see Event Background section below.

² Low, best, and high estimates for fatalities, injuries and illnesses, direct economic loss, and number of displaced from homes for at least two days come from the low, average, and high values of the set of events meeting one of the following two threshold criteria: 1) at least one “public” fatality, defined as one fatality other or in addition to an employee fatality, caused by the hazardous material; 2) at least one fatality of any kind caused by the hazardous material, plus a reported evacuation or shelter-in-place order; this set came from the set of all reported toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) incidents reported 1994-2010 to either the EPA’s RMP (Risk Management Program) accident database for fixed industrial producers and consumers of listed toxic chemicals above given threshold limits, or to the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Substances Administration (PHMSA)’s database of road, rail, water, and air transportation accidents. For further details see Assumptions sections below.

³ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories.

⁴ Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘best’ estimate.

⁵ Frequency estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years of the longest interval between accident events (low), the mean frequency of the accident events (best), and the greatest number of accidents within one year (high) of the set described in note 2 above.

⁶ See note 11.

Chemical Substance Release

the city of Bhopal, India, which killed about 4,000 people immediately and 20,000 in subsequent years, is the primary historical example of the human damage such a release may cause.⁷

Across the United States, accidental releases of chemicals hazardous to human beings occur with a frequency of several times a day.⁸ Of these, the largest number of historical (and recurring) accidents causing human death and injury—sometimes in the dozens or hundreds—are caused by fires and explosions from highly flammable chemicals such as propane, liquefied petroleum gas, and ammonium nitrate. However, as these fire and explosion hazards are of a different character and potential magnitude than the hazard posed by a highly toxic gas such as chlorine, hydrogen fluoride (HF), or the Bhopal chemical methyl isocyanate which could potentially kill thousands of people if released in a high population area,⁹ they have not been included within the scope of this chemical substance release event analysis for the purpose of the SNRA.

Highly toxic gases may be released while transported by road, rail, or pipeline, or from a fixed facility where they are manufactured, stored, or used for further chemical processing, agricultural chemical production, meat packing, or water treatment. Of the most toxic industrial chemicals, chlorine in particular is used and transported in a total quantity much greater than all the other most toxic industrial chemicals combined: after anhydrous ammonia (which is less toxic),¹⁰ it is the second most commonly used and transported chemical in this country.¹¹ Chlorine is also normally stored, used, and transported in the United States in volumes large enough to kill thousands of people if released in a densely populated area.¹² Further, like other hazardous chemicals it is routinely transported through the nation's most densely populated areas, in particular Chicago, the central hub of North America's railroad network (one out of every 25 of the nation's major rail accidents—derailments, fires, explosions—occur in Cook County, Illinois alone).¹³ An insurance model of a single accidental chlorine railcar breach in the Chicago railyards projected 10,200 fatalities, with several square miles of the city's business district shut down and cordoned off for a week for investigation and recovery efforts.¹⁴ Similarly, FEMA's

⁷ [Pastel/Bhopal]. Bibliographic information for all cited references may be found at the end of this section.

⁸ [Belke], appendix A. A scrolling newsfeed on the homepage of the Chemical Safety Board at <http://www.csb.gov/> lists all the reported chemical accidents which occurred in the United States in the past week. A similar newsfeed with global coverage may be found on the homepage of the Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center, <http://process-safety.tamu.edu/>.

⁹ [Argonne-2000] pp 128, 132; [PHMSA].

¹⁰ [Argonne-2000] pp 128, 132; [PHMSA].

¹¹ Chlorine gas, like the Bhopal chemical methyl isocyanate and many other industrial chemicals used in the U.S., is a highly toxic gas capable of killing large numbers of people at relatively low concentrations, but is used and transported in much greater quantities than any other. Anhydrous ammonia and flammable chemicals such as propane are used and shipped in comparable total quantities in storage tanks, pipelines, trucks, and railcars comparable to chlorine, under much less stringent safety standards, and are involved in a much higher proportion of fatal accidents. However, they are most frequently shipped in much smaller containers than chlorine, and by toxicity (ammonia) or blast range (propane and other flammables) they have the capability to cause many fewer deaths than chlorine even if transported in similar quantities (which is why their required storage and shipment safety standards are much lower) ([Wharton] pp 69, 129, [DoT-1992] p 7-9, [Argonne-2000] pp 4-5, 19, 67-69, 126-128, 148-150).

¹² Unlike most other chemicals which are most frequently shipped by road and pipelines, the primary hazard chlorine is shipped almost exclusively (85%) by rail, usually in standard 90 ton (18,000 gallon) tanks ([Branscomb] pp 11-12) which are of comparable size to the largest storage tanks (60,000 – 120,000 gallon) used in fixed facilities often cited in catastrophic-release scenarios (as in [FEMA-2006]). Eleven ruptures of chlorine railcars resulting in the loss of most or all contents have occurred in the 42 year period 1965-2007 which included 2.2 million rail shipments of chlorine (for comparison, the 2007 annual rate was 30,000 shipments). [ACC]

¹³ 7% of the nation's rail network mileage lies within the highest population density counties, 3000 people per square mile or more ([Vanderbilt] pp 3-5); 8% of severe rail accidents occur in these counties (the 23 most densely populated) (all derailments, fires, and explosions, 2006-2010, [FRA] database sorted by county, correlated with Census county population data). Half of these (4% of the total) occur in Cook County, IL alone. The population density of Cook County is 5800 people per square mile; the population of Aiken County, South Carolina where the 2005 Graniteville crash resulted in 9 fatalities and 631 injuries was 144 per square mile ([DoT-PHMSA] pp 33, 104). Other references calculating similar proportions include ([DoT-1992] pp 5-15-19, [DoE] pp 68-72).

DoT's most recent review noted

DOT is aware that there are [toxic inhalation hazard] rail movements along corridors with population densities several times higher than these [four of the major hazmat rail releases of the past decade]. This coupled with the relatively favorable circumstances surrounding the four incidents leads DOT to believe that the mean of the casualties resulting from the releases analyzed is likely not the true mean of the distribution of the population of preventable releases, but rather lies in the lower end of the distribution. DOT believes that absent issuance of the proposed standards a future incident could potentially result in a larger number of casualties than experienced in recent years. ([DoT-PHMSA] p 33)

¹⁴ [RMS] pp 54-59. This estimate of 10,200 dead (and additionally 32,400 injured) models a 90-ton chlorine railcar breach in a switchyard in Chicago, where the areas of greatest rail line and node density are surrounded by densely populated neighborhoods. Although hundreds of thousands of people

current National Planning Scenario for a catastrophic release of chlorine from a fixed plant near a medium sized city projects 17,000 dead.¹⁵

However, these impact models do not attempt to estimate the likelihood of such an event to occur, which was a particular requirement of the SNRA project. Compared to other types of events (for instance, nuclear plant accidents), few studies linking frequency to impact estimates have been done for catastrophic chemical accidents. Although the overall national risk to human health and life from catastrophic accidents has been quantitatively modeled in a number of studies of the transportation portion of the chemical sector as a whole, these results could not be used for the SNRA because comparable national-scale estimates could not be found for fixed facilities. Unlike the transportation sector, it does not appear that a national risk assessment attempting to answer these questions for the fixed-facility sector has been attempted since 1974.¹⁶

This 1974 national risk assessment for catastrophic chemical accidents¹⁷ (performed by UCLA's School of Engineering, also referenced below by its lead author as Simmons et al 1974) was commissioned by the Atomic Energy Commission as one of a set of studies attempting to quantify the risk on a national scale of a number of different hazards (dam failure, airplane accidents, hurricanes, tornadoes, asteroids) for the purpose of comparison with the risk to the nation of civilian nuclear power.¹⁸ However, only the risk of transporting chlorine by rail was treated in a fully quantitative manner: semi-quantitative analyses were used to assess that this risk dominated the national risk of catastrophic accidents from all TIH in the fixed and transportation sectors combined to such an extent, that the chlorine rail accident likelihood and impact estimates could be taken as a reasonable approximation to the risk of catastrophic mass-casualty accidents from the chemical industry as a whole. Although its quantitative approach was further developed in subsequent and more sophisticated studies of the transportation sector taken in isolation, and similar methods have been applied to individual chemical process plants, no public industry-wide quantitative risk assessment has been attempted in this country since.¹⁹

may be within the zone of a modeled chlorine cloud (see also [FEMA-2006]), most scenarios (including both of these) realistically assume that nearly everyone is indoors at home or at work, or is able to go indoors before they are overcome: such shelter-in-place measures are known from experience to reduce the number of human casualties by ten times or more. Under circumstances where large numbers of people may be gathered for an outdoor event the fatality rate may be much higher: a similarly modeled scenario of a chlorine railcar breach within Washington DC, but set at a time when thousands of people are thronged on the National Mall for a festival or other event, estimated 100,000 fatalities. [Branscomb] p 5 footnote 9.

¹⁵ [FEMA-2006]. This scenario modeled a deliberate release, but the consequences are similar to a catastrophic accidental release: once a large volume of gas escapes to the air, its subsequent behavior no longer depends on the cause of the breach.

¹⁶ Accident data and worst-case scenarios reported by fixed facilities in the United States from 1995-2005 have been most extensively analyzed by [Belke], [Wharton], [Kleindorfer], and other reports from its authors available at this reference's parent site link (<http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/papers.php>). They do not attempt to quantitatively estimate the likelihood of the type of low-frequency high-consequence accidents within the scope of SNRA. They have, however, concluded that the extensively documented historical frequency of high-frequency but lower-consequence accidents has too low a correlation with the likelihood of high-consequence events for extrapolation from historical data to generate meaningful frequency estimates for high-consequence accidents [Elliot].

One partial list of major historical accidents involving chlorine (as well as the flammable liquefied petroleum gas and the explosive ammonium nitrate not considered here) may be found at [UK-HSE]: although worldwide in scope, it is dominated by accidents from fixed facilities which have occurred in the United States. Another list of major chemical accidents may be obtained from the UN Environmental Program's APPELL database [APPELL] by query limited to the United States and sorted by chemical involved. Other good historical sources of comprehensive chemical accident lists include [NICS], [Lees], and for pre-1974 accidents [EPA-1974].

Because of its reliance on recent historical data, this risk summary sheet for chemical accidents is essentially an update of [EPA-1974]. Along with [Simmons] which was completed in the same year (1974) these appear to have been the last and only attempts to produce a national-scale risk assessment for chemical accidents in the United States. See also [Fullwood] pp 428ff.

¹⁷ [Simmons].

¹⁸ These results were presented in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's landmark 1975 Reactor Safety Study [WASH-1400], also known as the Rasmussen Report, which developed many of the techniques of probabilistic risk assessment relied upon for risk assessments today. In its quantitative approach, communication of uncertainty estimates, all-hazards scope, and deliberate comparison of different national-level risks by common metrics, chapter 6 of this report reads very similar to the SNRA.

¹⁹ [Simmons] Being also almost 40 years old, it is unclear to what extent industry trends and practices in the years since, the last decade in particular, have rendered its inputs and assumptions out to date (although its growth projections for the chlorine industry, its prediction that this trend and population increases along rail routes would roughly cancel the risk reduction of expected safety improvements with time, and its prediction that accident trends would hence remain constant through 1990 proved accurate). As the first attempt of its kind, it relied on many simplifying assumptions

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For the fixed sector, the only recent national-scale likelihood estimate for a catastrophic chemical accident comes from a 1996 regulatory impact analysis by the EPA. After including its estimated risk reduction consequent to the proposed regulation (which was enacted) fully going into effect, and incorporating its given ranges in uncertainty in its estimates of consequent risk reduction and in its basic assumptions, the EPA study's calculations give a 0.002% (1 in 50,000) to 0.4% (1 in 250) annual likelihood of a Bhopal-scale accident causing on the order of 4,000 fatalities to occur in the United States, with 0.4% being the best as well as high estimate.²⁰

For the transportation sector, the National Transportation Risk Assessment done for the Department of Transportation (DoT) by Argonne National Laboratory in 2000 modeled the nation's road and rail network, routing for each of the top six toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) chemicals, accident rates and rupture probabilities for different models of train car, variation of population density along transport routes, and expected distributions of atmospheric conditions relevant to gaseous chemical dispersion to model expected ten-year frequency estimates for accidents along a range from zero to thousands of fatal exposures. The authors estimated the annual likelihood of a catastrophic chemical accident causing thousands of fatalities to be 0.0001% (one in 100,000 years).²¹

to reduce the problem space and make tractable the large computational problem with its variables of rail traffic modeled across multiple segments, population distribution, weather patterns, railcar accident and rupture rates. Every subsequent quantitative study of hazardous material transportation hazards of a national scope located by the SNRA project team ([DoT-1988], [DoT-1992], [Argonne-2000], [DoE]), although each increasing in sophistication over the one before it, has followed this model. It reported two fatality-vs-frequency curves, one with and one without modeled evacuation: both curves are presented in figures 6-1 and 6-12 of [WASH-1400], but only the lower-fatality evacuation model is represented on the graph here.

²⁰ [EPA-1996] Chapter 6, pp 6-8 – 6-30. Noting that the Bhopal plant was American-owned and similar to American-owned plants in the U.S., the authors' first estimate comes from the product of the historical frequency of such events worldwide (1 in 50 years of 'the modern industrial era' since the second world war) with the proportional exposure of the United States to chemical risks (50%, as 50% of the world's annual output of chemicals and refined petroleum came from the U.S.), resulting in $1/50 \times 1/2 = 0.01$ or 1% in the absence of further regulation (page 6-9). This was used as their best estimate because it required the fewest number of assumptions. On an alternate assumption that the U.S. share of fatal hazardous-materials disasters decreases with the number of fatalities (the world's largest mass-casualty accidents rarely occur in the U.S.) the authors estimated the likelihood might be only 15% of this number (0.15%) (pp 6-10 – 6-11). In footnote 9 they note that if the curves on a plot of the U.S.'s share of fatal accidents (y axis) vs. the log of fatalities per accident (x axis, i.e. the numbers on the x-axis represent 101 = 10, 102 = 100, 103 = 1000, 104 = 10,000) could be relied upon in the high-casualty region where the curves are projected beyond the last data point, then a 1-2% proportion might be more appropriate than the 15% they cited in the main text (15% represents the high curve for the last data point). Although the authors state that they were not confident that the curve could be projected out this far, for the purposes of reporting their total range of certainty it is used here.

For the estimate of risk reduction consequent to the RMP rule coming into effect, the authors gave the best estimate of risk reduction from both the RMP rule and new OSHA regulations due to come into effect in the same timeframe to be 60% (pp 6-18 – 6-23; because the impact estimate is essentially a point estimate for a single event, the overall risk reduction in costs from 'Large Magnitude Toxic Events' is here taken to be a reduction in frequency rather than impacts). This factor was used as their best estimate. Two alternate estimates of risk reduction in the authors' sensitivity analysis (pp 6-23 to 6-28) give what the SNRA project team calculated to be 80% and 83% total reductions in risk from the RMP and OSHA rules combined: after reduction to the one significant figure used throughout the authors' analysis in this section, these collapse to a single factor of 80%. Given the chemical industry's changes in a number of practices subsequent to these rules coming into effect, largely because of these rules (see Mitigating Factors), this range of 60-80% of risk reduction since 1996 seems reasonable. Since these are risk reductions, the overall residual risk multiplier after they are taken into account is either $(100\% - 60\%) = 40\%$ or $(100\% - 80\%) = 20\%$.

Hence after incorporating both sources of uncertainty, the net range of annual likelihood comes to $(0.01\% \text{ to } 1\%) \times (20\% \text{ to } 40\%) = 0.002\%$ to 0.4%. The SNRA project team took 0.4% to be the authors' best estimate because each of the factors going into it (1% base and 60% reduction) were the ones the authors selected to calculate their actual cost estimates.

Comparable likelihood estimates for a fixed-site industrial accident (but for the hazardous materials sector generally, including petroleum refining, flammables, and explosives) causing thousands of fatalities have been obtained by a fuller analysis of historical accidents for France [Rocard] and, by a full probabilistic-risk-analysis (but for only particular large concentrations of industry) for the UK (the Canvey Island studies, see for instance [Lees], [Fullwood]). Equipment failure rates which may be used for probabilistic safety analysis of chemical process plants are given in [Lees] and [FEMA-1989].

The International Atomic Energy Agency has published a procedure for conducting a regional or national quantitative risk assessment of fixed chemical sites using generic process plant and storage tank failure rates and specific chemical information [IAEA]. By allocating the number of loading and unloading operations to process plants in proportion to their reported quantities, total national amounts shipped of each chemical, and the distribution between rail and road shipments for each chemical as provided by studies such as [Argonne-2000], sufficient data exist in the public domain from Census block population and geographic population center data, RMP data available through [RTK], and chemical shipment statistics collated by the Department of Transportation and transportation studies such as those cited here to conduct such a national-scale quantitative risk assessment for catastrophic mass-casualty accidents caused by fixed facilities in the United States.

²¹ [Argonne-2000] pp 11-12, chapter 5. The summary figure 5.11 and table 5.22 may be found on pp 154, 156. These tabulate estimated fatal exposures for each chemical, as well as for all six TIH chemicals combined, at the 15 minute LC-50 threshold, representing the concentration at which an expected 50% of a normally distributed human population would be dead after fifteen minutes of continuous exposure. To account for the likelihood that most of the population within this area would be partially protected by being indoors (being inside even an ordinary building offers substantial partial protection, which can be enhanced to 90% protection or greater by sealing doors and windows with tape, rolled towels, or anything which will block off routes for air exchange), the authors note that these exposure numbers should be divided by 7 to give estimates for actual

Given the frequency of major chemical accidents in the United States, whether during transport (at least five in the last decade²²) or at fixed facilities,²³ and the routine production, use, and carriage of large volumes of hazardous chemicals in or through large population centers as mentioned earlier, other researchers have assessed the likelihood of a catastrophic release to be much greater than the estimate reported in the DoT study mentioned above. For example, a later (non-quantitative) DoT study of rail hazardous material transport qualitatively compared the frequency of accidents with the frequent proximity of transport to large population centers in this manner, and concluded it was only a matter of time before the two probabilities should overlap with catastrophic results.²⁴ The recent accidental rupture of the nuclear plant in Fukushima, Japan may also bring to mind the unquantified but possibly substantial risk of an external event such as an earthquake causing similar damage to a chemical plant or storage tank here, with catastrophic results: several very large concentrations of chlorine are stored on earthquake fault lines in California in highly populated counties.²⁵ (Note that complex, cascading events such as an earthquake triggering a chemical release are not considered in the SNRA because of the difficulty of quantifying their interdependencies; this is a limitation of the assessment.)²⁶

A notable historical counterexample to these expectations of large casualty numbers from an urban chemical accident is the 1979 multiple-railcar multiple-chemical derailment, release, and fire in the Canadian city of Mississauga, a suburb of Toronto. The train accident caused several cars to burst, including a full 90 ton tank of liquefied chlorine gas (the same volume as that of the Chicago train scenario mentioned above), and several tanks of an assortment of flammable and toxic chemicals. Evacuations soon began, and continued for several days while different chemicals came into contact, reacted with each other, and caused new fires, explosions, and clouds of toxic gases, making it an exceptionally difficult disaster for the fire crews to contain. 210,000 people were evacuated from the city—three-quarters of the city’s population of 280,000—and were not permitted to return for a period of three to six days. The entire city was essentially shut down for a week. Extensive federal and provincial resources were mobilized to assist the city’s emergency crews, reroute traffic around the city, and coordinate the temporary resettlement and aid to the evacuated population. However, the winds happened to be blowing in the right direction to blow much of the toxic chlorine gas out over Lake Ontario and away from the city center, most of the rest burned up in reactions with the other chemicals, and the

fatalities, pp 122-123. Although their reported numbers represent totals from all accidents in a ten-year period, the right hand high-exposure end of the curve may be taken as the approximate predicted frequency of a single event having that many fatal exposures in a ten year period: because of their sharply decreasing probability, an exceptionally high casualty toll in a given ten year period is more likely to be dominated by a single catastrophic event. The six TIH chemicals were estimated by the authors to represent about 90% of the risk from TIH chemicals as a whole, p 8. It is interesting to note how chlorine dominates the high-fatality end of the combined-chemical curve (figure 5.11).

This study is similar to previous studies commissioned by DoT ([DoT-1988], [DoT-1992]).

²² [DoT-PHMSA] Tables 3, 4, pp 62, 71.

²³ Such as the Magnablend ammonia and allied chemicals plant in Waxahachie, Texas which caught fire in spectacular fashion in October 2011 during the drafting of this sheet. Such accidents are hardly exceptional, however: see note 8.

²⁴ See note 8.

²⁵ [Tierney], [Eguchi]. There is some evidence to suggest that the Fukushima accident may not have been an outlier event, or one characteristic only of nuclear facilities: the frequency of accidental chemical releases in Japan markedly spikes in earthquake years: [Wharton] figure 1.A-2, p 42. It is interesting that these three spikes are depicted on the graph as dotted lines as though to indicate that they should be considered outlier events.

As part of the overall industrywide risk-reduction trend discussed in Mitigating Factors below, many of the largest chemical hazards in quake zones have switched or plan to soon switch to alternate or less hazardous chemical production processes. One of the highest profile examples has been Clorox, which maintained a number of bleach production plants in the hills above Los Angeles storing very large quantities of liquefied chlorine gas on-site. The company announced in 2009 that it would be converting all its bleach plants to processes using concentrated bleach as the starting material rather than pure chlorine. [SHG], [CAP-2006], [CAP-2008], [PIRG].

The question of earthquake-caused accidents at fixed facilities storing or using hazardous chemicals has been extensively studied—[Tierney] and [Eguchi] cited above are but two of a large field—but it appears no attempt has been made to quantify the risk of such an event occurring on a national scale.

This summary sheet also does not consider catastrophic chemical release due to a terrorist attack, as that is considered elsewhere. However, it is interesting to note that well before 9/11, 10% of the thousands of chemical accidents occurring in the U.S. every year were attributed to deliberate or intentional human action [EPA-1999].

²⁶ [Simmons] also explicitly ruled out treatment of earthquake hazards to chemical plants or storage tanks for similar reasons (p 39).

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remainder, diluted by the water firefighters hosed at the ruptured tank, was frozen into a chlorine-water ice slush in the bottom of the tank by the subfreezing night temperatures of the Canadian winter. This was the worst-case imaginable scenario, a major release of highly toxic gas in a densely populated urban area similar to cities in the United States, causing massive disruption and economic loss to an entire city: yet there were no human fatalities.²⁷

Since a distribution of frequency and impact estimates representing these low-probability, high-impact mass-casualty events could not be derived for the fixed chemical sector with rigor comparable to the studies producing such estimates for the transportation sector, the SNRA project team elected to rely on recent historical data of more frequent accidents which have occurred in the United States. These came from two publicly available databases of comparable quality and uniformity, the Risk Management Program (RMP) database of accidents reported to the EPA by fixed facilities under the Clean Air Act, and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) of the Department of Transportation's database of reported road, rail, air, and water accidents involving hazardous chemicals. Both were restricted to the seventeen year range 1994-2010 covered by the RMP database.²⁸

The predicted fatality versus likelihood curves from the 1974 UCLA chlorine risk assessment (Simmons et al 1974), the EPA's 1996 Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for the Risk Management Program for fixed facilities (one data point, plus uncertainties in frequency and impact²⁹), and data for one-year cumulative-year totals for all TIH generated by Argonne National Labs for the 2000 Argonne NTRA are plotted in Figure 1, along with historical fatality curves for 1994-2010 for fatalities directly caused by hazardous materials for all TIH fatal accidents reported to the PHMSA and RMP databases. Note that with the exception of the EPA estimate and the historical data, these lines represent only the best estimates without uncertainty,³⁰ and they are not strictly comparable. In particular, the Simmons and EPA estimates and the historical data represent the annual frequency or estimated probability that an accident of that magnitude or greater will occur; the Argonne numbers represent the estimated probability that the fatalities from all accidents in a given year will total to that number or greater. As the frequency of high-fatality accidents decreases with greater fatality numbers, a large number for a given year will be more and more likely to represent the effect of one rare large accident

²⁷ [Mississauga], [City-Mississauga]. The identity of the slush as a semi-frozen mixture of chlorine and water was the assessment of hazardous materials experts on the scene at the time of the accident [City-Mississauga]; chemical interactions between the chlorine and water may have made the composition of the plugging slush more complicated.

For discussion of mass evacuations from chemical accidents in general, see [Cutter-1989], [Cutter-1991], [Sorensen].

²⁸ The EPA's Risk Management Program was established in 1999 to implement new reporting requirements from amendments to the Clean Air Act introduced after the Bhopal disaster. It requires fixed facilities producing, consuming, or storing more than a threshold quantity of a listed hazardous chemical in any single container or set of interconnected containers to report all accidents in the prior five-year period resulting in any loss of life, injury, environmental damage, evacuation or shelter-in-place orders, any economic damage outside the facility, or significant (judged by the reporting company) economic damage to the facility itself. It has been extensively studied and described by [Belke], [Wharton], [Kleindorfer], and in other papers available at the latter publication's parent site (<http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/papers.php>). The EPA provided the SNRA project team with a disk containing the RMP accident databases through July 2011 for direct analysis. This database is also conveniently available on the Web through the Right to Know Network's site [RTK].

The PHMSA transportation database is available online [PHMSA-database].


²⁹ The likelihood (vertical) uncertainty is the range cited above, and represents the product of the uncertainty about the base likelihood of a Bhopal-style accident to occur in the U.S. (to what extent historical frequency data should be modified by an estimate of different conditions in the U.S. than in India) and the uncertainty about how much the net risk of high-consequence chemical accidents would decrease subsequent to the RMP's coming into effect in years following 1996. The impact (horizontal) uncertainty is the range represented by the estimate of "on the order of 4,000 fatalities", which for the purposes of graphing was taken to mean the range 3,500 – 4,499, the significant-figure uncertainty represented by the use of a single significant figure (this is the range which would be rounded up or down to 4,000).

³⁰ The uncertainty in the Argonne numbers (frequency and impact) are a factor of 3 ([Argonne-2000] p 5). The uncertainty estimates given by the UCLA Simmons et al (1974) report are a factor of 10 in frequency and a factor of 2 in impact ([Simmons] pp 3, 41, 43).

dominating the results, and so this curve will approach the estimated frequency of a single accident having that number of fatalities or greater.³¹

Figure 1

Fatalities (estimated or historical)



Note: The fatality scale from 0 to 1 is direct, and logarithmic above 1; the likelihood scale is logarithmic along its entire range. Fatalities are per event for historical data, the EPA's 1996 RIA (Regulatory Impact Analysis), Simmons et al (UCLA) 1974; annual yearly totals of all accidents for Argonne's 2000 NTRA (National Transportation Risk Assessment). Uncertainties are depicted only for the EPA point estimate, other curves are best estimate lines. The estimated uncertainty in likelihood and impact in Argonne 2000 is a factor of 3, in Simmons et al 1974 a factor of 10 for likelihood and 2 for impact.

The Argonne data represent 1 year totals, and total rail and road fatalities for all TIH (toxic inhalation hazard) chemicals, rather than the 10 year totals for six selected TIH chemicals as reported in the published NTRA: the line above represents actual estimated fatalities (LD-50 exposures divided by 7, see summary sheet text for reference). Historical RMP and PHMSA accident data represent all TIH accidents reported 1994-2010. Simmons et al (1974) calculated fatality estimates from chlorine transportation by rail alone, but estimated that this modality dominated the risk to the general population from fixed and transported chlorine combined: the curve here comes from the lower-fatality estimates of their evacuation model presented in figure 16 (p 53), which corresponds to the lower curve in the Rasmussen Report (WASH-1400) (see references).

³¹ The Argonne report reported ten-year totals rather than single-year totals: these also (when divided by ten) will approximate the annual estimated probability of a single catastrophic high-fatality accident for fatality levels taken above a sufficiently high selected threshold to reduce to a minimum the likelihood that a high ten-year total could represent two or more medium-sized accidents, rather than be dominated by one very large, very rare accident. In order to allow for this approximation to be valid for a larger range of impact data, Dan Brown of the original Argonne team kindly calculated single-year totals for the SNRA project team from the original study data and computer program. To extend the scope of the results to the class of chemical hazards the SNRA project team was considering, Dr Brown also extended the calculations to include estimates for all TIH chemicals transported by road and rail, rather than the top six TIH chemicals reported in the original study (which the authors estimated represented 90% of the total TIH hazard, [Argonne-2000] p 8). These data, divided by the factor of seven which the study authors themselves applied (to account for expected mitigating factors such as sheltering-in-place, pp 122-123) to convert their estimates of LC-50 fatal exposures to estimates of actual fatalities, are the data plotted in the graph above. Loading and unloading accidents may be reflected in the historical data, but were excluded from the risk assessment of the Argonne study ([Argonne-2000] pp 9-10).

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In order to restrict the set of historic events to those which presented the most significant challenge to national preparedness, the SNRA project team selected those events which either 1) caused at least one fatality outside the plant or accident location, or to a member of the public or a public responder; or 2) caused at least one fatality of any kind (public, public responder, or employee), and which also resulted in an evacuation or a shelter-in-place order. These criteria excluded accidents causing fatalities only among workers, if no evacuation or shelter orders were issued. In choosing these criteria, the SNRA project team attempted to select those events which had a serious impact to public health outside the plant or industry where it occurred. These criteria, while imperfect, reflect the difference in public perception between the voluntary acceptance of the risk of occupational hazards by those who choose to work in the chemical industry, and the involuntary risk to the general public from chemical accidents.³²

Assumptions

Frequency, fatality, injury and illness, direct economic loss, and social displacement estimates were determined from the set of all reported toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) incidents from 1994-2010 in two historical accident databases, the EPA RMP database for fixed facilities and the PHMSA database for transportation accidents. The EPA's RMP (Risk Management Program) maintains a database of accident reports from fixed industrial producers and consumers of listed toxic chemicals above given threshold limits. The Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Substances Administration (PHMSA)'s database records road, rail, water, and air transportation accidents.

Low, best, and high estimates for fatalities, injuries and illnesses, direct economic loss, and number of displaced from homes for at least two days come from the low, average, and high values of historical incidents in this set meeting threshold criteria for the Chemical Substance Release event. Frequency estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years of the longest interval between accident events (low), the mean frequency of the accident events (best), and the greatest number of accidents occurring within one year (high) from this set.

Environmental impact estimates were elicited from EPA subject matter experts.

Fatalities and Illnesses/Injuries

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate health and safety impacts caused by an accidental toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) chemical release event:

- The scope of this national-level event was limited to chemical accidents having the potential to cause a large number of human casualties in the brief timescale characterizing what is commonly considered to be an 'event'. As the class of chemicals having the potential to kill a large number of people in a very short period of time is comprised almost entirely of toxic inhalation hazards which are gaseous under normal conditions, only accidents involving toxic inhalation hazards (TIH) were considered to be within the scope of this event category. This choice effectively excludes accidental spills or releases of chemicals in liquid or solid form, which form the class most likely to cause environmental damage or contamination capable of causing human death and injury over long-term exposure, and also excludes accidents primarily involving chemicals hazardous by their flammable or explosive potential, such as propane, liquefied gas, and ammonium nitrate. Included were accidents caused by chemicals listed as toxic (T) in the RMP database, and classes 2.2 (non-flammable gases, selected

³² The concept of 'voluntary' versus 'involuntary' risk is discussed in the introduction to [EPA-1974]; see also [EPA-1983].

because ammonia is classed in this category) and 2.3 (poisonous gases) in the PHMSA database.

- The set of accidents selected were those which either 1) caused at least one fatality outside the plant or accident location, or to a member of the public or a public responder; or 2) caused at least one fatality of any kind, public, public responder, or employee, and which also resulted in an evacuation or a shelter-in-place order. Within this set, no distinction was made between fatalities (onsite, offsite, employee, responder, or public).
- From the PHMSA transportation database, only fatalities and injuries reported as being caused by the hazardous substance were included.
- The databases contained many duplicate reports, largely updates to previous reports of the same accident event: these were eliminated manually once the small threshold set was generated.

Economic Loss

In addition to the generally applicable assumptions of those listed above, the SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate economic impacts caused by an accidental chemical release event:

- All economic estimates were inflation-adjusted to 2011 dollars.
- The direct economic damages which fixed facilities are required to report, and update for accuracy, to the RMP database are property damage to equipment or the facility itself, and all known or readily knowable property damage outside the facility. These damages do not include business interruption costs, medical or insurance costs, or litigation or settlement costs not overlapping with the above.³³
- The direct economic damages carriers are required to report, and update for accuracy, to the PHMSA transportation database are the value of the material (spilled chemical) which was lost, physical damage sustained by the carrier (vehicles or other cargo), damage caused to public or private property, the dollar value of the response cost, and the dollar value of any remediation and clean-up cost. These damages do not include business interruption costs, medical or insurance costs, or litigation or settlement costs not overlapping with the costs listed above.³⁴
- The SNRA project team added cost estimates tied to the number of injured or killed. The cost of medical care per injury/illness was taken as \$6,600, for consistency with previous DHS risk assessments (including the Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment conducted by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate to assess the risk of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism).
- The SNRA project team did not attempt to estimate an equivalent dollar value or a value of a statistical life (VSL) to determine an economic cost per fatality. Instead, only the countable direct contribution to the national economy of the average annual spending of one person in a year, which the SNRA project team set at \$42,500, was multiplied by the number of fatalities to estimate the loss to the economy from accident fatalities.

³³ [RMP-reqts].

³⁴ [HMIR].

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Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

Social displacement estimates for the SNRA chemical accidents event come from the same historical dataset of 1994-2010 historic toxic industrial chemical accidents in the United States used for the other quantitative measures of the accidental chemical substance release event.

- There is historical precedent for very large evacuations due to chemical accidents. After Hurricane Katrina, the evacuation of 210,000 people from Mississauga was the second largest evacuation in history in North America. However, the same historical dataset used for other metrics was used for social displacement to ensure consistency of scope across measures for this event.
- The PHMSA and RMP databases include evacuation estimates. The PHMSA database additionally reports total evacuation time; the RMP database reports the total duration of the chemical substance release itself, which the SNRA project team used as a proxy for evacuation time.³⁵ Only two events in the historical data set, as reported in these databases, had evacuations lasting 48 hours or more (see Data Table).
- The low, best, and high social displacement estimates represent the low (0), average (260), and high (5,400) of this set.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.³⁶ The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

³⁵ E.g. the SNRA project team assumed that people would not return to their homes while the toxic substance was still being released, and that they would return shortly thereafter.

³⁶ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: accidental Chemical Substance Spill or Release was given a C_{EF} of 1.1.

The numerical estimates calculated from this formula are reported in Appendix G. The semi-quantitative risk matrix is discussed in the Findings (Psychological Distress Risk).

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (such as chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence and toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—or infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)³⁷ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “Moderate.” Experts made this estimate given that the primary set of scenarios considered for this event were releases of toxic gases which could cause large numbers of human casualties. The widespread release of a toxic gas could contaminate tens to hundreds of acres with toxic material, but not on a catastrophic scale compared with other types of disaster.
- The greater likelihood for toxic releases to happen in sparsely populated areas, although decreasing human fatalities, increases the potential for ecological damage.
- Persistence was also judged to be a possible issue. The more persistent the chemical, the greater the impact it will have on the environment. There is also a potential for water contamination (depending on the contamination, and the spread of the contaminant through water), which could elevate a chemical disaster to an environmentally high impact event.

Potential Mitigating Factors

It appears that the risk from chemical accidents has been decreasing in recent years and, should current trends continue, is expected to continue decreasing. The combination of new reporting requirements for fixed facilities in this country introduced in the years 1986-1999 following the Bhopal catastrophe, pressure from local and issue-oriented public policy groups, and sharply increased public and political attention on the potential attractiveness of chemical facilities to terrorist attack following 9/11 has resulted in a significant reduction in the quantities of highly toxic chemicals held by fixed facilities located in the most populated areas nationwide, largely due to the substitution of less toxic intermediates where possible.³⁸ Although attempts at directly reducing the risk from transportation accidents by regulation and rerouting have been less

³⁷ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

³⁸ In addition to accidents, the EPA’s Risk Management Program requires facilities holding more than a threshold quantity of a listed hazardous chemical in a single container or set of interconnected containers to submit risk assessments including modeling the impacts of the worst-case-possible scenario on surrounding populations. The number of reporting facilities substantially decreased from the first reporting period 1995-2000 to the second 2000-2005, in large part because many sites reduced the amount of chemical on-site or the amounts in any one ruptureable container below the reporting thresholds [Wharton]. Concerns about terrorists targeting chemical plants predate 9/11, and were the primary reason the EPA partially restricted the RMP data from public access [Wharton], [CRS]. Other risk reduction examples include the widespread substitution of sodium hypochlorite (concentrated bleach) for pure liquefied chlorine by water treatment facilities and the consumer bleach manufacturer Clorox, and DuPont’s switching a pesticide manufacturing process from a batch production process requiring 40-50,000 pounds of the Bhopal chemical methyl isocyanate to a continuous process consuming the intermediate as it is produced, such that no more than two pounds of the chemical exists on-site at any one time [SHG] pp 3-2 – 3.4. Also see [CAP-2006], [CAP-2008], [PIRG].

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successful,³⁹ the decreased end-user need for the most toxic chemicals at fixed facilities has also reduced the quantities being transported, reducing the overall risk from transported toxic chemicals in a similar fashion.⁴⁰

Additional Relevant Information

Although the majority of fatal chemical accidents which have occurred in recent years have occurred in rural areas or small population centers, because road and rail traffic is so routinely routed through urban centers of high population density⁴¹ and because of cities' dependence on water treatment plants which frequently use large amounts of chlorine,⁴² some of the risk from the most catastrophic chemical accidents appears to be broadly spread among the American population. However, much of the risk appears to be geographically and socially distributed less evenly. As noted above, Chicago is at particular risk from chemical accidents by rail, and earthquake-prone regions such as California from fixed facilities. The bulk of the nation's chlorine production factories are located on the Gulf Coast:⁴³ although these factories withstand hurricanes on a regular basis,⁴⁴ their location increases that region's risk exposure to at least transportation accidents as their manufactures must be shipped out.⁴⁵ A risk factor particular to the fixed chemical sector, having possible social consequence as demonstrated by the government's experience of Hurricane Katrina, is the finding from studies of RMP accident data that fixed chemical facilities rated as 'highest risk' are disproportionately situated in counties having higher minority populations. This correlation persists after other demographic factors, including geographic location and poverty levels, are factored out.⁴⁶

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³⁹ [Branscomb] pp 7-9, 41-46 for unsuccessful rerouting attempts by local city councils, recent safety standards on new railcars not yet realized because of low turnover in railcar fleet.

⁴⁰ Recent annual shipment rates of chlorine (30,000 rail shipments in 2007) are lower than the historical average (2.2 million over 42 years, average 52,000 annually) [ACC].

⁴¹ See note 13.

⁴² [CAP-2007], map p 11. Also [PIRG], [CAP-2006], [CAP-2008], [SHG].

⁴³ [Branscomb] figure 1, p 12.

⁴⁴ [Challener].

⁴⁵ [DoT-1988] pp 7 to 8, page 3-12.

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Data Table

Commodity Short Name	Date	City	State	Fixed Site or Transport	Source	'Public' Fatalities	Employee Fatalities	Total Hazmat Fatalities	Total Hazmat Injuries	Reported Loss or Damages	CPI	Adjusted (2011\$)	SNRA Direct Economic Damage
Ammonia (anhydrous)	12/13/94	Pensacola	FL	Fixed	RMP	0	4	4	27	\$220,200,000	1.49	\$327,330,768	\$327,678,968
Chlorine	4/11/96	Alberton	MT	Transport	PHMSA	1	0	1	787	\$10,000,000	1.44	\$14,438,815	\$19,675,515
Ammonia (conc 20% or greater)	8/26/97	Lancaster	OH	Fixed	RMP	5	0	5	0	\$0	1.39	\$0	\$212,500
Ammonia (anhydrous)	11/3/97	Sacaton	AZ	Fixed	RMP	0	1	1	1	\$50,000	1.39	\$69,492	\$118,592
Chlorine	2/23/98	Orlando	FL	Fixed	RMP	9	0	9	1	\$0	1.39	\$0	\$389,100
Ammonia (conc 20% or greater)	4/22/98	Centralia	KS	Fixed	RMP	12	0	12	0	\$0	1.39	\$0	\$510,000
Ammonia (anhydrous)	10/10/98	Tacoma	WA	Fixed	RMP	5	0	5	0	\$11,400,000	1.36	\$15,501,879	\$15,714,379
Ammonia (anhydrous)	10/26/98	Franklinton	LA	Fixed	RMP	25	0	25	0	\$0	1.36	\$0	\$1,062,500
Ammonia (anhydrous)	1/5/00	Green River	WY	Fixed	RMP	1	0	1	2	\$0	1.32	\$0	\$55,700
Hydrogen chloride (anhydrous) (HCl)	5/17/00	Jefferson	OK	Fixed	RMP	15	0	15	0	\$300	1.32	\$395	\$637,895
Ammonia (anhydrous)	4/2/01	Hammond	LA	Fixed	RMP	1	0	1	12	\$5,800,000	1.28	\$7,419,317	\$7,541,017
Chlorine	7/14/01	Newberg	OR	Fixed	RMP	0	3	3	51	\$115,000	1.26	\$144,818	\$608,918
Ammonia (anhydrous)	10/16/01	Mesquite	NM	Fixed	RMP	1	0	1	2	\$600,000	1.26	\$755,570	\$811,270
Ammonia (anhydrous)	1/18/02	Minot	ND	Transport	PHMSA	1	0	1	0	\$0	1.26	\$0	\$42,500
Ammonia (conc 20% or greater)	4/11/03	Soddy Daisy	TN	Fixed	RMP	0	1	1	0	\$6,015,000	1.23	\$7,405,805	\$7,448,305
Ammonia (anhydrous)	4/21/03	Lakewood	CO	Fixed	RMP	1	0	1	6	\$100	1.23	\$123	\$82,223
Ammonia (anhydrous)	7/13/03	Pampa	TX	Fixed	RMP	1	0	1	3	\$0	1.20	\$0	\$62,300
Ammonia (anhydrous)	11/4/03	Paynesville	MN	Fixed	RMP	1	0	1	1	\$0	1.20	\$0	\$49,100
Vinyl acetate monomer ⁴⁷	4/23/04	Illiopolis	IL	Fixed	RMP	0	5	5	6	\$0	1.20	\$0	\$252,100
Ammonia (anhydrous)	5/25/04	Seymour	IN	Fixed	RMP	10	0	10	0	\$0	1.20	\$0	\$425,000
Chlorine	6/28/04	Macdona	TX	Transport	PHMSA	2	1	3	66	\$0	1.20	\$0	\$563,100
Chlorine	1/6/05	Graniteville	SC	Transport	PHMSA	8	1	9	631	\$8,018,600	1.16	\$9,301,453	\$13,848,553
Carbon dioxide (refrigerated liquid)	1/8/05	Sanford	FL	Transport	PHMSA	1	1	2	0	\$0	1.16	\$0	\$85,000
Ammonia (anhydrous)	8/28/06	Ebensburg	PA	Fixed	RMP	10	0	10	4	\$0	1.09	\$0	\$451,400
Titanium tetrachloride	6/27/07	Westlake	LA	Fixed	RMP	0	1	1	1	\$178,000	1.09	\$194,485	\$243,585
Argon (refrigerated liquid)	5/20/08	Hollywood	FL	Transport	PHMSA	3	0	3	0	\$0	1.05	\$0	\$127,500
Ammonia (anhydrous)	7/15/09	Swansea	SC	Transport	PHMSA	1	0	1	7	\$700	1.04	\$727	\$89,427
Ammonia (anhydrous)	11/16/09	Cincinnati	OH	Fixed	RMP	2	0	2	0	\$0	1.04	\$0	\$85,000

Commodity Short Name	Date	Evacuated (RMP)	Shelter in Place (RMP)	Public Evacuated (PHMSA)	Employees Evacuated (PHMSA)	Evacuated > 48 hours	Environmental Damage	Mode of Transportation (PHMSA) or Industry (RMP)			Cause
Ammonia (anhydrous)	12/13/94	2,000	80			2,000	Yes	Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufacturing			Equipment Failure
Chlorine	4/11/96			0	0	0	No	Rail (Transportation)			Derailment
Ammonia (conc 20% or greater)	8/26/97	0	0			0	No	Farm Supplies Wholesalers			Equipment Failure
Ammonia (anhydrous)	11/3/97	30	0			0	Yes	Apiculture			Human Error
Chlorine	2/23/98	0	0			0	No	Sewage Treatment Facilities			Human Error
Ammonia (conc 20% or greater)	4/22/98	0	0			0	No	Farm Supplies Wholesalers			Equipment Failure
Ammonia (anhydrous)	10/10/98	0	0			0	No	Refrigerated Warehousing and Storage			Equipment Failure
Ammonia (anhydrous)	10/26/98	6	0			0	No	Corn Farming			Human Error
Ammonia (anhydrous)	1/5/00	6	0			0	No	Ice Manufacturing			Equipment Failure
Hydrogen chloride (anhydrous) (HCl)	5/17/00	0	0			0	No	All Other Basic Organic Chemical Manufacturing			Unknown
Ammonia (anhydrous)	4/2/01	0	0			0	No	Fluid Milk Manufacturing			Unknown
Chlorine	7/14/01	2,000	0			0	Yes	Petrochemical Manufacturing			Equipment Failure
Ammonia (anhydrous)	10/16/01	0	0			0	Yes	Corn Farming			Human Error
Ammonia (anhydrous)	1/18/02			0	0	0	No	Rail (Transportation)			Derailment
Ammonia (conc 20% or greater)	4/11/03	26	1,500			0	Yes	Flavoring Syrup & Concentrate Manufacturing			Equipment Failure
Ammonia (anhydrous)	4/21/03	20	0			0	Yes	Farm Supplies Merchant Wholesalers			Human Error
Ammonia (anhydrous)	7/13/03	0	0			0	No	Fresh and Frozen Seafood Processing			Equipment Failure
Ammonia (anhydrous)	11/4/03	0	0			0	No	Other Farm Product Raw Material Merchant Wholesalers			Human Error
Vinyl acetate monomer ⁴⁸	4/23/04	980	0			0	No	Plastics Material and Resin Manufacturing			Unknown
Ammonia (anhydrous)	5/25/04	8	4			0	No	Farm Supplies Merchant Wholesalers			Equipment Failure
Chlorine	6/28/04			0	0	0	Yes	Rail (Transportation)			Crash/Derailment
Chlorine	1/6/05			5,400	0	5,400	Yes	Rail (Transportation)			Derailment
Carbon dioxide (refrigerated liquid)	1/8/05			0	0	0	No	Highway (Transportation)			Human Error (Loading Acc.)
Ammonia (anhydrous)	8/28/06	0	0			0	No	Animal Slaughtering and Processing			Equipment Failure
Titanium tetrachloride	6/27/07	0	100			0	No	Inorganic Dye and Pigment Manufacturing			Equipment Failure
Argon (refrigerated liquid)	5/20/08			0	0	0	No	Water (Transportation)			Equip. Failure (Corrosion)
Ammonia (anhydrous)	7/15/09			0	5	0	No	Highway (Transportation)			Equipment Failure
Ammonia (anhydrous)	11/16/09	0	0	0	0	0	No	Farm Supplies Merchant Wholesalers			Unknown

⁴⁷ Acetic acid ethenyl ester.

⁴⁸ Acetic acid ethenyl ester.

Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)

An accident involving fire or an explosion of combustible or flammable substances transported by rail occurs within the U.S., resulting in one fatality or greater.

Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities ¹	1	1	1
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses ²	0	20	52
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011) ³	\$43,000	\$900,000	\$2.9 million
	Indirect Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	See Discussion		
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0	0	0
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	5	25	57
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins	N/A		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number per Year ⁴	0.039	0.11	0.22

Note

The results for this analysis indicate an extremely low risk associated with combustible/flammable cargoes transported by rail. However, this conclusion is tied to the assumptions which determine the scope of the event, the selection and interpretation of data, and the choice of results to be reported; and these limitations must be understood before using these results. The scoping of this hazard to only incidents resulting in fatalities may have resulted in an assessment that does not adequately address factors that affect risk. Additionally, the use of historic data depends upon the assumption that the future will resemble the past: with respect to combustible/flammable rail cargo accidents, recent changes in the volume of cargo suggest that the use of historic data may not adequately describe current risk. Furthermore, the SNRA project team believes that the limitation of the current SNRA displacement metric to displacements of 48 hours or more may exclude information important to the characterization of this hazard.

The SNRA project team believes that the effects of these recognized limitations (which are shared by other technological/accidental hazards in the SNRA) upon the final reported estimates may be significant. To better understand the risk from this hazard, the SNRA project team

¹ Low, average, and high fatalities from the set of 1980–2014 U.S. historical combustible/flammable rail accidents resulting in one or more fatalities in Table 1.

² Low, average, and high from the set of 1980–2014 U.S. historical combustible/flammable rail accidents resulting in one or more fatalities in Table 1.

³ Low, average, and high direct economic estimates from the set of 1980–2014 U.S. historical combustible/flammable rail accidents resulting in one or more fatalities in Table 1.

⁴ Low, best, and high frequencies represent the 5th, mean, and 95th percentile of the uncertainty distribution for frequency, based upon four observations in 35 years and the assumption of a random (Poisson) process.

Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)

recommends further analysis that includes all factors included in the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) data.

Overview

Recent rail accidents involving combustible/flammable cargoes such as Bakken crude oil have raised concerns about this hazard among many people in the U.S.⁵ Increases in the volume of Bakken crude oil transported by rail coupled with high-profile accidents like the Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, Canada accident, have been major factors in driving this concern and risk perception.⁶ Although the Lac-Mégantic accident falls outside of the scope of the SNRA because it occurred in Canada, the images associated with this accident still affect perception in the U.S. The Lac-Mégantic accident, which resulted in 47 fatalities, represents an actual worst-case scenario involving combustible/flammable rail cargoes.⁷

Five other dramatic accidents involving the rail transport of combustible substances occurred in 2014: although none resulted in fatalities, they further bolstered perceptions that rail shipments of combustible/flammable materials pose a risk of real risk.

However, as with other risks, the perception of risk often differs from the actual probability and likely impacts of risk.⁸ For example, the PHMSA data from 1980 through 2014 that was leveraged for the 2015 SNRA contains only four accidents in the U.S. involving at least one fatality. Moreover, none of those incidents caused more than one fatality, or resulted in impacts on the other SNRA measures of impact comparable to those of many other accidental and natural hazards studied in the SNRA.⁹ Consequently, the relative risk of a fatal accident involving combustible/flammable cargoes may not necessarily match the perception of risk.

Prior to using results from the SNRA to inform a decision with significant impacts in the real world, it is important for end users to review the underlying data and fully understand its limitations.

Event Background

The recent advent of the shale oil boom in the U.S. and accidents involving rail cargoes of Bakken crude oil have raised concern over the hazards of such cargoes.¹⁰ In 2013, over 462,000 barrels of oil were shipped by rail out of North Dakota, one of several states with crude oil production.¹¹ In the U.S., rail companies transported approximately 435,560 carloads of crude oil

⁵ Pipeline & Gas Journal. (2014). Rail transportation of oil: A growing congressional safety concern [Online document]. *Pipeline & Gas Journal*, 241. Retrieved from <http://pipelineandgasjournal.com/rail-transportation-oil-growing-congressional-safety-concern>; Nader: Bakken oil-related railroad accidents are “national emergency” [Web page]. Retrieved from <http://kfgo.com/news/articles/2015/feb/18/nader-bakken-oil-related-railroad-accidents-are-national-emergency>.

⁶ The train accident in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, Canada resulted in 47 fatalities, and the destruction of 40 buildings and 53 vehicles. Transportation Safety Board of Canada. (2013). *Railway investigation report R13D0054: Runaway and main-track derailment*. Retrieved from <http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054.pdf>

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Regarding perception, Pipeline & Gas Journal (2014), Nader (2015), *op. cit.* (footnote 5). As noted by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) accident risk per shipment is extremely low: nearly one million shipments of HAZMAT shipments including Bakken crude oil occur in the U.S. every day without incident, indicating an extremely low probability of a serious accident resulting in a fatality, injury, environmental impact, or economic impact occurring for a shipment. Nader, R. (2015, February 18). US DOT. (2014, February 2). PHMSA’s ongoing Bakken investigation shows crude oil lacking proper testing, classification: Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration issues proposed civil penalties to three companies [Web page]. Retrieved from <http://www.dot.gov/briefing-room/phmsa%20%99s-ongoing-bakken-investigation-shows-crude-oil-lacking-proper-testing>

⁹ 2012–2014 data was collected from the U.S. DOT PHMSA website (<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>) using the Incidents Reports Database Search function. 1980–2011 data was archival data collected by RMA for the original SNRA.

¹⁰ Frittelli, J., Andrews, A., Parfomak, P. W., Pirog, R., Ramseur, J. L., & Ratner, M. (2014). U.S. rail transportation of crude oil: Background and issues for congress [Online document]. Retrieved from www.crs.gov

¹¹ Pumphrey, D., Hyland, L., & Melton, M. (2014). *Safety of crude oil by rail* [Online document]. Retrieved from http://csis.org/files/publication/140306_Pumphrey_SafetyCrudeOilRail_Web.pdf

in 2013. From 2012 to 2014 (the last full year for data), four accidents occurred in the U.S. involving rail cargoes of crude oil.¹² However, accidents involving crude oil cargos from 1980–2014 represent approximately 0.09 percent of all incidents.¹³ Alcohol N.O.S.¹⁴ cargoes represented 0.8 percent of all incidents or 977 incidents out of over 13,000.¹⁵ Additionally, alcohol N.O.S. and crude oil represent two of the approximately 180 different flammable or combustible commodities represented in the set of incidents reported to PHMSA in the 1980–2014 period included in the SNRA analysis.¹⁶

Aside from the type of cargo, the PHMSA data provided information on what failed (e.g. valve failed) that resulted in the release of the cargo. Three of the four events analyzed involved the failure of the container.¹⁷ Three of the failures resulted from accident damage from a collision.¹⁸

Assumptions

All data used to develop the risk analysis came from the publically available PHMSA database. The PHMSA database includes incident information from several modes of transportation including aviation and rail. The scope of this report includes rail incidents involving cargoes with hazardous class noun names that include combustible, explosive, or flammable.¹⁹ Cargoes that fall within the scope previously described include crude oil (e.g., Bakken crude), xylene, ethanol, etc.²⁰ In addition to the restrictions to rail and to specific cargoes, the scope of the SNRA Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail) was limited to incidents involving at least one fatality related to the cargo.

Scope

The following are the parameters for data inclusion for the analysis:

1. Data set only includes incidents occurring within the U.S., U.S. territories, and possessions.²¹
2. Incidents must include at least one fatality.
3. Direct economic estimates were converted to 2011 dollars to allow for comparison with the existing SNRA 2011 data set.
4. Displacement data must be from incidents with displacements of 48 hours or longer.
5. Incidents only involve rail as a means of transportation.
6. The analysis included incidents that use combustible, explosive, or flammable in the hazard noun name.²²
7. To ensure data compatibility, to include but not limited to data collection methods and data collection standards, only PHMSA data is used.
8. Incidents only cover full years of data from 1980 to 2014.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ PHMSA data for years 2012–2014 (<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>) expanded data set includes incidents without a fatality

¹⁴ Alcohol Not Otherwise Specified

¹⁵ PHMSA data for years 2012–2014 (<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>) expanded data set includes incidents without a fatality

¹⁶ PHMSA data for years 2012–2014 (<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>) expanded data set includes incidents without a fatality

¹⁷ PHMSA data for years 2012–2014 (<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>) as meets analytic scope.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Hazard class codes 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, all subclasses; 1.5, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2, 2.1, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4.

²⁰ PHMSA data for years 2012–2014 (<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>)

²¹ Lands specified in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 as amended and the Stafford Act.

²² Hazard class codes 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, all subclasses; 1.5, 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 2, 2.1, 3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.4.

Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)***Specific Assumptions***

The following are assumptions used for this analysis:

1. The scope of the SNRA 2015 Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail) event allows for a meaningful representation of the risk to the Nation from this hazard.
2. Factors not included in the analysis do not produce statistically significant affects that could change the analysis.
3. The SNRA metric for psychological distress is a valid and meaningful measure for comparison among hazards, within the order of magnitude precision and generic limitations of the SNRA.

Data Cleaning

Data cleaning involved two specific measures. First, data cleaning involved the elimination of multiple lines of data that did not contain unique quantitative data. Second, data cleaning also included removing records that did not include a cargo with noun names falling within the scope of the analysis.

Frequency

From 1980 to 2014, a span of 35 years, only four incidents occurred that resulted in at least one fatality (SNRA minimum threshold for inclusion of a risk) due to the cargo out of over 13,000 incidents. All four incidents involved different cargoes.

Low, best, and high annual frequency estimates represent the 5th, mean, and 95th percentile of the frequency distribution based upon an assumption of a Poisson (random and independently occurring) process and four observations in 35 years.²³ The resulting low, best, and high estimates of 0.039, 0.114, and 0.222 incidents per year for a fatal combustible/flammable cargo rail accident are relatively low in comparison with many other hazards in the SNRA, including chemical (toxic inhalational hazard) accidents, dam failures, and the majority of the SNRA natural hazards.

Health and Safety

The analysis of the four incidents resulted in an average of one fatality, given the occurrence of an incident resulting in any fatalities. Although the average (expected value) of the set was used as the best estimate for consistency with other hazards analyzed in the SNRA, for the Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail) this value of one fatality was also the most likely value (mode) of the set. Injuries ranged from 0 to 52, with an average of 20.

Economic Impacts***Direct Economic Impacts***

Direct economic impacts as defined in the SNRA include decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction costs including property (structure, contents, physical infrastructure and other physical property) and crop damage; one year's lost spending due to fatalities; medical costs; and business interruption directly resulting from the impacts of an event.

²³ The distribution for the unknown frequency λ of the Poisson process given four observations in 35 years was represented by a gamma(4, 1/35) distribution.

Direct economic impacts for the set of incidents meeting the threshold criteria of this SNRA event ranged from \$42,500 to \$2,886,612, with an average of \$904,994, according to the measure of direct economic impact used by the SNRA.²⁴

Indirect Economic Impacts²⁵

Direct economic losses alone do not represent the full picture of the economic impacts to the Nation from a disaster or attack. Indirect and induced economic losses can be substantially larger than the direct economic losses that occur in the aftermath of an event.

- **Indirect economic impacts** include costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the industries impacted by the direct costs. Indirect impacts also include positive offsets due to increased spending within sectors impacted by the direct costs.²⁶
- **Induced economic impacts** include those incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries. Induced impacts can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.

Highly mature economic models exist for calculating estimates of indirect and induced economic losses for natural disasters, human and animal pandemics, technological accidents, terrorist attacks, and cyber events. However, there is at present no generally agreed or practical method for translating estimates produced by these disparate models into a single measure which can be meaningfully compared across all of the threats and hazards of the SNRA in a defensible fashion. Because such a measure would yield data of great value for multiple purposes beyond the context of the SNRA and similar assessments, it has been among the highest risk research priorities for DHS and its academic Centers of Excellence for over a decade. Should these efforts prove successful in coming years, the next iteration of the SNRA will include comparisons of total economic loss to the Nation across all of its threats and hazards.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

For the limited data set of historical observations resulting in one or more fatalities, no incident resulted in a displacement of populations for 48 hours or longer.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on significant distress and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality

²⁴ Note that the definition of direct economic impact is specific to the SNRA family of assessments, and should not be used for other purposes using different definitions without translation into the definition specific to that purpose unless the differences are insufficiently to affect a decision or communication using these estimates.

²⁵ The SNRA's taxonomy of indirect and induced economic impacts comes from the DHS Terrorism Risk Assessments and so is retained here for consistency across DHS assessments. However, both combined will be referred to as 'indirect economic impacts' where it is not expected to impede clarity.

²⁶ These may include the waste management, environmental consulting, mortuary services, and medical industries, among others.

Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)

of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event.²⁷ The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs. A multiplicative factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.

The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + Inj + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement).

- In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement.
- The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long-term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA.
- Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

The Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail) hazard event was added by the SNRA project subsequent to the 2011 iteration of the SNRA for which Event Familiarity Factors were elicited from subject matter experts. The SNRA project team assigned a provisional Event Familiarity Factor of 1.0 by analogy with other natural and accidental hazards in the existing SNRA, for the calculation of *provisional* psychological distress estimates. It must be stressed that this assignment has not been reviewed by the 2011 subject matter experts.

Environmental Impact

The SNRA environmental impact estimate, which was assessed in calendar year 2011 for the 23 original national-level events of the 2011 SNRA by subject matter experts from the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), could not be assessed for the Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail) hazard event which was added to the SNRA in calendar year 2015. A future iteration of the SNRA will assess the environmental impacts of this event on measures comparable with other SNRA threat and hazard events.

Discussion

Based upon the scope of the SNRA analysis and the specific data set selected by the SNRA project, the overall risk from a rail incident involving combustible/flammable cargoes is

²⁷ See Appendix G for references and additional discussion of the SNRA Psychological Distress metric.

comparatively low on every measure of risk assessed in the SNRA, relative to other threats and hazards in the existing SNRA data set.

Combustible/flammable cargo rail accidents resulting in fatalities have historically occurred only once every 10 years on average in the U.S., within the 1980–2014 historical observation period of the SNRA analysis. None of the four incidents meeting this threshold resulted in mass fatalities. Additionally, none of the incidents resulted in impacts on any other impact scale, which would meet the minimum threshold of inclusion for any other existing hazard in the SNRA. Although any such assessment must be made in recognition of the significant limitations of the SNRA methodology when leveraging historical data—particularly in view of recent evidence in a neighboring country of this hazard’s potential to cause catastrophic mass fatality accidents—the differences in risk across impact measures between this hazard and other SNRA hazards sharing the same data and methodological limitations and constraints are striking. Objectively, these differences are greater than the order of magnitude considered to be the minimum resolution for risk judgments in the SNRA.

Fatalities and Illnesses/Injuries

The data set of over 13,000 incidents indicates that fatalities due to the cargo as opposed to fatalities due to collisions are uncommon.²⁸ Additionally, injuries are relatively rare with only 149 out of over 13,000 incidents involving an injury.²⁹

Psychological Distress

The methodological approach for psychological distress used in the SNRA represents a first attempt to include psychological impacts in a strategic, national-level risk assessment focused on national preparedness. While this approach is straightforward and transparent, it also has important limitations that should be considered when interpreting the psychological distress results:

Additional analysis is required to verify and validate this approach, and the sensitivity of the results to the selection of weights in the formula should also be explored. Experts consulted about psychological impacts emphasized *extreme caution* in using the SNRA’s measure of psychological distress, and the need for additional research.³⁰

- Quantitative assessments of psychological factors generally involve an extreme level of complexity requiring specific controls. The methodological approach for psychological distress used in the SNRA does not include controls for factors such as preexisting psychological conditions, gender, age, culture, or other significant factors.
- The index approach currently does not include a component for translating economic losses into psychological distress. If estimates of homes destroyed and jobs lost (rather than overall direct economic losses) are obtained as impact estimates for various national-level events, it would be possible to capture financial loss as part of the equation for psychological distress in future iterations of the SNRA.

²⁸ PHMSA data for years 2012 – 2014 (<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>) expanded to include events without a fatality.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its partner organizations leveraged previously funded social and behavioral science research to better understand how to anticipate, prepare for, counteract, and mitigate the effects of terrorist acts, natural disasters, and technological accidents. Additional research is required to further explore psychosocial factors that enable resilience and affect recovery in individuals, organizations, communities, and at the societal level.

Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)

- The current social displacement measure (counting people as displaced if they are forced to leave home for two or more days) does not differentiate between short term displacement (i.e., short-term evacuation) and long-term permanent displacement (i.e., the home is destroyed). Ideally, the psychological impact index would differentiate these two types of displacement, because the long term displacement is much more impactful for “significant distress” and “prolonged distress” psychological impacts.
- The duration of distress is an important factor which is not considered in the current approach. Most people do recover over time, although individuals vary greatly in the speed with which they rebound.
- The psychometrics for the measure of psychological distress used in the SNRA is unknown.

The SNRA approach represents the first attempt to include psychological impacts in a DHS strategic, national-level risk assessment. However, the approach and inputs have not been extensively verified and validated by the broader community of academic researchers focused on psychosocial effects of disasters. As with all of the methodology and analysis introduced by the 2011 and 2015 iterations of the SNRA, the psychological distress estimates should be considered provisional pending full peer and stakeholder review.

Social Displacement

The limitation of the SNRA combustible/flammable rail accident hazard event to only those incidents with a fatality and displacements of 48 or more hours resulted in no cases of social displacement by the measure used in the SNRA. Expanding the data set to include incidents without a fatality added only two incidents with displacement of 48 or more hours.³¹ However, when the incident set parameters included all cases of displacement, only 139 of over 13,000 incidents included a displacement,³² or less than 0.1 percent of all incidents.

Environmental Impact

Although the SNRA measure of environmental impact could not be assessed for the Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail) event in the 2015 SNRA, the project team examined other measures and indicators of environmental impact. The SNRA project team used reports from the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), and PHMSA in the qualitative analysis.

The concentration of oil released in a relatively small area, when transported by rail, could result in a serious environmental impact.³³ Spills from rail cargoes for the analyzed data set range from 500 liquid gallons (LGA) to 31,856 LGA.³⁴ However, while large, these quantities pale in comparison to the Exxon Valdez spill (10.92 million LGA) and the largest pipeline spill (1.68 million LGA).³⁵ Although volume of spill represents only one factor that affects environmental impacts, it still provides a means for comparing effects. By this measure, the environmental impacts of rail spills in the historical data set used by the SNRA are small by comparison with historical spills from other forms of transportation.

³¹ PHMSA data for years 2012–2014 (<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>) expanded to include events without a fatality.

³² Ibid.

³³ Congressional Research Service analysis. Frittelli, J., Andrews, A., Parfomak, P. W., Pirog, R., Ramseur, J. L., & Ratner, M. (2014). U.S. rail transportation of crude oil: Background and issues for Congress [Online document]. Retrieved from www.crs.gov

³⁴ PHMSA data for years 2012–2014 (<https://hazmatonline.phmsa.dot.gov/IncidentReportsSearch/>) as meets analytic scope.

³⁵ Pumphrey, D., Hyland, L., & Melton, M. (2014). Ibid. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Crude Oil Supply & Disposition (www.eia.gov) a barrel of oil is equal to 42 gallons.

Potential Mitigating Factors

Several factors could mitigate higher potential fatality and injury rates such as speed limits in more populous areas, which would mitigate catastrophic accidents. For example, the Lac-Mégantic accident occurred in part due to the train traveling in excess of 65 MPH into a corner rated for 35 MPH.³⁶ Thus, speed limits in populous areas may reduce fatality or injury risk for this hazard event.

Limitations and Other Recommendations

The limited scope of this assessment does not adequately address specific risks from specific cargoes. In addition, the lack of prior studies focused on specific cargoes limited the ability of the SNRA project team to compare different types of cargo. Different cargoes do present different specific hazards and risks. However, the SNRA analysis indicates that the transportation of any form of combustible/flammable cargo by rail presents comparatively low risks on all SNRA impact measures, within the limitations of the SNRA method and the historic incident data set leveraged by the SNRA.

The SNRA does not indicate what variables may have been mitigating what may be an otherwise substantial, but unknown, risk from some very dangerous cargoes. The SNRA project team was unable, within the compressed timeframe of the 2015 SNRA, to locate sufficient data or prior analysis to indicate whether it is predominately a single variable (e.g., speed limits), or combinations of factors, that have mitigated the historic likelihood of catastrophic incidents by this modality.

Future research should include specific efforts into variable analysis to help develop an understanding of which variables mitigate hazards. Such an effort could help identify single points of failure if they exist. However, any effort to study the different variables would likely need to be a more complex analysis, using advanced statistical methods such as stepwise regression analysis.

Additional unknowns which the SNRA analysis indicated as important for further research:

- Risk factors such as speed limits, because of the potential to provide significant insight into risks associated with rail cargoes.
- Risk factors other than type of cargo, such as rail infrastructure.

As with all analysis and findings conducted for the SNRA, any further analytic efforts should include a scientific peer review process to mitigate potential bias, and ensure that the results are valid and reliable.

³⁶ Transportation Safety Board of Canada. (2013). *Railway investigation report R13D0054: Runaway and main-track derailment*. Retrieved from <http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054.pdf>

Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accident (Rail)**Table 1: PHMSA Data Set**

Report Number	Date of Incident	Incident City	State	Commodity Short Name	Hazardous Class	Quantity Released (LGA)	Total Amount of Damages	Total Hazmat Fatalities	Non-Hazmat Fatalities	Total Hazmat Hospitalized Injuries	Total Hazmat Non-Hospitalized Injuries	Total Hazmat Injuries	Total Evacuated	Total Evacuation Hours	Major Artery Closed	Major Artery Hours Closed
I-1996030174	6/8/86	San Antonio	TX	Butadienes inhibited	Flammable gas	31,856	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	No	0
X-2009070185	2/1/96	Cajon	CA	Butylacrylate	Flammable - combustible liquid	500	300,000	1	0	2	50	52	50	0	No	0
I-1986070066	10/15/05	Texarkana	AR	Propylene	Flammable gas	22,736	26,542	1	0	20	1	21	1,012	17	Yes	34
I-2005120302	6/19/09	Cherry Valley	IL	Alcohols N.O.S.	Flammable - combustible liquid	11,051	2,700,000	1	0	2	6	8	999	20	Yes	48

Dam Failure

Accidental conditions where dam failure and inundation results in one fatality or greater. This event does not include releases caused by malicious acts.¹

Data Summary²

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities ³	1	17	170
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses ⁴	0	50	3,000
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	N/A ⁵		
Social	Social Displacement	Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days ⁶			
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ⁷	Moderate ⁸		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year ⁹	0.17	0.54	3

Event Background

A catastrophic dam failure may be caused by extraordinary levels of rainfall or snowmelt, leading to water levels higher than the dam can handle. Dam failures can also be caused by earthquakes, mechanical failure of the dam, and other mechanisms. The most common cause of dam failure is prolonged rainfall that produces flooding.¹⁰

¹ The data and findings for the SNRA Dam Failure event were completed in 2011, but a separate risk summary sheet for the event was not completed (the data were reported as a spreadsheet). This risk summary sheet as a text description for this data was written in 2013 using material written for the main body of the Technical Report.

² The data reported in this table represent historical U.S. dam failures reporting one or more human fatality from 1960-2009, compiled by the Dams Sector Office (DHS/NPPD) from U.S. Bureau of Reclamation historical data (Table 1).

³ Low, best, and high estimates for fatalities come from the low, average, and high values of the set of events meeting threshold criteria.

⁴ The high injury estimate is the highest reported injury from a subset of the events in the overall data set for which injury reports were available. The low injury estimate was selected to be zero by the SNRA project team, as the most reasonable assumption consistent with the sparse data available and the pattern observed from fatality counts from the set. The best estimate is the geometric mean of the high estimate and 1 (since a geometric mean cannot be taken of zero). See Injuries discussion for details.

⁵ Additional analysis is required to estimate the direct economic impacts of dam failure. Studies of some specific dams have estimated economic impacts in the hundreds of millions to billions of dollars, but may not be representative of the full set of dams in the U.S.. See Economic discussion for details.

⁶ See Social Displacement discussion for details.

⁷ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories.

⁸ Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'best' estimate.

⁹ Frequency estimates correspond to the inverse of the number of years of the longest interval between accident events (low), the mean frequency of the accident events (best), and the greatest number of accidents within one year (high) of the set described in note 2 above.

¹⁰ Federal Emergency Management Agency (1997). Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (MHIRA), chapter 20: Dam Failure.

Dam Failure

The scope of this event does not include dam failures caused by intentional attacks, whether kinetic (e.g. explosives) or cyber attacks, which are considered within the Explosives Terrorist Attack and the Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure events respectively. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security is the lead Sector-Specific Agency for managing risks to the Dams Sector due to intentional attack under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.¹¹ Scenarios analogous to the levee failure of Hurricane Katrina, where the levees are local to the community suffering destruction and their failure is directly caused by a hurricane which itself directly impacts the community, are also excluded from the scope of this event to avoid double counting with the Hurricane event.

There are 83,000 dams listed in the National Inventory of Dams.¹² People, property, and infrastructure downstream of dams could be subject to a devastating loss of life and damage in the event of sudden and unexpected collapse. The United States Society on Dams, a professional organization devoted to dam engineering, safety, and environmental issues, notes that 17 dams in the U.S. are over 500 feet in height, and there are 16 dams with reservoir capacities over 3 million acre-feet.¹³ The number of high-hazard-potential dams (dams whose failure would cause loss of human life) has increased to 13,000, with more than 3,300 high and significant dams located within one mile of a downstream population center and more than 2,400 located within two miles.^{14,15}

In addition to single dam failures, there is also the possibility of a failed dam stressing other dams downstream, causing a cascading and escalating catastrophic disaster.

The most significant factor determining the magnitude of life loss from a dam collapse is the speed and extent of population evacuation before the water arrives, which is primarily dependent upon warning time, communications, local emergency planning and preparedness, and whether local road networks allow for the rapid evacuation of downstream populations to higher ground within what may be only minutes.^{16,17,18} Deaths on a massive scale may result if an evacuation cannot be quickly implemented to move people above inundation levels.

Assumptions

Although numerous estimates of failure likelihoods and impacts for particular dams may be found in the literature,^{19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29} many of which are based upon detailed quantitative

¹¹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2013). Dams Sector Resources [web resource]. At <http://www.dhs.gov/dams-sector-resources> (accessed April 2013).

¹² Federal Emergency Management Agency (2009, February). Dam Safety in the United States. FEMA P-759; at <http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=3677> (checked April 2013).

¹³ United States Society on Dams. Dam, Hydropower and Reservoir Statistics. Accessed July 25, 2011. http://ussdams.org/uscold_s.html.

¹⁴ Association of State Dam Safety Officials, Dam Safety 101, available at <http://www.damsafety.org>.

¹⁵ FEMA (2009, February).

¹⁶ Aboelata, M.A. and Bowles, D.S. (2005). LIFESim: A Model for Estimating Dam Failure Life Loss. Institute for Dam Safety Risk Management, Utah State University, Logan, Utah. Report to Institute for Water Resources, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Australian National Committee on Large Dams.

¹⁷ McClelland et al (2002, July). Estimating life loss for dam safety risk assessment – a review and new approach. IWR Report 02-R-3, Institute for Dam Safety Risk Management, Utah State University; at <http://planning.usace.army.mil/toolbox/library/IWRServer/02-R-3.pdf> (checked April 2013).

¹⁸ Graham, W.J. (2009, September). A procedure for estimating loss of life caused by dam failure. U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, DSO-99-06, 1999; at <http://www.usbr.gov/ssle/damsafety/Risk/Estimating%20life%20loss.pdf> (checked April 2013).

¹⁹ Oregon Partnership for Disaster Resilience. (2009, October). Eugene/Springfield Multi-Jurisdictional Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan. Prepared for The Cities of Eugene and Springfield, Oregon. Accessed July 19, 2011: www.eugene-or.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_2_355923_0_0_18/NHMP09.pdf.

²⁰ Bowles et al (1999, November). Alamo Dam demonstration risk assessment. Proceedings of the Australian Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD) Annual Meeting, Jindayne, New South Wales, Australia. At <http://www.engineering.usu.edu/uwr/www/faculty/dsb/alamo.html> (checked April 2013).

²¹ Bowles et al (2005) Risk-based evaluation of operating restrictions to reduce the risk of earthquake-induced dam failure [model Lake Success Dam, California]. At <http://uwr.usu.edu/people/faculty/DSB/ussd2005.pdf> (checked April 2013).

²² Lewis et al (2011, April). Approaches to estimating consequences due to levee failure, St. Paul Levee system beta test. Proceedings, 31st Annual U.S. Society of Dams Conference, San Diego, pp 1105-1115; at <http://ussdams.com/proceedings/2011Proc/1105-1116.pdf> (checked April 2013).

modeling,^{30,31} the SNRA project team was unable to locate an overall quantitative assessment of national dam risk during the research phase of the SNRA project. The closest example of such an assessment was a quantitative risk assessment of major California dams³² done for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's 1974 WASH-1400 report, a comparative assessment of civilian nuclear power risk relative to other catastrophic risks to the Nation which parallels the SNRA in many respects.³³ Although this dams study pioneered a number of quantitative methods used by subsequent studies, because it was the first of its kind and because of its limited geographic scope the SNRA project team were unable to determine how representative its results were of the true risk of catastrophic dam failure for the entire Nation in the present day.

For this reason, the SNRA project team elected to use U.S. historical data for its quantitative estimates of likelihood and fatalities for the dam event. The historical data were provided to the SNRA project by the Dams Sector Office of the Office of Infrastructure Protection, DHS/NPPD as part of a prepublication draft report on impact estimation for dam failures.³⁴ The threshold selected for the Dam Failure national-level event for the SNRA project was one or more human fatalities. Since this source's data set included all dam failures with one or more fatality from 1960-2009 but only failures causing 25 or more fatalities before 1960, the SNRA project team selected 1960-2009 as the temporal window for its own data set. After consolidation of entries for secondary dam failures caused by the failure of upstream dams, which the SNRA treated as single cascading failure events, 26 historical events remained in the set (see Table 1 below).

Likelihood

Estimates in the literature for the annual probability of failure of a generic dam range from 10^{-5} to 10^{-3} , clustering around 10^{-4} . Given an expected lifetime of 100 years, this corresponds to a generic probability of failure of 10^{-2} for a given dam over its lifetime. As these generic estimates are ultimately based upon extrapolations from historical data, by construction these theoretical estimates are usually in good agreement with estimates derived with historical data sets such as

²³ Texas Colorado River Floodplain Coalition, 2004. Dam Failure. 2004 Hazard Mitigation Action Plan - Creating a Disaster-Resistant Lower Colorado River Basin, chapter 15. At www.tcrfc.org/member-resources/hazard-mitigation/2004-hazard-mitigation-action-plan/ (checked April 2013).

²⁴ Needham et al (2011, June). Consequence Estimation for the Herbert Hoover Dike Dam [Florida] Safety Risk Assessment. Presentation, USACE Infrastructure Systems Conference, June 13-17 2011; at http://www.usace-isc.org/presentation/HHC%20-%20Hydrologic%20Engineering/Consequence%20_Estimation%20for%20the%20HHD%20Dam%20Safety%20Risk%20Assessment_Ochs_Elk2.pdf (checked April 2013).

²⁵ Department of Water Resources, State of California (2008, December). Delta Risk Management Strategy Phase I Risk Analysis Report, section 12 (Consequences Modeling); at www.water.ca.gov/floodmgmt/dsmo/sab/drmsp/docs/Risk_Report_Section_12_Final.pdf (checked April 2013).

²⁶ Eiker et al (2000, October). Application of risk-based analysis to planning reservoir and levee flood damage reduction systems [risk assessment Folsom Dam]. Presentation; at <http://www.hec.usace.army.mil/publications/TechnicalPapers/TP-160.pdf> (checked April 2013).

²⁷ Goettel, K.A. (2001, September 24). Regional All Hazard Mitigation Master Plan for Benton, Lane and Linn Counties, Phase Two. Prepared for the Benton County Project Impact and the Oregon Cascades Regional Emergency Management Coordinating Council.

²⁸ City of Livermore, California (2005). Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, Annex D: All Hazard Vulnerability Assessment. At <http://www.cityoflivermore.net/civicax/filebank/documents/4184/> (checked April 2013).

²⁹ City of Los Angeles (2008). Citywide General Plan Framework Final Environmental Impact Report, Section 2.17, Geologic/Seismic Conditions; at <http://cityplanning.lacity.org/housinginitiatives/housingelement/frameworkfeir/FrameworkFEIR.pdf> (checked April 2013).

³⁰ U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1987). Socioeconomic considerations in dam safety risk analysis. IWR Report 87-R-7, Risk Analysis Research Program USACE; at <http://planning.usace.army.mil/toolbox/library/IWRServer/IWR001-000255-000433.pdf> (checked April 2013).

³¹ Dam Safety Office, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (1998, July). Prediction of embankment dam breach parameters: a literature review and needs assessment. Report DSO-98-004, Water Resources Research Laboratory; www.usbr.gov/pmts/hydraulics_lab/twahl/breach/breach_links.html (checked April 2013).

³² Ayyaswamy et al (1974). Estimates of the risks associated with dam failure. University of California – Los Angeles report UCLA-ENG-7423 for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission; at http://www.osti.gov/energycitations/product.biblio.jsp?query_id=1&page=0&osti_id=6387737 (checked April 2013).

³³ Rasmussen, Norman (1975, October). Reactor Safety Study: An assessment of accident risks in U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Chapter 6: Comparison of nuclear accident risks to other societal risks. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, WASH-1400 (NUREG 75/014). Available at <http://teams.epris.com/PRA/Big%20List%20of%20PRA%20Documents/WASH-1400/02-Main%20Report.pdf> (checked April 2013).

³⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011, September), Estimating Loss of Life for Dam Failure Scenarios. Dams Sector Office, Office of Infrastructure Protection, National Protection and Programs Directorate; at <http://www.damsafety.org/media/Documents/Security/DamsSectorConsequenceEstimation-LossofLife.pdf> (accessed April 2013).

Dam Failure

that used by the SNRA.^{35,36,37,38,39} Expected failure likelihoods of particular dams vary from one dam to another, depending on size, age, construction, local geological factors, and use.^{40,41,42}

Of the historical events in table 2, the low, best, and high estimates for frequency correspond to the inverse of the longest interarrival time (in years) between events in the historical set (low estimate), the average interarrival time (best estimate), and the maximum number of events occurring within the same calendar year (high estimate).

Fatalities and Injuries

Fatality estimates correspond to the low, average, and maximum number of fatalities from events in the set. As a minimum of one fatality was used as the threshold for inclusion in the set, all events had fatalities to count.

Injuries were not reported by the primary data source relied upon for event frequency and fatalities, but were obtained separately for a limited number of events from the set by additional staff research. Of this set, the low number was 2 (Bergeron Pond Dam failure, New Hampshire, 1996) and the high number was 3000 (Canyon Lake Dam, South Dakota, 1972). The SNRA project team made the assumption that zero injuries was a reasonable low assumption. Given the sparseness of injury data, the project team decided to use a geometric mean of the high estimate (3,000) and 1 injury (since a geometric mean cannot be taken of zero) for the best estimate. This approach seemed reasonable given that the arithmetic average of the set of fatalities (17) was on the order of the geometric mean (13) of the same set.

Economic Loss

The SNRA project team could not obtain reasonably defensible estimates of economic damage from dam failure during the research phase of the SNRA project.⁴³ Studies of specific dam failure scenarios have estimated economic impacts in the hundreds of millions to billions of dollars. Examples include estimates ranging from \$400M to \$2.9B for failures of the Miller Dam and Mansfield Dam in Austin, Texas;⁴⁴ estimates ranging from \$78M to \$4.5B for dams in northeastern Idaho;⁴⁵ and an estimate of approximately \$20B for a catastrophic failure of the

³⁵ Baecher et al (1980, June). Risk of dam failure in benefit-cost analysis. Water Resources Research 16(3) 449-456. This reference is the source of a common tabulation of estimates, and may be the primary origin of 10-4 being used as a common rule of thumb for dam risk estimation. The tabulation of prior estimates is substantively reproduced in Wang, Z. Melching, S. Management of Impounded Rivers. <http://www.irtces.org/zt/training2007/ppt/ch-7%20IMPOUNDED-3.pdf>. [accessed July 2011] and Salas, Jose D. (2006). Dam Breach Floods [instructional handout], at www.engr.colostate.edu/~jsalas/classes/ce624/Handouts/Dam%20Break%20Floods-Introduction.pdf (accessed April 2013).

³⁶ Biswas, A. 1971. Some Thoughts On Estimating Spillway Design Flood, International Association of Scientific Hydrology. *Bulletin*, 16:4, 63-72.

³⁷ Bowles et al (2005), op cit.

³⁸ Crum, Douglas (2009, January 28). Dams Safety Program [presentation], slide 22. Presentation, Society of American Military Engineers (SAME) Industry Day 2009, University of Missouri-Kansas City; at http://www.sameomaha.org/Files/Kansas%20City%20Post%20Industry%20Day%20Presentations%20-%20January%202027-28,%202009/Douglas%20Crum,%20P.E._USACE_Dams%20Safety%20Program.pdf (accessed April 2013).

³⁹ Hirschberg et al (1998, November). Severe accidents in the energy sector (1st ed.). Paul Scherrer Institut report number 98-16; at http://manhaz.cyf.gov.pl/manhaz/szkola/materials/S3/psi_materials/ENSAD98.pdf (checked April 2013).

⁴⁰ National Research Council (1985). Safety of dams: flood and earthquake criteria. Committee on Safety Criteria for Dams, Water Science and Technology Board, National Academies; at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=288 (checked April 2013).

⁴¹ U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (2008, March 19). Dam safety – managing risk [presentation]. Slide 27, Reclamation Risk Profile. Presentation, Tolerable Risk Workshop, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, March 18-19 2008; at <http://www.usbr.gov/ssle/damsafety/jointventures/tolerablerisk/11Muller.pdf> (checked April 2013).

⁴² McClenathan, Jeffrey T. (2010). Update for screening portfolio risk analysis for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dams. Proceedings, 30th Annual U.S. Society on Dams Conference April 12-16 2010, 1355-1366; at <http://ussdams.com/proceedings/2010Proc/1355-1366.pdf> (checked April 2013).

⁴³ The primary data source did not report economic loss estimates. For an approach relating economic losses to Population At Risk (PAR), see page 13 of Dams Sector (2011, September): Estimating Economic Consequences for Dam Failure Scenarios. Office of Infrastructure Protection, National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), U.S. Department of Homeland Security; <http://www.damsafety.org/media/Documents/Security/DamsSectorConsequenceEstimation-EconomicConsequences.pdf> (checked April 2013).

⁴⁴ Texas Colorado River Floodplain Association, op cit.

⁴⁵ Northeastern Idaho Region, 2008. All Hazard Mitigation Plan Regional Summary, p 33.

Hills Creek Dam in Oregon.⁴⁶ However, the SNRA project team was unable to determine how representative this limited set of regional scenarios were of the economic risk of dam failure for the Nation as a whole.

Social Displacement

The breaching of a major dam would force an enormous evacuation of downstream residents. Studies of two different dams predicted over 250,000 people would be required to evacuate if there were a catastrophic dam failure at the Hills Creek Dam⁴⁷ in Oregon or the Folsom Dam in California.⁴⁸ The expectation would be that disruption and displacement in the inundated area would last for an extended period, given the physical destruction of housing and infrastructure. Towns and residential areas scoured by the wall of water would take years to rebuild.

The SNRA project team was not able to collect data over the full range of dam breach events within the historical data set. Because fatalities, the scale for which the SNRA project team was able to determine impacts for each event in the data set by construction, clustered at the minimum of 1 and included very few much larger-impact events, the SNRA project team assumed a similar pattern for social displacement, assuming a minimal value (1 displaced) for the low estimate of social displacement. As with injuries, the SNRA project team selected the geometric mean of the low and high estimates (500) as the best estimate.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.⁴⁹ The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

⁴⁶ Goettel, *op cit.*

⁴⁷ Oregon Partnership for Disaster Resilience. (2009). Eugene/Springfield Multi-Jurisdictional Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan. Prepared for The Cities of Eugene and Springfield, Oregon. October 2009. Accessed July 19, 2011: http://www.eugene-or.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_2_355923_0_0_18/NHMP09.pdf.

⁴⁸ Ayyaswamy, *supra* note 2. The 250,000 estimate is actually of fatalities, largely in Sacramento, following a catastrophic breach of Folsom Dam. This does not, however, take into account the effects of evacuation: given the distance between the dam and the most populated portion of the city, an instantaneous break would still give 2-3 hours of water travel time for warning and evacuation of this downstream population time (according to an experimental evacuation model provided by Ayyaswamy but not applied to Folsom in the study) assuming no impairment of civil communications or transport. Hence the SNRA project team considered this was unlikely to be a realistic fatality estimate for the most likely Folsom Dam breach scenario. However, since few homes in the path of the water would remain habitable, it was considered to be a reasonable estimate for social displacement, defined as the number of people displaced from their homes for two or more days.

⁴⁹ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2}D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: dam failures were given a C_{EF} of 1.0.

The numerical estimates calculated from this formula are reported in Appendix G. The semi-quantitative risk matrix is discussed in the Findings (Psychological Distress Risk).

Dam Failure***Environmental Impact***

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (such as chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence and toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—or infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)⁵⁰ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “Moderate.” Experts assessed that the water released could impact a significant area, but the duration of impact would likely be short term, with a year or more for recovery.

⁵⁰ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

Table 1. Historical U.S. Dam Failures causing Loss of Life, 1960-2009¹

Dam	State	Date of Failure	Failure Cause	Dam Height (Feet)	Volume Released (Ac-Ft)	Size Category	Warning Time (Hours) ²	People at Risk ³	Loss of Life	Injuries
Electric Light Pond Dam	NY	1/1/1960	n/a	26	n/a	Small	n/a	n/a	1	
Mohegan Park Dam	CT	3/6/1963	Piping during elevated level from rainfall	20	138	Small	0	500	6	6 ⁴
Little Deer Creek Dam	UT	6/16/1963	Piping during normal weather	86	1,150	Intermediate	0	50	1	
Baldwin Hills Dam	CA	12/14/1963	Piping during normal weather	66	700	Intermediate	1.3	16,500	5	
Swift Dam	MT	6/8/1964	Overtopping	157	34,300	Large	Probably 0	n/a	19	
Cripple Creek Dam No. 3 and domino failure of Dam No. 2	CO	6/17/1965	Rainfall caused failure of No. 3, then overtopping failure of No. 2	n/a	640	Small	0	10	1	
Lee Lake Dam	MA	3/24/1968	Piping during normal weather	25	300	Small	0	80	2	
Virden Creek Dam	IA	7/17/1968	Overtopping	20	1,100	Intermediate	n/a	5,400	1	
Buffalo Creek Coal Waste Dam	WV	2/26/1972	Slumping of dam face during 2-year rainfall	46	404	Intermediate	0	4,000	125	1,000 ⁵
Lake "O" Hills	AK	4/1/1972	n/a	15	48	NJS ⁶	n/a	n/a	1	
Canyon Lake Dam	SD	6/9/1972	Overtopping; 245 total deaths from area-wide flood	30	700 (10,100 flood total)	Intermediate	0	10,750	165	3,000 ⁷
Lakeside Dam	SC	9/18/1975	Overtopping	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	1	
Bear Wallow Dam	NC	2/22/1976	Rainfall; probable overtopping	36	40	Small	0	8	4	
Teton Dam	ID	6/5/1976	Piping during initial reservoir filling	305	250,000	Large	1.2	25,000	11	800 ⁸
Laurel Run Dam	PA	7/20/1977	Overtopping	42	450	Intermediate	0	150	40	
Kelly Barnes Dam	GA	11/6/1977	Embankment slope failure during 10-year flood	40	630	Intermediate	0	250	39	
Eastover Mining Co. Dam	KY	12/18/1981	n/a	n/a	77	Small	n/a	100	1	
Lawn Lake Dam + Cascade Lake Dam ⁹	CO	7/15/1982	Piping during normal weather; Overtopping resulting from Lawn Lake Dam failure	26; 17	674; 25	Small; NJS	0; some	25; 4,275	3	
D.M.A.D. Dam ⁵	UT	6/23/1983	Backcutting from collapse of downstream diversion dam	29	16,000	Intermediate	1+	500	1	
Nix Lake Dam	TX	3/29/1989	Overtopping	23	837	Small	0	6	1	
Evans Dam + Lockwood Dam ¹⁰	NC	9/15/1989	Overtopping; Overtopping resulting from Evans failure	18; 14	72; 32	Small; NJS	n/a; n/a	n/a; n/a	2	
Kendall Lake Dam	SC	10/10/1990	Overtopping	18	690	Small	0	n/a	4	
Timberlake Dam	VA	6/22/1995	Overtopping	33	1,449	Intermediate	0	Road traffic ¹¹	2	
Bergeron Pond Dam	NH	3/13/1996	Dam not overtopped	36	193	Small	0	50	1	2 ¹²
Mike Olson Dam (Grand Forks County Comm. No. 1 Dam)	ND	6/12/2000	Undermining of downstream end of spillway conduit	29	263	Small	0	n/a	2	
Ka Loko Dam	HI	3/14/2006	Overtopping	44	1,400	Intermediate	0	7	7	

¹ U.S. Bureau of Reclamation records of historical dam failures 1960-2009, extracted from a longer table compiled by the Dams Sector Office, Office of Infrastructure Protection, DHS/NPPD and provided to the SNRA project team September 2011. The source table corresponds to Table 2 of U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011, September), Estimating Loss of Life for Dam Failure Scenarios, with the addition of reported injury estimates for a limited number of entries culled from other sources (as noted).

² "Warning Time" is defined as the interval between the first issuance of dam failure warnings and the initiation of dam failure. This definition of warning time may differ from that used elsewhere in this [the source] document. Most of the entries in this column are zero, indicating that dam failure warnings were not issued prior to dam failure. In some cases in which no warnings preceded dam failure, none of the people at risk were warned. In other cases, people living close to the dam were not warned, but warnings were issued for areas farther downstream as the dam failure was discovered or the flooding was observed. In some cases, warnings were issued for areas downstream from a dam due to natural flooding not associated with the dam failure; this was not considered a dam failure warning and was therefore assigned a zero in the table. [Footnote in source.]

³ "People at Risk" is defined as the number of people in the dam failure floodplain immediately prior to the issuance of any flood or dam failure warning. [Footnote in source.]

⁴ "Connecticut Dam Breaks, Fear Six Dead." Daily Courier, Connellsville Pennsylvania, from United Press International, March 7, 1963. At <http://www3.gendisasters.com/connecticut/18029/norwich-ct-earthend-dam-breaks-mar-1963> (checked April 2013).

⁵ "Buffalo Creek" [website]. West Virginia Division of Culture and History, unknown date; at <http://www.wvculture.org/history/buffcreek/buff1.html> (checked April 2013).

⁶ Non-Jurisdictional Size.

⁷ Association of State Dam Safety Officials, 2011 (April 1). Dam Failures, Dam Incidents (Near Failures). Datasheet, at [http://www.damsafety.org/media/Documents/PRESS/US_FailuresIncidents\(1\).pdf](http://www.damsafety.org/media/Documents/PRESS/US_FailuresIncidents(1).pdf) (pdf date 4/1/11, checked April 2013).

⁸ Graham, op cit; p 11.

⁹ The entries for the 7/15/1982 failures of Lawn Lake Dam and Cascade Lake Dam were considered a single event (cascading failure) for the purposes of the SNRA. The columns for Failure Cause through People at Risk give each dam's information on a line of its own; the Loss of Life column gives the combined fatalities.

¹⁰ The entries for the 9/15/1989 failures of Evans Dam and Lockwood Dam were considered a single event (cascading failure) for the purposes of the SNRA. The columns for Failure Cause through People at Risk give each dam's information on a line of its own; the Loss of Life column gives the combined fatalities.

¹¹ A 2-lane and 4-lane road [entry in source].

¹² U.S. Water News (1996, April). Dam break in New Hampshire damages homes, washes out highway. Online Archives, at <http://www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcsupply/6newhamp.html> (checked April, 2013).

Dam Failure

Radiological Substance Release

Accidental conditions where reactor core damage causes release of radiation. This event does not include releases caused by malicious acts.

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities ¹	Number of Fatalities	0 ²	230 ³	2200 ⁴
	Injuries and Illnesses ⁵	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	0 ²	240 ³	2300 ⁴
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	\$7.5B ⁶	\$8.6B ³	\$16B ⁴
	Indirect Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	\$9.4B ⁶	\$11B ³	\$23B ^{4,7}
Social	Social Displacement ⁸	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	76,000	147,000	500,000
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ⁹	Moderate ¹⁰		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	6 e-3 ¹¹	9 e-3 ³	1 e-2 ¹²

¹ Latent cancer fatalities: deaths resulting from cancer that became active after a latent period following exposure to radiation.

² The case with zero fatalities is drawn from the Three Mile Island core meltdown (Perham, 1980). A value of 58 fatalities and 61 illnesses would result from the most frequent, lowest impact scenarios that were outlined in each of the license renewal reports. Despite choosing the lowest impact events outlined in the report, some reports only contained somewhat rare, medium impact events, raising the overall expected fatalities. Therefore, the use of the Three Mile Island accident was selected as a more representative example of the most likely results of core damage accident.

³ The Best estimates use a simulation of the expected core damage frequencies obtained from the license renewal applications for a number of individual reactors available from the public website of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission). The data from the license renewal applications is used to perform cost/benefit analyses on reactor upgrades and the baseline data was not developed for use in a general risk assessment. Currently, this is the most recent publicly available data and adequate for order of magnitude estimates of the SNRA. An alternative analysis was also conducted using fatality, injury, and core damage frequency data from NUREG-1150, and the best estimates from this analysis were within the same order of magnitude as the results obtained using data from license renewal applications (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1990). The expected impacts are weighted by the likelihood of a core damage accident for each reactor using a Crystal Ball simulation. The details are explained in the Additional Relevant Information section.

⁴ The High impact estimates also come from the license renewal applications (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission). The impacts correspond to the highest impact scenarios outlined in the report. These usually involve a large, early release and assume that there is not enough time for successful evacuation. The frequency of these events is typically one to two orders of magnitude less than the frequency of any core damage event. Note that the likelihood values in the table do not correspond to the impacts for the High and Low categories.

⁵ Latent cancer morbidities.

⁶ The Low values of economic damage are determined from the results of the most frequent types of core damage accidents in each report as discussed in Footnote 2. The economic costs are mostly fixed values associated with business interruption and are consistent with the \$1B in decontamination costs from the shutdown of Reactor 2 at Three Mile Island (*New York Times*, 1993). The replacement power costs assumed in the model should be applicable here.

⁷ The current cost estimates for the Fukushima disaster are in the hundreds of billions of dollars. This includes the damage directly from the earthquake and the tsunami as well as the nuclear power plant disaster (Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry).

⁸ The low and best estimates reflect published estimates of displacement from the Three Mile Island incident. The high estimate reflects published estimates of displacement from the Chernobyl incident (see text).

⁹ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group.

Radiological Substance Release

Event Background

An accidental radiological release could come from a nuclear power plant accident or public exposure to lost or stolen radioactive sources. Most recorded exposure deaths and illnesses involve patients in medical accidents, workers and scientists working with radiological materials, or releases for criminal purposes (Johnston's Archive, 2010; Mohtadi, 2006; Streeter, Lombardi, & Cantrell, 2008). There have been a few accidental releases of lost material worldwide, but the documented exposures of this type are small and less likely to happen in the United States considering the standards regulating the maintenance and transport of radioactive material. Given the consequences of a large, radiological release from a power plant, this analysis focuses on nuclear power plant accidents.

A national-level power plant accident is defined in this scenario as any accident which damages the reactor core. The risk to the public and environment based on this type of accident is highly dependent on radiation containment and the location of the reactor. Accidents causing a radiological release from spent fuel are not considered in this summary sheet as their fatality and illness risk has been calculated to be more than an order of magnitude less than that of a core damage accident (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (T.E. Collins, G. Hubbard), 2001).

Assumptions

Fatalities and Illnesses/Injuries

Health and safety impacts were estimated based on the following assumptions:

- The fatalities and illnesses involved in a nuclear reactor accident are latent cancer fatalities and illnesses, determined as an increase over expected background illnesses and fatalities in an unexposed population. These would occur over the lifetimes of the exposed population with no expected deaths immediately after exposure.
- The fatalities and cancer illnesses were calculated from the dose consequence information in the license renewal applications available on the website of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
- The High and Low impact values use the largest impact release events and lowest impact events available in each report. Some reactors do not report the most likely scenarios, which make the Low impact values higher than would be expected for the most likely scenario. The most probable low impact scenario would be quite similar to the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 in which it was determined that the radiological release would not raise the exposure of the population enough to cause an additional case of cancer above the expected background (Perham, 1980).

Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimus (none) categories.

¹⁰ Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event.

¹¹ This number is the 5th percentile of the core damage frequencies taking into account variability across the different reactors and the uncertainty of a single reactor. Note that this frequency incorporates the uncertainty and variability of the expectation and does not directly correspond to the Low impact values.

¹² This number is the 95th percentile of the core damage frequencies taking into account variability across the different reactors and the uncertainty of a single reactor. This does not correspond to the High impact values which have likelihoods one to two orders of magnitude lower than the Best CDF value.

- All of the impact estimates assume that the accident is confined to a single reactor. Damage to multiple reactors could cause higher impacts. Also, the impacts associated with external events could be greater than those for internal events (the basis for impacts in NRC models) due to potential difficulties in evacuation.

Economic Loss

Economic impacts were estimated based on the following assumptions:

- The costs associated with a nuclear power plant accident listed with the license renewal application at the website of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission) include the offsite costs associated with land remediation and business interruption for areas affected outside of the power plant, the direct costs of decontamination and disposal at the power plant site, and the cost to replace the power that would have been generated at the plant.
- The offsite costs vary depending on the size of the release. The cost of onsite decontamination and disposal as well as the cost of using a different power generator are assumed fixed.
- In determining the overall economic impacts for a radiological release incident, the SNRA project team used an approach to estimating direct, indirect, and induced economic losses. The definitions for direct, indirect, and induced costs are listed in Table 1 below:

Table 1. Definitions for Direct, Indirect, and Induced Costs

Direct Costs include:

- **Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction:** DDP costs covered the repair, replacement and environmental clean-up which are considered expenditures by the government. It was assumed the government would recoup this spending through tax increases, causing a reduction of household spending of that same amount. However, this spending would be received as income by some sectors, such as waste management and environmental consulting services. The increase in spending into the waste management and environmental consulting services is treated as increase in annual output for these sectors.
- **Business Interruption:** Business interruption impacts considered losses due to decreased output at the target area, along with other increases and decreases to related sectors due to behavioral changes resulting from the event.
- **Loss in Spending from Fatalities:** This SNRA project team estimated a loss of spending of \$42,500 for each fatality. In addition, \$6,000 is included in increased output for mortuary services for each fatality.
- **Medical Costs:** Costs of medical mitigation were considered to be borne through private spending and insurance companies, while the hospital sector received an offsetting increase in output.

Indirect Costs include:

- Costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the

Radiological Substance Release

industries impacted by the direct costs above.

Induced Costs include:

- The induced costs are those incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries. Induced costs can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.
- In order to apply this model to the set of costs available, the offsite, disposal and decontamination, and alternate power generation costs must be binned into the above direct costs categories.
- Because the offsite costs are assumed to mostly be due to business interruption, they are placed in that category. The alternative power generation would also be a business interruption cost. Both of these values are several billion dollars and expected to contain the majority of business interruption costs from the accident.
- Onsite decontamination and disposal should be the primary area where this type of work would need to be conducted, so these costs are directly used for the decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction category.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- For the accidental Radiological Substance Release event, the low and best estimates reflect published estimates of displacement from the Three Mile Island incident. This displacement represented voluntary evacuation by individuals and families rather than a mandatory evacuation order: the SNRA's social displacement metric counts all people displaced from homes for two or more days, whether the displacement was directed or not.¹³ The high estimate reflects published estimates of displacement from the Chernobyl incident.¹⁴

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact

¹³ Sources for the low and best estimates of displacement due to Accidental Radiological Substance Release are Cutter, Susan, and Kent Barnes. 1982. "Evacuation Behavior and Three Mile Island." *Disasters* 6.2: 116-124.; and Soffer, Yechiel, Dagan Schwartz, Avishay Goldberg, Maxim Henenfeld and Yaron Bar-Dayan. 2008. "Population Evacuations in Industrial Accidents: A Review of the Literature about Four Major Events." *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 23.3: 276-281.

¹⁴ Soffer, Yechiel, Dagan Schwartz, Avishay Goldberg, Maxim Henenfeld and Yaron Bar-Dayan. 2008. "Population Evacuations in Industrial Accidents: A Review of the Literature about Four Major Events." *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine* 23.3: 276-281.

based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.¹⁵ The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (such as chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence and toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—or infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹⁶ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “moderate.” Nuclear power plant disruption could cause radioactive airborne releases that could travel for large distances and settle into down-range eco-systems, with possible disruptions. In addition, releases into water bodies may have impacts on aquatic life.

Key Mitigating Factors

The impacts caused by a nuclear release are currently mitigated through several preparedness strategies. Monitoring systems indicate the need for individuals in the designated evacuation zone to evacuate to the recommended safe distance. The monitoring and warning systems are regularly tested to ensure that they are functioning properly when an event occurs. Additionally, evacuation and safe routes are identified and communicated to individuals residing or working in the evacuation zones. Further, a properly prepared and deployed response team could potentially aid in limiting exposure to the radiological substance and reducing the size of the contaminated area.

¹⁵ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: accidental Radiological Substance Release was given a C_{EF} of 1.1.

The numerical estimates calculated from this formula are reported in Appendix G. The semi-quantitative risk matrix is discussed in the Findings (Psychological Distress Risk).

¹⁶ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

Additional Relevant Information

The frequencies of radiological releases were determined by Core Damage Frequency (CDF)¹⁷ results provided in license renewal applications, which are available at the website of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission). Of the 104 active nuclear reactors in the United States, 81 have either completed applications for license renewal or have applications that are currently under review. As part of this license renewal process, each reactor includes an environmental report with a Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) analysis, which is where the CDFs can be found. Information for reactors that do not have current license renewal applications is not available, but it was assumed that the data available on the 81 reactors with current renewal application is representative of the remaining reactors without current license renewal applications. Therefore, in accordance with this assumption, the mean internal CDFs¹⁸ are drawn from the distribution of the 81 reactors whose information is available.

Regarding the SAMA data in the license renewal applications, it is important to note that data from SAMA analyses are developed and used to perform cost/benefit analyses on reactor upgrades, not to perform general risk assessments. However, SAMA data are the best publicly available data for our purposes and are adequate for the order-of-magnitude estimates of the SNRA. The NRC is currently re-evaluating severe accident impacts using two pilot plants. Preliminary results from this State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analysis (which is still in progress¹⁹) indicate that selected accident scenarios could reasonably be mitigated, either preventing core damage or delaying/reducing the radiation release. For scenarios assumed to proceed without mitigation, accidents progress more slowly and result in smaller and more delayed radiological releases than previously predicted (e.g. in NUREG-1150) (Gauntt, 2008).

Furthermore, each of the reactor license renewal applications includes the CDFs associated with internal events, which are accidents arising from plant activities, such as worker error or parts malfunctions. Uncertainty around these CDFs was collected for 15 license renewal applications, which report 5th and 95th percentiles along with mean CDFs. For example, in Reactor 1 this value is 2.10 for the ratio of the 95th percentile to the mean and 0.462 for the 5th percentile to the mean, and in Reactor 2 the ratio of the 95th percentile to the mean is 1.40, and the ratio of the 5th percentile to the mean is 0.687. However, uncertainty was collected in only 15 of the 81 CDFs (not all reports included these values), and the functions associated with the Monte Carlo runs that underlie the uncertainty are not reported. Therefore, to address this lack of information and assign uncertainty to all CDFs for all the reactors, the 15 available reports on uncertainty are used to calculate 15 separate ratios of the 95th percentile to mean and of the 5th percentile to mean. Also, it was assumed that the distributions of the 5th-mean and 95th-mean ratios for the available 15 cases would be representative of all reactors. Crystal Ball was used to find a statistical best fit for the distributions of these ratios. Then to assign uncertainty to all CDFs, the 15 reference values were used for their corresponding reactors and drew randomly from the best fit 95th-mean and 5th-mean distributions for all other reactors, multiplying their CDFs by the randomly assigned ratios in order to derive 5th and 95th percentile values for the CDFs. These

¹⁷ **Core Damage Frequency (CDF)** - An expression of the likelihood that, given the way a reactor is designed and operated, an accident could cause the fuel in the reactor to be damaged (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2011).

¹⁸ **Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE)** - While the "individual plant examination" takes into account events that could challenge the design from things that could go awry internally (in the sense that equipment might fail because components do not work as expected), the "individual plant examination for external events" considers challenges such as earthquakes, internal fires, and high winds (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2011).

¹⁹ As of August 2011.

distributions were chosen independently for each of the reactors, and it was assumed that the uncertainty for each of the reactors is independent: the model does not simulate a systematic dependency among the reactors' uncertainties, which could push all of the reactors' CDFs in the same direction (high or low).

The frequency of core damage caused by external events (fire, earthquake, flood, plane crash, etc.) is included in some—but not all—of the applications. For the reactors where external CDFs are readily available, they have been included directly in the frequency calculation. In the examples examined, external CDFs including fire, seismic events, and high winds are frequencies that share the same order of magnitude as the internal CDFs. For example, for two given reactors, the internal CDFs are 1.79e-5 for Reactor 1 and 1.15e-5 for Reactor 2. The external CDF values are 5.01e-5 for Reactor 1 and 5.20e-5 for Reactor 2. For reactors without external CDFs, a lognormal distribution based on the selection of 18 known external CDF/internal CDF ratios is used to calculate the variation in external factors. (The lognormal distribution was chosen based on a Crystal Ball best fit.)

The other frequency of interest is the Large, Early Release Frequency (LERF).²⁰ For example, in Reactor 1 the CDF of 1.79e-5 corresponds to a LERF of 6.50e-7. Similarly in Reactor 2, the CDF of 1.15e-5 corresponds to a LERF of 9.43e-7. Any event with core damage is assumed to cross the threshold of national significance and influence national preparedness goals. Therefore, the CDF is the frequency listed in the risk characteristics table above, which will include all large, early release events. Based on the data from 16 reactors, the frequency of a large, early release is between one and two orders of magnitude lower than the frequency of a more general core damage event.

The results of the analysis using license renewal applications were compared to an alternative analysis that was conducted using fatality, injury, and core damage frequency data from NUREG-1150 (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1990.). The average of the core damage frequencies taken from NUREG-1150 was multiplied by 104 (the number of active nuclear reactors in the United States) and the fatalities and dose rates taken from NUREG-1150 were used to determine the comparability of the results of the two data sources. The best estimates from the NUREG-1150 analysis were within the same order of magnitude as the results obtained using data from license renewal applications.

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²⁰ **Large, Early Release Frequency (LERF)** - The frequency of those accidents leading to significant, unmitigated releases from containment in a time frame prior to effective evacuation of the close-in population such that there is a potential for early health effects. Such accidents generally include unscrubbed releases associated with early containment failure or at shortly after vessel breach, containment bypass events, or loss of containment (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2002).

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Transportation Systems Failure

Accidental conditions where a bridge failure occurs within the U.S., causing one fatality or greater.¹

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities ²	1	8.6	47
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses ³	0	8.8	145
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	\$250,000 ⁴	\$200 million ⁵	\$6.4 billion ⁶
	Indirect Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	See Discussion		
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0 ⁷		
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See Discussion		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins	N/A		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number per Year ⁸	0.17	0.57	2

¹ The Transportation Systems Failure hazard event is intended to include within its scope the failure of tunnels and other highway and rail infrastructure causing loss of life. However, the SNRA 2015 event is effectively scoped to bridge failure because of data availability.

² Low, average, and high fatalities from the set of U.S. historical bridge failure incidents in Table 3.

³ Low, average, and high injuries from the set of U.S. historical bridge failure incidents in Table 3.

⁴ DDP, generic cost estimate for state-federal bridge loss, NWS StormData preparation guide for reporting damages from natural disasters (p. B-2: Low end of \$250K–\$750K range selected for SNRA low estimate). National Weather Service (2007, August 17), Storm Data Preparation (Instruction 10-1605), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; at <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/sym/pd01016005curr.pdf> (retrieved 5 March 2014). This estimate does not include the other components of SNRA direct economic loss, such as business interruption.

⁵ Estimate is based on information from multiple sources:

(a) Padgett, J., DesRoches, R., Nielson, B., Yashinsky, M., Kwon, O., Burdette, N., and Tavera, E. (2008). "Bridge Damage and Repair Costs from Hurricane Katrina." *J. Bridge Eng.*, 13(1), 6–14, January/February 2008; available at http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~jp7/Padgett_JBE_Jan08_Bridge_Damage_and_Repair_Costs_from_Hurricane_Katrina_PUBLISHED.pdf

(b) WSDOT, "I - 5 Skagit River Bridge – Estimate of the Direct Cost of Closure", accessed 3/18/2015, available at http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/983F3385-A349-4372-9493-1C21E033DEC0/0/SkagitRiverBridge_DirectCost_1082013.pdf.

(c) Minnesota DOT (2007, September 4), "Economic Impacts of the I-35W Bridge Collapse," available at <http://www.dot.state.mn.us/i35wbridge/rebuild/pdfs/economic-impacts-from-deed.pdf> (checked 15 April 2015).

(d) Pioneer Press, "The Design for the I-35W Replacement Bridge is Unveiled," available at http://www.twincities.com/ci_7122021, accessed March 18, 2015.

⁶ Based upon the replacement cost of the Oakland Bay Bridge. Cuff, Dennis (2014, September 8). Cost of Bay Bridge demolition rises amid complication. *Oakland Tribune*. [\$6.4 billion cost was for replacement: demolition cost estimate cited in article, \$271 million.] Bay Area Toll Authority (2015). Bridge facts: San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge [dynamic resource]: <http://bata.mtc.ca.gov/bridges/sf-oak-bay.htm> (retrieved 13 April 2015).

⁷ Social displacement was assumed to be zero for the Transportation Systems Failure national-level event.

⁸ Low, best, and high frequencies represent the inverse of the longest inter-arrival time (gap) between incidents, the average number of incidents per year, and the largest number of incidents occurring in any one year from the set of U.S. historical bridge failure incidents in Table 3.

Transportation Systems Failure

Event Background

The SNRA Transportation Systems Failure hazard event was originally developed by the DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) for the 2012–13 Homeland Security National Risk Characterization (HSNRC) project.⁹ The original HSNRC data and analysis were expanded and revised for the 2015 SNRA by project staff from Argonne National Laboratory and FEMA.

Transportation infrastructure is broadly distributed, but the health of the overall system can be monitored by the state of disrepair and trends of failures of bridges, tunnels, road segments, and other assets. Bridges and tunnels are necessary means to overcome physical obstacles. By necessitating greater convergence of traffic in these locations, bridges and tunnels become critical nodes or choke points in networks. However, roadways can also operate as critical nodes when they provide sole or primary access to an area, connect to critical facilities, or when there is a lack of sufficient redundancy within the network.

Infrastructure owners and operators often struggle to fund and implement proper maintenance and repairs to the structures and assets that compose transportation systems, leading to an increasing risk of infrastructure failure. The Nation’s transportation network includes reliance on key infrastructure nodes such as bridges and tunnels, which are aging. In some cases these nodes are at risk due to conditions exceeding design specifications, and in others due to external threats and hazards. The more aware owners and operators are of the critical nature of their key nodes, the more likely they are to maintain them appropriately. However, the general system decline and lack of resources suggests a broader trend toward increasing infrastructure failure.¹⁰

Transportation system failures can disrupt supply chains, resulting in unexpected costs to repair or rebuild damaged components. They can also increase transportation costs to those normally using the disrupted facility due to increased congestion or detouring, and often entail delays for emergency response and other important services. In rare instances these infrastructures can come under extreme loads or other unforeseen conditions (e.g., design errors), that create situations where high numbers of casualties could occur from their catastrophic failure.

Bridges, tunnels, and roadway culverts represent a subset of transportation infrastructure assets that, as identifiable network nodes and through interaction with the surrounding environment, are at a greater risk to acute failures that can cause broader disruption or impact to the transportation system. A background summary of bridge, tunnel, and culvert transportation failures are summarized below.

Bridge Failures

Bridge failures represent a subset of all transportation risk; however, there is a larger amount of data on highway bridge condition and failures compared with other transportation infrastructure, which better enables a national-level assessment of associated risks. The National Bridge Inventory (NBI) maintains condition and inspection data on individual bridges for all roadway bridges in the U.S. There is no national database of highway bridge failures; however, a review

⁹ The HSNRC was a collaborative effort of the DHS analytic enterprise to expand the 2011 SNRA risk knowledge base to additional threats and hazards, and to adapt the SNRA to the information needs of DHS strategic planning.

¹⁰ One advocacy group assessed that the number of bridges older than 50 years was 95,150 in 1990 and 199,584 in 2010, and would be 383,060 by 2030 and 542,170 by 2050. Transportation for America (2011), “The Fix We’re In For: The State of Our Nation’s Bridges,” Washington, DC. Accessed 3/18/2015 <http://t4america.org/docs/bridgereport/bridgereport-national.pdf>.

of 92 failures¹¹ has categorized causes of bridge failure as indicated in Table 1. This failure database was statistically analyzed in conjunction with the NBI to estimate that annually, 128 bridges fail in the U.S. It should be noted, however, that this is a statistically determined number, and includes all bridge failures (i.e., from major roadways to low-volume roads), some of which may have little impact. Most failures are a result of flooding or scour (a hydraulic-related failure of bridge foundation supports) as well as truck or vehicle collisions. Deterioration, fatigue, fire, soil bearing, and bridge overload have also resulted in bridge failures.

Databases of condition and inspection information to the NBI are not broadly available for railway bridges. Although rail bridges are of systemic and economic importance, they are primarily privately owned facilities, and therefore, national data is not maintained in a central location. The potential for high casualty counts resulting from rail bridge accidents may be attributable to passengers trapped in trains, as well as momentum of the train following the incident.

The Bridge Forum Bridge Collapse Database, maintained by the Cambridge University Department of Engineering, contains 25 U.S. road, rail, and pedestrian bridge failures that resulted in one or more fatalities from 1964 through 2007 (Table 3).¹² This database has been updated with information from multiple data sources, and has been used to provide a basis for the frequency, fatality, and injury estimates in the 2015 SNRA.

Table 1: Bridge Failure Study, Percentages of Failure Causes

Cause of Failure	Partial Collapse	Total Collapse	Total Count	Percentage of Total
Hydraulic Total	21	27	48	52.17%
Hydraulic	—	2	2	2.17%
Flood	8	18	26	28.26%
Scour	12	7	19	20.65%
Ice	1	—	1	1.09%
Collision Total	17	1	18	19.57%
Collision	14	1	15	16.30%
Auto/Truck	3	—	3	3.26%
Overload	3	8	11	11.96%
Deterioration Total	4	2	6	6.52%
Deterioration	—	1	1	1.09%
Steel deterioration	2	1	3	3.26%
Concrete deterioration	2	—	2	2.17%
Fire	3	—	3	3.26%
Construction	1	1	2	2.17%
Fatigue-steel	1	—	1	1.09%
Bearing	—	1	1	1.09%
Soil	1	—	1	1.09%
Miscellaneous	1	—	1	1.09%
Total	52	40	92	100.00%

¹¹ Reproduced from Table 2, p. 27: Cook, W. (2014, May 1). "Bridge Failure Rates, Impacts, and Predictive Trends." Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Utah State University, Logan, UT: at <http://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/2163/> (checked 13 April 2015).

¹² Imhof, Daniel, and University of Cambridge (2012). BridgeForum Bridge Failure Database [electronic resource]. Structures Group, University of Cambridge Department of Engineering, adapted from Imhof, Daniel (2005), Risk Assessment of Existing Bridge Structures [dissertation], abstract at <http://www-civ.eng.cam.ac.uk/abstract/Imhofabs.html>. Database at <http://www.bridgeforum.org/dir/collapse/country/United%20States.html> (accessed December 13, 2012). The 25 incidents causing fatalities are a subset of 71 U.S. bridge failure incidents from 1964–2007 in total in these sources.

Transportation Systems Failure

Tunnel Failures¹³

In the United States, there are about 337 highway tunnels as compared to over 600,000 highway bridges. As with bridges, many of these tunnels are choke points or critical nodes in the Nation's highway transportation network that have completely unique design, construction, and operational requirements. Tunnel structures are designed to withstand environmental impacts from the soil or seabed through which they pass; however, a failure of a tunnel could result in hundreds of casualties and billions of dollars in reconstruction cost. The greatest threats to tunnel users are fire and chemical spills, resulting from the closed environment of tunnels. Therefore, life safety and evacuation are the most important considerations for risk reduction. There have been a number of tunnel incidents in the United States, which resulted in casualties, but these incidents have not been as catastrophic as compared to those in other countries. Tunnel owners must conduct systematic reviews to understand their facilities and vulnerabilities, and develop protection and life safety strategies.

There is no national data set or study that presents tunnel failure risks or vulnerabilities in the U.S. Global studies have been conducted;¹⁴ however, variability in international design and safety practices relating to construction, operation, and management suggest that global trends in tunnel failures may not accurately represent or be predictive of such failures in the United States.

Culvert Failures

The number of culverts in the U.S. is significantly greater than the number of bridges, and most of these are roadway culverts that are owned and maintained by state Departments of Transportation (DOT), state Departments of Natural Resources, and local counties or municipalities. Culverts are water runoff control devices designed to constrict or control surface water runoff to allow it to pass under roadways, railways, or other similar systems. Culverts range in size from small pipes several inches in diameter to large structures that may be dozens of feet wide. They are distinct from bridges in that they contain structure on all sides of the opening (although some newer “open-bottomed” culverts omit structure on the bottom of the opening to preserve streambeds), and can be constructed of concrete, galvanized steel, aluminum, timber, or other materials. As with bridges and tunnels, however, the flooding, failure, or washout of a roadway culvert results in closure of, or disruption to, the overlying roadway.

The cost and length of time to replace or repair a road culvert is significantly less than bridges and tunnels; therefore, the aggregate risks associated with disruption may be comparatively less than that for bridges. Road culvert failures typically occur during extreme weather events, heavy rains, and flooding. They frequently are a result of overwhelmed capacity, poor maintenance, or some combination thereof. Numerous state DOTs maintain inventories of culvert condition and inspection data; however, such practices are not nationally standardized and are documented with a widely ranging level of detail, if at all.^{15,16}

¹³ Transportation Research Board (TRB), National Academies (2006). “TCRP Report 86/NCHRP Report 525, Transportation Security, Volume 12: Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure,” National Academies Press, Washington, DC. At http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_rpt_525v12.pdf (checked 13 April 2015).

¹⁴ For example, “Catalog of Notable Tunnel Failure Case Histories (Up to October 2012),” Presented by Mainland East Division, Geotechnical Engineering Office, Civil Engineering and Development Department, Hong Kong: at <http://www.cedd.gov.hk/eng/publications/geo/doc/HK%20NotableTunnel%20Cat.pdf> (accessed 16 March 2015).

¹⁵ Wall, T.A. (2013) “A Risk-Based Assessment Tool To Prioritize Roadway Culvert Assets for Climate Change Adaptation Planning,” Doctoral Dissertation, School of Civil & Environmental Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA: at <https://smartech.gatech.edu/handle/1853/50393> (checked 13 April 2015).

Data Scope

The SNRA transportation systems failure data set includes historical incidents of automotive, rail, and pedestrian bridge collapses in the United States. Bridge failures represent a subset of all mass transportation risk. However, there is a larger amount of data on bridge failures compared with tunnel and other transportation infrastructure, and bridges were considered sufficiently representative of a larger trend of changing conditions in critical infrastructure for the purposes of informing preparedness planning decisions at a strategic level.

Assumptions

- Transportation-related infrastructure such as tunnels, roadway culverts, navigation locks, and railway systems are all potential points of system vulnerability and failure. However, due to lack of national-level data to serve as a basis for a nationally-consistent risk assessment, these systems are excluded and the focus is redirected exclusively to bridges. Additionally, focus is given to major roadway bridges (i.e., those located on main highway and roadway networks), and excludes bridges such as those on undeveloped roads (e.g., logging, forest access) or private property.
- The SNRA social displacement measure (persons, other than response personnel and those hospitalized, with homes destroyed or who are prevented from returning home for more than two days) is used in this analysis. Other measures, such as whether or not a transportation system component provides soleaccess to a community or facility, or network redundancy can be useful alternative metrics for social displacement, but are excluded here due to lack of available national-level data.
- Aging infrastructure, whose construction techniques and materials are now considered substandard in the U.S., are considered part of the failing transportation infrastructure system if they had continued to be used at the time of their failure.
- Economic impacts are highly varied and dependent on the context of the particular bridge failure and its cascading effects. There is no basis to make such an estimate in this assessment for the more minor failures in an unclassified estimate. Therefore, direct costs reflected in the quantitative estimates, and a discussion of other relevant factors, including broader and indirect economic impacts, are provided in the final section.
- While there is no broad consensus as to what items to include in a list of U.S. bridge failures—the factors that most directly contributed to those risks, or in the analysis of their impacts—the resources consulted and discussed here provide a sufficient basis upon which to form an estimate and inform further consideration, but not a comprehensive and complete study of those failures, contributing factors, or impacts.

Frequency

Low, best, and high estimates of annual frequency represent the inverse of the longest inter-arrival time (longest gap between incidents, six years, 1995–2001), the average number of incidents per year, and the maximum number of incidents occurring in any one year of the incidents in Table 3.

¹⁶ Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) (2014). “Culvert and Storm Drain Management Case Study: Vermont, Oregon, Ohio, and Los Angeles County.” U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.

Transportation Systems Failure

Health and Safety

Low, best, and high estimates of fatalities and injuries represent the lowest, average, and highest fatalities and injuries from the set of incidents in Table 3.

Direct Economic Loss

Direct economic impacts as defined in the SNRA include decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction costs including property (structure, contents, physical infrastructure and other physical property) and crop damage; one year's lost spending due to fatalities; medical costs; and business interruption directly resulting from the impacts of an event.

The historical incident database (Table 3) did not report economic damage information. Low, best, and high estimates for the SNRA 2015 Transportation Systems Failure hazard event are based upon literature data and analyst judgment.

The low estimate of direct economic loss is based on a generic cost estimate for state-Federal bridge loss for reporting damages from natural disasters.¹⁷ This estimate does not include the other components of SNRA direct economic loss, such as business interruption.

For the best estimate of direct economic loss, cost information available for three recent events—bridges affected by Hurricane Katrina, the I-35W Bridge, and the I-5 Skagit River Bridge—was used to compute an average cost including the impact on transportation costs, and economic output, where available.¹⁸ Because these estimates include costs in addition to physical damage, their degree of approximation to the SNRA direct economic loss metric (which includes a component for direct business interruption but not other second-order costs) is unknown. The SNRA project team made the assumption that the resulting average would be a reasonable approximator to an average cost of catastrophic bridge failures resulting in loss of life, within the order of magnitude precision of the SNRA.

The cost for replacing the Oakland Bay Bridge was used as the high estimate for direct economic loss.¹⁹ Note that this estimate excludes the impact on transportation costs, output, and employment, and therefore underestimates both direct and total economic loss from this event.

Social Displacement

The impacts of transportation network disruptions on travel behavior are a function of the geographic scope of the disruption, the existence of alternate routes, network redundancy, capacity utilization, and congestion, and restoration time. Depending on the level of disturbance, travelers may consider options such as shifting work schedules, telecommuting, or public transportation.

¹⁷ National Weather Service (2007, August 17), Storm Data Preparation (Instruction 10-1605), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; at <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/sym/pd01016005curr.pdf> (retrieved 5 March 2014). Page B-2: Low end of \$250K–\$750K range selected for SNRA low estimate.

¹⁸ Estimate is based on information from multiple sources:

(a) Padgett, J., DesRoches, R., Nielson, B., Yashinsky, M., Kwon, O., Burdette, N., and Tavera, E. (2008). "Bridge Damage and Repair Costs from Hurricane Katrina." *J. Bridge Eng.*, 13(1), 6–14, January/February 2008; available at http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~jp7/Padgett_JBE_Jan08_Bridge_Damage_and_Repair_Costs_from_Hurricane_Katrina_PUBLISHED.pdf

(b) WSDOT, "I - 5 Skagit River Bridge – Estimate of the Direct Cost of Closure", Accessed 3/18/2015, available at http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/983F3385-A349-4372-9493-1C21E033DEC0/0/SkagitRiverBridge_DirectCost_1082013.pdf.

(c) Minnesota DOT (2007, September 4), "Economic Impacts of the I-35W Bridge Collapse," available at <http://www.dot.state.mn.us/i35wbridge/rebuild/pdfs/economic-impacts-from-deed.pdf> (checked 15 April 2015).

(d) Pioneer Press, "The Design for the I-35W Replacement Bridge is Unveiled," available at http://www.twincities.com/ci_7122021, accessed March 18, 2015.

¹⁹ Cuff, Dennis (2014, September 8). Cost of Bay Bridge demolition rises amid complication. *Oakland Tribune*. [\$6.4 billion cost was for replacement: demolition cost estimate cited in article, \$271 million.] Bay Area Toll Authority (2015). Bridge facts: San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge [dynamic resource]: <http://bata.mtc.ca.gov/bridges/sf-oak-bay.htm> (retrieved 13 April 2015).

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

The historical incident database (Table 3) did not include information on persons displaced. The SNRA project team made the assumption that no persons were separated from their homes for more than two days for any of these incidents.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on significant distress and prolonged distress, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event.²⁰ The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs. A multiplicative factor elicited from subject matter experts (SMEs) weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.

The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + Inj + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement).

- In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement.
- The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long-term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by SMEs for each national-level event included in the SNRA.
- Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

The Transportation System Failure national-level event was added by the SNRA project subsequent to the 2011 iteration of the SNRA for which Event Familiarity Factors were elicited from SMEs. The SNRA project team assigned a provisional Event Familiarity Factor of 1.0 by analogy with the SNRA Dam Failure event, for the calculation of *provisional* psychological distress estimates. It must be stressed that this assignment has not been reviewed by the 2011 SMEs.

²⁰ See Appendix G for references and additional discussion of the SNRA Psychological Distress metric.

Transportation Systems Failure

Environmental Impact

In general, the direct environmental impacts of a bridge collapse would be limited to localized debris and disturbance of contaminants in a riverbed. In special cases, where environmentally volatile or hazardous material is transported over the bridge (either by vehicles or by co-located infrastructure such as fuel pipelines), direct environmental impacts would be greater. Indirect environmental impacts related to additional emissions related to increased congestion and detouring as a result of disruption, and direct impacts to the surrounding environment related to replacement activities could also occur. However, these are significantly variable and contextual, and thus difficult to reasonably quantify.

The environmental impact estimate, which was assessed for the 23 original national-level events of the 2011 SNRA by subject matter experts from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), could not be assessed for the transportation systems failure event added to the SNRA in calendar year 2015. A future iteration of the SNRA will assess the environmental impacts of this event.

Potential Mitigating Factors

The aging of the Nation's transportation infrastructure is a risk that can be addressed through proactive inspection, maintenance, repair and replacement of deteriorating assets. However, this would require significant investment at the local, state, and Federal levels, and, therefore such activities will have to be prioritized based on criticality, risk, available funds, and other factors. A recent Federal requirement that state DOTs engage in risk-based asset management²¹ to better strategically plan for transportation infrastructure investment and improvement may ensure more effective use of existing funding, but expanded funding may also be required for effective mitigation of risk. Additionally, complementary action may be taken for enhanced contingency, response, and emergency preparedness planning. In the event of a transportation system failure, better emergency preparedness and response planning will enable agencies to more immediately respond to and mitigate direct impacts, and better contingency planning (e.g., establishing detouring and rerouting plans around higher risk assets) can mitigate indirect costs associated with disruption to the transportation system and supply chain, and associated congestion.

Additional Relevant Information

There is not a comprehensive database for bridge, tunnel, or culvert failures in the U.S. There is also a lack of consensus on how to define a failure, with some studies excluding failures due to natural disasters.²²

The SNRA does not quantitatively assess trends or other measures of how the current national risk picture may be changing. However, engineering design principles, coupled with NBI bridge inspection data do provide potential indicators of increased vulnerability or risk of failure among bridges in the United States. These are summarized below.

Bridge Condition Indicators Related to Increased Risk of Failure

Scour-Critical Bridges: Scour refers to the “removal of a streambed or bank area by streamflow; erosion of streambed or bank material due to flowing water; often considered as being localized

²¹ Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), U.S. Public Law 112-141 – July 6, 2012

²² Wardhana, Kumalasari and Hadprono, Fabian C., “Analysis of Recent Bridge Failure in the United States,” *Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities*, 2003, Vol 17(3), pp. 144–150.

around piers and abutments of bridges.”²³ Scour critical bridges are those that either have insufficient information regarding the construction of the bridge’s substructure (i.e., bridge foundation)²⁴ or that are known to have a substructure or foundation element that has structural issues or is determined to be unstable due to scouring. Scour-critical bridges are not necessarily substandard and do not note a specific defect for the structure; they are simply structures that should be monitored during high water events as they may be more susceptible to settlement and foundation failure if scouring of the stream or river would occur during a high water event.

Fracture-Critical Bridges: These are bridges that do not contain redundant supporting elements, and if key supports fail, the bridge would be in danger of partial or complete collapse.²⁵ Fracture criticality does not necessarily mean that a bridge is inherently unsafe, but rather that the design lacks redundancy and, therefore, may be at greater risk to threats that could damage fracture critical members of the structure.

Functionally Obsolete Bridges: These are bridges built to design standards that are no longer in use. For example, they may not have adequate lane widths, shoulder widths, or vertical clearances to serve current traffic demand. These bridges are not inherently unsafe and are not automatically rated as structurally deficient; however, in some cases they may have different operational or management requirements (e.g., imposing weight or clearance restrictions).

Structurally Deficient Bridges: These are bridges “where significant load carrying elements are found to be in poor or worse condition due to deterioration and/or damage, or the adequacy of the waterway opening provided by the bridge is determined to be extremely insufficient to the point of causing intolerable traffic interruptions” (i.e., the deck is frequently overtopped by water during floods). These structures are classified as structurally deficient if the deck, superstructure, substructure, or a culvert is rated in “poor” condition (0 to 4 on the NBI rating scale).²⁶

Fatalities, Injury and Illness Related to Bridge Failures

The deadliest failure of a bridge used for automobile transportation in the United States since 1960 was the collapse of the Silver Bridge over the Ohio River in 1967, which killed 46 people and injured at least nine. The bridge collapsed due to the failure of a single fracture-critical structural bridge member due to fatigue. Another recent major failure of a fracture-critical bridge was the collapse of the I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis in 2007, which killed 13 people with 145 injured. The failure in this latter case was the result of a structural member gusset plate that was constructed thinner than was specified in the original design and ripped along a line of rivets. A truss railroad bridge in Mobile, Alabama, in 1993 failed leading to 47 deaths and 103 injuries. This failure was caused when an assembly of heavy barges had collided with the bridge just eight minutes prior to the failure, causing displacement of a bridge span and deformation of the rails.

Economic Impact Studies of Bridge Failures

Little analysis has been conducted of the economic impacts from bridge failures, and the economic impacts of such incidents are highly contextual. They must consider the full range of systemic impacts of the incident. The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center

²³ FHWA (2012). "Bridge Inspector's Reference Manual." U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C.

²⁴ Marathon County Highway Department (2015), “Scour Critical Bridges.” Accessed 3/17/2015, <http://www.co.marathon.wi.us/Departments/HighwayDepartment/LocalGovernmentInformation/ScourCriticalBridges.aspx>.

²⁵ AASHTO (Undated) “Subcommittee on Transportation Communications: Bridge Terms Definitions.” Accessed 3/17/2015, <http://www.iowadot.gov/subcommittee/bridgeterms.aspx#f>.

²⁶ MDOT (2015) “Structurally Deficient.” Accessed 3/17/2015. At http://www.michigan.gov/mdot/0.4616.7-151-9618_47418-173622-.00.html.

Transportation Systems Failure

(NISAC) conducted an analysis of the consequences of the failure of the I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in 2007.²⁷ The estimated cost for reconstruction ranged from \$40 million to \$180 million, pending decisions about whether only damaged sections would need to be replaced, or the entire bridge. The broader economic impacts were not assessed, but the cascading impacts to infrastructure provide insights into the source of economic losses that might result from the loss of a significant bridge. For example, the primary economic impact of the loss of the I-35W bridge was assessed to be the increased commuting times and transportation delays related to the 140,000 cars/day that would need to be rerouted. Changes for trucking would create minor increases in transit time for goods shipments going through the Twin Cities metropolitan area. While there were negligible impacts to the water and wastewater infrastructures in this incident, bridge infrastructures frequently include co-located water pipelines, power lines, fiber-optic cables, and sometimes fuel pipelines, which could be damaged in such an event. There were no such complications in the collapse of the I-35W Bridge. However, the failure of a bridge that included damage to these other infrastructures would have had a much more significant multi-sector systemic impact than what was observed in I-35W.

The Minnesota DOT (MNDOT) analyzed the impact of the loss of the bridge on road users and the Minnesota economy. The increased cost to road users totaled \$400,000 per day in terms of longer travel times and higher operating costs for auto (\$247,000) and commercial truck traffic (\$153,000). These increased transportation costs were assessed to have a direct impact on businesses in the Minneapolis area. The economic costs in terms of state gross domestic product were estimated to be \$113,000 per day, with a total impact of \$60 million over the 2007–2008 restoration period.²⁸ MNDOT estimated that the total replacement project would cost \$393 million dollars.²⁹

The 26-day closure of the I-5 Skagit River Bridge in Washington State was estimated by the Washington State DOT to have had a direct economic impact on travel costs of \$8.3 million.³⁰ The analysis included estimates for increases in variable operating costs and travel times due to rerouting of traffic during bridge restoration. The total cost of the bridge replacement was \$20.7 million, with \$8.1 million for the temporary bridge, \$8.5 million for the new permanent bridge, and \$4.1 million for additional repair work to other parts of the bridge

The significant damage to highway bridges along the coastal region of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama caused by the combination of high winds, rain, and storm surge in Hurricane Katrina led to an estimated cost to repair or replace the damaged bridges at over \$1 billion. Much of the bridge damage from Katrina is attributable to storm surge resulting in damage to mechanical and electrical equipment on movable spans and displacement of bridge decks in traditional fixed spans. The average repair/replacement cost for bridges damaged in Hurricane Katrina was estimated to be \$14 million, ranging from \$1,000 for minor repairs to mechanical systems for movable bridges in Louisiana, to an estimated \$276 million for repairs to US-90 in Mississippi.³¹ Table 2 shows the estimated cost by extent of bridge damage.

²⁷ National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, “Impacts of the I35W Bridge Failure (Preliminary Analysis),” August 3, 2007.

²⁸ Minnesota DOT (2007, September 4), “Economic Impacts of the I-35W Bridge Collapse,” available at <http://www.dot.state.mn.us/i35wbridge/rebuild/pdfs/economic-impacts-from-deed.pdf> (checked 15 April 2015).

²⁹ Pioneer Press, “The Design for the I-35W Replacement Bridge is Unveiled,” available at http://www.twincities.com/ci_7122021, accessed March 18, 2015.

³⁰ WSDOT, “I - 5 Skagit River Bridge – Estimate of the Direct Cost of Closure,” accessed 3/18/2015. http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/983F3385-A349-4372-9493-1C21E033DEC0/0/SkagitRiverBridge_DirectCost_1082013.pdf.

³¹ Padgett, J., DesRoches, R., Nielson, B., Yashinsky, M., Kwon, O., Burdette, N., and Tavera, E. (2008). ”Bridge Damage and Repair Costs from Hurricane Katrina.” *Journal of Bridge Engineering* 13(1), 6–14, January/February 2008.

The repair costs to bridges with more minor damage from Hurricane Katrina amounted to less than \$10,000; however, there was significant variation in the repair cost for bridges that were in the extensive and complete damage state, ranging from \$25,000 to nearly \$276 million. Repair costs are a function of many different factors including size of bridge, how many of the spans were collapsed, whether or not the bridge was salvageable or required replacement, as well as the level of damage to and cost for repair of the submerged electrical and mechanical systems.³²

Table 2: Estimated Bridge Repair or Replacement Cost Following Hurricane Katrina³³

Bridge Damage	Number of Bridges	Minimum	Average	Maximum
Slight-Moderate	19	\$1,000	\$374,737	\$6,000,000
Extensive	20	\$25,000	\$1,893,250	\$7,700,000
Complete	5	\$1,500,000	\$116,880,000	\$276,000,000
Total	44	\$1,000	\$14,304,205	\$276,000,000

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

Transportation Systems Failure**Table 3: Major Bridge Failures (SNRA Data Set)**

Event	Year	Fatal	Injured	Displaced > 2 Days
Lake Pontchartrain Bridge	1964	6	0	0*
Silver Bridge (Ohio River)	1967	46	9	0*
Sidney-Lanier Bridge (Brunswick, GA)	1972	10	0	0*
Motorway Bridge (Pasadena, CA)	1972	6	0	0*
Lake Pontchartrain Bridge	1974	3	0	0*
21-Span Pass Manchac Bridge (LA)	1976	2	2	0*
Sunshine Skyway Bridge (St. Petersburg, FL)	1980	35	0	0*
Multiple Span (East Chicago, Indianapolis)	1982	13	18	0*
Syracuse Bridge (NY)	1982	1	5	0*
Connecticut Turnpike Bridge (Greenwich)	1983	3	3	0*
Walnut St. Viaduct (Denver, CO)	1985	1	4	0*
EI Paso Bridge (TX)	1987	1	7	0*
Oakland Bay Bridge (San Francisco, CA)	1989	1	0	0*
Truss Bridge (Mobile, AL)	1993	47	0	0*
Truss Bridge (Concord, NH)	1993	2	7	0*
Interstate 5 (Coalinga, CA)	1995	7	0	0*
3-Span 3-Girder (Clifton)	1995	1	0	0*
Queen Isabella Causeway (TX)	2001	8	0	0*
Marcy Bridge (Utica-Rome Expressway)	2002	1	9	0*
Highway 14 Overpass (TX)	2002	1	1	0*
Imola Avenue Bridge (Napa, CA)	2003	1	7	0*
Interstate 70 Bridge (Denver, CO)	2004	3	0	0*
Shelby (NC)	2004	1	2	0*
35-West Bridge (Minneapolis, MN) ³⁴	2007	13	145	0*
MacArthur Maze ³⁵	2007	1	0	0*

³⁴ Fatality and injury data for the significant I-35W bridge collapse (2007) were obtained from Hao, S. (2010), I-35W bridge collapse, *Journal of Bridge Engineering* (September/October 2010) 608-609, at http://suhao-acii.com/files/I35W_note.pdf (retrieved January 2013).

³⁵ Waters, Lew (2014). Bridge collapses in the U.S. from 1940 to 2013. Internet resource (not academic or peer reviewed). At <http://lewwaters.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/bridge-collapses-in-the-u-s-from-1940-to-2013.pdf> (retrieved 15 April 2014).

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A hostile non-state actor(s) crashes a commercial or general aviation aircraft into a physical target within the U.S. resulting in at least one fatality or injury other than to the attacker(s).

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities ¹	Number of Fatalities	2	290	2,800
	Injuries and Illnesses ²	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	3	640	5,100
Economic	Direct Economic Loss ³	U.S. Dollars (2011)	\$4.0 million	\$2.5 billion	\$27 billion
Social	Social Displacement ⁴	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0	3,000	32,000
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact ⁵	Qualitative Bins	Low		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events ⁶	Number of Events per Year	0.036	0.13	0.27

Overview

Frequency estimates for the 2015 SNRA Aircraft as a Weapon event were derived from unclassified analysis published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).⁷ For impact estimates, these primary FBI sources were supplemented with data and research from multiple

¹ Low, average (293), and high (2,753) fatalities from the list of historical incidents in Table 1.

² Low, average (643), and high (5,124) injuries from the list of historical incidents in Table 1.

³ Low, average, and high direct economic loss estimates for the list of historical incidents in Table 1. For 9/11 attack, DDP and business interruption costs are taken from Hartwig (2013), other incidents per-fatality multiplier from RMS scenario in Carroll et al (2005); all incidents include medical and fatality lost-spending estimates. See text for details.

⁴ Low, average (5,124), and high displacement from historical incidents in Table 1. The SNRA measure of social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer.

⁵ In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event for the 2011 SNRA. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimus (none) categories. Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'Best' estimate.

⁶ 5th, mean, and 95th percentile of the uncertainty distribution for frequency parameter λ for aircraft as a weapon attacks treated as a Poisson process: gamma(3,23) posterior from gamma(1,0) prior updated with two event counts in 23 years (01/01/1992–12/31/2014). Best estimate reflects mean and range represents central 90% credible interval. See text for discussion.

⁷ FBI (2006), FBI (2011).

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secondary public sources including insurance studies and models, the START Global Terrorism Database (GTD),⁸ peer-reviewed literature, and U.S. and foreign press sources.

Event Background

Terrorists have long viewed aviation as a target for attack and exploitation. Successful attacks in the air domain can inflict mass casualties and grave economic damage and attract significant public attention. Historically, large passenger aircraft have been at the greatest risk to terrorism, whether bombings, taking of hostages, traditional hijacking, and attack using human-portable surface-to-air missiles. Aircraft have also been used as weapons against targets on the ground, most notably, but not limited to, the attacks of September 11, 2001.⁹

Use of aircraft as a weapon for suicide attacks goes back to at least the Japanese kamikaze attacks of World War II. Attacks by non-state actors resulting in fatalities or injuries other than the attacker include the 9/11 attacks and the 2010 attack on the Austin, Texas IRS building represented in Table 1. Failed attempts include at least one attack by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka,¹⁰ a 1972 attempt to commandeer a commercial aircraft to crash into the White House,¹¹ and a 2002 suicide attack on the Bank of America corporate building in Tampa, Florida, by a teenager in a light plane.¹² Leaders of the Rajneeshee community considered a suicide airplane attack upon the county courthouse as one of several options for resolving their political dispute with the Oregon county where they had established their commune, before settling on the *Salmonella* contamination plan for which they are better known.¹³

For this incident, the SNRA only considered the risk of aircraft being used as a kinetic mode of attack (e.g., a 9/11 style attack) rather than the risk of an improvised explosive device (IED) being detonated on an aircraft. The latter risk is considered under the explosives incident category in the SNRA.

Assumptions

The 2015 SNRA used the same historical incident data as the 2011 SNRA for fatalities and injuries, with the addition of a 1945 incident where a B-25 bomber crashed into the Empire State Building. Social displacement estimates were also based upon this data set for the 2015 SNRA. Direct economic loss estimates leveraged historical data and published insurance models for property damage and business interruption, and literature sources for medical costs.

Frequency estimates were based upon the U.S. subset of these incidents identified as terrorist incidents by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).¹⁴

⁸ The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database including information on terrorism events around the world (including domestic, transnational, and international incidents) from 1970 to 2010. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and—when identifiable—the group or individual responsible.

START, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, is a DHS Center of Excellence and network of scholars coordinated from the University of Maryland. Since 2011 when the first SNRA was executed the START GTD has become the most commonly cited source for global terrorism statistical data, and is now used as the primary data source (with similar parameters as the 2011 SNRA) for the U.S. Government's annual Statistical Annex on Terrorism published for the U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism. START GTD (2013).

⁹ DHS (2007).

¹⁰ 20 February 2009: START GTD 200902200005.

¹¹ 9/11 Commission Report (2004) endnote 21, p. 561; Jenkins (2014).

¹² 5 January 2002: START GTD 200201050007. This did not result in injuries or fatalities other than to the pilot.

¹³ Zeitz (2011). See Biological-Chemical Terrorism Attack (small-scale) risk summary sheet.

¹⁴ FBI (2006, 2011).

Frequency

Aircraft as a weapon attacks were treated in a fashion similar to other adversarial and non-adversarial events in the 2015 SNRA.¹⁵ Low, best, and high frequency estimates represent the 5th percentile, mean, and 95th percentile of the uncertainty distribution for the annual frequency¹⁶ of aircraft as a weapon attacks.¹⁷ For events with few or no historical observations, representation of the unknown likelihood by a distribution encoding the information from these observations allows the uncertainty in the event's true underlying frequency of occurrence to be strongly bounded within the credible interval of frequencies that is consistent with the observational evidence. Given the choice of observation period, number of incidents meeting the counting threshold, and the desired credible (confidence¹⁸) range of uncertainty expressed as a percentage, the mean, lower, and upper bounds of this interval are uniquely determined in an objective and repeatable manner.

The SNRA project team selected the 23-year period of 1992–2014 as the observation period for determining the frequency estimates for similar reasons as the SNRA 2015 large-scale chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) attack events.¹⁹ Two historical aircraft-as-a-weapon attacks in this period, the 9/11 attacks²⁰ and the 2010 suicide attack on the Austin, Texas, IRS building,²¹ met the threshold criteria of this event and are categorized as terrorist attacks by the FBI. The 9/11 attacks were treated as a single attack for the purposes of the SNRA, following the counting convention of the FBI.

The frequency parameter λ (annual frequency of successful attacks) was parameterized by a gamma(3,23) distribution. This distribution was obtained by updating the gamma(1,0) agnostic prior distribution, with two event counts in the 23 years from 01/01/1992 to 12/31/2014.

Health and Safety

The SNRA project team used the following to estimate health and safety impacts resulting from an aircraft-as-a-weapon attack:

- Historical events: the SNRA project team analyzed a set of 11 historical events in which aircraft intentionally or unintentionally crashed into buildings or crowds of people. These include the two aircraft-as-a-weapon terrorist attacks in the historical data set used as the basis of the frequency estimates, as well as additional historical incidents. A detailed listing of these events is found in Table 1 under “Additional Relevant Information.”

¹⁵ Each SNRA 2015 event is modeled as a Poisson (random and ‘memory-less’) process. This reflects both 1) agnosticism regarding the relative dominance of factors acting to increase (demonstration of feasibility, copy-cat attacks) and decrease (suppressive actions by USG and law enforcement agencies in reaction) the frequency of subsequent attacks following a first successful attack, and 2) the multiple independent processes driving aircraft-as-a-weapon attack attempts as evidenced by the historical record of repeated attacks by multiple, independent non-state actors with differing ideologies and motives. See Mohtadi et al (2005, 2009a).

¹⁶ The frequency parameter λ of the modeled Poisson process.

¹⁷ In most cases, events in the SNRA having a large data set of historical incidents generally estimate low and high frequencies as the inverses of the longest and shortest inter-arrival times between incidents. For rare events where the number of historical incidents is too small to support a meaningful estimate of inter-arrival time, low and high frequency estimates usually represent the 5th and 95th percentiles of the distribution modeling the uncertainty in the event's underlying frequency of occurrence. See appendices B (Frequency) and I (Thresholds).

¹⁸ This interval, corresponding to the confidence interval of frequentist statistics, is referred to as the ‘Bayesian confidence interval’ or ‘credible interval’ by different authors. The latter will be used here for clarity. NRC (2003) B-11.

¹⁹ Although successful and unsuccessful suicide attacks using aircraft have a long history as noted above, this choice of observation period was motivated by an analytic assumption that the underlying frequency of this mode of attack is strongly influenced by factors particular to the ‘new age of suicide terrorism’ following the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War at the end of 1991. This differs from the 1980–2012 observation period used for the other conventional terrorism attacks and for small-scale chemical-biological attacks, which have a longer demonstrated history of successful attacks in this country. It is the same observation period used for the large-scale CBRN terrorism events, which share similar assumptions regarding a fundamental difference in the underlying conditions driving frequency of successful attacks before and since 1991.

²⁰ FBI (2006) 65.

²¹ FBI (2011). Also Obama (2013) [description as terrorist], GTD 201002180013 [incident detail].

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- This list comprises the same data set used for SNRA 2011, with the addition of the 1945 incident where a B-25 bomber crashed into the Empire State Building (incident 1, Table 1).
- The analysis does not take into account possible higher-impacts events that have not yet occurred, but rather assumes maximum fatalities and injured counts from the 9/11 attacks in New York.

Direct Economic Loss

Direct economic costs in the SNRA include decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction (DDP) costs; business interruption costs; medical costs; and lost demand from fatalities.

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate the direct economic costs resulting from an aircraft-as-a-weapon attack:

- **Business Interruption and DDP Costs:** For the 9/11 attacks, the historical DDP and business interruption costs were used.²²
- For the other historical attacks, proxy estimates for property damage including structure, contents, and aircraft hull loss costs and direct business interruption costs were taken from the insurance model in Carroll et al (2007). These were applied as multipliers of \$1.20 million DDP and \$0.723 million direct business interruption per fatality.²³
- **Medical Costs:** The numbers of injured were based on the set of events listed above. To account for the distribution of injuries and corresponding medical costs from single events, the SNRA project team multiplied total injuries from the events in the historical data set by \$5,200 per fatal injury and \$24,000 per non-fatal injury.²⁴ These estimates, based upon the average medical costs for gunshot injuries due to deliberate assault or homicide in the U.S., were judged to be most representative of injuries due to other extreme violence and were used for each of the conventional terrorism events of the 2015 SNRA.²⁵
- **Lost Demand from Fatalities:** To estimate the costs of lost demand from deaths, the SNRA project team multiplied the number of deaths listed in Table 1 by \$42,500, the same figure used across the SNRA 2011 events.²⁶

²² In USD\$2011 (CPI 2012-2011 0.9797) \$12.7 billion DDP including property damage to World Trade Center, aviation hull loss, and other property damage, and \$12.7 billion business interruption, from Hartwig (2013).

²³ In \$2011 (CPI 1.152 2005–2011): building property damage \$1.95 billion, contents property damage \$1.12 billion, aircraft hull \$144 million, for 2,632 fatalities (model) and 35,524 non-fatal injuries. As Carroll do not report passenger fatalities, 68 fatalities were added to this fatality number representing the average number (59.3) of passenger fatalities per plane in fatal U.S. airline passenger airplane crashes 1982–2009 (NTSB (2013a)) excluding the 9/11 hijackers increased in proportion by 0.16, the ratio of total crew to non-hijacker passenger fatalities on the 9/11 flights, to account for crew fatalities not reported in these statistics. The scenario of Carroll et al represents the 93rd casualty (fatalities + injuries) percentile of the RMS (Risk Management Solutions) aircraft as a weapon scenario space (scenario counts as opposed to probability weighted scenarios). Additional information is given but without breakdown by fatalities and injuries: this scenario was selected as representative because of its use by the authors and citation by other RAND studies (e.g., Morral et al (2012) 51) as representative. DDP/BI values were calculated in proportion to fatalities as opposed to total fatalities plus injuries, because was unclear what subset of the injuries reported in Carroll corresponded to the injuries in the SNRA historical data set.

²⁴ Medical cost per fatal and non-fatal injury for gunshot injuries in the United States from Corso et al (2007), adjusted from 2000 to 2011 dollars using the general CPI-U inflator (1.306). Estimated costs from lost labor productivity are not included.

²⁵ Medical costs from Explosives/Kinetic/Incendiary (E/K/I) injuries taken as a class are comparatively well studied and were used as a proxy for medical costs in the Aircraft as a Weapon attack SNRA event. SNRA 2011 also used E/K/I medical costs for the AAW event, but these were represented by a uniform distribution over \$13,490 to \$122,802, the distribution used by the RAPID assessment for medical costs associated with E/K/I injuries, by repeated random sampling from each distribution. This distribution represents the range of average medical costs for fifteen blast related injuries from nonspecific chest pain (\$13,490) to spinal cord injury (\$122,802) from the 2009 National Inpatient Survey (see AHRQ (2011) for corresponding 2011 estimates). As this distribution averages to \$68,150 per injury, the SNRA 2015 medical cost estimates for conventional terrorism events are approximately 2–3 times smaller than those of SNRA 2011.

²⁶ This number originates from the 2008 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA 2008) (the BTRA as a whole is classified Secret, but its economic methodology appendix is U//FOUO), and represents the midpoint (the expected value of a linear uniform distribution over the interval) of the

All cost estimates were converted to constant 2011 dollars to maintain comparability with SNRA 2011 events.

The 2015 SNRA project did not attempt to calculate indirect, induced, or total economic cost estimates.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- Low, best, and high estimates represent the minimum, average, and maximum estimates of persons from the historical incidents in Table 1.
- Several of these incidents resulted in no displacement from homes, confirming the SNRA 2011 low estimate of 0.
- The SNRA 2015 high estimate of 32,000 displaced represents the number of residents of Lower Manhattan who evacuated their homes following the 9/11 attacks who had not returned by September 13.²⁷

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on significant distress and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event.²⁸ The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs. A multiplicative factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.

- The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + Inj + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement).
- In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement.

\$35,000–\$50,000 median household income band in 2011. DHS (2008) pp. E2.7-34. (Appendix reference is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED.)

²⁷ Extrapolated from data provided by the 25% of Lower Manhattan residents responding to the World Trade Center Health Registry Survey. 61% of respondents evacuated their homes, of whom 91.2% had not returned to their homes by September 13: this proportion was extrapolated to the 57,511 total resident population of Lower Manhattan. Farfel et al (2008). These evacuating residents represented a small fraction of the 1 million people (the SNRA 2011 high estimate) who left Lower Manhattan on September 11, the majority of whom were returning to homes elsewhere. The SNRA 2015 best estimate of 32,000 is on the order of the SNRA 2011 best estimate of 50,000 (SNRA 2011 draft Unclassified Documentation of Findings, Appendix F).

²⁸ See Appendix G for references and additional discussion of the SNRA Psychological Distress metric.

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- The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long-term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Aircraft as a Weapon was given a C_{EF} of 1.2.
- Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event in the 2011 SNRA. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)²⁹ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- The environmental assessment included effects resulting from terrorism threats, but did not include human health effects or effects in urban areas, because these effects are already reflected in other impact measures.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “Low.” Experts indicated that one airplane could cause tens of acres of environmental impact of a limited duration but the identified event would likely occur in an urban environment. Impacts could be elevated to “Medium” depending on the target (e.g., a chemical plant).

Potential Mitigating Factors

The frequency estimates related to this event depend on the ability of potential terrorists to gain access to an airplane through either hostile takeover or other means using illicit documents, or a legal process. The nature of the impacts is related to the size of the airplane and the ability to direct it to a desired target.

²⁹ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

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Additional Relevant Information

Table 1: List of Analyzed Events

#	Event	Date	Fatalities	Injuries	Displaced	Direct Economic Loss (\$2011) ¹
1	USAAF B-25 Bomber Crashes into Empire State Building (New York, NY, USA)	7/28/1945	14 ²	26 ³	0 ⁴	\$28,060,000
2	Ramstein Air Show Disaster (Ramstein, Germany)	8/28/1988	70 ⁵	1,500 ⁶	0 ⁷	\$173,200,000
3	Flight 1862 Crash (Amsterdam, Netherlands)	10/4/1992	47 ⁸	26 ⁹	250 ¹⁰	\$92,740,000
4	Air France Concorde Crash (Paris, France)	7/25/2000	113 ¹¹	6 ¹²	0 ¹³	\$221,600,000
5	September 11th Attacks (New York, Virginia, Pennsylvania, USA)	9/11/2001	2,753 ¹⁴	5,124 ¹⁵	32,000 ¹⁶	\$26,900,000,000
6	Small Plane Hits the Pirelli Tower (Milan, Italy)	4/18/2002	3 ¹⁷	30 ¹⁸	0 ¹⁹	\$6,600,000
7	Small Plane Crashes in Park (San Dimas, CA, USA)	7/4/2002	4 ²⁰	9 ²¹	0 ²²	\$8,060,000
8	Ukraine Air Show Disaster (Lviv, Ukraine)	7/27/2002	77 ²³	241 ²⁴	0 ²⁵	\$156,700,000
9	Military Plane Crashes into Building (Tehran, Iran)	12/6/2005	115 ²⁶	90 ²⁷	250 ²⁸	\$227,600,000
10	Small Plane Hits Apartment Complex (New York, NY, USA)	10/11/2006	2 ²⁹	3 ³⁰	80 ³¹	\$3,992,000
11	Suicide Attack on IRS Building (Austin, TX, USA)	2/18/2010	2 ³²	13 ³³	0 ³⁴	\$4,232,000

¹ See text for description of the method used to calculate representative direct economic loss estimates. Estimates are rounded to nearest thousand to avoid (reduce) communicating false precision.

² Barron (1995).

³ Washington Post (1998b).

⁴ Barron (1995), Resner (1945).

⁵ Bulau (2008).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Planes crashed into crowd at airshow and forest: Ibid.

⁸ Netherlands (1994).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Residents of destroyed apartments initially missing. BBC (1992, October 4), Montgomery (1992).

¹¹ France (2002).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Aircraft crashed into a hotel, no other property damage. France (2000) 14, 18.

¹⁴ AP (2011, June 18).

¹⁵ FEMA (2001).

¹⁶ SNRA 2015 project team estimate from World Trade Center Health Registry counts: 61% of respondent residents evacuated homes of which 91.2% did not return within two days, times 57,511 total residents of lower Manhattan (12,371 residents of lower Manhattan, 25% of total population, registered with survey: 7,458/12,371 responding residents evacuated). Farfel et al (2008).

¹⁷ NTSB (2002).

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Office building: Ibid.

²⁰ NTSB (2004).

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ukraine (2002).

²⁴ BBC (2005, June 24).

²⁵ Aircraft crashed into crowd at airshow: Ibid.

²⁶ USA Today (2011, July 16).

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Reuters (2005, December 6).

²⁹ NTSB (2007).

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ SNRA 2015 project team estimate: 100 of 137 apartments affected, many residents in temporary quarters elsewhere for months; approximately ¼ of building floors (38th to 47th floors) most affected by fire and breakage, times 2.3 average residents per apartment = approximately 70–80 residents. Upper end of range taken as estimate for residents forced to leave home for 2 days or more. Barron (2007).

³² Fox (2010, February 19).

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid. (Pilot burned family home prior to attack, but this was not a consequence of the attack itself.)

Armed Assault

A hostile, non-state actor(s) uses assault tactics to conduct strikes on vulnerable target(s) within the U.S., resulting in at least one fatality or injury.

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	0	2 ¹	334
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	0	6	810
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	\$61,000	\$510,000	\$78 million
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0	0	0
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact ²	Qualitative Bins	<i>De minimus</i> ³		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events ⁴	Number of Events per Year	0.11	0.48	3

Overview

Frequency, fatality, and injury estimates for the 2015 SNRA Armed Assault event were derived from unclassified statistical and historical data published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).⁵ These primary FBI sources were supplemented with data and research from multiple secondary public sources, in particular the START Global Terrorism Database (GTD)⁶ (the primary source for impact data for the 2011 SNRA event), peer-reviewed literature, and U.S. and foreign press sources.

¹ Best estimate fatalities, 1.94 (weighted average fatalities given attack).

² In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event in the 2011 SNRA. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimus (none) categories.

³ Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘Best’ estimate.

⁴ Low estimate, inverse of maximum inter-arrival time between U.S. historical incidents, Tab le 1 (9 years, 1985 to 1994); best estimate, average frequency 1980–2012, Table 1; high estimate, most incidents in one year (3 in 2009), Table 1.

⁵ FBI (1982), FBI (1983), FBI (1984), FBI (1986), FBI (2000), FBI (2006), FBI (2011); additional FBI sources as cited.

⁶ The GTD is an open-source database including information on terrorism events around the world (including domestic, transnational, and international incidents) from 1970 to 2010. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and—when identifiable—the group or individual responsible.

START, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, is a DHS Center of Excellence and network of scholars coordinated from the University of Maryland. Since 2011 when the first SNRA was executed the START GTD has become the most commonly cited source for global terrorism statistical data, and is now used as the primary data source (with similar parameters as the 2011 SNRA) for the U.S. Government’s annual Statistical Annex on Terrorism published for the U.S. State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism. START GTD (2013).

Armed Assault

Assumptions

Historical incident statistics published by the FBI were used as the primary data source for this event. These were supplemented with additional data from the START Global Terrorism Database,⁷ scholarly reviews, and press sources as needed.

Historical incidents of indiscriminate violence resulting in one or more fatality or injury other than the attacker(s), identified as acts of terrorism by U.S. Government sources, occurring in the U.S. homeland between 1980 and 2012 were included (Table 1). All of the following criteria were required to be met:

- U.S. Government (FBI) characterization of the incident as a terrorist attack;
- Occurring within the U.S. homeland;⁸
- Resulting in at least one fatality or injury, other than the attacker(s);
- Indiscriminate (assassinations are excluded from scope); and
- Meeting the definition of the Armed Assault event given above.

Targeted attacks where the victim was known and selected by the attacker were considered assassinations, as opposed to armed assault/active shooter incidents (regardless of whether they met other criteria for terrorism). However, attacks targeting particular people that resulted in harm to others were included in the scope of this event.

The beginning observation period date of 1/1/1980 was determined by the primary FBI source data set which included U.S. incidents from 1980 to 2005.⁹ The end observation date of 12/31/2012 was selected, because in many cases a definite determination by the U.S. Government that an act is terrorist in nature requires some degree of distance.¹⁰

- In an absence of a single authoritative FBI list of designated terrorist incidents post-2005, meeting this requirement necessitated searching through public statements and speeches by political leadership, review articles, newspaper interviews, Federal indictments, and other sources to effect a positive determination for each incident that the U.S. Government (in all cases, the FBI) considered a terrorist assault as opposed to a hate crime, active shooter, or some other violent act.

This determination is not often clear or fixed in the immediate aftermath of an attack. For example, the March 2013 Boston Marathon bombing was deliberately not classified as a terrorist attack by the U.S. Treasury for insurance purposes.¹¹ The U.S. Government designation as terrorist or non-terrorist of the November 2013 assault on a Transportation Safety Administration checkpoint, which killed one of the Department's own, also remains ambiguous at the time of writing.¹²

Frequency

Incidents between 1980–2005 causing fatalities or injuries were those identified by the last FBI statistical review of terrorism in the U.S.¹³ Incidents occurring from 2006–2012 were those specifically identified as terrorist acts in subsequent FBI reviews and official statements.

⁷ START GTD (2013).

⁸ Including territories and possessions identified in the Stafford Act and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended.

⁹ FBI (2006).

¹⁰ FBI (2006) 32 (2002 LAX shooter discussion).

¹¹ Insurance Journal (2014, September 19), (2013, November 27).

¹² February 2015.

¹³ FBI (2006).

Incidents that targeted and resulted in harm to specific individuals were classified as assassinations outside the scope of the other events.¹⁴ Literature sources, in particular but not limited to the other FBI statistical annual reports¹⁵ (1981–2005) and the START Global Terrorism Database,¹⁶ were consulted to determine the discriminate or indiscriminate nature of the attack. Incidents involving the use of explosives as the primary instrument of violence,¹⁷ aircraft as a weapon, or unconventional (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN)) materials were excluded from the scope of the Armed Assault event. One incident involved an attack with a vehicle, driven into a crowd as opposed to a vehicle bomb;¹⁸ the remainder involved firearms.

To identify the national risk baseline for this kind of attack, the resulting list of 16 incidents were analyzed as a recurring historical event similar to the SNRA's analysis of natural and technological hazards.

- In part, this reflects agnosticism in the absence of other public information of predictive value. Terrorism is driven by multiple deterministic drivers, as well as stochastic (chance) factors. However, without knowledge of those factors that would both remain valid and have predictive value for each successful attack in the U.S. for the next 3–5 years (the time frame of the 2015 SNRA), representation as a random event without additional qualifications accurately represents our actual state of knowledge.¹⁹
- Additionally, given current disagreements about the nature and future path of terrorism, this choice is also motivated by the utility of a description of the historical baseline which can be objectively agreed upon, by decision makers with differing beliefs about the future threat environment, as a common point of departure.
- However, it is also chosen for consistency with the findings of past U.S. Government reviews that periods of political violence of even greater intensity—and public awareness of that intensity—than that of today are in fact the historical norm for our country, rather than the exception.²⁰

The average frequency of attacks in the 33-year observation period was used as the basis of the best estimate. Similar to natural hazards, the low estimate of frequency is the inverse of the longest time gap between events (the longest inter-arrival time), and the high estimate the largest number of events in one year.

Health and Safety

Perpetrator fatalities and injuries were not counted. For events occurring 1980–2005, the numbers given by the FBI were used. For events occurring 2006–2012, the numbers given by the

¹⁴ Assassinations are not currently considered in the SNRA, but are part of one of the Department's highest profile missions (protection of dignitaries).

¹⁵ FBI (1992), FBI (1993), FBI (1994), FBI (1995), FBI (1996), FBI (1997), FBI (1998), FBI (1999), FBI (2000), FBI (2001), FBI (2006).

¹⁶ START GTD (2013).

¹⁷ This division is intended to clarify the scope of the SNRA 2015 explosives and armed assault events. Although SNRA 2011 national-level events were intended to be mutually exclusive in scope, the focus of the Armed Assault attack on coordinated team attacks using hand-carried explosives resulted in a substantial overlap of the historical data sets used for the primary impact estimates of each event. While this is not a methodological issue when the data are intentionally used as proxy estimates for future attacks in the U.S. as they were in the 2011 SNRA (both events used worldwide 1970–2010 incident data from the START GTD), it becomes a prohibitive issue when the same historical data are used as the basis for each event's frequency estimates, as they are in SNRA 2015.

¹⁸ The 3/3/2006 Chapel Hill assault (Table 1).

¹⁹ Mohtadi et al (2005, 2009a).

²⁰ Staff and Commission reports and data set produced for/by the 1968–69 National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Graham et al (1969), Kirkham et al (1969), Levy (1969a, b, c), National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969)). See also [non-USG] Gage (2004), Gage (2011), START GTD (2013), Turchin et al (2014).

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primary FBI sources were supplemented with data from the GTD and other sources. The average number of fatalities and injuries were taken as the best estimates.

- The low estimate for both fatalities and injuries is zero, since events with one fatality and zero injuries (and the converse) define the lower threshold of the set.
- Rather than the highest of this set, the high estimates for fatalities and injuries are taken from the September 2004 school siege and massacre in the Russian town of Beslan to represent the range of catastrophic human consequences evidenced by history to be possible outcomes of terrorist armed assault attacks.²¹

Direct Economic Loss

The SNRA direct economic metric includes

- **Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction (DDP):** The value or replacement cost of physical buildings, infrastructure, building contents, vehicles, and other physical property directly destroyed by the attack. This includes decontamination, if any, and debris removal costs.
- **Business Interruption:** Business interruption costs caused directly by the incident or the immediate investigation, as opposed to shock, substitution, or second-order effects on the economy.
- **Medical Costs:** Cost of medical care to injured, including those who become fatalities.
- **Lost Demand from Fatalities:** No economic value was assigned to a human life (or injury) in itself as a Value of Statistical Life, because this is a value judgment which differs from person to person, and because it would represent double counting with these impacts counted separately. The lost contribution to the national economy as spending was captured, but capped at one year for consistency with benchmark risk assessments. This value was taken at \$42,500, the midpoint of the median \$35,000–\$50,000 household earning value used as the average one year spending per person by past assessments.

Direct economic costs were calculated by the SNRA project team using the following assumptions:

- **DDP Costs:** The SNRA project team made the assumption that the property damage costs were dominated by the other costs counted under the direct economic damage metric, and could be neglected in comparison for the order of magnitude precision of the SNRA.²² Except for the most complex armed assault events such as Beslan or the 2008 Mumbai attacks—conducted by coordinated assault teams using hand-carried explosives or incendiaries in addition to guns—the direct property damages of active-shooter attacks (terrorist or otherwise) are much smaller than for explosives or other terrorist attack types.
- **Business Interruption:** Business interruption costs were estimated from the \$10 million lost business costs to the approximately 500 businesses in the 12-block immediate impact area of

²¹ Official figures, Russian Government. 334 fatalities and 810 non-fatal injuries include victims and response personnel (civil and military), but does not include the hostage-takers. RT (2014).

²² The scope of the Armed Assault event contains spectacular exceptions, some of which—such as the 2008 coordinated team attacks in Mumbai, India—comprise the original exemplar of the Armed Assault event in the 2011 SNRA. However, the SNRA 2011 data which define the scope of the event in fact are dominated by small-scale shooting incidents which would be categorized as active shooter or spree killer incidents were they not politically motivated.

the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing that was restricted for approximately one week of investigation.²³

- The size and duration of the restricted immediate impact area was considered to be a reasonable estimate for the post-attack investigation of any terrorist attack of comparable magnitude in this country.
- For the purposes of estimating business interruption costs for armed assault attacks, the resulting proportional multiplier of \$37,000 per casualty (fatality + injury) of the Boston bombings was used to estimate business interruption costs for the historical armed assault attacks in this data set.²⁴
- **Medical Costs:** An average medical cost of \$5,200 per fatality and \$24,000 per non-lethal injury²⁵ was applied. These estimates, based upon the average medical costs for gunshot injuries due to deliberate assault or homicide in the U.S., were judged to be most representative of injuries due to other extreme violence and were used for each of the conventional terrorism events of the 2015 SNRA.
- **Lost Demand from Fatalities:** To estimate the costs of lost demand from deaths, the SNRA project team multiplied the number of deaths listed in Table 1 by \$42,500, the same figure used across the SNRA 2011 events.^{26,27}

As with the fatality and injury numbers, the lowest and average estimates of the historical data set were used as the low and best estimates of direct economic loss. The high estimate is that of the representative worst case scenario based on the Beslan attack, with the same multipliers applied to fatalities and injuries to estimate the direct economic costs of a similar scale scenario in this country.

Indirect, induced, or total economic loss estimates were not calculated for the 2015 revision of the SNRA.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

²³ Exclusion zone 12 blocks, with 500 businesses, Luna (2013); cost to businesses in exclusion zone for one week restrictions \$10 million, Dedman et al (2013). Costs of the citywide lockdown and law enforcement deployment were excluded from the estimate here, because they are not characteristic of the aftermath of most terrorist attacks in this country. Direct property damage costs were also excluded, since these were specific to the bomb attack. Note that estimates of \$250–\$300 million often reported (Green et al (2013), Dedman et al (2013), Luna (2013)) in the media refer to costs of the lockdown. They are a reasonable estimate of this (being calculated as a 1/2-1/3 of one day's economic activity of Boston), but such broad lockdowns accompany few, if any, of the other bombing and shooting attacks included here. Most conventional-weapon terrorist attacks (bombs, flame, guns) are very localized in their direct effects to property and business interruption.

²⁴ This counts interruptions to public sector activity, such as the Fort Hood or Little Rock shootings at U.S. Government facilities, on the same basis as private sector economic activity. This equivalence is applied only in this estimator (e.g., lost taxes or parking fines and public sector response costs not counted in the medical costs are not included in the total direct economic loss estimates).

²⁵ Medical cost per fatal and non-fatal injury for gunshot injuries in the United States from Corso et al (2007), adjusted from 2000 to 2011 dollars using the general CPI-U inflator (1.306). Estimated costs from lost labor productivity are not included.

²⁶ This number originates from the 2008 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA 2008) (the BTRA as a whole is classified Secret, but its economic methodology appendix is U//FOUO), and represents the midpoint (the expected value of a linear uniform distribution over the interval) of the \$35,000–\$50,000 median household income band in 2011. DHS (2008) pp. E2.7-34. (Appendix reference is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED.)

²⁷ Some calculations in prior estimates subtract, from the base \$42,500 per fatality, \$6,000 for increased economic activity from funeral expenses. As this difference was inconsistently applied in the 2011 SNRA and was considered insignificant within the targeted order of magnitude precision of the SNRA, this adjustment was discontinued for new estimates generated for the 2015 revision.

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Since attacks targeted at specific persons were excluded from the scope of the armed assault event, all attacks in this set occurred in public places rather than private homes or residential neighborhoods. For this reason, the project team assumed that the number of persons displaced from their homes would be zero for all three of the low, best, and high estimates.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on significant distress and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event.²⁸ The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs. A multiplicative factor elicited (in 2011) from subject matter experts for weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.

- The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement).
- In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement.
- The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by the experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Armed Assault was given a C_{EF} of 1.1.
- Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event in the 2011 SNRA. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).

²⁸ See Appendix G for references and additional discussion of the SNRA Psychological Distress metric.

- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)²⁹ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- The environmental assessment included effects resulting from terrorism threats, but did not include human health effects or effects in urban areas because these effects are already reflected in other impact measures.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “*de minimus*.” Environmental impacts would be minimal.

Trend Adjustment (Optional)

Although it is not applied in this summary sheet, an alternative analysis could incorporate trend information from allied nations with similar security conditions (Western Europe and Canada) by multiplying the best and high estimate frequencies by a factor proportional to the frequency of current attacks relative to 4–5 years ago. This adjustment should be considered only if the trend is unambiguous.

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²⁹ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11–32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

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Armed Assault**Additional Relevant Information****Table 1: U.S. Historical Incidents 1980–2012**

Date	City	State	Fatal	Injured	Displ. ¹	DE (2011) ^{2,3}	Perpetrator	Target	Source ⁴
4/19/80	Chattanooga	TN	0	4	0*	\$240,000	Ku Klux Klan	Crowd	FBI ⁵
11/27/81	Fort Buchanan	PR	0	1	0*	\$61,000	PR nationalists	Military base	FBI ⁶
5/16/82	San Juan	PR	1	3	0*	\$270,000	PR nationalists	U.S. Navy sailors	FBI ⁷
5/19/82	Villa Sin Miedo	PR	1	12	0*	\$820,000	PR nationalists	Police	FBI ⁸
2/13/83	Medina	ND	2	4	0*	\$410,000	Sheriff's Posse Comitatus	Police, U.S. Marshals	FBI ⁹
11/06/85	Bayamon	PR	0	1	0*	\$61,000	PR nationalists	U.S. Army soldier	FBI ¹⁰
3/1/94	New York	NY	1	3	0*	\$270,000	Individual	Jewish students in van	GTD, FBI ¹¹
7/02-04/99	Multiple ¹²	IL, IN	2	8	0*	\$660,000	Individual	Multiple minorities	GTD, FBI ¹³
8/10/99	Granada Hills	CA	1	5	0*	\$390,000	Individual	Jews, Asians	FBI ¹⁴
7/4/02	Los Angeles	CA	2	4	0*	\$410,000	Individual	EI AI terminal LAX	GTD, FBI ¹⁵
3/3/06	Chapel Hill	NC	0	9 ¹⁶	0*	\$550,000	Individual	Car driven into crowd	GTD, FBI ¹⁷
6/1/09	Little Rock	AR	1	1	0*	\$150,000	Individual	Recruiting center	GTD, FBI ¹⁸
6/10/09	Washington	DC	1	0	0*	\$85,000	Individual	U.S. Holocaust Museum	FBI, P ¹⁹
11/5/09	Fort Hood	TX	13	32	0*	\$3,000,000	Individual	Fellow soldiers	GTD, FBI, P ²⁰
8/05/12	Oak Creek	WI	6	4	0*	\$750,000	Individual	Sikh worshippers	GTD, FBI, P ²¹
8/15/12	Washington	DC	0	1	0*	\$61,000	Individual	Family Research Council	GTD, FBI ²²

[Supplemental] Table 2: Terrorist Armed Assault Incidents 1980-2005 Without Injuries/Fatalities²³

Date	City	State	Fatal	Injured	Displ.	DE (2011)	Perpetrator	Target	Source
4/29/82	San Juan	PR	0	0	0*	\$230,000	PR nationalists	PR government building	FBI ²⁴

¹ Persons displaced from home for 2 or more days assumed to be zero for all events except where indicated otherwise by the source(s). Assumed zeroes are marked with an asterisk; other zeroes from sources.

² DE = Direct economic loss, 2011 dollars. All numbers are estimates based upon extrapolations from a subset of incidents. For the definition of direct economic loss used in the SNRA see the text of this risk summary sheet above.

³ For the armed assault events, decontamination/disposal/physical destruction (DDP) was assumed to be zero (insignificant in proportion to other components); business interruption, \$37,000 per fatality and injury as multiplier based upon the \$10 million direct lost income (Dedman et al (2013)) of the 500 businesses in the 12-block restriction zone during the one week of investigation following the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, Luna (2013); medical costs, \$5,200 per fatality and \$24,000 per non-fatal injury, average medical costs for gunshot injuries in the U.S. from Corso et al (2007) excluding costs from lost labor productivity; and \$42,500 one year lost spending per fatality. All costs adjusted to 2011 dollars.

⁴ Where FBI and other sources differ on details (date, location, fatalities, injuries), the FBI figures are given.

⁵ FBI (2006).

⁶ FBI (1982, 2006).

⁷ FBI (1983, 2006).

⁸ FBI (1983, 2006).

⁹ FBI (1984, 2006).

¹⁰ FBI (1986, 2006).

¹¹ GTD 199403010007, FBI (2006).

¹² Chicago, Skokie, and Northbrook IL, and Bloomington IN.

¹³ FBI (2000) pp 4-5 and FBI (2006), list. GTD 199907020004, 199907020005, 199907020006, 199907030007, 199907030008, 199907040005, but coded as doubtful for terrorism (doubtterr=1).

¹⁴ FBI (2000) p 5 and FBI (2006), list. Also GTD 199908100001, but coded as doubtful for terrorism (doubtterr=1).

¹⁵ GTD 200202040010, FBI (2006).

¹⁶ While all injuries were comparatively minor, they included several broken bones; six people assaulted were taken to hospital, treated, and released. Braun et al (2014).

¹⁷ GTD 200603030013, FBI (2011).

¹⁸ FBI (2011). GTD event 200906010028, but not coded as meeting terrorism criterion 3. For detail see Coleman et al (2011).

¹⁹ FBI (2011), Obama (2013). Also GTD 200906100003, but not coded as meeting terrorism criterion 2.

²⁰ GTD 200911060002, FBI (2011), Obama (2013). GTD lists date as 11/06/2009 and 31 injuries; FBI lists 32 injuries. NCTC 2014 Counterterrorism Calendar (not cited) lists 29 wounded.

²¹ GTD 201208050006, FBI (2011), Obama (2013).

²² GTD 201208150059. FBI: FBI statement in U.S. Attorney DC (2013, September 19); also confession and conviction to terrorism charge (District of Columbia Code).

²³ FBI (1983, 2006). Not used to calculate frequency or impact estimates in May 2015 SNRA because outside event threshold. Added to this documentation subsequent to SNRA 2015 project (June 2015) to permit calculation using alternative threshold ([FBI designated] terrorist attack regardless of impact, same as Explosives Terrorism Attack and CBRN events: Appendix K table K.4). Note that incident point frequency will differ from Table 1 events due to differing observation periods (1/33 years, Table 1, 1/26 years, Table 2). As with Table 1, assassination attempts (targeted as opposed to indiscriminate) are excluded; also excluded are two unarmed assaults intended as protests or harassment ("burning ribbon" thrown at speaker, 2/9/1981; unarmed menacing of diplomats by protest group, 9/9/1981) not resulting in injury.

²⁴ FBI (1983). Shooting assault on Puerto Rico Justice Building, guard escaped injury: \$100,000 (1982) property damage.

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An act of terrorism using one or more explosive or incendiary devices against people or property in the U.S.

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	0 ¹	1 ²	3,650 ³
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	0 ⁴	11 ⁵	4,500 ⁶
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	\$42,000 ⁷	\$3.4 million ⁸	\$20 billion ⁹
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0 ¹⁰	5 ¹¹	400 ¹²
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins	Low ¹³		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	0.72 ¹⁴	7.0 ¹⁵	25 ¹⁶

¹ Minimum from Table 7.

² Average (1.00) number of fatalities from Table 7.

³ Extrapolated by OBP and from Lundberg (2013), based on successful 1993 WTC bombing, successful 2005 Bojinka plot, and successful 2006 trans-Atlantic aviation plot. See Health and Safety discussion for details.

⁴ Minimum from Table 7.

⁵ Average (10.8) number of injuries from Table 7.

⁶ Number of injuries, 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya: SNRA project team assumption using this historical event as proxy. See Health and Safety discussion.

⁷ Total 2011-dollar adjusted property damages (\$1.061 billion) 1988–1988 divided by total number of bombing incidents (25,065), including actual, attempted, and [1998 reporting only] accidental explosive and incendiary U.S. incidents.

⁸ Estimate based upon per-casualty average property damage of all U.S. bombings 1988–1998, FBI (1999b), for decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction (DDP); per-casualty proportion of \$10 million direct business interruption costs to the businesses in the 12 block exclusion zone following the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, Luna (2013), Dedman et al (2013); medical costs, medical costs for gunshot injuries per fatality and per non-fatal injury, Corso et al (2007); one year lost spending to the national economy per fatality, \$42,500, SNRA 2015 standard (this does not represent a value of statistical life (VSL)). See Direct Economic Loss section for details. All estimates converted to 2011 U.S. dollars.

⁹ Mean of four property loss estimates from a 20,000-lb VBIED in major US cities in Kunreuther et al (2014), adjusted to 2011 dollars.

¹⁰ Minimum from Table 7 (SNRA project team assumption of 0 for all 1980–2005 incidents excepting Oklahoma City bombing).

¹¹ Average from Table 7.

¹² Maximum from Table 7 (400 persons displaced from home, 1998 Oklahoma City bombing, DOJ (2000)).

¹³ Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as to reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘Best’ estimate.

¹⁴ Inverse of maximum inter-arrival time, 508 days expressed in years, between incidents in Table 7 (11/27/1993 Chicago fire bombings and 4/19/1995 Oklahoma City bombing).

¹⁵ Average number per year of explosive/incendiary incidents 1980–2005 as reported by FBI (2006), 181 incidents in 26 years (Table 7).

¹⁶ Maximum number of explosive/incendiary incidents 1980–2005 occurring in any one year (each of 1981 and 1982) in Table 7.

Explosives Terrorism Attack

Event Background

Frequency, fatality, and injury estimates for the 2015 SNRA Explosives Terrorism Attack event were derived from unclassified statistical and historical data published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).¹⁷ These results were compared with and supplemented by data and research from additional primary and secondary public sources, peer-reviewed literature, and U.S. and foreign press sources.

Weapon Characteristics and Tactics¹⁸

An Explosives Terrorism Attack is an act of terrorism using one or more “explosive devices” against people or property in the U.S., including vessels or aircraft en route to or from U.S. territory, intended to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. Terms such as bomb, homemade bomb, incendiary device, firebomb, and more recently improvised explosive device (IED) are also used to describe the type of weapons involved.¹⁹ The term IED will be used to generically refer to constructed devices with explosive and incendiary effects in the following discussion.

IEDs consist of a variety of components including an initiation system, a main explosive charge, and a container to house and sometimes conceal the components. Because they are improvised, IEDs can come in many forms, ranging from a small pipe bomb to a sophisticated device capable of causing massive damage and loss of life. IEDs are often surrounded by or packed with additional materials or “enhancements” such as nails, glass, or metal fragments designed to increase the amount of shrapnel propelled by the explosion. Enhancements may also include other elements such as hazardous materials.

Many commonly available materials, such as fertilizer, gunpowder, and hydrogen peroxide, can be used as the main charge explosive materials in IEDs (see Table 1). Explosives must contain a fuel and an oxidizer, which provides the oxygen needed to sustain the reaction. A common example is ammonium nitrate – fuel oil (ANFO), a mixture of ammonium nitrate, which acts as the oxidizer, and fuel oil (the fuel source). Concern about the use of explosives created from liquid components transported in a stable form and mixed at the site of attack is the reason that in 2006 the U.S. Department of Homeland Security restricted the amount of liquids passengers may carry on commercial aircraft. Explosives are sensitive to heat, shock, and friction, which are used to initiate them. Initiation systems may rely on a variety of methods depending on the intended use, such as a burning fuse, electric charge, chemical reaction, physical force, or some combination. In practice, those methods may employ simple mechanisms like a pressure plate, digital timer, mechanical clock, or other means to begin the initiation process. Initiated systems are triggered by the bomber or by the victim, depending on intended use.

¹⁷ FBI (1963, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1986, 1987, 1999b, 2000, 2006, 2007b, 2008a, 2010, 2011), FBI (2009, April 21); additional FBI sources as cited.

¹⁸ Substantial portions of this section are adapted from National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004), IED attack: improvised explosive devices (NAS/DHS (2004)).

¹⁹ Explosive devices are sometimes considered weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). See relevant definitions for terrorism, destructive devices, and WMDs in 18 U.S.C. §921, §1864, §2331, and §2332, and 26 U.S.C. §5845. For the purposes of the SNRA, this threat event includes explosive attacks (including rocket attacks) and incendiary attacks.

Table 1: Examples of Explosive Materials²⁰

	Common Uses	Common Form	Known IED Use
High explosives (HE)			
Ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO)	Fertilizer, engine fuel, mining and blasting (in mixed form)	Solid	Oklahoma City bombing
Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP)	No common uses; mixed from common household items	Crystalline solid	2005 bombings in London
Semtex, C-4	Primarily military explosives	Plastic solid	Irish Republican Army bombings
Ethylene glycol dinitrate (EGDN)	Component of low-freezing dynamite	Liquid	Millennium Bomber, intended for Los Angeles airport, 1999
Urea nitrate	Fertilizer	Crystalline solid	World Trade Center 1993
Low explosive			
Smokeless powder	Ammunition	Solid	Olympic Park bombings

In addition to the initiation systems, IEDs tactics include how they are placed at the target. They can be carried, placed, or delivered by person or vehicle; thrown by a person; delivered in a package; or concealed at the target location in advance, such as along a roadside. Bombs can also be surreptitiously carried by an unknowing individual on their person or in their bags or vehicle. This tactic is sometimes used to avoid security measures and reduce the likelihood of attribution to the actual bomber. Another common tactic is to target multiple locations simultaneously or in near succession. Security and rescue efforts can be hampered by the need to respond to more than one site. Suicide tactics are also associated with bombings. Suicide tactics allow the perpetrators to get close to their target and time the attack precisely for maximum success. Another tactic, known as a secondary attack, uses a distraction, such as a phoned bomb threat, 911 call, fire alarm, gunfire, small initial bombing, or other surprises, to drive or attract people to a location and then detonate the device at the gathering point. Evacuees, first responders, and bystanders are usually the targets of secondary attacks.

Effects

An explosion in or near a building or public transportation venue may blow out windows, destroy walls, and shut down building systems such as power, ventilation, fire suppression, water/sewage, and others. Exit routes may be disrupted or destroyed, and smoke and dust may travel through stairways and elevator shafts, making navigation difficult. Building failure may result in the release of hazardous materials used within a building, such as radioactive material from medical devices, or incorporated within the structure of a building, such as asbestos insulation. An IED attack may cause disruptions in municipal services such as electricity, water, communications, and transportation, which may continue for days to weeks after the attack.

The explosion of a bomb can cause secondary explosions if gasoline, natural gas, or other flammable material is ignited. Secondary hazards that result can include fire with possibly toxic

²⁰ NAS/DHS (2004), *op. cit.*

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smoke, disruption of electric power, ruptured natural gas lines and water mains, and debris. There can be a loss of traffic control in the area of the blast with possible traffic accidents involving fleeing people.

The extent of damage caused by an IED depends on the quantity and type of its explosive content, construction, and placement relative to its target. Table 2 predicts the damage radius based on the volume or weight of explosive (TNT equivalent) and the type of bomb. Vehicle bombs, also known as vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), can carry significantly more explosive material, and therefore, do more damage.

Table 2: Recommended Evacuation Distance based on Potential Effects of Explosive Weights²¹

Device Type	Explosive Capacity (HE Only)	Building Evacuation Distance	Outdoor Evacuation Distance
Pipe Bomb	5 lb	70 ft	1,200 ft
Suicide Bomber	20 lb	110 ft	1,700 ft
Briefcase/Suitcase	50 lb	150 ft	1,850 ft
Car	500 lb	320 ft	1,900 ft
SUV/Van	1,000 lb	400 ft	2,400 ft
Small Moving Van/Delivery Truck	4,000 lb	640 ft	3,800 ft
Moving Van/Water Truck	10,000 lb	860 ft	5,100 ft
Semi-Trailer	60,000 lb	1,570 ft	9,300 ft

The type of injuries and the number of people hurt will vary depending on the physical environment and the size of the blast; the amount of shielding between victims and the blast; fires, or structural damage that result from the explosion; and whether the explosion occurs in a closed space or an open area. There are several known injuries common to explosions:

- Overpressure damage to the lungs, ears, abdomen, and other pressure-sensitive organs—blast lung injury, a condition caused by the extreme pressure of a high explosive (HE) explosion, is the leading cause of illness and death for initial survivors of an explosions;
- Fragmentation injuries caused by projectiles thrown by blast—material from the bomb, shrapnel, or flying debris that penetrates the body and causes damage;
- Impact injuries caused when the blast throws a victim into another object, e.g., fractures, amputation, and trauma to the head and neck;
- Thermal injuries caused by burns to the skin, mouth, sinus, and lungs;
- Other injuries including exposure to toxic substances, crush injuries, and aggravation of pre-existing conditions (asthma, congestive heart failure, etc.).

Some health effects caused by IEDs, including eye injuries, abdominal injuries, and traumatic brain injuries may not be apparent initially, but can cause symptoms and even fatalities hours to months after the event. Psychological effects in attack survivors, first responders, and others are not unusual in the aftermath of a high-casualty event. While most symptoms diminish with time, in some cases assistance and guidance from mental health professionals may be required.

²¹ NAS/DHS (2004), *op. cit.*

Usage History in the United States

Terrorists and criminals with diverse motives have used explosive devices in the U.S. Thousands of terrorist and criminal incidents involving bombings, attempted bombings, incendiary bombings, stolen explosives, and related offenses occur each year. Most are minor criminal and mischief-related events. Table 3 shows statistics for explosive-related incidents in the U.S. from 1973 through 1999,²² while Table 4 shows selected incidents, including 44 high-casualty incidents (i.e., more than four casualties), since the late 19th Century. In the past 127 years, periods of both intense explosive device use and relative infrequency have occurred. Flashpoints of activity often coincide with periods of social or economic unrest, such as labor and anarchist movement violence in the late 19th and early 20th century, Jim Crow and Civil Rights eras, and during anti-war and anti-government violence in the 1960s through 1980s. In several cases, individual or small groups of serial bombers have conducted terror campaigns with extreme frequency for a short period or infrequently over extended periods of time. Examples include more than 44 bombings and attempted bombings from April to June 1919 by Galleanist anarchists;²³ the New York City bomber George Metesky in the 1940s and 1950s;²⁴ the Weather Underground during the 1960s and 1970s;²⁵ Ted Kaczynski during the late 1970s through 1990s;²⁶ Eric Rudolph during the 1990s;²⁷ and al Qaeda and affiliated groups since the 1990s.²⁸

The recognized likelihood and risk of explosive attacks to the Nation remains an enduring policy and security concern for the U.S. Government today.²⁹

²² The last year FBI published national statistics.

²³ FBI At: <http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/about-us/history/famous-cases/famous-cases-1919-bombings>.

²⁴ FBI At: <http://vault.fbi.gov/Criminal%20Profiling/Criminal%20Profiling%20Part%201%20of%207>.

²⁵ FBI At: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2004/january/weather_012904.

²⁶ FBI At: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/april/unabomber_042408.

²⁷ FBI At: http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2005/may/swecker_051605.

²⁸ FBI At: <http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/al-qaeda-international>.

²⁹ Chertoff, Michael (2007), testimony: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110shrg38842/html/CHRG-110shrg38842.htm>; DNI (2008), Annual Threat Assessment; Obama, Barack (2012, February): http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cied_1.pdf; DoD/JIEDDO (2012, June), https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/20120712_Barbero_testimony.pdf; DNI (2013, March), Annual Threat Assessment, <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf>; Mueller, Robert (2013, August), Reflections: <http://www.npr.org/2013/08/23/214549458/outgoing-fbi-boss-on-his-legacy-and-what-kept-him-up-at-night>.

Explosives Terrorism Attack**Table 3: Bombing and Arson-related Incidents in the U.S. 1973–1999³⁰**

Year	Incidents	Actual Explosions	Injuries	Fatalities
1999	1,797	1,193	114	9
1998	2,300	1,432	160	16
1997	2,217	1,590	204	18
1996	2,573	1,884	336	23
1995	2,577	1,968	744	193
1994	3,163	2,461	308	31
1993	2,980	2,418	1,323	49
1992	2,989	2,493	349	26
1991	2,499	1,974	230	29
1990	1,582	1,198	222	27
1989	1,208	844	202	11
1988	977	749	145	20
1987	848	704	107	21
1986	858	709	185	14
1985	847	677	144	28
1984	803	645	112	6
1983	687	569	100	12
1982	795	679	99	16
1981	1,142	952	133	30
1980	1,249	1,078	160	34
1979	1,220	1,033	173	22
1978	1,301	1,117	135	18
1977	1,318	1,115	162	22
1976	1,570	1,257	212	50
1975	2,074	1,701	326	69
1974	2,044	1,651	207	24
1973	1,955	1,529	187	22
Total	45,573	35,620	6,779	840
Per Year	1,688	1,319	251	31
Per Explosion			0.19	0.024

³⁰ Reconstructed from data, Bureau of Justice Statistics (FBI data) (1973–1999).

Table 4: Selected U.S. Terrorist Bombings 1886–2013 (Not SNRA Data Set)³¹

Date	City	State	Fatal	Injured	Displaced	Perpetrator	Target	Source
5/4/1886	Chicago	IL	11	100	0*	Labor/Anarchists	Crowd (Haymarket Square)	AP ³²
6/6/1904	Cripple Creek	CO	14	7		Labor/Anarchists	Independence Depot railway station	Press ³³
1/1/1910	Los Angeles	CA	20	100	0*	Labor/Anarchists	LA Times building	Press ³⁴
7/4/1914	New York City	NY	0	19	140	Labor/Anarchists	Apartment in New York City	Press ³⁵
7/22/1916	San Francisco	CA	10	40	0*	Labor/Anarchists	Crowd (Preparedness Day Parade)	Press ³⁶
11/24/1917	Milwaukee	WI	11	2	0*	Unknown	Church; exploded in police station	Press ³⁷
9/4/1918	Chicago	IL	4	75	0*	Labor/Anarchists	Federal Building	Press ³⁸
9/16/1920	New York City	NY	40	300	0*	Unknown	Wall Street	FBI, Press ³⁹
5/18/1927	Bath	WI	45	58	0*	Individual	Bath School House	NCTC, FBI ⁴⁰
10/10/1933	Chesterton	IN	7	0	0*	Individual	United Airlines	AP ⁴¹
11/16/1940	New York	NY	0	10	0*	Individual	ConEd Power Plant	Press ⁴²
11/1/1955	Longmont	CO	44	0	0*	Individual	United Airlines Flight 629	FBI ⁴³
12/2/1956	New York	NY	0	6	0*	Individual	Brooklyn Paramount Theater	Press ⁴⁴
11/16/1959	Gulf of Mexico		42	0	0*	Individual	National Airlines Flight 967	Press
1/6/1960	Bolivia	NC	34	0	0*	Individual	National Airlines Flight 2511	Press
10/13/1960	New York	NY	0	33	0*	Individual	Time Square Subway Station	Press
11/7/1960	New York	NY	1	18	0*	Individual	125th Street Subway Station	Press
5/22/1962	Unionville	MO	45	0	0*	Individual	Continental Airlines Flight 11	Press
9/16/1963	Birmingham	AL	4	16	0*	Ku Klux Klan	Church	AP, FBI ⁴⁵
8/7/1969	New York	NY	0	20	0*	Weather Underground	Marine Midland Building	Press ⁴⁶
3/6/1970	New York	NY	3	2		Weather Underground	Greenwich Village townhouse	Press
3/8/1971	St. Louis	MO	0	10	0*	Unknown	Military	GTD ⁴⁷
1/26/1972	New York	NY	1	13	0*	Jewish Defense League	Business	GTD ⁴⁸
8/6/1974	Los Angeles	CA	3	26	0*	Individual	Airport/Aircraft	GTD ⁴⁹
1/24/1975	New York City	NY	4	53	0*	PR nationalists	Fraunces Tavern	AP, FBI ⁵⁰
7/15/1975	Los Angeles	CA	0	4	0*	Cuban Action	Diplomatic	GTD ⁵¹
12/29/1975	New York City	NY	11	75	0*	Croatian nationalists	TWA terminal, LaGuardia (locker)	AP ⁵²
4/22/1976	Boston	MA	0	22	0*	United Freedom Front	Government	GTD ⁵³
8/3/1977	New York City	NY	1	7	0*	FALN ⁵⁴	Business	GTD ⁵⁵
12/11/1979	New York City	NY	0	8	0*	Omega-7	Diplomatic	GTD ⁵⁶
1/13/1980	New York City	NY	0	4	0*	Cuban exiles	Aeroflot	GTD, FBI ⁵⁷
3/17/1980	New York City	NY	0	3	0*	Croatian nationalists	Yugobank office	GTD, FBI ⁵⁸
8/20/1980	Berkeley	CA	0	2	0*	Iranian exiles	High school student meeting	GTD, FBI ⁵⁹
10/12/1980	New York City	NY ⁶⁰	0	5	0*	Armenian nationalists	Turkish mission (UN), travel agency	GTD, FBI ⁶¹
5/16-18/1981	New York City	NY	1	0	0*	PR nationalists	Pan Am terminal JFK	GTD, FBI ⁶²
6/27/1981	College Park	MD	1	4		Unknown	Educational Institution	GTD ⁶³
4/5/1982	New York City	NY	1	7	0*	Jewish Defense League	Restaurant (arson)	GTD, FBI ⁶⁴
8/11/1982	Honolulu	HI	1	15	0*	May 15 Organization ⁶⁵	Airport/Aircraft	GTD ⁶⁶
12/31/1982	New York City	NY	0	3	0*	PR nationalists	Federal buildings	GTD, FBI ⁶⁷
8/15/1985	Paterson	NJ	1	1	0*	Jewish Defense League	Alleged war criminal	GTD, FBI ⁶⁸
9/06/1985	Brentwood	NY	0	1	0*	Jewish Defense League	Alleged war criminal	GTD, FBI ⁶⁹
10/11/1985	Santa Ana	CA	1	7	0*	Jewish Defense League	Arab-American activist	GTD, FBI ⁷⁰
10/28/1986	Multiple ⁷¹	PR	0	1	0*	PR nationalists	Multiple bombings	GTD, FBI ⁷²
8/21/1989	Atlanta	GA	0	8	0*	ACFJS ⁷³	NGO	GTD ⁷⁴
10/21/1989	Lockerbie	UK	270			Libyan Government	Pam Am Flight 103	FBI ⁷⁵
2/26/1993	New York City	NY	6	1,042	0*	al Qaeda	World Trade Center	GTD, FBI ⁷⁶
4/19/1995	Oklahoma City	OK	168	754	400 ⁷⁷	Individual	Federal Building	GTD, FBI ⁷⁸
7/27/1996	Atlanta	GA	1	110	0*	Individual	Olympic Games	GTD, FBI ⁷⁹
1/16/1997	Atlanta	GA	0	6	0*	Individual	Abortion clinic	GTD, FBI ⁸⁰
2/21/1997	Atlanta	GA	0	4	0*	Individual	Nightclub	GTD, FBI ⁸¹
1/29/1998	Birmingham	AL	1	1	0*	Individual	Abortion clinic	GTD, FBI ⁸²
6/24/1998	Santa Isabel	PR	0	1	0*	PR nationalists	Bank offices	GTD, FBI ⁸³
8/02/2008	Santa Cruz	CA	0	1	4	Animal Liberation Front	Researcher's home	GTD, FBI ⁸⁴
4/15/2013	Boston	MA	3	264		Individual	Boston Marathon finish line	FBI ⁸⁵

³¹ This data set is intended for developing distributions for extended visualizations and stakeholder engagement in follow-on work to the 2015 SNRA, and is still under development and documentation.³² AP (2013); characterization of anarchist movement bombings as terrorist, FBI (2008a).

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- ³³ http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/trials/haywood/HAY_N66.HTM.
- ³⁴ AP (2013), King (1960), Harrison (2011); characterization of anarchist movement bombings as terrorist, FBI (2008a).
- ³⁵ All four persons killed were the bomb plotters. Seven seriously injured, ‘about a dozen’ less seriously injured. 140 displaced: 150 building tenants, minus seven injured and four plotters killed (who were building residents), rounded to two significant figures [NYT (1914) has contradictory reports of building damage, but describes substantial damage to apartments in the majority of floors]. NYT (1914, 1915), AP (1914).
- ³⁶ AP (1961), ATF (1970), Gage (2004) 4; characterization of anarchist movement bombings as terrorist, FBI (2008a).
- ³⁷ AP (1917), NYT (1917), LA Times (1917), Tanzilo (1992), Gurda (2001); USG characterization as terrorist act, Hutchinson (2001).
- ³⁸ AP (1918a, 1918b), Morning Oregonian (1918), NYT (1918a, 1918b); characterization of anarchist movement bombings as terrorist, FBI (2008a).
- ³⁹ AP (2013); Gage (2004) pp 142, 143; FBI (2007b).
- ⁴⁰ NCTC (2007).
<https://www.fbiic.gov/public/2008/sept/NCTC%20Did%20you%20know%20the%20first%20suicide%20car%20bombing%20took%20place%20in%20Bath,%20Michigan%20in%201927.pdf>
- ⁴¹ AP “Suspects Bomb Wrecked Plane.” Prescott Evening Courier. 10/12/1933. Page 3. At http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=D_EKAAAIBAJ&sjid=0E8DAAAIBAJ&pg=5344%2C6739444
- ⁴² Forbes at www.forbes.com/sites/williampentland/2014/03/16/meet-americas-first-electric-grid-saboteur
- ⁴³ <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/jack-gilbert-graham>
- ⁴⁴ New York Times at: <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C05E4DF1530F933A2575AC0A9629C8B63>
- ⁴⁵ AP (2013), FBI (1963) part 1, page 50.
- ⁴⁶ New York Times at: <http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/1969-a-year-of-bombings/>.
- ⁴⁷ GTD.
- ⁴⁸ GTD 197201260003.
- ⁴⁹ GTD 197408060004.
- ⁵⁰ AP (2013), FBI (1999a) 16.
- ⁵¹ GTD 197507150001.
- ⁵² AP (2013).
- ⁵³ GTD 197604220004.
- ⁵⁴ Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional.
- ⁵⁵ GTD 197708030006.
- ⁵⁶ GTD 197912110003.
- ⁵⁷ GTD 198001130006, FBI (2006).
- ⁵⁸ GTD 198003170025, FBI (2006).
- ⁵⁹ GTD 198008200004, FBI (1982) 48, FBI (2006).
- ⁶⁰ Includes the bombing of the Turkish Mission to the UN with four injuries, and a second bombing the same day of a travel agency in Hollywood, CA causing one injury.
- ⁶¹ GTD 198010120008, 198010120009, FBI (2006).
- ⁶² GTD 198105160004, FBI (1982, 2006).
- ⁶³ GTD 198106270006
- ⁶⁴ GTD 198204050005, FBI (1983, 2006).
- ⁶⁵ May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
- ⁶⁶ GTD 198208110007
- ⁶⁷ GTD 198212310009, 198212310010, 198212310011, 198212310012, FBI (1983, 2006).
- ⁶⁸ GTD 198508150001, FBI (1986, 2006).
- ⁶⁹ GTD 198509060007, FBI (1986, 2006).
- ⁷⁰ GTD 198510110002, FBI (1986, 2006).
- ⁷¹ Fajardo, Fort Buchanan, Santurce, Aguadilla, Mayaguez, Bayamon (FBI (1987)).
- ⁷² GTD 198610280017, 198610280018, 198610280019, 198610280020, 198610280021, 198610280022, 198610280023, FBI (1987, 2006).
- ⁷³ Americans for a Competent Federal Judicial System.
- ⁷⁴ GTD 198908210014
- ⁷⁵ FBI At: <http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2003/december/panam121903>
- ⁷⁶ GTD 199302260001, FBI (1999b, 2006).
- ⁷⁷ U.S. Department of Justice (2000), p. 1.
- ⁷⁸ GTD 199504190004, FBI (2006).
- ⁷⁹ GTD 199607270003, FBI (2006).
- ⁸⁰ GTD 199701160006, FBI (2006).
- ⁸¹ GTD 199702210003, FBI (2006).
- ⁸² GTD 199801290002, FBI (2006).
- ⁸³ GTD 199806240003, FBI (2006).
- ⁸⁴ GTD 200808020023; FBI (2009, April 21). Press release regarding a man suspected of different crimes, but describing the 2008 Santa Cruz firebombing as a terrorist act. For additional detail see McCord (2008), Knoll et al (2008), Buchanan et al (2008), FBI (2010).
- ⁸⁵ FBI At: <http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2013/federal-grand-jury-returns-30-count-indictment-related-to-boston-marathon-explosions-and-murder-of-mit-police-officer-sean-collier>.

Assumptions

Frequency

To identify the national risk baseline for this kind of attack, explosives terrorist attacks were analyzed as a recurring historical event similar to the SNRA's analysis of natural and technological hazards. In part, this analytic treatment reflects agnosticism in the absence of other public information of predictive value. Terrorism is driven by multiple deterministic drivers, as well as stochastic (chance) factors. However, without absolute knowledge of those factors that would both remain valid and have predictive value for each successful attack in the U.S. for the next three to five years (the time frame of the 2015 SNRA), representation as a random event without additional qualifications is the most accurate representation of our actual state of knowledge.¹ This treatment was also chosen for consistency with the findings of past U.S. Government reviews that periods of political violence of even greater intensity—and public awareness of that intensity—than that of today are, in fact, the historical norm for our country, rather than the exception.²

Historical incident data can be derived from several publicly available government and academic sources. Because publicly available Department of Justice (DOJ) data is limited to after 1973 and include criminal and terrorism intent, other sources are needed to help build a data set of terrorism-related bombings. The RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) and University of Maryland START Global Terrorism Database (GTD)³ are valuable sources for bombing incident data already filtered for terrorist intent; however, they do not contain data from incidents prior to 1970.

The DOJ has formally maintained bombing incident statistics since the early 1970s through the FBI Bomb Data Center (to 1999) and the U.S. Bomb Data Center (USBDC) of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).⁴ Data were released publicly through annual reports until the early 2000s and are now made available via summary publications. DOJ data include all types of incidents related to bombings—threats, failed attempts, and successful bombings, as well as arson/incendiary incidents. An advantage of the DOJ data is that it best demonstrates the frequency of explosive threats, overall, regardless of terrorism intent or outcome. Table 3 shows that a very high frequency of successful bombing and incendiary attacks of all kinds have occurred in the 26 years for which data is publicly available—close to 1,400 events per year.

A longer time period provides additional information useful for the estimation of the likelihood of rare, high-impact explosive attacks (Table 4). As part of SNRA 2015 project work, analysts

¹ Mohtadi et al (2005, 2009a).

² Staff and Commission reports and data set produced for/by the 1968-69 National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Graham et al (1969), Kirkham et al (1969), Levy (1969a, b, c), National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969)). See also [non-USG] Gage (2004), Gage (2011), START GTD (2013), Turchin et al (2014). The labor and anarchist related disturbances of the 1880s through the early 1920s saw dozens of bombings every year, which reached national attention (FBI Philadelphia Division (unknown date: retrieved February 2015), 1919 Bombings: <http://www.fbi.gov/philly/about-us/history/famous-cases/famous-cases-1919-bombings>.) However, bombings that reach national attention historically have represented the tip of a very large iceberg of bombings that do not. For example, by the close of the 1960s, total bombings were estimated to number in the thousands per year (4,330 in the sixteen months from January 1969 to April 1970: Allyn, Bobby (2009, August 27), 1969, a year of bombings. Note, *New York Times*: at <http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/27/1969-a-year-of-bombings>).

³ START, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, is a DHS Center of Excellence and network of scholars coordinated from the University of Maryland. Since 2011, when the first SNRA was executed, the START GTD has become the most commonly cited source for global terrorism statistical data, and is now used as the primary data source (with similar parameters as the 2011 SNRA) for the U.S. Government's annual Statistical Annex on Terrorism published for the U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism. START GTD (2013). The GTD is an open-source database with information on terrorism events around the world (including domestic, transnational, and international incidents) from 1970 to 2010. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the incident, the weapons used and nature of the target, the number of casualties, and—when identifiable—the group or individual responsible.

⁴ DOJ At: <http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/ATF/a0501/final.pdf>.

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from multiple DHS components⁵ developed new data sets and methods for estimating the absolute and conditional probabilities of such events.

- For purposes of illustration, Table 4 includes data that can be used to estimate the likelihood of an explosive attack resulting in four or more casualties—what could be considered a “mass casualty incident.” Forty-four such incidents within the 127-year historical data set in Table 4 represent a mean likelihood of 0.3 incidents per year.
- Low, mean, and high likelihood estimates of a mass casualty bombing in the next five years can be developed by reviewing the data in Table 4 and identifying the number of qualifying incidents per five-year historical period. Forty-four events within 25 five-year periods represent a mean of 1.76 incidents per period, with a low of 0 (multiple periods) and high of six (1975–1980).

Using mass casualty incidents as the basis for overall frequency analysis may be more reliable under the assumption that those incidents were more reliably reported and recorded than the vastly larger number of incidents in which there were no casualties. Such incidents are also more likely to be considered events of national significance. However, the disadvantage of that approach is that the chance factors associated with bombing impacts mean that the risk posed by bombings that did not result in casualties may be overlooked. It is for this reason that the 2015 SNRA examines bombing attacks with a lower threshold,⁶ in order to capture this broader picture of risk to the Nation.

Low, best, and high frequency estimates of Explosives Terrorism Attacks are based upon 1980–2005 data reported by the FBI. This data set was chosen because of its high quality, prior vetting, and internal consistency. It was also chosen to avoid the inherent value judgments and interpretation of what to include in the data set designated as ‘terrorist’, which are properly questions for stakeholders rather than the analyst. The prior designation by a single U.S. Government entity responsible for counterterrorism of a set of historical incidents spanning three decades made this data set ideal for the purposes of the SNRA. The best estimate of frequency represents the average number of occurrences per year of this set; the low estimate of frequency represents the inverse of the longest inter-arrival time (the longest gap between incidents); and the high estimate of frequency represents the largest number of incidents occurring in any one year.

Health and Safety

Estimating impacts from explosive attacks is also difficult due to the multiple factors involved in the outcome of an explosion, such as explosive quantity, proximity to target, blast mitigation, and chance (i.e., intended targets are not present). However, historical incident data and predictive modeling based on potential impacts from past events and adversary capability can assist in health and safety impact estimation.

The low and best estimates of fatalities and injuries are the minimum (0 for both) and average numbers of fatalities and injuries per incident in Table 7. Perpetrator fatalities and injuries are

⁵ National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), DHS Office of Policy, and FEMA. The following discussion represents work still in progress, and does not represent the opinion of any one contributing Component or analytic team. The intended end state of this project is the representation of the Explosives Terrorism Attack event, along with the other threats and hazards in the 2015 SNRA, in full distributional form. Its purpose is to put the threshold decisions (terrorist attacks only? minimum fatalities or casualties? hoaxes causing economic impacts?) that are presently made by DHS analysts by necessity into the hands of stakeholders where they belong. This work is still in progress.

⁶ Comparable to those of the CBRN terrorist attacks in the 2011 SNRA.

not included in the data tables and were not included in the quantitative calculations for this event.

For the high estimate, the SNRA project team judged that this historical data set was not adequately representative of the potential for larger mass-casualty events than have been observed to date in the United States, and would not be suitable as the basis for a high estimate for the risk communication purposes of the SNRA. High estimates for the SNRA impacts were adapted from historical events overseas and plausible alternative outcomes to ‘near-miss’ explosives attacks targeting the U.S. population or U.S. interests.

For injuries, the 1998 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi Kenya is one of the most significant in the historical record, with more than 4,500 reported.⁷ This is likely a conservative high estimate because a similar sized VBIED in a major urban core in the U.S. would be expected to affect a higher population density; however, in the absence of other defensible estimates located in the literature, it was taken as a reasonable high estimate.

For fatalities, three previous incidents in the historical record were identified as suitable for alternative outcome analysis: (1) the failed 2006 plot to simultaneously target seven transatlantic aircraft;⁸ (2) the failed 1995 plot simultaneously targeting 11 transpacific aircraft, known as the “Bojinka plot,”⁹ and (3) the successful 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.¹⁰ Had either of the aviation plots succeeded, fatality estimates can be made based on aircraft capacity and the assumption of total loss of airframe. Further, assuming full aircraft in the Boeing 747¹¹ or 777¹² class, fatality estimates would range from approximately 2,840 to 4,460 overall, for an average of 3,650. According to the U.S. Government, transnational terror groups remain interested in targeting aviation,¹³ and more recent attempts made in 2009¹⁴ and 2010¹⁵ support the reasonability of these scenarios as the basis for the fatality high estimate.

Estimates of alternative outcomes during the World Trade Center Bombing have also been conducted that assume the same loss as a single tower during the 9/11 attacks—approximately 2,000 fatalities.¹⁶ However, during 9/11, the majority of the potential victims were able to evacuate prior to the towers’ collapse. A VBIED detonating without warning, like in 1993, capable of collapsing the building would not afford victims the opportunity to evacuate. Theoretically, most or all of those in the building itself would be killed as well as many in the path of the collapsing building. Twenty-five thousand people were estimated to work in each of the World Trade Center towers.

Direct Economic Loss

The SNRA direct economic metric includes

- Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction (DDP): The value or replacement cost of physical buildings, infrastructure, building contents, vehicles, and other physical property

⁷ FBI at <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings-1998>.

⁸ FBI at <http://leb.fbi.gov/2011/september/the-evolution-of-terrorism-since-9-11>.

⁹ New York Times at <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/09/09/nyregion/bomb-trial-jurors-say-panel-had-no-doubts.html>.

¹⁰ FBI at http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608.

¹¹ Boeing technical data. 747 class averages 467 passengers per aircraft. At <http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/747family/index.page>?

¹² Boeing technical data. 777 class averages 344 passengers per aircraft. At <http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/777family/background.page>?

¹³ FBI (2011) 4.

¹⁴ DOJ at <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-sentenced-life-prison-attempted-bombing-flight-253-christmas-day>

¹⁵ FBI (2011) 8.

¹⁶ Lundberg (2013) 204.

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directly destroyed by the attack. This includes the cost of decontamination, if any, and debris removal costs.

- Business Interruption: Business interruption costs caused directly by the incident or the immediate investigation, as opposed to shock, substitution, or second-order effects on the economy.
- Medical Costs: Cost of medical care to injured, including those who become fatalities.
- Lost Demand from Fatalities: No economic value was assigned to a human life (or injury) in itself as a Value of Statistical Life, because this is a value judgment that differs from person to person, and because it would represent double counting with these impacts counted separately. The lost contribution to the national economy as spending was captured, but capped at one year for consistency with benchmark risk assessments. This value was taken at \$42,500, the midpoint of the median \$35,000–\$50,000 household earning value used as the average one year spending per person by past assessments.

Direct economic costs for the low and best estimates were calculated separately from the high estimate. The low and best estimates were calculated by the SNRA project team using the following assumptions:

Low and Best Estimates

DDP Costs

A per-casualty multiplier (factor approach) was constructed as the average property damage per casualty for all U.S. bombings between 1988 and 1998. Property damage figures were converted to 2011 dollar values prior to calculation. Because these figures include many thousands of bombings of much lower destructive power than those of the SNRA data set (Table 7), the average property damage of \$227,000 per casualty, as opposed to average property damage per incident (which was used as the low estimate, see below) was used to construct this multiplier for the best estimate (Table 5).

Table 5: Direct Economic Loss Estimates for Historical Incidents of Table 7¹⁷

Component	Inputs per		Number		
	Fatality	Injury	Fatalities	Injuries	
DDP	\$227,000	\$227,000	1	10.8	Total
BI	\$37,000	\$37,000	\$227,000	\$2,451,600	\$2,678,600
Medical	\$5,200	\$24,000	\$37,000	\$399,600	\$436,600
Lost spending	\$42,000	\$0	\$5,200	\$259,200	\$264,400
			\$42,000	\$0	\$42,000
					\$3,421,600

Because this approach would have resulted in zero dollar loss (as the other components of the SNRA direct economic loss metric are also tied to the fatality and injury estimates) for the low estimate, which was judged unrealistic for the comparatively small set of incidents called out by the FBI source as terrorist incidents, the average property damage per incident of the 1988–1998 set was used as a reasonable low estimate of direct economic loss. Total 2011-dollar adjusted

¹⁷ Kunreuther et al (2014).

property damages (\$1.061 billion) from 1988 to 1988 were divided by the total number of bombing incidents (25,065), including actual, attempted, and [1998 reporting only] accidental explosive and incendiary U.S. incidents, to generate a low estimate of \$42,000.

Business Interruption

Business interruption costs were also estimated by a proxy multiplier applied to the total number of fatalities and injuries. The only definite estimate of business interruption that could be obtained for any of the historic events was zero.¹⁸ Since this was due to unusual circumstances particular to the event, a per-casualty multiplier was obtained from the 2013 Boston bombing in the same manner as for the armed assault event.¹⁹

Business interruption costs were estimated from the \$10 million lost business costs to the approximately 500 businesses in the 12-block immediate impact area of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, restricted for approximately one week of investigation.²⁰ The size and duration of the restricted immediate impact area was considered to be a reasonable estimate for the post-attack investigation of any explosives terrorist attack of comparable magnitude in this country. This per-casualty (fatality + injury) cost of \$37,000 of the Boston bombings was applied to the remaining incidents.^{21,22}

Medical Costs

To these costs, an average medical cost of \$5,200 per fatality and \$24,000 per non-lethal injury were applied.²³ These numbers are the same as used for armed assault.

- These numbers differed substantially from medical costs due to burns, blunt-force, and other trauma injuries from violent causes in the United States, which averaged in the low- to mid-single thousands. However, gunshot injuries were judged to be a closer analog to injuries from terrorist explosive devices due to their exceptionally violent and targeted nature.
- This assumption was supported by a parallel analysis of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing,²⁴ which resulted in an average per-injury cost of \$23,000 (2011 dollars).²⁵

¹⁸ This was the 1920 Wall Street bombing (Gage (2004)). Business and political leaders perceived this attack to be an attack upon the capitalist system and rapidly restored normal commercial operations as an act of defiance and to maintain investor confidence. The bomb site was cleaned up the same day; normal business operations with replacement staff resumed the following day; and public communications by political, business, and press leaders designed to boost investor confidence resulted in stock and bond values rising above their pre-attack averages within days. The prioritization of restoring normal operations and public confidence over preserving evidence at the bomb site for investigation resulted in minimal interruption of business compared with other historic U.S. terrorist attacks. However, this prioritization came at the cost of justice: the perpetrator or group was never determined.

¹⁹ Because the SNRA project team could not be confident in the assessment of zero business interruption cost for the 1920 attack based upon inference from the literature, this multiplier was also applied to obtain proxy business interruption estimates for this attack rather than using the apparent historical value of zero.

²⁰ Exclusion zone 12 blocks, with 500 businesses, Luna (2013); cost to businesses in exclusion zone for one week restrictions \$10 million, Dedman et al (2013). Costs of the citywide lockdown and law enforcement deployment were excluded from the estimate here, because they are not characteristic of the aftermath of most terrorist attacks in this country. Direct property damage costs were also excluded, since these were specific to the bomb attack. Note that estimates of \$250–\$300 million often reported (Green et al (2013), Dedman et al (2013), Luna (2013)) in the media refer to costs of the lockdown. They are a reasonable estimate of this (being calculated as a 1/2-1/3 of one day's economic activity of Boston), but such broad lockdowns accompany few, if any, of the other bombing and shooting attacks included here. Most conventional-weapon terrorist attacks (bombs, flame, guns) are very localized in their direct effects to property and business interruption.

²¹ This counts interruptions to public sector activity, such as the Fort Hood or Little Rock shootings at U.S. Government facilities, on the same basis as private sector economic activity. This equivalence is applied only in this estimator (e.g., lost taxes or parking fines and public sector response costs not counted in the medical costs are not included in the total direct economic loss estimates).

²² As the Boston bombing itself occurred in 2013 after the time frame of the main data sources used for this event, it was not included directly but only as a source of proxy estimates to fill in data gaps for other incidents.

²³ Medical cost per fatal and non-fatal injury for gunshot injuries in the United States from Corso et al (2007), adjusted from 2000 to 2011 dollars using the general CPI-U inflator (1.31). Estimated costs from lost labor productivity are not included.

²⁴ Shariat et al (1998).

²⁵ Costs: Hospital acute care costs, excluding emergency transport, physician, surgeon, and rehabilitation charges, \$2.5 million [\$3.7 million in 2011 dollars]. Mean charges: treated and released from ER, [over] \$350 [\$520], hospitalized, \$28,000 [\$41,000]. Long -term medical costs (follow-up 1996) for 494 persons interviewed of 914 persons affected by the bombing: \$5.7 million [\$8.2 million] total, average \$16,000 [\$23,000] per person.

Explosives Terrorism Attack***Lost Demand from Fatalities***

To estimate the costs of lost demand from deaths, the SNRA project team multiplied the number of deaths listed in Table 7 by \$42,500, the same figure used across the SNRA 2011 events.²⁶

High Estimate

Like health and safety impacts, direct economic losses caused by IEDs can have vast disparity. Loss will range from minimal in most cases to billions of dollars for the most large-scale attacks in densely built urban environments.

As with health and safety analysis, a high estimate (\$350 million) generated by this method using the high fatalities (168) and injuries (1,042) from the data set in Table 7 appeared overly conservative given knowledge of historical incidents. This estimate has been exceeded routinely, including an estimated \$4.3 billion in property losses attributed to the 1992 IRA bombing of the London Financial District.²⁷ Instead, the SNRA project team constructed the high estimate from an analysis of property losses expected following a 20,000-lb. VBIED in Los Angeles, New York City, Chicago, or Houston.²⁸ The results are shown in Table 6. The average property loss of \$20 billion is significant, but not unreasonable when compared to historical incidents such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing or 1993 World Trade Center bombings, both of which caused nearly \$1 billion in property loss, but also contained damage to a more isolated area than would be expected in the center of an urban core.

Table 6: Massive VBIED Property Loss Model²⁹

City	Property Loss (\$2011 billion) (DDP + BI)
Chicago	\$25.1
Houston	\$18.1
Los Angeles	\$18.9
New York	\$18.4

This scenario does not report fatalities or injuries. However, estimation of medical costs and lost spending due to fatalities using the 3,650 fatalities and 4,500 injuries of the SNRA high estimate and the inputs of Table 6 summed to \$280 million. As the correlation between the high estimates of fatalities and injuries and direct economic loss would have required additional analyst assumptions and this addition would not have had an effect on the total within the order of magnitude precision of the SNRA, the reported high direct economic estimate includes only the \$20.1 billion average of the DDP + business interruption estimates above.

²⁶ 84 incurred no medical expenses, so 410 persons did; $410 \times \$16,000 = \6.56 million; it is unclear how to account for the discrepancy. 92 percent of the 494 interviewed (454) had been injured in the bombing. The project team used $\$5.7$ million total /454 injured = $\$13,000$ per injury long-term cost, $\$5.7$ million x $754/454 = \$9.5$ million [$\$13.6$ million 2011 dollars]. Total medical costs in 2011 dollars is $\$17.3$ million, or $\$23,000/injury$.

²⁷ This number originates from the 2008 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA 2008) (the BTRA as a whole is classified Secret, but its economic methodology appendix is U//FOUO), and represents the midpoint (the expected value of a linear uniform distribution over the interval) of the \$35,000–\$50,000 median household income band in 2011. DHS (2008) pp. E2.7–34. (Appendix reference is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED.)

²⁸ GTD 199204100007 (2011 USD).

²⁹ Kunreuther et al (2014). Converted to 2011 dollars using 2014 to 2011 CPI of 0.950. The property damage metric in the RMS insurance model used for this study corresponds to the SNRA DDP (structure and contents) and business interruption cost estimates: published scenarios such as these also calculate all losses, not only insured losses, so these numbers are directly comparable without additional adjustment. Workers' compensation costs, typically on the same order of magnitude as property damage losses in RMS scenarios, are not counted in the SNRA direct economic loss metric.

²⁹ Kunreuther et al (2014).

Indirect, induced, or total economic loss estimates were not calculated for the 2015 revision of the SNRA.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured. As noted, incidents of bomb threats or hoaxes frequently displace people for shorter periods of time but still cause disruption and economic impact.

- A few of the attacks in the historic data sets that were directed at specific persons, such as the 1985 and the 2008 bombings by the Jewish Defense League (JDL) (Table 7) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) (Table 4) respectively, occurred in residential neighborhoods. Like most terrorist attacks, bombings tend to occur in urban centers where concentrations of people can be found rather than residential neighborhoods.

In the majority of cases, however, the number of displaced from these historical attacks could not be determined from primary sources available to the SNRA project team. The one exception in the SNRA primary data set was the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing that left approximately 400 people homeless (Table 7).

Although not included in the SNRA primary data set, two other incidents are included in Table 7—the 2008 ALF firebombing attack, which displaced a family of four, and a 1914 accident where a group of bomb-makers working in their apartment blew themselves up but also caused substantial injury and damage to the other apartments and residents of their building (estimated 140 displaced).

The SNRA project team was unable to identify other instances of terrorist explosives attacks in the event data set resulting in displacement. For this reason, the 2015 SNRA project team made the assumption that the remaining events most likely resulted in zero persons displaced from their homes.

Low, best, and high estimates reflect the minimum (0), average (2.2, reported as 2), and maximum (400) numbers of persons displaced from the set of incidents in Table 7.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event.³⁰ The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs. A multiplicative factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.

The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + Inj + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event

³⁰ See Appendix G for references and additional discussion of the SNRA Psychological Distress metric.

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Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement).

- In words, this formula suggests that there are five significantly distressed persons for each life lost; one for each person injured; and one for each two people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement.
- The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long-term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Explosives Terrorist Attack was given a C_{EF} of 1.2.
- Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

In 2011, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event in the 2011 SNRA. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous *variables* (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity,—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)³¹ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- The environmental assessment included effects resulting from terrorism threats, but did not include human health effects or effects in urban areas, because these effects are already reflected in other impact measures.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “Low” explaining that the overall environmental impacts are low, but that they could become more severe if a water treatment plant or chemical plant were targeted.

³¹ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

Additional Relevant Information

Adjustment for population density

Fatality, injury, and direct economic loss incident information for older historical attacks in urban areas (the majority of attacks) could be multiplied in proportion to the greater population density or greater density of modern very high-occupancy business district buildings over the past, using historical relative urban population density data.³² However, the effects of adjusting the threshold for the higher-casualty observation class (the threshold will differ from four casualties and will be different for different time periods) would need to be accounted for in some way.

Scope

Risks posed by IEDs occur regardless of the actor's intent (e.g., terrorism vs. criminal); therefore, a more thorough analysis of historical incidents would ideally include criminal incidents.

Moreover, IED incidents are unusual in that threats or hoaxes can easily present significant economic impacts (and occasional injuries/fatalities due to panic). Therefore, effective risk communication would also ideally include consideration for these types of incidents. For example, economic impacts from business interruption and response costs are not insignificant. A series of Twitter-based bomb threats to planes necessitated response from military aircraft estimated to cost \$22,500 per hour.³³ Closing Denver International Airport at noon for two hours to evaluate a threat or security breach was estimated to cost \$2.5 million in flight cancellations directly related to the airport and affect an additional 800 flights nationwide.³⁴

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³² Such as those presented in figures 2.1, 2.2, pp. 4–5 RMS (2004).

³³ See <http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2015/01/hoax-bomb-threats>

³⁴ See Forrest et al (2012)

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Explosives Terrorism Attack

**Table 7: SNRA 2015 Data Set
U.S. Historical Explosives and Incendiary Terrorist Attacks 1980-2005³⁵**

Date	Location	Incident type	Perpetrator	Killed	Injured	Displaced
1/7/1980	San Juan, PR	Pipe Bombing	Anti-Communist Alliance	0	0	0 ^{*36}
1/13/1980	New York, NY	Bombing	Omega 7	0	4	0*
1/13/1980	Miami, FL	Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*
1/19/1980	San Juan, PR	Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*
3/17/1980	New York, NY	Bombing	Croatian Freedom Fighters	0	3	0*
3/25/1980	New York, NY	Attempted Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*
6/3/1980	Washington, DC	Bombing	Croatian Freedom Fighters	0	0	0*
6/3/1980	New York, NY	Bombing	Croatian Freedom Fighters	0	0	0*
7/14/1980	Dorato, PR; San Juan, PR	Multiple Bombings (2)	³⁷	0	0	0*
7/14/1980	Ponce, PR; Mayaguez, PR	Multiple Arsons (2)	³⁸	0	0	0*
7/22/1980	Puerto Rico (multiple) ³⁹	Multiple Bombings (4)	⁴⁰	0	0	0*
8/20/1980	Berkeley, CA	Pipe Bombing	Iranian Free Army	0	2	0*
10/7/1980	New York, NY	Attempted Bombing	⁴¹	0	0	0*
10/12/1980	New York, NY	Bombing	⁴²	0	4	0*
10/12/1980	Hollywood, CA	Bombing	⁴³	0	1	0*
12/21/1980	New York, NY	Pipe Bombing	⁴⁴	0	0	0*
12/30/1980	Hialeah, FL	Attempted Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*
1/8/1981	Puerto Rico (multiple) ⁴⁵	Multiple Incendiary Bombings (3)	⁴⁶	0	0	0*
1/12/1981	San Juan, PR	Bombing	⁴⁷	0	0	0*
1/23/1981	New York City, NY	Bombing	Croatian Freedom Fighters	0	0	0*
1/26/1981	San Francisco, CA	Bombing	⁴⁸	0	0	0*
2/2/1981	Los Angeles, CA	Attempted Bombing	October 3	0	0	0*
2/22/1981	Hollywood, CA	Bombing	⁴⁹	0	0	0*
3/15/1981	San Juan, PR	Attempted Bombing	⁵⁰	0	0	0*
4/27/1981	Washington, DC	Incendiary Bombing	Iranian Patriotic Army	0	0	0*
5/16-18/81	New York City, NY	Multiple Bombings (5)	P.R. Armed Resistance	1	0	0*
6/25/1981	Torrance, CA	Incendiary Bombing	Jewish Defenders	0	0	0*
6/26/1981	Los Angeles, CA	Bombing	June 9 Organization	0	0	0*
8/20/1981	Washington, DC	Arson	Black Brigade	0	0	0*
8/20/1981	Los Angeles, CA	Bombing	June 9 Organization	0	0	0*
8/27/1981	Carolina, PR	Bombing	Grupo Estrella	0	0	0*
9/3-4/1981	New York City, NY	Multiple Bombings (2)	Jewish Defense League	0	0	0*
9/11/1981	Miami, FL	Multiple Bombings (2)	Omega 7	0	0	0*
9/12/1981	New York City, NY	Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*

³⁵ FBI (2006) 57-66. Explosives attacks (including rocket attacks), incendiary attacks, and attempted attacks designated as terrorist in nature in cited source.

³⁶ * = Assumption, SNRA project team.

³⁷ Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rico Revolution.

³⁸ Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rico Revolution.

³⁹ Hato Rey, PR; Santurce, PR; Rio Piedras, PR.

⁴⁰ Revolutionary Commandos of the People, Ready and at War.

⁴¹ International Committee Against Nazism.

⁴² Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide.

⁴³ Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide.

⁴⁴ Armed Forces of Popular Resistance.

⁴⁵ Santurce, PR; Ponce, PR; Rio Piedras, PR.

⁴⁶ People's Revolutionary Commandos.

⁴⁷ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.

⁴⁸ Jewish Defense League/American Revenge Committee.

⁴⁹ Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.

⁵⁰ Armed Forces of Popular Resistance.

Date	Location	Incident type	Perpetrator	Killed	Injured	Displaced
9/22/1981	Schenectady, NY	Bombing	Communist Workers Party	0	0	0*
9/24/1981	Miami, FL	Attempted Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*
10/1/1981	Hollywood, CA	Bombing	⁵¹	0	0	0*
10/25/1981	New York City, NY	Incendiary Bombing	Jewish Defense League	0	0	0*
11/11/1981	Santurce, PR	Bombing	⁵²	0	0	0*
11/20/1981	Los Angeles, CA	Bombing	⁵³	0	0	0*
11/27/1981	Santurce, PR; Condado, PR	Multiple Bombings (2)	⁵⁴	0	0	0*
12/24/1981	New York City, NY	Attempted Pipe Bombing	Jewish Defense League	0	0	0*
2/19/1982	Miami, FL	Multiple Bombings (2)	Omega 7	0	0	0*
2/19/1982	Washington, DC	Bombing	Jewish Defense League	0	0	0*
2/21/1982	Rio Piedras, PR	Pipe Bombing	⁵⁵	0	0	0*
2/28/1982	New York City, NY	Multiple Bombings (4)	⁵⁶	0	0	0*
3/22/1982	Cambridge, MA	Bombing	⁵⁷	0	0	0*
4/5/1982	Brooklyn, NY	Arson	Jewish Defense League	1	7	0*
4/28/1982	New York City, NY	Multiple Bombings (2)	Jewish Defense League	0	0	0*
4/29/1982	San Juan, PR; Bayamon, PR	Multiple Bombings (2)	⁵⁸	0	0	0*
5/17/1982	Union City, NJ	Incendiary Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*
5/20/1982	San Juan, PR	Attempted Bombing	⁵⁹	0	0	0*
5/30/1982	Van Nuys, CA	Attempted Bombing	⁶⁰	0	0	0*
6/10/1982	Carolina, PR	Multiple Bombings (3)	⁶¹	0	0	0*
7/4/1982	New York City, Astoria, NY	Multiple Pipe Bombings (2)	Croatian Freedom Fighters	0	0	0*
7/5/1982	New York City, NY	Multiple Pipe Bombings (2)	Jewish Defense League	0	0	0*
8/20/1982	Old San Juan, PR	Bombing	⁶²	0	0	0*
9/1/1982	Naranjito, PR	Attempted Bombing	⁶³	0	0	0*
9/2/1982	Miami, FL	Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*
9/8/1982	Chicago, IL	Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*
9/20/1982	New York City, NY	Bombing	⁶⁴	0	0	0*
9/25/1982	Miami, FL	Attempted Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*
10/22/1982	Philadelphia, PA	Attempted Bombing	⁶⁵	0	0	0*
12/8/1982	Washington, DC	Attempted Bombing	Individual	^{0⁶⁶}	0	0*
12/16/1982	Elmont, NY	Multiple Bombings (2)	United Freedom Front	0	0	0*
12/21/1982	New York City, NY	Attempted Pipe Bombing	Jewish Defense League	0	0	0*
12/31/1982	New York City, NY	Multiple Bombings (5)	⁶⁷	0	3	0*
1/11-12/83	Miami, FL	Multiple Bombings (3)	Omega 7	0	0	0*
1/28/1983	New York City, NY	Bombing	Revolutionary Fighting Group	0	0	0*
2/19/1983	Washington, DC	Pipe Bombing	Jewish Defense League	0	0	0*

⁵¹ Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.⁵² Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.⁵³ Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide.⁵⁴ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.⁵⁵ Antonia Martinez Student Commandos.⁵⁶ Armed Forces of National Liberation.⁵⁷ Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide.⁵⁸ Provisional Coordinating Committee of the Labor Self-Defense Group.⁵⁹ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.⁶⁰ Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.⁶¹ Armed Forces of Popular Resistance.⁶² Armed Forces of National Liberation.⁶³ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.⁶⁴ Armed Forces of National Liberation.⁶⁵ Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide.⁶⁶ The only fatality was the attacker, shot by police (bomb was a hoax). FBI (1983) 116.⁶⁷ Armed Forces of National Liberation.

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Date	Location	Incident type	Perpetrator	Killed	Injured	Displaced
3/20/1983	San Antonio, TX	Bombing	Republic of Revolutionary	0	0	0*
4/26/1983	Washington, DC	Bombing	Armed Resistance Unit	0	0	0*
4/27/1983	Miami, FL	Attempted Bombings (4)	Haitian Extremists	0	0	0*
5/12/1983	Uniondale, NY	Bombing	United Freedom Front	0	0	0*
5/13/1983	New York City, NY	Bombing	United Freedom Front	0	0	0*
5/27/1983	Miami, FL	Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*
8/8/1983	Detroit, MI	Attempted Incendiary Bombing	Fuqra	0	0	0*
8/9/1983	Detroit, MI	Arson	Fuqra	0 ⁶⁸	0	0*
8/18/1983	Washington, DC	Bombing	Armed Resistance Unit	0	0	0*
8/21/1983	New York City, NY	Bombing	United Freedom Front	0	0	0*
8/27/1983	Washington, DC	Incendiary Bombing	Unknown	0	0	0*
10/12/1983	Miami, FL	Pipe Bombing	Omega 7	0	0	0*
10/30/1983	Hato Rey, PR	Rocket Attack	⁶⁹	0	0	0*
11/7/1983	Washington, DC	Bombing	Armed Resistance Unit	0	0	0*
12/13-14/83	East Meadow, NY	Multiple Bombings (2)	United Freedom Front	0	0	0*
1/29/1984	New York City, NY	Bombing	United Freedom Front	0	0	0*
2/23/1984	New York City, NY	Bombing	Jewish Direct Action	0	0	0*
3/19/1984	Harrison, NY	Bombing	United Freedom Front	0	0	0*
4/5/1984	New York City, NY	Bombing	Red Guerrilla Resistance	0	0	0*
4/20/1984	Washington, DC	Bombing	Red Guerrilla Resistance	0	0	0*
8/22/1984	Melville, NY	Bombing	United Freedom Front	0	0	0*
9/26/1984	New York City, NY	Bombing	Red Guerrilla Resistance	0	0	0*
9/26/1984	Mount Pleasant, NY	Bombing	United Freedom Front	0	0	0*
12/10/1984	Puerto Rico (multiple) ⁷⁰	Multiple Bombings (5)	⁷¹	0	0	0*
1/25/1985	Old San Juan, PR	Rocket Attack	⁷²	0	0	0*
2/23/1985	New York City, NY	Bombing	Red Guerrilla Resistance	0	0	0*
5/15/1985	Northridge, CA	Pipe Bombing	Jewish Defense League	0	0	0*
8/15/1985	Paterson, NJ	Bombing	Jewish Defense League	1	1	0*
9/6/1985	Brentwood, NY	Bombing	Jewish Defense League	0	1	0*
11/10/1985	Santa Ana, CA	Bombing	Jewish Defense League	1	7	0*
1/6/1986	Puerto Rico (multiple) ⁷³	Multiple Bombings (4)	⁷⁴	0	0	0*
3/17/1986	Ponce, PR	Attempted Bombing	Commando Rojo	0	0	0*
4/14/1986	Rio Piedras, PR	Bombing	⁷⁵	0	0	0*
9/15/1986	Coeur d'Alene, ID	Pipe Bombing	Aryan Nations	0	0	0*
9/29/1986	Coeur d'Alene, ID	Multiple Bombings (4)	Aryan Nations	0	0	0*
10/20/1986	New York City, NY	Incendiary Bombing	Jewish Defense League	0	0	0*
10/28/1986	Puerto Rico (multiple) ⁷⁶	Multiple Bombings (7)	⁷⁷	0	1	0*
11/4/1986	Puerta De Tierra, PR	Attempted Bombing	⁷⁸	0	0	0*
12/28/1986	Yauco, PR; Guayama, PR	Multiple Bombings (2)	⁷⁹	0	0	0*
4/16/1987	Davis, CA	Arson	Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0*

⁶⁸ The only fatalities were the attackers. FBI (1984) 30.⁶⁹ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.⁷⁰ Levittown, PR; Rio Piedras, PR; Ponce, PR; Mayaguez, PR; Cayey, PR.⁷¹ Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution.⁷² Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros/ Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution.⁷³ Cidra, PR; Toa Baja, PR; Guanica, PR; Santurce, PR.⁷⁴ Ejercito Revolucionario Clandestino/ National Revolutionary Front of Puerto Rico.⁷⁵ Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution.⁷⁶ Bayamon, PR; Fajardo, PR; Mayaguez, PR; Aguadilla, PR; Santurce, PR; Fort Buchanan, PR.⁷⁷ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.⁷⁸ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.⁷⁹ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.

Date	Location	Incident type	Perpetrator	Killed	Injured	Displaced
5/25/1987	Puerto Rico (multiple) ⁸⁰	Multiple Bombings (7)	Guerr. Forces of Liberation	0	0	0*
1/12/1988	Rio Piedras, PR	Multiple Incendiary Bombings (2)	⁸¹	0	0	0*
5/26/1988	Coral Gables, FL	Bombing	⁸²	0	0	0*
7/22/1988	Caguas, PR	Pipe Bombing	⁸³	0	0	0*
9/19/1988	Los Angeles, CA	Bombing	Up the IRS, Inc.	0	0	0*
11/1/1988	Rio Piedras, PR	Multiple Bombings (2)	⁸⁴	0	0	0*
4/3/1989	Tucson, AZ	Arson	Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0*
6/19/1989	Bayamon, PR	Multiple Bombings (2)	⁸⁵	0	0	0*
1/12/1990	Santurce, PR; Carolina, PR	Multiple Pipe Bombings (2)	⁸⁶	0	0	0*
2/22/1990	Los Angeles, CA	Bombing	Up the IRS, Inc.	0	0	0*
5/27/1990	Mayaguez, PR	Arson	Unk. Puerto Rican Group	0	0	0*
9/17/1990	Arecibo, PR; Vega Baja, PR	Multiple Bombings (2)	⁸⁷	0	0	0*
2/3/1991	Mayaguez, PR	Arson	Popular Liberation Army	0	0	0*
2/18/1991	Sabana Grande, PR	Arson	Popular Liberation Army	0	0	0*
3/17/1991	Carolina, PR	Arson	Unk. Puerto Rican Group	0	0	0*
4/1/1991	Fresno, CA	Bombing	Popular Liberation Army	0	0	0*
7/6/1991	Punta Borinquen, PR	Bombing	Popular Liberation Army	0	0	0*
11/19/1992	Urbana, IL	Attempted Firebombing	⁸⁸	0	0	0*
12/10/1992	Chicago, IL	⁸⁹	Boricua Revolutionary Front	0	0	0*
2/26/1993	New York, NY	Car Bombing	Int'l Islamist Extremists	6	1,042	0*
7/20-22/93	Tacoma, WA	Multiple Bombings (2)	American Front Skinheads	0	0	0*
11/27-28/93	Chicago, IL	Firebombings (9)	Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0*
4/19/1995	Oklahoma City, OK	Truck Bombing	Individual	168	754	400 ⁹⁰
4/1/1996	Spokane, WA	Pipe Bombing/Bank Robbery	Individual	0	0	0*
7/12/1996	Spokane, WA	Pipe Bombing/Bank Robbery	Individual	0	0	0*
7/27/1996	Atlanta, GA	Pipe Bombing	Individual	2	112	0*
1/2/1997	Wash. DC; Leavenworth, KS	Letter Bbing (count.as 1 incident)	Unknown	0	0	0*
1/16/1997	Atlanta, GA	Bombing of Abortion Clinic	Individual	0	8	0*
2/21/1997	Atlanta, GA	Bombing of Alt. Lifestyle Nightclub	Individual	0	5	0*
1/29/1998	Birmingham, AL	Bombing, Reproductive Svcs. Clinic	Individual	1	1	0*
3/31/1998	Arecibo, PR	⁹¹	⁹²	0	0	0*
6/9/1998	Rio Piedras, PR	Bombing of Bank Branch Office	⁹³	0	0	0*
6/25/1998	Santa Isabel, PR	Bombing of Bank Branch Office	⁹⁴	0	1	0*
6/27/1998	Espanola, NM	Arson	Individual	0	0	0*
10/19/1998	Vail, CO	Arson Fire at Ski Resort	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
3/19/1999	Santa Fe, NM	Attempted Bombing	Individual	0	0	0*
3/27/1999	Franklin Township, NJ	Bombing of Circus Vehicles	Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0*

⁸⁰ Caguas, PR; Carolina, PR; Mayaguez, PR; Cidra, PR; Aibonita, PR; Ponce, PR.⁸¹ Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces.⁸² Organization Alliance of Cuban Intransigence.⁸³ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.⁸⁴ Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces.⁸⁵ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.⁸⁶ Eugenio Maria de Hostos International Brigade of the Pedro Albizu Campos Revolutionary Forces.⁸⁷ Pedro Albizu Group Revolutionary Forces.⁸⁸ Mexican Revolutionary Movement.⁸⁹ Car Fire and Attempted Firebombing (2).⁹⁰ DoJ (2000).⁹¹ Bombing of Superaqueduct Construction Project.⁹² Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.⁹³ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros.⁹⁴ Ejercito Popular Boricua Macheteros (suspected).

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Date	Location	Incident type	Perpetrator	Killed	Injured	Displaced
5/9/1999	Eugene, OR	Bombing	Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0*
12/25/1999	Monmouth, OR	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
12/31/1999	East Lansing, MI	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
1/3/2000	Petaluma, CA	Incendiary Attack	Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0*
1/15/2000	Petaluma, CA	Incendiary Attack	Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0*
1/22/2000	Bloomington, IN	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
5/7/2000	Olympia, WA	Arson	Revenge of the Trees	0	0	0*
7/2/2000	North Vernon, IN	Arson	Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0*
12/1/2000	Phoenix, AZ	Multiple Arsons	Individual	0	0	0*
12/9-30/00	Suffolk Ct., Long Island, NY	Multiple Arsons	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
1/2/2001	Glendale, OR	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
2/20/2001	Visalia, CA	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
3/30/2001	Eugene, OR	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
4/15/2001	Portland, OR	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
5/21/2001	Seattle, WA	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
5/21/2001	Clatskanie, OR	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
10/14/2001	Litchfield, CA	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
3/24/2002	Erie, PA	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
8/11/2002	Warren, PA	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
11/26/2002	Harborcreek, PA	Arson	⁹⁵	0	0	0*
1/1/2003	Girard, PA	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
8-9/2003	San Diego, CA	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
8/28/2003	Emeryville, CA	Bombing	Individual (suspected)	0	0	0*
9/26/2003	Pleasanton, CA	Bombing	Individual (suspected)	0	0	0*
1/19/2004	Henrico County, VA	Arson	ELF suspected	0	0	0*
4/1/2004	Oklahoma City, OK	Arson	Individual/Aryan Nations	0	0	0*
4/20/2004	Redmond, WA	Vandalism and Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
5-7/2004	Provo, UT	Vandalism and Arson	Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0*
12/27/2004	Lincoln, CA	Attempted Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
1-2/2005	Auburn, Sutter Creek, CA	Attempted Arson and Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
4/13/2005	Sammanish, WA	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*
7/7/2005	Los Angeles, CA	Attempted Arson	⁹⁶	0	0	0*
9/16/2005	Los Angeles, CA	Attempted Arson	Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0*
11/20/2005	Hagerstown, MD	Arson	Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0*

⁹⁵ Earth Liberation Front/ Animal Liberation Front.⁹⁶ Animal rights extremists (suspected).

Physical Attack on the Power Grid

A malicious actor causes physical damage to an aspect of the power grid, resulting in a loss of power in one or more metropolitan areas for three or more hours.¹

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low ²	Best ³	High ⁴
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	0 ⁵	0 ⁶	90 ⁷
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	0 ⁸	2 ⁹	400 ¹⁰
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	\$15 million	\$46 million	\$5.7 billion
Social	Displacement	Displaced from Homes \geq 2 Days	0 ¹¹	0 ¹²	0 ¹³
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	TBD	TBD	TBD
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins	<i>De Minimus</i> ¹⁴		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events ¹⁵	Number per Year	0.013 ¹⁶	1 every four years ¹⁷	1 to 3 per year ¹⁸

¹ Some studies have chosen to examine a nationwide or near-nationwide power outage in the continental United States for at least six months. However, experts differ on how realistic this scenario could be. Because of the uncertainty regarding feasibility of a nationwide power outage, the scenario included here is scoped to a significant but reasonable event.

² For the Physical Attack on the Power Grid event, low, best, and high impact estimates are correlated across impact axes because they represent three physical scenarios (such correlation should not be assumed for other SNRA events). Note that the low, best, and high estimates of likelihood are not correlated to these scenarios: they represent the low estimate, best estimate, and high estimate of the overall frequency of any scenario within the scope of the event (any of the three impact scenarios defining the SNRA's reported range and any other scenario meeting the thresholds which define the scope of the Physical Attack on the Power Grid event).

The low impact estimates assume a successful attack on the grid infrastructure that causes physical damage, but which does not result in a power outage with significant impacts. This outcome could be because the grid is able to offload power and prevent a power outage or disruption, or because there is an outage of 3 or more hours which occurs at night (critical facilities and industries are assumed to have backup power sufficient for several hours).

³ The best impact estimates assume a successful attack on the grid infrastructure that causes physical damage and a power outage to a broad metropolitan area in the continental U.S. at daytime, with the power outage lasting 3 hours. The best estimate duration is based on the lengths of the accidental outages discussed in the Event Background section. In order to estimate the impacts of an outage for the best estimate scenario, this assessment assumes the size of the population affected is 2,138,460. This population size represents the median population size for the 50 largest metropolitan urban areas as captured in the 2010 census.

⁴ The high impact estimates assume a successful attack on the grid infrastructure that causes physical damage and a power outage to a broad metropolitan area in the continental U.S., similar to the best estimate. However, the outage lasts for one day, resulting in net impacts to the Nation similar to those of the Northeast Blackout in August 2003.

⁵ Zero by assumption.

⁶ Scaled from high estimate in proportion to total person-days without power.

⁷ Injuries and fatalities from power grid failures generally result from heat stroke and respiratory ailments, which can occur when outages occur during the summer months. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to directly tie heat stroke victims to a power outage. Determining the role of heat (versus other concurrent factors) in a death can be complicated, and different jurisdictions use different criteria for considering deaths heat related. For the high estimate, the 90 deaths in New York City associated with the 2003 Northeast Blackout, as determined by Anderson et al (2012), are used. This figure is likely to be inflated because of the city's population density; however, studies of the New York City-specific impacts from 2003 blackout remain the most defensible high estimate for the scenarios articulated in the Economic Impacts section of this paper.

⁸ Zero by assumption.

⁹ Scaled to the high estimate in proportion to total person-days without power.

¹⁰ Mean estimate of excess hospitalizations for complications of respiratory illnesses in New York City for August 14-15 attributed to the loss of electric power in the 2003 Northeast Blackout (Lin et al (2011)) minus the three fatalities due to respiratory illness found (Anderson et al (2012)), on the assumption that these deaths were most likely pronounced in hospital. This epidemiological study examined hospitalizations for respiratory,

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Event Background

Utility executives and Federal energy officials have long worried that the electric grid is vulnerable to sabotage. That is in part because the grid, which is really three systems serving different areas of the U.S., [had failures impacting a large number of customers] when small problems such as trees hitting transmission lines created cascading blackouts. ... Many of the system's most important components sit out in the open, often in remote locations, protected by little more than cameras and chain-link fences.¹⁹

From 2011²⁰ to 2014,²¹ there were 322²² reported incidents of alleged or confirmed sabotage, physical attack and vandalism²³ to different parts of U.S. utilities. These cases represented about 35 percent of all incidents²⁴ reported to the U.S. Department of Energy that posed a risk to the grid. Most had little effect,²⁵ but some resulted in measureable impacts. The well-known incident at the Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) Company's Metcalf Transmission Substation outside of San Jose, California, for example, had widely reported estimates of \$15 million²⁶ in damages and the potential for more serious impacts because the PG&E Metcalf substation provides power to California's Silicon Valley.

In the U.S., there is no single interconnected national grid. Instead, the continental U.S. is served by three separate grids, which are largely not impacted by the failure or resiliency of the others. It is feasible for coordinated events to impact more than one of the grids within the U.S., but it is highly unlikely that an attack within one grid could cascade and impact the others.

cardiovascular, and renal diseases: only respiratory diseases showed statistically significant hospitalizations over prior year averages (from a subset with comparable temperature ranges) of the same days in August. Other studies have examined excess hospitalizations for severe diarrheal illnesses caused by eating spoiled meat products due to loss of refrigeration (Marx et al (2006)) and other measures of increased burdens on emergency responders and the hospital system in New York City due to the blackout (Prezant et al (2005)) but did not provide quantitative estimates which could be extracted for this summary sheet.

¹¹ SNRA project team assumption.

¹² SNRA project team assumption.

¹³ The SNRA project team could not find defensible estimates of the number of people displaced from their homes due to the August 2003 blackout, for instance to cooling centers (temperatures were elevated in New York City, Anderson et al (2012)), used as the physical model for the high impact estimates: it is likely this number is non-zero, though perhaps very small.

¹⁴ Provisional estimate by the 2015 SNRA project team by analogy with the environmental impact estimate description for the Cyber Attack against Physical Infrastructure event, elicited from EPA experts in 2011. Note that this estimate has NOT been reviewed by the original subject matter experts. See Environmental Impacts section.

¹⁵ Based on data from Department of Energy's OE-417 Filings from 2011-2014 (most complete data for which physical attacks were tracked). Data are available at www.oe.netl.doe.gov/oe417.aspx. For over 100 incidents representing 1/3 of reported physical attacks, the impacts were listed as unknown. This analysis presumes that there were no impacts from these incidents.

¹⁶ One incident in the United States FBI (1982) pp 29-30 (Thomas (1981)) in the 80 year period since 1936, chosen as the longest observation period where terror attacks causing blackouts in the United States have been a reasonable possibility. 1936 is sometimes used as a reference point for the maturation of the large-scale, integrated electric grid in the U.S.: it marked the first large scale accidental blackouts and the first appearance in popular culture of the suggestion that the electric grid could be a vulnerable target for terrorists in the Hitchcock film *Sabotage*. The first large scale deliberate blackouts occurred in the U.S. in 1939, when they were used by striking electrical workers as a tool to pressure employers: the power supply to Times Square and Broadway was shut off in 1941, and the entire city of Pittsburgh was shut down twice in 1946 by striking electrical workers including a month long blackout of the central business district. Nye (2010) pp. 2, 59-64, 70-72, 182.

¹⁷ Assumes continuing average of one event every four years that causes a confirmed *and* measurable loss of power and effect on customers. Also assumes that these types of events have the potential to cascade into a blackout.

¹⁸ Assumes continuing average of about one event with impact (defined as loss of power *or* an effect on customers) per year and that this type event holds the potential of cascading into a blackout.

¹⁹ Smith (2014a).

²⁰ The first year the Department of Energy began collecting this information via OE-417 filings.

²¹ Most recent, complete year of data available from the Department of Energy's OE-417 filings.


²² OE-417 filings are considered emergency forms. Depending on the specific circumstances, they must be filed either within one hour or six hours of the incident.

²³ Due to similar definitions and time frame for data submission by owners and operators, sabotage, physical attack and vandalism are all considered physical attacks for purposes of this analysis.

²⁴ Other incident types include weather and natural disasters, fuel supply deficiency, and operator actions.

²⁵ For over 100 incidents representing 1/3 of reported physical attacks, the impacts were listed as unknown. This analysis presumes that there were no impacts from these incidents. For many other incidents, it was reported that there was no load shedding or loss of power to customers, so these are presumed to have had little-to-no effect.

²⁶ Baker (2014).

Figure 1: Interconnections and Reliability Regions²⁷

The three separate networks are:

- The Western Interconnection, which serves those contiguous states west of the Rockies as well as their Canadian neighbors and portions of Northwestern Mexico.
- The Electric Reliability Council of Texas, which serves only the state of Texas.
- The Eastern and Quebec Interconnection which serves all states (and Canadian Provinces) east of the Rockies and south of the Great Lakes and New York. The Eastern Interconnection is actually made up of multiple interconnected but separately managed grids, allowing some cascading failures but also additional resiliencies within this large, heavily populated area.

To date, “no major power outage in the Western world has originated from an antagonistic attack, [and]... there are few publicly reported sabotage attempts (near-misses).”²⁸ However, two recent accidental causes of domestic power outages are worth noting, as they serve as examples of what malicious attacks could feasibly achieve:

- In February 2008, a small, isolated fire in a substation on the outskirts of Miami “caused a cascading regional grid collapse—including the Turkey Point nuclear power plant south of Miami—as electricity demand suddenly outstripped what was being produced. Some three million people from South Beach to Tampa to Daytona Beach lost power”²⁹ for a few hours.

²⁷ NERC (2012).

²⁸ Holmgren et al (2007).

²⁹ Padgett (2008).

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- In 2011, a human error at an Arizona substation tripped a 500 kilovolt (kV) transmission line and cut power to 1.6 million customers in Arizona and southern California. The majority of customers were located in the San Diego Gas & Electric service territory, and about four million customers were without power. Most customers were without power for just a few hours; however, about 1.4 million of those affected were without power for anywhere from 11³⁰ to 13³¹ hours.

Overall, a significant limitation to estimating risk from this threat is a lack of publicly available information on the electric grid and its resiliency. “Detailed analyses of these grids are, naturally, conducted by the network operators, but are seldom published for business and operational security reasons.”³² Generally speaking, anyone could learn about “transformer vulnerabilities from engineers and operators experienced with this technology, either domestically or abroad, since the same technology is used in power grids throughout the world.”³³ Furthermore, knowledge of transformer locations themselves is also relatively easy to gain, such as by viewing images on mapping websites or following the path of high-transmission power lines back to their source.

For the purposes of this assessment, the 2003 Northeast Blackout could be used as a starting point to estimate potential impacts, but it would be difficult to estimate³⁴ how long a blackout caused by this type of an event would last. Rather than a nationwide or near-nationwide outage, this analysis assumes the outage will affect a metropolitan area. For any blackout, the amount of time³⁵ it lasted would dictate the severity of the impacts. If a large blackout were to happen because of an adversarial attack, there is one variable that makes it difficult to know how long it would last: the unproven domestic manufacturing capacity to rapidly replace damaged transformers.³⁶ “Today, there is limited manufacturing capacity in the United States for [high-voltage] transformers. Five U.S. facilities³⁷ state that they can manufacture transformers rated 345 kV or above, although it is not clear how many units in this range they have actually produced. Canada and Mexico have five additional [high-voltage transformer] manufacturing plants.”³⁸ The estimated capacity of the five U.S. plants is about a typical year’s imports, which in 2013³⁹ was almost 500 transformers of various types. However, it is still unclear how rapidly these facilities could build and transport the high-voltage transformers necessary to rapidly fix a critical substation. It will be important to monitor demonstrated domestic manufacturing capacity, as measured by domestic plants successfully manufacturing high-voltage transformers for domestic utilization.

At the most extreme, there a nationwide failure across multiple interconnections of the U.S. power grid because of an adversarial attack could lead to a catastrophic outage across the country. One scenario could result from attackers causing the loss of power for one of the three grids through a coordinated attack on the critical substations for a specific grid: “four in the East,

³⁰ Los Angeles Times (2011a).

³¹ Los Angeles Times (2011b).

³² Holmgren (2006).

³³ Parformak (2014).

³⁴ This scenario is implied by the nationwide option, but it is not clear if a similar 18-month window would apply.

³⁵ The large-scale loss of electricity for a few days, or if localized a few weeks at most, is a common enough occurrence that American society is relatively resilient to it: people cope, or (as power is restored in localized areas) go to friends, family, or temporary shelters with power, heat or air conditioning, and water.

³⁶ Large or high-voltage transformers must be custom designed and built (U.S. Department of Energy (2014)).

³⁷ These plants are located in Alabama, Georgia, Missouri, Tennessee and Wisconsin (U.S. Department of Energy (2014), Thornton (2015)).

³⁸ Parformak (2014).

³⁹ Thornton (2015).

three in the West and two in Texas.”⁴⁰ However, there is a high degree of uncertainty around whether it would even be possible to simultaneously sabotage critical substations across the interconnections and how many substations would need to be sabotaged in order to cripple the grids, so it is only mentioned here as an area of further study.

Some scholars have created electric grid models to project and estimate potential effects, and they found that consequences were more likely to come⁴¹ from attacks executed by organized groups as opposed to opportunistic individuals. However, “trying to quantitatively evaluate the probability of such low-probability–high-consequence potential terrorist attacks is very challenging, resource-demanding, and subject to inaccuracies.”⁴² Ultimately, because of this type of uncertainty, this analysis does not make a determination as to the feasibility or probability of a successful attack causing a nationwide or near-nationwide blackout. To more clearly establish the potential risk of attacks, more complete data is needed from owners and operators regarding the impacts of incidents, identification and prioritization of critical assets, models of scenarios and outcomes, and tests of the grid’s resiliency. Without additional information, “the true vulnerability of the grid to a[n]…attack remains an open question.”⁴³ However, there is data to conclude that physical attacks on the electric grid are a documented, reoccurring risk, and they will likely continue to happen. Additionally, based on the historical evidence on accidental incidents causing outages, it remains possible for well-planned adversarial actors to cause a blackout.

Assumptions

There are two types of motivations that frame how an adversarial actor could approach an attack: causing as much damage as possible to the grid itself or causing a blackout to a large area. Attacks to the grid that cause medium-term load shedding require significant resources and “will lead to a longer-lasting system ‘pain,’ and the element replacement/repair costs might be higher.”⁴⁴ However, these impacts are largely not visible to the public. On the other hand, causing short-term cascading outages requires fewer resources and causes less damage⁴⁵ to the grid itself; however, because of automated self-protection measures built into the system itself, these types of events are more likely to cause blackouts. Because so much economic and societal activity is dependent on electricity, blackouts have the ability to cause wider damages beyond the grid itself. Plus, “the U.S. electric power grid has historically operated with such high reliability that any major disruption, either caused by weather, operational errors, or sabotage, makes news headlines.”⁴⁶

Therefore, while it is “difficult to accurately understand the objective of the terrorists”⁴⁷ or others with malicious intent, it is assumed that the intent of an adversarial attack would be to cause a blackout rather than maximize damage to the grid itself. There is also evidence of this method being a preferred approach of adversarial actors. For example, one white supremacist group posted the following in a manual on sabotage:

The power generation and distribution systems of most major Western cities are surprisingly vulnerable.... Attacking during peak consumption times (Winter in cold climates and Summer in

⁴⁰ Smith (2014b).

⁴¹ Holmgren (2006).

⁴² Wang et al (2014).

⁴³ Parformak (2014).

⁴⁴ Wang et al (2014).

⁴⁵ Sequential system protection actions are triggered and do not directly damage the facilities.

⁴⁶ Parformak (2014).

⁴⁷ Wang et al (2014).

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hot climates) will make power diversion impossible.... Arson, explosives or long-range rifle fire can be used to disable substations, transformers and suspension pylons. A simultaneous attack against a number of these targets can shut down power ... with the advantage that service cannot be quickly restored by diverting power from another source. Each broken link in the power grid must be repaired in order to fully restore service. An individual, equipped with a silenced rifle or pistol, could easily destroy dozens of power transformers in a very short period of time.⁴⁸

The magnitude (the size of the outage) and duration (length of disruption), of an outage affect the impacts of an event.⁴⁹ For the purposes of this assessment, the low, best, and high estimates, we have made the following assumptions.

- For the low estimate magnitude, the assumption is that there is a successful attack on the grid infrastructure that causes damage but that the grid is able to offload power and prevent a power outage or disruption. In the low scenario, assumptions about timing and duration are insignificant.
- However, for the high estimate scenario, this assessment assumes that the attack is successful and causes a power outage, the outage affects a metropolitan area in the continental U.S., and the outage lasts for one day, which is consistent with the outage across the Northeast in August 2003.⁵⁰
- The best estimate scenario assumes the attack is successful and causes a power outage, the outage affects a metropolitan area in the continental U.S., and the outage lasts for three hours. The best estimate duration is based on the lengths of the accidental outages discussed in the event background section. In order to estimate the impacts of an outage for the best estimate scenario, this assessment assumes the size of the population affected is 2,138,460. This population size represents the median population size for the 50 largest metropolitan urban areas as captured in the 2010 census.⁵¹

In order to inform the impact estimates, this summary sheet assesses the risk from a national perspective, average and general data is used in the economic impacts section. This allows for a general calculation to be made; however, if this risk were to be assessed for a specific locality or metropolitan area, specific factors would need to be considered:

- Industries that make up the local economy—especially those in manufacturing or information technology that can be significantly affected by even momentary lapses in power
- Mitigation measures for blackouts that have been taken by companies with significant local economic output
- Seasonal changes in weather patterns (i.e., very hot or very cold temperatures) and their potential stress on the electric grid
- Resiliency of the electric grid in that particular community

⁴⁸ Performak (2014).

⁴⁹ Although timing is important in determining the impacts, this assessment did not make assumptions about the time of year or time of day.

⁵⁰ While there is research to suggest catastrophic disruption to the grid that could leave a portion of the country without power for an extended period of time, there was not sufficient evidence at the time of this research to estimate the impacts of a catastrophic disruption and further research is warranted.

⁵¹ Census Bureau (2010). The estimate is derived from taking the mean of the top 50 metropolitan areas according to the 2010 population in the Large Metropolitan Statistical Areas—Population data set.

Health & Safety Impacts

Based on the assumptions made in this assessment about the magnitude and duration of a potential outage for the low and best estimate scenario, any health and safety impacts would most likely be limited to a few individuals and would likely be within a community's existing public health capacity to address. At the low end, the power being out for a few minutes or even a few hours, it is unlikely to cause any noticeable impact. Instead, the most pronounced impacts are likely to be caused by any power disruptions themselves.

However, there is historical evidence to suggest that health and safety impacts for a multi-day outage, as assumed in the high estimate, would be significant. The August 2003 blackout's impact in New York City (not the entire region) presents a potential scenario. In this case, "respiratory device failure (mechanical ventilators, positive pressure breathing assist devices, nebulizers, and oxygen compressors) was responsible for the greatest burden"⁵² on the city's Emergency Medical Services (EMS) system. These issues were primarily caused by heat, poor air quality and exertion from disabled mass transit systems, but they may also have been "aggravated by a fourth factor: the psychological stress of not knowing what had happened, not knowing what else might happen, not knowing how to get home, and worrying about loved ones."⁵³ Subsequent studies identified approximately 90 excess fatalities and 400 excess illnesses attributable to the blackout in New York City.^{54,55}

As noted above, the low and best estimates of fatalities and injuries/illnesses were zero by assumption. The best estimates were scaled to the high estimate, in proportion to the total population without power and outage duration. As noted above, of the physical parameters defining the best estimate across impact categories total population affected numbered totaled 2,138,460 and duration 1/8 of a day (3/24 hours). Scaled in proportion to the 90 fatalities and 400 illnesses from the high estimate event with 50,000,000 people out of power for one day (see below), this scenario results in 0.48 fatalities and 2.13 illnesses. Because the best estimate physical model is derived from a median and because of the uncertainties involved, these were rounded to the nearest integer for best estimates of 0 fatalities and 2 illnesses rather than kept as fractional numbers in the manner of other SNRA best estimates representing averages of a distribution or set.

Economic Impacts

There are several types of economic impacts that the Nation could face from an adversarial attack on one or more continental U.S. interconnections. There is the cost to the utility owners to repair damage to their electrical infrastructure (e.g. transmission lines, transformers, and substations). These costs can be significant, particularly since transformers are difficult to build and are typically customized to their exact location, which makes stockpiling supplies difficult. This assessment relies on the 2013 Metcalf incident to form the low economic damage value. In the case of the Metcalf attack, estimates of \$15 million⁵⁶ in damages were widely reported for transformers that were damaged but not in need of replacement. Had all of the 17 transformers

⁵² Prezant et al (2005).

⁵³ Lin et al (2011).

⁵⁴ Anderson et al (2012), Lin et al (2011). Excess respiratory illnesses: other illness causes, including diarrheal illness from spoiled food, did not result in detectable excess illnesses (Marx et al (2006)). Each of these studies used epidemiological methods similar to those used for counting excess fatalities due to influenza and influenza-related illnesses.

⁵⁵ Because of New York City's large population size, this figure is higher than what would intuitively be expected in smaller localities. To cite Anderson et al (2012), "among US cities, New York, NY, may be particularly vulnerable [to fatalities from power outages] because of its many high-rise buildings and substantial dependence on public transportation."

⁵⁶ Baker (2014).

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suffered damage and needed to be replaced, it could have cost as much as \$102 million, based on an approximate cost of \$6 million⁵⁷ per transformer. In the case of the Metcalf substation disruption, there were no outages, so for the purpose of this assessment \$15.11⁵⁸ million in direct economic costs forms the low estimate for economic impacts.

In addition to the physical damage to infrastructure, a successful outage (as is assumed in the best and high estimate scenarios) would cause additional direct economic loss. For the best estimate, which assumes that a U.S. metropolitan city of 2,138,460 experiences a three-hour outage, this assessment uses the benefit-cost analysis (BCA) methodology developed by FEMA in 2011. According to the BCA methodology, electricity disruption⁵⁹ on economic activity would cost \$114.39 per capita per day in direct economic costs.⁶⁰ Since the analysis assumes the outage is three hours, the economic cost per three hours in 2015 terms is \$14.30 per capita. By multiplying it across the population, the best estimate for direct economic impact is \$30.58 million for the cost of the outage itself, or \$46 million for total direct economic impact including the \$15.11 million cost of damaged infrastructure.

For the high estimate, this assessment again uses the BCA guidance from FEMA. Based on historical evidence from the Northeast Blackout, the high estimate assumes there will be 50 million people affected for one day and using the direct impact on the economy of \$114.39 per capita per day (in 2015 terms) from FEMA's BCA, the outage would cost \$5.72 billion in direct economic loss.⁶¹

Due to the limitations of available research, there are other variables that would affect economic impacts that were not included in the scenario development—namely the fragility of businesses, mitigation steps that has already been taken, and the timing of the event. These variables warrant further discussion and study, but it is worth noting that some businesses are more fragile than others with regards to a power outage. Some sectors⁶² are particularly vulnerable to even momentary lapses in power. One researcher notes “even a one-second outage can damage equipment and disrupt highly sensitive operations to the point where labor becomes idled as systems are reset and brought back online.”⁶³ Nationally, these types of highly electricity-dependent companies “account for approximately 40 percent⁶⁴ of U.S. gross domestic product

⁵⁷ According to (U.S. Department of Energy (2014)), a large power transformer is estimated to cost \$2 to \$7.5 million plus expenses for transportation and installation, which can cost 25 to 30 percent more. A simplified figure of \$6 million per transformer is used based on the midpoint of the range of cost plus an additional midpoint percentage increase to reflect transportation and installation expenses.

⁵⁸ This figure is adjusted for inflation in 2015 terms.

⁵⁹ FEMA (2011). FEMA's BCA methodology is as follows: 1. Estimate the physical damages to the electric power system in dollars, 2. Estimate the functional downtime (system days of lost service), 3. Obtain the number of people served by the electric power utility, and 4. Calculate the economic impacts of lost electric power service, using the per capita economic impacts and the affected population.

⁶⁰ FEMA (2011). Using 2010 numbers, FEMA determined that the direct economic cost of an electricity disruption is \$106.27 per capita per day. \$114.39 reflects this value adjusted for inflation in 2015 terms.

⁶¹ It is worth noting that by using the FEMA BCA methodology on the Northeast Blackout, the direct economic costs in 2003 would equate to \$4.48 billion. However, other methodologies can be used to determine the economic cost, but these figures take into account some indirect as well as direct costs. Using a proportional relationship between electricity consumption and national GDP, one calculation of the impacts of the 2003 Blackout showed that “50 million people were without electric power for a day, and so it estimated to have cost \$5.6 billion, which is within the range of [other, more complex] estimates that have been published.” (Zimmerman (2005)).

⁶² Continuous manufacturers and digital/IT companies would be examples.

⁶³ Lineweber et al (2001).

⁶⁴ The specific industries and their Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes came from Lineweber et al (2001) and are as follows: Apparel and other Finished Products Made from Fabrics and Similar Materials - 23; Biological Research - 873101; Chemical & Allied Products - 28 (Does not include 2836); Chemical Manufacturing - Biological products, except Diagnostic - 2836; Communications - 48; Computer And Office Equipment - 357; Custom Computer Programming Services - 7371; Data Processing and Preparation - 7374; Depository Institutions - 60; Electronic And Other Electrical Equipment And Components, Except Computer Equipment - 36; Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transportation - 34; Food and Kindred Products - 20; Furniture and Fixtures - 25; Gas and Sanitary Services - 49 (does not include 4911 or 4931); Holding And Other Investments Offices - 67; Hospitals - 806; Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment - 35 (Does not include 357); Information Retrieval Services - 7375; Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service - 64; Insurance Carriers - 63; Leather and Leather Products - 31; Local and Suburban Transit And Interurban Highway Passenger Transportation - 41; Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture ; Measuring, Analyzing, And Controlling Instruments; Photographic, Medical And Optical Goods; Watches And Clocks - 38; Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries - 39;

(GDP)⁶⁵ even though they represent less than 20 percent of all U.S. business establishments. In order to evaluate the vulnerability of businesses to a blackout, it is important to understand how companies have mitigated their vulnerability to blackouts. Some companies have installed backup generators to prevent lapses in power, while other businesses and economic activities are naturally more resilient⁶⁶ to lapses in power. For example, an analysis⁶⁷ based on self-reported estimates from businesses estimated that three-quarters of companies would experience no costs from a one-second outage, half of all businesses would not suffer measurable costs from a three-minute outage, and a quarter would not experience real costs from a one-hour outage. Additional research would need to be done to determine how widespread these mitigation actions may be on a national level and how instantaneously they can provide replacement electricity.

The direct costs associated with a loss of power are also impacted by the time of year when the blackout happens. For example, some costs, such as food spoilage and transportation, are dependent on season/weather and time of day. Residential costs—such as the purchase of wood for home heating, alternative light sources, food spoilage, or damage to electrical equipment—are “a fraction of those incurred by end-users in the other sectors”⁶⁸ and largely dependent on the timing⁶⁹ of a blackout.

Although rigorous study on the indirect costs of an outage was not fully analyzed within this assessment, research has been done to look at the indirect costs of an outage. Researchers noted “there are several types of indirect costs (e.g., accidental injuries, looting, vandalism, legal costs, loss of water supply, insurance rate increases) with monetary impacts that, in some cases, may exceed direct costs. In fact, an analysis of the interruption costs incurred as a result of the 1977 New York City blackout estimated that the indirect costs of the blackout exceeded direct costs by a margin of 5 to 1.”⁷⁰ While this has the potential to significantly increase the economic impacts of an intentional disruption to the electrical grid, additional research is required to determine the impacts of indirect costs.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

Unlike the Space Weather event, the physical scenarios used as the basis of the impact estimates for the Physical Attack on the Power Grid event included only comparatively short-term outages. Additionally, the SNRA project team was not able to find records of people who were displaced from their homes from two or more days due to the 2003 East Coast Blackout, the historical event used to model the high impact estimates.⁷¹ For these reasons, the SNRA project team made

Noncommercial Biological Research - 873301; Non-Depository Credit Institutions - 61; Nursing And Personal Care Facilities - 805; Paper & Allied Products - 26; Petroleum & Coal Products - 29; Pipelines, Except Natural Gas - 46; Primary Metals Industries - 33; Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries - 27; Railroad Transportation - 40; Real Estate - 65; Rubber & Misc. Plastics Products - 30; Security And Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, and Services - 62; Stone, Clay & Glass Products - 32; Systems Integration Services - 7373; Textile Mill Products - 22; Tobacco Products - 21; Transportation By Air - 45; Transportation Equipment - 37; United States Postal Service - 43; Water Transportation - 44.

⁶⁵ Lineweber et al (2001).

⁶⁶ For example, workers who use laptops with built-in batteries.

⁶⁷ Lineweber et al (2001).

⁶⁸ Balducci et al (2003).

⁶⁹ To think if it in practical terms, losing power for a few hours in the middle of the night could easily be unnoticed by those who are asleep at the time.

⁷⁰ Balducci et al (2003).

⁷¹ Hospitalizations are not included in the social displacement metric of the SNRA, as this would result in double counting with the Injuries/Illnesses metric.

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the assumption that the number of persons displaced from their homes would be zero for all three of the low, best, and high estimates.

Psychological Impacts

The SNRA metric of psychological distress includes a scaling factor for each event, which was elicited from subject matter experts in 2011 for the first iteration of the SNRA. Although these factors have a strong regularity across the accidental and natural hazards which enabled the provisional determination of factors for many of the new hazard events in the 2015 SNRA, this is not true of the adversarial events. For this reason, the 2015 SNRA does not report psychological distress estimates for the Physical Attack on the Power Grid event.

Environmental Impacts

The environmental impact estimate, which was assessed for the 23 original national-level events of the 2011 SNRA by subject matter experts from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), could not be assessed for the Physical Attack on the Power Grid threat event which was added to the SNRA in calendar year 2015.

To support the comparative analysis of the SNRA, the SNRA 2015 project team made a provisional assignment of environmental impact on the same scale as the 2011 events based upon the closely analogous Cyber Attack against Physical Infrastructure national-level event, which was assessed by the EPA experts in 2011.

For a power outage caused by a malevolent actor attacking the grid (with cyber as opposed to physical means), the 2011 experts identified the best estimate of environmental impact as *De Minimus* or none.

- Experts indicated, however, that this depends on the duration of the event. If the impacts of a power outage event occur for longer than a few days, then backup systems for sewage plants, chemical facilities, and other infrastructure could fail and result in more severe environmental impacts. The experts provided a Second Best estimate of Low for the environmental impacts of such a longer duration scenario.

The SNRA project team assigned a provisional Best estimate of *De Minimus* and a provisional Second Best estimate of Low for the environmental impacts of the Physical Attack on the Power Grid threat event. It must be stressed that this assignment has not been reviewed by the 2011 subject matter experts or by the EPA.

A future iteration of the SNRA will assess the environmental impacts of this event directly.

Potential Mitigating Factors

In March 2014, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)⁷² determined that physical attacks “could adversely impact the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System,⁷³ resulting in instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures.”⁷⁴ FERC’s intent is to require owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System to improve their resiliency from physical attacks by doing the following:

⁷² FERC is an independent agency within the U.S. Department of Energy, and it regulates the interstate transmission of electricity, natural gas and oil. Its responsibilities include protecting the reliability of the high voltage interstate transmission system through mandatory reliability standards and enforcing its requirements through imposition of civil penalties and other means.

⁷³ The Bulk-Power System and electric grid are synonyms for practical purposes.

⁷⁴ FERC Docket No. RM14-15-000; Order No. 802.

- Identify which of their facilities are the most critical to the bulk-power system
- Assess those facilities' risk to physical attacks
- Have those assessments be verified by an appropriate third-party
- Develop and implement a security plan based on those risks

The existence of reliability standards themselves may not be enough to mitigate risk if they are not properly followed and enforced.

At this time, the rule-making process has not yet been completed, and it will still take additional time to be fully implemented. In the meantime, another key form of mitigation is already taken place: voluntary actions by the industry. For example, California-based PG&E announced plans to spend \$100 million⁷⁵ to improve the security of its critical facilities, and a subsequent robbery⁷⁶ at the Metcalf substation in the months following the attack further reinforced the need for these improvements. In the short-term, voluntary risk reduction methods will be a key mitigation strategy.

In addition, government-led research and development holds potential for mid-term mitigation strategies. For example, in partnership with the utility industry and the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) developed a prototype extra high-voltage transformer. Called the Recovery Transformer (RecX) project,⁷⁷ this prototype drastically reduced the amount of time needed to repair an extra high voltage transformer in an emergency—from several months to less than one week. Working with its industry partners, S&T successfully demonstrated the RecX prototype for one year, and the pilot ended in March 2013. A final report is currently in development.

To specifically mitigate health and safety impacts, local communities could identify their most critical systems and vulnerable populations, and steps could then be taken to ensure adequate measures are in place in the event of a power outage. For example, backup power systems could be “mandated, not only for acute care facilities, but also for community-based patients dependent on electrically powered lifesaving devices.”⁷⁸ This would greatly minimize the impact of shorter-term power outages on public health capacity during emergencies.

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⁷⁵ Baker (2014).

⁷⁶ Smith (2014c).

⁷⁷ DHS Science & Technology Directorate (2014).

⁷⁸ Prezant et al (2005).

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Physical Attack on the Power Grid

Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)

A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and releases a biological agent against an outdoor, indoor, or water target directed at a concentration of people within the U.S.

Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	See classified data sheet		
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	See classified data sheet		
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	See classified data sheet		
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0	1,800	N/A
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See classified data sheet		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ¹	Low ²		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	See classified data sheet		

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Event Background

The SNRA considered the risk from a non-food biological attack in which a hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and releases a biological agent against an outdoor, indoor, or water target with a concentration of people within the United States. Frequency estimates for this event only include data for successful attacks (e.g., detonation of a device or release of an agent). Examples of failed attacks not included in the SNRA include interdiction during the fabrication and assembly of the dissemination device, interdiction during travel to the United States, or failure of the dissemination device.

Biological agents can be isolated from sources in nature, acquired from laboratories or a state bioweapons stockpile, or synthesized or genetically manipulated in a laboratory. Potential dissemination mechanisms of a biological agent by terrorists include aerosol dissemination from sprayers or other devices outdoors or through the ventilation system of a building, subway, or airplane, human carriers, insects or other animal vectors, or physical distribution through the U.S. Mail or other means. Biological agents include transmissible agents that spread from person

¹ In 2011, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories. Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'best' estimate.

² Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'Best' estimate.

Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)

to person (e.g. smallpox, Ebola) or agents that may cause adverse effects in exposed individuals but which do not make these individuals contagious (e.g. anthrax, botulinum toxin).³

Unlike a nuclear or chemical attack, a biological attack may go undetected for hours, days, or potentially weeks (depending on the agent) until humans, animals, or plants show symptoms of disease. If there are no immediate signs of the attack as with the anthrax letters, a biological attack will probably first be detected by local health care workers observing a pattern of unusual illness, or by early warning systems that detect airborne pathogens. There may be uncertainties about crucial facts such as the exact location or extent of the initial release, the type of biological agent used, and likelihood of additional releases. The exact infectious dose (the number of organisms needed to make one sick, referred to as dose response) and the long-term health consequences for those who survive exposure are key scientific knowledge gaps for many biological agents: while approximate ranges and prognoses for humans have been extrapolated from animal studies, they comprise additional uncertainties which may complicate the public health response to a biological attack.⁴

This National-Level Event focuses on non-food biological attacks. Note that the risks of intentional biological food contamination are considered in a separate National-Level Event in the SNRA and should not be considered for this event.

Assumptions

The SNRA leveraged classified data from the DHS/S&T 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA)⁵ for quantitative frequency, fatality, illness/injury, and economic loss estimates for the biological (non-food) terrorism attack event. The data relies heavily on the Intelligence Community (IC) and other technical experts to develop scenarios and estimate the likelihoods of those scenarios for analysis. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) extracted ITRA data for biological attacks on targets other than food and agriculture targets for the SNRA project to correspond to the scope of the SNRA biological (non-food) terrorism attack event.

SNRA analysis for this national-level event adopted the definition of a terrorist attack from the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which is any activity that:

- Involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources;
- Involves an act that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State or other subdivision of the United States;
- Appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
- Appears to be intended to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
- Appears to be intended to affect the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

³ National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004). Biological attack: human pathogens, biotoxins, and agricultural threats. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/biological-attack-fact-sheet> via <http://www.ready.gov>.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ DHS Directorate of Science & Technology (2011), Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (reference is SECRET//NOFORN).

In addition to this general definition, SNRA analysis considered the following categories of actors:

- International Terrorist Organizations: Terrorist organizations that operate both inside and outside of the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., al-Qaeda);
- State-Sponsored Terrorist Organizations: Terrorist organizations that operate inside and/or outside of the U.S. that are sponsored by a nation; sponsorship is defined as the provision of technical assistance, equipment, or chemical by a state program (e.g., Hezbollah);
- Domestic Terrorist Organizations: Terrorist organizations that operate only within the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., Animal Liberation Front and Rajneesh);
- Small Groups/Individuals Terrorist Organizations: Small groups (i.e., 2 to 3 members) or individuals that operate only within the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., the Unabomber and Timothy McVeigh).

Biological agents can be classified into different categories and disseminated in different modes (e.g., wet or dry aerosol). The SNRA considers the following categories of biological agents:

- Traditional Biological Agents: Includes bacterial, viral, toxin, and prion agents; these agents are most often considered in biological agent assessments;
- Enhanced Biological Agents: Refers to traditional agents that have been modified to increase the hazard associated with the agent, such as bacterial agents enhanced to be antibiotic resistant;
- Emerging Biological Agents: Includes organisms that were not previously considered significantly pathogenic but are currently recognized for that potential. The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is an example of such an agent.⁶

Frequency estimates for this National-level Event only include data for successful attacks, e.g., detonation of a device or release of an agent. Failed attacks are not considered during this assessment process. Examples of failed attacks include interdiction during the fabrication and assembly of the dissemination device, interdiction during travel to United States, or failure of the dissemination device.

The SNRA project team used the definitions of direct, indirect, and induced economic costs given in Table 1 for economic loss estimates of this national-level event.

Table 1. Definitions for Direct, Indirect, and Induced Costs

Direct Costs include:

- **Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction:** DDP costs covered the repair, replacement and environmental clean-up which are considered expenditures by the government. It was assumed the government would recoup this spending through tax increases, causing a reduction of household spending of that same amount. However, this spending would be received as income by some sectors, such as waste management

⁶ Bush, George W. (2001, January 31). Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-18 – Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction: at <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-18.html>. HSPD-18, the mandate for the Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA 2011) which the Biological Attack (non-food) national-level event leverages for its frequency, fatality, illness, and economic impact data, defined the traditional/enhanced/emerging/advanced agent classification used in characterizing biological terrorism agents.

Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)

and environmental consulting services. The increase in spending into the waste management and environmental consulting services is treated as increase in annual output for these sectors.

- **Business Interruption:** Business interruption impacts considered losses due to decreased output at the target area, along with other increases and decreases to related sectors due to behavioral changes resulting from the event.
- **Loss in Spending from Fatalities:** This SNRA project team estimated a loss of spending of \$42,500 for each fatality. In addition, \$6,000 is included in increased output for mortuary services for each fatality.
- **Medical Costs:** Costs of medical mitigation were considered to be borne through private spending and insurance companies, while the hospital sector received an offsetting increase in output.

Indirect Costs include:

- Costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the industries impacted by the direct costs above.

Induced Costs include:

- The induced costs are those incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries. Induced costs can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- Low and best estimates of social displacement for the Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food) national-level event were provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).⁷
- The low estimate of 0 reflects assessed judgment of START subject matter experts. The best estimate of 1,800 represents the number of people evacuated in a historical outbreak of tuberculosis in East Timor in 1999, used as a proxy estimate for a small-scale but deliberate dissemination of a contagious agent.⁸
- A high estimate for social displacement was not determined for this event.

⁷ START is a Department of Homeland Security University Center of Excellence that focuses on social and behavioral aspects of terrorism, natural disasters, and technological accidents, and the social, behavioral, cultural and economic factors influencing responses to and recovery from catastrophes.

⁸ (Source: Connolly, Maire, 1999. "Communicable Disease Surveillance and Control in East Timor." World Health Organization.) Subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA noted that this estimate is arbitrary given the large range of potential biological attack scenarios; the high estimate could be significantly higher than the best estimate provided if there is a need to decontaminate a large area.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.⁹ The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹⁰ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “Low.” The environmental impact will vary on agent or persistence, but the highest potential would be an increase in animal disease. However, this potential is low given the focus on human diseases. Additionally, the disposal of contaminated waste could result in a higher risk for environmental impacts.

Potential Mitigating Factors

Viable human-health surveillance techniques, to include DHS Bio-Watch detection systems where available, should be employed in order to minimize the time window between attack and start of treatment. Emergency notification systems should be operational, with special care taken

⁹ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human consequence metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological consequences. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food) was given a C_{EF} of 1.3.

The numerical psychological distress estimates for this event and the complete semi-quantitative risk matrix may be found in Appendix G and the Findings sections, respectively, of the classified SNRA Technical Report.

¹⁰ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)

to provide the most accurate and current information to hospitals that they may take steps to mitigate surge capacity problems and diagnose patients effectively. The appropriate Prevention/Deterrence, Preparedness, Emergency Assessment/Diagnosis, Emergency Management/Response, Hazard Mitigation, Evacuation/Shelter, Victim Care, Investigation/Apprehension and Recovery/Mediation mission areas should be activated to ensure a comprehensive, integrated response and minimize the impact of an attack.

Weather can have an ameliorating effect on biological agents as humidity, wind currents and ultraviolet radiation may decrease their potency. Therefore, agents are often most harmful when released in enclosed spaces.

Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)

A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and releases a chemical agent against an outdoor, indoor, or water target directed at a concentration of people, using an aerosol, ingestion, or dermal route of exposure.

Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	See classified data sheet		
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	See classified data sheet		
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	See classified data sheet		
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0	100,000	700,000
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See classified data sheet		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ¹	Moderate ²		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	See classified data sheet		

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Event Background

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) define a chemical attack as follows:³

A chemical attack is the spreading of chemicals with the intent to do harm. The Chemical Weapons Convention defines a chemical weapon as “any toxic chemical or its precursor that can cause death, injury, temporary incapacitation, or sensory irritation through its chemical action.” A variety of chemicals could be used in an attack, to include toxic commercial and industrial chemicals and warfare agents developed for military use. The chemical could be used in various forms or states—such as gas, liquid, or solid. The toxicity of chemicals varies greatly; some are acutely toxic (causing immediate symptoms) in small doses, others are not toxic at all. Chemicals in liquid or vapor form generally create greater exposure than chemicals in solid form.

Chemical agents can be disseminated in various modes. Potential delivery mechanisms of a chemical agent by terrorists include building ventilation systems, misting or aerosolizing devices, passive release (container of chemical left open), explosives, improvised devices

¹ In 2011, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental consequences for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories. Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘best’ estimate.

² Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘best’ estimate.

³ “Potential Terrorist Attack Methods: Joint Special Assessment”, DHS & FBI, 23 April 2008, p. 15 (Reference is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY: Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED).

Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)

combining readily available chemicals to produce a dangerous chemical, or sabotage of industrial facilities or vehicles containing chemicals.⁴

This National-level Event focuses on non-food chemical attacks. Note that the risks of intentional chemical food contamination are considered in a separate National-level Event in the SNRA and should not be considered for this event.

Assumptions

The SNRA leveraged classified data from the DHS/S&T 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA)⁵ for quantitative frequency, fatality, illness/injury, and economic loss estimates for the chemical (non-food) terrorism attack event. The data relies heavily on the Intelligence Community (IC) and other technical experts to develop scenarios and estimate the likelihoods of those scenarios for analysis. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) extracted ITRA data for chemical attacks on non-food targets for the SNRA project, separate from attacks on food and beverage⁶ targets, to correspond to the event structure of the SNRA.

The SNRA leveraged data for the classified risk summary sheet that assumed terrorist attack to include the following:

- Involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources.
- Involves an act that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State or other subdivision of the United States.
- Appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.
- Appears to be intended to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.
- Appears to be intended to affect the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

The SNRA only includes data for successful attacks for this national-level event (e.g., detonation of a device or release of an agent). Failed attacks (e.g., interdiction during the fabrication and assembly of the dissemination device, interdiction during travel to United States, or failure of the dissemination device) are not considered during this assessment process.

The analysis used broad definitions of organizations that may initiate or represent potential chemical terrorism threats to the U.S., the categories of chemical agents that could be used for an attack, and the targets that may be selected for a chemical attack. The adopted criteria for general categories representing chemical terrorist threats to the U.S. are as follows:

- The International Terrorist Organization category is composed of terrorist organizations that operate both inside and outside of the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., al-Qaeda).
- The State-Sponsored Terrorist Organization category is composed of terrorist organizations that operate inside and/or outside of the U.S. that are sponsored by a nation. Sponsorship is

⁴ National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004). Chemical attack: warfare agents, industrial chemicals, and toxins. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/chemical-attack-fact-sheet> via <http://www.ready.gov>.

⁵ DHS Directorate of Science & Technology (2011), Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (reference is SECRET//NOFORN).

⁶ Water systems such as city and building water supplies are included in the non-food event; attacks using bottled water as a vector are included in the chemical-biological food contamination event.

defined as the provision of technical assistance, equipment, or chemical by a state program (e.g., Hezbollah).

- The Domestic Terrorist Organization category is composed of terrorist organizations that operate only within the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., Animal Liberation Front and Rajneesh).
- The Small Groups/Individuals Terrorist Organization category is composed of small groups (i.e., 2 to 3 members) or individuals that operate only within the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., the Unabomber and Timothy McVeigh).

Chemical agents can be acquired from a variety of different sources and disseminated in various modes. The analysis uses data that classifies chemical agents into the following categories:

- Toxic Industrial Materials (TIMs) and Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs): Includes toxic substances in solid, liquid, or gaseous form that are used or stored for use for military or commercial purposes. Chlorine is an example of this type of agent.
- Traditional Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs): Encompasses the range of blood, blister, choking, nerve, and psychotropic agents historically developed for military use. Examples include: sulfur mustard, VX, and sarin.⁷

The SNRA project team used the definitions of direct, indirect, and induced economic costs given in Table 1 to estimate the economic losses for this national-level event.

Table 1. Definitions for Direct, Indirect, and Induced Costs

Direct Costs include:

- **Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction:** DDP costs covered the repair, replacement and environmental clean-up which are considered expenditures by the government. It was assumed the government would recoup this spending through tax increases, causing a reduction of household spending of that same amount. However, this spending would be received as income by some sectors, such as waste management and environmental consulting services. The increase in spending into the waste management and environmental consulting services is treated as increase in annual output for these sectors.
- **Business Interruption:** Business interruption impacts considered losses due to decreased output at the target area, along with other increases and decreases to related sectors due to behavioral changes resulting from the event.
- **Loss in Spending from Fatalities:** This SNRA project team estimated a loss of spending of \$42,500 for each fatality. In addition, \$6,000 is included in increased output for mortuary services for each fatality.
- **Medical Costs:** Costs of medical mitigation were considered to be borne through private spending and insurance companies, while the hospital sector received an offsetting increase in output.

⁷ National Academies, DHS (2004), Chemical attack fact sheet, *op. cit.*

Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)**Indirect Costs include:**

- Costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the industries impacted by the direct costs above.

Induced Costs include:

- The induced costs are those incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries. Induced costs can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- Social displacement estimates for the Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food) national-level event were provided by staff researchers and subject matter experts at the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).⁸
- The low estimate of 0 reflects assessed judgment of START subject matter experts. The best and high estimates of 100,000 and 700,000 respectively represent estimated evacuation and dispersal numbers in two modeled chemical attack scenarios in the literature: an attack with a blister agent aimed at a large gathering such as a football game (best), and a terrorist attack against a petroleum plant using explosives to cause a catastrophic release of toxic industrial chemicals (high).⁹

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.¹⁰ The numerical outputs of this index

⁸ START is a Department of Homeland Security University Center of Excellence that focuses on social and behavioral aspects of terrorism, natural disasters, and technological accidents, and the social, behavioral, cultural and economic factors influencing responses to and recovery from catastrophes.

⁹ Bea, Keith. 2005. "National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress." CRS Report for Congress. March 10, 2005.

¹⁰ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human consequence metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological consequences. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for

formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹¹ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- The environmental assessment included effects resulting from terrorism threats, but did not include human health effects or effects in urban areas because these effects are already reflected in other impact measures.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “Moderate.” Experts indicated that the impacts will most likely be localized as effects will require direct exposure to the chemical. Aquatic runoff could disseminate certain chemicals and increase the impact on the environment. Defining variables that will determine whether or not the impacts are increased or decreased include toxicity, spread, and the persistence of the chemical agent used in the attack.

Potential Mitigating Factors

Hazardous Material (HazMat) Teams should be prepared to quickly dispatch to the target site and detect/identify the chemical agent deployed in the attack. This will determine the response steps necessary to mitigate consequences from a particular chemical agent. The hazard should be isolated and cordoned in order to prevent spreading the agent by fleeing victims. Additionally, the evacuation effort should include populations downwind from the explosion (chemical agent dependent) and emphasize at-risk or special populations in order to enhance mitigation efforts. Planners should note the importance of effective communication during the response effort to inform the public about evacuation routes, contaminated areas, and potential victims who may have experienced exposure to the chemical agent.

unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food) was given a C_{EF} of 1.3.

The numerical psychological distress estimates for this event and the complete semi-quantitative risk matrix may be found in Appendix G and the Findings sections, respectively, of the classified SNRA Technical Report.

¹¹ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)

Additional Relevant Information

The severity of an attack is related to the toxicity of the chemical and its concentration when it reaches people. Many variables affect the concentration of a chemical, including the volatility of the chemical and environmental conditions.

The release of toxic chemicals in closed spaces, such as subways, airports, and financial centers, could deliver doses high enough to injure or kill a large number of people. A volatile chemical will disperse to fill the space. The smaller the space, the greater the concentration of the chemical.

In an open area, a toxic chemical cloud (plume) would become less concentrated as it spreads and would have to be released in large quantities to produce many casualties. The area affected would depend upon such factors as the type and amount of chemical agent, the means of dispersal, the local topography, and the local weather conditions. A toxic cloud would spread roughly with the speed and direction of the wind. For a highly toxic chemical, lethal or immediately life-threatening results could be seen close to the release point of the agent where its concentration is highest. However, the concentration of the chemical, and consequently its human health risk, would be greatly diminished at distances far from the source.¹²

¹² National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004), op. cit.

Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack

A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and disperses a biological or chemical agent into food supplies within the U.S. supply chain.

Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	See classified data sheet		
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	See classified data sheet		
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	See classified data sheet		
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0	N/A	N/A
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See classified data sheet		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ¹	Low ²		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	See classified data sheet		

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Event Background

The SNRA considered biological and chemical attacks on the food supply chain in this event.

A terrorist attack on the Nation's food supply chain using chemical or biological agents may initially be indistinguishable from an unintentional food contamination. Depending on the type of agent used in the attack, it could take several days for individuals to show symptoms and possibly weeks before public health, food, and medical authorities suspect terrorism as the source.³ In 1984 members of the Rajneeshees, a religious community in an accelerating political dispute with the Oregon county where they had established their commune, deliberately contaminated salad bars at eight county restaurants with *Salmonella* bacteria, infecting or sickening 751 people and hospitalizing 45.⁴ However, deliberate contamination was not

¹ In 2011, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental consequences for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimus (none) categories. Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'best' estimate.

² Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'best' estimate.

³ Federal Emergency Management Agency (August 2008), Food and Agricultural Incident Annex, p. 2, at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf_FoodAgricultureIncidentAnnex.pdf (retrieved January 2015).

⁴ This was to test a plan to poison the county water supply on Election Day, to suppress voter turnout and enable the group to take over the county board by electing their own candidates. Török et al (1997, August 6). A large community outbreak of Salmonellosis caused by intentional contamination of restaurant salad bars. *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)* 278(5) 389-395; at http://www.cdc.gov/php/docs/forensic_epidemiology/Additional%20Materials/Articles/Torok%20et%20al.pdf (retrieved May 2014). Although unsuccessful in identifying deliberate action as the cause of the poisoning, CDC and FBI investigations following the incident may have deterred the group from carrying out their planned Election Day attack in November. Sobel et al (2002, March 9). Threat of a biological attack on the US food supply: the CDC perspective. *Lancet* 359(9309) 874-880.

Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack

identified until a year later, when the commune collapsed and criminal investigations into its other activities uncovered its clandestine biological laboratories.^{5,6}

Chemical and biological weapons differ in potential toxicity, specificity, speed of action, duration of effect, controllability, and residual effects. Children, the elderly, pregnant women, and immune-compromised individuals are particularly susceptible to the adverse effects of a chemical/biological food contamination.^{7,8}

This National-level Event focuses on chemical and biological attacks targeting food supplies within the U.S. supply chain. Note that the risks of chemical and biological attacks aimed at non-food targets are considered in separate National-level Events in the SNRA and should not be considered for this event.

Assumptions

The SNRA leveraged classified data from the DHS/S&T 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA)⁹ for quantitative frequency, fatality, illness/injury, and economic loss estimates for the chemical/biological food contamination terrorism attack event. The data relies heavily on the Intelligence Community (IC) and other technical experts to develop scenarios and estimate the likelihoods of those scenarios for analysis. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) extracted ITRA data for chemical and biological attacks on food and beverage targets to permit analysis of chemical-biological food attacks as a national-level event in the SNRA distinct from attacks on non-food targets.

The SNRA leveraged data for the classified risk summary sheet that assumed terrorist attack to include the following:

- Involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources;
- Involves an act that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State or other subdivision of the United States;
- Appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
- Appears to be intended to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
- Appears to be intended to affect the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

The SNRA only includes data for successful attacks for this national-level event, e.g., detonation of a device or release of an agent. Failed attacks are not considered during this analysis (e.g., interdiction during the fabrication and assembly of the dissemination device, interdiction during travel to United States, or failure of the dissemination device).

⁵ Török et al, *op cit.*

⁶ Carus, W. Seth (2001, February). Bioterrorism and biocrimes: the illicit use of biological agents since 1900. Pages 50-58. National Defense University; at http://www.ndu.edu/centercounter/full_doc.pdf (retrieved March 2013). Agents experimented with included *Salmonella typhimurium*, the variant which was used in the salad bar attacks, *Salmonella typhi* which causes hepatitis and typhoid fever, *Giardia*, HIV, and multiple chemical and pharmaceutical poisons. *Giardia lamblia* was to be introduced into the county water supply via dead rats and beavers, which carry the parasite (p. 54).

⁷ United Nations (1970). Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use, p. 12. Report of the Secretary-General, UN Publication no. E.69.I.24. Reprinted by Ballantine Books, 1970.

⁸ FEMA (2008), *op. cit.*

⁹ DHS Directorate of Science & Technology (2011), Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (reference is SECRET//NOFORN).

The analysis used broad definitions of organizations that may initiate or represent potential chemical or biological terrorism threats to the U.S. supply chain, the categories of chemical agents that could be used for an attack, and the targets that may be selected for a chemical attack. The adopted criteria for general categories representing chemical/biological food terrorist threats to the U.S. are as follows:

- The International Terrorist Organization category is composed of terrorist organizations that operate both inside and outside of the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., al-Qaeda).
- The State-Sponsored Terrorist Organization category is composed of terrorist organizations that operate inside and/or outside of the U.S. that are sponsored by a nation. Sponsorship is defined as the provision of technical assistance, equipment, or chemical by a state program (e.g., Hezbollah).
- The Domestic Terrorist Organization category is composed of terrorist organizations that operate only within the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., Animal Liberation Front and Rajneesh).
- The Small Groups/Individuals Terrorist Organization category is composed of small groups (i.e., 2 to 3 members) or individuals that operate only within the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., the Unabomber and Timothy McVeigh).

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions identified in Table 1 to estimate the economic losses for this national-level event.

Table 1. Definitions for Direct, Indirect, and Induced Costs

Direct Costs include:

- **Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction:** DDP costs covered the repair, replacement and environmental clean-up which are considered expenditures by the government. It was assumed the government would recoup this spending through tax increases, causing a reduction of household spending of that same amount. However, this spending would be received as income by some sectors, such as waste management and environmental consulting services. The increase in spending into the waste management and environmental consulting services is treated as increase in annual output for these sectors.
- **Business Interruption:** Business interruption impacts considered losses due to decreased output at the target area, along with other increases and decreases to related sectors due to behavioral changes resulting from the event.
- **Loss in Spending from Fatalities:** This SNRA project team estimated a loss of spending of \$42,500 for each fatality. In addition, \$6,000 is included in increased output for mortuary services for each fatality.
- **Medical Costs:** Costs of medical mitigation were considered to be borne through private spending and insurance companies, while the hospital sector received an offsetting increase in output.

Indirect Costs include:

- Costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the

Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack

industries impacted by the direct costs above.

Induced Costs include:

- The induced costs are those incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries. Induced costs can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- Subject matter experts from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START)¹⁰ judged that although a terrorist chemical or biological attack against the food chain could sicken or kill many people, it was unlikely to force people to evacuate or leave their homes. Note that deaths and unplanned hospital stays are not considered social displacement for the purposes of the SNRA.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.¹¹ The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

¹⁰ START is a Department of Homeland Security University Center of Excellence that focuses on social and behavioral aspects of terrorism, natural disasters, and technological accidents, and the social, behavioral, cultural and economic factors influencing responses to and recovery from catastrophes.

¹¹ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, *Fat* is the number of fatalities, *Inj* is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and *D* is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack was given a C_{EF} of 1.3.

The numerical psychological distress estimates for this event and the complete semi-quantitative risk matrix may be found in Appendix G and the Findings sections, respectively, of the classified SNRA Technical Report.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹² as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- The environmental assessment included effects resulting from terrorism threats, but did not include human health effects or effects in urban areas because these effects are already reflected in other impact measures.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “low.” Experts indicated that this hazard is directed towards humans leading the environmental impacts to be minimal. If the agent is introduced into an agricultural setting, there could be consequences for the local ecosystem. Waste disposal is one of the primary concerns and depending on the volume of material this could lead to more significant environmental impacts.

Potential Mitigating Factors

Population exposure can be limited with fast and accurate identification of the agent and vehicle (water, milk, lettuce, etc.) utilized to target the food supply system. A prepared public communications plan will assist in further limiting the spread, while also mitigating the economic losses associated with falsely identifying the food supply contaminant.

Additional References

Khan et al (2001). Precautions against biological and chemical terrorism directed at food and water supplies. *Public Health Review* 116 (January–February 2001) 3–14.

Mohtadi et al (2009). Risk analysis of chemical, biological, or radionuclear threats: implications for food security. *Risk Analysis* 29(9) 1317–1335.

World Health Organization (2008, May). Terrorist threats to food: Guidance for establishing and strengthening prevention and response systems. At http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/fs_management/terrorism/en/ (checked April 2013).

¹² The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11–32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack

Nuclear Terrorism Attack

A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires an improvised nuclear weapon through manufacture from fissile material, purchase, or theft, and detonates it within a major U.S. population center.

Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	See classified data sheet		
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	See classified data sheet		
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	See classified data sheet		
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	330,000	2 million	3 million
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See classified data sheet		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ¹	High ²		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	See classified data sheet		

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Event Background

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) define a nuclear attack as follows:

A nuclear weapon is a device with explosive power resulting from the release of energy unleashed by the splitting of nuclei of a heavy chemical element, such as plutonium or uranium (fission), or by the fusing of nuclei from a light element, such as hydrogen (fusion). Fusion (thermonuclear) bombs can be significantly more powerful than fission bombs, but are at this point believed to be beyond the capability of terrorists to construct.³

A successful nuclear attack would cause substantial fatalities, injuries, and infrastructure damage from the heat and blast of the explosion, and significant radiological consequences from both the initial nuclear radiation and the radioactive fallout that settles after the initial event. A nuclear detonation in a modern urban area would impact the medical system more than any disaster previously experienced by the Nation.⁴ An electromagnetic pulse from the explosion could also

¹ In 2011, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories. Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'best' estimate.

² Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'best' estimate.

³ "Potential Terrorist Attack Methods: Joint Special Assessment", DHS & FBI, 23 April 2008, p. 36. (Reference is (UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY): Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED.)

⁴ National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness and Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats.(2010, June), *Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation* (2nd ed), p. 81.

Nuclear Terrorism Attack

disrupt telecommunications and power distribution. Significant economic, social, psychological, and environmental impacts would be expected.⁵

Nuclear explosions are classified by yield, or the amount of energy they produce, relative to how many tons of TNT would be needed to produce an equivalent explosive yield. Strategic nuclear weapon systems held by state actors deliver weapons with yields in the multi-hundred kilotons to megaton (1,000 kiloton) range. Generally, when considering nuclear explosion scenarios perpetrated by terrorists, experts assume a low-yield nuclear device detonated at ground level, where low yield in this context ranges from fractions of a kiloton (kT) to 10 kT.⁶ This is still orders of magnitude greater than conventional explosives which may be used in a terrorist attack: for comparison, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was equivalent to 2 tons of TNT, or 0.002 kilotons.⁷

There are two general types of nuclear weapons a terrorist may acquire and use: illicitly acquired weapons produced by nation-states and improvised nuclear devices (INDs).

- The former are designed, constructed, and usually tested using the resources of a sovereign state. They are typically reliable, high-yield weapons designed for a delivery vehicle, such as an aircraft or missile.
- An IND, by contrast, would be a crude nuclear device built from components of a stolen weapon or from scratch using nuclear material. The primary obstacle to terrorists attempting to construct a viable IND is obtaining the weapons-grade fissile material—plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or a stolen state-manufactured weapon—needed to produce a nuclear explosion.
- Crude nuclear weapons are typically heavy, ranging from a few hundred pounds to several tons. Smaller, specially designed systems such as the so-called suitcase nuclear weapons are much lighter but more technically difficult to produce.⁸

Assumptions

The SNRA leveraged classified data from the DHS/S&T 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA)⁹ for quantitative frequency, fatality, illness/injury, and economic loss estimates for the nuclear terrorism attack event. The data relies heavily on the Intelligence Community (IC) and other technical experts to develop scenarios and estimate the likelihoods of those scenarios for analysis. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) extracted ITRA data for successful terrorist attacks corresponding to the five CBRN national-level events in the SNRA.

The SNRA leveraged data for the classified risk summary sheet that assumed terrorist attack to include the following:

- Involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources;

⁵ National Academies, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2005). Nuclear attack. Fact sheet for the public (series, Communicating in a Crisis). Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/prep_nuclear_fact_sheet.pdf via <http://www.ready.gov> (checked April 2015).

⁶ It should be noted that if a state-built weapon were available to terrorists, the presumption of low yield may no longer hold. NSS (2010) *op cit.*, p. 15.

⁷ National Academies, DHS (2005), Nuclear attack public fact sheet, *op cit.*; p. 16, NSS 2010, *op cit.*

⁸ National Academies, DHS (2005), Nuclear attack public fact sheet, *op cit.*

⁹ DHS Directorate of Science & Technology (2011), Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (reference is SECRET//NOFORN).

- Involves an act that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State or other subdivision of the United States;
- Appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
- Appears to be intended to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
- Appears to be intended to affect the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

Nine U.S. cities were considered in calculating the probabilities and impacts of the attack. The cities were chosen to sample a variety of locations and population densities and included New York, Washington, Houston, and Miami. Impacts of the attack were evaluated for four yields across the nine cities and were evaluated 12 times throughout the year to sample atmospheric conditions at detonation.

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions identified in Table 1 to estimate the economic losses for this national-level event.

Table 1. Definitions for Direct, Indirect, and Induced Costs

Direct Costs include:

- **Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction:** DDP costs covered the repair, replacement and environmental clean-up which are considered expenditures by the government. It was assumed the government would recoup this spending through tax increases, causing a reduction of household spending of that same amount. However, this spending would be received as income by some sectors, such as waste management and environmental consulting services. The increase in spending into the waste management and environmental consulting services is treated as increase in annual output for these sectors.
- **Business Interruption:** Business interruption impacts considered losses due to decreased output at the target area, along with other increases and decreases to related sectors due to behavioral changes resulting from the event.
- **Loss in Spending from Fatalities:** This SNRA project team estimated a loss of spending of \$42,500 for each fatality. In addition, \$6,000 is included in increased output for mortuary services for each fatality.
- **Medical Costs:** Costs of medical mitigation were considered to be borne through private spending and insurance companies, while the hospital sector received an offsetting increase in output.

Indirect Costs include:

- Costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the industries impacted by the direct costs above.

Induced Costs include:

- The induced costs are those incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries. Induced costs can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set

Nuclear Terrorism Attack

of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- Social displacement estimates for the Nuclear Terrorism Attack national-level event were provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).¹⁰
- The low, best, and high social displacement estimates of 330,000, 2 million, and 3 million for the Nuclear Terrorism Attack event reflect judgments from START subject matter experts, based on published evacuation/shelter-in-place estimates for a detonated 10 kiloton improvised nuclear device.¹¹

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.¹² The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk,

¹⁰ START is a Department of Homeland Security University Center of Excellence that focuses on social and behavioral aspects of terrorism, natural disasters, and technological accidents, and the social, behavioral, cultural and economic factors influencing responses to and recovery from catastrophes.

¹¹ Davis, Tracy C. 2007. "Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense." Duke University Press.; Meade C, Molander R.C. Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy; 2006. http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf; National Security Staff Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness and Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats. Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation. 2nd Edition; 2010. <http://www.remm.nlm.gov/PlanningGuidanceNuclearDetonation.pdf>.

¹² The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Nuclear Terrorism Attack was given a C_{EF} of 1.3.

The numerical psychological distress estimates for this event and the complete semi-quantitative risk matrix may be found in Appendix G and the Findings sections, respectively, of the classified SNRA Technical Report.

toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹³ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- The environmental assessment included effects resulting from terrorism threats, but did not include human health effects or effects in urban areas because these effects are already reflected in other impact measures.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “High.” Experts indicated that the environmental impacts would be high due to the size and effect of the fallout and the persistence of the material. The relative toxicity may be moderate, since isotopes could be remediated. Ultimately, the long-term impact to the environment could be more moderate, but the impact would be high for in the short and intermediate term (1 year or more).

Additional Relevant Information

The consequences of a nuclear attack would be determined by the following effects of a detonation:

- *Air blast:* As with a conventional explosive, a nuclear detonation produces a shock wave, or air blast wave.
- *Heat:* The second effect would be extreme heat, a fireball, with temperatures reaching to millions of degrees.
- *Initial radiation:* The initial radiation is produced in the first minute following detonation.
- *Ground shock:* Ground shocks roughly equivalent to a large localized earthquake would also occur. This could cause additional damage to buildings, communications, roads, utilities and other critical infrastructure.
- *Secondary radiation:* Secondary radiation exposure from fallout would occur primarily downwind from the blast, but changing weather conditions could spread radioactivity and enlarge the affected area.

A failed detonation is potentially hazardous to the extent that it results in a fizzle yield, which occurs if the fissile material mechanically disassembles before a significant yield is generated. Even a fizzle yield, however, can produce a fairly large explosion that could disperse radioactive material widely.

¹³ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

Nuclear Terrorism Attack

Radiological Dispersal Device Attack

A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires radiological materials and disperses them through explosive or other means or creates a radiation exposure device (RED).

Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	See classified data sheet		
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	See classified data sheet		
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	See classified data sheet		
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	25,000	50,000	100,000
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See classified data sheet		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ¹	Low ²		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	See classified data sheet		

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Event Background

Radiological devices used for terrorism may include radiological dispersal devices (RDD) and radiological exposure devices (RED). The principal type of RDD is a “dirty bomb” that combines a conventional explosive with radioactive material. A second type involves radioactive material dispersed in air or water by other mechanical means, such as a water spray truck, a crop duster, or manually spread. An RED may comprise a powerful radioactive source hidden in a public place, such as a trash receptacle in a busy train or subway station, to expose passers-by to a potentially significant dose of radiation.³

It is very difficult to design an RDD that would deliver radiation doses high enough to cause immediate health effects or fatalities in a large number of people. Most injuries from a dirty bomb would probably occur from the heat, debris, and force of the conventional explosion used to disperse the radioactive material, affecting individuals close to the site of the explosion. At the low radiation levels expected from an RDD, the immediate health effects from radiation

¹ In 2011, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories. Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘best’ estimate.

² Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘best’ estimate.

³ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2006, October). OSC Radiological Response Guidelines. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Office of Air and Radiation, U.S. EPA; at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/nsfweb/foscr/ASTFOSCRseminar/References/EnvResponsePapersFactSheets/OSCRadResponseGuidelines.pdf> (retrieved April 2013).

Radiological Dispersal Device Attack

exposure would likely be minimal.⁴ Subsequent decontamination of the affected area could involve considerable time and expense. A dirty bomb could have significant psychological and economic effects.⁵

Most radiological devices would have very localized effects, ranging from less than a city block to several square miles. Factors determining the area of contamination would include the amount and type of radioactive material, the means of dispersal, the physical and chemical form of the radioactive material (for example, material dispersed in the form of fine particles may be carried by the wind over a relatively large area), local topography and location of buildings, and local weather conditions.⁶

Preparedness and effectiveness of response teams will play a significant role in mitigating the impacts caused by an RDD attack. Early identification of a radiological attack is important in determining whether or not to evacuate the area or shelter in place and the size of the area requiring cordonning.

There is evidence indicating terrorist organizations have expressed interest in using RDDs, though experts disagree as to how attractive they are as a tactic due to the limited number of expected casualties and the challenges associated with acquiring and handling radiological material. However, others assert that the resulting psychological and economic impacts may be enough for terrorists to risk the difficulties in pursuing this as a method for attack.⁷

Assumptions

The SNRA leveraged classified data from the DHS/S&T 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA)⁸ for quantitative frequency, fatality, illness/injury, and economic loss estimates for the radiological terrorism attack event. The data relies heavily on the Intelligence Community (IC) and other technical experts to develop scenarios and estimate the likelihoods of those scenarios for analysis. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) extracted ITRA data for successful terrorist attacks corresponding to the five CBRN national-level events in the SNRA.

The SNRA leveraged data for the classified risk summary sheet that assumed the qualifiers for terrorist attack to include the following:

- Involves an act that is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources;
- Involves an act that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State or other subdivision of the United States;
- Appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
- Appears to be intended to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
- Appears to be intended to affect the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.

⁴ National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2005). Radiological attack: dirty bombs and other devices. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/radiological-attack-fact-sheet> via <http://www.ready.gov>.

⁵ EPA (2006) OSC Radiological Response Guidelines, *op. cit.*

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Dana A. Shea, "Radiological Dispersal Devices: Select Issues in Consequence Management," Congressional Research Service for the Library of Congress (December 7, 2004).

⁸ DHS Directorate of Science & Technology (2011), Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (reference is SECRET//NOFORN).

The analysis only included data for successful attacks for this national-level event, e.g. detonation of the device or successful spread into the food or water system. Failed attacks were not included in this analysis (e.g., interdiction during the fabrication and assembly of the dispersal device, interdiction during travel to United States, or failure of the dispersal device).

The analysis used broad definitions of organizations that may initiate or represent potential radiological terrorism threats to the U.S., the categories of radionuclides that could be used for an attack, and the targets that may be selected for a radiological attack. The adopted criteria for general categories representing radiological terrorist threats to the U.S. are as follows:

- The International Terrorist Organization category is composed of terrorist organizations that operate both inside and outside of the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., al-Qaeda).
- The Domestic Terrorist Organization category is composed of terrorist organizations that operate only within the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., Animal Liberation Front and Rajneesh).
- The Small Groups/Individuals Terrorist Organization category is composed of small groups (i.e., 2 to 3 members) or individuals that operate only within the U.S. that are not sponsored by a nation (e.g., the Unabomber and Timothy McVeigh).

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions identified in Table 1 to estimate the economic losses for this national-level event.

Table 1. Definitions for Direct, Indirect, and Induced Costs

Direct Costs include:

- **Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction:** DDP costs covered the repair, replacement and environmental clean-up which are considered expenditures by the government. It was assumed the government would recoup this spending through tax increases, causing a reduction of household spending of that same amount. However, this spending would be received as income by some sectors, such as waste management and environmental consulting services. The increase in spending into the waste management and environmental consulting services is treated as increase in annual output for these sectors.
- **Business Interruption:** Business interruption impacts considered losses due to decreased output at the target area, along with other increases and decreases to related sectors due to behavioral changes resulting from the event.
- **Loss in Spending from Fatalities:** This SNRA project team estimated a loss of spending of \$42,500 for each fatality. In addition, \$6,000 is included in increased output for mortuary services for each fatality.
- **Medical Costs:** Costs of medical mitigation were considered to be borne through private spending and insurance companies, while the hospital sector received an offsetting increase in output.

Indirect Costs include:

- Costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the industries impacted by the direct costs above.

Radiological Dispersal Device Attack

Induced Costs include:

- The induced costs are those incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries. Induced costs can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- Social displacement estimates for the Radiological Terrorism Attack national-level event were provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).⁹
- The low, best, and high social displacement estimates of 25,000, 50,000, and 100,000 for the Radiological Terrorism Attack event reflect judgments from START subject matter experts, based on published evacuation/shelter-in-place estimates for radiological dispersal device (RDD) attack scenarios.¹⁰

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.¹¹ The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

⁹ START is a Department of Homeland Security University Center of Excellence that focuses on social and behavioral aspects of terrorism, natural disasters, and technological accidents, and the social, behavioral, cultural and economic factors influencing responses to and recovery from catastrophes.

¹⁰ Worcester, Maxim. "International Terrorism and the Threat of a Dirty Bomb." Institute Fur Strategies, Politik, Sicherheits, und Wirtschaftsberatung, Berlin.

¹¹ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Radiological Terrorism Attack was given a C_{EF} of 1.3.

The numerical psychological distress estimates for this event and the complete semi-quantitative risk matrix may be found in Appendix G and the Findings sections, respectively, of the classified SNRA Technical Report.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agents, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹² as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- The environmental assessment included effects resulting from terrorism threats, but did not include human health effects or effects in urban areas because these effects are already reflected in other impact measures
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “Low.” Experts indicated that the environmental impact would be limited because: fallout would be restricted to an urban area, toxicity from likely materials would be relatively low, and the dispersion area could be relatively limited as well. Environmental impacts could be elevated to “Medium” depending on the specific scenario.

Potential Mitigating Factors

Though the effects of an RDD attack will vary by the size of the detonation device, the means of dispersal, weather conditions, and the selected radionuclide, the preparedness level and effectiveness of response teams will play a significant role in mitigating the consequences caused by an RDD attack. Those closest to the detonation site would likely sustain injuries from the explosion, but as the radioactive material spreads it becomes less concentrated and harmful.¹³ Early identification of a radiological attack is important in determining whether or not to evacuate the area or shelter in place and the size of the area requiring cordonning. Additionally, the evacuation effort should include populations downwind from the explosion and also consider the needs of at-risk and special populations. Planners should note the importance of effective communication during the response effort to inform the public about evacuation routes and areas that are potentially contaminated.

In general, protection from radiation is afforded by utilizing the following principles:

- Minimizing the time exposed to radioactive materials;
- Maximizing the distance from the source of radiation; and
- Shielding from external exposure and inhaling radioactive material.¹⁴

¹² The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

¹³ “Dirty Bombs: Backgrounder”, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 2007.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Radiological Dispersal Device Attack

Appendix J2: SNRA 2011 Qualitative Risk Summary Sheets

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Overview

Five national-level events in the 2011 SNRA were qualitatively treated, because the quantitative likelihood and impact data that could be gathered in the highly compressed timeframe of the 2011 project was insufficient to support quantitative comparison with the other events. The 2015 SNRA project was able to move one of these events, space weather, to the quantitative column because additional research in the literature subsequent to 2011 provided sufficient sources for a quantitative analysis. The other threats and hazards remained qualitative.

Because the 2015 SNRA included a larger number of qualitatively treated events, a clearer distinction between the set of threats and hazards which were included in the full comparative assessment of the SNRA and those which could not be—due to project time constraints, or their inherently cross-cutting nature—was made in order to make clear what the published findings were based upon. As such, the four hazards in the following which have not been superseded are considered SNRA working papers: however, since they are not otherwise reproduced in the consolidated (July 2015) SNRA documentation, they are reproduced here. Another reason for their inclusion in this volume is to keep the 2011 risk summary sheets that have not been superseded in one volume.

As with the quantitative risk summary sheets, the reader should keep in mind that these 2011 risk summary sheets were not intended to be used as products in their own right.

Tsunami

A large tsunami with a wave of approximately 50 feet impacts the Pacific Coast of the United States.

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	1	300	1,000
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	1	300	1,000
Economic	Direct Economic Loss ¹	U.S. Dollars (2011)	\$705 Million	\$1.53 Billion	\$3.32 Billion
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	8,600	14,700	N/A ²
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ³	Moderate ⁴		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	0.26% ⁵	0.57% ⁶	0.92% ⁷

Event Background

A tsunami event could present a significant risk to the west coast of the United States. The Pacific Northwest is an area of increased risk due to the Cascadian Subduction Zone, which is where the Juan de Fuca Plate meets and is forced under the North American Plate.⁸ These subduction zones are associated with volcanism, earthquakes, and orogenic uplift, commonly referred to as mountain building. Earthquakes produced in these areas have the potential to be

¹ The economic damage numbers reported here include property damage and business interruption costs. The SNRA measure of direct economic damage additionally includes medical costs, and one year's lost demand due to fatalities (\$42,500 per fatality): the SNRA project team made the assumption that these contributions would be negligible in comparison to the property damage and business interruption costs, in particular the property damage estimates calculated by HAZUS.

² Since variations of scenario parameters in HAZUS did not produce social displacement estimates substantially higher than the best estimate of 14,700, the SNRA does not report a separate high estimate.

³ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories.

⁴ Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'Best' estimate.

⁵ One-year frequency corresponding to 12% probability within the next 50 years of a 9.0 magnitude earthquake causing a tsunami inundating coastal communities across the U.S. Pacific Northwest and Northern California. 12% was taken as the midpoint of the 10-15% range estimate cited by geologists (see Additional Relevant Information).

⁶ One-year frequency corresponding to a 25% probability of a tsunami within 50 years. The SNRA project team averaged the low and high probability estimates reported in the literature to obtain this best estimate.

⁷ One-year frequency corresponding to a 37% probability within the next 50 years of an 8.2 magnitude earthquake causing a tsunami impacting a portion of the U.S. Pacific Northwest and/or Northern California (see Additional Relevant Information).

⁸ Local Tsunami Hazards in the Pacific Northwest from Cascadia Subduction Zone Earthquakes, <http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/pp1661b/pp1661b.pdf>.

Tsunami

incredibly powerful, with nine of the ten largest quakes over the last 100 years occurring in these areas, including the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and the 2011 Tohoku, Japan, earthquake, both of which caused massive tsunamis. This is the same risk posed to the Pacific Northwest as a result of the Cascadian Subduction Zone.

A report for Seaside, Oregon, involved running more than 25 models including both near field (local) and far field (distant) generated tsunamis with estimated return periods.⁹ A modeled 100-year tsunami event showed similar impacts to the 1964 Alaska earthquake, which represented a distant event. The local event looked at Cascadian-type events, which tended to follow a 500-year return period event, although the historical evidence shows that these are rarer than every 500 years. The models generated from this project showed tsunami depths ranging from 22 to 38 meters (72 to 124 feet), although the highest of these depths occurred at the shoreline, with the depths of the land areas seeing highs around 14 to 16 meters (45 to 52 feet). A study was performed to develop a method for Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis based on traditional Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis.¹⁰ While the study did not focus on the Pacific Northwest, this area was included in the discussion, and the findings showed a maximum expected height from a 975-year return period event would be in the range of 10 to 15 meters.

The Seaside area of the Oregon Coast was chosen to model the risk of such an event because it is typical of many coastal communities in the section of the Pacific Coast from Cape Mendocino to the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and because State agencies and local stakeholders expressed considerable interest in mapping the tsunami threat to this area.¹¹ Looking at possible events with catastrophic consequences, the Cascadian Subduction Zone is one that has a likelihood of occurring and would result in major damages. Oregon has detailed modeling and analysis of tsunamis that would be generated by an earthquake along this zone, including an inundation boundary that extends the entire length of the coastline.

To perform this scenario analysis, ground digital elevation models (DEM) were used for the entire study area as well as the mapped tsunami inundation line from the State of Oregon GIS Clearinghouse.^{12,13} The inundation line was converted to a 3D feature with the DEM as the elevation source. This line was copied and placed parallel to the west, offset by approximately 1,000 meters. This outer line was generalized to remove the inlets and river areas that were represented in the original inundation line feature. The lines were used to create a tin that represented a constant ground surface from the actual inundation line, extending west beyond the coast. This tin was converted into a grid, which allowed for a raster calculation to be performed where the ground surface DEM was subtracted from the inundation grid. The output from the calculation produced the depth grid. Potential losses in the seven coastal counties in Oregon were

⁹ Wong, F.L., Venturato, A.J., and Geist, E.L., 2006, Seaside, Oregon, tsunami pilot study—Modernization of FEMA flood hazard maps: GIS Data: USGS Data Series 236: <http://pubs.usgs.gov/ds/2006/236/>.

¹⁰ Thio, H. K., Ichinose, G. A.; Somerville, P. G.; Polet, J., 2006. Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis. Presentation, American Geophysical Union Fall Meeting, December 2006; abstract at <http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2006AGUFM.S31C..08T>. See also Thio et al 2007, Probabilistic tsunami hazard analysis for ports and harbors, Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Ports 2007, pp 1-10, abstract [http://ntrmp.tsunami.gov/2012tsuhazworkshop/presentations/Thio_presentation.pdf](http://ascelibrary.org/doi/abs/10.1061/(ASCE)1084-2823(2007)1:1(103); and Thio, H. K., Probabilistic Tsunami Hazard Analysis, presentation, National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program 2012 Tsunami Hazard/Risk Analysis Workshop, July 2012, full deck <a href=) (accessed March 2013).


¹¹ Wong, *op cit.*

¹² Oregon GIS Data Clearinghouse, <http://spatialdata.oregonexplorer.info/GPT9/catalog/main/home.page>.

¹³ The inundation line matched well with the near field event boundary from the USGS project, and it was determined that this was an acceptable line upon which to base scenario depths.

estimated using HAZUS-MH to model the scenario defined by these modeling inputs.¹⁴ Figure 1 shows the scenario area and the inundation zones.

Figure 1. Tsunami Scenario Location Map¹⁵



Assumptions

Based on previously conducted research, it is reasonable to assume that modeling a tsunami with the maximum height of 15 meters (approximately 50 feet) is appropriate for analyzing a potential Cascadian event generated tsunami along the Oregon Coast.^{16, 17} Additionally, the depth damage functions were adjusted to reflect the velocity losses associated with the tsunami phenomenon. The damage function used assumes a linearly increasing damage from 0 to 100 percent for flood depth, with wave action ranging from 0 feet to 4 feet and 100 percent damage at 4 feet and beyond.

¹⁴ HAZUS-MH: multihazard loss estimation software. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (1997-2011); <http://www.fema.gov/hazus>. See FEMA 433 (2004, August), Using HAZUS-MH for Risk Assessment, <http://www.fema.gov/pdf/plan/prevent/hazus/fema433.pdf>.

¹⁵ Source: GIS Analysis using Hazus-MH and Oregon GIS Data Clearinghouse data. See Discussion.

¹⁶ Thio et al 2006, *op cit*.

¹⁷ Wong, *op cit*.

Tsunami

Fatalities and Injuries

The HAZUS-MH flood model used to model the Tsunami scenario does not provide direct estimates of fatalities and injuries. The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate health and safety impacts caused by a tsunami event:

- In terms of fatalities, minimal impact is assumed except:
 - In areas that do not receive the warning in time (may include possible malfunction of warning equipment)
 - In communities not trained in evacuation
 - In flat areas where no evacuation routes exist
 - For persons who do not obey orders or who happen to be in vulnerable areas with no warning systems
- Based on these exceptions, it is reasonable to assume the possible range of fatalities to be between 1 and 1,000 and injuries to be between 1 and 1,000. The timing of a tsunami (impact during day versus night) could potentially impact the ability of the population to receive warnings; therefore, a tsunami at 2 a.m. when people are sleeping could potentially cause more deaths and injuries than a daytime tsunami.
- The population information used for estimating the health and safety impacts is 2000 U.S. Census data.
- Given the effort Oregon has put into training, warning systems, evacuation route planning, as well as other mitigation techniques, professional engineering judgment based on experience suggests that it would be reasonable to expect that approximately 1% of the exposed population would be injured or killed as a result of this event. The result was then split evenly with 50% counted as injured and 50% counted as being killed by the event.
- If a similar scenario were to occur along other areas of the U.S. coastline, higher casualty rates may be more likely because the West Coast (as well as Alaska and Hawaii) is better prepared for tsunami impacts than the East Coast and Gulf Coast (in terms of evacuation plans, drills, and warning systems), and the exceptions listed above would be more likely to be the case in non-West Coast areas.

Economic Loss

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate economic impacts caused by a tsunami event:

- More than 1,700 buildings were estimated as being destroyed in the modeled event. Building losses would likely exceed \$1.5 billion. The event would also cause business disruption, which is estimated to be nearly \$13 million. The area incurring the most severe impacts would be Clatsop County, accounting for nearly half of the destroyed buildings and economic losses which would occur.
- If a similar scenario were to occur along other areas of the U.S. coastline, higher economic losses may be expected resulting from the proximity of more development to the coast, lack of warning, and panic.

Social Displacement

- The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate social impacts caused by a tsunami event:
- Displacement estimates assume those affected would require accommodations in temporary public shelters. The results estimate that approximately 14,737 persons would seek temporary refuge in public shelters, which was used as the best estimate.
- Range estimates for social displacement were calculated by running the same scenario using inundation level as a variation parameter, decreasing the inundation by 2 feet to estimate the lower bound and increasing the inundation by 2 feet to estimate the higher bound. The lower bound of 8,600 was used as the low estimate.
- Since increasing inundation level did not substantially vary the displacement numbers, the SNRA does not report a high estimate for the tsunami event.¹⁸

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on significant distress and prolonged distress, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. To reflect empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event, the SNRA psychological distress metric is constructed from the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs, weighted by a secondary factor elicited from subject matter experts for differing psychological impact based on the type of event.¹⁹

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).

¹⁸ Because the inundation boundary line would not likely extend further due to topography as well as other contributing factors, the number of displaced persons is not expected to change from the original scenario calculation even when inundation was assumed to increase by two feet of water.

¹⁹ A Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is an expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics. The familiarity factor, intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts, was assessed as 1.0 for Tsunami on a scale of 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events.

The specificity of the tsunami event to a single geographic scenario precluded comparative judgments of risk on the psychological or other impact metrics with other events. This limitation will be addressed in a future national risk assessment.

Tsunami

- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)²⁰ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “Moderate.” Experts indicated that this is the best estimate, but that impacts could be higher or lower depending on the precise location, barrier channels, and ecosystem impacts.

Potential Mitigating Factors

The consequences caused by a tsunami can be mitigated through several preparedness strategies. Warning and monitoring systems can assist in alerting population areas that may be impacted by a tsunami. Periodically testing these systems will ensure that they are functioning when a tsunami event occurs. Identifying evacuation routes and training communities in how to use them during an event will improve the ability for the population to egress vulnerable areas. Finally, the importance of evacuating during a potential event should be communicated to individuals living or working in vulnerable areas.

Additional Relevant Information

In 1700, a major earthquake occurred along this zone, rupturing a 620-mile section of the fault line. The estimated magnitude was between 8.7 and 9.2 and caused a tsunami that impacted the Oregon coastline and was recorded in Japan. More recently, geologists have studied this fault and concluded there is a 37 percent chance of an 8.2 or larger event in the next 50 years and a 10 to 15 percent chance for a rupture along the entire fault from a 9.0 or larger event.^{21,22,23} A tsunami generated from this magnitude event could reach heights of 20 to 30 meters (65 to 100 feet) along the Pacific Northwest coast and have catastrophic results.²⁴ All oceanic regions of the world can experience tsunamis, but in the Pacific Ocean there is a much more frequent occurrence of large, destructive tsunamis because of the many large earthquakes along the margins of the Pacific Ocean.

It is reasonable to expect that a tsunami impacting the U.S. could potentially experience similar consequences to this scenario, regardless of coastal location. The range of potential loss could be broad depending upon many factors including but not limited to the population density of low-lying coastal areas, presence of agricultural assets such as crops and livestock, and location of nearby drinking water supplies. Long-term impacts could also be experienced and would depend on the level of contamination caused in the area.

²⁰ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

²¹ Odds are 1-in-3 that a huge quake will hit Northwest in next 50 years. Oregon State University press release, 24 May 2010, announcing preliminary results later published as reference [23]; at <http://oregonstate.edu/ua/ncs/node/13426> (accessed 3/17/2013).

²² Risk of giant quake off American west coast goes up. *Nature News*, 31 May 2010, citing results later published as reference [23]; at <http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100531/full/news.2010.270.html>.

²³ Goldfinger et al, 2012. Turbidite event history – Methods and implications for Holocene paleoseismicity of the Cascadia Subduction Zone. USGS p 1661-F, 7/17/2012; <http://pubs.usgs.gov/pp/pp1661f/> (accessed 3/17/13).

²⁴ Recent findings concluded the Cascadia subduction zone was more hazardous than previously suggested. The feared next major earthquake has some geologists predicting a 10% to 14% probability that the Cascadia Subduction Zone will produce an event of magnitude 9 or higher in the next 50 years; however, the most recent studies suggest that this risk could be as high as 37% for earthquakes of magnitude 8 or higher. Geologists have also determined the Pacific Northwest is not prepared for such a colossal earthquake. The tsunami produced may reach heights of approximately 30 meters (100 ft).

Volcanic Eruption

A large volcano in the Pacific Northwest erupts, impacting the surrounding areas with lava flows and ash, and areas east with smoke and ash.

Data Summary

In the following table, note that the low and high likelihoods do not correspond to the low and high impacts. In addition, low and high impacts are not necessarily correlated with each other between different impact categories.

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	340 ¹	515 ²	780 ³
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	2,000	17,000	150,000
Economic	Direct Economic Loss ⁴	U.S. Dollars (2011)	\$4.3 Billion ⁵	\$8.3 Billion ⁶	\$16.2 Billion ⁷
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	1,300	130,000	2.1 Million
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ⁸	High ⁹		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	1/1000 yrs	1/500 yrs	1/100 yrs

Event Background

This volcanic hazard scenario focuses on community exposure to lahar (large, swift, and saturated debris flows produced by volcanoes) hazards and ashfall associated with Mount Rainier, Washington. Mount Rainier lahar flow affects four counties in the state of Washington: King County, Lewis County, Pierce County, and Thurston County. A majority of the hazard

¹ The ‘Low’ estimation was calculated by overlaying the Case I Debris Flow GIS boundary on 2000 U.S. Census designated census blocks to determine the affected population. 2010 U.S. Census data was not available during the time of analysis (July 2011).

² The ‘Best’ estimation is the geometric mean of ‘Low’ and ‘High’ possible fatalities.

³ Community Exposure to Lahar Hazards from Mount Rainier, Washington; Nathan J. Wood and Christopher E. Soulard, USGS Scientific Investigations Report 2009-5211, September 16, 2009.

⁴ The economic damage numbers reported here includes property damage and business interruption costs, but not lost demand due to fatalities and medical costs due to injuries. The SNRA project team determined that the property damage and business interruption costs dominated the direct economic damages of the scenario used for the volcanic eruption event to the extent that the multipliers for the other two components would have a negligible effect on the reported totals.

⁵ The ‘Low’ estimation was calculated by overlaying the Case I Debris Flow GIS boundary was overlaid on 2000 U.S. Census designated census blocks to determine the affected population. 2010 U.S. Census data was not available during the time of analysis (July 2011).

⁶ The ‘Best’ estimation is the geometric mean of ‘low’ and ‘high’ possible economic impacts.

⁷ The ‘High’ estimate for economic impacts was calculated using previously collected data that was developed by overlaying and calculating the union of lahar-hazard zone, community boundaries, and block-level population counts compiled for the 2000 U.S. Census (2010 U.S. Census data was not available during the time of analysis). The economic loss amounts used are based on the total loss of annual sales generated by 3,890 businesses within lahar hazard areas.

⁸ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories.

⁹ Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘Best’ estimate.

Volcanic Eruption

areas are located in Pierce County. Mount Rainier is part of the Cascade Volcano range aligned in a north-south direction that roughly parallels the Pacific Ocean. Mount Rainier is the second highest peak in the conterminous U.S. at 14,410 feet (4,393 meters) and the largest single-peak glacial system in the U.S. Due to the proximity of over 1.5 million people living within the shadow of Mount Rainier, it is considered the most dangerous volcano in the Cascade Range.¹⁰ The most populous city near Mount Rainier is Tacoma. Tacoma is approximately less than one mile from the lahar hazard area boundary.

The lahar hazard areas and debris flow paths used in this scenario are based on the behavior of the Electron Mudflow, a lahar that traveled along the Puyallup River approximately 500 years ago and was due to a slope failure on the west flank of Mount Rainier (Figure 1).¹¹

The SNRA project team leveraged data from a 2009 study calculating community vulnerability to possible lahar hazards originating at Mount Rainier.¹²

Ash normally accompanies an eruption of a volcano and is composed of fine particles of fragmented volcanic rock (less than 2 mm diameter).¹³ Ashfall is the accumulation of volcanic ash and a typical result of volcanic activity. Ashfall radius is dependent on wind direction, wind strength, and size of ash particles. The negative effects are dependent on the amount of ash accumulation. Ashfall with a thickness of 1/3 inch may cause disruption of ground and air transportation and cause damage to electronics and machinery, while four inches of ash could be sufficient to collapse building roofs. Ash can possibly produce acid rain when mixed with precipitation creating a form of diluted sulfuric acid.¹⁴

Volcanoes commonly repeat past behaviors, therefore historic ashfall and gas patterns were evaluated for Mount Rainier.¹⁵ For this scenario, historic ashfall and gas patterns from Mount St. Helens were used. These patterns caused ash and gas to rise more than 15 miles vertically in 15 minutes. Clouds of ash can extend thousands of miles.¹⁶ Mount St. Helens' heaviest ash deposition occurred in a 60 mile long swath immediately downwind of the volcano and thick ash deposits extended about 195 miles. During the 9 hours of vigorous eruptive activity, about 540 million tons of ash fell over an area of more than 22,000 square miles.¹⁷ If similar ashfall were to occur as a result of Mount Rainier volcanic activity, the ash would reach westerly to Fort Lewis and easterly past the Snoqualmie National Forest.

Some possible negative consequences of ash include, but are not limited to:¹⁸

- Respiratory effects such as nasal irritation, throat irritation, and airway irritation
- Eye symptoms such as eye irritation, abrasions, discharge, or acute conjunctivitis
- Skin irritation

¹⁰ Mount Rainier National Park: Geologic Resource Evaluation Report; U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service; Natural Resource Report NPS/NRPC/GRD/NRR—2005/007, September 2005.

¹¹ Community Exposure to Lahar Hazards from Mount Rainier, Washington; Nathan J. Wood and Christopher E. Soulard, USGS Scientific Investigations Report 2009-5211, September 16, 2009.

¹² All lahar hazard zone area boundaries used in calculations for this scenario are from the USGS 2009 study.

¹³ Pierce County Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment: Volcanic; Pierce County Department of Emergency Management; 2010.

¹⁴ The Health Hazards of Volcanic Ash: Guide for the Public. International Volcanic Health Hazard Network (IVHHN), 2003-2011; at http://www.ivhhn.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=55&Itemid=61 (accessed March 2013).

¹⁵ Hazard Identification and Vulnerability Analysis (HIVA) of Walla Walla, Washington – Volcanic Ash Fall; Walla Walla County Emergency Management Department, October 2003.

¹⁶ Volcanic Ash Fall – A “Hard Rain” of Abrasive Particles: USGS Fact Sheet 027-00; USGS, 2000.

¹⁷ Eruptions of Mount St. Helens: Past, Present, and Future, U.S. Geological Survey Special Interest Publication: Ash Eruption and Fallout; Cascades Volcano Observatory (Robert I. Tilling, Lyn Topinka, and Donald A. Swanson); 1990.

¹⁸ The Health Hazards of Volcanic Ash: Guide for the Public.


Figure 1 – Reference Map¹⁹

Figure 1. Map showing counties, incorporated cities, and census-designated places within a lahar-hazard zone on and near Mount Rainier, Washington (Hoblitt and others, 1998; Schilling and others, 2008).

- Indirect health effects such as reduction of visibility on roadways, increased demand on power leading to electricity loss, and effects on water supply creating possible contamination
- Disruption of ground and air transportation
- Major air routes pass downwind of the Cascade Volcanoes resulting in possible disturbance to flights and flight patterns
- Damage to electronics and machinery possibly affecting economic dynamics
- Crop damage causing agricultural loss
- Interruption of telephone, cell, and radio communications

¹⁹ Wood and Soulard, *op. cit.*

Volcanic Eruption

Assumptions

Fatalities and Injuries

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate health and safety impacts resulting from a volcano event:

- The total population within lahar hazard areas was calculated using a GIS shapefile representing Inundation Zones for Case I Debris Flows.²⁰ Inundation Zones for Case I Debris Flows are areas that could be affected by cohesive debris flow that originates as enormous avalanches of weak chemically altered rock from the volcano. The Case I Debris Flow GIS boundary shapefile was used in this scenario because the layer covers a larger potentially hazardous area, and therefore includes all possibly vulnerable populations.
- One percent of the total population in lahar hazard areas was used as the amount of possible deaths in the health and safety impacts calculations because the total population is not at risk during Case I Debris Flow activity due to national, regional, state, and local monitoring systems, evaluation routes, and mitigation measures.²¹ Further, one percent of the population was used to calculate possible deaths as a result of volcanic activity based on previous data from the 1980 Mount St. Helens eruption. 57 deaths occurred as a result of volcanic activity.²² The Skamania County 1980 population was 8,289; therefore, 0.6% of the County's population was lost due to volcanic activity. This percentage was increased to 1% for this scenario in the event that a greater percentage of the population was at risk during eruption.
- The methodology used consists of overlaying and calculating the union of lahar-hazard zone, community boundaries, and block-level population counts compiled for the 2000 U.S. Census.²³
- Possible tourist populations were not considered in any calculations.

To calculate injuries and illness amounts, a possible ashfall area with a radius of 60 miles from Mount Rainier (46.852947, -121.760424) was created and is depicted in Figure 2.²⁴

- The radius buffer was overlaid on 2000 U.S. Census block data to determine the total population in the ashfall area. The ashfall area was distributed over an eight-county area: Cowlitz County, King County, Kittas County, Lewis County, Pierce County, Skamania County, Thurston County, and Yakima County. The population of the ashfall area was estimated to be approximately 1.5 million. For the 'High' estimate of injuries/illnesses, ten percent of the total population was determined to be vulnerable to injury or illness as a result of ashfall.²⁵
- Wind direction and speed were not taken into account during this analysis.

²⁰ Digital Data for Volcano Hazards from Mount Rainier, Washington Revised 1998: Data to accompany U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 98-428; USGS; 2007.


²¹ Danger Lurks Deep: The Human Impact of Volcanoes; Joanne Feldman and Robert I. Tilling, Division of Emergency Medicine at the Stanford University School of Medicine in Palo Alto, Calif., GeoTime November 2007.

²² USGS Cascades Volcano Observatory, Vancouver, Washington Mount St. Helens, Washington. "On This Day in 1980" October 6, 1980 <http://vulcan.wr.usgs.gov/Volcanoes/MSH/May18/OnThisDay1980/Days/1980October06.html>.

²³ "Community Exposure to Lahar Hazards from Mount Rainier, Washington" by Wood and Soulard.

²⁴ A 60 mile radius was selected based on data from the actual Mt. St. Helens ashfall extents.

²⁵ Volcanic hazards: a sourcebook on the effects of eruptions: Academic Press; Blong, R.J., 1984, Australia, p. 424.

Figure 2 – Ashfall Radius

- Existing data did not include specific amounts for injuries and illness due to ashfall; therefore calculations for this scenario were performed using GIS technology.
- Ten percent of the population was used to calculate possible injury or illness as a result of volcanic activity based on previous data from the 1980 Mount St. Helens eruption. For this scenario it was estimated that 250 homes were damaged as a result of volcanic activity based on USGS calculations (USGS reports that more than 200 homes were destroyed).²⁶ The average household is comprised of an estimated 2.6 persons based on the U.S. Census. This resulted in an estimate that 650 people would be directly affected by the volcanic activity, or 7.3% of the county population. This percentage was increased to 10% for this scenario to include possible persons on transportation routes, working in the surrounding National Park, etc. Due to data limitations, only one radius layer was developed to calculate the “Best” estimation.

²⁶ USGS Cascades Volcano Observatory, Vancouver, Washington Mount St. Helens, Washington.

Volcanic Eruption

- For the ‘Low’ estimate of injuries/illnesses, the population in the State of Washington U.S. Census tracts immediately surrounding Mt. Rainier was used. Approximately 20,000 people live in the following Census tracts: Census Tract 30.01, Yakima County; Census Tract 701, Pierce County; Census Tract 9720, Lewis County; Census Tract 5238, Kittitas County; and Census Tract 315.02, King County. Ten percent of this population was determined to be vulnerable to injury or illness as a result of ashfall, as discussed above.²⁷
- The ‘Best’ estimate of injuries/illnesses was calculated as the geometric mean of the ‘Low’ and High’ estimates.

Economic Loss

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions to estimate the economic impacts resulting from a volcano event:

- The General Building Stock Dollar Exposure (Replacement Amount) designated by occupancy in census blocks was used to calculate the total dollar exposure of the combined amounts for commercial, industrial, agricultural, religion, government, and educational industries.
- Major transportation routes would be affected by possible volcanic activity. Interstate 5 and State Routes 161 and 167 are within Case I Debris Flow hazard areas, along with 195 major roadway segments. The obstruction of major roadways may have a negative impact on the economy due to supply and delivery delays, restrictions, and cancelations.
- A disruption in port activities resulting from volcanic activity could hinder job security and revenue, thus resulting in an economic loss for the state of Washington. More than 43,000 jobs in Pierce County and more than 113,000 jobs in Washington State are related to the Port activities. Port-related jobs generate \$637 million in annual wages in Pierce County and more than \$90 million annually in state and local taxes in Washington.²⁸ The Port of Tacoma is approximately 1 mile from the Case 1 Debris Flow hazard areas and vulnerable to possible volcanic activity.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- The number of homes destroyed in the output ranges of the HAZUS model gave low, best, and high estimates of numbers of persons displaced of 1,300, 130,000, and 2.1 million respectively.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on significant distress and prolonged distress, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this

²⁷ U.S. Census data obtained from <http://factfinder2.census.gov>. Accessed on September 18, 2001.

²⁸ The Economic Impact of the Port of Tacoma; Port of Tacoma as prepared by Martin Associates; May 24, 2005.

index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.²⁹ The numerical outputs of this index formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., as chemical or biological agents, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)³⁰ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “High.” A volcanic eruption can cause disruption of aquatic life, eco-systems, etc. over a potentially large area. In addition, there are potential long-term climate change effects if airborne plume is extreme.

Potential Mitigating Factors

The consequences of a volcanic eruption will depend on the severity of the eruption, the sophistication of the monitoring and warning systems, and the level of preparedness (familiarity with evacuation routes, mitigation measures implemented, etc.) of the surrounding population areas that can be potentially affected by fallout from the eruption.

Additional Relevant Information

The average time interval between eruptions of Mount Rainier is estimated at 100 to 1,000 years.³¹ For all impact calculations, the Inundation Zone for Case I Debris Flows used has a frequency of one event per 500 to 1,000 years.³² These frequencies are based on the last 5,600

²⁹ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is the expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: Volcanic Eruption was given a C_{EF} of 1.0.

The specificity of the volcanic eruption event to a single geographic scenario precluded comparative judgments of risk on the psychological or other impact metrics with other events. This limitation will be addressed in a future national risk assessment.

³⁰ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

³¹ Volcano Hazards from Mount Rainier, Washington, Revised 1998: Open File 98-428; USGS; 1998.

³² Ibid.

Volcanic Eruption

years. The annual probability of such a flow originating somewhere on Mount Rainier is thus about 0.1 to 0.2 percent. The debris flow reached the Puget Sound lowland about 600 years ago along the Puyallup River and is considered to be a characteristic Case I flow for purposes of identifying probable inundation areas.³³ The accounts of the most recent Mount Rainier volcanic event range from 1820 to 1870. According to the USGS, there is no immediate indication of renewed activity at Mount Rainier; however, due to the large population surrounding Mount Rainier hazard mitigation actions should be explored.

³³ Volcano Hazards from Mount Rainier, Washington, Revised 1998: Open File 98-428; USGS; 1998.

Cyber Event affecting Data (Data as Target)

A cyber event¹ occurs which seriously compromises the integrity or availability of data (the information contained in a computer system) or data processes, resulting in economic losses of \$1 billion or greater.

Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	Not determined		
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	Not determined		
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	Not determined		
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0		
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ²	None ³		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	See classified data table		

Event Background

This category includes cyber attacks that focus on compromising data or data processes as the primary result. Such attacks could take many forms and be perpetrated in order to achieve many goals. Some examples might include the altering of records in a healthcare or financial system or an attack which causes the internet, communications networks, or data processes to cease.

While frequency information about the type of data/data processes attacks included in this category is difficult to locate in open source material, there are several observations that can assist in setting the context.

A 2010 Verizon report analyzing 141 data breach cases from 2009 (worked by either the Verizon Investigative Response Team or the U.S. Secret Service) estimated the total number of data records compromised across these cases to exceed 143 million.⁴ Consistent with previous years, most of the losses in 2009 came from only a few of the 141 breaches. The average number of records lost per breach was 1,381,183, the median only 1,082, and the standard deviation 11,283,151.⁵

¹ The Cyber Attack against Data national-level event was renamed Cyber Event affecting Data in 2013 to address stakeholder concerns.

² The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and *de minimis* (none) categories.

³ Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the 'Best' estimate.

⁴ Verizon RISK Team, 2010 Data Breach Investigations Report (2010): 7.

⁵ Ibid.: 40.

Cyber Event affecting Data (Data as Target)

In the case of denial-of-service events, according to a 2010 CSIS-McAfee survey of 200 critical infrastructure executives from the energy, oil/gas, and water sectors in 14 countries, nearly 80 percent of the respondents reported facing a large-scale denial-of-service attack in 2010 (up from just over half in 2009), with a quarter reporting daily or weekly denial-of-service attacks on a large scale.⁶

Additionally, one in four of the CSIS-McAfee respondents said they had been the victim of extortion through attack or threat of attack to IT networks in the past two years—an increase from one in five respondents from the previous year.⁷

Impacts for the types of attacks in this event category are difficult to quantify, as they depend on the particular system attacked, the vulnerability and resilience of the network, specific data backup provisions, and other factors. A sample of several historical data/data processes-related cyber attacks is presented in the “Additional Relevant Information” section below. In addition, details on the Wall Street “Flash Crash” are included in the list, in order to provide context on the potential magnitude of impacts produced by events in this category.

Assumptions

Likelihood

Frequency estimates were elicited from the Intelligence Community (IC) by the SNRA project team in July-August 2011.⁸ Only attacks resulting in \$1 billion in losses or greater were considered. The frequency estimates for this event are classified, but are provided in the data tables of the classified SNRA Technical Report.

Frequency estimates were based on the following assumptions regarding the scope of events in this category.

- General Scope: This category includes cyber attacks that focus on compromising data or data processes as the primary result. Although events in this category almost always have indirect effects that “go beyond the computer,” only events in which these types of effects are a function of modern reliance on computer systems—rather than the primary objective of the attack—were considered.
- Actor Types: Given the goal of capturing the full range of national-level possibilities within each type of incident, events in which cyber attacks are intentionally caused by any type of human actor, including, e.g., hackers, activists, states, terrorists, malicious insiders, or criminals, were considered. Unintentional human-caused events (such as unintentional breaches or accidents) or non-human-caused events (such as those caused by natural disasters or equipment malfunctions) were not considered.
- Weapon Types: All types of cyber weapons, including but not limited to malicious software, botnets, distributed denial-of-service attacks, etc., were considered.
- Target Types: Any type of civilian target was considered. Note that for the purposes of the SNRA—which is intended to inform civilian capability development—direct attacks on

⁶ McAfee and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, *In the Dark: Crucial Industries Confront Cyberattacks* (April 2011): 6.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ IC participants in the Cyber Event affecting Data frequency elicitation included subject matter experts from multiple agencies. The frequency estimates (see classified SNRA Technical Report) reflect the opinion of the group and have not been formally vetted by any of the agencies which participated.

defense systems were not considered. Additionally, state- and non-state- sponsored espionage was not considered.

- Time Period: The SNRA focuses on estimating risk within the next five years, in support of the overall need to focus on future-oriented core capability development.
- National-level Threshold: As stated above, the SNRA is designed to assess the risks of those events and incidents which create impacts that rise to a strategic, national-level of impact. Thus, small-scale attacks, which occur on a daily basis, were not considered. Instead, only high-impact events, which could produce a national level of awareness due to major impacts related to life safety, economic damage, psychological damage, social displacement, or environmental damage were considered.

Fatalities, Injuries and Illnesses, Economic Damage

Defensible estimates could not be obtained on these impact measures. Additional analysis will be needed to quantify the human health and economic impacts of the Cyber Event affecting Data event.

Psychological Distress

Since the SNRA measure of psychological distress is tied to fatality and illness/injury estimates, psychological distress estimates were not reported in the SNRA for the Cyber Event affecting Data national-level event.⁹

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- As the Cyber Event affecting Data national-level event is restricted to cyber events not directly causing impacts on the physical world, the SNRA project team assessed the low, best, and high estimates for social displacement to be zero.

Environmental Impact

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

⁹ The SNRA measures psychological distress by a Significant Distress Index calculated from fatality, illness/injury, and social displacement estimates using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is an expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: experts assessed a C_{EF} of 1.0 for the Cyber Event affecting Data national-level event.

Although the SNRA determined null social displacement estimates for the Cyber Event affecting Data, scenarios which could credibly threaten human health and safety without forcing people to flee their homes remained part of the event scope and so the SNRA project team could not assume zero estimates for fatalities and illnesses/injuries as well.

Cyber Event affecting Data (Data as Target)

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g., chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹⁰ as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “de minimus” or none.

Potential Mitigating Factors

The risk of this type of cyber attack can be mitigated through several preparedness strategies. Practices such as employing advanced authentication measures, the use of encryption technologies, and the monitoring of network use for anomaly detection would help to prevent, more quickly identify, and facilitate a timely response to cyber attacks.¹¹ In addition, organizations can employ tailored strategies that increase resilience to cyber attacks on data. These could include strategies such as employing back-up systems and developing plans for maintaining operations without the use of computer systems.

Additional Relevant Information

A sample list of several historical data/data processes related to cyber attacks is presented below. Details on the Wall Street “Flash Crash” are included in the list, in order to provide context on the potential magnitude of impacts produced by events in this category.

Attacks on Data and the Potential Magnitude of Compromised Data Integrity or Accessibility ¹²
Seattle Hospital Denial of Access. Cyber criminals in 2007 compromised the networks of a Seattle hospital, causing system malfunctions including the crash of the Intensive Care Unit Network.
Wall Street “Flash Crash.” In Wall Street’s May 2010 “flash crash,” complex automated trades created enough market volatility to hemorrhage approximately 1 trillion dollars in only minutes, with some stocks dropping more than 90 percent in value. While the volatility was unintentional and the stocks recovered, the crash illustrates the potential impacts of sophisticated cyber attacks against a financial system that relies increasingly on automated high-frequency trading. ¹³

¹⁰ The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March], On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

¹¹ See McAfee and the Center for Strategic and International Studies: 24.

¹² This list was provided to the participants in the frequency elicitation, to encourage consideration of potential impacts of a cyber attack against data.

¹³ Quoted in full from David Pett, “High-Frequency Swaps, Dark Pools Under Scrutiny,” *National Post’s Financial Post & FP Investing* (8 May 2010) and Kara Scannell and Tom Lauricella, “Flash Crash Is Pinned On One Trade,” *The Wall Street Journal* (2 October 2010) as cited in Lord and Sharp: 1.25.

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Cyber Event affecting Data (Data as Target)

Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure

A cyber event in which cyber means are used as a vector to achieve effects which are “beyond the computer” (i.e., kinetic or other effects), resulting in one or more fatalities or economic losses of \$100 million or more.

Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	Not determined		
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	Not determined		
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars (2011)	Not determined		
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home \geq 2 Days	0	400	Not determined
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	See text		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins ¹	None ²		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	See classified data table		

Event Background

This category encompasses cyber attacks that directly produce national-level effects outside the virtual world. These types of events could involve a variety of targets, such as large-scale assets in a variety of critical infrastructure sectors. Examples might include the electric grid, a dam, or the water system.

The threat of this type of event has seen increased prominence recently, as the extent of the Stuxnet infections have come to light. According to a 2010 CSIS-McAfee survey of 200 critical infrastructure executives from the energy, oil/gas, and water sectors in 14 countries, around 40 percent of respondents found Stuxnet on their computers.³ While three-quarters of respondents who found Stuxnet were confident it has been removed from their systems, the potential for widespread sabotage through the introduction of malware into SCADA systems was clearly demonstrated.⁴ The 2007 “Aurora” tests conducted at Idaho National Labs further confirmed the proposition that hackers could gain remote access to a control system and, in that case, remotely change the operating cycle of a generator, sending it out of control.⁵

¹ The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. The comments and rankings presented in this Risk Summary Sheet have not undergone review by the EPA and only represent the opinions of the group. Estimates pertain to the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment; they are grouped into high, moderate, low, and de minimis (none) categories.

² Experts provided both first and second choice categories, allowing the experts to express uncertainty in their judgments as well as reflect the range of potential effects that might result depending on the specifics of the event. The first choice represents the ‘Best’ estimate.

³ McAfee and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, *In the Dark: Crucial Industries Confront Cyberattacks* (April 2011): 8.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ James A. Lewis, “The Electrical Grid as a Target for Cyber Attack,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (March 2010).

Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure

More than 40 percent of the executives interviewed in the CSIS-McAfee survey reported they expected a major cyber attack within 12 months—i.e., an attack that would cause severe loss of services for at least 24 hours, a loss of life or personal injury, or the failure of a company.⁶ It should be noted, however, that the types of attacks cited in the study—though important for individual companies—would not necessarily produce impacts that would rise to the threshold for a national-level event.

Impacts for the types of attacks in this event category are sector dependent and difficult to quantify. Approximately 85% of critical infrastructure is believed to be owned and operated by the private sector, and system vulnerability and resilience is highly sector-dependent and localized.⁷ A sample of historical attacks on the SCADA systems of critical infrastructure assets, along with a list of unintentional or non-cyber related failures within critical infrastructure sectors is included in the “Additional Relevant Information” section below.

Assumptions

Likelihood

Frequency estimates were elicited from the Intelligence Community (IC) by the SNRA project team in July-August 2011.⁸ Only attacks resulting in one or more fatalities, or \$100 million in losses or greater were considered. The frequency estimates for this event are classified, but are provided in the data tables of the classified SNRA Technical Report.

Frequency estimates were based on the following assumptions regarding the scope of events in this category:

- **General Scope:** This event encompasses cyber attacks that directly produce national-level effects outside the virtual world. While the attacks in this category may involve the manipulation of data as a means to an end, an event whose direct result is only compromised data (such as intellectual property theft or altered healthcare records) was not considered.
- **Actor Types:** Given the goal of capturing the full range of national-level possibilities within each type of incident, events in which cyber attacks are intentionally caused by any type of human actor, including, e.g., hackers, activists, states, terrorists, malicious insiders, or criminals, were considered. Unintentional human-caused events (such as unintentional breaches or accidents) or non-human-caused events (such as those caused by natural disasters or equipment malfunctions) were not considered.
- **Weapon Types:** All types of cyber weapons, including but not limited to malicious software, botnets, distributed denial-of-service attacks, etc., were considered.
- **Target Types:** Any type of civilian target was considered. Note that for the purposes of the SNRA—which is intended to inform civilian capability development—direct attacks on defense systems were not considered. Additionally, state- and non-state- sponsored espionage was not considered.

⁶ McAfee and the Center for Strategic and International Studies: 10.

⁷ According to the Office of Infrastructure Protection, Department of Homeland Security. http://www.dhs.gov/files/partnerships/editorial_0206.shtm.

⁸ IC participants in the Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure frequency elicitation included subject matter experts from multiple agencies. The frequency estimates (see classified SNRA Technical Report) reflect the opinion of the group and have not been formally vetted by any of the agencies which participated.

- **Time Period:** The SNRA focuses on estimating risk within the next five years, in support of the overall need to focus on future-oriented core capability development.
- **National-level Threshold:** As stated above, the SNRA is designed to assess the risks of those events and incidents which create impacts that rise to a strategic, national-level of impact. Thus, small-scale attacks, which occur on a daily basis, were not considered. Instead, only high-impact events, which could produce a national level of awareness due to major impacts related to life safety, economic damage, psychological damage, social displacement, or environmental damage were considered.

Fatalities, Injuries and Illnesses, Economic Damage

Defensible estimates could not be obtained on these impact measures. Additional analysis will be needed to quantify the human health and economic impacts of the Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure event.

Social Displacement

For the purposes of the SNRA, social displacement was defined as the number of people forced to leave home for a period of two days or longer. Note that there are limitations to this measure of social displacement, as the significant differences between temporary evacuations and permanent displacement due to property destruction are not captured.

- Low and best estimates of social displacement estimates for the Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure national-level event were provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START).⁹ The low estimate of 0 reflects assessed judgment of START subject matter experts. The best estimate of 400 comes from a case study of an evacuation of an U.S. Army base due to a large but accidental power outage: this historical event was considered a reasonable proxy for displacement due to an intentional power outage following a cyber attack on the electrical grid.¹⁰
- No high estimate was determined. However, START subject matter experts noted that a cyber event causing a prolonged power outage over a large area could result in several thousand people evacuating, regardless of the outage cause.

Psychological Distress

Psychological impacts for the SNRA focus on *significant distress* and *prolonged distress*, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. An index for significant distress was created that reflected empirical findings that the scope and severity of an event is more important than the type of event. The equation for this index uses the fatalities, injuries, and displacement associated with an event as primary inputs; a factor elicited from subject matter experts weights the index for differing psychological impact based on the type of event, but as a secondary input.¹¹ The numerical outputs of this index

⁹ START is a Department of Homeland Security University Center of Excellence that focuses on social and behavioral aspects of terrorism, natural disasters, and technological accidents, and the social, behavioral, cultural and economic factors influencing responses to and recovery from catastrophes.

¹⁰ Reed, Charlie and Grant Okubo. "Flooding, power outages force evacuations at Yokota." *Stars and Stripes* (July 6, 2010). <http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/japan/flooding-power-outages-force-evacuations-at-yokota-1.110071>.

¹¹ The Significant Distress Index is calculated from these inputs using a formula proposed by subject matter experts consulted for the SNRA project: $N_{SD} = C_{EF} \times (5 \text{ Fat} + \text{Inj} + \frac{1}{2} D)$, where N_{SD} represents the number of persons significantly distressed, C_{EF} is an expert assessed Event Familiarity Factor, Fat is the number of fatalities, Inj is the number of injuries and/or illnesses, and D is the number of persons displaced (Social Displacement). In words, this formula suggests that there are 5 significantly distressed persons for each life lost; 1 for each person injured; and 1 for each 2 people displaced. This formula was constructed to reflect the empirical finding that the most severe stressor of a disaster is losing a loved one, followed by

Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure

formula were used to assign events to bins of a risk matrix for a semi-quantitative analysis of psychological risk in the SNRA.

Environmental Impacts

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) convened an ad hoc group of environmental experts representing the fields of environmental science, ecological risk, toxicology, and disaster field operations management to estimate environmental impacts for this event. Estimates are based on the following assumptions:

- Experts were elicited to provide estimates in the environmental impact category based on assumptions. Actual environmental/ecological harm that occurs as a result of the events described in a given scenario may vary considerably, and will depend on numerous variables (e.g. chemical or biological agent, contamination extent, persistence, toxicity—both chronic and acute toxicity—and infectivity).
- EPA defined environmental consequence (impact)¹² as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.
- Experts identified the best estimate for environmental impacts as “de minimus” or none. Experts indicated, however, that this depends on the duration of the event. If the impacts of the event (e.g., power outages) occur for longer than a few days, then backup systems for sewage plants, chemical facilities, etc. could fail and result in more severe environmental impacts.

Potential Mitigating Factors

The risk of this type of cyber attack can be mitigated through preparedness strategies that act on both cyber systems and the actual target itself. Cyber strategies include practices such as the use of encryption technologies and the monitoring of network use for anomaly detection.¹³ Target specific strategies include the range of measures that are typically employed to manage the risk to critical infrastructure systems. These will vary from sector to sector, but, in general, strategies to increase resilience will likely assist in mitigating the impacts from this type of cyber attack, as well as other threats and hazards.

Additional Relevant Information

A sample of historical attacks on the SCADA systems of critical infrastructure assets is presented below, in order to provide context for the type of impacts that might reasonably be considered within this event category. Because many, if not all, of these attacks did not produce national-level impacts, a second list of unintentional or non-cyber related failures within the critical

injury, followed by displacement. Uncertainty was captured by applying the index formula to the low, best, and high estimates of these three human impact metrics.

The Event Familiarity Factor is intended to capture the extent to which the event entails an ongoing threat with uncertainty regarding long term effects, is unfamiliar, or that people dread, exacerbating psychological impacts. This factor, ranging from 1.0 for familiar events to 1.3 for unfamiliar events, was provided by subject matter experts for each national-level event included in the SNRA: experts assessed a C_{EF} of 1.0 for the Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure event.

As fatality and injury/illness estimates were not determined, psychological distress estimates could not be calculated for this event.

¹² The 2011 SNRA referred to impacts as ‘consequences’ because of prior usage in quantitative risk assessment (Kaplan and Garrick [1981, March]. On the quantitative definition of risk: *Risk Analysis* 1(1) 11-32). Except where it will cause confusion, ‘impact’ is used synonymously in this document because of pre-existing connotations of the word ‘consequence’ within FEMA.

¹³ See McAfee and the Center for Strategic and International Studies: 24.

infrastructure sectors is presented, in order to provide context on the potential magnitude of impacts produced by events in this category.

Targeted and Nontargeted Attacks on Critical Infrastructure Control Systems ¹⁴
Worcester air traffic communications. In March 1997, a teenager in Worcester, Massachusetts, disabled part of the telephone network using a dial-up modem connected to the system. This disabled phone service to the airport control tower, airport security, the airport fire department, the weather service, and the carriers that use the airport. Also, the tower's main radio transmitter and another transmitter that activates runway lights were shut down, as well as a printer that controllers use to monitor flight progress. The attack also disrupted phone service to 600 homes in a nearby town.
Maroochy Shire sewage spill. In the spring of 2000, a former employee of an Australian organization that develops manufacturing software applied for a job with the local government, but was rejected. Over a 2-month period, this individual reportedly used a radio transmitter on as many as 46 occasions to remotely break into the controls of a sewage treatment system. He altered electronic data for particular sewerage pumping stations and caused malfunctions in their operations, ultimately releasing about 264,000 gallons of raw sewage into nearby rivers and parks.
Los Angeles traffic lights. According to several published reports, in August 2006, two Los Angeles city employees hacked into computers controlling the city's traffic lights and disrupted signal lights at four intersections, causing substantial backups and delays. The attacks were launched prior to an anticipated labor protest by the employees.
CSX train signaling system. In August 2003, the Sobig computer virus was blamed for shutting down train signaling systems throughout the East Coast of the United States. The virus infected the computer system at CSX Corporation's Jacksonville, Florida, headquarters, shutting down signaling, dispatching, and other systems. According to an Amtrak spokesman, 10 Amtrak trains were affected. Train service was either shut down or delayed up to 6 hours.
Davis-Besse power plant. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission confirmed that in January 2003, the Microsoft SQL Server worm known as Slammer infected a private computer network at the idled Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbor, Ohio, disabling a safety monitoring system for nearly 5 hours. In addition, the plant's process computer failed, and it took about 6 hours for it to become available again.
Zotob worm. In August 2005, a round of Internet worm infections knocked 13 of DaimlerChrysler's U.S. automobile manufacturing plants offline for almost an hour, leaving workers idle as infected Microsoft Windows systems were patched. Zotob and its variations also caused computer outages at heavy-equipment maker Caterpillar Inc., aircraft maker Boeing, and several large U.S. news organizations.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, water system. In October 2006, a foreign hacker penetrated security at a water filtering plant. The intruder planted malicious software that was capable of affecting the plant's water treatment operations. The infection occurred through the Internet and did not seem to be an attack that directly targeted the control system.
Lodz, Poland, tram system. In early 2008, a 14-year old boy jerry-rigged an infrared transmitter that allowed him to hack into the switching network of the Lodz, Poland, city tram system and cause four trams to derail, injuring at least a dozen riders.
Siberian hydro-electric plant. In Russia in the summer of 2009, maintenance personnel for a Siberian hydro-electric plant remotely logged on to the plant's control network and set the turbines to operate beyond safe parameters. One of the turbines was ejected from its moorings damaging additional turbines, leading to the generator room being flooded and causing a transformer explosion. The turbine room was destroyed and 75 workers were killed.

¹⁴ The first seven entries in this table are quoted in whole from Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Systems Are Under Way, but Challenges Remain (September 2007): 15–17.

Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure

The Potential Magnitude of Critical Infrastructure Failures^{15,16} (provided for context to encourage participants to consider potential consequences of a cyber attack)

Northeast power blackout. In August 2003, failure of the alarm processor in the control system of FirstEnergy, an Ohio-based electric utility, prevented control room operators from having adequate situational awareness of critical operational changes to the electrical grid. This problem was compounded when the state estimating program at the Midwest Independent System Operator failed due to incomplete information on the electric grid. When several key transmission lines in northern Ohio tripped due to contact with trees, they initiated a cascading failure of 508 generating units at 265 power plants across eight states and a Canadian province.

Taum Sauk Water Storage Dam failure. In December 2005, the Taum Sauk Water Storage Dam, approximately 100 miles south of St. Louis, Missouri, suffered a catastrophic failure, releasing a billion gallons of water. According to the dam's operator, the incident may have occurred because the gauges at the dam read differently than the gauges at the dam's remote monitoring station.

Bellingham, Washington, gasoline pipeline failure. In June 1999, 237,000 gallons of gasoline leaked from a 16-inch pipeline and ignited an hour and a half later, causing three deaths, eight injuries, and extensive property damage. The pipeline failure was exacerbated by poorly performing control systems that limited the ability of the pipeline controllers to see and react to the situation.

Browns Ferry power plant. In August 2006, two circulation pumps at Unit 3 of the Browns Ferry, Alabama, nuclear power plant failed, forcing the unit to be shut down manually. The failure of the pumps was traced to excessive traffic on the control system network, possibly caused by the failure of another control system device.

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¹⁵ This list was provided to the participants in the frequency elicitation, to encourage consideration of potential impacts of a cyber attack against physical infrastructure.

¹⁶ The entries in this table are quoted in whole from Government Accountability Office: 16-17.

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Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure

Appendix K: SNRA Data Set

Table K.1: SNRA Data Summary

Threat or Hazard	Frequency			Fatalities			Injuries/Illnesses			Direct Economic Loss			Social Displacement			Psychological Distress			EFF _*	Environmental Impact	
	Low	Best	High	Low	Best	High	Low	Best	High	Low	Best	High	Low	Best	High	Low	Best	High	Best	2nd Best	
Animal Disease Outbreak	0.04	0.1	0.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,300	15,200	69,000	0	1,000	500	0	0	0	1	Low	Moderate
Drought	0.50	0.63	1.0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,000	8,680	38,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	1		
Earthquake	0.11	0.27	2	0	370	8,900	0	8,700	210,000	107	8,700	105,000	160	27,000	2,000,000	90	27,000	1,400,000	1.1	Moderate	High
Flood	0.5	4	10	0	3	25	0	95	4,500	104	740	16,000	150	29,000	200,000	75	15,000	100,000	1	Moderate	Moderate
Human Pandemic Outbreak	0.017	0.033	0.1	77,000	154,000	230,000	61,000,000	77,000,000	110,000,000	71,000	110,000	180,000	0	0	0	61,000,000	78,000,000	110,000,000	1	Low	Moderate
Hurricane	0.33	1.9	7	0	26	1,200	0	650	30,000	100	5,700	92,000	430	520,000	5,000,000	220	260,000	2,500,000	1	Moderate	High
Space Weather	0.0017	0.0067	0.014	90	2,000	400	10,000	5,700	2,000,000	0	40,000,000	850		20,000,000						De minimus	Moderate
Tornado	0.63	2.9	7	0	22	320	0	250	3,100	100	450	4,700							1		
Wildfire	0.2	0.8	3	0	5	25	0	63	190	100	900	2,800	770	110,000	640,000	390	55,000	320,000	1	Low	High
Winter Storm	0.13	0.56	2	0	50	270	0	1,700	14,000	1,000	3,100	9,000							1		
Biological Food Contamination	0.2	0.64	1.2	0	11	42	200	17,000	45,000				0	400	950	200	17,000	46,000	1	Moderate	Low
Chemical Substance Spill or Release	0.61	1.6	5	1	5	25	0	60	790	0.043	14	330	0	255	5,400	6	230	4,000	1.1	Moderate	High
Combustible/Flamm. Cargo Acc.(Rail)	0.039	0.11	0.22	1	1	1	0	20	52	0.043	0.90	2.9	0	0	0	5	25	59	1		
Dam Failure	0.17	0.54	3	1	17	170	0	50	3,000				1	500	250,000	6	390	130,000	1	Moderate	Moderate
Radiological Substance Release	0.0062	0.0093	0.014	0	230	2,200	0	240	2,300	7,500	8,600	16,000	76,000	150,000	500,000	42,000	82,000	290,000	1.1	Moderate	High
Transportation Systems Failure	0.17	0.57	2	1	8.6	47	0	8.8	145	0.25	200	6,400	0	0	0	5	150	3,600	1		
Aircraft as a Weapon	0.036	0.13	0.27	2	290	2,800	3	640	5,100	4.0	2,500	27,000	0	3,000	32,000	18	4,000	39,000	1.2	Low	Moderate
Armed Assault	0.11	0.48	3	0	1.94	334	0	6	810	0.061	0.51	78	0	0	0	0	18	2,800	1.1	De minimus	De minimus
Explosives Terrorism Attack	0.72	7.0	25	0	1	3,700	0	11	4,500	0.043	3.4	20,000	0	5	400	0	21	39,000	1.2		
Physical Attack on the Power Grid	0.013	0.25	1	0	0	90	0	2	400	15	46	5,700	0	0	0				De minimus	Moderate	
Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)													0	1,800					1.3	Low	Low
Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)													0	100,000	700,000				1.3	Moderate	High
CB Food Contamin. Terrorism Attack													0						1.3	Low	Moderate
Nuclear Terrorism Attack													330,000	2,000,000	3,000,000				1.3	High	High
Radiological Terrorism Attack													25,000	50,000	100,000				1.3	Low	Moderate

* Event Familiarity Factor (see Appendix G)

Cell color key
New or revised
Data are classified
No data

Table K.2: SNRA Core Data

Record Type	Event Group	Threat/Hazard	Place	State	Event Start	Comments/Identifiers	SNRA Fatalities	SNRA Inj/Ill	SNRA Displaced	EFF	SNRA Psych.Distress	SNRA Direct Economic Damage	Event End	Observation Period Start	Observation Period End	Observation Period (years)	Incident Likelihood	Source
Scenario	Natural	Animal Disease Outbreak					0	0	1,000	1.0	500	\$15,200,000,000					0.1	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.316, CFR 0.0002	154,000	77,000,000	0	1.0	78,000,000	\$110,000,000,000					0.033	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Space Weather				Carrington Event - low best estimate	90	400	0	1.0	850	\$5,700,000,000				0.0033	See RSS	
Scenario	Natural	Space Weather				Carrington Event - high best estimate	2,000	10,000	40,000,000	1.0	20,000,000	\$2,000,000,000,000				0.0033	See RSS	
Scenario	Adversarial	Power Grid Physical Attack				Best-estimates scenario	0	2	0			\$46,000,000				0.2500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Drought			6/1/1980	Central/E Drought/Heatwave Summer-Fall 1980	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$27,550,000,000	11/30/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			6/1/1983	Southeast Drought Summer 1983	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$5,700,000,000	8/31/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			6/1/1986	Southeast Drought/Heatwave Summer 1986	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$3,800,000,000	8/31/1986	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			6/1/1988	U.S. Drought/Heatwave Summer 1988	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$38,000,000,000	8/31/1988	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			6/1/1989	Northern Plains Drought Summer-Fall 1989	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$3,800,000,000	11/30/1989	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			3/1/1991	U.S. Drought Spring-Summer 1991	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$4,750,000,000	8/31/1991	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			6/1/1993	Southeast Drought/Heat Wave Summer 1993	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$1,900,000,000	8/31/1993	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			3/1/1994	Southern Plains Drought Spring-Summer 1994	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$1,900,000,000	8/31/1994	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			6/1/1998	Southeast Drought/Heat Wave Summer 1998	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$5,700,000,000	8/31/1998	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			6/1/1999	Eastern Drought/Heat Wave Summer 1999	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$2,850,000,000	8/31/1999	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			3/1/2000	W/Central/ESE Drought/Heatwave Spring-Fall 2000	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$6,650,000,000	11/30/2000	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			3/1/2002	U.S. Drought Spring-Fall 2002	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$10,450,000,000	11/30/2002	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			3/1/2003	W/Central Drought/Heatwave Spring-Fall 2003	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$5,700,000,000	11/30/2003	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			3/1/2005	Midwest Drought Spring-Summer 2005	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$1,900,000,000	8/31/2005	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			3/1/2006	Midwest/Plains/S.E. Drought Spring-Summer 2006	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$1,900,000,000	8/31/2006	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			6/1/2007	W/E Drought/Heatwave Summer-Fall 2007	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$2,850,000,000	11/30/2007	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			1/1/2008	U.S. Drought 2008	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$7,600,000,000	12/31/2008	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			1/1/2009	Southwest/Great Plains Drought 2009	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$3,800,000,000	12/31/2009	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			3/1/2011	S/Plains/SW Drought Spring-Summer 2011	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$12,350,000,000	8/31/2011	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			1/1/2012	U.S. Drought/Heatwave 2012	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$29,450,000,000	12/31/2012	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			3/1/2013	Western/Plains Drought/Heatwave Spring-Fall 2013	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$10,450,000,000	11/30/2013	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Drought			1/1/2014	Western Drought 2014	0	0	0	1.0	0	\$1,900,000,000	12/31/2014	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	San Francisco	CA	4/18/1906	Assumption 1% mitigation	8,896	209,056	11	1.1		\$104,905,367,626	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	El Centro	CA	6/22/1915	Assumption 1% mitigation	13	306	11	1.1		\$131,076,352	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	San Jacinto/Riverside County	CA	4/21/1918	Assumption 1% mitigation	0	0	11			\$193,990,095	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Mona Passage	PR	10/11/1918	Assumption 1% mitigation	138	3,243	11	1.1		\$1,943,953,812	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Santa Barbara	CA	6/29/1925	Assumption 1% mitigation	44	1,034	11	1.1		\$1,371,950,746	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Long Beach	CA	3/11/1933	Assumption 1% mitigation	358	8,413	11	1.1		\$7,565,220,534	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Helena	MT	10/19/1935	Assumption 1% mitigation	5	118	11	1.1		\$960,000,000	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Helena	MT	10/31/1935	Assumption 1% mitigation	3	71	11	1.1		\$512,380,253	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	El Centro/Imperial Valley	CA	5/19/1940	Assumption 1% mitigation	6	141	11	1.1		\$392,000,000	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Puget Sound/Olympia	WA	4/13/1949	Assumption 1% mitigation	24	564	11	1.1		\$3,403,585,667	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Terminal Island	CA	11/18/1949	Assumption 1% mitigation	0	0	11	1.1		\$44,189,342	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Terminal Island	CA	8/15/1951	Assumption 1% mitigation	0	0	11	1.1		\$109,913,6308	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Kern County/Bakersfield	CA	7/21/1952	Assumption 1% mitigation	26	611	11	1.1		\$1,820,696,601	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Kern County/Bakersfield	CA	8/22/1952	Assumption 1% mitigation	4	94	11	1.1		\$662,071,491	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Hebgen Lake	MT	8/18/1959	Assumption 1% mitigation	54	1,269	11	1.1		\$706,863,603	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Prince William Sound/Anchorage	AK	3/28/1964	Assumption 1% mitigation	220	5,170	11	1.1		\$11,213,495,628	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Seattle	WA	4/29/1965	Assumption 1% mitigation	9	212	11	1.1		\$299,194,941	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Santa Rosa	CA	10/21/1969	Assumption 1% mitigation	2	47	11	1.1		\$120,000,000	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	San Fernando	CA	2/9/1971	Assumption 1% mitigation	81	1,904	11	1.1		\$5,083,948,997	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Imperial Valley	CA	10/15/1979	Assumption 1% mitigation	0	0	11	1.1		\$129,804,214	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Whittier/Los Angeles	CA	10/1/1987	Assumption 1% mitigation	9	212	9,000	1.1	5,232	\$795,888,336	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Loma Prieta/San Francisco	CA	10/18/1989	Assumption 1% mitigation	60	1,410	32,500	1.1	19,756	\$10,485,000,000	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Fremdale/Fortuna/Petrolia	CA	4/25/1992	Assumption 1% mitigation	0	0	11	1.1		\$106,971,740	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Landers/Yucca Valley	CA	6/28/1992	Assumption 1% mitigation	3	71	750	1.1	507	\$202,144,394	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Northridge/Los Angeles	CA	1/17/1994	Assumption 1% mitigation	62	1,457	120,000	1.1	67,944	\$78,235,199,499	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Seattle/Tacoma/Olympia	WA	2/28/2000	Assumption 1% mitigation	1	24	400	1.1	251	\$2,378,245,427	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Earthquake	Paso Robles/San Simeon	CA	1/22/2003	Assumption 1% mitigation	2	47	160	1.1	151	\$328,283,332	1/1/1906	7/15/2011	105.53	0.0095	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			3/27/1993	Flooding in SC and TN	3	0	1	0		\$238,068,000						
Incident	Natural	Flood			5/6/1993	Heavy rain in parts of OK, AR, and TX.	5	0	1	0		\$103,635,700	1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			5/8/1993	Extensive flooding, South Central Kansas.	0	0	1	0		\$157,000,000	1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			5/8/1993	Flooding in OK.	0	0	31,000	1.0	15,500	\$157,000,000	1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			8/31/1993	Great Flood of 93.	0	0	0	1.0		\$15,700,000,000	1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			9/24/1993	Steady rains in and around Springfield MO.	1	0	1	0		\$119,013,850	1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			8/18/1994	Heavy rains, flash floods in PA and NY.	3	6	1	0		\$111,766,500	1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			10/16/1994	Texas flooding.	15	0	14,070	1.0	7,110	\$399,146,400	1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	

Record Type	Event Group	Threat/Hazard	Place	State	Event Start	Comments/Identifiers	SNRA Fatalities	SNRA Inj/Ill	SNRA Displaced	EFF	SNRA Psych.Distress	SNRA Direct Economic Damage	Event End	Observation Period Start	Observation Period End	Observation Period (years)	Incident Likelihood	Source
Incident	Natural	Flood			1/10/1995	Flooding, Kern, Los Angeles, San Diego CA.	0	0	1,0		\$166,135,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			3/1/1995	Flooding from Kern to Tulare CA.	0	0	1,0		\$168,072,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			3/10/1995	Salinas river flooding in Monterey County CA	0	0	1,0		\$447,000,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			1/18/1996	Rain, snow melt caused flooding from VA to NY.	22	1	1,0		\$475,800,480		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			2/6/1996	Northern Oregon river flooding.	7	0	24,900	1.0	12,485	\$576,000,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Flood			7/17/1996	Record breaking rainfall over Illinois.	0	0	1,0		\$111,888,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			7/19/1996	Heavy thunderstorms in PA.	2	1	1,0		\$326,160,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			1/1/1997	Melting snow, heavy rain in Southern Oregon.	0	0	18,100	1.0	9,050	\$126,900,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Flood			1/1/1997	Damages in CA from Sierra Nevada rain, snow melt.	3	52	125,000	1.0	62,567	\$1,635,600,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Flood			3/1/1997	Flooding from excessive rain in KY, OH, and WV.	10	3	1,0		\$153,368,520		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			3/1/1997	Record 24 hour rainfall in Jefferson County, KY.	2	0	1,0		\$296,100,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			4/8/1997	Shayenne River flooding in ND.	0	0	50,400	1.0	25,200	\$5,428,500,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Flood			6/20/1997	Flash floods in MN and WI.	0	6	1,0		\$141,751,530		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			7/28/1997	Heavy rains, flash floods in CO.	5	40	424	1.0	277	\$289,162,800		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Flood			8/1/1997	Hail, wind, torrential rain Lakewood, Denver CO.	0	0	1,0		\$180,480,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			2/4/1998	Slow moving Nor'easter battered eastern VA.	0	0	1,0		\$104,250,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			2/23/1998	Powerful Pacific storm southern and central CA.	5	3	1,0		\$152,316,200		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			3/8/1998	Slow moving system dumped much rain on AL.	4	0	18,000	1.0	9,020	\$165,389,150		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Flood			3/8/1998	Gulf storm dumped up to 14 inches of rain, AL, GA.	1	1	1,0		\$543,490,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			3/10/1998	Nearly six inches of rain, multiple counties FL.	0	0	1,0		\$510,130,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			6/1/1998	Agricultural damage from Sierra Nevada snow melt.	0	0	1,0		\$139,556,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			6/26/1998	Sustained flooding, parts of East Central OH.	10	0	14,000	1.0	7,050	\$281,502,800		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Flood			8/5/1998	Slow moving thunderstorms moved through WI.	2	5	1,0		\$114,410,900		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			8/5/1998	Flooding from Devils Lake in ND.	0	0	1,0		\$136,000,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			10/17/1998	The Great October Flood in west Texas.	25	4,520	1,0		\$559,266,500		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			5/7/2000	Heavy rainfall, Jefferson and Franklin county MO.	2	0	300	1.0	160	\$132,660,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Flood			6/19/2000	Heavy thunderstorms in MN, record rainfall amounts.	0	0	1,0		\$147,840,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			8/12/2000	Thunderstorms, near torrential downpours, NJ.	0	0	175	1.0	88	\$237,996,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Flood			10/3/2000	Massive rainfall in South West FL.	0	0	1,0		\$1,254,000,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			4/1/2001	Flooding from rapid snow melt and rain.	3	1	1,0		\$256,000,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			7/8/2001	Severe flash flooding in WV and VA.	1	0	1,0		\$280,748,800		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			10/11/2001	High water in Columbia AR.	0	0	1,0		\$153,605,400		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			5/2/2002	Flash floods in KY, VA, and WV.	4	0	1,0		\$141,233,400		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			6/10/2002	Heavy rainfall, Roseau River overflowed dikes.	0	0	1,0		\$252,000,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			4/6/2003	Heavy rains, flooding, several counties MS.	2	0	1,0		\$325,683,090		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			5/5/2003	Flooding TN, GA and AL.	3	6	1,0		\$1,474,800,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			7/21/2003	Thunderstorm, flash floods throughout OH.	5	0	1,200	1.0	625	\$288,261,570		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Flood			5/23/2004	Stationary front, flooding SE Michigan.	0	0	1,0		\$120,000,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			6/1/2004	Heavy rains, southern WI.	0	0	1,0		\$301,860,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			1/10/2005	Stalled storm system dumped rain throughout UT.	1	6	1,0		\$348,000,000		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Flood			12/30/2005	Widespread flooding, several CA counties.	0	0	3,600	1.0	1,800	\$476,296,320		1/1/1993	12/31/2005	13.00	0.0769	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1970	Celia	11	275	1,0		\$6,850,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1971	Doria	6	150	1,0		\$2,400,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1971	Edith	1	25	1,0		\$310,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1971	Fern	1	25	1,0		\$480,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1971	Ginger	0	0	1,0		\$190,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1972	Agnes	122	3,050	1,0		\$20,300,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1973	Della	5	125	1,0		\$300,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1974	Carmen	1	25	1,0		\$1,140,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1974	Subtrop 1974	0	0	1,0		\$130,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1975	Eloise	21	525	1,0		\$6,230,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1976	Belle	9	225	1,0		\$570,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1978	Amelia	36	900	1,0		\$190,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1979	Claudette	3	75	1,0		\$1,710,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1979	David	1	25	1,0		\$980,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1979	David	1	25	1,0		\$1,570,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1979	Frederic	17	425	1,0		\$12,640,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1980	Allen	2	50	1,0		\$2,060,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1981	Dennis	0	0	1,0		\$140,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1983	Alicia	22	550	1,0		\$9,670,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1984	Diana	4	100	1,0		\$370,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1985	Bob	0	0	1,0		\$120,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1985	Danny	0	0	1,0		\$160,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1985	Elena	9	225	1,000,000	1.0	500,270	\$4,340,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS

Record Type	Event Group	Threat/Hazard	Place	State	Event Start	Comments/Identifiers	SNRA Fatalities	SNRA Inj/Ill	SNRA Displaced	EFF	SNRA Psych.Distress	SNRA Direct Economic Damage	Event End	Observation Period Start	Observation Period End	Observation Period (years)	Incident Likelihood	Source
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1985	Gloria	1	25		1.0		\$520,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1985	Gloria	6	150		1.0		\$2,490,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1985	Juan	11	275		1.0		\$4,560,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1985	Kate	2	50		1.0		\$1,270,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1988	Gilbert	5	125		1.0		\$200,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1989	Allison	4	100		1.0		\$1,680,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1989	Chantal	1	25		1.0		\$280,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1989	Hugo	51	1,275	25,000	1.0	14,030	\$18,320,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1989	Jerry	1	25		1.0		\$210,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1990	Marco	13	325		1.0		\$210,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1991	Bob	16	400	1,200	1.0	1,080	\$3,620,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1992	Andrew	26	650	250,055	1.0	125,808	\$66,770,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1993	Emily	2	50		1.0		\$100,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1994	Alberto	20	500	20,022	1.0	10,611	\$1,290,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1994	Beryl	3	75		1.0		\$180,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1994	Gordon	16	400		1.0		\$1,230,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1995	Erin	3	75	6,000	1.0	3,090	\$820,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1995	Erin	3	75		1.0		\$830,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1995	Jerry	0	0		1.0		\$110,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1995	Opal	23	575	78,000	1.0	39,690	\$7,490,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1996	Bertha	3	75		1.0		\$610,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1996	Fran	32	800	4,000	1.0	2,960	\$7,260,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1996	Josephine	1	25		1.0		\$310,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1997	Danny	4	100		1.0		\$200,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1998	Bonnie	4	100	17,000	1.0	8,620	\$1,440,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1998	Earl	0	0		1.0		\$150,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1998	Frances	3	75		1.0		\$970,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1998	Georges	14	350	5,127	1.0	2,984	\$4,100,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1999	Dennis	2	50		1.0		\$270,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1999	Floyd	50	1,250	3,000,010	1.0	1,501,505	\$7,700,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			1999	Irene	9	225		1.0		\$1,430,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2001	Allison	43	1,075	172,000	1.0	87,290	\$8,330,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2001	Gabrielle	2	50		1.0		\$390,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2002	Isidore	2	50	13,200	1.0	6,660	\$480,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2002	Lili	6	150		1.0		\$1,210,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2003	Claudette	1	25		1.0		\$250,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2003	Isabel	22	550	225,000	1.0	113,160	\$4,820,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2004	Charley	0	0	545	1.0	273	\$120,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2004	Charley	16	400	30,000	1.0	15,480	\$18,520,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2004	Frances	11	275	5,000,000	1.0	2,500,330	\$12,310,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2004	Gaston	0	0		1.0		\$160,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2004	Ivan	25	625		1.0		\$18,480,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2004	Jeanne	8	200	40,000	1.0	20,240	\$9,350,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2005	Cindy	0	0	545	1.0	273	\$360,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2005	Dennis	2	50		1.0		\$2,670,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2005	Katrina	1,200	30,000	500,000	1.0	286,000	\$92,050,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2005	Rita	8	200	300,000	1.0	150,240	\$11,330,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2005	Wilma	16	400	30,000	1.0	15,480	\$26,210,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2006	Ernesto	0	0	140	1.0	70	\$550,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2008	Dolly	2	50		1.0		\$1,080,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2008	Fay	1	25	400	1.0	230	\$590,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2008	Gustav	7	175	2,100,000	1.0	1,050,210	\$4,220,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2008	Hanna	0	0		1.0		\$170,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Hurricane			2008	Ike	31	775	200,000	1.0	100,930	\$19,600,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Tornado	IL, IN, KY		2010	Hermine	12	300		1.0		\$250,000,000		1/1/1970	12/31/2010	41.00	0.0244	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Tornado	OK, AR		4/18/1996	75 tornado cluster: max EF 3	1	118		1.0		\$141,559,990	4/20/1996	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Tornado	KY		4/21/1996	33 tornado cluster: max EF 3	4	112		1.0		\$220,326,680	4/22/1996	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Tornado	KY		5/27/1996	15 tornado cluster: max EF 4	0	11		1.0		\$145,888,600	5/28/1996	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Tornado	TX		5/25/1997	95 tornado cluster: max EF 5	28	35		1.0		\$182,873,600	5/28/1997	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Tornado	MI		7/2/1997	15 tornado cluster: max EF 3	2	98		1.0		\$178,990,000	7/2/1997	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Tornado	FL		2/2/1998	6 tornado cluster: max EF 2	0	0		1.0		\$310,693,200	2/2/1998	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Tornado	FL		2/22/1998	11 tornado cluster: max EF 3	42	259		1.0		\$147,982,920	2/23/1998	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Tornado	MN		3/29/1998	16 tornado cluster: max EF 3	1	2		1.0		\$221,931,600	3/29/1998	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Tornado	AL, FL		4/8/1998	9 tornado cluster: max EF 5	35	286		1.0		\$418,554,000	4/8/1998	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS

Record Type	Event Group	Threat/Hazard	Place	State	Event Start	Comments/Identifiers	SNRA Fatalities	SNRA Inj/Ill	SNRA Displaced	EFF	SNRA Psych.Distress	SNRA Direct Economic Damage	Event End	Observation Period Start	Observation Period End	Observation Period (years)	Incident Likelihood	Source
Incident	Natural	Tornado	TN, KY, AR		4/15/1998	58 tornado cluster; max EF 5	12	152	1.0		\$210,204,360	4/16/1998	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	NY, PA		5/31/1998	72 tornado cluster; max EF 4	3	189	1.0		\$163,645,920	6/1/1998	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	TN, AR		1/21/1999	129 tornado cluster; max EF 4	9	162	1.0		\$122,322,150	1/22/1999	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	OH		4/9/1999	8 tornado cluster; max EF 4	4	67	1.0		\$121,837,500	4/9/1999	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	OK, TX, KS		5/3/1999	107 tornado cluster; max EF 5	47	861	1.0		\$1,882,923,300	5/5/1999	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	UT		8/11/1999	1 tornado cluster; max EF 2	1	80	1.0		\$229,500,000	8/11/1999	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	TX		3/12/2001	1 tornado cluster; max EF 1	0	0	1.0		\$387,350,000	3/12/2001	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	MD		9/24/2001	8 tornado cluster; max EF 4	2	59	1.0		\$133,579,870	9/24/2001	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	OK		10/9/2001	19 tornado cluster; max EF 3	0	10	1.0		\$128,351,280	10/9/2001	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	MD, OH		4/28/2002	21 tornado cluster; max EF 4	3	143	1.0		\$230,312,500	4/28/2002	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	OH, MS, TN, AL, OH, PA		11/9/2002	77 tornado cluster; max EF 3	32	284	1.0		\$200,260,000	11/1/2002	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	OK, TN, MO, IL, KS, KY		5/4/2003	315 tornado cluster; max EF 4	36	605	1.0		\$1,027,065,760	5/1/2003	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	VA, GA, FL		9/15/2004	118 tornado cluster; max EF 3	7	41	1.0		\$102,474,470	9/18/2004	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	MS		4/6/2005	23 tornado cluster; max EF 3	0	10	1.0		\$599,850,350	4/6/2005	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	KY		11/6/2005	3 tornado cluster; max EF 3	24	243	1.0		\$103,201,000	11/6/2005	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	AR, KY, TN, IL		4/2/2006	67 tornado cluster; max EF 3	27	348	1.0		\$214,368,000	4/2/2006	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	TN, AR, GA, KY		4/7/2006	55 tornado cluster; max EF 3	10	144	1.0		\$116,824,960	4/6/2006	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	FL		2/2/2007	4 tornado cluster; max EF 3	21	76	1.0		\$235,444,320	2/2/2007	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	AL, GA		3/1/2007	35 tornado cluster; max EF 4	19	97	1.0		\$449,241,120	3/2/2007	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	KS		5/4/2007	139 tornado cluster; max EF 5	14	89	1.0		\$289,417,320	5/9/2007	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	TN, MS, AL, AR, KY		2/5/2008	85 tornado cluster; max EF 4	44	286	1.0		\$407,381,520	2/6/2008	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	OK, AR, GA, MO		5/10/2008	72 tornado cluster; max EF 4	24	400	1.0		\$215,957,040	5/11/2008	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	CO, KS		5/22/2008	113 tornado cluster; max EF 4	3	87	1.0		\$163,545,200	5/24/2008	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	IA		5/25/2008	8 tornado cluster; max EF 5	9	73	1.0		\$106,229,760	5/25/2008	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	AR		4/9/2009	23 tornado cluster; max EF 3	3	44	1.0		\$162,021,300	4/10/2009	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	TN, GA, SC		4/10/2009	63 tornado cluster; max EF 4	2	102	1.0		\$132,940,500	4/10/2009	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	LA		4/23/2010	37 tornado cluster; max EF 4	10	202	1.0		\$451,956,790	4/25/2010	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	IL, MI, OH		6/3/2010	51 tornado cluster; max EF 4	8	75	1.0		\$277,366,640	6/6/2010	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	IA		7/22/2010	3 tornado cluster; max EF 1	0	0	1.0		\$77,813,250	7/23/2010	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	OK, MO, IL		12/30/2010	25 tornado cluster; max EF 3	9	29	1.0		\$113,346,350	1/2/2011	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	MS		4/4/2011	20 tornado cluster; max EF 2	0	3	1.0		\$508,137,000	4/4/2011	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	AL, AR, MS, OK		4/14/2011	116 tornado cluster; max EF 3	12	107	1.0		\$155,469,000	4/16/2011	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	NC		4/16/2011	54 tornado cluster; max EF 3	24	456	1.0		\$401,266,000	4/16/2011	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	AL, GA, MS, TN, VA		4/22/2011	382 tornado cluster; max EF 5	316	3,125	1.0		\$4,676,142,000	4/28/2011	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	MO, OK, IL, AR, KS		5/20/2011	188 tornado cluster; max EF 5	173	1,545	1.0		\$2,839,996,000	5/26/2011	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	MN, WI		5/21/2011	34 tornado cluster; max EF 2	1	52	1.0		\$190,982,000	5/23/2011	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Tornado	MA		6/1/2011	4 tornado cluster; max EF 3	3	200	1.0		\$227,600,000	6/1/2011	1/1/1996	12/31/2011	16.00	0.0625	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Oakland	CA	10/20/1991	Oakland Hills Fire	25	150	1.0		\$2,803,063,000	10/20/1991	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Sacramento	CA	10/26/1993		0	89	1.0		\$514,587,000	10/31/1993	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Los Angeles	CA	10/27/1993	Old Topanga Fire	6	187	1.0		\$2,221,587,000	11/4/1993	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Central Florida	FL	5/31/1998		0	150	1.0		\$261,731,000	7/30/1998	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Chelan	WA	8/2/1998		0	0	1.0		\$123,978,000	8/30/1998	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Los Alamos	NM	5/4/2000	Cerro Grande	0	0	25,400	1.0	\$1,966,720,000	5/31/2000	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Tehama	CA	9/29/2000		0	0	1.0		\$717,197,000	9/30/2000	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Pima	AZ	6/17/2003	Rodeo-Chediski Fire	0	0	1,269	1.0	\$35,641,040,000	7/15/2003	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	San Diego	CA	10/25/2003	Cedar Fire	22	157	27,104	1.0	\$13,819	2/5/2004	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Carson	TX	3/12/2006		12	8	1.0		\$107,289,000	3/18/2006	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Wheeler	TX	4/11/2006		0	2	1.0		\$103,553,000	4/3/2006	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Alpine	CA	6/24/2007	Alpine Fire	0	3	768	1.0	387	\$544,127,000	6/30/2007	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	San Diego County	CA	10/21/2007		10	132	640,064	1.0	320,214	\$748,175,000	10/31/2007	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Wildfire	Sacramento	CA	11/15/2008		0	0	55,000	1.0	27,500	\$156,960,000	11/19/2008	1/1/1990	12/31/2009	20.00	0.0500	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			1/8/1982	Midwest/SE/NE Winter Storm/Coldwave	85	2,250	1.0		\$1,900,000,000	1/6/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			12/24/1983	Florida Freeze	0	0	1.0		\$4,750,000,000	1/25/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			1/19/1985	Winter Damage, Cold Wave: SE, S, SW, NE, Midwest, N	150	4,000	1.0		\$1,900,000,000	1/22/1985	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			1/20/1985	Florida Freeze	0	0	1.0		\$2,850,000,000	1/22/1985	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			1/22/1989	Winter Damage, Cold Wave: Frost: NE, SE	100	2,700	1.0		\$950,000,000	1/26/1989	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			1/23/1989	Florida Freeze	10	270	1.0		\$3,800,000,000	1/25/1989	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			12/18/1990	California Freeze	0	0	1.0		\$5,700,000,000	12/25/1990	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			12/10/1992	Northeast: Northeast, New England	19	500	1.0		\$3,800,000,000	1/21/1992	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			3/11/1993	Storm of the Century	270	3,200	1.0		\$8,550,000,000	3/4/1993	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			1/17/1994	Winter Damage, Cold Wave: Winter storm SE, NE	70	1,859	1.0		\$1,900,000,000	1/20/1994	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS	
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			2/8/1994	Southeast Ice Storm	9	14,400	1.0									

Record Type	Event Group	Threat/Hazard	Place	State	Event Start	Comments/Identifiers	SNRA Fatalities	SNRA Inj/Ill	SNRA Displaced	EFF	SNRA Psych.Distress	SNRA Direct Economic Damage	Event End	Observation Period Start	Observation Period End	Observation Period (years)	Incident Likelihood	Source
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			1/5/1998	Northeast Ice Storm	16	16	1.0			\$1,900,000,000	1/9/1998	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			1/22/01/1998	California Freeze	0	0	1.0			\$3,800,000,000	1/22/1998	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			1/1/1999	Winter Storm S, SE, Midwest, NE	25	150	1.0			\$950,000,000	1/1/1999	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			1/13/1999	Central & Eastern Winter Storm	0	480	1.0			\$950,000,000	1/16/1999	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			1/11/2007	California Freeze	1	0	1.0			\$1,900,000,000	1/17/2007	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			4/4/2007	Spring Freeze	0	0	1.0			\$1,900,000,000	4/10/2007	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Natural	Winter Storm			2/1/2011	Groundhog Day Blizzard	36	950	1.0			\$1,900,000,000	02/03/11	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Biological Food Contamination			1998	1998 Lysteria-Hot Dog	42	212	1.0					1/1/1998	12/31/2008	11.00	0.0909	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Biological Food Contamination			2004	2004 Salmonella-Roma Tomato	0	12,570	1.0					1/1/1998	12/31/2008	11.00	0.0909	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Biological Food Contamination			2006	2006 E. Coli-Spinach	10	6,212	1.0			\$67,400,000		1/1/1998	12/31/2008	11.00	0.0909	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Biological Food Contamination			2006	2006 Salmonella-Peanut Butter	18	20,950	1.0					1/1/1998	12/31/2008	11.00	0.0909	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Biological Food Contamination			2007	2007 Salmonella-Pot Pie	6	11,749	1.0					1/1/1998	12/31/2008	11.00	0.0909	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Biological Food Contamination			2008	2008 Salmonella-Jalapeno/Serrano Peppers	4	44,976	1.0					1/1/1998	12/31/2008	11.00	0.0909	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Biological Food Contamination			2008	2008 Salmonella-Peanut Butter	18	20,979	1.0					1/1/1998	12/31/2008	11.00	0.0909	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Pensacola	FL	12/13/1994	Fertilizer Manufacturing Facility, Ammonia	4	27	2,000	1.1	1,152	\$327,678,968		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Alberton	MT	4/11/1996	Rail Transport, Chlorine	1	787	0	1.1	871	\$19,675,515		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Lancaster	OH	8/26/1997	Farm Supplies Facility, Ammonia	5	0	0	1.1	28	\$212,500		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Sacaton	AZ	11/3/1997	Agriculture Facility, Ammonia	1	1	0	1.1	7	\$118,592		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Orlando	FL	2/23/1998	Sewage Treatment Facility, Chlorine	9	1	0	1.1	51	\$389,100		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Centralia	KS	4/22/1998	Farm Supplies Wholesaler Facility, Ammonia	12	0	0	1.1	66	\$510,000		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Tacoma	WA	10/10/1998	Refrigerated Warehouse Facility, Ammonia	5	0	0	1.1	28	\$15,714,379		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Franklinton	LA	10/26/1998	Corn Farming Facility, Ammonia	25	0	0	1.1	138	\$1,062,500		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Green River	WY	5/1/2000	Ice Manufacturing Facility, Ammonia	1	2	0	1.1	8	\$55,700		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Jefferson	OK	5/17/2000	Chemical Manufacturing Facility, HCl	15	0	0	1.1	83	\$637,895		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Hammond	LA	4/2/2001	Milk Manufacturing Facility, Ammonia	1	12	0	1.1	19	\$7,541,017		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Newberg	OR	7/14/2001	Petrochemical Manufacturing Facility, Chlorine	3	51	0	1.1	73	\$608,918		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Mesquite	NM	10/16/2001	Corn Farming Facility, Ammonia	1	2	0	1.1	8	\$811,270		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Minot	ND	1/18/2002	Rail Transport, Ammonia	1	0	0	1.1	6	\$42,500		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Soddy Daisy	TN	4/11/2003	Syrup Manufacturing Facility, Ammonia	1	0	0	1.1	6	\$7,448,305		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Lakewood	CO	4/21/2003	Farm Supplies Wholesaler Facility, Ammonia	1	6	0	1.1	12	\$82,223		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Pampa	TX	7/13/2003	Seafood Processing Facility, Ammonia	1	3	0	1.1	9	\$62,300		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Paynesville	MN	11/4/2003	Farm Raw Material Wholesaler Facility, Ammonia	1	1	0	1.1	7	\$49,100		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Jillipolis	IL	4/23/2004	Plastic Manufacturing Facility, Vinyl acetate monomer	5	6	0	1.1	34	\$252,100		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Seymour	IN	5/25/2004	Farm Supplies Wholesaler Facility, Ammonia	10	0	0	1.1	55	\$425,000		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Macdon	TX	6/28/2004	Rail Transport, Chlorine	3	66	0	1.1	89	\$563,100		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Graniteville	SC	1/6/2005	Rail Transport, Chlorine	9	631	5,400	1.1	3,714	\$13,848,553		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Sanford	FL	1/8/2005	Highway Transport, Carbon dioxide (refrigerated liquid)	2	0	0	1.1	11	\$85,000		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Ebensburg	PA	8/28/2004	Animal Slaughtering Facility, Ammonia	10	4	0	1.1	59	\$451,400		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Westlake	LA	6/27/2007	Pigment Manufacturing Facility, Titanium tetrachloride	1	1	0	1.1	7	\$243,595		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Hollywood	FL	5/20/2008	Water Transport, Argon (refrigerated liquid)	3	0	0	1.1	17	\$127,500		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Swansea	SC	7/15/2009	Highway Transport, Ammonia	1	7	0	1.1	13	\$89,427		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Chemical Accident	Cincinnati	OH	11/16/2009	Farm Supplies Wholesaler Facility, Ammonia	2	0	0	1.1	11	\$85,000		1/1/1994	12/31/2010	17.00	0.0588	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Combustible/Flammable Rail	San Antonio	TX	6/8/1986	Butadiene inhibited (flammable gas)	1	0	0	1.0	5	\$42,500	6/8/1986	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Combustible/Flammable Rail	Cajon	CA	2/1/1996	Butylacrylate (flammable-combustible liquid)	1	52	0	1.0	57	\$485,794	2/1/1996	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Combustible/Flammable Rail	Texarkana	AR	10/15/2005	Propylene (flammable gas)	1	21	0	1.0	26	\$205,070	10/15/2005	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Combustible/Flammable Rail	Cherry Valley	IL	6/19/2009	Alcohols N.O.S. (flammable-combustible liquid)	1	8	0	1.0	13	\$2,886,612	6/19/2009	1/1/1980	12/31/2014	35.00	0.0286	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		NY	1/1/1960	Electric Light Pond Dam	1			1.0				1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		CT	3/6/1963	Mohegan Park Dam	6	6	1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		UT	6/16/1963	Little Deer Creek Dam	11		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		CA	12/14/1963	Baldwin Hills Dam	5		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		MT	6/8/1964	Swift Dam	19		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		CO	6/17/1965	Cripple Creek Dam No. 3, domino failure Dam No. 2	1		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		MA	3/24/1968	Lee Lake Dam	2		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		IA	7/17/1968	Virden Creek Dam	1		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		WV	2/26/1972	Buffalo Creek Coal Waste Dam	125	1,000	1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		AK	4/1/1972	Lake "O" Hills	1		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		SD	6/9/1972	Canyon Lake Dam	165	3,000	1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		SC	9/8/1975	Lakeside Dam	1		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		NC	2/22/1976	Bear Wallow Dam	4		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		ID	6/5/1976	Teton Dam	11	800	1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		PA	7/20/1977	Laurel Run Dam	40		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		GA	11/6/1977	Kelly Barnes Dam	39		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		KY	12/18/1981	Eastover Mining Co. Dam	1		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		CO	7/15/1982	Lawn Lake Dam + Cascade Lake Dam	3		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS

Record Type	Event Group	Threat/Hazard	Place	State	Event Start	Comments/Identifiers	SNRA Fatalities	SNRA Inj/Ill	SNRA Displaced	EFF	SNRA Psych.Distress	SNRA Direct Economic Damage	Event End	Observation Period Start	Observation Period End	Observation Period (years)	Incident Likelihood	Source	
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		UT	6/23/1983	D.M.A.D. Dam	1		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		TX	3/29/1988	Nix Lake Dam	1		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		NC	9/15/1989	Evans Dam + Lockwood Dam	2		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		SC	10/10/1990	Kendall Lake Dam	4		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		VA	6/22/1990	Timberlake Dam	2		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		NH	3/3/1990	Bergeron Pond Dam	1	2	1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		ND	6/1/2000	Mike Olson Dam (Grand Forks Co. Comm. No. 1 Dam)	2		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Dam Failure		HI	3/1/2000	Ka Loa Dam	7		1.0					1/1/1960	12/31/2009	50.00	0.0200	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	New Orleans	LA	1964	Lake Pontchartrain Bridge	6	0	0	1.0	30			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Point Pleasant	WV	1967	Silver Bridge (Ohio River)	46	9	0	1.0	239			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Brunswick	GA	1972	Sidney Lanier Bridge	10	0	0	1.0	50			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Pasadena	CA	1972	Motorway Bridge	6	0	0	1.0	30			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	New Orleans	LA	1974	Lake Pontchartrain Bridge	3	0	0	1.0	15			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Manchac Swamp	LA	1976	21-Span Pass Manchac Bridge	2	2	0	1.0	12			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	St. Petersburg	FL	1980	Sunshine Skyway Bridge	35	0	0	1.0	175			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Indianapolis	IN	1982	Multiple Span (East Chicago, Indianapolis)	13	18	0	1.0	83			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Syracuse	NY	1982	Syracuse Bridge	1	5	0	1.0	10			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Greenwich	CT	1983	Connecticut Turnpike Bridge	3	3	0	1.0	18			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Denver	CO	1985	Walnut St. Viaduct	1	4	0	1.0	9			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	El Paso	TX	1987	El Paso Bridge	1	7	0	1.0	12			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	San Francisco	CA	1989	Oakland Bay Bridge	1	0	0	1.0	5			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Mobile	AL	1993	Truss Bridge	47	0	0	1.0	235			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Concord	NH	1993	Truss Bridge	2	7	0	1.0	17			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Cooling	GA	1995	Interstate 5	7	0	0	1.0	35			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Clifton	TN	1995	3-Span 3-Girder	1	0	0	1.0	5			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Port Isabel	TX	2001	Queen Isabella Causeway	8	0	0	1.0	40			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Marcy	NY	2002	Marcy Bridge (Utica-Rome Expressway)	1	9	0	1.0	14			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Richland	TX	2002	Highway 14 Overpass	1	1	0	1.0	6			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Napa	CA	2003	Imola Avenue Bridge	1	7	0	1.0	12			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Denver	CO	2004	Interstate 70 Bridge	3	0	0	1.0	15			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Shelby	NC	2004	Shelby	1	2	0	1.0	7			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Minneapolis	MN	2007	I-35W Bridge	13	145	0	1.0	210			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Incident	Accidental	Transportation Systems Failure	Oakland	CA	2007	MacArthur Maze	1	0	0	1.0	5			1/1/1960	12/31/2013	44.00	0.0227	See RSS	
Scenario	Adversarial	Aircraft as a Weapon				USAAF B-25 bomber crashes into Empire State Building*	14	26	0	12	115	\$28,063,000						0.0119	See RSS
Scenario	Adversarial	Aircraft as a Weapon				Ramstein Air Show Disaster (Ramstein, Germany)*	70	1,500	0	12	2,220	\$173,194,000						0.0119	See RSS
Scenario	Adversarial	Aircraft as a Weapon				Scenario - Flight 1862 Crash (Amsterdam, Netherlands)*	47	26	250	12	463	\$92,740,000						0.0119	See RSS
Scenario	Adversarial	Aircraft as a Weapon				Air France Concorde Crash (Paris, France)*	113	6	0	12	685	\$221,615,000						0.0119	See RSS
Scenario	Adversarial	Aircraft as a Weapon	New York, Virginia, Pennsylvania		9/11/2001	September 11th Attacks	2,753	5,124	32,000	12	41,867	\$26,902,541,000						0.0119	See RSS
Scenario	Adversarial	Aircraft as a Weapon				Small plane hits the Pirelli Tower (Milan, Italy)*	3	30	0	12	54	\$6,600,000						0.0119	See RSS
Scenario	Adversarial	Aircraft as a Weapon				Small plane crashes in park (San Dimas, CA)	4	9	0	12	35	\$8,056,000						0.0119	See RSS
Scenario	Adversarial	Aircraft as a Weapon				Ukraine Air Show Disaster (Lviv, Ukraine)	77	241	0	12	751	\$156,698,000						0.0119	See RSS
Scenario	Adversarial	Aircraft as a Weapon				Military plane crashes into building (Tehran, Iran)	115	90	250	12	948	\$227,551,000						0.0119	See RSS
Scenario	Adversarial	Aircraft as a Weapon				Small plane hits apartment complex (New York, NY)	2	3	80	12	64	\$3,992,000						0.0119	See RSS
Scenario	Adversarial	Aircraft as a Weapon	Austin	TX	2/18/2010	Suicide attack on IRS Building	2	13	0	12	28	\$4,232,000						0.0119	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Chattanooga	TN	4/19/1980	Ku Klux Klan - Shooting - Crowd	0	4	0	11	4.4	\$240,000	4/19/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Fort Buchanan	PR	11/27/1981	PR-nationalists - Shooting - Military base	0	1	0	11	1.1	\$61,000	11/27/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	San Juan	PR	5/16/1982	PR-nationalists - Shooting - U.S. Navy sailors	1	3	0	11	8.8	\$270,000	5/16/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Villa Sin Miedo	PR	5/19/1982	PR-nationalists - Shooting - Police	1	12	0	11	18.7	\$820,000	5/19/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Medina	ND	2/13/1983	Sheriff's Pos. Comitäl - Shooting - Police, U.S. Marshals	2	4	0	11	15.4	\$410,000	2/13/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Bayamon	PR	11/6/1985	PR-nationalists - Shooting - U.S. Army soldier	0	1	0	11	1.1	\$61,000	11/6/1985	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	New York	NY	3/1/1994	Individual - Shooting - Jewish students in van	1	3	0	11	8.8	\$270,000	3/1/1994	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Multiple	IL, IN	7/2/1999	Individual - Multiple Shootings - Multiple minorities	2	8	0	11	19.8	\$660,000	7/1/1999	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Granada Hills	CA	8/10/1999	Individual - Multiple Shootings - Jews, Asians	1	5	0	11	11	\$390,000	8/10/1999	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Los Angeles	CA	7/4/2002	Individual - Shooting - El Al terminal LAX	2	4	0	11	15.4	\$410,000	7/4/2002	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Chapel Hill	NC	3/2/2006	Individual - Car driven into crowd - UNC campus	0	9	0	11	9.9	\$550,000	3/2/2006	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Little Rock	AR	6/1/2009	Individual - Shooting - Recruiting center	1	1	0	11	6.6	\$150,000	6/1/2009	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Washington	DC	6/1/2009	Individual - Shooting - U.S. Holocaust Museum	1	0	0	11	5.5	\$85,000	6/1/2009	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Fort Hood	TX	11/5/2009	Individual - Shooting - Fellow soldiers	13	32	0	11	106.7	\$3,000,000	11/5/2009	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Oak Creek	WI	8/5/2012	Individual - Shooting - Sikh worshippers	6	4	0	11	37.4	\$750,000	8/5/2012	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	Washington	DC	8/15/2012	Individual - Shooting - Family Research Council	0	1	0	11	1.1	\$61,000	8/15/2012	1/1/1980	12/31/2012	33.00	0.0303	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	San Juan	PR	1/7/1980	Pipe Bombing: Anti-Communist Alliance	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/7/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	1/13/1980	Bombing: Omega 7	0	4	0	12	4.8	\$1,152,000	1/13/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Miami, FL	FL	1/3/1980	Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/3/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS	
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	San Juan	PR	1/19/1980	Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/19/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS	

Record Type	Event Group	Threat/Hazard	Place	State	Event Start	Comments/Identifiers	SNRA Fatalities	SNRA Inj/Ill	SNRA Displaced	EFF	SNRA Psych.Distress	SNRA Direct Economic Damage	Event End	Observation Period Start	Observation Period End	Observation Period (years)	Incident Likelihood	Source
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	3/17/1980	Bombing: Croatian Freedom Fighters	0	3	0	12	4	\$864,000	3/17/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	3/25/1980	Attempted Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/25/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Washington DC	DC	6/3/1980	Bombing: Croatian Freedom Fighters	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	6/3/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	6/3/1980	Bombing: Croatian Freedom Fighters	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	6/3/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Dorado, San Juan	PR	7/14/1980	Multiple Bombings (2): Org. Volunteers PR Revolution	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	7/14/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Ponce, Mayaguez	PR	7/14/1980	Multiple Arsons (2): Org. Volunteers PR Revolution	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	7/14/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Multiple	PR	7/22/1980	Multiple Bombings (4): Rev. Commandos of the People	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	7/22/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Berkeley	CA	8/20/1980	Pipe Bombing: Iranian Free Army	0	2	0	12	2	\$576,000	8/20/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	10/7/1980	Attempted Bombing: Int'l Committee Against Nazism	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	10/7/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	10/12/1980	Bombing: Justice Commandos Armenian Genocide	0	4	0	12	5	\$1,152,000	10/12/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Hollywood	CA	10/12/1980	Bombing: Justice Commandos Armenian Genocide	0	1	0	12	1	\$288,000	10/12/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	12/21/1980	Pipe Bombing: Armed Forces of Popular Resistance	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/21/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Hialeah, FL	FL	12/30/1980	Attempted Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/30/1980	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Multiple	PR	1/8/1981	Multiple Incendiary Bombings (3): Peop. Rev. Commdos	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/8/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	San Juan	PR	1/21/1981	Bombing: Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/21/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	1/23/1981	Bombing: Croatian Freedom Fighters	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/23/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	San Francisco	CA	1/26/1981	Bombing: JDL/American Revenge Committee	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/26/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Los Angeles	CA	2/21/1981	Attempted Bombing: October 3	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/21/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Hollywood	CA	2/22/1981	Bombing: Armenian Secret Army	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/22/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	San Juan	PR	3/15/1981	Attempted Bombing: Armed Forces Popular Resistance	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/15/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Washington, DC	DC	4/27/1981	Incendiary Bombing: Iranian Patriotic Army	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/27/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	5/16/1981	Multiple Bombings (5): Puerto Rican Armed Resistance	1	0	0	12	6	\$311,200	5/18/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Torrance	CA	6/25/1981	Incendiary Bombing: Jewish Defenders	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	6/25/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Los Angeles	CA	6/26/1981	Bombing: June 9 Organization	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	6/26/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Washington, DC	DC	8/20/1981	Arson: Black Brigade	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	8/20/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Los Angeles	CA	8/20/1981	Bombing: June 9 Organization	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	8/20/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Carolina	PR	8/27/1981	Bombing: Grupo Estrella	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	8/27/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	9/3/1981	Multiple Bombings (2): Jewish Defense League	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/4/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Miami, FL	FL	9/11/1981	Multiple Bombings (2): Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/11/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	9/12/1981	Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/12/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Schenectady	NY	9/22/1981	Bombing: Communist Workers Party	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/22/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Miami, FL	FL	9/24/1981	Attempted Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/24/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Hollywood	CA	10/1/1981	Bombing: Armenian Secret Army	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	10/1/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	10/25/1981	Incendiary Bombing: Jewish Defense League	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	10/25/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Santurce	PR	11/11/1981	Bombing: Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	11/11/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Los Angeles	CA	11/20/1981	Bombing: Justice Commandos Armenian Genocide	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	11/20/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Santurce, Condado	PR	11/27/1981	Multiple Bombings (2): Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	11/27/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	12/4/1981	Attempted Pipe Bombing: Jewish Defense League	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/4/1981	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Miami, FL	FL	2/19/1982	Multiple Bombings (2): Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/19/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Washington, DC	DC	2/19/1982	Bombing: Jewish Defense League	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/19/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Rio Piedras	PR	2/21/1982	Pipe Bombing: Antonia Martinez Student Commandos	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/21/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	2/28/1982	Multiple Bombings (4): Armed Forces Nati'l Liberation	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/28/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Cambridge	MA	3/22/1982	Bombing: Justice Commandos Armenian Genocide	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/22/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Brooklyn	NY	4/5/1982	Arsen: Jewish Defense League	1	7	0	12	14.4	\$2,327,200	4/5/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	4/28/1982	Multiple Bombings (2): Jewish Defense League	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/28/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	San Juan, Bayamon	PR	4/29/1982	Multiple Bombings (2): Provisional Coordinating Cmte.	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/29/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Union City, NJ	NJ	5/17/1982	Incendiary Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/17/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Old San Juan	PR	5/20/1982	Attempted Bombing: Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/20/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Naranjito	PR	9/1/1982	Attempted Bombing: Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/1/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Miami, FL	FL	9/2/1982	Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/2/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Chicago	IL, IN	9/8/1982	Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/8/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	9/20/1982	Bombing: Armed Forces of National Liberation	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/20/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Miami, FL	FL	9/25/1982	Attempted Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/25/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Philadelphia, PA	PA	10/22/1982	Attempted Bombing: Justice Com. Armenian Genocide	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	10/22/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Washington, DC	DC	12/8/1982	Attempted Bombing: Individual	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/8/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Elmont	NY	12/16/1982	Multiple Bombings (2): United Freedom Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/16/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	12/21/1982	Attempted Pipe Bombing: Jewish Defense League	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/21/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	12/31/1982	Multiple Bombings (5): Armed Forces of Nati'l Liberation	0	3	0	12	3.6	\$864,000	12/31/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Miami, FL	FL	1/1/1983	Multiple Bombings (3): Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/1/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS

Record Type	Event Group	Threat/Hazard	Place	State	Event Start	Comments/Identifiers	SNRA Fatalities	SNRA Inj/Ill	SNRA Displaced	EFF	SNRA Psych.Distress	SNRA Direct Economic Damage	Event End	Observation Period Start	Observation Period End	Observation Period (years)	Incident Likelihood	Source
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	1/28/1983	Bombing: Revolutionary Fighting Group	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/28/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Washington, DC	DC	2/19/1983	Pipe Bombing: Jewish Defense League	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/19/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	San Antonio, TX	TX	3/20/1983	Bombing: Republic of Revolutionary	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/20/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Washington	DC	4/26/1983	Bombing: Armed Resistance Unit	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/26/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Miami	FL	4/27/1983	Attempted Bombings: (4): Haitian Extremists	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/27/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Uniondale	NY	5/12/1983	Bombing: United Freedom Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/12/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	5/13/1983	Bombing: United Freedom Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/13/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Miami	FL	5/27/1983	Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/27/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Detroit	MI	8/8/1983	Attempted Incendiary Bombing: Fugra	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	8/8/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Washington	DC	8/17/1983	Bombing: Armed Resistance Unit	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	8/17/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	8/21/1983	Bombing: United Freedom Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	8/21/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Washington	DC	8/27/1983	Incendiary Bombing: Unknown	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	8/27/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Miami	FL	10/12/1983	Pipe Bombing: Omega 7	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	10/12/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Hato Rey	PR	10/30/1983	Rocket Attack: Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	10/30/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Washington	DC	11/7/1983	Bombing: Armed Resistance Unit	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	11/7/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	East Meadow	NY	12/13/1983	Multiple Bombings: (2): United Freedom Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/14/1983	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	1/29/1984	Bombing: United Freedom Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/29/1984	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	2/23/1984	Bombing: Jewish Direct Action	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/23/1984	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Harrison	NY	3/19/1984	Bombing: United Freedom Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/19/1984	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	4/5/1984	Bombing: Red Guerrilla Resistance	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/5/1984	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Washington	DC	4/20/1984	Bombing: Red Guerrilla Resistance	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/20/1984	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Melville	NY	8/22/1984	Bombing: United Freedom Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	8/22/1984	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	9/26/1984	Bombing: Red Guerrilla Resistance	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/26/1984	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Mount Pleasant	NY	9/26/1984	Bombing: United Freedom Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/26/1984	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Multiple	PR	10/10/1984	Multiple Bombings: (5): Org. Volunteers PR Revolution	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	10/10/1984	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Old San Juan	PR	1/25/1985	Rocket Attack: Multiple PR-nationalist groups	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/25/1985	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	2/23/1985	Bombing: Red Guerrilla Resistance	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/23/1985	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Northridge	CA	5/15/1985	Pipe Bombing: Jewish Defense League	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/15/1985	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Paterson	NJ	8/15/1985	Bombing: Jewish Defense League	1	1	0	12	72	\$599,200	8/15/1985	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Brentwood	NY	9/6/1985	Bombing: Jewish Defense League	0	1	0	12	1,2	\$288,000	9/6/1985	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Santa Ana	CA	11/10/1985	Bombing: Jewish Defense League	1	7	0	12	14,4	\$2,372,200	11/10/1985	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Multiple	PR	1/6/1986	Multiple Bombings: (4): Multiple PR-nationalist groups	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/6/1986	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Ponce	PR	3/17/1986	Attempted Bombing: Commando Rojo	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/17/1986	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Rio Piedras	PR	4/1/1986	Bombing: Org. Volunteers PR Revolution	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/1/1986	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Coeur d'Alene	ID	9/15/1986	Pipe Bombing: Aryan Nations	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/15/1986	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Coeur d'Alene	ID	9/29/1986	Multiple Bombings: (4): Aryan Nations	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/29/1986	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	New York City	NY	10/20/1986	Incendiary Bombing: Jewish Defense League	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	10/20/1986	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Multiple	PR	10/28/1986	Multiple Bombings: (7): Macheteros	0	1	0	12	1,2	\$288,000	10/28/1986	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Puerto De Tierra	PR	11/4/1986	Attempted Bombing: Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	11/4/1986	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Yauco, Guayama	PR	12/28/1986	Multiple Bombings: (2): Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/28/1986	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Davis	CA	4/16/1987	Arson: Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/16/1987	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Multiple	PR	5/25/1987	Multiple Bombings: (7): Guerrilla Forces of Liberation	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/25/1987	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Rio Piedras	PR	1/12/1988	Multiple Incendiary Bombings: (2): P.A.C Rev. Forces	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/12/1988	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Coral Gables	FL	5/26/1988	Bombing: Organization Alliance of Cuban Intransigence	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/26/1988	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	aguas	PR	7/22/1988	Pipe Bombing: Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	7/22/1988	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Los Angeles	CA	9/19/1988	Bombing: Up the IRS, Inc.	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/19/1988	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Rio Piedras	PR	11/1/1988	Multiple Bombings: (2): P.A.C. Rev. Forces	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	11/1/1988	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Tucson	AZ	4/3/1989	Arson: Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/3/1989	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Bayamon	PR	6/19/1989	Multiple Bombings: (2): Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	6/19/1989	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Santurce, Carolina	PR	1/12/1990	Multiple Pipe Bombings: (2): Int'l Brigade, P.A.C. Rev. Fcs.	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/12/1990	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Los Angeles	CA	2/22/1990	Bombing: Up the IRS, Inc.	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/22/1990	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Mayaguez	PR	5/27/1990	Arson: Unknown Puerto Rican Group	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/27/1990	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Arecibo, Vega Baja	PR	9/17/1990	Multiple Bombings: (2): P.A. Group Revolutionary Forces	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/17/1990	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Mayaguez	PR	2/3/1991	Arson: Popular Liberation Army	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/3/1991	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Sabana Grande	PR	2/18/1991	Arson: Popular Liberation Army	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/18/1991	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Carolina	PR	3/17/1991	Arson: Unknown Puerto Rican Group	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/17/1991	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Fresno	CA	4/1/1991	Bombing: Popular Liberation Army	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/1/1991	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Punta Borinquen	PR	7/6/1991	Bombing: Popular Liberation Army	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	7/6/1991	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Urbana	IL	11/19/1992	Attempted Firebombing: Mexican Rev. Movement	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	11/19/1992	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Ad																	

Record Type	Event Group	Threat/Hazard	Place	State	Event Start	Comments/Identifiers	SNRA Fatalities	SNRA Inj/Ill	SNRA Displaced	EFF	SNRA Psych.Distress	SNRA Direct Economic Damage	Event End	Observation Period Start	Observation Period End	Observation Period (years)	Incident Likelihood	Source
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Oklahoma City, OK	OK	4/19/1995	Truck Bombing: Individual	168	754	400	12	2152.8	\$269,433,600	4/19/1995	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Spokane	WA	4/1/1996	Pipe Bombing/Bank Robbery: Individual	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/1/1996	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Spokane	WA	7/12/1996	Pipe Bombing/Bank Robbery: Individual	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	7/12/1996	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Atlanta	GA	7/27/1996	Pipe Bombing: Individual	2	112	0	12	146.4	\$32,878,400	7/27/1996	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	DC: Leavenworth, KS	DC/KS	1/21/1997	Letter Bombing (counted 1 incident): Unknown	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/21/1997	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Atlanta	GA	1/6/1997	Bombing of Abortion Clinic: Individual	0	8	0	12	9.6	\$2,304,000	1/6/1997	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Atlanta	GA	2/21/1997	Bombing of Alternative Lifestyle Nightclub: Individual	0	5	0	12	6	\$1,440,000	2/21/1997	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Birmingham	AL	1/29/1997	Bombing, Reproductive Services Clinic: Individual	1	1	0	12	7.2	\$59,200	1/29/1997	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Arecibo	PR	3/31/1998	Bombing, Superquaduct Construction: Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/31/1998	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Rio Piedras	PR	6/9/1998	Bombing of Bank Branch Office: Macheteros	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	6/9/1998	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Santa Isabel	PR	6/25/1998	Bombing of Bank Branch Office: Macheteros suspected	0	1	0	12	1.2	\$288,000	6/25/1998	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Espanola	NM	6/27/1998	Arsen: Individual	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	6/27/1998	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Vail	CO	10/19/1998	Arson Fire at Ski Resort: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	10/19/1998	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Santa Fe	NM	3/19/1999	Attempted Bombing: Individual	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/19/1999	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Franklin Township	NJ	3/27/1999	Bombing of Circus Vehicles: Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/27/1999	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Eugene	OR	5/9/1999	Bombing: Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/9/1999	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Monmouth	OR	12/25/1999	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/25/1999	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	East Lansing	MI	12/31/1999	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/31/1999	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Petaluma	CA	1/3/2000	Incendiary Attack: Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/3/2000	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Petaluma	CA	1/15/2000	Incendiary Attack: Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/15/2000	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Bloomington	IN	1/22/2000	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/22/2000	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Olympia	WA	5/7/2000	Arsen: Revenge of the Trees	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/7/2000	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	North Vernon	IN	7/2/2000	Arsen: Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	7/2/2000	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Phoenix	AZ	12/1/2000	Multiple Arsons: Individual	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/1/2000	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Suffolk Ct, Long Island	NY	12/9/2000	Multiple Arsons: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/30/2000	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Glendale	OR	1/2/2001	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/2/2001	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Visalia	CA	2/20/2001	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	2/20/2001	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Eugene	OR	3/30/2001	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/30/2001	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Portland	OR	4/15/2001	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/15/2001	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Seattle	WA	5/21/2001	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/21/2001	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Claatskanie	OR	5/21/2001	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/21/2001	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Litchfield	CA	10/14/2001	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	10/14/2001	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Erie	PA	3/24/2002	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	3/24/2002	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Warren	PA	8/11/2002	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	8/11/2002	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Harborcreek	PA	11/26/2002	Arson: ELF, ALF	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	11/26/2002	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Girard	PA	1/1/2003	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/1/2003	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	San Diego	CA	8/9/2003	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	8/9/2003	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Emeryville	CA	8/28/2003	Bombing: Individual (suspected)	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	8/28/2003	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Pleasanton	CA	9/26/2003	Bombing: Individual (suspected)	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/26/2003	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Henrico County	VA	1/19/2004	Arsen: ELF suspected	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/19/2004	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Oklahoma City	OK	4/1/2004	Arsen: Individual/Aryan Nations	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/1/2004	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Redmond	WA	4/20/2004	Vandalism and Arson: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/20/2004	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Provo	UT	5/7/2004	Vandalism and Arson: Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	5/7/2004	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Lincoln	CA	12/27/2004	Attempted Arson: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	12/27/2004	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Auburn, Sutter Creek	CA	1/2/2005	Attempted Arson and Arson: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	1/2/2005	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Sammarish	WA	4/13/2005	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	4/13/2005	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Los Angeles	CA	7/7/2005	Attempted Arson: Animal rights extremists suspected	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	7/7/2005	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Los Angeles	CA	9/16/2005	Attempted Arson: Animal Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	9/16/2005	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Incident	Adversarial	Explosives Terrorism Attack	Hagerstown	MD	11/20/2005	Arsen: Earth Liberation Front	0	0	0	12	0	\$42,000	11/20/2005	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS

Animal Disease, Human Pandemic, and Physical Attack on the Power Grid represent single scenarios: they are represented by the best estimate of their annual frequency and associated impacts. Space Weather includes both low best estimate and high best estimate impact scenarios: the best estimate frequency (0.0065/year) is split evenly between them. Best estimate frequency for Aircraft as a Weapon, while based upon two historical U.S. attack incidents, is divided among the eleven historical incidents of aircraft impacts used as proxy scenarios for the construction of consequence distributions. The remaining data in this table consist of the raw data from which the quantitative estimates for the remaining natural and accidental hazards were derived, as presented in the corresponding risk summary sheets. Accidental Radiological Substance Release is not included in this table.

For each incident, a point likelihood is calculated as 1/(event observation period)—that is, if the observation period from which the source data were reported covered the 18.5 years from 1/1/1970 to 7/1/1988, the point frequency for the incident would be $1/18.5 = 0.054$. This is done to permit aggregation, subdivision, selection of different thresholds, and other manipulations on the source data.

The SNRA environmental impact estimates are not included here because the semi-quantitative bin judgments could not be defensibly translated to ratio (divisible) quantities suitable for this incident/scenario breakdown.

- EFF = Event Familiarity Factor, used in the SNRA Psychological Distress metric (Appendix G).

- See RSS = See event Risk Summary Sheet (Appendix J) for data sources.

- Blanks indicate no data, not zero.

- * = Used as consequence scenario (applies to Aircraft as a Weapon only).

Table K.3: Supplemental Data

Record Type	Event Group	Threat/Hazard	Place	State	Event Start	Comments/Identifiers	SNRA Fatalities	SNRA Inj/Ill	SNRA Displaced	EFF	SNRA Psych.Distress	SNRA Direct Economic Damage	Event End	Observation Period Start	Observation Period End	Observation Period (years)	Incident Likelihood	Source
Incident	Adversarial	Armed Assault	San Juan	PR	4/29/1982	PR nationalists - Shooting – PR Justice Building	0	0	0	1.1	0	\$230,000	4/29/1982	1/1/1980	12/31/2005	26.00	0.0385	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.2, CFR 0.0002	12,300	61,400,000	0	1.0	61,461,500	\$54,300,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.224, CFR 0.0002	13,800	68,800,000	0	1.0	68,869,000	\$60,900,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.251, CFR 0.0002	15,400	77,200,000	0	1.0	77,277,000	\$66,300,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.282, CFR 0.0002	17,300	86,500,000	0	1.0	86,586,500	\$76,600,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.316, CFR 0.0002	19,400	97,000,000	0	1.0	97,097,000	\$85,900,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.2, CFR 0.0036	21,800	61,400,000	0	1.0	61,509,000	\$56,800,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.224, CFR 0.0036	24,500	68,800,000	0	1.0	68,922,500	\$63,700,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.251, CFR 0.0036	27,400	77,200,000	0	1.0	77,337,000	\$71,400,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.282, CFR 0.0036	30,800	86,500,000	0	1.0	86,654,000	\$80,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.316, CFR 0.0036	34,500	97,000,000	0	1.0	97,172,500	\$89,700,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.2, CFR 0.0006	38,800	61,400,000	0	1.0	61,594,000	\$62,400,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.224, CFR 0.0006	43,500	68,800,000	0	1.0	69,017,500	\$70,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.251, CFR 0.0006	48,800	77,200,000	0	1.0	77,444,000	\$78,400,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.282, CFR 0.0006	54,700	86,500,000	0	1.0	86,773,500	\$87,900,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.316, CFR 0.0006	61,400	97,000,000	0	1.0	97,307,000	\$96,600,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.2, CFR 0.0011	69,100	61,400,000	0	1.0	61,745,500	\$72,400,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.224, CFR 0.0011	77,400	68,800,000	0	1.0	69,187,000	\$81,200,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.251, CFR 0.0011	86,800	77,200,000	0	1.0	77,634,000	\$91,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.282, CFR 0.0011	97,300	86,500,000	0	1.0	86,986,500	\$102,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.316, CFR 0.0011	109,000	97,000,000	0	1.0	97,545,000	\$114,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.2, CFR 0.002	123,000	61,400,000	0	1.0	62,015,000	\$89,600,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.224, CFR 0.002	138,000	68,800,000	0	1.0	69,490,000	\$100,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.251, CFR 0.002	154,000	77,200,000	0	1.0	77,970,000	\$113,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.282, CFR 0.002	173,000	86,500,000	0	1.0	87,365,000	\$126,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.316, CFR 0.002	194,000	97,000,000	0	1.0	97,970,000	\$142,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.2, CFR 0.0036	218,000	61,400,000	0	1.0	62,490,000	\$119,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.224, CFR 0.0036	245,000	68,800,000	0	1.0	70,025,000	\$134,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.251, CFR 0.0036	274,000	77,200,000	0	1.0	78,570,000	\$150,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.282, CFR 0.0036	308,000	86,500,000	0	1.0	88,040,000	\$168,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.316, CFR 0.0036	345,000	97,000,000	0	1.0	98,725,000	\$188,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.2, CFR 0.0063	388,000	61,400,000	0	1.0	63,340,000	\$170,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.224, CFR 0.0063	435,000	68,800,000	0	1.0	70,975,000	\$190,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.251, CFR 0.0063	488,000	77,200,000	0	1.0	79,640,000	\$213,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.282, CFR 0.0063	547,000	86,500,000	0	1.0	89,235,000	\$239,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.316, CFR 0.0063	614,000	97,000,000	0	1.0	100,070,000	\$268,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.2, CFR 0.0112	691,000	61,400,000	0	1.0	64,855,000	\$257,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.224, CFR 0.0112	774,000	68,800,000	0	1.0	72,670,000	\$288,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.251, CFR 0.0112	868,000	77,200,000	0	1.0	81,540,000	\$323,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.282, CFR 0.0112	973,000	86,500,000	0	1.0	91,365,000	\$362,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.316, CFR 0.0112	1,090,000	97,000,000	0	1.0	102,450,000	\$406,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.2, CFR 0.02	1,230,000	61,400,000	0	1.0	67,550,000	\$408,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.224, CFR 0.02	1,380,000	68,800,000	0	1.0	75,700,000	\$457,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.251, CFR 0.02	1,540,000	77,200,000	0	1.0	84,900,000	\$513,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.282, CFR 0.02	1,730,000	86,500,000	0	1.0	95,150,000	\$575,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS
Scenario	Natural	Human Pandemic Outbreak				Scenario - Attack rate 0.316, CFR 0.02	1,940,000	97,000,000	0	1.0	106,700,000	\$644,000,000,000					0.000741	See RSS

This table provides supplemental data for exploration of alternative thresholds and visualizations. These include the zero-impact armed assault incident data needed to assess the terrorism events with thresholds harmonized to those of Explosives Terrorism Attack and the (classified) CBRN events, and the distribution of Table 4, Pandemic risk summary sheet, modeled to visualize the range of attack rate and case-fatality rate evidenced from historical influenza pandemics (see Pandemic risk summary sheet for details) for more granular visualizations than the single low/best/high scenario of the primary SNRA results. Note the differing observation period of the Armed Assault data point due to differing data sources (0 injury/fatality incidents, 1980-2005, 1+ injuries or fatalities other than/in addition to the attacker(s), 1980-2012).

Table K.4: Summary Data: Natural Disasters with \$1 Billion Threshold and Threshold Dependence of Adversarial Events

Threat/Hazard (National-level Event)	Threshold	# Data points		Frequency			Fatalities			Injuries/Illnesses			Direct Economic Loss			Social Displacement			Psychological Distress		
		Index	Displ.	Low	Best	High	Low	Best	High	Low	Best	High	Low	Best	High	Low	Best	High	Low	Best	High
Earthquake	\$1 billion	11	3	0.056	0.10	0.33	1	900	8,900	24	21,000	210,000	1,400	21,000	100,000						
Flood	\$1 billion	5	2	0.15	0.38	0.81	0	1.2	3	0	12	52	1,300	5,100	16,000						
Hurricane	\$1 billion	40	20	0.25	0.98	4	1	47	1,200	25	1,200	30,000	1,100	11,000	92,000	1,200	650,000	5,000,000	1,100	330,000	2,500,000
Tornado	\$1 billion	4	0	0.085	0.25	0.57	36	140	320	605	1,500	3,100	1,000	2,600	4,700						
Wildfire	\$1 billion	4	2	0.068	0.20	0.46	0	13	25	0	120	190	2,000	2,400	2,800						
Armed Assault	0	17	17	0.11	0.52	3	0	1.8	334	0	5.3	810	0.061	0.49	78	0	0	0	0	16	2,800
Armed Assault*	Injury/fatality	16	16	0.11	0.48	3	0	1.9	334	0	6	810	0.061	0.51	78	0	0	0	0	18	2,800
Armed Assault	Fatality	11	11	0.091	0.33	3	1	2.8	334	0	6.9	810	0.085	0.66	78	0	0	0	5.5	23	2,800
Explosives Terrorism Attack	0	181	181	0.72	7.0	25	0	1.0	3,700	0	11	4,500	0.043	3.4	20,000	0	5	400	0	21	39,000
Explosives Terrorism Attack*	Injury/fatality	19	19	0.14	0.73	5	0	9.5	3,700	0	100	4,500	0.29	33	20,000	0	21	400	1	190	39,000
Explosives Terrorism Attack	Fatality	8	8	0.13	0.31	2	1	23	3,700	0	240	4,500	0.31	76	20,000	0	50	400	6	450	39,000

* Threshold in 2011 SNRA

Cell color key
Same as current data
Limited frequency data: Low/high represent Poisson 5th/95th percentiles
Insufficient social displacement data
No data
Current SNRA 2015 data for comparison

Table K.4 displays for a selection of threat and hazard events what the summary data would be or would approximate, given different choices of threshold. Not all event data sets are sufficiently granular to permit calculation of top-level estimates at present in the SNRA. In particular, the estimates presented above for each of Hurricane, Flood, and Tornado are based upon only four or five data points. Because of the poor fidelity of this data in its present state these estimates are presented only for purposes of illustration, and should not be relied upon without further analysis.

The ‘index’ number is the number of data points used as the basis for calculating the overall frequency of an event exceeding a particular impact threshold: where this threshold can be represented as a quantity on a single measure of impact, that measure of impact defines the effective scope of the event. For the natural disaster hazards listed above that ‘index’ impact measure is direct economic loss, and for the adversarial threats listed above it is either injuries (fatal and non-fatal) or fatalities. For the three hazards having a small number of data points, low/best/high frequencies are estimated as the 5th percentile, average, and 95th percentile of a Poisson distribution on the assumption of an underlying constant-frequency Poisson process in a fashion similar to other SNRA events with limited historical observations (Aircraft as a Weapon, Combustible/Flammable Cargo Accidents (Rail), Space Weather [source paper]) with a frequentist prior (i.e. the best estimate is simply the average number of incidents in the observed time period, same as the SNRA best estimate calculated from larger data sets). These estimates are indicated in pink above.

For four of the above hazards, displacement data is too limited for the subset of billion dollar disasters to permit defensible estimates (the above procedure will not work because the limited data is a result of data gaps rather than limited observation) using the unmodified SNRA data set, so estimates for social displacement and psychological distress (which uses displacement as an input, Appendix G) are not presented.

Other than the Poisson-estimated low and high frequencies discussed above, indicated in by pink coloring in Table K.4, all calculated estimates (some SNRA high estimates are based on scenarios without corresponding incident data, but these are unmodified from those in Table K.1) were calculated from the data presented in Tables K.2-K.3.

Environmental impact estimates are not displayed because they are tied to the scope of the event as elicited in 2011.

Summary data for natural hazards having \$100 million thresholds in the SNRA are presented with hazards scoped to a \$1 billion threshold. Data for Armed Assault and Explosives Terrorism Attack are presented with three thresholds:

- Attack only (current Explosives Terrorism Attack, classified CBRN events)
- One or more injuries or fatalities [other than/in addition to the attacker(s)] (current Armed Assault, Aircraft as a Weapon events)
- One or more fatalities [other than/in addition to the attacker(s)] (majority of accidental/technological hazards in the SNRA)

Aircraft-as-a-Weapon estimates are not displayed because they are the same for each of the thresholds. Current data for the Explosives and Armed Assault events are reproduced in this table for ease of comparison because they have more than one obvious alternative threshold choice. Data for all other SNRA threats and hazards, including natural hazard events with an existing \$1 billion threshold and natural, accidental, and adversarial events which do not have a simple casualty or dollar threshold may be found in Table K.1.

Appendix L: Data Sources in the Classified SNRA

Blue text indicates superseded information.

The 2011 SNRA natural hazard and technological hazard data was derived completely from unclassified data, with substantial reliance on historical records. Data within the assessment which addresses only natural hazards and technological hazards has been treated as unclassified. The following paragraphs describe the derivation of the **For Official Use Only** and classified SNRA data which may be found in the classified SNRA Technical Report.

Impacts

For the adversarial/human-caused events, some impact estimates were unclassified **but marked For Official Use Only (U//FOUO)** in accordance with DHS practice, while other impact estimates were classified by derivation.

- For the conventional attack events (Armed Assault, Explosives, and Aircraft as a Weapon) fatality and injury/illness estimates were derived from unclassified historical data, as detailed in the corresponding risk summary sheets (Appendix J, SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings).¹ Following DHS practice these estimates were marked as (U//FOUO). Direct economic impact estimates were calculated from (U//FOUO) models and data using the Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision-Making (RAPID) engine.²
- Fatality, injury/illness, and economic impact data for the CBRN events were uniformly obtained from the DHS Directorate of Science & Technology (S&T) 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA). While these estimates are unclassified in their original form, the CBRN data provided by S&T to the SNRA team utilized weighted average consequences, which incorporate frequencies (the modelled relative likelihood that an attack, given occurrence, will result in consequences of a given magnitude). This calculation elevated the CBRN impact estimates provided to the SNRA project to the SECRET//NOFORN classification level of the incorporated frequency data.
- Quantitative impact data for the cyber attack events were not determined. **Although the 2011 project successfully elicited quantitative frequency estimates from Intelligence Community and DHS cyber experts (see below), these experts could not reach agreement on the consequences of attacks corresponding to the estimated frequencies.** The 2015 SNRA qualitatively identified a broader taxonomy of cyber events, but did not attempt to determine quantitative impact estimates.³

Social displacement and environmental impact estimates were unclassified for all events.

¹ The primary sources for the Aircraft as a Weapon historical fatality and injury data are the same as those in the present volume, with minor differences. The primary historical data source for the 2011 Armed Assault and Explosives Terrorism Attack events was the START Global Terrorism Database, retained as a supplementary data source for the 2015 risk summary sheets.

² The Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision Making (RAPID) 2010 was a strategic level, DHS-wide process to assess risk and inform strategic planning priorities developed by the DHS Office of Risk Management & Analysis (National Protection & Programs Directorate). The RAPID engine is a suite of computational tools for calculating human and economic measures of risk and the relative effectiveness of different DHS programs in risk reduction. Like the SNRA it is a quantitative tool for calculating and comparing risks in the homeland security mission space with each other, but unlike the SNRA it is designed for additionally calculating the comparative effectiveness of different governmental programs in buying down risk.

³ The 2015 SNRA did not attempt to elicit updated frequency estimates. Although the 2011 qualitative cyber attack risk summary sheets are included in this volume for completeness, the corresponding frequency estimates are no longer current because of the substantial evolution of the cyber risk environment since 2011.

Frequency

Quantitative estimates of the frequency with which an adversarial/human-caused attack may be initiated and successfully executed were used as measures of the likelihood of SNRA events. Where subject matter expert judgment was used to determine frequency of successful attacks, adversary intent and capability were considered implicitly by the experts, but were not explicitly quantified or characterized. Attack initiations may occur with higher frequency than the ranges provided.

Due to the short timeline imposed by the PPD-8 Implementation Plan, the 2011 SNRA project team made a concerted effort to rely on previously conducted analyses wherever possible. Appropriate prior analysis had been accomplished for the CBRN, [aircraft-as-a-weapon](#), and [explosives terrorism attack](#) events. For these events, all frequency and impact data derive directly from previously conducted analysis. [The 2011 project team conducted expert elicitations for the armed assault and cyber attack events which had not been previously studied within a methodology comparable to the SNRA.](#)

Existing Frequency Data

A designated Intelligence Community (IC) agency reviewed and commented on the relative frequency of the adversarial/human-caused events for which data was derived from previous governmental risk assessments, including DHS/S&T's Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) and DHS/NPPD/RMA's Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision-making (RAPID). To accomplish this, the agency reviewed frequency data, including the 5th, mean, and 95th percentiles of the frequency distributions. The review was performed in the summer of 2011. The IC agency did not comment on the absolute values of the frequencies.⁴

Elicited Frequency Data

Within the adversarial/human-caused set of events, there were two event types, armed assault and cyber (affecting data and affecting physical infrastructure) for which appropriate frequency data sources could not be located. For these events, an elicitation protocol was developed and separate elicitations were conducted of IC experts.

For the cyber elicitation, representatives from DHS/NPPD/CS&C, ODNI, CIA, FBI, NSS, and NSA participated in a two part elicitation. All participants attended a half day working session to discuss the scope of the cyber events, identify event thresholds, and begin to provide frequency data. A subset of the participating agencies (ODNI, CIA, FBI, NSS) then completed the frequency elicitation tool and submitted it as input for consideration and review by the larger group.

- Elicitations for the cyber attack against data incorporated three specific target types (financial institution system, public health/emergency system, internet) and asked that the elicitees provide individual frequency judgments for each of these target types.
- Elicitations for the cyber attack against physical infrastructure incorporated five specified target types (dam failure, chemical release, electric grid failure, radiological release from a nuclear reactor, transportation system failure) and asked that the elicitees provide individual frequency judgments.

⁴ The IC agency did not comment on the relative ordering of the frequencies for the two cyber events or armed assault, since those frequencies had not yet been elicited from the Intelligence Community SMEs within the SNRA project's structured elicitation process.

- As noted above, no consensus consequence estimates corresponding to these elicited frequency judgments were obtained for the cyber events.

For the armed assault elicitation, representatives from DHS/I&A, FBI, and NSS participated in a group elicitation. All participants attended a half day working session to discuss the scope of the armed assault event, identify event thresholds, and provide frequency data. All data was collected during this group session, with the exception of one domestic terrorism expert who was individually elicited to ensure that domestic terrorism perspectives were included. No specific target types were articulated by the group.

For all elicitations, elicitees were asked to assign a frequency range to the events leveraging structured bins. Elicitees identified whether the frequency of these events were more or less frequent than once per year. If more frequent, elicitees then assigned the events to one of four buckets, each of varying order of magnitude (1-10 events per year, 11-100 events per year, 101-400 events per year, or greater than 400 events per year). If less frequent than once per year, elicitees assigned the events to one of four probability ranges (1% or less probable per year, 10% probable per year, 25% probable per year, or 50% probable per year). Elicitee input was aggregated into a range, which is represented within the SNRA frequency data.

Detail

Five SNRA adversarial/human-caused events are discussed as a unit below because the data within the SNRA was uniformly obtained from the DHS/ Science & Technology (S&T) 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA).

SNRA Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism Attack Events	
Events Covered	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)• Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack• Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)• Nuclear Terrorism Attack• Radiological Terrorism Attack
Data Source	DHS/Science & Technology (S&T) 2011 Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA)
Data Gathering Process⁵	<p>The Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment elicitations were conducted throughout May and June 2010. Experts were formally elicited on five topics: absolute frequency of CBR initiation, relative frequency of CBR selection, absolute frequency of IND acquisition, frequency of CBRN interdictions, and CTRA and BTRA terrorist organization category capabilities. From this data, absolute frequency of acquisition for CBRN and the absolute frequency of attack with CBRN were calculated. Elicitation methods used were based on the approach described in NUREG-1150.⁶ Elicitation experts followed the below steps in obtaining probabilities from intelligence analysts:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Pre-elicitation meeting: The group discussed the purpose and approach and scope of the planned elicitations2. Intelink Terrorism Risk Assessment Frequency of Initiation Intellipedia discussion: Elicitees continued on-line discussion of event definitions and scope, to ensure shared definitions3. Dissemination of elicitation materials: Elicitation materials were shared electronically to allow the group to review the elicitation process and event definitions4. Study period/individual formal elicitation meetings: Individual elicitations were conducted5. Group review meeting: The full panel reviewed the final results and confirmed or updated responses6. Dissemination of group review meeting follow-up document and reconciliation responses: The final results were circulated amongst the group for documentation purposes <p>Resultant probabilities were based on analysts' knowledge of the field and prior exposure to intelligence reporting, but probabilities were not expressly linked to specific reporting. Probability distributions resulting from the elicitations were classified as SECRET//NOFORN.</p>
Participating Organizations	A combined panel of CBRN experts was convened for elicitation purposes, including analysts from: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• National Counterterrorism Center• Defense Intelligence Agency• National Security Agency• Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)• DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis Experts who were selected generally had significant expertise in at least one of the four CBRN terrorism threat areas, along with knowledge of the other threat areas.

⁵ This process description is a summation of material contained in the DHS Science & Technology Directorate's 2011 Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment, Chapter 3: Technical Approach (p. 3-149 – 3-155). (Reference is SECRET//NOFORN; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED.)

⁶ NUREG-1150 is an elicitation methodology developed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 1991 to formalize the process by which subject matter experts may provide probabilistic assessments in areas where data is sparse.

Two of the adversarial/human-caused events had previously been assessed within the DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate's (NPPD) Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision-making (RAPID), which provided a quantitative assessment of strategic risk facing the Nation. These events are discussed as a unit below.

SNRA Explosives and Aircraft-as-a-Weapon Events	
Events Covered	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Explosives Terrorism Attack• Aircraft as a Weapon
Data Source	NPPD RAPID (2010)
Data Gathering Process	<p>The RAPID elicitations were conducted between October 2009 and January 2010. Eleven experts participated in the elicitation process. Following a modified NUREG-1150 expert elicitation process, RAPID II was able to obtain likelihood probabilities for the terrorism incident sets. Elicitation experts followed the below steps in obtaining probabilities from intelligence analysts:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Identification of issues: Elicitation topics were identified in alignment with the analytic fault trees provided2. Selection of experts: RAPID team members identified appropriate experts within the intelligence community3. Individual elicitations performed: Using R Project, the RAPID team worked with experts to interactively create probability distributions which represent the likelihood that an adversary will initiate an attack, and, if initiated, the relative likelihood of different types of attacks4. Review by experts: Experts reviewed anonymous inputs of all participating experts, with the opportunity to make adjustments <p>The resultant probability distributions identified the likelihood with which particular attack types would be initiated and the likelihood that a particular target class would be selected. Resultant probabilities were based on analysts' knowledge of the field and prior exposure to intelligence reporting, but probabilities were not expressly linked to specific reporting. Probability distributions resulting from the elicitations were classified as SECRET//NOFORN.</p>
Participating Organizations All eleven experts were from the DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) or a DHS operational component. Experts were selected based on their knowledge of the research area.	

Finally, the SNRA team conducted original subject matter elicitations for two adversarial/human-caused events. These elicitations were conducted separately but are treated as a unit here because the same elicitation protocol was used.

SNRA Armed Assault and Cyber Events	
Events Covered	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Armed Assault• Cyber Attack against Data• Cyber Attack against Physical Infrastructure
Data Source	Original frequency elicitations conducted in August 2011 to support the SNRA
Data Gathering Process	<p>Following a modified NUREG-1150 expert elicitation process, SNRA was able to obtain likelihood probabilities for the terrorism incident sets. Elicitation experts followed the below steps in obtaining probabilities from intelligence analysts:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Selection of experts: The SNRA team worked with staff within the ODNI to identify appropriate participants2. Identification of issues: On the day of the elicitation, the experts discussed and agreed upon the definition of the events. Note that for cyber, the broad categories of attacks against data and attacks against physical systems had been previously constructed3. Group elicitations performed: Using a binning structure, each member of the group provided their probability estimate. Some information was collected via an in-person group discussion, while some information was received in electronic form after the meeting4. Review by experts: Following the elicitation, the SNRA team compiled the inputs and provided final outcomes to participants for review and comment <p>The resultant probability distributions identified the likelihood with which each event types would be initiated and the likelihood that a particular target class would be selected. Resultant probabilities were based on analysts' knowledge of the field and prior exposure to intelligence reporting, but probabilities were not expressly linked to specific reporting. Probability distributions resulting from the elicitations were classified as SECRET//NOFORN.</p>
Participating Organizations	
Armed Assault	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• National Counterterrorism Center• Department of Homeland Security Intelligence & Analysis• Federal Bureau of Investigation	
Cyber Attacks (Infrastructure and Data)	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Office of the Director for National Intelligence• Central Intelligence Agency• Federal Bureau of Investigation• National Security Agency• National Security Staff• Department of Homeland Security Cyber Security and Communications	

Derivative Classification Sources for SNRA Data

The following references are derivative classification sources for the classified data of the SNRA, as noted in the data tables provided in Appendices B through E of the classified SNRA Technical Report.

Armed Assault SME: Subject matter expert elicitation session with representatives from the DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Staff (NSS) (2011, July 26). Classification level of discussion was SECRET; Derived from: Multiple Sources; Declassify on: 20360726.


Cyber SME: Subject matter expert elicitation session with representatives from DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate Office of Cyber Security and Communications (CS&C), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Security Staff (NSS), and National Security Agency (NSA) (2011, July 25). Classification level of discussion was SECRET; Derived from: Multiple Sources; Declassify on: 20360725.

ITRA: Email correspondence from Program Manager, Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA), DHS Science & Technology Directorate (2011, September 28). Data file: '(SNF) 20110926 Uncertainty (U).zip'. Extracted information is SECRET//NOFORN; Derived from: Multiple Sources; Declassify on: 25X2.

ITRA – Nuclear Econ Update: Email correspondence from Battelle Memorial Institute Support Contractor, Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA) Program, DHS Science & Technology Directorate (2012, July 20). Data file: '(U) Histogram Bins Rad and Bio_files are SNF.zip'. Extracted information is SECRET//NOFORN; Derived from: Multiple Sources; Declassify on: 20370720.

RAPID: DHS Office of Risk Management & Analysis (RMA) Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision-making (RAPID) Database. Accessed July 12, 2011. Extracted information is SECRET//NOFORN; Derived from: Multiple Sources; Declassify on: 20360712.

Additional detail is given in Appendix I of the classified SNRA Technical Report. Derivative classifications for narrative statements are noted as footnotes in the body of the classified SNRA Technical Report.



Context

National Risk
Drivers and Evolving Threats
Climate Change

Context

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Appendix M: National Risk

Overview

The SNRA is complemented by the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) processes conducted at multiple jurisdictional levels.¹ THIRA is a common risk assessment process designed to help the whole community—including individuals, businesses, faith-based organizations, nonprofit groups, schools and academia and all levels of government—understand its risks and estimate capability requirements. The THIRA process helps communities map their risks to the core capabilities, enabling them to determine whole-community informed:

- Desired outcomes,
- Capability targets, and
- Resources required to achieve their capability targets.

At the national level, THIRA outputs provide the foundation for a range of other preparedness efforts within the National Preparedness System, including State Preparedness Reports (SPR) and the National Preparedness Report (NPR). At the jurisdictional level, the THIRA process informs a variety of emergency management efforts including emergency operations planning, mutual aid agreements, and hazard mitigation planning. Ultimately, the THIRA process helps communities answer the following questions:

- What do we need to prepare for?
- What shareable resources are required in order to be prepared?
- What actions could be employed to avoid, divert, lessen, or eliminate a threat or hazard?

The THIRA process consists of four steps:

1. **Identify Threats and Hazards of Concern:** Based on a combination of experience, forecasting, subject matter expertise, and other available resources, identify a list of the threats and hazards of primary concern to the community.
2. **Give the Threats and Hazards Context:** Describe the threats and hazards of concern, showing how they may affect the community.
3. **Establish Capability Targets:** Assess each threat and hazard in context to develop a specific capability target for each core capability identified in the National Preparedness Goal. The capability target defines success for the capability.
4. **Apply the Results:** For each core capability, estimate the resources required to achieve the capability targets through the use of community assets and mutual aid, while also considering preparedness activities, including mitigation opportunities.

Analysis

For the 2015 SNRA, THIRAs from 2012 through 2014 were reviewed to identify the threats and hazards of greatest concern to urban areas, states, territories, and tribes across the Nation as reported in their THIRAs.


¹ The THIRA process is completed by urban areas, states, tribal nations, territories, and the FEMA Regions.

- The 2014 THIRA analysis highlighted five threats and hazards frequently selected by a wide range of urban areas, states, tribal nations, and territories: Flood, Utility Interruption, Hazmat Release—Chemical, Cyber Attack, and Explosive Devices (see Figure M1).
- Flood, the most frequently identified hazard, was included by 64 percent of all contributing jurisdictions as a hazard of greatest concern.
- Year-over-year analysis indicates that the top five threats and hazards of greatest concern across jurisdictions remained largely consistent from 2012 through 2014, though in a slightly different order each year.
- In addition to the top five, other frequently identified threats and hazards throughout the three THIRA iterations include transportation accidents, human pandemic, and earthquakes. This reinforces that jurisdictions' perception of risk has not changed much since 2012.

The 2015 SNRA participants reviewed this data to identify potential national-level risks not previously identified in the 2011 SNRA.


Figure M2 depicts the top 25 threats and hazards identified by all reporting jurisdictions across all groups (i.e., natural, technological, and human-caused) by year for 2012 and 2013.

Figure M1: Most Frequently Identified Threats and Hazards in 2014 Jurisdictional THIRAs²



² While these findings do show trends across several different perspectives, they are not intended to create a ranking of threats and hazards. Likewise, they are not intended to be representative of all possible threats and hazards within the jurisdictions, as many jurisdictions utilize varying approaches to selecting threats and hazards for inclusion in their THIRAs.

Figure M2: Top 25 Most Frequently Identified Threats and Hazards of Concern by Jurisdictions in 2012 and 2013³



N - Natural Hazard

T - Technological Hazard

H - Human-Caused Threat

³ While these findings do show trends across several different perspectives, they are not intended to create a ranking of threats and hazards. Likewise, they are not intended to be representative of all possible threats and hazards within the jurisdictions, as many jurisdictions utilize varying approaches to selecting threats and hazards for inclusion in their THIRAs.

Appendix N: Drivers and Evolving Threats

Certain threats and hazards frequently appeared in documents across governmental, intergovernmental, non-profit, and academic sources as growing issues for the United States as a whole and the world in the near-term and long-term. The list of evolving threats included in the SNRA emerged from a variety of sources. We examined data sets used to prepare the National Preparedness Report over the past three years. The majority of the sources included in the NPR data sets stretched from 2011 to 2014. Another group of sources used for the SNRA evolving threats list were government documents. Reports from the Department of Homeland Security, the White House, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Congressional Research Service, the Government Accountability Office, testimonies from House and Senate committees, the Department of Agriculture, the National Intelligence Council, and the U.S. Census Bureau provided additional insight beyond the information included in the NPR data sets. In addition to government reports, the list of evolving threats grew from information in peer reviewed academic journals and books as well as reports from non-profits and intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations.

Critical Infrastructure

The country's critical infrastructure provides essential services that underpin American society in sectors such as transportation, communication, energy, and health care.¹ Over the next 15–20 years, aging transportation, communication, energy, and health care infrastructure poses significant risk due to potential cascading impacts of failures and harm to the Nation's long term economic competitiveness.² The scale of the Nation's critical infrastructure makes it vulnerable to a diversity of risks. Severe weather events; terrorists and other actors seeking to cause harm and disrupt essential services through physical and cyber -attacks; pandemic influenza or other health crises; and potential accidents and failures from infrastructure operating beyond its lifespan are threats to the Nation's critical infrastructure systems.³

Aging Infrastructure

Age is one of the most pressing issues facing America's critical infrastructure, but it is not the only factor that determines the health and safety of critical infrastructure. Age -related failure mechanisms include material fatigue, corrosion, and erosion that occur over time making infrastructure susceptible to failure without proper maintenance.⁴ One in nine of the Nation's bridges are structurally deficient, while the average age of the country's 607,380 bridges is 42.⁵ Additionally, out of 4 million miles of road, 65 percent of America's major roads are rated in less than good condition.⁶ The poor condition of America's roads cost \$67 billion a year for U.S. motorists.⁷

¹ Department of Homeland Security, *Aging Infrastructure: Issues, Research, and Technology*, December 2010, p. 1–2; *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7*, 2003, <http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7>.

² Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Strategic Foresight Initiative*, January 2012, p. 9.

³ Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure, Security, and Resilience, 2013, p. 8.

⁴ Department of Homeland Security, National Risk Estimate: Aging and Failing Critical Infrastructure Systems, December 2014, p. 12.

⁵ American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013 Report Card for America's Critical Infrastructure, p. 6.

⁶ The White House, An Economic Analysis of Transportation Infrastructure Investment, July 2014, p. 2.

⁷ American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013 Report Card for America's Critical Infrastructure, p. 48.

America's aging infrastructure extends beyond roads and bridges to also include water. Water infrastructure systems in the U.S., including dams, drinking water systems, levees, and wastewater, are overextended and outdated.⁸ The growth of the U.S. population over the decades has strained critical water systems.⁹ The average age of the 84,000 dams in the country is 52, while the number of high-hazard dams is on the rise.¹⁰ Many of the Nation's estimated 100,000 miles of levees were originally used to protect farmland, but are now increasingly protecting developed communities.¹¹ Moreover, the country's drinking water infrastructure is nearing the end of its life. There are approximately 240,000 water main breaks in the U.S. every year as repairs take place every day to sustain critical infrastructure.¹² The cost to replace the drinking water aging infrastructure over the next couple of decades could reach nearly \$1 trillion.¹³

Banking and Finance/Economic Security

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 included the banking and finance sector as an important component of the Nation's critical infrastructure. The Nation's banking and finance sector accounts for more than 8 percent of the U.S. annual gross domestic product and is the backbone for the world economy.¹⁴ America's economic strength is key to the Nation's natural security.¹⁵ The sector is composed of federally insured depository institutions; providers of various investment products; providers of risk transfer products (insurers); and other credit and finance organizations.¹⁶ They are all tied together through a network of electronic systems with innumerable entry points. The sector is threatened by terrorist attacks, large scale power outages, and natural disasters.¹⁷

The impacts of market crashes, cyber -attacks, and natural disasters on the banking and finance sector have ramifications beyond the sector. The current economic crisis has impacted local, state, and Federal budget forecasts. In the decade ahead, the United States and the world face challenges in ensuring continued economic growth and the strength of government finances.¹⁸ The current and near-term budget forecasts for local, state, and Federal budgets are grim and may lead to critical shortfalls in funding to address aging infrastructure and build resilience to and recover from manmade and natural disasters.¹⁹

Energy Sector

The U.S. energy infrastructure is vital to the U.S. economy. America's energy infrastructure is divided into three interrelated segments: electricity, petroleum, and natural gas.²⁰ Currently, the U.S. is the world's largest natural gas and oil producer, reducing the country's dependence on

⁸ American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013 Report Card for America's Critical Infrastructure, p. 4–5.

⁹ American Water Works Association, Buried No Longer: Confronting America's Water Infrastructure Challenge, 2011, p. 3.

¹⁰ American Society of Civil Engineers, "Executive Summary," 2013 Report Card for America's Critical Infrastructure, <http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/a/#p/overview/executive-summary>

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ American Water Works Association, Buried No Longer: Confronting America's Water Infrastructure Challenge, 2011, p. 3.

¹⁴ Department of Homeland Security and Department of the Treasury, Banking and Finance: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, May 2007, p. 1.

¹⁵ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, February 2015, p. i.

¹⁶ Department of Homeland Security and the Department of the Treasury, Banking and Finance: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2010, p. 1.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Government Accountability Office, *Strategic Plan 2014–2019*, p. 9.

¹⁹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Strategic Foresight Initiative; White Paper: Climate Change*, January 2012, p. 4, <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/103600>.

²⁰ Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Energy Sector, 2011, p. 1.

foreign oil to a 20 -year low.²¹ The U.S. energy infrastructure is vulnerable to terrorist and cyber-attacks, natural disasters, and aging equipment.²² Power outages have increased from 76 in 2007 to 307 in 2011 as a result of aging equipment.²³

Since 2008, numerous oil and pipeline failures have occurred.²⁴ Pipeline failures can potentially impact surrounding populations, property, and the environment.²⁵ With population growth projected to increase, the U.S. energy infrastructure will encounter problems meeting demand after 2020.²⁶

Cyber Security

The range of cyber threat actors, methods of attack, targeted systems, and victims are expanding and growing.²⁷ While computerized and networked systems provide significant benefits, cyber threats against the country and private institutions can have a serious impact on national security, the economy, and public health and safety.²⁸ The Nation's economy, safety, and health are linked through a networked infrastructure that is targeted by malicious government, criminal, and individual actors.²⁹

The number of reported cyber -attacks has continued to grow, resulting in economic loss, privacy breaches, data theft, the compromise of proprietary information or intellectual property, and harm to national security.³⁰ Cyber threats can be both intentional and unintentional. Types of intentional cyber threats include computer network and disruption activities such as denial of service attacks and destructive attacks that delete information or render systems inoperable. Unintentional cyber threats can result from software upgrades or defective equipment that inadvertently disrupt systems.³¹

Demographic Shifts in the U.S. and Potential Future Challenges

Over the next four decades, the U.S. population will undergo significant demographic changes. By 2025, nearly one in five Americans will be over the age of 65 as that population will jump from 43.1 million in 2012 to 83.7 million in 2050.³² The growth of the 65 and older population will have significant ramifications for the country economically, socially, politically, and for the emergency management community. The Nation's expenditures on health care will rise considerably. Older Americans are more likely to suffer from chronic diseases as two out of

²¹ The White House, *National Security Strategy*, February 2015, p. 5.

²² American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013 Report Card for America's Critical Infrastructure, p. 60-61; Department of Homeland Security, Energy Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2012, p. 13; The White House, Economic Benefits of Increasing Electric Grid Resilience to Weather Outages, August 2013, p. 3.

²³ American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013 Report Card for America's Critical Infrastructure, p. 61.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ U.S. Department of Transportation, The State of the National Pipeline Infrastructure, p. 1.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record: World Wide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2015; Government Accountability Office, Cybersecurity: A Better Defined and Implemented National Strategy is Needed to Address Persistent Challenges, March 7, 2013, p. 2.

²⁸ Government Accountability Office, Cybersecurity: A Better Defined and Implemented National Strategy is Needed to Address Persistent Challenges, March 7, 2013, p. 1.

²⁹ National Security Strategy, February 2015, p. 12.

³⁰ Government Accountability Office, Cybersecurity: A Better Defined and Implemented National Strategy is Needed to Address Persistent Challenges, March 7, 2013, p. 1.

³¹ Ibid., p. 3.

³² Federal Emergency Management Agency, Strategic Foresight Initiative, January 2012, p. 8; Jennifer M. Ortman, Victoria A. Velkoff and Howard Hogan, An Aging Nation: The Older Population in the United States: Population Estimates and Projections, U.S. Census Bureau, May 2014, p. 1.

every three older Americans have chronic conditions.³³ Currently, treatment for this population amounts to 66 percent of the country's overall health care budget.³⁴ By 2030, health care spending in the U.S. will increase by 25 percent, primarily because of the aging population.³⁵ The cost of Medicare is projected to increase from \$555 billion in 2011 to \$903 billion in 2020.

In addition to the aging population, internal migratory shifts will also shape the country demographically. Currently, more people in the U.S. are living in metropolitan regions and along coastal areas.³⁶ Continued urbanization and coastal migration will result in the growth of "megaregions," which include not only cities, but counties that share interlocking economic systems, interrelated population and employment centers, cultures, natural resources and ecosystems, and common transportation systems.³⁷ Many of the identified megaregions are located along the country's coastal areas.³⁸ The concentration of the country's population into densely populated areas will have wide ranging ramifications. With changes to the climate, sea level rise could make homes and businesses congregated along coastal areas more prone to flooding.³⁹ Additionally, for emergency management, the concentration of the population in megaregions could make evacuations more difficult and access to medical resources could be strained.⁴⁰ The growth in the U.S. population will increase the stress on aging critical infrastructure and make densely populated areas potentially high terrorist targets.⁴¹

Beyond internal migratory shifts, international migration to the U.S. is projected to be the primary driver of the country's population growth between 2027 and 2038.⁴² This would mark the first time since 1850 that the primary driver of population growth is not the result of domestic births.⁴³ Higher international migration could result in a fast growing, more diverse, and younger U.S. population.⁴⁴

Food and Water Insecurity

Climate change, global population growth, and economic development have the potential to create water and food insecurity in the coming decades.⁴⁵ Food and water insecurity have the possibility of affecting the U.S. domestically and its relationships with numerous countries. Over the course of the next 10 years, many countries important to U.S. national security will experience water problems causing instability in those regions of the world.⁴⁶ In California, the ongoing drought caused the town of East Porterville to run out of water in late 2014.⁴⁷ Since

³³ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *The State of Aging and Health in America 2013*, p. ii and p. 5.

³⁴ Ibid., p ii.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

³⁶ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Strategic Foresight Initiative*, January 2012, p. 8.

³⁷ Yoav Hagler, "Defining U.S. Megaregions," *America 2050*, November 2009, http://www.america2050.org/upload/2010/09/2050_Defining_US_Megaregions.pdf, p. 1-7.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 7.

³⁹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, "U.S. Demographic Shifts: Long-term Trends and Drivers and Their Implications for Emergency Management, *Strategic Foresight Initiative White Papers*, May 2011, p. 5, <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/103600>.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 5.

⁴² U.S. Census Bureau, *International Migration is Projected to Become Primary Driver of U.S. Population Growth for First Time in Nearly Two Centuries*, May 15, 2013, <http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2013/cb13-89.html>.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ National Intelligence Council, *Global Water Security*, February 2, 2012, p. iii; United Nations, *Water and Food Security*, http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/food_security.shtml; The White House, *National Security Strategy*, February 2015, p. 12; World Bank Group, *Water and Food Security: Improving Agricultural Water Productivity*, <http://water.worldbank.org/WPP-Food-Security>.

⁴⁶ National Intelligence Council, *Global Water Security*, February 2, 2012, p. iii.

⁴⁷ No author, "East Porterville Residents Without Water as Wells Go Dry During California Drought, *CBS Sacramento*, August 27, 2014, <http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2014/08/27/porterville-residents-without-water-as-wells-go-dry-during-california-drought/>.

California is a major producer of agricultural produce, including fruits and vegetables, the severe drought in the state has implications for U.S. produce supplies and prices.⁴⁸ Beyond fruit and vegetables, California also leads the Nation in dairy production and produces 21 percent of the Nation's milk.⁴⁹ The drought in California could increase the price and decrease the availability of alfalfa, which is the primary feed for dairy cattle.⁵⁰

Global Supply Chain

As globalization continues to shape nations socially, economically, and technologically, the global supply chain is an example of the growing interconnections that stretch across national borders. The efficient and secure movement of goods through the global supply chain is essential for the U.S. economy and security.⁵¹ The global supply chain is composed of a network of “suppliers, manufacturing centers, warehouses, distribution centers, and retail outlets”⁵² that involve transportation, postal, air, and shipping assets, which make the U.S. and worldwide trade systems possible.⁵³ Governments and multinational corporations play key roles in ensuring the functioning of operations across national borders.⁵⁴ As a result of its complexity and scale, the global supply chain is vulnerable to a variety of threats and hazards that can cause disruptions. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions, as well as terrorist attacks and labor strikes can heavily impact the global supply chain.⁵⁵ The 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami provide an example of the global supply chain’s vulnerability. After the earthquake and tsunami, General Motors, Toyota, and Subaru slowed down or halted production at plants in the United States because needed parts manufactured in Japan were delayed.⁵⁶

Homegrown Violent Extremists

The terrorist threat to the Nation remains significant and continues to evolve, most recently with the rise of the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL).⁵⁷ Homegrown violent extremists are a persistent threat to the country.⁵⁸ Homegrown terrorist activity continues to grow as changing national and

⁴⁸ United States Department of Agriculture, “California Drought 2014: Farm and Food Impacts,” September 12, 2014, <http://ers.usda.gov/topics/in-the-news/california-drought-2014-farm-and-food-impacts.aspx>. California is not the only region of the country susceptible to drought. Similar to California, the Midwest provides essential agricultural products for the country. Climate change has the potential to increase the likelihood of droughts in the Midwest alongside wildfires and heat waves. See Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Impacts in the Midwest, <http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts-adaptation/midwest.html>.

⁴⁹ United States Department of Agriculture, “California Drought 2014: Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry Sectors,” September 12, 2014, <http://ers.usda.gov/topics/in-the-news/california-drought-2014-farm-and-food-impacts/california-drought-2014-livestock,-dairy,-and-poultry-sectors.aspx>.

⁵⁰ United States Department of Agriculture, “California Drought 2014: Food Prices and Consumers,” October 7, 2014, <http://ers.usda.gov/topics/in-the-news/california-drought-2014-farm-and-food-impacts/california-drought-2014-food-prices-and-consumers.aspx>.

⁵¹ The White House, National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security, January 2012, p. 1.

⁵² Henry H. Willis and David S. Ortiz, *Evaluating the Security of the Global Containerized Supply Chain*, RAND Corporation, 2007, p. ix.

⁵³ American National Standards Institute, Department of Homeland Security, *Global Supply Chain Security Standards*, November 2012, p. 1; Department of Homeland Security, *2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, p. 25.

⁵⁴ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Strategic Foresight Initiative, White Papers: Global Interdependencies*, January 2012, p. 2, <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/103600>.

⁵⁵ Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, p. 25The White House, National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security, January 2012, p. 4–5.

⁵⁶ Associated Press, “Japan Disaster, Lack of Parts Forces General Motors to Halt Production,” *Huffington Post*, March 17, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/17/japan-general-motors-parts_n_837355.html.

⁵⁷ Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Current Terrorist Threat to the United States, Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2015. This section is primarily discussing Homegrown Extremists tied to and influenced by radical Islam that advocates attacks on the U.S.

⁵⁸ Jerome P. Bjelopera, American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, Congressional Research Service, January 23, 2013; James R. Clapper, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 11, 2014; Department of Homeland Security, 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, p. 19; William L. Painter, Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 113th Congress, Congressional Research Service, September 23, 2013; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Strategic Foresight Initiative, January 2012, p. 9; Government Accountability Office, Strategic Plan 2014–2019, p. 100; Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Current Terrorist Threat to the United States, Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2015.

international security dynamics will affect the Nation's safety, prosperity, and resilience.⁵⁹ Individuals (lone offenders) and small groups acting on their own initiative are a tenacious threat and difficult to counter.⁶⁰

The rise of ISIL during the past year and its adept use of media have created unprecedented opportunities for the organization to reach potential recruits or influence people.⁶¹ Social media and the Internet have the potential to play a critical role in the immediate future in radicalizing and mobilizing homegrown extremists towards violence.⁶² There is the possibility that a number of individuals traveling to Iraq and Syria to fight with ISIL will return to the country with field training to commit an act of terrorism against the Nation.⁶³

Future Risks

Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence describes a branch of computer science that uses algorithms to mimic human intelligence. It "includes performing tasks that normally require human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, problem solving, and language translation."⁶⁴ Artificial intelligence offers many benefits and has evolved greatly within the past decade because of cheap computing, better algorithms, and the ability of computers to process and store increasingly larger and larger amounts of collected data.⁶⁵ Everyday application of artificial intelligence includes Netflix recommendations, Facebook's ability to identify users' friends, and the personal assistant Siri on iPhones.⁶⁶ Additionally, artificial intelligence is playing a larger role in cybersecurity by helping companies to identify risks and anticipate problems.⁶⁷

There are potential risks with artificial intelligence. There are concerns that there will be advanced computer systems with the possible ability to match or surpass human intelligence, resulting in unexpected outcomes.⁶⁸

⁵⁹ Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Strategic Foresight Initiative*, January 2012, p. 9 and p. 23.

⁶⁰ Department of Homeland Security, *2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, p. 18.

⁶¹ Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Current Terrorist Threat to the United States, Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2015.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Babak Hojjat, "Myth Busting Artificial Intelligence," *Wired*, February 2015, <http://www.wired.com/2015/02/myth-busting-artificial-intelligence/>.

⁶⁵ Kevin Kelly, "The Three Breakthroughs that have Finally Unleashed AI on the World," *Wired*, 27 October 2014, <http://www.wired.com/2014/10/future-of-artificial-intelligence/>.

⁶⁶ Babak Hojjat, "The AI Resurgence: Why Now?" *Wired*, March 2015, <http://www.wired.com/2015/03/ai-resurgence-now/>; Kevin Kelly, "The Three Breakthroughs that have Finally Unleashed AI on the World," *Wired*, 27 October 2014, <http://www.wired.com/2014/10/future-of-artificial-intelligence/>.

⁶⁷ Rachel King, "The Security Download: Anticipating Cyberattacks with Machine Learning," *Wall Street Journal*, 9 March 2015, <http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/03/09/the-security-download-anticipating-cyberattacks-with-machine-learning/>.

⁶⁸ Rory Cellan-Jones, "Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Mankind," *BBC News*, 2 December 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540>; Paul Smith, "Apple Co-founder Steve Wozniak on the Apple Watch, Electric Cars, and the Surpassing of Humanity," *Australian Financial Review*, 23 March 2015, <http://www.afr.com/technology/apple-cofounder-steve-wozniak-on-the-apple-watch-electric-cars-and-the-surpassing-of-humanity-20150323-1m3xxk>; Baum et al, 2011, "How Long Until Human-Level AI? Results from an Expert Assessment," *Technological Forecasting & Social Change* 78(1) 185–195; Vinge, Vernor, "The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era," *Whole Earth Review*, Winter 1993, <http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/vinge/misc/singularity.html>; Eliezer Yudkowsky, "Artificial Intelligence as a Positive and Negative Factor in Global Risk," in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, edited by Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Cirkovic, London, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 331–333. For contrary views from different perspectives, see Stephen F. DeAngelis, "The Upside of Artificial Intelligence Development," *Wired*, February 2015, <http://www.wired.com/2015/02/the-upside-of-artificial-intelligence-development/>; Kurzweil, Ray, 2005, *The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology*: Viking Press; Lanier, J, "One-Half of a Manifesto: Why Stupid Software Will Save the Future from Neo-Darwinian Machines," *Wired* 8.12 (2000), http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.12/lanier_pr.html.

Cognitive Enhancement

Cognitive enhancement involves the “amplification or extension of core capacities of the mind through improvement or augmentation of internal or external information processing systems.”⁶⁹ Medical and scientific efforts at cognitive enhancement cover a range of drugs and technologies. With some brain disorders and developmental conditions, the use of drugs has become established in clinical practice. Many of these medications, which can also be used to enhance cognitive functions in healthy people above their normal baseline, have been used in the past for military applications and are drugs of abuse in the civilian population.⁷⁰ In addition to the use of medical drugs, good nutrition, education, mental training, transcranial magnetic stimulation, increased and better human-computer interaction, and regular exercise have been used to produce long term cognitive improvements.⁷¹ More unconventional and experimental forms of cognitive enhancement include gene therapy, and neural implants.⁷²

Cognitive enhancement raises a number of ethical issues and there are a few risks. There are side effects from the use of pharmacological drugs.⁷³ Ethically, there are concerns about the use of genetic enhancements raising fears about crossing the line into eugenics,⁷⁴ and the impacts upon society of human enhancement technologies more generically.⁷⁵ The improvement of human-computer interaction touches on privacy and data protection.⁷⁶

Nanotechnology

Nanotechnology holds great potential for a variety of fields, but also has potential risks. Nanotechnology involves the “creation of structures, devices, and systems on the atomic scale.”⁷⁷ In general, nanotechnology is used as a component part in larger manufacturing products, which limits their scope and impact as the manufacturing process and non-nanotechnology components influence the way nanotechnology can be used.⁷⁸ The benefits of nanotechnology include a more efficient drug delivery systems, medical imaging for diagnosis, and new cancer therapies.⁷⁹ Additionally, nanotechnology is used to improve energy efficiency, desalinate water, clean up hazardous waste, and detect contaminants.⁸⁰ Nanotechnology is now used in over 1,000 consumer products, which marks a 379 percent increase from 2006.⁸¹

⁶⁹ Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg, “Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges,” *Science and Engineering Ethics* 15 (2009), p. 311.

⁷⁰ JASON (MITRE Corporation), *Human Performance*, March 2008, <https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/human.pdf>; Masud Husain and Mitul A. Mehta, “Cognitive Enhancement by Drugs in Health and Disease,” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, no. 1, 2011 January 15, p. 28.

⁷¹ Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg, “Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges,” *Science and Engineering Ethics* 15 (2009), p. 313–321; Hannah Maslen, Nadira Faulmuller, and Julian Savulescu, “Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancement – How Neuroscientific Research Could Advance Ethical Debate,” *Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience* no. 8, 2014, p. 107.

⁷² Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg, “Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges,” *Science and Engineering Ethics* 15 (2009), p. 312.

⁷³ Masud Husain and Mitul A. Mehta, “Cognitive Enhancement by Drugs in Health and Disease,” *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, no. 1, 2011 January 15.

⁷⁴ Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg, “Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges,” *Science and Engineering Ethics* 15 (2009), p. 324–328.

⁷⁵ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds*, December 2012, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf.

⁷⁶ Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg, “Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, Ethics, Regulatory Challenges,” *Science and Engineering Ethics* 15 (2009), p. 324–328.

⁷⁷ National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Nanotechnology at AMES,” http://www.nasa.gov/centers/ames/research/technology-onepagers/ames_nanotech.html.

⁷⁸ Chris Phoenix and Mike Treder, “Nanotechnology as Global Catastrophic Risk,” in *Global Catastrophic Risks*, edited by Nick Bostrom and Milan M. Cirkovic, London, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 482–483.

⁷⁹ Daniel J. Fiorino, *Voluntary Initiatives, Regulation, and Nanotechnology Oversight: Charting a Path*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 2010, p. 12.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

There are different types of possible risks with nanotechnology. Nanotechnology could be used to manufacture weapons on a mass scale.⁸² “Uncontrolled aggressive nanotechnology is a scenario in which humanity unleashes weapons that it cannot subsequently bring under control, which go on to have independent negative impacts on the world.”⁸³ In utilizing nanotechnology, there is a fear that robots could self-replicate, thus putting humanity in danger.⁸⁴

It is difficult to provide exact risks from the use of nanotechnology because of the diverse uses and complexity of nanomaterials.⁸⁵ There are few studies on the environmental fate of nanomaterials in soil, atmosphere, and water.⁸⁶ Nanomaterials could possibly transform in the environment and become toxic to human health.⁸⁷

⁸² Global Challenges Foundation, *Global Challenges: 12 Risks that Threaten Human Civilization*, February 2015, p. 117.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Bill Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us,” *Wired*, April 2000.

⁸⁵ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, *Nanotechnology White Paper*, February 2007, p. 29; Global Challenges Foundation, *Global Challenges: 12 Risks that Threaten Human Civilization*, February 2015, p. 117.

⁸⁶ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, *Nanotechnology White Paper*, February 2007, p. 33.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

Appendix O: Climate Change

Scientific evidence indicates the climate is changing and significant economic, social, and environmental impacts are expected as a result. Climate change is an increasingly significant factor in assessing and managing risks and vulnerabilities to extreme events. Over the past 50 years, much of the U.S. has experienced increases in prolonged periods of excessively high temperatures, heavy precipitation, and, in some regions, severe floods and droughts.¹ The best available scientific data indicates these trends will continue and will likely have further cascading effects on human health, infrastructure, and the economy.²

Primary Impacts

The impacts of climate change will vary across the Nation, but the following are examples of critical anticipated shifts in the frequency, intensity, and/or geographic range of natural hazards:

- Increasing heavy precipitation events will contribute to flash floods and urban floods.³
- Average global sea level has risen by approximately eight inches since reliable record keeping began in 1880 and is projected to rise another one to four feet by 2100.⁴
- Western forests in the U.S. will be more frequently affected by large and intense fires.⁵
- The frequency and intensity of heat waves will continue to increase.⁶
- Higher temperatures cause faster evaporation rates, which may lead to drought conditions even when there is no decrease in precipitation.⁷
- Over the last three to five decades, the heaviest rainfall events have become heavier and more frequent,⁸ and these are projected to continue in most of the U.S.;⁹ and
- Although many contributing factors make hurricanes difficult to predict, most models project an overall increase in the frequency of the strongest (Category 4 and 5) hurricanes by the end of the century.¹⁰

Due to the complexity of climatological forecasting and the myriad anticipated impacts, some uncertainty remains about the magnitude and types of future changes to natural hazards. It is clear, however, that increasing frequency, intensity, and impacts of hazards due to climate change may render historical risk profiles outdated, and, therefore, they may no longer be an adequate measure for identifying and addressing future risks.

¹ NCA3 Highlights, “Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment: Highlights,” <http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/Highlights>, Pg. 24.

² NCA3 Highlights, Pgs. 12–14.

³ U.S. Third National Climate Assessment (NCA3), “Climate Change Impacts in the United States The Third National Climate Assessment,” U.S. Global Change Research Program, May 2014: <http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report>. Pg. 75.

⁴ NCA3, Pg. 66.

⁵ NCA3, Pg. 192.

⁶ NCA3, Pg. 64.

⁷ NCA3 Highlights, Pg. 24.

⁸ NCA3 Highlights, Pg. 25.

⁹ NCA3, Pg. 37.

¹⁰ NCA3, Pg. 41.

Secondary Impacts

As climate change alters the natural hazard risk environment, secondary risk and vulnerability effects are likely. The social and health-related impacts of climate change will likely be more concentrated in communities already facing economic or health-related challenges.¹¹ Agricultural pressures associated with climate change may lead to rising food prices,¹² which in turn can contribute to food insecurity. More frequent heat waves, worsening air quality, and more favorable growing conditions for common allergens may increase chronic heat-, respiratory-, and allergy-related conditions.¹³

Future climate extremes may strain the reliability of critical infrastructure and availability of key resources, forcing the whole community to reconsider current and future resource needs. Degraded natural barriers such as salt marshes, reefs, mangrove forests, and barrier islands have a reduced capacity to buffer coastal infrastructure from extreme events like floods and storms. Even outside of coastal areas, climate change is expected to have a profound impact on the Nation's infrastructure, including a reduction in the reliability and capacity of transportation infrastructure and systems,¹⁴ which are critical to lifesaving response efforts and disaster recovery.

The economic ramifications of climate change can affect resources and response capabilities at all levels of government. There has been a sizeable upward trend in the number of storm events causing large financial and other losses in the U.S.,¹⁵ though this trend can be attributed to increases in property values at risk in addition to increases in storm activity. In addition to a rising economic toll of disaster response, the underlying drivers of local economies could be significantly altered as climate zones suitable for agricultural production and climate-driven tourism shift.¹⁶ Such economic impacts have the potential to ripple across the Nation. For example, ports are deeply interconnected with inland areas through the goods imported and exported each year.¹⁷ Their exposure to sea level rise is not just a concern for coastal communities, but has far-reaching implications for the Nation's economy as a whole.

¹¹ NCA3 Pgs. 228–229.

¹² NCA3, Pg. 228.

¹³ NCA3, Pg. 222.

¹⁴ NCA3 Highlights, Pg. 40.

¹⁵ NCA3, Pg. 65.

¹⁶ NCA3. Pgs. 334–339.

¹⁷ NCA3, Pg. 590.

Natural Hazard Risk

Long-term, independent records from weather stations, satellites, ocean buoys, tide gauges, and many other data sources all confirm that the Nation, like the rest of the world, is in the midst of a long-term warming trend.¹⁸ Although the warming trend is clear, the exact quantitative risk of climate change is difficult to estimate due to natural climatic variations.¹⁹ The Third National Climate Assessment (NCA3) was produced by a team of more than 300 experts, guided by a 60-member Federal Advisory Committee, and extensively reviewed by the public and experts, including federal agencies and a panel from the National Academy of Sciences. The NCA3 comprises the best available scientific data on the potential impacts of climate change in the U.S. and summarizes the status of the current scientific consensus on various aspects of climate change.

Climate change presents a challenge to individuals throughout the Nation, however, its impacts will vary across the U.S. The NCA3 describes eight regions and their anticipated changes in climate-related hazards:

- In the Northeast, communities will be affected by heat waves, more extreme precipitation events, and coastal flooding due to sea level rise and storm surge.
- In the Southeast and Caribbean, decreased water availability, exacerbated by population growth and land use change, will cause increased competition for water in addition to growing risks associated with extreme events such as hurricanes.
- In the Midwest, an increased occurrence of extreme events such as heat waves, droughts, and floods is anticipated.
- In the Great Plains, rising temperatures will lead to increased demand for water and energy, as well as impacts on agricultural practices.
- In the Southwest, drought and increased warming will increase the risk of wildfires and competition for scarce water resources.
- In the Northwest, changes in the timing of streamflow due to earlier snowmelt will reduce the supply of water in the summer, causing far-reaching ecological and socioeconomic consequences.
- In Alaska, rapidly receding summer sea ice, shrinking glaciers, and thawing permafrost cause damage to infrastructure and major changes to ecosystems.
- In Hawai‘i and the Pacific Islands, increasingly constrained fresh water supplies, coupled with increased temperatures, will stress both people and ecosystems and decrease food and water security.²⁰

Historical risk profiles for hazards may no longer serve as effective planning tools for identifying and addressing future risks. Climate change has the potential to affect the frequency, intensity, and/or geographic range of many natural hazards. However, due to the complexity of climatological forecasting and the plethora of anticipated impacts, not all projections are backed by equally strong scientific evidence. Some are backed by scientific consensus and a

¹⁸ NCA3.

¹⁹ NCA3, Pg. 28.

²⁰ NCA3 Highlights, Pg. 8.

comprehensive body of supporting data; others are supported by limited studies, or are the subject of ongoing scientific debate. Table O1 identifies key natural hazards that will potentially be affected by climate change, and how, as well as the degree of scientific confidence behind each anticipated or observed change in hazard characteristic, according to the NCA3.

Table O1: Climate Change Impacts Table Legend

Hazard	Identifies the hazard for which there is either a projected future or an observed historical shift in frequency, intensity, or range of impact.
“Very High” to “Low”	<p>Indicates the degree of scientific confidence that climate change has/will affect the given hazard characteristic.²¹</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Note: Some of the projected hazard increases/shifts have differing degrees of scientific confidence in different regions. This is noted in the qualitative description when applicable.
Qualitative description for each hazard	Provides additional information as to whether the shift is projected (future) vs. observed (current), or regional vs. national in nature. Also provides the source page number from NCA3, or NCA3 Highlights, for each statement.

Table O2: Climate Change Impacts on Natural Hazards in the U.S.

Hazard Characteristic:	Increase in Frequency	Increase in Intensity	Shift in Geographic Range of Impacts
Wildfire	Very High Confidence	Very High Confidence	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Hotter and drier weather and earlier snowmelt may result in wildfires in the west starting earlier in the spring, lasting later into the fall, and burning more acreage. (NCA3 Pg 1) ▪ There is very high confidence that western forests in the United States will be affected increasingly by large and intense fires that occur more frequently. Wildfires will increase substantially in response to warming and also in conjunction with other changes such as an increase in the frequency and/or severity of drought and amplification of pest and pathogen impacts. (192) ▪ Eastern forests are less likely to experience immediate increases in wildfire unless/until a point is reached at which warmer temperatures, concurrent with seasonal dry periods or more protracted drought, trigger wildfires. (192) ▪ Excessive wildfire destroys homes, exposes slopes to erosion and landslides, threatens public health, and causes economic damage. (468) 			
Floods	Regional Trends	Regional Trends	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increasing heavy precipitation events will contribute to flash floods and urban floods, while rising sea levels will contribute to increasing tidal and storm-related flooding. (75) ▪ Confidence is very high that sea level will continue to rise; medium confidence that the rise will be in the range of one to four feet by 2100. (66) 			

²¹ “Very High” - High scientific consensus due to established theory, multiple sources, consistent results, well documented and accepted methods, etc.

“High” - Medium scientific consensus due to several sources, some consistency, methods vary and/or documentation limited, etc.

“Medium” - Competing schools of thought due to suggestive evidence, few sources, limited consistency, models incomplete, methods emerging, etc.

“Low” - Inconclusive evidence due to limited sources, extrapolations, inconsistent findings, poor documentation and/or methods not tested, etc.; disagreement or lack of opinions among experts.

Hazard Characteristic:	Increase in Frequency	Increase in Intensity	Shift in Geographic Range of Impacts
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rates of sea level rise are not uniform along U.S. coasts and can be exacerbated locally by land subsidence or reduced by uplift. (582) Detailed hydrologic models of rivers that simulate response to projected precipitation and temperature changes from climate models have only recently begun to emerge in peer-reviewed literature. Confidence in current estimates of future changes in flood frequencies and intensities is overall judged to be low [nationally], due to the impact of future development and the need to conduct individual projections for each river basin. (107) Confidence is high that there have been regional trends in floods and droughts. (65) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Northeast: Very High confidence for sea level rise and increasing coastal flooding as well as heat waves; High confidence for more intense precipitation events and riverine flooding. (393) Midwest: There is Medium confidence that, in the absence of substantial adaptation actions, the enhancement in extreme precipitation and other tendencies in land use and land cover result in a projected increase in flooding. (439) Southwest: There is Very High confidence the sea level will continue to rise and that this will entail major damage to coastal regions in the Southwest. There is also very high confidence that flooding and erosion in coastal areas are already occurring even at existing sea levels and damaging some areas of the California coast during storms and extreme high tides. (485) Northwest: There is High confidence in the projections of increased [coastal] erosion and inundation. (509) 			
Drought	High Confidence	High Confidence	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The number of extremely hot days is projected to continue to increase over much of the U.S., especially by late century. (39) Higher temperatures cause increased rates of evaporation, which may result in a decrease of surface water and soil moisture, and lead to drought conditions even when there is no decrease in precipitation. (Highlights 24) Potential secondary impacts include an increase in wildfire severity and frequency (32), a reduction in energy generation capacity in areas that rely on hydropower (85), and a decrease in water quality due to higher relative concentrations of contaminants in surface water. (78) Confidence is judged to be medium-high that short-term (seasonal or shorter) droughts are expected to intensify in most U.S. regions. Confidence is high that longer-term droughts are expected to intensify in large areas of the southern U.S. (107) Confidence is high that the length of dry spells is projected to increase in most areas, especially the southern and northwestern portions of the contiguous U.S. (106) Confidence is judged to be medium-high that short-term (seasonal or shorter) droughts are expected to intensify in most U.S. regions. Confidence is high that longer-term droughts are expected to intensify in large areas of the Southwest, southern Great Plains, and Southeast. (107) 			
Extreme Heat	High Confidence	High Confidence	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate change has increased the probability of heat waves. Prolonged (multi-month) extreme heat has been unprecedented since the start of reliable instrumental records in 1895. (NCA 3 Highlights Pg 24) The national number of heat waves in 2011 and 2012 was almost triple the long-term average. (Highlights 24) Heat waves sharply increase risks of power outages and fatalities from heat stroke and related 			

Hazard Characteristic:	Increase in Frequency	Increase in Intensity	Shift in Geographic Range of Impacts
<p>conditions, particularly in urban areas. (NCA 3 Pg 224)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ High confidence that heat waves everywhere are projected to become more intense in the future. (64) ▪ High confidence that heat waves have become more frequent and intense, especially in the West. (64) 			
Heavy Precipitation	High Confidence	High Confidence	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Over the last three to five decades, the heaviest rainfall events have become heavier and more frequent, and the amount of rain falling on the heaviest days has also increased. (Highlights 25) ▪ High confidence that heavy downpours are increasing, and will continue to increase, in most regions of the U.S., with especially large increases in the Midwest and Northeast. (64) ▪ High confidence that further increases in the frequency and intensity of extreme precipitation events are projected for most U.S. areas, including in regions where total precipitation is projected to decrease, such as the Southwest. (37) ▪ Secondary impacts may include increases in flash flooding, erosion and landslides, as well as associated infrastructure stresses. 			
Hurricanes	Medium Confidence	Medium Confidence	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Although there are many contributing factors that make hurricanes difficult to predict, most models project an overall increase in the frequency of the strongest (Category 4 and 5) hurricanes by the end of the century. (41) ▪ Rising sea levels along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts will make coastal areas even more vulnerable to storm surge. (401) ▪ Overall, medium confidence that hurricane intensity and rainfall rates are projected to increase as the climate continues to warm. (65) 			
Winter Storms	Medium Confidence	Medium Confidence	Medium Confidence
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There is evidence of an increase in both winter storm frequency and intensity since 1950 in the northern and eastern parts of the U.S., but they have been less frequent since 2000. (43) ▪ Confidence is high that cold waves have become less frequent and intense across the Nation. (64) ▪ Confidence is medium that winter storms have increased slightly in frequency and intensity, and that their tracks have shifted. (65) 			
Tornadoes	Low	Low	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ A recent study suggests a projected increased in the conditions favorable for severe thunderstorms, but more studies are required. (43) ▪ Low confidence in increasing trend in intensity and frequency of tornadoes, hail and damaging thunderstorms. (65) 			

Impacts on Society and Systems

Climate change is expected to act as a hazard multiplier for many current threats and hazards, and in some cases will introduce new hazards to communities. The effects of climate change may cascade into a number of areas that are not directly weather related, affecting population shifts, public health, resources, and local economies.

As climate change alters the natural hazard risk environment, cascading risk and vulnerability effects on public health, natural resources, infrastructure, and society are likely. The social and health-related impacts of climate change will likely be more concentrated in communities that already face economic or health-related challenges,¹ but may substantially affect the capacity of communities as a whole to prepare for, respond to, and recover from increasing threats from natural hazards. Below are examples of climate change-related effects that can increase vulnerability to extreme events.

Natural Resources Effects

Climate change, combined with other stressors, is overwhelming the capacity of ecosystems to buffer the impacts from extreme events like droughts, floods, and storms.² Salt marshes, reefs, mangrove forests, and barrier islands provide an ecosystem service of defending coastal ecosystems and infrastructure against storm surges. Losses of these natural features to sea level rise and other causes render coastal ecosystems and infrastructure more vulnerable to catastrophic damage during or after extreme events.

Infrastructure Effects

Much of the Nation’s infrastructure, including buildings and energy, transportation, water, and sanitation systems, is outdated and/or in need of upgrades. This existing infrastructure is expected to become “more stressed in the next decades—especially when the impacts of climate change are added to the equation.”³ Increased exposure to hazards due to climate change may lead decision makers and planners to consider how climate change will affect their new and existing infrastructure systems, assets, and networks across the lifespan of those structures.

Anticipated impacts include a reduction in the reliability and capacity of transportation infrastructure and systems, which are critical to lifesaving response efforts and disaster recovery.⁴ Additionally, urban infrastructure systems are highly interdependent, so a failure in one sector may have “cascading effects across affected urban economies.”⁵

While it may be obvious that infrastructure faces challenges nationwide, infrastructure exposure to natural hazards is a nationwide concern and requires further analysis and investment in order to mitigate risks of disruption. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) conducted an in-depth analysis of infrastructure exposure⁶ to natural hazards in the contiguous U.S. (see next section). The preliminary analysis reveals where existing infrastructure systems are exposed to natural hazards and where that exposure may shift

¹ NCA 228–229.

² NCA3, Pg. 217.

³ NCA3, Pg. 283.

⁴ NCA3 Highlights, Pg. 40.

⁵ NCA3, Pg. 283.

⁶ DHS NPPD commissioned the RAND Corporation to conduct analysis on infrastructure exposure to natural hazards. As of April 2015, the data, methods, analysis, and findings are being documented and will be reviewed by representatives from across the interagency.

due to climate change.⁷ Even without adjusting for climate change, the Nation's infrastructure is exposed to a range of natural hazards such as landslides, hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, and wildfire. While additional analysis is required to quantify the vulnerability of specific infrastructure systems to climate-related hazards, understanding infrastructure exposure is an important step in planning for adapting to the impacts of climate change.

Climate change impacts on critical infrastructure is examined in greater depth in the following section.

Water Insecurity

Changes in water availability have the potential to drive "critical climate-related conflicts and relief challenges across the globe."⁸ Climate change is projected to reduce water availability and increase demand in the American Southwest and Southeast.⁹ This will create water management challenges, including potential competition between sectors and/or land owners. The agricultural sector is currently responsible for around 70 percent of freshwater consumption. There is also the potential, as water becomes a scarcer resource, for water infrastructure to become an increasingly attractive target for terrorism.

Sea Level Rise

Global sea level has risen by about eight inches since reliable record keeping began in 1880. It is projected to rise another one to four feet by 2100.¹⁰ This rise will not be constant throughout the U.S., but will be impacted by coastal uplift and subsidence as well as any movement of the Atlantic jet stream. For example, in the same period of 1880 to present, the relative sea level rise was approximately one foot in the Northeast.¹¹ Since 1992, the rate of global sea level rise measured by satellites has been roughly twice the rate observed over the last century, indicating a potential increase in the rate of sea level rise.

Health Effects

Increasing heat waves, worsening air quality, and more favorable growing conditions for common allergens may increase the strain on health systems due to increasing chronic heat-, respiratory-, and allergy-related conditions.¹² The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Climate Change Adaptation Plan¹³ identifies several effects that climate change can have on public health. These impacts will likely be most severe among individuals and communities that already face economic or health-related challenges. Individuals with asthma are especially vulnerable to health consequences associated with extreme heat, wildfires, and mold outbreaks from flood events. Asthma prevalence (the percentage of people who have ever been diagnosed with asthma and still have asthma) increased nationwide from 7.3% in 2001 to 8.4% in 2010.¹⁴ Heat waves can also worsen specific health concerns not traditionally associated with heat, such

⁷ For the purposes of the infrastructure exposure analysis (pp 481-486), permanent inundation, tidal flooding, coastal surge, extreme temperatures, drought, and wildfires were considered to be impacted by climate change. Earthquakes, landslides, tornadoes, tsunamis, ice storms, riverine flooding, and hurricane winds were not considered related to climate change, as there is not sufficient data to support a nationwide evaluation of how the hazard could be expected to change.

⁸ National Research Council "*Climate and Social Stress*," Pg. 98.

⁹ NCA3, Pg. 87.

¹⁰ NCA3, Pg. 66.

¹¹ NCA3, Pg. 370.

¹² NCA3, Pg. 222.

¹³ HHS Climate Change Adaptation Plan. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2012. <http://www.hhs.gov/about/sustainability/adaptation-plan.pdf>.

¹⁴ NCA3, Pg. 222.

as cardiovascular disease and respiratory disease, leading to spikes in hospitalizations during extreme heat events.¹⁵ Finally, the changing climate may impact the geographic range and lengthen the active season of tropical disease-carrying vectors such as mosquitoes.¹⁶

Food Insecurity

During the next century, the predicted higher incidence of extreme weather will influence agricultural productivity. Near-term climate change effects on agriculture include the potential for increased soil erosion through extreme precipitation events, as well as regional and seasonal changes in the availability of water resources for both rain-fed and irrigated agriculture.¹⁷

According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Climate Change Adaptation plan, pressures associated with climate change, including “weeds, diseases, and insect pests, together with potential changes in timing and coincidence of pollinator lifecycles, will affect growth and yields.”¹⁸ In addition to impacting crop agriculture, climate change can “affect animal agriculture in four primary ways: (1) feed-grain production, availability, and price; (2) pastures and forage crop production and quality; (3) animal health, growth, and reproduction; and (4) disease and pest distributions.”¹⁹

In response to the above pressures, food prices are expected to rise.²⁰ Historically, food insecurity rises with rising food prices, and the NCA3 notes that in such situations, “people cope by turning to nutrient-poor but calorie-rich foods, and/or they endure hunger, with consequences ranging from micronutrient malnutrition to obesity.”²¹ Additionally, Americans with specific dietary patterns, such as Alaska Natives, will confront shortages of key foods.²²

Mass Migration/Social Displacement

Climate change could displace many socially vulnerable individuals and lead to significant social disruptions in some coastal areas.²³ There is evidence that tribal communities in Alaska, coastal Louisiana, the Pacific Islands, and other coastal locations are already being forced to relocate due to sea level rise, coastal erosion, melting permafrost, and/or extreme weather events.²⁴ A recent National Research Council report notes that climate change may contribute to “temporary or permanent displacement of a population following some type of climate event or other disruptive event, such as a tsunami... temporary or permanent relocation of a population from an area threatened by flooding or inundation; and temporary or permanent movement from one region or country to another for economic opportunity.”²⁵ Such events are impossible to predict, but Hurricane Katrina demonstrated the potential of major climate-related disasters to permanently displace large portions of an impacted population.²⁶ Hurricane Katrina also demonstrated the challenges that may face the migrants, such as establishing themselves in a new community, finding employment, and accessing services. The receiving communities also face challenges, as

¹⁵ NCA3, Pg. 224.

¹⁶ NCA3, Pg. 225.

¹⁷ USDA Climate Change Adaptation Plan, Pg. 9.

¹⁸ USDA Climate Change Adaptation Plan Pg. 10.

¹⁹ USDA Climate Change Adaptation Plan.

²⁰ NCA3, Pg. 228.

²¹ NCA3, Pg. 228.

²² NCA3, Pg. 228.

²³ NCA3, Pg. 591.

²⁴ NCA3, Pg. 317.

²⁵ National Research Council “Climate and Social Stress,” Pg. 112.

²⁶ NCA3, Pg. 401.

their infrastructure, labor market, commerce, natural resources, and governance structures need to absorb a sudden population growth.²⁷

Economic Effects

Climate change has the potential to affect resources and response capabilities at all levels of government. There has been a sizeable upward trend in the number of storm events causing large financial and other losses in the U.S.,²⁸ though this trend can be attributed to increases in both storm activity and development. In 2012, the warmest year on record for the U.S., the Nation experienced 11 climate-related disasters resulting in over \$110 billion in damages.²⁹

In addition to the economic toll of disaster response, the underlying drivers of local economies could be significantly altered as climate zones suitable for agricultural production and climate-driven tourism shift.³⁰ The nation's ports are located in already-vulnerable coastal locations, and increasingly exposed to sea level rise and related hazards.³¹ This is not just a concern for coastal communities, but has far-reaching implications for the economy of the Nation as whole as ports are deeply interconnected with inland areas through the goods imported and exported each year.³² If additional mitigation actions are not taken, the potential economic toll from climate-related disasters could be huge.

Even the necessary mitigation efforts could have significant economic impact, however. There have been no comprehensive, nation-wide estimates of the total necessary mitigation investment, though there have been sector- and region-specific estimates. A water sector-specific study estimated the nationwide climate change adaptation costs for wastewater systems alone would fall between \$123 billion and \$252 billion by 2050.³³ A Gulf Coast-specific study estimated that investing approximately \$50 billion for adaptation over the next 20 years could lead to approximately \$135 billion in averted losses over the lifetime of adaptive measures.³⁴

Abrupt Climate Change Impacts

An additional climate change consideration is the rate at which the change might occur. Most changes are anticipated to occur gradually, allowing time to implement adaptation measures. However, the National Research Council report *Abrupt Impacts of Climate Change: Anticipating Surprises*, notes that the possibility also exists, however that “some changes will be abrupt, perhaps crossing a threshold or ‘tipping point’ to change so quickly that there will be little time to react.”³⁵ These ‘abrupt’ changes could occur over decades or years or could accelerate the rate at which other hazards are affected.³⁶

Summary

Climate change will act as a hazard amplifier for many current threats and hazards, or introduce hazards to new communities. The impacts of climate change may strain the reliability of critical

²⁷ NCA3, Pg. 545.

²⁸ NCA3, Pg. 65.

²⁹ *The President’s Climate Action Plan*. Executive Office of the President. 2013. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27scimateactionplan.pdf>.

³⁰ NCA3, Pgs. 334–339.

³¹ NCA3, Pg. 589.

³² NCA3, Pg. 590.

³³ NCA3, Pg. 588.

³⁴ NCA3, Pg. 589.

³⁵ “*Abrupt Impacts of Climate Change: Anticipating Surprises*” by the National Research Council.

³⁶ “*Abrupt Impacts of Climate Change: Anticipating Surprises*” by the National Research Council.

infrastructure and availability of key resources, forcing the whole community to reconsider current and future resource needs. Its consequences may cascade into a number of areas that are not directly weather related, effecting population shifts, public health problems, and local economies. In other words, although a changing climate is not a threat or hazard unto itself, its impacts can stress capabilities across all five mission areas—prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery—and should be considered throughout risk analyses and future decision making processes.

Infrastructure Exposure to Natural Hazards and Climate Change

The quantitative risk of climate change is difficult to estimate because of the uncertainty that exists. Science does provide insight into the direction in which certain risks are trending. Regions across the U.S. will experience different impacts and need to plan according to their specific challenges. In the National Climate Assessment, the U.S. Global Change Research Program highlighted how regions across the U.S. could face different hazards.

- The National Climate Assessment analyzed data on how the Nation has seen rainfall events become heavier and more frequent in parts of the U.S., primarily in the Northeast, Midwest, and upper Great Plains, and these rainfall events have increased flooding in those regions.¹ As an example, in areas of the country where precipitation is expected to decrease, such as the Southwest, projections suggest there will be increased heavy precipitation.
- In addition to heavier precipitation, the National Climate Assessment analyzed hurricanes and concluded that hurricane-associated storm intensity and rainfall rates are projected to increase as the climate continues to warm.²
- The Southwest region of the U.S. is expected to be more prone to drought, wildfires, and heat waves, while the Northeast can expect heat waves, heavy downpours, and sea level rise to challenge their region.

These various hazards will impact the country in different, sometimes unprecedented ways, and may have catastrophic impacts on their populations and infrastructure.

Based on the climate science available today, which underpins the *National Climate Assessment* and is agreed upon by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), DHS conducted a preliminary analysis that reveals where infrastructure systems are exposed to natural hazards and how that exposure is expected to change based on climate change.³ While additional analysis is required to determine the level of vulnerability that specific infrastructure systems have or will have to climate-related hazards, understanding infrastructure exposure is an important step in planning for adapting to the impacts of climate change.

DHS developed a way to analyze and visualize infrastructure exposure to natural hazards and understand how that exposure may change due to climate change. The DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) conducted an in-depth, nationwide⁴ analysis of this exposure.⁵ While the preliminary findings are currently being reviewed by the interagency, this analysis reaffirms the work done by the *National Climate Assessment* and reflects the most current climate science. The analysis not only visualizes how infrastructure exposure to climate change and non-climate related hazards may shift, but also allows decision makers to estimate exposure to multiple hazards as well as various intensities. For the purpose of the analysis, DHS used subject matter expertise and expert judgments to identify a set of hazards that could affect critical infrastructure. Recognizing that any hazard event could have a major impact on a specific

¹ U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2015, p. 36.

² U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2015, p. 41.

³ For the purpose of this analysis, permanent inundation, tidal flooding, coastal surge, extreme temperatures, drought, and wildfires were considered to be impacted by climate change. Earthquakes, landslides, tornadoes, tsunamis, ice storms, riverine flooding, and hurricane winds were not considered related to climate change, as there is insufficient data to support a nationwide evaluation of how these hazards could be expected to change.

⁴ Due to the scoping for this analysis, DHS focused on the contiguous United States. Additional analysis would be required to incorporate Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. Territories.

⁵ DHS NPPD commissioned the RAND Corporation to conduct analysis on infrastructure exposure to natural hazards. As of March 2015, the data, methods, analysis, and findings are being documented and will be reviewed by representatives from across the interagency.

community or region, for the purpose of this national level analysis, DHS NPPD classified the hazards into low and high categories based on their relative magnitude.


Table O3: Classification of Hazards Analyzed

Low Magnitude Hazards	High Magnitude Hazards
<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Landslides▪ Drought (400-600 Index)▪ Extreme Heat (120° F daily max)▪ Hurricane Wind (Category 2)▪ Ice Storms (Category 4)▪ Coastal Flooding (1 ft. depth)▪ Earthquakes (0.34 ground acceleration)▪ Wildfire (Moderate)▪ Tornado (EF3)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ Drought (600-800 Index)▪ Extreme Heat (130° F daily max)▪ Hurricane Wind (Category 4)▪ Ice Storms (Category 5)▪ Coastal Flooding (6 ft. depth)▪ Earthquakes (0.64 ground acceleration)▪ Wildfire (Very High)▪ Riverine Flood▪ Tsunami▪ Tornado (EF5)

Even without adjusting for climate change, the Nation's infrastructure is exposed to a range of low intensity natural hazards. The map in Figure O1 visually depicts, by county areas across the U.S., where infrastructure⁶ is exposed to at least two assessed hazards from the category of low intensity hazards.⁷ While it may be obvious that infrastructure faces challenges nationwide, infrastructure exposure to natural hazards is a nationwide concern and requires further analysis and investment in order to mitigate risks of disruption.


⁶ The infrastructure data is found in HSIP Gold. The sectors considered in this analysis include chemical, communications, energy, transportation, water, wastewater, and dams.

⁷ Subject matter experts determined infrastructure exposure by first identifying which types of infrastructure were vulnerable to which types of hazards (e.g., power transmission lines are vulnerable to high winds), and then identifying where they are co-located. This data does not include mitigation efforts, such as burying electric power transmission lines to mitigate tornado exposure.

Figure O1: Infrastructure Exposure to Relatively Frequent Natural Hazards

This map illustrates that in 2015, most counties across the U.S. contain infrastructure that is exposed to hazards in the low magnitude category (see Table O3 for additional details) that occur relatively frequently within the U.S. (>1% chance of occurrence per year). These represent relatively common hazards.

Perhaps more significantly than viewing exposure to less severe hazards, DHS can use this analysis to determine where infrastructure is most likely to be exposed to high intensity hazards. This can be used as an indicator for where infrastructure is most likely to be exposed to more significant events that may require a National response. Based on this analysis, infrastructure in the Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, New England, and the West Coast is most likely to be exposed to these severe hazards.

Figure O2: Infrastructure Exposure to High Magnitude, Relatively Infrequent Hazards

This map illustrates that in 2015, a few concentrated regions across the U.S. contain infrastructure that is exposed to multiple⁸ hazards in the high magnitude category (see Table O3 for additional details) that occur relatively infrequently (<0.1% chance of occurrence per year), particularly in the Midwest, New England, and the West Coast..

This infrastructure exposure is a challenge today. Much of the Nation's infrastructure is outdated and needs to be upgraded. While the U.S. is trying to find ways to encourage infrastructure investment to address these challenges, experts estimate that the country would need to invest \$3.6 trillion in the Nation's infrastructure by 2020 to bring it up to date.⁹ Modern, efficient infrastructure is essential to the growth, health, and prosperity of the Nation and the direct cost of a disruption could cost billions of dollars. Hurricane Sandy caused an estimated \$1 billion in damage to the power and gas lines in New Jersey alone, and ended up causing an estimated \$65 billion in damages and economic loss across the region.¹⁰ Hurricane Sandy demonstrated the widespread catastrophic damage that can occur when a large storm hits a densely populated and highly interconnected region.

In addition to preparing for today's realities, the Nation must prepare for natural hazards that will be exacerbated by climate change. As regions make choices about their infrastructure and consider how to strategically invest their scarce resources, decision makers should consider how climate change will affect their new and existing infrastructure systems, assets, and networks across the lifespan of those structures. To support this, DHS conducted preliminary analysis on how hazard exposure changes according to a variety of/multiple future climate scenarios. Using representative concentration pathway (RCP) scenarios accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's Fifth Assessment Report, DHS modeled how different climate futures could alter the frequency and severity of natural hazards, and how these changes, in turn, could


⁸ Three or more.

⁹ American Society of Civil Engineers, 2013.

¹⁰ Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force, 2013, p. 21.

expose infrastructure in new and different ways.¹¹ In addition, DHS leveraged the work done by NOAA to evaluate potential sea level rise scenarios, which inform analysis on permanent inundation, tidal flooding, and coastal surge.

Figure O3: Infrastructure Exposure to High Magnitude, Relatively Infrequent Hazards Using a Pessimistic Climate Scenario



This map illustrates that, under a pessimistic climate scenario, by 2040 there could be an expansion of areas in the U.S. that contain infrastructure exposed to multiple¹² hazards in the high magnitude category (see Table O3 for additional details) that occur relatively infrequently (<0.1% chance of occurrence per year), particularly in the Midwest and along the coasts.

Figure O3 depicts how new concentrations of exposure emerge as a result of climate change scenarios, particularly in the Pacific Northwest, California, the Midwest, the Southeast, and New England. It is important to note that the specific hazards vary across the regions. The Southeast, for instance, is vulnerable to coastal flooding and permanent inundation, whereas the Midwest is more likely to be affected by drought and extreme heat. These different hazards pose their own unique challenges and could require different plans for mitigating the effects. Evaluating the vulnerability and risk to infrastructure in Charleston, South Carolina will involve different variables than the infrastructure in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Likewise, the resources required to respond and recover from disasters in various regions could differ as well. It is important to understand where the hazards are expected to change so the Nation can prepare accordingly.


It is also important to note that the preliminary analysis reflects similar patterns of exposure when selecting a less pessimistic climate scenario, albeit over a longer timeframe. Whereas the model in the High RCP scenario depicted in Figure O3 reflects the changes in exposure in the year 2040, the analysis also reflects similar results for a less aggressive model in the year 2065,

¹¹ Additional information on the models and the definitions for pessimistic, median, and optimistic climate scenarios used for analysis will be included in the forthcoming technical report. As of March 2015, the report is being finalized by the RAND Corporation on behalf of DHS NPPD. The report will document the data, methods, and analysis and will be reviewed by representatives from across the interagency.

¹² Three or more.

depicted in Figure O4. Considering the lifespan of infrastructure can be 50 to 100 years, the longer timeframe in this analysis still represents a significant finding and suggests the geographic clusters identified under a pessimistic model will be similarly exposed under less pessimistic scenarios.

Figure O4: Infrastructure Exposure to High Magnitude, Relatively Infrequent Hazards Using the Median Climate Scenario



This map illustrates that under the median climate scenario, by 2065 there could be an expansion of areas in the U.S. that contain infrastructure exposed to multiple¹³ hazards in the high magnitude category (see Table O3 for additional details) that occur relatively infrequently (<0.1% chance of occurrence per year), particularly in the Midwest and along the coasts.

As cities and regions grow and adapt to changing conditions, the supporting infrastructure will be stressed in new and more extreme ways. This groundbreaking preliminary analysis allows DHS NPPD to visualize infrastructure clusters and estimate how the exposure will change over time. At this point in time, DHS is not able to say precisely where and when a catastrophic hazard will strike. However, by better understanding the exposure of infrastructure to climate change, DHS NPPD and our partners can help decision makers incorporate climate vulnerability considerations into decisions, invest in critical infrastructure security and resilience, and prepare the Nation to adapt to climate change.

¹³ Three or more.

Appendix P: Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA)

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY: MISSION
6 U.S.C. § 313(b)(1)-(2)

Primary mission

The primary mission of the Agency is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.

Specific activities

In support of the primary mission of the Agency, the Administrator shall—

- (A) lead the Nation's efforts to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against the risk of natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents;
- (B) partner with State, local, and tribal governments and emergency response providers, with other Federal agencies, with the private sector, and with nongovernmental organizations to build a national system of emergency management that can effectively and efficiently utilize the full measure of the Nation's resources to respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic incidents;
- (C) develop a Federal response capability that, when necessary and appropriate, can act effectively and rapidly to deliver assistance essential to saving lives or protecting or preserving property or public health and safety in a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster;
- (D) integrate the Agency's emergency preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation responsibilities to confront effectively the challenges of a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster;
- (E) develop and maintain robust Regional Offices that will work with State, local, and tribal governments, emergency response providers, and other appropriate entities to identify and address regional priorities;
- (F) under the leadership of the Secretary, coordinate with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, the Director of Customs and Border Protection, the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the National Operations Center, and other agencies and offices in the Department to take full advantage of the substantial range of resources in the Department;
- (G) provide funding, training, exercises, technical assistance, planning, and other assistance to build tribal, local, State, regional, and national capabilities (including communications capabilities), necessary to respond to a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster; and
- (H) develop and coordinate the implementation of a risk-based, all-hazards strategy for preparedness that builds those common capabilities necessary to respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters while also building the unique capabilities necessary to respond to specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to our Nation.

Appendix Q: Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness

March 30, 2011
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-8
SUBJECT: National Preparedness

This directive is aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters. Our national preparedness is the shared responsibility of all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens. Everyone can contribute to safeguarding the Nation from harm. As such, while this directive is intended to galvanize action by the Federal Government, it is also aimed at facilitating an integrated, all-of-Nation, capabilities-based approach to preparedness.

Therefore, I hereby direct the development of a national preparedness goal that identifies the core capabilities necessary for preparedness and a national preparedness system to guide activities that will enable the Nation to achieve the goal. The system will allow the Nation to track the progress of our ability to build and improve the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.

The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism shall coordinate the interagency development of an implementation plan for completing the national preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The implementation plan shall be submitted to me within 60 days from the date of this directive, and shall assign departmental responsibilities and delivery timelines for the development of the national planning frameworks and associated interagency operational plans described below.

National Preparedness Goal

Within 180 days from the date of this directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop and submit the national preparedness goal to me, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. The Secretary shall coordinate this effort with other executive departments and agencies, and consult with State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and the public.

The national preparedness goal shall be informed by the risk of specific threats and vulnerabilities – taking into account regional variations – and include concrete, measurable, and prioritized objectives to mitigate that risk. The national preparedness goal shall define the core capabilities necessary to prepare for the specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, and shall emphasize actions aimed at achieving an integrated, layered, and all-of-Nation preparedness approach that optimizes the use of available resources. The national preparedness goal shall reflect the policy direction outlined in the National Security Strategy (May 2010), applicable Presidential Policy Directives, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, National Security Presidential Directives, and national strategies, as well as guidance from the Interagency Policy Committee process. The goal shall be reviewed regularly to evaluate consistency with these policies, evolving conditions, and the National Incident Management System.

National Preparedness System

The national preparedness system shall be an integrated set of guidance, programs, and processes that will enable the Nation to meet the national preparedness goal. Within 240 days from the date of this directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop and submit a description of the national preparedness system to me, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. The Secretary shall coordinate this effort with other executive departments and agencies, and consult with State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and the public.

The national preparedness system shall be designed to help guide the domestic efforts of all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and the public to build and sustain the capabilities outlined in the national preparedness goal. The national preparedness system shall include guidance for planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises to build and maintain domestic capabilities. It shall provide an all-of-Nation approach for building and sustaining a cycle of preparedness activities over time.

The national preparedness system shall include a series of integrated national planning frameworks, covering prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. The frameworks shall be built upon scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities to deliver the necessary capabilities. The frameworks shall be coordinated under a unified system with a common terminology and approach, built around basic plans that support the all-hazards approach to preparedness and functional or incident annexes to describe any unique requirements for particular threats or scenarios, as needed. Each framework shall describe how actions taken in the framework are coordinated with relevant actions described in the other frameworks across the preparedness spectrum.

The national preparedness system shall include an interagency operational plan to support each national planning framework. Each interagency operational plan shall include a more detailed concept of operations; description of critical tasks and responsibilities; detailed resource, personnel, and sourcing requirements; and specific provisions for the rapid integration of resources and personnel.

All executive departments and agencies with roles in the national planning frameworks shall develop department-level operational plans to support the interagency operational plans, as needed. Each national planning framework shall include guidance to support corresponding planning for State, local, tribal, and territorial governments.

The national preparedness system shall include resource guidance, such as arrangements enabling the ability to share personnel. It shall provide equipment guidance aimed at nationwide interoperability; and shall provide guidance for national training and exercise programs, to facilitate our ability to build and sustain the capabilities defined in the national preparedness goal and evaluate progress toward meeting the goal.

The national preparedness system shall include recommendations and guidance to support preparedness planning for businesses, communities, families, and individuals.

The national preparedness system shall include a comprehensive approach to assess national preparedness that uses consistent methodology to measure the operational readiness of national capabilities at the time of assessment, with clear, objective and quantifiable performance measures, against the target capability levels identified in the national preparedness goal.

Building and Sustaining Preparedness

The Secretary of Homeland Security shall coordinate a comprehensive campaign to build and sustain national preparedness, including public outreach and community-based and private-sector programs to enhance national resilience, the provision of Federal financial assistance, preparedness efforts by the Federal Government, and national research and development efforts.

National Preparedness Report

Within 1 year from the date of this directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit the first national preparedness report based on the national preparedness goal to me, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. The Secretary shall coordinate this effort with other executive departments and agencies and consult with State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and the public. The Secretary shall submit the report annually in sufficient time to allow it to inform the preparation of my Administration's budget.

Roles and Responsibilities

The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism shall periodically review progress toward achieving the national preparedness goal.

The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the domestic all-hazards preparedness efforts of all executive departments and agencies, in consultation with State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, nongovernmental organizations, private-sector partners, and the general public; and for developing the national preparedness goal.

The heads of all executive departments and agencies with roles in prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery are responsible for national preparedness efforts, including department-specific operational plans, as needed, consistent with their statutory roles and responsibilities.

Nothing in this directive is intended to alter or impede the ability to carry out the authorities of executive departments and agencies to perform their responsibilities under law and consistent with applicable legal authorities and other Presidential guidance. This directive shall be implemented consistent with relevant authorities, including the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 and its assignment of responsibilities with respect to the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Nothing in this directive is intended to interfere with the authority of the Attorney General or Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with regard to the direction, conduct, control, planning, organization, equipment, training, exercises, or other activities concerning domestic counterterrorism, intelligence, and law enforcement activities.

Nothing in this directive shall limit the authority of the Secretary of Defense with regard to the command and control, planning, organization, equipment, training, exercises, employment, or other activities of Department of Defense forces, or the allocation of Department of Defense resources.

If resolution on a particular matter called for in this directive cannot be reached between or among executive departments and agencies, the matter shall be referred to me through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.

This directive replaces Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 (National Preparedness), issued December 17, 2003, and HSPD-8 Annex I (National Planning), issued December 4, 2007, which are hereby rescinded, except for paragraph 44 of HSPD-8 Annex I. Individual plans developed under HSPD-8 and Annex I remain in effect until rescinded or otherwise replaced.

Definitions

For the purposes of this directive:

- (a) The term "national preparedness" refers to the actions taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.
- (b) The term "security" refers to the protection of the Nation and its people, vital interests, and way of life.
- (c) The term "resilience" refers to the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies.
- (d) The term "prevention" refers to those capabilities necessary to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism. Prevention capabilities include, but are not limited to, information sharing and warning; domestic counterterrorism; and preventing the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). For purposes of the prevention framework called for in this directive, the term "prevention" refers to preventing imminent threats.
- (e) The term "protection" refers to those capabilities necessary to secure the homeland against acts of terrorism and manmade or natural disasters. Protection capabilities include, but are not limited to, defense against WMD threats; defense of agriculture and food; critical infrastructure protection; protection of key leadership and events; border security; maritime security; transportation security; immigration security; and cybersecurity.
- (f) The term "mitigation" refers to those capabilities necessary to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters. Mitigation capabilities include, but are not limited to, community-wide risk reduction projects; efforts to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure and key resource lifelines; risk reduction for specific vulnerabilities from natural hazards or acts of terrorism; and initiatives to reduce future risks after a disaster has occurred.
- (g) The term "response" refers to those capabilities necessary to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred.
- (h) The term "recovery" refers to those capabilities necessary to assist communities affected by an incident to recover effectively, including, but not limited to, rebuilding infrastructure systems; providing adequate interim and long-term housing for survivors; restoring health, social, and community services; promoting economic development; and restoring natural and cultural resources.

BARACK OBAMA

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Strategic National Risk Assessment additional documentation

SNRA 2015 Working Papers, 22 May 2015

Insert: Strategic National Risk Assessment additional documentation

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The SNRA 2015 Working Papers and instructions to contributors are separate documents from the preceding Resource for Planners document. They are included in this PDF binder to make it self-contained.

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WORKING DRAFT

Strategic National Risk Assessment 2015

SNRA Working Papers
May 2015



Homeland
Security

PRE-DECISIONAL DRAFT

**Not for Public Distribution
or Release**

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Contents

The following contents comprise the basis for many of the qualitatively identified threats and hazards in the 2015 Strategic National Risk Assessment. Participants from across the Federal government contributed to these narratives in an effort further increase awareness and understanding of many of the risks our nation is currently facing.

The narratives are in varying stages of progress, and are presented in no particular order. The events listed in this document were not quantitatively assessed and did not result in comparative risk findings in the 2015 SNRA. This in no way diminishes the importance of these events as national-level risks, as identified by the SNRA project team. While insufficient time and/or data was available to mature these products to where comparative risk statements could be made, the narratives themselves are important in characterizing threats and hazards identified in the SNRA.

The SNRA project team believes that the following contents may serve as the basis for updates to future iterations of the SNRA and other risk related projects.

Electric Grid Failure (Natural / Accidental)

Event Description

Electric Power Grid Failure: A significant regional power-grid failure that extends beyond the geographic area of the initiating incident, which is due to natural disaster/hazards, equipment failure, distribution/transmission failure/disruptions, or public appeals to reduce usage (brown-to blackouts).

Event Background

Electric Power Grid Failures are common. Significant ones are often associated with large-scale natural hazards, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, solar storms, and major winter storms. In addition to the natural physical effects of the events and the damage on the generation, transmission, and distribution equipment, the power grid is designed to fail “safely,” which is to say, the control systems and operating protocols will intentionally shut down undamaged elements of the grid if sudden changes in supply and demand make the grid unstable. The Electric Power Grid Failure scenarios under evaluation are those that are attributable to the physical destruction of natural disasters, equipment failure, distribution/transmission disruptions and public appeals to reduce usage.

There is no single interconnected national grid for the U.S. Instead, the continental U.S. is served by four separate grids, which cannot be impacted by the failure of their neighbors, though it is feasible for events to impact more than one of the grids within the U.S.

The four separate networks are:

- The Western Interconnection, which serves those contiguous states west of the Rockies as well as their Canadian neighbors and portions of Northwestern Mexico;
- The Electric Reliability Council of Texas, which serves only the state of Texas,
- The Eastern Interconnection which serves all states (and Canadian Provinces) east of the Rockies and South of the Great Lakes and New York, and
- The Quebec Interconnection, which serves New York, New England, and Canadian provinces east of Manitoba.

The Eastern Interconnection is actually made up of four interconnected but separately managed grids, allowing some cascading failures within this large, heavily populated area.

No scenario exists for a national U.S. power grid failure, except apocalyptic events that may make power restoration issues seem minor.

A quantitative analysis of data provided by the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) regarding electric power grid outages from 2005 through 2014 was performed using those reported outages caused by 16 natural, equipment and public appeals for reduction of usage categories. Adversarial and Space Weather outages were not addressed in this analysis, but are covered elsewhere in the Strategic National Risk Assessment Summary; however, the resulting economic impacts may be comparable.

Over 10 years that cover the reported events, it is understood that more events occurred but only the reported events that resulted in outages were considered. These events led to significant

Megawatt (MW) Demand Loss to the electric power providers and significant economic loss to the customers. The overall average frequency of failure regardless of mechanism is 61.2 report events per year. The number of deaths that might be associated with power outages was not considered in this analysis for these reasons; 1) the information was not provided, 2) it is difficult to determine if a death is directly related to an outage, and 3) this analysis is not tracking deaths. This analysis looked at the economic impact that outages have in 2014 dollars using residential, small/medium businesses, and large businesses from 2012 and 2013 census data.

The following tables present the risk of grid failure to the Nation as a whole. The actual failure causative agents are localized in nature, and the failures do not affect the whole Nation at the time of the failure. The data does indicate these failures show the aggregate MW Demand Loss and economic impact that is incurred. Table 1 is a compilation of the 16 failure causes that occurred over the 10-year period outlining the resultant impact—in this case, on the MW Demand Loss that was incurred by the power industry providers and the numbers of customers affected by the outage.

Table 1: Electric Power Grid Reported Failure Loss – 2005–2014

Failure Cause	Number of Reported Events	Total Outage Hours	Average Outage Hours	Total MW Demand Loss	Average MW Demand Loss/Event	Average MW Demand Loss/Event Hour	Total Customers Affected ¹	Average Number of Customers ¹ Affected/Event
Flooding	1	432.5	432.5	200	200	0.46	21000	21000.00
Earthquake	3	67.57	22.52	1375	458.33	20.35	420886	140295.33
Tornados	4	189.02	47.26	2335	583.75	12.35	363294	90823.50
Hurricanes/ Tropical Storms	18	2200.96	122.28	15106	839.22	6.86	4389780	243876.65
Brush/Wildfires	11	51.39	4.67	10412	946.55	202.69	3632732	330248.36
Ice Storms	23	2168.53	94.28	9709	422.13	4.48	3009934	130866.70
Severe Winter/ Winter Storms	40	2836.94	70.92	14649	366.23	5.16	9309160	232729.00
Wind	50	2482.73	49.65	11624	232.48	4.68	7024603	140492.06
Thunderstorms/ Lightning	94	3357.80	35.72	44959	478.29	13.39	16259599	172974.46
Storms/Severe Storms	81	4275.30	52.78	33250	410.49	7.78	16070627	198402.80
Electrical System Failures	100	561.44	5.61	66005	600.50	1176.56	5722055	57220.55
Equipment Fires	4	12.79	3.20	1081	270.25	84.45	128654	32163.50
Distribution/ Transmission/ Generator Failures	72	1980.71	27.51	32918	457.19	16.62	6755455	93825.76
Fuel Supply Disruption	24	3410.96	142.12	14760	615.00	4.33	140001	5833.38
Load Shedding/ Voltage Reduction	74	692.64	9.36	23435	316.69	33.83	6156567	83196.85
Public Appeals Reduction	13	375.10	28.85	18645	1434.23	49.71	4277859	329066.08
TOTAL	612	24096.38	39.37	300463	490.95	12.47	83682206	136765.63

¹ All customers affected – residential; small, medium, and large retail businesses and industry.

Table 2 provides the breakdown and total of the numbers of electricity customers/consumers for the Nation using the most recent census data. These numbers provided a baseline for the data presented in Table 3, Table 4, and Table 6.

Table 2: Electricity Consumers in the United States

Consumer Segment	Subtotal of Segment	Percent of Total	Census
Residential	132,802,859	95	2013
Small–Medium Business²	6,232,434	4	2012
Large Business²	1,199,374	1	2012
TOTAL ALL	140,234,667	100	

Table 3 addresses the impact to the Nation as a whole should the entire “national” grid suffer a catastrophic failure and the resultant significant economic impact regardless of the causative or aggregate failure agent(s).

Table 3: Power Outage Economic Impact to Consumers

Consumer Segment	Subtotal of Segment	Average Cost Factor per Hour ³ (2004 \$)	Economic Impact per Outage Hour (2004 \$)	Inflation Factor (2004 – 2014) ⁴	Economic Impact per Outage Hour (2014\$)
Residential	132,802,859	\$3.00	\$398,408,577	1.253	\$499,205,947
Small–Medium Business	6,232,434	\$1200.00	\$7,478,920,800	1.253	\$9,371,087,762
Large Business	1,199,374	\$8200.00	\$9,834,866,800	1.253	\$12,323,088,100
NATIONAL TOTAL	140,234,667		\$17,712,196,177	1.253	\$22,195,381,809

² Small–Medium businesses are those that employ 0 to 499 employees. Large businesses are those that employ 500 or greater employees.

³ Understanding the Cost of Power Interruptions to U.S. Electricity Consumers (2004), U.S. Department of Energy and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

⁴ U.S. Inflation Calculator, U.S. Bureau of Statistics

Table 4 presents the economic and social impact resulting from data in Table 6 which addresses the economic impact that resulted from the reported failures over the 10-year reporting period 2004 to 2014.

Table 4: Table of Findings

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Medium	High
	All Events	MW Demand Loss	200	490.95	66005
	All Events	Outage Hours	12.79	39.37	4275.30
Economic	Economic Residential	Dollars/Event	\$75,012.00	\$18,682,052.49	\$58,079,287.63
Economic	Economic Small-Medium Business	Dollars/Event	\$1,263,024.00	\$314561410.50	\$977,917,322.26
Economic	Economic Large Business	Dollars/Event	\$2,157,666.00	\$537,375,546.10	\$1,670,608,759.85
Economic	Economic Residential	Average Dollars/Event Hour	\$173.44	\$896,866.89	\$3,643,347
Economic	Economic Small-Medium Business	Average Dollars/Event Hour	\$2,920.29	\$15,101,108.81	\$61,345,325.47
Economic	Economic Large Business	Average Dollars/Event Hour	\$4,988.82	\$25,797,728.22	\$104,798,264.34
Social	All Events	Household Displacement	1,995.00	496,863.10	1,544,661.91

Table 5 shows the frequency or likelihood that a failure may occur each year associated with a particular failure cause. The table shows, as well, the total failures that may or likely occur each year regardless of the causative agent.

Table 5: Event Frequency of Occurrence

Failure Cause	Flooding	Earthquake	Tornados	Hurricanes/Tropical Storms	Brush/Wildfires	Ice Storms	Severe Winter/Winter Storms	Wind	Thunderstorms/Lightning	Storms/Severe Storms	Electrical System Failures	Equipment Fires	Distribution/Transmission/Generator Failures	Fuel Supply Disruption	Load Shedding/Voltage Reduction	Public Appeals Reduction	TOTAL
Report Events Frequency/Year	0.1	0.3	0.4	1.8	1.1	2.3	4	5	9.4	8.1	10	0.4	7.2	2.4	7.4	1.3	61.2

Table 6 shows the overall economic impact each of the failure causes have on the economy broken down to residential, small–medium businesses, and large businesses along with, for planning purposes, the expected social displacement of households for shelter planning.

Summary

These tables present a wealth of information. The failure causes are isolated events that affect only a relatively small geographical area and rarely an entire region. As such, from a national risk assessment they may not necessarily be considered as risk. These failures and the resultant outages do have an economic impact, but it is isolated and is more a local nuisance than anything more. However, as we look at the aggregates of each failure cause then we begin to see that the economic impact begins to be significant, and the risk becomes nationally strategic. This becomes even more evident as we examine the result of all of the failures occurring at the same time or if the entire national grid and the four components that make up the national grid are affected at the same time catastrophically. Should this happen, the economic impact would be billions of dollars an hour (See Table 3), and if prolonged, would be economically unrecoverable. The social displacement from a catastrophic failure would be such that civilization as we currently know it would no longer exist because of the tremendous reliance the Nation's population has upon electric power. It is not unreasonable to expect that the social upheaval would be catastrophic as well. A prolonged catastrophic failure regardless of the causative agent(s) to society could lead to indeterminate collateral deaths, which could be in the tens to hundreds of million within the first year.

Table 6: Electric Power Grid Economic Loss – 2005–2014

Event Cause	Report Events	Total Outage Hours	Average Outage Hours	Total Customers Affected (100%)	Average Number of Customers Affected/Event	Residential Customers Affected (95%)	Small-Medium Business Affected (4%)	Large Business Affect (1%)	Impact Cost Factor ⁵ Res.	Impact Cost Factor ⁵ Large S – M	Econ Impact/Event Res.	Econ Impact/Event S – M	Econ Impact/Event Large	Aver. Econ Impact/Event Hour Res.	Aver. Econ Impact/Event Hour S – M	Aver. Econ Impact/Event Hour Large	Displaced Households ⁶	
Flooding	1	432.5	21000	21000.00	19956.00	840.00	210.00	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$21283024.00	\$21576866.00	\$173.44	\$2920.29	\$4988.82	1956.00		
Earthquake	3	67.57	22.52	420886	140295.33	399841.70	16335.44	4208.86	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$43244352.96	\$66758.65	\$124057.18	\$1920264.34	39884.17		
Tornadoes	4	189.02	47.26	363294	90823.50	345129.3	14531.76	3632.94	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$1297686.17	\$21849954.34	\$37327005.32	\$462335.05	\$789822.37	34512.33	
Hurricanes/ Tropical Storms	18	2200.96	122.28	4389780	243876.65	4170231.00	175591.20	43897.8	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$26401032335.85	\$15680294.16	\$128232.70	\$2159134.19	\$3688520.90	417029.10	
Brush/ Wildfires	11	51.39	4.67	3632732	330248.36	3451056.40	145309.28	36327.32	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$12976118.7	\$21848703.41	\$373248682.07	\$2778612.14	\$46785225.57	\$79924771.32	
Ice Storms	23	2168.53	94.28	3009934	130866.70	2859437.30	120397.36	30099.34	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$10751484.25	\$181029470.50	\$309258678.76	\$1114037.80	\$1920125.91	\$3280215.09	
Severe Winter/ Winter Storms	40	2836.94	70.92	9309160	232729.00	8843702.00	372366.40	93091.60	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$33252319.52	\$559890119.04	\$468870.83	\$89461.73	\$13486730.87	884370.20	
Wind	50	2482.73	49.65	7024603	140482.06	6673372.85	286984.12	70246.03	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$25911881.92	\$242487722.83	\$21749859.84	\$505375.27	\$8509319.69	14536754.48	
Thunderstorms/Lightning	94	3357.80	35.72	16259599	172974.46	15446619.05	162595.99	3572	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$58079287.63	\$97917322.26	\$1670608759.85	\$1625959.90	\$27377304.65	\$46769562.12	
Storms/ Severe Storms	81	4275.30	52.78	16070627	198402.80	156267095.65	642825.03	160706.27	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$57404279.64	\$966551790.29	\$1651192641.74	\$1087614.24	\$1312841.80	\$31284438.06	
Electrical System Failures	100	561.44	5.61	5722055	57220.55	5435932.25	228882.20	57220.55	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$20439180.46	\$3414147275.92	\$587918263.03	\$3643347.68	\$61345325.47	\$104798264.34	
Equipment Failures	4	12.79	3.20	128654	32163.50	122221.30	5146.16	1286.54	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$450552.09	\$737776.18	\$13218863.88	\$142610.03	\$2418051.93	\$4130838.71	
Distribution/ Transmission/ Generator Failures	72	1980.71	27.51	6755455	93825.76	64176832.25	270218.20	67554.55	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$24130485.26	\$406300085.52	\$694095979.43	\$8777153.25	\$14769177.95	\$25230679.00	
Fuel Supply Disruption	24	3410.96	142.12	140001	5833.38	133000.95	5600.04	1400.01	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$500083.57	\$8420220.14	\$14384542.75	\$3518.74	\$59247.26	\$101214.06	
Load Shedding/ Voltage Reduction	74	692.64	9.36	6156567	83196.85	58487738.65	246262.63	61565.67	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$21991257.32	\$370280565.65	\$632562632.98	\$2349493.30	\$39559869.49	\$67581477.82	
Public Appeals Reduction	13	375.10	28.95	4277859	32996.08	4063966.05	171114.63	42778.59	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$15280512.35	\$257287551.70	\$439532990.81	\$529653.81	\$918112.71	\$15235109.21	
TOTAL	612	24096.38	39.37	83682206	136785.63	79498095.70	3347288.24	836822.06	\$3.76	\$1503.60	\$10274.60	\$29912839.83	\$6032982597.66	\$8558011937.68	\$7592401.32	\$127838013.66	\$218389840.00	\$7949809.57

⁵ Understanding the Cost of Power Interruptions to U.S. Electricity Consumers (2004), U.S. Department of Energy and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory. (2004 Residential: \$3/hr., Small/Medium Business: \$1200/hr., Large Business: \$8200/hr. These values were multiplied by the inflation factor rise of 1.253 (25.3%) from 2004 to 2014 (U.S. Inflation Calculator, U.S. Bureau of Statistics).

⁶ Displaced Household values derived from using the planning metric of 10% of evacuated residents will seek shelter. Displacement values are for planning purposes only. Actual displacement of residents is dependent upon a number of variables. Not all event causes will necessitate a displacement.

Heat Wave

An extended period (typically two days or longer) of abnormally high temperature and humidity that causes temporary modification in lifestyle and that may have adverse health consequences for the affected population.

The SNRA Heat Wave hazard event is currently part of the SNRA's qualitatively described research base. Substantial work towards the fully quantitative analysis of the Heat Wave event within the SNRA framework has been undertaken, and the data sources and interim analysis in progress are provided below for the next analyst or project team to continue this work.

Interim estimates are provided in Table 8 at the end of this summary sheet, for the convenience of the reader or reviewer. These numbers are still under review, and may change substantially when the quantitative analysis of this hazard has been completed.

Event Background⁷

Extreme summer weather is characterized by a combination of very high temperatures and exceptionally humid conditions. When persisting over time, it is called a heat wave. The National Weather Service (NWS) defines a heat wave as a period of time (typically two days or longer) where the temperature is abnormally hot and unusually humid.⁸ The Environmental Protection Agency expands on the definition, noting that an excessive heat event (EHE) can be defined in different ways based on location:

Because how hot it feels depends on the interaction of multiple meteorological variables (e.g., temperature, humidity, cloud cover), EHE criteria typically shift by location and time of year. In other words, Boston, Philadelphia, Miami, Dallas, Chicago, San Diego, and Seattle are likely to have different EHE criteria at any point in the summer to reflect different local standards for unusually hot summertime weather. In addition, these criteria are likely to change for each city over the summer. As a result, reliable fixed absolute criteria, e.g., a summer day with a maximum temperature of at least 90°F, are unlikely to be specified.⁹

Research shows that behavioral, cultural, physical, and social adaptations are made in regions where summers are consistently hot and humid.^{10,11} Thus, thresholds for what is considered a heat wave may need to be set higher in those areas. One proposed definition suggests that a heat wave for a given location is a period of at least 48 hours during which both the overnight lows and daytime highs do not fall below the NWS heat stress thresholds of 80°F and 105°F

⁷ This section is substantially adapted from Chapter 8, Federal Emergency Management Administration (1997), Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (MHIRA): A Cornerstone of the National Mitigation Strategy: FEMA Mitigation Directorate, at <https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/7251?id=2214> (retrieved April 2013); and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Weather Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency (2006, June). Excessive Heat Event Guidebook, EPA 430-B-06-005, at http://www.epa.gov/heatisland/about/pdf/EHEguide_final.pdf (retrieved December 2012).

⁸ National Weather Service, Glossary [electronic resource]: <http://w1.weather.gov/glossary/index.php?letter=h> (retrieved December 2012).

⁹ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Weather Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency (2006, June). Excessive Heat Event Guidebook, EPA 430-B-06-005; page 9. At http://www.epa.gov/heatisland/about/pdf/EHEguide_final.pdf (retrieved December 2012).

¹⁰ Robinson, P. J. "On the Definition of a Heat Wave," Journal of Applied Meteorology 40 (2001): 763.

¹¹ Chestnut, L. G. and others. "Analysis of Differences in Hot-Weather-Related Mortality Across 44 U.S. Metropolitan Areas," Environmental Science & Policy 1 (1998): 59.

respectively, except where more than one percent of annual heat index observations exceed the NWS thresholds. In those locations (typically, the South and Southwest), the one percent high and low values would be used.¹²

There appears to be a strong relationship between heat-wave-related mortality and geographic region. Generally, the greatest levels of heat-wave-related mortality have occurred in metropolitan areas of the Northeast (e.g., Baltimore, Boston, and New York) and the Midwest (e.g., Chicago, Kansas City, and Minneapolis). These regions have mortality ranges of 2.5 - 5 heat-related deaths per 100,000. Southern (Atlanta, Houston, and Miami) and Western (Phoenix, Salt Lake City, and San Diego) metropolitan areas have significantly lower rates, less than one death per 100,000.^{13,14}

To account for the interactions of heat stress and local adaptation, some have suggested sequentially defining heat events. For example, to address periods that may appear to be heat waves but that do not meet threshold criteria, *warm spell* and *hot spell* have been used.¹⁵ An alternative that builds from the existing definition uses heatwave, severe heatwave, and extreme heatwave. A *heatwave* occurs when heat index thresholds are exceeded for two days (the current NWS definition). The intensity may be viewed as uncomfortable, but there is little social impact or adaptation. A *severe heatwave* would cause some social adaptation, with vulnerable population sectors (e.g., the aged, poor, or socially isolated) most affected. Finally, *extreme heatwaves* are characterized by cascading failures of the power, transportation, and health systems that usually protect the larger population.¹⁶

Heat Wave Characteristics

Independent of how the heat wave was defined, research indicates that communities typically face one to two heat waves per year, with little regional variation. Most heat waves last two to three days; heat waves lasting seven to ten days are very rare.^{17, 18}

Heat wave mortality rates are influenced by a heat wave's intensity, duration, and occurrence during the season. As one might expect, long duration events with an intense heat/humidity combination increase the relative risk of mortality. Early and first in-season heat waves generate higher mortality rates than subsequent and later in-season heat waves.¹⁹

Each year, many areas of the United States experience periods of prolonged high temperatures combined with high humidity. In susceptible areas, people usually are aware of the hazard, anticipate it, and are accustomed to avoiding its potentially dangerous effects. However, extreme summer heat does strike areas not accustomed to the phenomenon, where people tend to be less prepared.

¹² Robinson, “On the Analysis of a Heat Wave,” 762.

¹³ Chestnut, “Analysis of Differences....,” 63.

¹⁴ Anderson, G. B. and Bell, M. L. “Heat Waves in the United States: Mortality Risk during Heat Waves and effect Modification by Heat Wave Characteristics in 43 U.S. Communities,” Environmental Health Perspectives 119, no. 2 (2011): 212.

¹⁵ Robinson, “On the Analysis of a Heat Wave,” 766.

¹⁶ Nairn, J. and Fawcett, R. Defining Heatwaves: Heatwave Defined as a Heat Impact Event Servicing All Community and Business Sectors in Australia, CAWCR Technical Report No. 060 (Kent Town, South Australia: Bureau of Meteorology, 2013), 13.

¹⁷ Anderson, “Heat Waves in the United States:....,” 212.

¹⁸ Robinson, “On the Analysis of a Heat Wave,” 766-767.

¹⁹ Anderson, “Heat Waves in the United States:....,” 212-216.

Extreme heat events are a public health threat because they often increase the number of daily deaths (mortality) and other non-fatal adverse health outcomes (morbidity) in affected populations. The major threat of extreme summer weather is heatstroke, a medical emergency that can be fatal.

Heat waves pose the greatest danger to outdoor laborers, the elderly, children, people having physical challenges or mental impairments, and people residing in homes without air conditioning. Specific high-risk groups typically experience a disproportionate number of health impacts from extreme hot weather conditions. The following populations have physical, social, and economic factors that put them at high risk:

- Older persons (age > 65)
- Infants (age < 1)
- The homeless
- The poor
- People who are socially isolated
- People with mobility restrictions or mental impairments
- People taking certain medications (e.g., for high blood pressure, depression, insomnia)
- People engaged in vigorous outdoor exercise or work
- People under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

While the SNRA considers heat waves as contingent risks (incidents discrete in time) rather than persistent risks (total annualized loss), current estimates of average annual fatalities due to extreme heat events in the United States range from 1,000-2,000 fatalities and upward,²⁰ making extreme heat one of the largest non-disease causes of deaths in the U.S.

The combined effects of high temperatures and high humidity are more intense in urban centers than in rural areas, and most heat wave deaths occur in urban areas. One reason is the relative poverty of some urban areas: low-income people are less able to afford cooling devices, and the energy needed to operate them. Other reasons include specific environmental factors of urban areas. Poor air quality may exacerbate severe conditions. The masses of stone, brick, concrete, and asphalt that are typical of urban architecture absorb radiant heat energy from the sun during the day and radiate that heat during nights that would otherwise be cooler. Tall city buildings may effectively decrease wind velocity, thereby decreasing the contribution of moving air to evaporative and convective cooling.

The heat waves of 1995 caused hundreds of fatalities in the Chicago metropolitan area. Many deaths were among low-income elderly in residential units not equipped with air conditioning. Local utilities were forced to impose controlled power outages because of excessive energy demands, and water suppliers reported very low levels of water in storage.

The primary economic losses from heat waves are agricultural. Except for the August 1995 heat wave/drought, which is not otherwise counted, agricultural losses from heat wave/drought

²⁰ EPA/CDC/NWS/FEMA (2006), pp 7, 12-13 (both counts of combined metropolitan areas are a floor of fatalities in the Nation as a whole).

historical incident records are considered under the Drought national-level event to avoid double-counting. However, extreme heat can also cause damage to physical infrastructure, including roads, bridges, and railroads. High temperatures can be partially responsible for deflection of rails, raising the risk of railroad accidents.

Concern over the potential future health impacts of heat waves follows research conclusions that excessive heat events may become more frequent, more severe, or both in the United States.²¹

While droughts and heat waves can occur at the same time, they are separate meteorological events and have been assessed independently in the SNRA.²² For further information on droughts, please see the Drought risk summary sheet.

Assumptions

The Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States (SHELDUS)²³ was used to conduct the assessment. SHELDUS is a county-level hazard data set maintained by the University of South Carolina. The selected time period was from 1990 to 2011. It was decided by the SNRA project team that a narrower time period was appropriate and consistent with the assessment conducted on wildfires for the SNRA. At this point, however, it is possible to use data from 1967 – 2011.

SHELDUS provides data based on reports from individual counties, so the SNRA project team had to aggregate data in order to account for the accurate amount of economic loss, fatalities, and injuries. Events in the data set were combined into a single heat wave event if the entries had the same beginning and end date. There were 566 unique heat wave events during the time period from 1990 to 2011. Of the 566, six met the consequence threshold of 100 fatalities.

The SNRA project team chose to use 100 fatalities per event that are attributed to heat as a minimum threshold.

Frequency

The best-estimate frequency is the average frequency of occurrence of heat waves in the selected 21 year period. The low frequency is the inverse of the longest time interval between heat waves in this set (in days, measured from the start of the event); the high frequency is the highest number of heat wave events that occurred in one year.

Health and Safety

There were three events in 1999 that met the threshold of 100 or more fatalities, which happened during a long-term heat wave that struck the central United States in July 1999. The shortest period of time between each significant event determined the upper bound of the frequencies.

²¹ EPA/CDC/NWS/FEMA (2006), p 5.

²² To avoid double counting, for heat wave/drought historical records in the SHELDUS database which overlapped in time (e.g., when aggregated for each of the two events according to its threshold criteria), human fatality and injury and property damage amounts were counted under the Heat Wave event, while crop damage amounts were counted under the Drought event.

²³ Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute (2011). The Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States (SHELDUS), version 8.0 [online database]. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina. Available from <http://www.sheldus.org>.

Direct Economic Loss

Except for heat incidents overlapping in time with those counted for the drought national-level event, and for which crop losses were subtracted to avoid double counting, property loss and crop loss for counted incidents were combined to reflect total direct economic loss (see Table 7 below). All values are adjusted for inflation and represent the economic loss in 2011 dollars.

Social

SHELDUS does not provide data on social displacement. Although temporary relocation of large numbers of at-risk persons to cooling centers and public facilities with air conditioning is a pillar of current community heat wave emergency response, collated estimates of numbers of persons leaving their homes for extended periods in historical heat wave incidents could not be found in the literature. This field requires further research.

Psychological

In the absence of estimates for what the project team expected would be a non-negligible level of social displacement, the SNRA measure of psychological distress, which uses social displacement as a key input, could not be calculated.

Environmental

The environmental consequence estimate, which was assessed for the 24 original national-level events of the 2011 SNRA by subject matter experts from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), could not be assessed for the heat wave event added to the SNRA in calendar year 2012.

Potential Mitigating Factors

Mitigation efforts to reduce the frequent severity of heat waves are related to a reduction in the burning of hydrocarbons through a decreased global dependence on fossil fuels. These mitigation efforts are focused on reduced occurrence and decreased severity rather than individual measures that can be taken to reduce heat-related mortality (e.g., use of air conditioners, limiting element exposure).

Table 7: Heat Wave Events

Date	Fatalities [†]	Injuries	Total Loss (Property + Crop Loss) Adjusted for Inflation in 2011 Terms
7/15/1995	859	617	\$17,196,587
8/3/1995	145	150	\$588,681,793
7/5/1999	161	824	\$0
7/23/1999	136	576	\$4,472,369
7/31/1999	131	11	\$67,763
8/1/2006	117	365	\$11,196

Table 8: Summary of Interim Data²⁴

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities ²⁵	Number of Fatalities	117 ²⁶	258	859
	Injuries and Illnesses ²⁷	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	11	424	824
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars	\$0	\$102 Million	\$589 Million
	Indirect Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars	N/A		
Social	Social Displacement	Displaced from Homes \geq 2 Days	N/A	N/A	N/A
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	N/A		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins	N/A		
Likelihood	Frequency of Events	Frequency of Events ²⁸	TBD		

²⁴ The quantitative analysis for this hazard event is still in progress. The above estimates from the data that have been collected and analyzed to date are provided for convenience, but they should NOT be considered as final SNRA estimates.

²⁵ Minimum, mean, and maximum values of fatalities for historical events in the SHELDUS database meeting threshold criteria. See Methodology and Assumptions for details.

²⁶ 100 is the minimum number of fatalities because it represents the minimum consequence threshold for a national level event.

²⁷ Minimum, mean, and maximum values of Total Affected of the subset of events reporting this measure. See Methodology and Assumptions for details.

²⁸ Minimum, mean and maximum frequencies. See Methodology and Assumptions for details.

Oil Spills

The United States produces, distributes, and consumes large quantities of oil every year to fuel the Nation's factories and homes, to produce plastics and pharmaceuticals, to provide transportation, and to provide fuel for a small number of power plants. In 2013, the US consumed 18.49 million barrels of oil per day²⁹, or 283.5 billion gallons per year. From the production, storage, transport, and use of oil, an estimated 18,000-24,000 oil spills are reported and 10-25 million gallons of oil (or .003% - .009% of oil consumed) are spilled annually. The average size of a spill is 50 gallons.³⁰ The likelihood of a large spill is inversely proportional to the size of the spill.

All non-adversarial maritime oil spills are included in the Oil Spills national-level event. Also excluded from this analysis are large oil spills attributed to hurricanes. From 1964 to 2009, there were 2807 off shore spills greater than one barrel (42 gallons). Of those, 2175 events spilled an average of 3 barrels, 390 events spilled an average of 19 barrels, 210 events spilled an average of 186 barrels, and 32 events spilled an average of 16,052 barrels.³¹ For comparison with pipeline spills, from 1968 to 2007, there were 7828 coastal and inland pipeline spills greater than one barrel. Of those, 16% were 10 barrels or less, 40% were 100 barrels or less, 84% were 1000 barrels or less, and 99% were 10,000 barrels or less.³²

For the purpose of this risk assessment, we have divided oil spills into two categories: small oil spills ranging in size from 25 barrels but less than 2500 barrels, and large oil spills that are greater than 2500 barrels. Small oil spills create significant cleanup costs, particularly when they occur near coastlines. Large oil spills require contingency / surge operations to mitigate the effects of the spill, perhaps before it reaches a coastline.

Small oil spills in the maritime domain are often overlooked due to their localized effects and create a unique challenge due to containment issues, weather, geography, currents, waterways, and other factors. Although not given much national attention, smaller scale oil spills happen frequently with substantial economic impacts. For example, a 100 foot fishing vessel can hold thousands of gallons of fuel. In the event of sinking or grounding, most of this oil is frequently spilled.

Large scale oil spill events are infrequent but cause significant impacts to human health and safety, the environment, the economy, and surrounding communities. Large oil spills may or may not be declared a Spill of National Significance, as this designation reflects a determination of the potential magnitude and impact of the disaster which depends on multiple factors (in particular, location), not a release volume threshold fixed by plan or statute.

²⁹ <http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm?view=consumption>

³⁰ Dagmar Schmidt, Etkin, "Analysis of Oil Spill Trends in the United States and Worldwide," Environmental Research Consulting, Presented at 2001 International Oil Spill Conference, p.1291.

³¹ Anderson, Mayes, LaBelle, "Update of Occurrence Rates for Offshore Oil Spills," Department of the Interior, June 2012, p. 38.

³² Dagmar Schmidt Etkin, "Analysis of U.S. Oil Spillage," Environmental Research Consulting, API Publication 356, August 2009, p. 40.

Event Background

Oil releases in maritime environments threaten public health and safety by fouling drinking water, causing fire and explosion hazards, diminishing air and water quality, compromising agriculture, destroying recreational areas, and wasting nonrenewable resources. Oil spills also have a severe environmental impact on ecosystems by harming or killing wildlife and plants, and destroying habitats and food.

The severity of impact of an oil spill depends on a variety of factors, including characteristics of the oil itself. Even large spills of refined petroleum products, such as gasoline, evaporate quickly and cause only short-term environmental effects. On the other hand, crude oils, heavy fuel oils, and water-in-oil mixtures may sink or cause widespread and long-lasting physical contamination of shorelines. Natural conditions, such as water temperature and weather, also influence the behavior of oil in the marine environment.

The rate at which an oil spill spreads is a primary determinant of its effect on the environment. Most oils tend to spread horizontally into a smooth and slippery surface, called a slick, on top of the water. Oil spilled immediately begins to move and weather, breaking down and changing its physical and chemical properties. Crude oil spilled at sea may mix with sea water and become submerged as a cloud. This occurred during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010.³³

After oil is spilled, the most volatile and toxic substances in it evaporate quickly. Therefore, plant, animal, and human exposure to the most toxic substances are reduced rapidly with time, and are usually limited to the initial spill area. However, although some organisms may be seriously injured or killed very soon after contact with the oil in a spill (lethal effects), chronic toxic effects are more subtle and often longer lasting. For example, marine life on reefs and shorelines is at risk of being smothered by oil that washes ashore, or of being slowly poisoned by long-term exposure to oil trapped in shallow water or on beaches.

Catastrophic oil spills, where large amounts of oil can freely flow into the environment for days or weeks, can occur at sea when an oil well or tanker fails. While minor oil spills occur hundreds of times a year, spills of 10,000 barrels or more occur only a couple of times a decade, and the United States has experienced only three spills of 100,000 barrels or more in the past 40 years.³⁴

Assumptions

Many of the assumptions used in this assessment are included in the footnotes.

The SNRA project team used the following to estimate health and safety consequences resulting from major oil spills ranging from catastrophic events (all off shore) to smaller pipeline and rail events.

- Historical Events: The SNRA project team analyzed a set of four historical maritime events in which large amounts of oil were spilled. A detailed listing of these events is found in

³³ Ramseur, Jonathan L.; Hagerty, Curry L. (31 January 2013). [Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: Recent Activities and Ongoing Developments](#), CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, R42942.

³⁴ Exxon Valdez in March 1989, Mega Borg in June 1990, and Deepwater Horizon in 2010. A fourth large spill occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in June 1979 when the Mexican IXTOC 1 well ruptured. Since this was not a U.S. spill, it is not included in the analysis in this report.

Table 9 under “Additional Relevant Information.” Additionally, the analysis does not take into account possible higher-consequence events that have not yet occurred, but rather assumes maximum fatalities and injured counts from the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and the Mega Borg oil spill.

Environmental Impact

Large oil spills on the scale of those from the Exxon Valdez and Deepwater Horizon are among the most catastrophic environmental hazards in the homeland security mission space. By reference to these rare, large events, small oil spills as a national-level event typically have a much smaller environmental impact, as these events include oil spill incidents occurring dozens of times every year.

Potential Mitigating Factors

Maritime oil spills are becoming less frequent and less severe overall,³⁵ but catastrophic risk remains due to continued increase in oil imports and explorations in deeper water, as exemplified by the Exxon Valdez event and the Deepwater Horizon event. Much of this decrease is due to preventive actions put in place in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. These improvements include double hulled ships and the use of GPS, RADAR, and SONAR for navigation.

While much of the responsibility for the response and recovery for an event rests within the private sector, state and territorial governments and the Federal Government also coordinate responses through the US Coast Guard (USCG) for off-shore spills and spills in the Great Lakes, and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for inland waterways. Specific activities include cleaning up the spill on land, removing soil exposed to oil, and cleaning up the spill on water by removing oil from water using controlled burns, or dispersing agents and sunlight to evaporate the spill.

Several methods exist for mitigating the effects of oil spills in the aquatic environment include rapidly containing and cleaning up the spills. Mechanical equipment, such as booms and skimmers, is often used to block the spread of oil, concentrate it into one area, and remove it from the water. Chemical and biological treatment of oil can be used in place of, or in addition to, mechanical methods, especially in areas where untreated oil may reach shorelines and sensitive habitats in which cleanup becomes difficult and expensive.

Cleaning shorelines after an oil spill is a challenging task. Factors that affect the type of cleanup method used include the type of oil spilled, the geology of the shoreline, and the type and sensitivity of biological communities in the area. Natural processes such as evaporation, oxidation, and biodegradation help to clean the shoreline. Physical methods, such as wiping with sorbent materials, pressure washing, and raking and bulldozing can be used to assist these natural processes.

In addition, the application of reparations for economic damages to individuals and businesses have been effective means of reducing the frequency and magnitude of events.

³⁵ Etkin, D.S., Environmental Research Consulting, “Analysis of U.S. Oil Spillage”, August 2009.

Additional Relevant Information

Table 9 lists the maritime events analyzed and includes total fatalities and injuries for each event.

Table 9: List of Analyzed Events

#	Event	Date	Fatalities	Injuries
1	Ixtoc 1 Well ³⁶ : 39.9 million gallons of oil, 1100 square miles, 162 miles of US shoreline	6/3/1979	0	0
2	Exxon Valdez Ship ³⁷ : 11 million gallons of oil, 11,000 square miles, 1,300 miles of US shoreline	3/24/1989	0	0
3	Mega Borg Ship ³⁸ : 4.6 million gallons, 300 square miles, little shoreline impact	6/08/1990	4 ³⁹	17 ²²
4	Deepwater Horizon ⁴⁰ : 210 million gallons, 68,000 square miles, 1,074 ⁴¹ miles of shoreline impact	4/20/2010	11 ⁴²	17 ⁴³

³⁶ Linda Garmon (25 October 1980). "Autopsy of an Oil Spill". Science News 118 (17). pp. 267–270.

³⁷ "Questions and Answers". History of the Spill. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council.

³⁸ Leveille, Thomas P. "The Mega Borg Fire and Oil Spill: A Case Study." U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Oil Spill Conference (1991): n. pag. ioscproceedings.org. Web. 21 Jan. 2014.

³⁹ Belkin, Lisa (June 11, 1990). "Flaming Oil Is Spilled Into Gulf as Blasts Rack Tanker". New York Times.

⁴⁰ "On Scene Coordinator Report on Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill," September 2011. http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/dwh/fosc_dwh_report.pdf

⁴¹ Polson, Jim (15 July 2011). "BP Oil Still Ashore One Year After End of Gulf Spill". <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-15/bp-oil-still-washing-ashore-one-year-after-end-of-gulf-spill.html>

⁴² Kaufman, Leslie (24 April 2010). "Search Ends for Missing Oil Rig Workers". The New York Times. p. A8.

⁴³ Brenner, Noah; Guegel, Anthony; Hwee Hwee, Tan; Pitt, Anthea (22 April 2010). "Coast Guard confirms Horizon sinks". Upstream Online (NHST Media Group). <http://www.upstreamonline.com/live/article212769.ece>

Pipeline Failure

A failure of a major pipeline, including crude oil, petroleum, natural gas transmission and natural gas distribution pipelines.

The SNRA Pipeline Failure hazard event is currently part of the SNRA's qualitatively described research base. Substantial work towards the fully quantitative analysis of the Pipeline event within the SNRA framework has been undertaken, and the data sources and interim analysis in progress are provided below for the next analyst or project team to continue this work.

Interim estimates are provided in Table 12 at the end of this summary sheet, for the convenience of the reader or reviewer. These numbers are still under review, and may change substantially when the quantitative analysis of this hazard has been completed.

Event Background

While many forms of transportation are used to move products such as crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas to marketplaces throughout the U.S., pipelines and pipe networks are major carriers because they are the safest, most efficient, and most economical way to transport all manner of liquid and gaseous commodities throughout the Nation.⁴⁴

Although pipelines have proven to be a safe means of transportation, they are still susceptible to significant and costly failures. These failures may result in system impacts, economic impacts, fatalities and injuries, and can also result in significant environmental impact. When failures occur they result in release of the transported product to the environment, with potential for fire, explosion, and toxic exposure. The nature of the system consequences will vary according the system, the materials involved, and the length of time the system is out of operation. There is a wide variety of causes for the accidents.

Pipelines transport hydrocarbon-based liquids and gases from one site to another, sometimes at great distances as part of a large system. These resources are found in completely different locations than where they are eventually processed or refined into fuels. They are also in very different locations from where they are consumed. While many forms of transport are used to move these products to marketplaces, pipelines remain the safest, most efficient and economical way to move these natural resources.

The U.S. depends on a network of more than 185,000 miles of liquid petroleum pipelines, nearly 320,000 miles of gas transmission pipelines, and more than 2 million miles of gas distribution pipelines to safely and efficiently move energy and raw materials to fuel our Nation's economic engine. This system of pipelines serves as a national network to move the energy resources from production areas or ports of entry throughout North America to consumers, airports, military bases, population centers, and industry every day.⁴⁵

For the purposes of understanding the risk profile of pipelines, it is useful to consider four different types of pipeline:

- Crude oil pipelines

⁴⁴ <http://www.pipeline101.com/why-do-we-need-pipelines>

⁴⁵ <http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/special/pdf/california.pdf>

- Petroleum product pipelines
- Natural gas transmission lines (including natural gas gathering lines and liquid natural gas pipelines)
- Natural gas distribution piping networks

When a *crude oil* pipeline fails, the movement of crude oil into a refinery is disrupted and the refinery may need to scale back production when its feed stocks are reduced (typically one to two weeks). If disruptions to a crude oil pipeline are frequent or prolonged, a refinery could be forced to shut down. Crude oil also produces environmental contamination and clean-up costs. Crude oil pipeline failures may also present significant restart challenges for very heavy crude oil requiring heating to flow; loss of pipeline flow can cause the heavy crude oil to begin to solidify, requiring clearing that could result in an extended loss of service to the refineries they serve, depending on the conditions under which the system managers are operating.⁴⁶

Refined petroleum products move in the pipeline consecutively. Each distinct product is referred to as a "batch" and when several products are placed together in the line, they are called a "batch train." As a batch train moves through the pipeline, adjacent products commingle, forming the "interface" zone. The extent of commingling, or the length of the interface, is a function of velocity, density difference between the two products, viscosity, pipe diameter, and distance traveled.⁴⁷ The long-term failure of a petroleum product pipeline disrupts the supply chain to all of the distribution points downstream, forcing the use of tanker trucks and trains as an inefficient alternative.

Typically when a petroleum pipeline fails there are few fatalities or injuries. Release of other hazardous chemicals may result in fatalities or injuries, but often in small numbers. During 2012 and 2013 (the latest analyzed at a national level) a total of 762 hazardous liquid pipeline incidents occurred. Five of these were classified as serious, resulting in four fatalities and nine injuries. For comparison, there were a total of 1,188 accidents for all pipeline classes in 2012 and 2013, with a total of 22 fatalities and 113 injuries. According to Pipeline Hazardous Materials Substances Administration (PHMSA) data, the hazardous liquid pipeline failures in that two-year period resulted in \$412 million in property damage.⁴⁸

Approximately 114,200 barrels were lost due to these incidents, with an estimated current value of over \$14 million, based on an average crack spread of \$25 per barrel during 2012 to 2013⁴⁹ and an average value crude oil price of \$100 per barrel.⁵⁰ This might be considered a fairly common event, with relatively low consequences, though the costs of environmental remediation have not been captured. This information is provided for the purpose of clarifying the pattern of risks for non-gas pipelines, but was not included in this assessment as a separate break-down of incident types. However, a failure of a major land pipeline transporting refined petroleum products could result in direct economic damages of \$100 million or greater.

⁴⁶ <http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-96/issue-40/in-this-issue/pipeline/batching-treating-keys-to-moving-refined-products-in-crude-oil-line.html>

⁴⁷ <http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-96/issue-40/in-this-issue/pipeline/batching-treating-keys-to-moving-refined-products-in-crude-oil-line.html>

⁴⁸ <http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/library/datastatistics/pipelineincidenttrends>

⁴⁹ <http://marketrealist.com/2013/07/crack-spread-101-part-4-effect-on-refiner-margins/>

⁵⁰ <http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/realprices/>

In July 2010 a six-foot break in Enbridge's 6B pipeline occurred, releasing more than 20,000 barrels of heavy tar sands crude into Talmadge Creek, a tributary of the Kalamazoo River in Michigan. The clean-up from this spill has totaled \$1.21 billion to date, and is still on-going. It represents the largest inland U.S. oil spill and one of the costliest spills in U.S. history.⁵¹

The potential for much more problematic petroleum pipeline failures exist on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico, as evidenced by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill. These pipelines are not subject to the same maintenance, inspections, and regulations that surface pipelines are, and due to the constant motion of the water, are difficult to precisely locate. The routine observed rate of failure is lower for such pipelines, however, than incidents on land. Maritime oil spills due to pipeline ruptures are discussed more in the Oil Spill section of this assessment.

Natural gas transmission pipeline system accidents are also fairly common (229 during the period of 2012-2013), and more likely than petroleum pipelines to result in casualties. However, the casualty numbers typically are still low because these pipelines are not commonly found in heavily populated areas. No fatalities and nine injuries from natural gas transmission pipeline incidents we reported in 2012-2013, and property damages of just over \$109 million for all 229 accidents, or an average of close to \$476 thousand per incident. While the average transmission accident is more costly, because of its comparative rarity and lower casualty count, transmission pipeline accidents pose lower fatality and injury risk than other pipeline accidents.

When a natural gas transmission pipeline ruptures in an urban area, it can result in a substantial amount of destruction. A good example of this is the explosion of a 30 inch pipeline in downtown San Bruno, CA on September 9, 2010. The loud roar and shaking caused people in the community to initially think it was an earthquake. The USGS registered the explosion and resulting shockwave as a magnitude 1.1 earthquake.⁵² Eyewitnesses stated that the initial explosion resulted in a wall of fire more than 1000 feet high. Eight people died in the explosion and 58 people were injured⁵³. The explosion also destroyed 35 homes and damaged many more. It took PG&E, the owner of the pipeline, 90 minutes to shut off the natural gas flow through the ruptured pipeline. On April 9, 2015, the California PUC fined PG&E \$1.6 billion for the event.⁵⁴

Natural gas distribution pipelines are located in heavily populated areas and, thus, are exposed to more frequent accidents from excavators and other sources of outside force. There were a total of 197 incidents on distribution systems in 2012-2013, resulting in about \$43.4 million in property damages. This is an average of close to \$220.5 thousand per incident, or less than half the average cost for a transmission pipeline failure. However, there were a total of 18 fatalities and 85 injuries in 2012-2013, considerably higher than those for transmission pipeline failures. These occurrences, although carrying a lower average economic cost, are considered higher risk for its higher fatality rate and a higher frequency than the natural gas transmission system failures.

Natural gas distribution systems carry an additional societal burden and potential cascading risk. Loss of supply to residential and commercial customers necessitates, because of safety reasons,

⁵¹ http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2014/11/2010_oil_spill_cost_enbridge_1.html

⁵² "Magnitude 1.1 – San Francisco Bay Area, California". United States Geological Survey. 09 September 2010.

⁵³ Melvin, Joshua (October 28, 2010). "Death toll in San Bruno pipeline explosion climbs to eight". San Jose Mercury News.

⁵⁴ http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_27880159/san-bruno-pg-e-faces-record-penalty-punishment

the relighting of pilot lights, which cannot be initiated until system integrity has been restored. The added time to complete the relight phase can create a major problem. If the reduction in capacity were to occur during the winter, many people in the Midwest and Pacific Northwest (and wherever residential customers rely on natural gas for residential heating) would be without heat. (Residential customers in the New England states typically use fuel oil for heating.) To cope with the situation, many may purchase electric heaters, putting strains on the power distribution system that the system design may be unable to accommodate. This, in turn, could lead to frequent power outages at the distribution level. There is also concern that impatient customers would attempt their own relighting. It is strongly recommended that a qualified service technician light any pilot light that has gone out. If the customer attempts to relight the pilot he is taking the risk of starting a fire or an explosion.⁵⁵

Natural gas pipeline systems are involved not only in the transportation of product but also in its delivery to the end user.

Assumptions

The SNRA project team used the following assumptions:

- The low, best, and high frequency estimates reflect the low, mean (arithmetic average), and high counts of incidents of major failures of pipelines of all types, as defined and recorded by the PHMSA of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), from 1995 through 2014.
- The best estimates of fatalities, injuries, and direct economic damages reflect the average fatalities, injuries, and direct economic damage per incident of major pipeline failures from the same data set. These were calculated by dividing the 20 year total fatalities, injuries, and direct economic damage by the average annual number of major pipeline failures.
- Low estimates of 0 fatalities and injuries were assumed by the SNRA project team.
- As this PHMSA data set did not report a per-incident breakdown, but only annual totals, high estimates of fatalities and injuries and low and high direct economic damage estimates were not determined by the SNRA.

Direct Economic Loss

Direct economic losses are difficult to assess at the national-level due to the variety of scenarios presented in the PHMSA dataset across the four pipeline-types assessed. The best estimate for direct economic loss based on PHMSA is just under \$1,000,000 per incident (\$978,639) with the low at \$135,735 and high estimate approximately \$2.4 million. The Event Background section provides an overview of historical economic impacts in the context of each pipeline: crude oil, petroleum, natural gas transmission, and natural gas distribution.

Social

While social displacement estimates were not reported by this PHMSA data set, an assumption of 0 civilian U.S. residents displaced from their homes for two or more days was made for the

⁵⁵ <http://staging.usepropane.com/safe-source-of-energy/homeowner-safety-information/#Link 11>

low and best estimates by the SNRA project team for the purposes of reporting the SNRA in this document. A high estimate was not made.

By analogy with other technological accidents not releasing highly toxic chemical gases or radioactive substances assessed by subject matter experts for the 2015 SNRA project, a provisional Event Familiarity Factor of 1.0 was assigned to the Pipeline Failure national-level event by the SNRA project team for the purposes of reporting psychological distress estimates for the final SNRA documentation (see Psychological consequences below).

Psychological

Psychological consequences for the SNRA focus on significant distress and prolonged distress, which can encompass a variety of outcomes serious enough to impair daily role functioning and quality of life. Observation of gasoline consumers' behavior in cities where pipeline accidents have disrupted fuel supplies suggest that the psychological impact of a pipeline's disruption would be minimal. A major pipeline failure would likely affect those in the transportation sector because it is heavily dependent on pipelines to transport motor fuel.

Environmental

A pipeline accident on land within the scope of the national-level event as defined by the SNRA data set—occurring with a frequency of about one every week in this country—could have minor environmental impact, but would most likely have moderate but localized impacts. Exceptional cases where a very large pipeline ruptures in a sensitive or protected ecosystem could have very high negative environmental consequences, as shown by the 2010 Enbridge crude oil pipeline failure in Michigan. In this incident, a 30-inch diameter pipeline carrying heavy tar sands crude (diluted bitumen or “dilbit”) ruptured, pumping an estimated 20,000 barrels of crude oil into the Kalamazoo River near the town of Marshall, Michigan. This event was so severe that cleanup work continued for four years, closing a thirty-five mile section of the river for two years, affected wildlife both in the river and on land.⁵⁶ Final cleanup costs to date are in the area of \$1.21 billion.

Potential Mitigating factors

The aging of the Nation's transportation infrastructure is a risk that can be addressed through proactive inspection, maintenance, repair, and replacement of deteriorating assets; however, this requires significant investment from the Federal, state, and local levels, and therefore, such activities will have to be prioritized based on criticality, risk, available funds, and other factors. The recent Federal requirement that state DOTs engage in risk-based asset management⁵⁷ to better strategically plan for transportation infrastructure investment and improvement, can make more effective use of existing funding, but expanded funding may also be required for effective mitigation of risk. Additionally, complementary action may be taken for enhanced contingency, response, and emergency preparedness planning. In the event of a transportation system failure, better emergency preparedness and response planning will enable agencies to more immediately respond to and mitigate direct impacts, and better contingency planning (e.g., establishing

⁵⁶ <http://archive.freep.com/article/20130623/NEWS06/306230059/Kalamazoo-River-oil-spill>

⁵⁷ Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), U.S. Public Law 112-141 – July 6, 2012

detouring and rerouting plans around higher risk assets) can mitigate indirect costs associated with disruption to the transportation system and supply chain, and associated congestion.

Additional Relevant Information

On June 26, 1996, a pipeline owned by Colonial Pipeline ruptured near Fork Shoals, South Carolina, releasing over 1 million gallons of diesel fuel into the Reedy River, one of the largest inland oil spills in U.S. history. The resulting spill was devastating to the Reedy, essentially wiping out the entire food chain throughout a 23-mile stretch of the river. Mammals, waterfowl, and shorebirds dependent upon the riverine / riparian food chain were also affected, or at least temporarily extirpated from the Reedy corridor. This disastrous spill was particularly incredible because the reach of the Reedy in southern Greenville and Laurens Counties had previously been among the more healthy reaches of the river.⁵⁸

Another high-end scenario for pipeline failure may be construed to be something comparable to the Deepwater Horizon accident, which resulted in \$20 billion paid by BP, and a \$4.5+ billion fine. It would take a number of complex interacting failures to have such an incident be considered a pipeline failure. If a deep-water drill head was in safe operating condition, but somehow the ability to shut it off failed, and a downstream physical failure in the pipeline resulted in uncontrolled leakage within the deep-water environs, a comparable physical event could be postulated. However, it is likely that a much more prompt repair to the controls that would allow the wellhead to be shut off would be feasible if it were not also the source of the spewing crude. Thus, an analytic judgment is made that this event is not a suitable analogy.

Table 10: National All Pipeline Systems Serious Incidents from 1995-2014

Year	Number	Fatalities	Injuries	Property Damage (current year dollars)	Gross barrels Spilled
1995	59	21	64	\$7,435,010	6,564
1996	63	53	127	\$19,501,368	14,315
1997	49	10	77	\$6,145,793	20,000
1998	70	21	81	\$57,738,002	11,117
1999	66	22	108	\$74,664,129	54,456
2000	62	38	81	\$8,846,912	10,981
2001	40	7	61	\$6,058,891	16,114
2002	36	12	49	\$6,067,785	0
2003	61	12	71	\$12,162,651	0
2004	44	23	56	\$11,250,326	860
2005	39	16	47	\$21,354,868	4,048

⁵⁸ <http://www.friendsofthereedyriver.org/the-river/>

2006	32	19	34	\$8,550,884	4,513
2007	43	16	46	\$20,235,909	12,176
2008	37	8	55	\$52,261,149	6,755
2009	46	13	62	\$20,101,704	364
2010	34	19	104	\$406,772,532	3,105
2011	32	12	51	\$13,421,557	0
2012	28	10	54	\$11,020,309	1,500
2013	24	9	44	\$16,750,062	23,702
2014	29	19	96	\$94,563,684	14,270
20 year Totals	894	360	1,368	\$874,903,525	204,840
5 Year Average (2010-2014)	29	14	70	\$108,505,629	8,515
10 Year Average (2005-2014)	34	14	59	\$66,503,266	7,043
20 Year Average (1995-2014)	45	18	68	\$43,745,176	10,242

Table 11: Pipeline Consequence Statistics

Totals	Number	Fatalities	Injuries	Property Damage	Gross Barrels Spilled
Median	41.5	16.0	61.5	\$15,085,810	6,660
5th	27.8	8.0	43.5	\$6,067,340	0
95th	66.2	38.8	109.0	\$110,174,126	25,240
Mean	44.7	18.0	68.4	\$43,745,176	10,242
Min	24	7	34	\$6,058,891	0
Max	70	53	127	\$406,772,532	54,456
Per Incident, Average	0.403	1.530	\$978,639	229	
Per Incident, 5th Percentile	0.18	0.97	\$135,735	0	
Per Incident, 95th Percentile	0.87	2.44	\$2,464,746	565	

Table 12: Summary of Interim Data⁵⁹

Category	Fatalities	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	060	0.40	0.87
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	061	1.53	2.44
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars	\$135,735	\$978,639	2,464,746
	Indirect Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars	N/A		
Social	Social Displacement	Number of Displaced from Homes for ≥ 2 Days	0	0	N/A
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Qualitative Bins	N/A		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Qualitative Bins	Low (See Discussion)		
Likelihood	Frequency of Events	Number per Unit of Time	TBD		

⁵⁹ The quantitative analysis for this hazard event is still in progress. The above estimates from the data that have been collected and analyzed to date are provided for convenience, but they should NOT be considered as final SNRA estimates.

⁶⁰ Calculated value is 0.18. Lowest likely assumed to be 0

⁶¹ Calculated value is 1.1. Lowest likely assumed to be 0

Urban Fire / Urban Conflagration

Synopsis

Trend analysis^{62,63} demonstrates a decline in the incidents of fire and fire death in the United States (U.S.), which may explain why a survey of articles found few selections on the topic of urban conflagration⁶⁴ in the U.S. Current conflagration research focuses on the challenges of developing nations. Articles that focused on the U.S. tend to do so from a historical perspective.

While articles from the past five years agree that the U.S. does not have a strong risk of conflagration from traditional causes, literature demonstrates that urban areas might be at an increased risk of urban fires caused by natural and man-made hazards. The literature review examines the nexus of urban fire and hurricanes (i.e., Superstorm Sandy), earthquakes, and the Wildland Urban Interface. The final theme evaluated was literature demonstrating that lighter building materials and modern furniture means hotter, faster fires and a need for a change in firefighting tactics.

Literature Review – Urban Fire/Urban Conflagration Viewed as Unlikely, but When Combined with Other Hazards May Become a More Frequent Occurrence

Introduction

Event Description

For purposes of this assessment, urban⁶⁵ fire/urban conflagration is defined as a fire, other than a wildfire, occurring within the U.S., with major building-to-building flame spread over some distance.^{66,67}

Event Background

An Overview of Fire Frequency and Consequences

Historically, the U.S. fire rate, on a per capita basis, has been higher than most of the industrialized world.⁶⁸ From 1979 to 2007, the fire death rate in the U.S. declined by 66 percent

⁶² USFA. Fire Death Rate Trends: An International Perspective. (2011). Topical Fire Report Series, Volume 12 (Issue 8). Pg. 4. Figure 3. Retrieved from <http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/statistics/v12i8.pdf>

⁶³ National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). (March 2015). Trends and Patterns of U.S. Fire Losses in 2013. Pgs. 1-2 (Figures 1 and 2) and Pg. 6 (Figures 8 and 9). Retrieved March 24, 2015, from <http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/fires-in-the-us/overall-fire-problem/trends-and-patterns-of-us-fire-losses>.

⁶⁴ As noted in the Event Background, for SNRA purposes, Urban Fire/Urban Conflagration is defined as a fire, other than a wildfire, occurring within the U.S. resulting in ten or more reported fatalities, a declaration of emergency, or a request for international assistance.

⁶⁵ For purposes of this qualitative assessment a precise definition of urban is not necessary. As a point of reference, the NFPA uses the U.S. Census Bureau's definition for Urban: An area with at least 1000 people per square mile. Similarly, suburban is defined as an area with between 500 people and 1000 people per square mile.

⁶⁶ NFPA Fire Protection Handbook, 19th edition. Quincy, MA: NFPA, 2003. Of note, conflagration is not defined in the NFPA 2014 standards glossary.

⁶⁷ Historically, conflagrations implied city-wide fires or at least multiple city blocks. In more recent years, fire professionals have used the term more loosely to imply major fires that spread from building-to-building. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary defines conflagration as a large disastrous fire.

⁶⁸ USFA. Fire Death Rate Trends: An International Perspective. (2011). *Topical Fire Report Series*, Volume 12(Issue 8). Pg. 1. Retrieved from <http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/statistics/v12i8.pdf>.

and the U.S. moved from having the third highest death rate in 1979 to the tenth highest death rate in 2007 out of twenty-four industrialized nations.⁶⁹

In 2013, the most recent year of completed and published statistics from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)⁷⁰, there were 1,240,000 fires, 3,240 civilian deaths, 15,925 civilian injuries, and \$11.5 billion in property damage caused by fires.^{71,72}

Over the years, there has been little change in the proportion of fires, deaths, injuries, and dollar loss by the type of property involved. In terms of numbers of fires, the largest category continues to be outside fires (46 percent) in fields, vacant lots, trash, and wild spaces. Vehicle fires comprise another 15 percent of reported fires. While there are many of these two kinds of fires, they are not the source of most fire damage or deaths. Structure fires accounted for 86 percent of fire deaths, 76 percent of injuries, and 82 percent of dollar loss of all U.S. fires in 2013.⁷³ Residential properties in particular, account for the largest percentage of deaths from all fires in 2013 (85 percent),⁷⁴ with the majority of these in one- and two-family dwellings.⁷⁵ Residential and nonresidential structure fires together comprise 39 percent of all fires, with residential structure fires outnumbering nonresidential structure fires by over three to one.⁷⁶ From 1980-2013 there were twenty-two residential fires with ten or more fatalities, none of which occurred between the period of 2009-2013.⁷⁷

The NFPA threshold for their annual Catastrophic Multiple-Death Fire Report is “fires or explosions in homes or apartments that result in five or more fire-related deaths, or fires or explosions in all other structures and outside of structures, such as wildfires and vehicle fires that claim three or more lives”.⁷⁸ The NFPA’s 2013 report documented 10 residential fires resulting in five or more fire-related deaths, and six non-residential structural fires with three or more fire-related deaths.^{79,80}

The NFPA also documents “large-loss” fires on an annual basis, which they define as losses in excess of \$10 million.^{81,82} In 2013, there were 17 structure fires, resulting in a total property loss of \$387.7 million. Only three of these fires were residential structures, accounting for \$76.9 million in losses. The majority of large-loss fires, in both frequency and dollars lost, occur in

⁶⁹ USFA (2011). Pg. 1.

⁷⁰ The USFA’s latest statistics are based on 2011 data. The USFA Statistics page directs users to view the NFPA’s website for more statistics on U.S. Fire Loss.

⁷¹ Karter, Jr., M. (2014). Fire Loss in the United States During 2013. Retrieved March 2015, from <http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/fires-in-the-us/overall-fire-problem/fire-loss-in-the-united-states>

⁷² Direct property damage figures do not include indirect losses, like business interruption.

⁷³ Karter (2014). pp iii-vi.

⁷⁴ Karter (2014). p 10. Non-residential, structure fires account for only 1% of deaths.

⁷⁵ Karter (2014). p 45.

⁷⁶ Karter (2014). pp iii-vi.

⁷⁷ Home Fires with Ten or More Fatalities, 1980-2013. (2014, August 1). Retrieved March 24, 2015, from <http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/fires-in-the-us/multiple-death-fires/homes-fires-with-ten-or-more-fatalities>

⁷⁸ Since this analysis is focused on non-wildfires, the numbers cited in the narrative account for only structural fires.

⁷⁹ Badger, S. (2014, September). Catastrophic Multiple-Death Fires in 2013. Retrieved March 2015, from <http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/fires-in-the-us/multiple-death-fires/catastrophic-multiple-death-fires>

⁸⁰ The NFPA’s non-residential figures include fires caused by Industrial Accidents. For SNRA purposes, Industrial Accidents are evaluated as a separate hazard.

⁸¹ Badger, S. (2014, November). Large-Loss Fires in the United States. Retrieved March 24, 2015, from <http://www.nfpa.org/research/reports-and-statistics/fires-in-the-us/large-property-loss/large-loss-fires-in-the-united-states>

⁸² The SNRA economic threshold for a “national-level” event is \$100 million.

non-residential structures such as manufacturing properties, properties under construction, or other commercial properties.^{83,84}

While residential fires in single and two-family homes account for the majority of deaths from all fires, including multiple-fatality fires,^{85,86} the rare fires causing ten or more fatalities are disproportionately concentrated in multiple-family dwellings such as apartment buildings, group homes, and non-residential structures (e.g., nightclubs, hotels).⁸⁷

Fire Risks Vary by Region

The risks and consequences of urban fires and conflagration are directly related to the condition and infrastructure of the built environment, and is affected by issues such as zoning and transportation networks. Typically, older Northeast, Southeast and Rust Belt urban areas are more susceptible to conflagration than other areas due to the age and construction of the built environment and condition of water distribution services. Newer Southwest and Western urban areas have addressed many of the “historic errors” of urban development, and addressed conflagration concerns through enhanced building codes with aggressive requirements for fire resistance, roof coverings, and built-in fire protection systems; wider transportation infrastructure to prevent horizontal fire spread via radiation; and, up-to-date water storage and distribution systems (e.g., more storage capacity, larger distribution mains, strategically placed hydrants, looping and redundancy, inspection, maintenance, testing). Increasingly, communities encroaching on the wildland are at risk for conflagration because typical construction methods in those areas consist of combustible materials and closely spaced buildings.

Federal, State and Local Government Firefighting Responsibilities

State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Responsibilities

Firefighting is an inherently local responsibility. Local fire resources often receive assistance from other fire departments/agencies through established mechanisms identified in local mutual aid agreements.⁸⁸

⁸³ Badger, S. (2014, November). Six of these structure fires occurred in manufacturing properties: a fertilizer plant, an egg processing plant, an oil reprocessing plant, a steel mill arc-furnace building, a plastics laminate plant, and an aluminum die-cast plant. These six fires resulted in total losses of \$202.6 million. Four more fires occurred in special properties. Two of the properties were apartment buildings under construction and two were a highway tunnel and a highway interchange that were severely damaged following separate vehicle crashes. The combined loss of these four fires was \$52.7 million. Another three fires occurred in residential properties, one each in a single-family home, a high-rise apartment building, and a cluster of rental cabins. The combined losses for these fires totaled \$76.9 million. Of the final four structure fires, two occurred in restaurants and resulted in a combined loss of \$25 million. The third and fourth fires occurred in a warehouse and a high school, and produced losses of \$20 million and \$10.5 million, respectively.

⁸⁴ The NFPA’s non-residential figures include fires caused by Industrial Accidents. For SNRA purposes, Industrial Accidents are evaluated as a separate hazard.

⁸⁵ USFA (2013, July). Multiple-fatality fires in residential buildings (2009-2011). USFA Topical Fire Report Series 15(6). Retrieved January 2014 from <http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/statistics/v14i6.pdf>.

⁸⁶ This is also true of total economic loss and the proportion of the most costly fires, which are generally wildfires destroying residential properties across large geographic areas. See the SNRA Wildfire Assessment for details.

⁸⁷ While the characteristics of all fires and multiple-fatality (two or more) fires, and the overall small relative proportion of total fatalities from the 10+ fatality fires, come from USFA and NFPA sources as cited, this judgment on the relative proportions of structure fires for the 10+ fatality fires is based solely on the data in Appendix 1-Table 1. These data come from the U.S. Government-funded international disaster database EM-DAT, but not from the USFA.

⁸⁸ This paragraph is directly from Emergency Support Function (ESF) #4 – Firefighting Annex, 2013. See: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32180>

There are roughly 1.1 million active firefighters in the U.S., of which just under three-fourths (73%) are volunteer firefighters. Nearly half of the volunteers serve in communities with less than 2,500 people.⁸⁹ In 2006, these organizations reported:

- 11% of the Nation's estimated 32,000 fire departments can handle a technical rescue with Emergency Medical Services (EMS) at a structural collapse of a building with 50 occupants with local trained personnel. Only communities of 500,000 or more people had a majority of departments report that they were both responsible for such an incident and had enough local specially trained personnel.
- 24% of fire departments can handle a wildland/urban interface fire affecting 500 acres with local trained personnel. Another 49% said this was within their responsibility, but they would need specially trained people from outside their local area. 27% said such incidents were outside of their responsibility.⁹⁰

Further assistance can be obtained through an established intrastate mutual aid system. If additional assistance is required, firefighting resources can be requested from other jurisdictions through processes established under mutual aid agreements, state-to-state or regional compacts, or other agreements. If the governor of the affected state declares an emergency, firefighting resources may be requested through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). If the President declares an emergency or major disaster under the Stafford Act, firefighting resources may also be requested through Emergency Support Function (ESF) #4. Using existing authorities and agreements, ESF #4 can mobilize wildland and structure firefighting resources from across the country and from several foreign countries through the national firefighting mobilization system to incidents anywhere in the U.S.⁹¹

As a result of community risk analysis and budget limitations, municipal fire services generally are not resourced for conflagrations. Major urban fire services may be an exception, but likely are limited to command and control of a single large-scale event. Multiple events could compromise service delivery. Participation in joint fire suppression automatic or mutual aid compacts is voluntary. Depending on local services provided (e.g., fire-based emergency medical services), life safety and rescue may take priority over fire suppression and deplete resources that would normally be committed to fire control.⁹²

Shortages of critical firefighting resources are adjudicated at the lowest jurisdictional level. Many firefighting agencies provide additional functions such as emergency medical services, technical rescue, and hazardous materials response. During a Federal response, these resources may support multiple ESFs in support of different core capabilities.⁹³

⁸⁹ USFA/NFPA. (2006). *Four Years Later – A Second Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service*. Report No. FA-303. United States Fire Administration, Emmitsburg, Maryland. Retrieved from <http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa-303-508.pdf>

⁹⁰ USFA/NFPA. (2006).

⁹¹ This paragraph is directly from Emergency Support Function (ESF) #4 – Firefighting Annex, 2013. See: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32180>

⁹² This paragraph was pulled from the 2011 SNRA Risk Summary Sheet.

⁹³ This paragraph is directly from Emergency Support Function (ESF) #4 – Firefighting Annex, 2013. See: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32180>

Federal Government

Within the National Response Framework the United States Forest Service (USFS) is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #4, Firefighting. The mission of ESF #4 includes coordinating Federal firefighting activities and providing resource support to rural and urban firefighting operations. The United States Fire Administration (USFA) plays a support and advisory role for the urban environment.⁹⁴

In addition to the USFS and USFA, the Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of the Interior, Army Corps of Engineers, Environmental Protection Agency, and United States Coast Guard all have responsibilities under ESF #4. Federal Government agency actions are described in ESF #4, pages 4-6.⁹⁵

Literature Review

Urban Conflagration in the U.S. Mostly Viewed Through Historical Lenses

Recent articles and studies evaluating urban conflagration within the U.S. examine the topic from an historic perspective.

William M. Shields's article, "Urban Conflagrations in the United States", explores the history of the Great Fires in the 18th, 19th, and earliest part of the 20th centuries and identifies the technological and social causes of conflagrations in U.S. cities.^{96,97} Shields identifies the lessons learned and risk mitigation efforts taken after the fires to address the causes, and in doing so, explains how such mitigation efforts, combined with technological improvements and social and political changes, eventually eliminated the city-destroying fires. He asserts that by the 1920s, all "major sources of conflagration risk" had been reduced, and U.S. cities "felt confident that they were no longer at serious risk" of citywide fires.⁹⁸

It is unclear if the document was peer reviewed, but the article is well footnoted and was recently referenced by a joint Resilient Cities initiative involving the University of Cambridge (see footnote 23). The primary reason to include it in this literature review is to demonstrate what appears to be the de facto assumption that conflagrations, at least for the U.S., are an issue of the past. In fact, in framing the term "conflagrations", Shields calls them "devastating fires" suffered by American cities from earliest colonial times until the early part of the 20th century.⁹⁹

George Bankoff's book, *Flammable Cities: Urban Conflagration and the Making of the Modern World*, published by the University of Wisconsin Press, takes a broader view both in scope of the cities studied as well as the time frame.¹⁰⁰ *Flammable Cities: Urban Conflagration and the*

⁹⁴ Emergency Support Function (ESF) #4 – Firefighting Annex, 2013. See: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32180>

⁹⁵ ESF #4 – Firefighting Annex, 2013. See: <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/32180>

⁹⁶ Shields, W. M., Ph.D. (c.2009-2010) "Urban Conflagrations in the United States." Retrieved March 2015 from http://www.tvsfpe.org/_images/conflagrations.pdf.

⁹⁷ Shields' article previously (June 2013) resided on the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) website at this link: <http://www.hss.energy.gov/nuclearsafety/nfsp/fire/workshop2010/shields/conflagrations.pdf>. The article is not dated, however, the latest citation in the article is from 2009 and the DOE web link indicates it was used at a DOE workshop in 2010, therefore it is was likely written between 2009-2012. The article does not provide a publication source – appearing to be a 'White Paper', and thus likely has not been peer reviewed. It was cited by a November 2013 paper, "Building Resilient Cities: From Risk Assessment to Redevelopment," published jointly by Ceres, The Next Practice, and the University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability Leadership.

⁹⁸ Shields (c.2009-2010) P 16.

⁹⁹ Shields (c. 2009-2010) P 1.

¹⁰⁰ Bankoff, G. (2012). *Flammable cities urban conflagration and the making of the modern world*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Making of the Modern World provides a series of essays examining the role of conflagrations in planning and building the world's cities. It covers 18 cities and regions across the world from the 17th to the 21st centuries. The essays are grouped into three parts: Part I: Cities as Fire Regimes; Part II: Fire as Risk and as Catalyst of Change; and Part III: The Politics of Fire. Part III addresses conflagrations in the 20th and 21st centuries, and may provide relevant findings for the current risk evaluation.

In the introduction, Bankoff acknowledges that “most wealthy countries today” view fire as an “occasional and isolated threat”.¹⁰¹ The book suggests that this may not be an accurate view of reality: “The Flammable cities of the past may prove to be the forebears of the flammable cities of the future, and the much touted “fire gap” more a temporal phenomenon than a spatial one.”¹⁰² This argument is largely focused on the urban slums in developing countries. However, the book includes an essay studying the case of Cleveland in the 1960s and 1970s (with references to Detroit and Los Angeles), and points out that even in modern, developed cities, fire “has continued to be a weapon of the weak, used to throw the social order into disarray and register protests that would otherwise go unheard, as well as a tool of elites, used to manipulate the urban poor and to reconfigure physical social space in the city to serve their own interests.”¹⁰³

Recent examples of civil unrest that involved acts of arson include the November 2005 French Riots¹⁰⁴, the August 2011 London Riots¹⁰⁵, and most recently, the riots in Ferguson, Missouri in November 2014.¹⁰⁶ A 2014 study by the Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies asserts there has been an increase in civil unrest around the globe and in the U.S., citing examples such as the Arab Spring movement (2010-2013) and the Occupy movement (2011-2012), and that it is likely to continue, in part due to the amplifying effect of social media.¹⁰⁷ The focus Bankoff’s book, and likely publication date, did not allow for more in-depth exploration of this latter point.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰¹ Bankoff (2012). Introduction.

¹⁰² Bankoff (2012). Introduction.

¹⁰³ Bankoff (2012).

¹⁰⁴ “The rioters . . . caused over €200 million in damage as they torched nearly 9000 cars and dozens of buildings, daycare centers, and schools. The French police arrested close to 2900 rioters; 126 police and firefighters were injured, and there was one fatality.” – Sahlins, P. (2006, October 24). Civil Unrest in the French Suburbs, November 2005. Retrieved March 2015 from <http://riotsfrance.ssrc.org>.

¹⁰⁵ The United Kingdom’s Home Office reports 266 recorded crimes of arson during the August 2011 riots. An Overview of Recorded Crimes and Arrests Resulting from Disorder Events in August 2011. (2011, January 1). Retrieved March 2015 from https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116257/overview-disorder-aug2011.pdf.

¹⁰⁶ More than a dozen buildings were set on fire the night of November 25, 2014, in protest against a grand jury’s decision. Retrieved March 2015 from <http://abcnews.go.com/US/additional-national-guardsmen-headed-ferguson-fires-burn-city/story?id=27157986>.

¹⁰⁷ Bowman, G.; Caccioli, F.; Coburn, A.W.; Hartley, R.; Kelly, S.; Ralph, D.; Ruffle, S.J.; Wallace, J.; 2014, Millennial Uprising Social Unrest Scenario; Cambridge Risk Framework Series: Centre for Risk Studies, University of Cambridge. Retrieved March 2015 from http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&ved=0CFkQFjAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcambridgeriskframework.com%2Fgetdocument%2F22&ei=P0sPVcfGHJP9oQSYkIKgCg&usg=AFQjCNHkzJQi_94TE5Gn6rf46VPO73RChA&sig2=6KFs2UiHsfpQ37wh7MqS1g&bvm=bv.88528373,d.cGU.

¹⁰⁸ Flammable Cities was published in January 2012. The London Riots had occurred only five months earlier, and while the Arab Spring Movement and Occupy Movement had been underway for two years, there was likely insufficient research at the time of their drafting to make a stronger case.

Urban Fires as a Consequence of Natural Disasters

Superstorm Sandy

The fires in Breezy Point, Queens, New York caused by Superstorm Sandy on October 29, 2012 were called a conflagration by major media outlets and trade journals.^{109,110,111,112} The images of the fire damage were called one of the “most shocking photographs taken in the wake of Hurricane Sandy’s rampage.”¹¹³ The response to the fire was complicated by not only the high-winds that caused the fire to climb higher than 60 feet and jump houses easily, but also the severe flooding that slowed access to the area and prevented use of fire hydrants.¹¹⁴ 135 homes were destroyed by fire.¹¹⁵ That there were no fatalities or serious injuries, particularly to the firefighters, was called miraculous.

The New York Fire Department (FDNY) Assistant Chief Joseph Pfeifer¹¹⁶ was the Incident Commander for the Breezy Point fire and in 2013 he wrote a detailed account of the incident for Fire Engineering Magazine.¹¹⁷ He introduces the topic of conflagration and provides background on the early “Great Fires” of New York City, as well as the recent great fires: the 9/11 World Trade Center fires and the 2006 Greenpoint Terminal Market fire in Brooklyn. Chief Pfeifer was present at both of these incidents, which makes his account of the Breezy Point fire all the more valuable.

Pfeifer’s article provides a detailed narrative of what happened that night, describing the evolution of the fire, the complications of fighting the fire based on the conditions, and the strategy and tactics used to attack the fire, including a “three-pronged attack that combined flanking strategies with direct tactics to contain the fire”.¹¹⁸ Pfeiffer puts into context the importance of the FDNY’s preparedness efforts (the previous summer they ran tabletop exercises on hurricanes in several communities including the Rockaways), and draws out lessons learned for Incident Commanders. One of his primary themes is that a “major characteristic of complex disasters is the presence of novelty” (events not seen before).¹¹⁹ Novelty slows down decision-

¹⁰⁹ For example: Dolnick, S. and Kilgannon, C.(2012, October 30). Wind-Driven Flames Reduce Scores of Homes to Embers in Queens Enclave. The New York Times. Retrieved March 2015 from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/nyregion/wind-driven-flames-burn-scores-of-homes-in-queens-enclave.html?_r=0.

¹¹⁰ Tangel, A. (2013, October 29). Breezy Point looks back a year after Superstorm Sandy. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved March 2015 from <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/29/nation/la-na-breezy-point-20131030>.

¹¹¹ Also references at Footnote 43 and 47.

¹¹² There are varying opinions as to whether these fires were conflagrations in the strictest, historical understanding of the term. However, this assessment uses a broader definition of the term to ensure the full spectrum of the risk is evaluated.

¹¹³ Breezy Point Inferno: Photo that Captures the Horror of Queens. (2012, October 31). The Week. Retrieved March 2015 from <http://www.theweek.co.uk/us/hurricane-sandy/49854/breezy-point-inferno-photo-captures-horror-queens>.

¹¹⁴ Tangel (2013, October 29).

¹¹⁵ Tangel (2013, October 29).

¹¹⁶ Pfeifer is currently the Chief of Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness for FDNY. During his career he has commanded some of the largest fires and emergencies in New York City’s history: he was the first chief at the World Trade Center attack on the morning of September 11, 2001, played a major command role during Hurricane Sandy in 2012, served as an Incident Commander at the Metro North commuter train Derailment in 2013, and assisted in developing the Ebola response in New York City in 2014. Pfeifer is a Senior Fellow of the Program on Crisis Leadership at Harvard Kennedy School and has presented in several of the program’s Executive Education programs, including Leadership in Crises and China Crisis Management. He is also Senior Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and has spoken about crisis leadership and disaster management at Harvard University, Columbia University, Wharton, the Naval Postgraduate School, the United States Military Academy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Tsinghua University in Beijing, China. He holds a Masters in Public Administration from Harvard University’s Kennedy School, a Masters in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Masters in Theology from Immaculate Conception. He writes frequently and is published in various books and journals.

¹¹⁷ Pfeifer, J. (2013, May). Conflagration in Breezy Point, Queens. Fire Engineering, 61-67.

¹¹⁸ Pfeifer, J. (2013, May). P 64.

¹¹⁹ Pfeifer, J. (2013, May). P 63.

making, and Pfeiffer recommends that in such cases, the commanders must “narrow the focus of units to achieve specific missions”.¹²⁰

That same night, there were four other simultaneous multiple-structure incidents in the Queens borough of New York City. Chief Robert Maynes, the Queens Borough Commander, was the incident commander for the Belle Harbor fire where 29 homes, two businesses and three garages were burned. In an article¹²¹ that evaluates FDNY’s overall Incident Management response¹²² (not just fire related) to Superstorm Sandy, Kat Sonia Thomson¹²³ highlights Chief Maynes’ approach because he drew upon his experience with wildland fires to design his attack strategy to the Belle Harbor fire. Chief Maynes worked on the Idaho East Zone Complex Wildland fire in 2006, and when assessing the Belle Harbor fire, realized the fire was “mimicking the behavior of a wind-driven wildfire.”¹²⁴ He determined he could not rely on the typical structure-by-structure approach and instead used wildland fire tactics (i.e., approach the “head of the fire” when it is safe to do so and focus limited resources in a “flanking action”).

Thomson’s article provides suggestions for additional areas of study to ensure future improvements to the use of an All-Hazards Incident Management Team (IMT) in large incidents. However, the primary point of her article is to draw connections between wildland and structural fires and show how both communities can learn from one another. She argues that the “instance of multiple-structure, wind-driven conflagration is becoming far too common to continue to ignore,” and that both communities should “work together to collect, analyze and implement a new typology of conflagration operations that incorporates concepts from wildland and structural operations.”¹²⁵

Professor Charles Jennings of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, The City University of New York, provides a more scholarly account of the fires caused by Superstorm Sandy in an article for Fire Safety Science News, an international newsletter from the International Association for Fire Safety Science.¹²⁶ It was published only four months after the incident, and thus is primarily a narrative record of the event, similar to the other literature reviewed, albeit with more precision of language and perhaps a more neutral perspective. A key observation in his article is that fire caused by hurricanes has “received scant attention in the scholarly fire engineering community and even in the trade press,” and that a “casual review of scholarly indexes shows scarcely any mention of the topic”.¹²⁷

¹²⁰ Pfeifer, J. (2013, May). P 63.

¹²¹ Thomson, K. (2013, July). When a Hurricane Becomes a Wildfire. Wildfire Magazine, 14-18.

¹²² Thomson explains the FDNY implemented the use of the All-Hazards Incident Management Team (IMT) and Incident Command System (ICS) after its value was demonstrated by wildland firefighters deployed to assist FDNY in the aftermath of 9/11. In addition to the structural changes and training the IMT approach required, FDNY regularly deployed its teams to support other hazards around the country, including hurricanes and wildland fires.

¹²³ Kat Sonia Thomson, BA Urban Studies, MPA, Ph.D. Candidate, has worked in wildland fire and aviation operations since 1998, and currently serves as an Air Attack Officer for the Government of Alberta. In the off-season, she consults on structural fire department operations and performance management in New York City.

¹²⁴ Thomson, K. (2013, July). P 15.

¹²⁵ Thomson, K. (2013, July). P 18.

¹²⁶ Jennings, C. (2013). Fires During the 2012 Hurricane Sandy in Queens, New York: A First Report. Fire Safety Science News, (Newsletter No. 34), 26-28. Retrieved March 2015 from <http://www.iafss.org/portal/wp-content/uploads/No-34-Fire-Safety-Science-News-March-2013.pdf>

¹²⁷ Jennings, C. (2013). P 26.

Earthquakes

Earthquake-induced conflagrations are a recognized hazard. A 2008 U.S. Geological Survey report describe these events in the following way:

Fire following earthquake refers to series of events or stochastic process initiated by a large earthquake. Fires occur following all earthquakes that significantly shake a human settlement, but are generally only a very significant problem in a large metropolitan area predominantly comprised of densely spaced wood buildings. In such circumstances, the multiple simultaneous ignitions can lead to catastrophic conflagrations that are by far the dominant agent of damage for that event. Regions of high seismicity with large metropolitan area predominantly comprised of densely spaced wood buildings include Japan, New Zealand, parts of Southeast Asia and western North America. A large earthquake such as a M7.8 event on the San Andreas fault in southern California (or comparable events in northern California, Puget Sound, or the Lower Mainland of British Columbia) combines all the requisite factors for major conflagrations that, depending on circumstances, can be of uniquely catastrophic proportions.¹²⁸

The report notes “the two largest peace-time urban conflagrations in history have been fires following earthquakes – 1906 San Francisco and 1923 Tokyo, the latter resulting in the great majority of the 140,000 fatalities”.¹²⁹

On October 17, 1989, the San Francisco Bay Area was hit by a M6.9 earthquake that killed 67 people and caused more than \$5 billion in damages.¹³⁰ In contrast to the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, fire was a minor factor.¹³¹ There was one major fire in the Marina District: approximately eight apartment buildings were destroyed on one street.¹³² The remaining fire losses were two homes and one auto repair shop.¹³³ A National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) study of the earthquake found that a number of factors might have contributed to the low fire-rate¹³⁴:

- There was low wind. Had there been wind, the researchers found, it was quite possible the Marina District fire could have developed into a multi-block conflagration.
- It rained shortly before the earthquake, resulting in high moisture in the ground and wild lands. Downed power lines in the Santa Cruz Mountains served as ignition sources and some minor fires occur. They were able to be managed locally, “But had the hills been dry and/or a strong wind been present, a different result could well have occurred.”

The study found that the fire services for the affected communities “were left in a condition where it is doubtful that they could have halted a serious spreading fire.”¹³⁵ Fire services were

¹²⁸ Scawthorn, C. (2008). Fire Following Earthquake: The ShakeOut Scenario Supplemental Study. Prepared for U.S. Geological Survey and California Geological Survey, by SPA Risk, LLC. (Berkeley, CA). P 6.

¹²⁹ Scawthorn, C. (2008). P 7.

¹³⁰ U.S. Geological Survey. October 17, 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake webpage: <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/regional/nca/1989/>

¹³¹ Nelson, H. (1990). “Performance of Fire Protection Systems”. Chapter 6 of Performance of Structures During the Loma Prieta Earthquake of October 17, 1989. Edited by Lew, H. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology. P 6-2. Retrieved April 2015 from http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=908823.

¹³² Nelson, H. (1990). P. 6-1.

¹³³ Nelson, H. (1990). P. 6-1.

¹³⁴ Nelson, H. (1990). P. 6-1.

¹³⁵ Nelson, H. (1990). P. 6-1.

overwhelmed responding to search and rescue efforts, communications were disrupted or overtaxed, and significant underground breakage of water mains eliminated the principal source of firefighting water.¹³⁶

Five years later and further south, a M6.7 earthquake struck the San Fernando Valley region of Los Angeles. The Northridge earthquake killed 60 people and more than 9,000 were injured.¹³⁷ From the initial main shock at 4:31AM to midnight, there were approximately 110 earthquake related fires.¹³⁸ A NIST sponsored study of the fires following the Northridge earthquake found that:

- More than 70% occurred in single- or multiple-family residences;
- The major cause of ignition was electric arcing as the result of a short circuit, although gas flame from an appliance is also a recurring source of ignition; and
- Where identification could be made, escaping natural gas (presumably from a broken gas line) is the single most common ignition material.¹³⁹

Other consequences that inhibited firefighting:

- Several instances of significant communications impairment
- The earthquake caused approximately 1,400 water system leaks, and pump stations and storage tanks also sustained damage. This resulted in a lack of water pressure at hydrants in certain portions of San Fernando Valley, and the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) resorted to using water tankers and drafting from alternative sources.¹⁴⁰

The NIST study determined that while a significant number of fires occurred in the hours after the earthquake, the resources of the Los Angeles region were sufficient to deal with the fires, as well as the other earthquake emergencies. However, the study indicates if the fires had turned into a conflagration the diminished water supply would not have been sufficient to address it.¹⁴¹

While these studies identify valuable lessons learned, they are based on the last major earthquakes to strike the U.S. mainland, which occurred over 20 years ago. Not surprisingly, several of the studies cited in this section are older than those usually selected for the literature review.¹⁴² While there is value in understanding the history of earthquake caused fires, they are less reliable sources for assessing risk. Current firefighting capabilities and technology have evolved significantly in twenty years. Federal, state, and local preparedness and capabilities for catastrophic events has improved since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.¹⁴³

¹³⁶ Nelson, H. (1990). P. 6-2.

¹³⁷ Scawthorn, C. (2008). P 10.

¹³⁸ Scawthorn, C., Cowell, A., and Borden, F. (1998, March). EQE Fire-related aspects of the Northridge Earthquake. Prepared for the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Building and Fire Research Laboratory. International, Inc. (San Francisco, CA) P iv.

¹³⁹ Scawthorn, C., Cowell, A., and Borden, F. (1998, March). P v.

¹⁴⁰ Scawthorn, C., Cowell, A., and Borden, F. (1998, March). P v-vi.

¹⁴¹ Scawthorn, C., Cowell, A., and Borden, F. (1998, March). P vi.

¹⁴² The target range for this Literature Review is publications from the past five years (2010-2015).

¹⁴³ Examples of improvements include: interoperable communications, situational awareness standard operating procedures, Incident Command Systems, exercises, training, and enhanced equipment.

Simultaneously, there are factors that may increase the risk of fires following earthquakes including:

- Recent severe droughts in the west have significantly depleted water supplies. The inability to quickly access water, will lead to more conflagrations.
- Increased drilling near populous areas and more refineries and tank farms; “When strongly shaken, oil refineries and tank farms have typically had large fires which have burned for days.”¹⁴⁴
- Wildland Urban Interface – as discussed below, increased development in wildland areas has led to an increased number of significant fires and conflagrations. They are also further exacerbated by extreme drought conditions.

Wildland Urban Interface

One of the most common topics found during this literature review was Wildland Urban Interface (WUI). Nine of the 25 costliest fires in U.S. history, in terms of property loss, were forest, wildland or WUI fires.¹⁴⁵ Over 46 million homes in 70,000 communities are said to be at risk of WUI fires.¹⁴⁶ The Natural Resource Conservation service estimates that since 1990, the U.S. has converted 3 acres per minute, 4,000 acres per day and close to 2 million acres per year of wildlands to WUI.^{147,148} The International Association of Wildland Fire reports that the number of structures lost to WUI fires has “grown significantly over the past 20 years.”¹⁴⁹ A number of factors contribute to the trend: “increased development in rural areas, fuel management policies, and climate change, all of which are projected to continue for the foreseeable future.”¹⁵⁰

The SNRA addresses wildfires as a stand-alone topic, separate from Urban Fire/Urban Conflagration. Increasingly however, wildfires move into populated areas and cause extensive damage. The NFPA defines WUI as: “The presence of structures in locations in which the [authority having jurisdiction] determines that topographical features, vegetation fuel types, local weather conditions, and prevailing winds result in the potential for ignition of the structures within the area from flames and firebrands of a wildland fire.” Or more simply: “The location where humans and their development meet or are intermixed with wildland fuels.”¹⁵¹

A 2010 article in the International Journal of Wildland Fire, written by experts from NIST and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), assessed the current approaches

¹⁴⁴ Scawthorn, C. (2008). P 10.

¹⁴⁵ Almand, K. (2014, September 3). Interface Investigation: The need for a closer look at how structures burn in the wildland/urban interface. National Fire Protection Association Journal. September-October 2014. Retrieved April 2015 from <http://www.nfpa.org/newsandpublications/nfpa-journal/2014/september-october-2014/columns/research>

¹⁴⁶ Bailey, D. (2013) WUI Fact Sheet, International Association of Wildland Fire and International Code Council. Retrieved April 2015: http://www.iawfonline.org/pdf/WUI_Fact_Sheet_08012013.pdf

¹⁴⁷ Bailey, D. (2013).

¹⁴⁸ Bailey, D. (2013) reference is a useful WUI fire fact sheet and provides many more statistics on WUI fires.

¹⁴⁹ Almand, K. (2014, September 3).

¹⁵⁰ Almand, K. (2014, September 3).

¹⁵¹ Both definitions are found in the 2014 NFPA Glossary. NFPA. “NFPA Glossary of Terms: 2014 Edition”. (2014, September). Retrieved March 2015 from <http://www.nfpa.org/got>

and research needs for the WUI fire problem.¹⁵² The study asserts that the WUI fire problem is a structure ignition problem and the best approach to reducing the severity of the problem is to reduce the potential for structure ignition.¹⁵³ The paper provides “an overview of the WUI fire problem, a short review of current approaches to addressing the WUI fire problem and reducing structure ignitions, a discussion and assessment of further needs, and an overview of the ongoing work at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to address some of the research needs”.¹⁵⁴

As of 2010, the authors stated there is no standardized method of risk assessment that can be applied nationwide to WUI communities in the U.S. They review and evaluate the limitations of several narrowly tailored risk assessment methodologies. A section on residential fuels, the definition of which includes both structures and vegetation, points out that most of the focus is on vegetation-to-structure fire spread. They believe this is valid for WUI communities with sufficiently low housing density, however, insufficient for medium to high housing density areas. Citing analysis of four separate WUI fires, structure-to-structure fire spread played a key role in the overall fire behavior. They assess that existing guidelines (as of 2010) for homeowners to mitigate WUI fire risk were developed for lower housing-densities and may not be applicable for the medium to high housing density areas.¹⁵⁵

A more recent article in the NFPA Journal by Kathleen H. Almand, suggests that there is still a need for better research.¹⁵⁶ The article reviews current efforts underway to address WUI fire:

- The NFPA reorganized its technical committees to better address the WUI fire problem.
- NIST, USFS and the Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety are actively pursuing research programs to better understand the spread of fire from the wildland to structures.
- The Fire Protection Research Foundation, a foundation that supports the NFPA mission, issued a report in March 2015, Pathways for Building Fire Spread at the Wildland Urban Interface.¹⁵⁷ The purpose of the report is to serve as a bridge between emerging research and NFPA’s codes and standards so that their prevention and protection strategies reflect the new and growing understanding of WUI firespread.¹⁵⁸

Lighter Building Materials, Modern Furniture Means Hotter, Faster Fires and a Change in Fire Fighting Strategies

As one would expect, many articles in the fire trade journals are focused on the nuts and bolts of daily firefighting. An interesting theme within the past five years of literature is the impact that

¹⁵² Mell, W., Manzello, S., Maranghides, A., Butry, D., and Rehm, R. The Wildland-Urban Interface Fire Problem – Current Approaches and Research Needs. (2010). P 238. International Journal of Wildland Fire. Vol 19. Retrieved April 2015 from http://www.firescience.gov/projects/07-1-5-08/project/07-1-5-08_Mell_et.al_WUIresearch_needs_ijwf2010.pdf

¹⁵³ Mell, W., Manzello, S., et. al. (2010). P 238. Which cites: Cohen JD (2008) The wildland–urban interface fire problem. *Forest History Today* (Fall), 20–26.

¹⁵⁴ Mell, W., Manzello, S., et. al. (2010). P 238.

¹⁵⁵ Mell, W., Manzello, S., et. (2010). P 242.

¹⁵⁶ Almand, K. (2014, September 3).

¹⁵⁷ Gollner, M., Hakes, R., Caton, S., and Kohler, K. (2015, March). Pathways for Building Fire Spread at the Wildland Urban Interface. Department of Fire Protection Engineering, University of Maryland. (College Park, MD), produced for Fire Protection Research Foundation. Retrieved April 2015 from <http://www.nfpa.org/research/fire-protection-research-foundation/reports-and-proceedings/for-emergency-responders/fire-prevention-and-administration/pathways-for-building-fire-spread-at-the-wildland-urban-interface>,

¹⁵⁸ Almand, K. (2014, September 3).

newer buildings and furniture have on fires.^{159,160} The articles provide some scientific explanations for how fire acts differently in buildings constructed prior to the 1960s (with solid wood) as compared to those built since. While the newer engineered products provide a supposedly stronger structure for less material and money, under the high-heat conditions a fire produces, the structures fail much more rapidly and the fire escalates more quickly and thus the firefighting strategies must be altered depending on the type of building. The articles also suggested there was a lack of consideration for the implications of fire prevention in the construction of these homes. No articles were found that connected new buildings to an increased risk of conflagration, however, urbanization trends in the U.S. – particularly when older homes, which tend to be spaced more closely together than suburban areas, are torn down or gutted and replaced with new materials – may increase the risk of fires with the potential to spread.

Similarly, an NFPA Journal article from January 2015 highlights new research from Fire Science that suggests tactical changes should be made in how firefighters approach fires.¹⁶¹ Some of this is based on finally having solid scientific data on how structure fires work, but the other reason for the suggested changes are to recognize that the ‘fuel sources’ in the modern home are extremely different than those fifty years ago when most firefighting tactical standards were developed. One experiment, which can be watched on YouTube, captured the significant difference in how fire behaved in a room with older versus newer furniture. The room filled with legacy furniture takes nearly thirty minutes to reach flashover, but the modern room reaches flashover in just three minutes, 40 seconds. Since the average response time for home structure fires is close to six minutes, it means firefighters are dealing with much more intense fires than their counterparts 50 years ago.

Conclusion

While articles from the past five years appear in agreement that the U.S. does not have a strong or even moderate risk of conflagration from traditional causes, there may be an increasing risk of urban fires caused by other hazards.

Flammable Cities, makes the case that urban fires, even in so-called “first world” countries, may see a resurgence in future years, as people resort to leveraging fire as a political tool. Whether the incidents in France, London, and Ferguson, Missouri are evidence of an emerging trend or an anomaly remains to be seen, and perhaps could be evaluated in future risk assessments.

On the nexus of fires and natural disasters, earthquakes and fires are well-studied due to the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and associated conflagration¹⁶², however, hurricanes and conflagrations, as Jennings’ points out, is less studied. In both cases, firefighters’ access to the blaze and access to water for fire suppression appear to be major challenges in keeping a fire from spreading. It should be noted that there was only one scholarly journal found on the topic of

¹⁵⁹ Naum, C. (2015, January). Building Construction for Today’s Fire Service: Newer buildings & occupancies present increasing challenges. Firehouse Magazine. P 74.

¹⁶⁰ Earls, A. (2009, July). Lightweight Construction. NFPA Journal. (July-August 2009 Edition). Retrieved March 2015 from <http://www.nfpa.org/newsandpublications/nfpa-journal/2009/july-august-2009/features/lightweight-construction>.

¹⁶¹ Roman, Jesse. (2015, January). New Fires, New Tactics. NFPA Journal. January-February 2015. Retrieved April 2015 from <http://www.nfpa.org/newsandpublications/nfpa-journal/2015/january-february-2015/features/fire-tactics>.

¹⁶² See draft 2011 Risk Summary Sheet on Urban Conflagration.

Superstorm Sandy and the fires.^{163,164} The incidents are fairly recent, thus studies may be ongoing and as Thomson and Jennings' articles indicate, there is a need for deeper analysis.

Though the 1989 and 1994 earthquakes did not result in conflagrations, they provided useful insights into the challenges of fighting fires caused by earthquakes. The literature reviewed, however, is limited in providing a useful risk assessment for today's environment due to changes in technology, equipment, and capabilities over the past twenty years. Alternatively, certain factors like climate change, extreme drought, more oil and gas drilling, and more refineries may exacerbate fires. This means that fires that were controllable in 1989 and 1994 may no longer be able to be suppressed.

There is general agreement among experts that "WUI fires will continue to be a serious and costly issue".¹⁶⁵ The NFPA even made it a priority in their current strategic plan. All indications are that the WUI will continue to grow as more and more people move into wildland areas. Current drought conditions in the west, and the potential for climate change to further exacerbate drought and other severe weather will provide more fuel and ignition sources for the fire. Thus the research is focused on mitigation and suppression techniques. This research and the NFPA's updated standards should help reduce the size and consequence of WUI fires, even as the frequency is likely to stay the same or increase.

Finally changes in building materials and furnishings are producing hotter and faster fires, making a structure-to-structure fire spread more likely if outdated firefighting techniques are used. The firefighting community seems to be aware of the need for changes; standards and training are being updated. While the fires may be more intense, there is reason to believe the tactics to mitigate that intensity will be successful.

All of these changes and increased risk factors require urban firefighters to be equipped with the skills necessary to handle the complex challenges of today's fires.

¹⁶³ Searches conducted via USFA's online library, NFPA's website and general internet searches, including Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁴ While there were numerous additional trade magazine articles about Superstorm Sandy and the associated fires, only one scholarly journal was found in a search of the USFA's Library catalogue. The article appeared in The Crisis Journal and was solely an interview with Joseph Pfeiffer. It did not contain any references to academic literature. Since Joseph Pfeiffer's article from Fire Engineering magazine had already been reviewed for this Literature Review, it was not included as a separate source for purposes of the Literature Review. Pfeiffer does cite additional lessons learned in the interview. Should further research on this topic be required, this article should be reviewed. Citation for the article: Christo Motz, (2013). How the FDNY responded to Hurricane Sandy. The Crisis Journal (Vol 8 (3)).

¹⁶⁵ Mell, W., Manzello, S. . . . (2010). P 248.

Table 13: Incidents of Fires with 10 or More Fatalities from 1970-2013^{166, 167}

Start	End	Location	Name	Killed	Tot. Affected	Est. Dmge (US\$ Million)	EM-DAT DisNo	CPI	Dmge. \$2011 (US\$ Million)
9/6/1970	9/6/1970	Ohio	Nursing Home	31			1970-0011	5.797	
12/1/1970	12/1/1970			28			1970-0130	5.797	
3/2/1971	3/2/1971	Woodbine		25	61		1971-0122	5.554	
6/24/1973	6/24/1973	New Orleans	Nightclubs	30			1973-0064	5.066	
6/30/1974	6/30/1974	New York	Nightclub	24			1974-0067	4.563	
10/24/1976	10/24/1976	Bronx, New York	Nightclub	25			1976-0080	3.953	
10/1/1976	10/1/1976	Fremont (Nebraska)	Nursing Homes	20			1976-0081	3.953	
6/1/1977	6/1/1977			42			1977-0237	3.712	
2/7/1978	2/7/1978	Beverly Hills, Southgate ...	Supper Club Fire	164	100		1978-0248	3.450	
5/28/1978	5/28/1978	Beverly Hills	Beverly Hills Country Club	16			1978-0150	3.450	
1/1/1979	1/1/1979	Sante Fé		28			1979-0120	3.098	
11/21/1980	11/21/1980	Las Vegas	Hotel	84	726		1980-0024	2.730	
12/4/1980	1/1/1981	New York	Hotel 'Stouffers Inn'	26			1981-0020	2.475	
12/24/1989	12/24/1989	Johnson City (Tennessee)	Retirement home	16			1989-0342	1.814	
1/1/1989	1/1/1989	Near Remer (Minnesota)	House	10			1989-0406	1.814	
3/25/1990	3/25/1990	New-York	Night club 'Happy Land'	87			1990-0432	1.721	
4/19/1993	4/19/1993	Waco		78			1993-0449	1.557	
3/16/1993	3/16/1993	Chicago	Hotel	16			1993-0127	1.557	
3/5/1993	3/5/1993	Los Angeles	Apartment complex	10			1993-0152	1.557	
11/21/1996	11/21/1996	San Juan	Building	29	90	12.1	1996-0332	1.434	17.3
3/1/2001	3/1/2001	Oak Orchard (Delaware Sta ...	House	11			2001-0004	1.270	
2/20/2003	2/20/2003	West Warwick (Rhode Isl. ...	Nightclub	100	150		2003-0095	1.222	
2/26/2003	2/26/2003	Hartford (Connecticut)	Nursing home' Greenwood	11	120		2003-0108	1.222	
11/26/2006	11/27/2006	Anderson (Missouri)	Hall for mentally disabled people	10	19		2006-0637	1.116	
7/3/2007	8/3/2007	Bronx (New York)	Home	10			2007-0118	1.085	
3/4/2008	3/4/2008	Pennsylvania	House	10	2		2008-0143	1.045	

¹⁶⁶ EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels (Belgium) [official citation]. EM-DAT is maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the School of Public Health of the Université Catholique de Louvain located in Brussels, Belgium (<http://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions>), and is supported by the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID (http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/).

¹⁶⁷ Accessed March 2015. Verified no further fire incidents available in EM-DAT through 2013.

Migrant Surge / Mass Migration

Synopsis

This survey of recent mass migration surge events and a review of associated research literature indicate there is a strong likelihood of future surges to the U.S. Such surges are caused by complex structural factors that render ‘quick solutions’ unlikely. This paper provides an overview of the “Why,” “Who,” and “How” of migration, including the dangers migrants encounter in their journey, an overview of the recent history of migration, examples of recent surges, and a brief overview of the roles and responsibilities of various U.S. Government agencies related to mass migration.

The literature review is grouped into two themes: (1) the 2014 Central American surge of unaccompanied children, and (2) push factors are intensifying and are likely to increase the frequency of surges.

Literature Review – Risk of Mass Migration Likely Increasing

Introduction

Event Description

Mass Migration is defined as a concentrated flow, or surge, of migrants into the United States primarily along maritime and land borders, regardless of method of entry or reason for migrating.¹⁶⁸ This assessment is inclusive of both legal and illegal (undocumented) migration attempts. It is focused on the short-term impacts to the United States in handling a surge of migrants, that is, primarily the increased resources and capabilities needed to manage a surge.¹⁶⁹ It does not attempt to assess the long-term impacts of legal or illegal immigration. This assessment also does not consider repatriation efforts even in events where repatriation and mass migration may be comingled concerns.

Event Background

Why People Migrate

Marc Rosenblum¹⁷⁰ and Kate Brick’s 2011 study, *U.S. Immigration Policy and Mexican/Central American Migration Flows: Then and Now*, explains “why people move, who and how many people migrate, and how they choose where to go, depends on a combination of structural factors that are difficult for governments to control and on the policy environment in which migration decision making occurs.”¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ Methods for entry and the reasons/intent for gaining entry are discussed in the event background.

¹⁶⁹ For example, maritime and land-based border patrol and search and rescue services, law enforcement and immigration courts services, and providing shelter, clothing, food, medical treatment, and other health and welfare services.

¹⁷⁰ Marc R. Rosenblum also co-edited the Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration published June 2012. This resource was not reviewed due to its length and the fact that the scope of the book covers more than just migration to the U.S. It is, however, a notable contribution to the literature of Mass Migration.

¹⁷¹ Rosenblum, Marc R. and Kate Brick. *U.S. Immigration Policy and Mexican/Central Migration Flows: Then and Now*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. 2011.

The reasons can be categorized into three structural factors:¹⁷²

- Push Factors – Factors in the country of origin that encourage departure. These can include limited economic opportunity, authoritarian or corrupt governments, crime, lack of education, wars, and natural disasters.
- Pull Factors – Factors that attract migrants to a country include availability of jobs and associated economic opportunities for immigrants and families, including safety, limited government, and equality before the law.
- Social networks – The ability to connect migrants to host-state jobs and communities. This occurs through providing funds and information to would-be migrants, assisting with how to relate to public authorities, and integration into the host-state economy. Rosenblum and Brick point out that with 10-20 percent of Mexicans and Central Americans now living in the U.S., social networks are a particularly important factor within this region.

The Current “Wave” of Immigration to the United States

Historically speaking, we are presently in the fourth ‘great wave’ of immigration. Figure 1 shows that the current immigrant¹⁷³ share of the U.S. population, 13.1 percent in 2013, is similar to that of the period of 1860-1920.^{174,175} Historians consider that period to include the second and third waves of large-scale immigration. The fourth peak period began in the 1970s and continues today.^{176,177,178}




Figure 1: Migration Policy Institute (MPI) - Number of Immigrants and Percentage of the Total U.S. Population, 1850-2013

¹⁷² Adapted from Rosenblum and Brick (2011). P 2. Rosenblum and Brick include the following citation on this list: The classic source on push-and-pull factors, and social networks is Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, Graeme Hugo, Ali Kouaouci, Adela Pellegrino, and J. Edward Taylor, *Worlds in Motion: Understanding International Migration at the End of the Millennium* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1998).

¹⁷³ “Foreign born” and “immigrant” are used interchangeably and refer to persons with no U.S. citizenship at birth. This population includes naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents, refugees and asylees, persons on certain temporary visas, and the unauthorized. Definition from the Migration Policy Institute. Washington, DC. See Zong, J., & Batalova, J. (2015, February 25). Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States. Retrieved March 2015, from <http://migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states#Demographic, Educational, and Linguistic>

¹⁷⁴ MPI Data Hub. (2013, August 14). U.S. Immigrant Population and Share Over Time, 1850-Present. Retrieved March 2015, from <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/immigrant-population-over-time?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true> MPI tabulation of data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2010 - 2013 American Community Surveys and 1970, 1990, and 2000 decennial Census data. All other data are from Campbell J. Gibson and Emily Lennon, "Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850 to 1990" (Working Paper no. 29, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC, 1999).

¹⁷⁵ Grieco, E., Trevlyan, E., Larsen, L., Acosta, Y., Gambino, C., De la Cruz, P., . . . Walters, N. (2012). The Size, Place of Birth, and Geographic Distribution of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 1960 to 2010. Working Paper no. 96, Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC.

¹⁷⁶ Hipsman, F., & Meissner, D. (2013, April 16). Immigration in the United States: New Economic, Social, Political Landscapes with Legislative Reform on the Horizon. Retrieved March 2015, from <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigration-united-states-new-economic-social-political-landscapes-legislative-reform>

¹⁷⁷ Grieco, E. . . . (2012).

¹⁷⁸ There is some variance by scholars in the segmentation of the immigration “waves”. Some group the second and third wave into one wave, while others consider them separate because of different push/pull migration factors. There is also variance in the dating of the beginning of the

In 2007, there was a decline in both legal and illegal immigration, which coincides with the 2007-2009 Great Recession. Figure 2 shows the number of people granted legal permanent residency each year and the decline that began around 2007.¹⁷⁹

Figure 3 shows the number of illegal immigrants estimated to be in the United States with a slight decline and leveling off around 2007.^{180, 181}

Hipsman and Meissner assert “illegal immigration is a bellwether of economic conditions, growing substantially in a strong economy with high demand for low-skilled labor (the 1990s and early 2000s), and tapering off with economic contraction (since 2008).” The decline may also be due to “heightened border enforcement, a rise in deportations, and the growing dangers associated with illegal border crossings.”¹⁸² As of March 2015, most research reflects data as late as 2013, and the researchers acknowledge it is possible, even likely, that the immigration numbers will increase again as the U.S. economy recovers.

U.S. Immigrants’ Countries of Origin

After the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, there was a remarkable shift of migratory patterns.




Figure 2: MPI - Annual Number of U.S. Legal Permanent Residents, FY 1820-2013




Figure 3: Pew Research Center - Growth in Unauthorized Immigration Has Leveled Off

fourth wave. Some consider it to start in 1965 at the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, while others date it to after 1970 when the trend of increased migration occurs.

¹⁷⁹ MPI Data Hub (2013). <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/Annual-Number-of-US-Legal-Permanent-Residents?width=1000&height=850&iframe=true> Migration Policy Institute tabulations of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (various years). Available at <http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm>. This chart tracks the number of people who annually are granted legal permanent residence (also known as getting a green card). Green-card holders are permitted to live and work in the country indefinitely, to join the armed forces, and to apply for U.S. citizenship after five years (three if married to a U.S. citizen). As of January 2012, an estimated 13.3 million green-card holders lived in the United States, including an estimated 8.8 million eligible to become U.S. citizens.

¹⁸⁰ Source: Table A1, derived from Pew Research Center estimates for 2005-2012 based on augmented American Community Survey data from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS); for 1995-2004, 2000 and 1995 based on March Supplements of the Current Population Survey. Estimates for 1990 from Warren and Warren (2013).

¹⁸¹ Note: Shading surrounding line indicates low and high points of the estimated 90 percent confidence interval. Data labels are for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2012. The 2009-2012 change is not statistically significant at 90 percent confidence interval.

¹⁸² Passel, J., Cohn, D., & Gonzalez-Barrera, A. (2012, April 23). Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero-and Perhaps Less. Retrieved March 29, 2015, from <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less/>

Prior to 1960, the U.S. immigrant population consisted mostly of European immigrants settling in the U.S. Northeast and Midwest. Beginning in 1970s, it was predominantly Latin American and Asian immigrants settling in the U.S. South and West.^{183,184}

In the 1970s there was a sharp rise in the number of Mexican-born immigrants arriving in the U.S. and by 1980, Mexico became the top originating country for U.S. immigrants.¹⁸⁵ In 2013, they accounted for 28 percent of the 41.3 million immigrants in the United States,¹⁸⁶ and they accounted for the largest share of both legal and illegal entries.¹⁸⁷ A Pew Research Center Hispanic Trends study conducted by Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera points out that in the history of the U.S., “no country has ever seen as many of its people immigrate to this country as Mexico has in the past four decades.”^{188,189} Further, the most “distinctive feature” of this wave is the “unprecedented share” (51 percent) of immigrants who have come to the U.S. illegally.¹⁹⁰

Now after four decades of Mexico leading as the dominant country of migration origin, we may be seeing another significant shift. In 2012, the Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends project examined census data from the U.S. and Mexico and found that immigration flows from Mexico have declined significantly, and simultaneously that the number of Mexican-born immigrants who left the U.S. for Mexico rose. They asserted that the result is a net migration flow of zero.¹⁹¹

Further, in a November 2014 report, the Pew Research Center identified that “as Mexican numbers continued to drop between 2009 and 2012, unauthorized immigrant populations from South America and from a grouping of Europe and Canada held steady,” and, migrants from “Asia, the Caribbean, Central America,¹⁹² and the rest of the world grew slightly from 2009 to 2012”.¹⁹³

In October 2011, the U.S. Government began




Figure 4: MPI - Top 10 Largest Immigrant Groups (2013)

¹⁸³ Zong, J., & Batalova, J. (2015, February 25). Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants and Immigration in the United States. Retrieved March 2015, from http://migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states#Demographic_Educational_and_Linguistic

¹⁸⁴ Grieco, E. . . . (2012).

¹⁸⁵ Passel, J., Cohn, D., & Gonzalez-Barrera, A. (2012, April 23). Chapter II. Migration Between the U.S. and Mexico.

¹⁸⁶ Zong, J., & Batalova, J. (2015, February 25).

¹⁸⁷ Hipsman, F., & Meissner, D. (2013, April 16).

¹⁸⁸ Passel, J., Cohn, D., & Gonzalez-Barrera, A. (2012, April 23). Overview.

¹⁸⁹ Passel, J., Cohn, D., & Gonzalez-Barrera, A. point out that when measured as a share of the immigrant population at the time, immigration waves from Germany and Ireland in the late 19th century equaled or exceeded the modern wave from Mexico.

¹⁹⁰ Passel, J., Cohn, D., & Gonzalez-Barrera, A. (2012, April 23). Overview.

¹⁹¹ Passel, J., Cohn, D., & Gonzalez-Barrera, A. (2012, April 23).

¹⁹² The increase of Central American migration is discussed in more detail in the Literature Review.

¹⁹³ Passel, Jeffrey S. and D’Vera Cohn. (2014, November). “Unauthorized Immigrant Totals Rise in 7 States, Fall in 14: Decline in Those From Mexico Fuels Most State Decreases.” Washington, D.C. Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends Project. Retrieved March 2015, http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2014/11/2014-11-18_unauthorized-immigration.pdf

seeing a dramatic rise in the number of unaccompanied¹⁹⁴ and separated children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.¹⁹⁵ Experts believe the surge is related to push factors that have intensified in recent years, including some of the highest homicide rates in the world, increasing crime and violence due to gangs, drug trafficking and organized crime, extreme poverty, and government corruption.¹⁹⁶ In the spring of 2014, a migration surge of unaccompanied minors captured the attention of the American public. This phenomenon is explored in the Literature Review section below, but it is worthwhile to point out that the increase of Central American migrants –adults, family units, and unaccompanied minors – was identified by Border Patrol statistics and recognized by researchers several years prior to 2014.

Figure 4 shows the percentages of the top ten originating countries as of 2013. After Mexico, the top countries of origin are: India, China (including Hong Kong but not Taiwan), Philippines, Vietnam, El Salvador, Cuba, Korea, Dominican Republic and Guatemala.¹⁹⁷

Examples of Migrant Surges

Along the land border, some would argue the past four decades of Mexican migration have been an ever-growing ‘surge’ until the decline and leveling-off beginning in 2007. Most of the ebbs and flows of migration on the southern land border have primarily been related to the economic cycles in both Mexico and the U.S. The recent surge of unaccompanied minors will be discussed in the Literature Review.

Along the Southeast maritime border, Haiti and Cuba historically and currently meet the push factors criteria described above and pose a risk for mass migration into the United States.¹⁹⁸ Both countries are geographically near to the U.S. and have had an ongoing flow of undocumented migrants into the U.S. for years.

- Between 1991 and 1995 over 120,000 migrants from 23 countries were interdicted. Haitian migrants began increased departures after a 1991 coup in Haiti.
- In 1994, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) responded to three mass migrations almost simultaneously—first from Haiti, then from Cuba, and again from Haiti—rescuing and preventing over 63,000 migrants attempting to illegally entering the U.S.
- The Dominican Republic has historically been a major source country for undocumented migrants attempting to enter the U.S. crossing the Mona Passage (the body of water between

¹⁹⁴ The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF), Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR)¹⁹⁴ defines an unaccompanied alien child (UAC) as “one who has no lawful immigration status in the United States: has not attained 18 years of age, and with respect to whom: 1) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or 2) no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to provide care and physical custody. See <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/resource/who-we-serve-unaccompanied-alien-children>

¹⁹⁵ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2014). Children on the Run: Unaccompanied Children Leaving Central America and Mexico and the Need for International Protection. P 15. Retrieved from [http://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/UAC_UNHCR_Children on the Run_Full Report.pdf](http://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/UAC_UNHCR_Children%20on%20the%20Run_Full%20Report.pdf)

¹⁹⁶ Gootnick, D. (2015). Central America: Information on Migration of Unaccompanied Children from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. *Government Accountability Office, GAO-15-362*. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-362>

¹⁹⁷ MPI Data Hub (2013). <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/largest-immigrant-groups-over-time> Migration Policy Institute tabulation of data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2010 and 2013 American Community Surveys, and 2000 Decennial Census. Data for 1960 to 1990 are from Campbell J. Gibson and Emily Lennon, "Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850 to 1990" (Working Paper No. 29, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC, 1999).

¹⁹⁸ Adapted from U.S. Coast Guard (2013, September 19), *Missions: Maritime Security* [electronic resource], at <http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/MaritimeSecurity.asp>, and USCG Office of Law Enforcement (2014, October 31), *Alien Migrant Interdiction* [electronic resource], at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp> (retrieved March 2015).

the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico) to enter Puerto Rico. Thousands of people have taken to sea in a variety of vessels, the most common is a homemade fishing vessel known as a Yola. Most of these migrants are smuggled by highly organized gangs. From April 1, 1995 through October 1, 1997, USCG conducted Operation ABLE RESPONSE, with enhanced operations dedicated to interdicting Dominican migrants. Over 9,500 migrants were interdicted or turned back when they sighted a USCG asset.

- Haiti suffered a devastating earthquake on January 12, 2010. Its effects caused roughly 2 million people to become displaced, 3.5 million people requiring humanitarian aid, and \$7.8 billion in damages and losses—a figure that was 120 percent of Haiti’s gross domestic product. Due to the lack of in-country resources, the stress on traditional United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) response capabilities, political instability, and the desire to reduce the risk of mass migration to the U.S., the U.S., in coordination with UN OCHA and USAID OFDA, deployed 20,000 civilian and military personnel and provided \$1 billion in humanitarian funding in part in order to prevent a mass migration into the U.S. In addition to the unstable environmental conditions, issues such as general lawlessness and disease outbreaks continue to prevail. These health, safety, and security factors can trigger a mass exodus to nearby nations, including the U.S.
- In January 2015, the USCG announced¹⁹⁹ there had been a surge of attempted maritime entries by Cubans. (Customs and Border Protection announced a similar surge at land border crossings and airports). The December 2014 announcement that the U.S. and Cuba were seeking to normalize relations spurred rumors and fears that the long-standing Cuban immigration policy, known as “wet foot/dry foot,” may change. This misperception prompted an increase of Cubans attempting entry into the U.S. before any changes in policy could occur.^{200,201}

The Dangerous Journey

Migrants often take great risks and endure significant hardships in their attempts to flee their countries and enter the United States. Individuals attempting to gain unauthorized entry into the U.S experience the vast majority of these dangers.

Of the asylum-seeking and unauthorized entries, the United Nations (UN) estimated that 97 percent enter the U.S. clandestinely through the border with Mexico, and maritime interdictions account for only one percent of the total.^{202,203} The increased U.S. border enforcement since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as well as the increased violence and dangers in the route to the border, appears to have deterred independent border crossers.²⁰⁴ Increasingly, migrants

¹⁹⁹ <http://www.uscnews.com/go/doc/4007/2442054/>

²⁰⁰ The U.S. Government has repeatedly stated no changes in the immigration policy are expected yet, but that has not seemed to quell the concerns and rumors. See USCG Press Release referenced in previous footnote or statement by DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson here: <http://tbo.com/ap/new-ties-with-cuba-wont-change-wet-foot-dry-foot-policy-20141218/>

²⁰¹ Despite U.S. Government (Executive Branch) statements, some legislators and policy experts have suggested it may be time for changes in the policy. For example, see <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/normalization-relations-cuba-may-portend-changes-us-immigration-policy>

²⁰² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (n.d.) Smuggling of migrants: The harsh search for a better life. Retrieved March 2015, from http://www.unodc.org/toc/en/crimes/migrant-smuggling.html#_ednref1

²⁰³ It is assumed the remaining 2 percent arrive by air, but a source could not be found to validate that assumption.

²⁰⁴ UNODC (2010). The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment. P. 62. Retrieved March 2015, from https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf

employ smugglers to help them with the journey.²⁰⁵ Crossing the border is often done in trucks, sometimes on foot, and there have been cases in which the crossing is made by rail, or even through special tunnels.²⁰⁶ Air travel using fraudulent visas is the preferred route for those who can afford it.²⁰⁷

The sophistication of the smugglers range from that of individual and family-run operations to organized criminal groups. For the smugglers, there appears to be little risk of arrest—if they are caught, they often pretend to be migrants themselves and are repatriated rather than apprehended. In 2010, the estimated amount paid to smugglers per migrant varied from \$2,000-3,000²⁰⁸ for a Mexican-born migrant to \$10,000 for non-Mexican-born.²⁰⁹ The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimates smuggling into the U.S. is a \$6.6 billion a year business.²¹⁰ Organized crime syndicates that previously focused on narcotics and contraband flows have been attracted by the higher fees and now incorporate humans into their smuggling networks.²¹¹

The dangers of the journey to unauthorized entry are multi-faceted and somewhat depend on the route and method of crossing:

- Maritime – Travel by sea is precarious as migrant vessels are often nothing more than homemade rafts or boats. They are usually overloaded and unseaworthy, lack basic safety equipment, and are operated by inexperienced mariners. Most of the U.S. Coast Guard’s interdictions begin as search and rescue missions.²¹² Alternatively, smugglers often use fast boats to avoid interdiction; however, employing smugglers comes with its own risks (see below).
- La Bestia – As many as half a million Central American migrants annually board freight trains colloquially known as “La Bestia,” or the beast, on their journey to the United States. The cargo trains, which run along multiple lines, carry products north for export. As there are no passenger railcars, migrants must ride atop the moving trains, facing physical dangers that range from amputation to death if they fall or are pushed. Accidents caused by train derailments and falls because of changes in speed or migrants falling asleep are common.²¹³ Migrants get off the train prior to reaching the U.S. border and usually cross on foot. The Mexican Government does not have a comprehensive policy to address the La Bestia phenomena and responses of various Mexican authorities have been “disjointed, uncoordinated, and often in reaction to particular events widely covered in the news.”²¹⁴

²⁰⁵ Rosenblum and Brick (2011). P 13. Rosenblum and Brick estimate 70-90 percent of unauthorized Mexicans now rely on a smuggler to cross the border up from 50 percent in 1986, and 78 percent in 1993.

²⁰⁶ UNODC (2010). P 62.

²⁰⁷ UNODC (2010). P 57.

²⁰⁸ Rosenblum and Brick (2011). P 13.

²⁰⁹ UNODC (2010). P 67.

²¹⁰ UNODC (2010). P 67. UNODC cites the Mexican Migration Project as the source for this data.

²¹¹ Rosenblum and Brick (2011). P 14.

²¹² U.S. Coast Guard (2013, September 19), *Missions: Maritime Security* [electronic resource], at <http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/MaritimeSecurity.asp>, and USCG Office of Law Enforcement (2014, October 31), *Alien Migrant Interdiction* [electronic resource], at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp> (retrieved March 2015).

²¹³ Villegas, R. (2014, September 10). Central American Migrants and “La Bestia”: The Route, Dangers, and Government Responses. Retrieved March 29, 2015, from <http://migrationpolicy.org/article/central-american-migrants-and-la-bestia-route-dangers-and-government-responses>

²¹⁴ Villegas, R. (2014, September 10).

- Lack of Protection from Governmental Authorities – As migrants journey to their destination, they often transit through other countries, the most prominent example being Mexico. In the past, the governments of those countries turn a blind eye to the migrants transiting illegally through their territory because they know they do not intend to stay in their country. Due to increased U.S. pressure to disrupt the flow of migrants, the Mexican Government has made efforts to “implement new security and surveillance measures with U.S. assistance” along the southern border of Mexico.²¹⁵ The challenge is that by increasing enforcement, migrants that are victims of crime at the hands of cartels, gangs and organized crime are less likely to report such crime for fear of deportation. Further, “reputable non-governmental organizations including Amnesty International, Sin Fronteras, and Catholic Relief Services, have documented” cases of abuse of power by Mexican authorities.²¹⁶ The Migration Policy Institute asserts that the Mexican Government’s response demonstrates “the struggle to simultaneously develop policies that tackle border enforcement, increased security, and the protection of human rights.”²¹⁷
- Drug Cartels, Gangs and Organized Crime – On the journey from their home country to the U.S. border, migrants are often subject to extortion, kidnapping, violence, sexual assault, serious injury, or death at the hands of gangs and organized-crime groups that control the routes into the U.S.^{218,219} The National Human Rights Commission (CNDH), an autonomous institution funded by the Mexican government, reported more than 11,000 abductions of migrants between April and September 2010.²²⁰
- Smugglers – As described above, increasingly, migrants employ smugglers that promise to get them across the borders and help them navigate the dangers of the wilderness. After they receive payment, smugglers have been known to rob, rape, and even kill their “customers.” They also often hold the migrants hostage until final payment is received, usually by the migrants’ relatives in the country of origin or the U.S.²²¹
- Wilderness – Once across the border, migrants must endure long hikes in stretches of desert. In an effort to avoid apprehension by the U.S. Border Patrol, the routes used are difficult and treacherous. The heat, snakes and wild animals, and a lack of water can lead to injuries,

²¹⁵ Villegas, R. (2014, September 10).

²¹⁶ Villegas, R. (2014, September 10).

²¹⁷ Villegas, R. (2014, September 10).

²¹⁸ Papademetriou, D., & Hooper, K. (2014, December 15). Top 10 of 2014 - Issue #3: Border Controls under Challenge: A New Chapter Opens. Retrieved March 2015, from <http://migrationpolicy.org/article/top-10-2014-issue-3-border-controls-under-challenge-new-chapter-opens>

²¹⁹ Just one example: In August 2010, the bodies of 72 people attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border illegally were discovered on a remote ranch 90 miles from the U.S. border. The drug gang responsible for the kidnapping and murders, Los Zetas, captured its victims as they traveled through Tamaulipas, presumably on their way to cross the border illegally into the United States. When the 72 people refused to work for the gang, they were executed. David Luhnow, “Mexico Killings Show Migrants’ Plight,” The Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2010, at <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704913704575454033356912888.html> (May 23, 2011), and “Source: Investigator in Migrants’ Massacre Killed,” MSNBC, August 27, 2010, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38883757/ns/world_news-americas/ (May 23, 2011).

²²⁰ Villegas, R. (2014, September 10).

²²¹ UNODC (2010). P 62.

dehydration, heat stroke, and death.^{222,223} For fiscal year 2014, the U.S. Border Patrol conducted 1,457 rescues and reported 307 known deaths in the Southwest border sectors.²²⁴

U.S. Government Roles and Missions Related to Mass Migration

The U.S. Government's response to mass migration is multifaceted. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the primary responsibility to secure and manage the U.S. borders. Responsibility for the enforcement of immigration law within DHS rests with USCG, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

USCG,²²⁵ as the United States' primary maritime law enforcement agency and tasked with enforcing immigration law at sea, is the lead organization in the DHS for intercepting migrants at sea. The USCG conducts patrols and coordinates with other Federal agencies and foreign countries to interdict undocumented migrants at sea, if appropriate, denying them entry via maritime routes to the United States, its territories, and possessions.

CBP is generally responsible for immigration enforcement at and between the ports of entry, focusing on preventing drugs, weapons, terrorists and other inadmissible persons from entering the country. The CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM) also has a maritime law enforcement mission to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband toward or across U.S. borders. OAM is the world's largest aviation and maritime law enforcement organization, and is a critical component of CBP's layered enforcement strategy for border security.²²⁶

In general, OAM's law enforcement authorities extend to the U.S. customs waters and land/riverine border environments, while the USCG's law enforcement authorities extend from U.S. waterways and marinas outward into international waters. Both operate marine and air assets. Unlike OAM, the USCG can use its Title 10 authority to operate as a member of the armed services under military chain of command.

ICE is generally responsible for interior enforcement, including detention and removal operations. USCIS is generally responsible for the administration of immigration and naturalization functions.²²⁷

Outside of DHS, other Federal agencies with missions related to immigration are affected by a surge:

²²² Rosenblum and Brick (2011). P 14.

²²³ Del Bosque, M., & The Guardian U.S. Interactive Team. (2014, August 6). Beyond the border. The Guardian and The Texas Observer. Retrieved March 1, 2015, from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2014/aug/06/sp-texas-border-deadliest-state-undocumented-migrants>

²²⁴ U.S. Border Patrol Statistics for FY 2014.

<http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USBP%20Stats%20FY2014%20sector%20profile.pdf>

²²⁵ Unless otherwise noted, Maritime Portions of the Event Background section were adapted from U.S. Coast Guard (2013, September 19), *Missions: Maritime Security* [electronic resource], at <http://www.uscg.mil/top/missions/MaritimeSecurity.asp>, and USCG Office of Law Enforcement (2014, October 31), *Alien Migrant Interdiction* [electronic resource], at <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp> (retrieved March 2015).

²²⁶ U.S. Customs and Border Protection Fact Sheet: Office of Air and Marine, (2013). Accessed March 2015: http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/air_marine_6.pdf

²²⁷ Content for this paragraph adapted from the following DHS website accessed in March 2015: <http://www.dhs.gov/publication/immigration-enforcement-actions-2013>

- The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), U.S. Department of Justice adjudicates immigration cases and seeks to fairly, expeditiously, and uniformly interpret and administer the Nation's immigration laws. Under delegated authority from the Attorney General, EOIR conducts immigration court proceedings, appellate reviews, and administrative hearings.²²⁸
- The Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration's (PRM)²²⁹ mission is to provide protection, ease suffering, and resolve the plight of persecuted and uprooted people around the world on behalf of the American people by providing life-sustaining assistance, working through multilateral systems to build global partnerships, promoting best practices in humanitarian response, and ensuring that humanitarian principles are thoroughly integrated into U.S. foreign and national security policy. PRM administers the refugee admissions program; it works in partnership with USCIS to review refugee and asylum applications.
- The Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF), Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR)²³⁰ provides refugees the social services they need to become self-sufficient as quickly as possible after their arrival in the U.S. ORR provides benefits and services to assist the resettlement and local integration of specific eligible populations, including refugees; asylees; Cuban/Haitian Entrants; Certified Victims of Trafficking; Iraqi or Afghan Special Immigrants; Amerasians; Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) who have held one of those statuses in the past, and in most cases, spouses and unmarried children under 21 of those holding such statuses. The ORR Unaccompanied Alien Children Program provides temporary custody and care to unaccompanied alien children who do not have an immigration status.²³¹

U.S. Protection and Response-Related Mass Migration Costs

There is limited knowledge on the immediate response-related²³² costs of mass migration to the host country.

The USCG's National Maritime Strategic Risk Assessment (NMSRA) assessed the economic impact per illegal migrant entry via maritime routes to be \$33,000. This is an average value over multiple scenarios varying in magnitude and character, and was developed for the purpose of

²²⁸ <http://www.justice.gov/eoir/>

²²⁹ <http://www.state.gov/j/prm/about/index.htm>

²³⁰ <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr>

²³¹ On March 1, 2003, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Section 462, transferred responsibilities for the care and placement of unaccompanied children from the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Since then, ORR has cared for more than 150,000 children, incorporating child welfare values as well as the principles and provisions established by the Flores Agreement in 1997, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and its reauthorization acts, the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2005 and 2008. Unaccompanied children apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) immigration officials are transferred to the care and custody of ORR. ORR makes and implements placement decisions in the best interests of the child to ensure placement in the least restrictive setting possible while in federal custody. ORR takes into consideration the unique nature of each child's situation and incorporates child welfare principles when making placement, clinical, case management, and release decisions that are in the best interest of the child. Source: HHS, ACF, ORR website. Retrieved April 2015: <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/ucs/about>

²³² This paper is focused on the protection and response-related responsibilities of the U.S. Government in the instance of a mass migration. There is more literature, and a wide-variety of opinion, on the long-term economic effects of immigration—both legal and illegal. Some believe that the costs for absorbing migrants into the U.S. are high as they take advantage of local, state, Federal, and private non-profit resources available (health services, education, welfare, etc.). Others point out that while there may be an initial drain on taxpayer or charitable services, the immigrants contribute to the economy in varying ways as well.

calculating equivalencies across disparate consequences to inform USCG risk assessments for the purpose of long-range strategic planning and long-term capability investment decisions.²³³

In July 2014, the President requested \$3.7 billion in emergency supplemental funding to address the surge of children arriving from Central America countries.^{234,235} The request²³⁶ included funding for:

- DHS’s ICE and CBP to handle increased protective, investigatory, and enforcement costs, as well as transportation and processing costs for the children,
- DOJ’s EOIR for hiring more immigration judge teams in order to expedite case processing and legal representation for the children,
- HHS’s ACF/ORR for additional capacity to provide temporary care and custody for unaccompanied children in the least restrictive setting while awaiting their immigration court date, and
- Department of State for repatriation and reintegration of migrants to their home countries and for public diplomacy and international information programs.

DHS’s 2016 budget request included increased resources for a comprehensive “Southern Border & Approaches Campaign.” The request includes funds for:

- The costs associated with apprehension and care of up to 104,000 unaccompanied children. A portion of these funds will be used to prepare facilities for families and unaccompanied children in the event of a surge that exceeds prior year apprehension levels. The request proposes up to \$162 million in contingency obligation authority—enabling CBP and ICE to respond effectively in the event migration volume significantly surpasses prior-year levels.²³⁷

Literature was not found that consolidates and assesses spending requests and actual spending over multiple fiscal years across Federal agencies.

Literature Review Theme 1 - The Central American “Surge” of Unaccompanied Children

In the spring of 2014, the American public was shocked to learn of the flood of unaccompanied minors at the southwest border. This trend began well before that spring however. The total number of CBP apprehensions of unaccompanied and separated children from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala—collectively known as the Northern Triangle—had doubled each year from FY 2011 to FY 2014²³⁸, reaching a peak of nearly 52,000 children. (When children

²³³ This assessment was based on the 1992-1994 maritime mass migration from Haiti, and as such is likely not valid for estimating the cost of mass migration at the southwest border.

²³⁴ The White House. (2014, July 8). Fact Sheet: Emergency Supplemental Request to Address the Increase in Child and Adult Migration from Central America in the Rio Grande Valley Areas of the Southwest Border. Retrieved March 2015. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/07/08/fact-sheet-emergency-supplemental-request-address-increase-child-and-adult-migration-from-central-america-in-the-rio-grande-valley-areas-of-the-southwest-border>

²³⁵ Congress did not approve the funding request. They approved a significantly lesser amount to address the crisis. DHS reported having to reallocate resources from other parts of the Department in order to address the crisis. Information on specific dollar amounts reallocated or actual costs spent to address the surge were not found.

²³⁶ The White House. (2014, July 8). Emergency Supplemental Budget Request.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/budget_amendments/emergency-supplemental-request-to-congress-07082014.pdf

²³⁷ Written testimony of DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson for a House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security hearing on the President’s FY 2016 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security. (2015, March 26). Accessed March 2015: <http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/03/26/written-testimony-dhs-secretary-jeh-johnson-house-appropriations-subcommittee>

²³⁸ FY 2011: 3,933; FY 2012: 10,146; FY 2013: 20,805 and FY 2014: 51,705. Sourced from CBP Statistics – see next footnote.

from Mexico are included, the number reaches over 67,000.) Early indications are that the migration flows may not be as intense as last year, as of March 31, 2015, the FY 2015 statistics show a 45 percent decline when compared to the same time period in FY 2014.²³⁹ However, the rate of migration is still on pace to be at least as high as FY 2012 or 2013. A survey of literature from the past five years on the broad topic of migration to the U.S. found a significant majority of the literature focused on this topic.

In 2014, the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) released a study entitled “Children on the Run: Unaccompanied Children Leaving Central America and Mexico and the Need for International Protection.”²⁴⁰ Beginning in 2009, UNHCR, the UN agency responsible for receiving asylum requests, began receiving an increased number from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.²⁴¹ From 2008 – 2013, there was a 712 percent increase in asylum requests from these three countries.^{242,243} The study was based on in-depth, individual interviews conducted between May and August 2013, with Northern Triangle and Mexican children that began arriving after the October 2011 surge began. Nearly all of the children were interviewed while in the custody of the HHS’s ACF/ORR. The report includes compelling narratives collected from the children describing the dangers and hardships from their homeland. It is primarily focused on the causes for attempting entry into the U.S. It does not collect information on the migration journey to the U.S.

Unique to the UNHCR report is a suggestion that there may also be a crisis with Mexican-born unaccompanied minors. Though the increase from the Northern Triangle is more dramatic, the migration of unaccompanied minors from Mexico has occurred over a longer period of time and outpaced the number of children migrating from any one of the Northern Triangle countries until FY 2014. The policy for Mexican-born persons is different than that for other migrants, and they are usually returned to Mexico within a day or two of apprehension. As a result, it was difficult for researchers to determine who the children were and why they were coming to the U.S.²⁴⁴

The UNHCR report found that 58 percent of children arriving from the Northern Triangle and Mexico raise potential international protection²⁴⁵ needs.²⁴⁶ The primary cause, at 48 percent, was violence by organized armed criminal actors, including drug cartels and gangs or by state actors.²⁴⁷ The report examines the findings for each country of origin. El Salvador appears to be

²³⁹ CBP Statistics on Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children. Accessed April 2015: <http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-border-unaccompanied-children>

²⁴⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2014). Children on the Run: Unaccompanied Children Leaving Central America and Mexico and the Need for International Protection. Retrieved from [http://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/UAC_UNHCR_Children on the Run_Full Report.pdf](http://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/UAC_UNHCR_Children%20on%20the%20Run_Full%20Report.pdf)

²⁴¹ UNHCR (2014). P 15.

²⁴² UNHCR notes that the U.S. receives the majority of the asylum applications, but Mexico, Panama, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Belize also received applications.

²⁴³ These statistics come from the UNHCR’s webpage for their report, which appears to provide more recent data than included in the report. See <http://www.unhcrwashington.org/children>

²⁴⁴ UNHCR (2014). P 5.

²⁴⁵ The UNHCR report provides a lengthy explanation of International Protection in its Executive Summary (see page 8). More succinctly, the UNHCR defines International Protection as “The actions by the international community on the basis of international law, aimed at protecting the fundamental rights of a specific category of persons outside their countries of origin, who lack the national protection of their own countries.” Source – UNHCR Master Glossary of Terms Rev. 1. (2006, June). Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain/opendocpdf.pdf?docid=42ce7d44>

²⁴⁶ UNHCR (2014). P 6.

²⁴⁷ UNHCR (2014). P 6.

the most volatile; 72 percent of the migrant children cases raised potential international protection needs.^{248,249}

The study demonstrates that the push factors involved in causing the displacement are complex. Notably, most of its recommendations are focused on what the international community, as well as the receiving countries, should do to address not only the emerging displacement of children from Central America, but also the unique needs the children require in the international protection process. It is a quiet acknowledgement that the international community's ability to fix the violence push factor is limited.

The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) issued a Report based on a delegation sent to Central America in November 2013.²⁵⁰ Consistent with the UNHCR Report, they found that “violence and criminal actors have permeated all aspects of life in Central America and are the primary factors driving the migration of children from the region.” They also noted that other “push factors include the absence of economic opportunity, the lack of quality education and access to education generally, and the resulting inability for individuals to financially support themselves and their families in their home countries/local communities; and the desire to reunify with family in the United States.”^{251,252,253}

These in-depth studies indicated children were encouraged by their family members to flee to the U.S. as a way to escape the violence at home. The UNHCR study was limited to a child’s perspective on why they were told to leave home. A limit of the study was the inability to ask the child’s parents or guardians why they felt that the journey to the U.S. was a more suitable risk than the risk of staying in their home country. Certainly there is a potential that the explanation a parent gives to a child is simplified.

Other potential causes for the surge include the following:

- Attempting to take advantage of how the U.S. immigration process works, particularly for unaccompanied children from non-contiguous countries (countries other than Mexico and Canada):
 - Non-Mexican and non-Canadian children have a lengthier screening process: New provisions added to the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) in 2008, require that all unaccompanied alien children be screened as potential victims of human trafficking. While children from non-contiguous countries are transferred to HHS for trafficking screening, and placed into formal immigration court removal proceedings, Mexican and Canadian children are screened by CBP for trafficking and, if no signs are reported, returned pursuant to negotiated repatriation agreements. The TVPRA in 2008

²⁴⁸ UNHCR (2014). P 9.

²⁴⁹ A finding that a migrant has a need for international protection does not necessarily mean they will be granted refugee status. See P 8 of UNHCR report for a deeper explanation.

²⁵⁰ Mission to Central America: The Flight of Unaccompanied Children to the United States. Report of the Committee on Migration of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. (2013, November). Retrieved March 2015, from http://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/UAC_1_USCCB_Mission_to_Central_America_November_2013_English.pdf

²⁵¹ U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (2013, November).

²⁵² Gootnick, D. (2015). PP 4-7. GAO’s report also agrees with these findings.

²⁵³ See U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (2013, November). P 10; and UNHCR (2014). P 13.

also ensured that unaccompanied alien children are exempt from certain limitations on asylum (i.e. a one-year filing deadline, and the standard safe third country limitation).²⁵⁴

- The process prioritizes and facilitates reunification with the child’s parent or other family members in the U.S., even if they are in the U.S. illegally: The TVPRA directs that unaccompanied children must “be promptly placed in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child.”²⁵⁵ Further, the settlement agreement in Flores v. Reno, which is binding on the U.S. Government, establishes an order of priority for sponsors with whom children should be placed, except in limited circumstances. The first preference for placement would be with a parent of the child. If a parent is not available, the preference is for placement with the child’s legal guardian, and then to various adult family members.²⁵⁶
- A misunderstanding exists about the U.S. immigration process particularly for unaccompanied children and those seeking asylum.^{257,258} There are accounts of smugglers and organized crime perpetuating misinformation about the process.^{259,260} One rumor is the belief that U.S. Immigration laws grant permisos (free passes) to unaccompanied children. Another potential source of misinformation is the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a 2012 executive order that allowed some undocumented individuals who previously arrived to the U.S. to remain in the U.S. legally. While the order applied only to children arriving prior to 2007, one theory is that the rumors and misinformation may have encouraged the child-migrant wave.
- A stronger, more sophisticated smuggling infrastructure and network.^{261,262}

There is no shortage of studies and perspectives on the surge of Central American unaccompanied minors. Multiple Washington, DC based think tanks have issued reports^{263,264,265} and there have been numerous Congressional hearings^{266,267,268,269} and GAO and CRS Reports^{270, 271} to examine both the causes of as well as the actions taken to address the surge.

²⁵⁴ American Immigration Council. (2014, July). Children in Danger: A Guide to the Humanitarian Challenge at the Border. Retrieved April 2015: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/special-reports/children-danger-guide-humanitarian-challenge-border>

²⁵⁵ See 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A).

²⁵⁶ HHS, ACF, ORR’s website on Unaccompanied Children’s Services. Accessed April 2015: <http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/ucs/about>

²⁵⁷ Chishti, M., & Hipsman, F. (2014, June 13). Dramatic Surge in the Arrival of Unaccompanied Children Has Deep Roots and No Simple Solutions. Retrieved March 2015, from <http://migrationpolicy.org/article/dramatic-surge-arrival-unaccompanied-children-has-deep-roots-and-no-simple-solutions>

²⁵⁸ Gootnick, D. (2015). P 6.

²⁵⁹ A leaked unclassified/law enforcement sensitive intelligence bulletin from the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)’s Criminal Threats Unit, which is jointly run by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and CBP, made national news in July 2014 for attributing misconceptions of U.S. immigration policy as a key driver to the Central American surge. See: <http://www.newsweek.com/leaked-intel-report-immigration-crisis-contains-both-iffy-informative-259598>

²⁶⁰ Renwick, D. (2014, September). The U.S. Child Migrant Influx. Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC. Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.cfr.org/immigration/us-child-migrant-influx/p33380>

²⁶¹ Chishti, M., & Hipsman, F. (2014, June 13).

²⁶² Gootnick, D. (2015). P 5.

²⁶³ Migration Policy Institute – Chishti, M., & Hipsman, F. (2014, June 13).

²⁶⁴ Renwick, D. (2014, September).

²⁶⁵ Negroponte, D. (2014, July). The Surge in Unaccompanied Children from Central America: A Humanitarian Crisis at Our Border. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/07/02-unaccompanied-children-central-america-negroponte>

²⁶⁶ For example, Dangerous Passage: The Growing Problem of Unaccompanied Children Crossing the Border: Hearings before the Committee on Homeland Security, House, 113th Cong. (June 24, 2014). Retrieved March 2015: <http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/dangerous-passage-growing-problem-unaccompanied-children-crossing-border>

The President declared it a humanitarian crisis and some called it a threat to national security because of the drain on CBP resources (focusing on the unaccompanied children and family units left little room for addressing other potential threats).²⁷² The response by the U.S. Government to the 2014 surge was unprecedented and leveraged capabilities usually reserved for disaster declarations. The President directed the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) to lead a Government-wide response to the situation, which included the following activities:²⁷³

- Diplomatic engagement with Central America and Mexico and providing new financial support to address the root push factors;
- Increased enforcement mechanisms to more quickly conduct removal proceedings for those not eligible for asylum—in the hopes that expedited returns will decrease some of the pull factors;
- Communication campaigns to combat rumors that may have been contributing to the pull factors (e.g., DACA eligibility and permisos); and
- Expanding capacity in the HHS/ACF/ORR nationwide shelter network and standing up temporary shelters on Department of Defense sites staffed by trained ORR grantee staff.

There are early hopes that these efforts appear to have worked. By March 2015, CBP reported a 45 percent decline in the number of unaccompanied minors from the Northern Triangle and Mexico. However most experts have indicated that the complicated confluence of pull and push factors will not be fully resolved in the short term.^{274,275,276}

A Brookings Institution assessment suggests that the surge from Central America may be a reaction by criminal organizations to the Mexican Government’s crackdown on them (i.e., they are seeking “alternative profitable ventures”).²⁷⁷ Similar to successful legal businesses, criminal organizations adapt to their environment. Thus, to the extent the drivers of the surge are the smugglers and other organized criminals, we should expect that as U.S. policy changes, so too will the behavior of these organizations.

²⁶⁷ An Administration Made Disaster: The South Texas Border Surge of Unaccompanied Alien Minors: Hearings before the Judiciary Committee, House, 113th Cong. (June 25, 2014). Retrieved March 2015: <http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2014/6/hearing-an-administration-made-disaster>

²⁶⁸ Field Hearing: Crisis on the Texas Border: Surge of Unaccompanied Minors, House, 113th Cong. (July 3, 2014). Retrieved March 2015: <http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/field-hearing-crisis-texas-border-surge-unaccompanied-minors>

²⁶⁹ Securing the Border: Understanding and Addressing the Root Causes of Central American Migration to the United States: Hearings before the Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Senate, 114th Cong. (March 25, 2015). Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/securing-the-border-understanding-and-addressing-the-root-causes-of-central-american-migration-to-the-united-states>

²⁷⁰ Gootnick, D. (2015).

²⁷¹ Kandel, W., Bruno, A., Meyer, P., Seelke, C., Taft-Morales, M., Wasem, R. (2014, July). *Unaccompanied Alien Children: Potential Factors Contributing to Recent Immigration*. Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC. Retrieved March 2015: <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43628.pdf>

²⁷² Renwick, D. (2014, September 1).

²⁷³ Fact Sheet: Unaccompanied Children from Central America. (2014, June 20). The White House. Retrieved March 2015: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/20/fact-sheet-unaccompanied-children-central-america>

²⁷⁴ Chishti, M., & Hipsman, F. (2014, June 13).

²⁷⁵ Testimony of Eric L. Olson, Associate Director, Latin America Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Senate, 113th Cong. Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Eric%20L%20Olson%20testimony%20Senate%20Homeland%20Security%20committee.pdf>

²⁷⁶ Negroponte, D. (2014, July).

²⁷⁷ Negroponte, D. (2014, July).

Some suggest that we are already seeing examples of such adaptability. Papademetriou and Hooper of the Migration Policy Institute assert that though the U.S. and other European countries have strengthened and take seriously their border security, the system is continually tested by “increasingly creative entry strategies.”²⁷⁸ A relatively new trend is for migrants to make no effort to avoid border patrol; instead they would actually present themselves for apprehension and processing. While some migrants do this because they believe they have a legitimate request for asylum, other migrants without such claims believe that the system will take so long to process them that they will be allowed to stay for at least several years. Because the migration flow is “mixed”—inclusive of asylum seekers as well as economic and family-stream migrants—it is harder for authorities to process and discern which migrants have legitimate claims for asylum. For such a trend to occur, the smugglers must be advising their ‘clients’ that this is the best approach given the current strength of border security.

Literature Review Theme 2 – Push Factors are Intensifying and are Likely to Increase the Frequency of Surges

Conflict-Related Push Factors

The number of refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced people (collectively, forced displacement) worldwide exceeded 50 million people in 2014 – the highest level since the post-World War II era – according to the UNHCR’s Global Trends Report for 2013.²⁷⁹ Half of forcibly displaced people are children, the highest figure in a decade.²⁸⁰ The war in Syria is the main cause of the massive increase: at the end of 2013, the conflict had led to 2.5 million refugees and rendered 6.5 million internally displaced.²⁸¹ In November 2014, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees called it a “mega-crisis”.²⁸² The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) extrapolates that the numbers for 2014 will show an even greater increase due to the rise of the jihadist group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the ensuing sectarian violence that forced many Iraqis to flee.²⁸³

Papademetriou and Hooper reviewed the current state of border security and the challenges posed by migration in a December 2014 assessment that summarized the global trends from the past year. They view the “demand for humanitarian protection” as a significant and growing push factor.²⁸⁴ The wars and conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and more recently Yemen, and “a constellation of unstable states in sub-Saharan Africa, and in Central America, have outpaced the ability and political willingness of neighbors in the region and the broader international community to offer meaningful protection to all, let alone resettlement opportunities, pushing many to embark on precarious voyages.” Papademetriou and Hooper

²⁷⁸ Papademetriou, D. and Hooper, K. (2014, December).

²⁷⁹ World Refugee Day: Global forced displacement tops 50 million for first time in post-World War II era. (2014, June 20). Retrieved March 30, 2015, from <http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html>

²⁸⁰ UNHCR Global Trends 2013: War's Human Cost. (2014, June 1). P 3. Retrieved March 2015, from <http://www.unhcr.org/5399a14f9.html>

²⁸¹ World Refugee Day: Global forced displacement tops 50 million for first time in post-World War II era. (2014, June 20). Retrieved March 30, 2015, from <http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html>

²⁸² http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/refugee-wave-from-syria-and-iraq-now-a-mega-crisis-un-official-says/2014/11/17/ebc5ee50-6eab-11e4-893f-86bd390a3340_story.html

²⁸³ Estimer, Marissa. (2014, December). Top 10 of 2014 – Issue #1: World Confronts Largest Humanitarian Crisis since WWII. Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC. March 2015, from <http://migrationpolicy.org/article/top-10-2014-issue-1-world-confronts-largest-humanitarian-crisis-wwii>

²⁸⁴ Papademetriou, D. and Hooper, K. (2014, December).

conclude that the push and pull factors causing mixed migration flows to the United States will not abate.

Globalization, Technology, and Climate Change

Beyond the war and conflict-related push factors, scholars have identified other global trends that are impacting and may increase migration flows. Rey Koslowski's essay, "Economic Globalization, Human Smuggling, and Global Governance" explains that the drivers of globalization—rapidly advancing information, communication and transportation technologies—are "propelling international migration and fostering transnational crime."²⁸⁵ As noted above, smugglers now facilitate upwards of 90 percent of U.S. border crossings. Local or national crime groups have expanded to become global criminal syndicates.²⁸⁶ The expansion (much like that of global business except that legal businesses deals in legal commodities) is in response to expanding markets for illegal commodities.²⁸⁷ For example, the cost of human smuggling across the U.S. border has increased dramatically since border security was strengthened post-9/11, and organized crime and smugglers have tapped into that 'market' to provide a 'service.'

Technology assists another structural factor—social networks. Historically, social networks are those that "connect migrants to host-state jobs and communities of co-nationals typically from the same village and area."²⁸⁸ Rosenblum and Brick point out that social networks are a particularly important factor for migrants from Mexico and Central America. Other than small references, primarily from interviews of migrants by journalists, it does not appear that the current literature has evaluated the role of technology in facilitating the social network factor. Several news reports covering the Central American surge in 2014, cited instances of migrants leveraging social networking—in the technological variety (e.g., Facebook)—to prepare for the journey. U.S.-based families or the migrant in his country of origin are able to more easily connect with potential smugglers, coordinate the best migration route, and facilitate payment. Additionally, rapid communication capabilities may lead to "sudden" surges. What previously may have taken a few months or years to build as a trend can occur much more quickly.

Finally, there is a growing set of research that asserts that climate change is likely to increase international migrations. In July 2014, Madeline Messick and Claire Bergeron surveyed recent events and unclassified National Intelligence Estimates and determined the demand for Temporary Protected Status (TPS)²⁸⁹ is likely to grow for reasons beyond war and conflict:

As the world adjusts to climate change, scientists predict that the number of severe weather events—such as floods, droughts, hurricanes, tornadoes, and wildfires—will increase, forcing more people to migrate. In 2012 alone, an estimated 29 million people

²⁸⁵ Koslowski, R. (2011). Economic Globalization, Human Smuggling, and Global Governance. P. 60. An essay published as Chapter 2 of "Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspective" edited by Kyle, D. and Koslowski, R. JHU Press (2011).

²⁸⁶ Koslowski, R. (2011). P 63.

²⁸⁷ Koslowski, R. (2011). P 63.

²⁸⁸ Rosenblum and Brick. (2011). P 2.

²⁸⁹ Since 1990, U.S. humanitarian relief has been granted to persons from certain countries suffering from wars, violence or natural disaster in the form of Temporary Protected Status (TPS). It is estimated 340,000 people currently hold TPS status. TPS is not a grant of permanent legal status in the United States. Recipients do not receive lawful permanent residence (a "green card"), nor are they eligible, based on their TPS status, to apply for permanent residence or for U.S. citizenship. Rather, TPS beneficiaries receive provisional protection against deportation and permission to work in the United States for a limited period of time. The United States can end a country's TPS designation once it has recovered from the triggering event. See USCIS' page on TPS at <<http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status-deferred-enforced-departure/temporary-protected-status>>. Also, see 8 U.S.C. §1254a. Temporary Protected Status at: <<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title8/pdf/USCODE-2011-title8-chap12-subchapII-partV-sec1254a.pdf>>

were displaced by extreme weather events. National intelligence estimates prepared by the U.S. intelligence community have predicted that changing weather patterns could contribute to political instability, disputes over resources, and mass migration.²⁹⁰

In a study that explores the methodologies for assessing environment-migration relationships, Fussell, Hunter, and Gray show that scholars and the policy community believe climate change will impact future migration.²⁹¹ They assert “most scholars in the field reject the deterministic view that directly links climate change to mass migration,” instead recognizing the linkages are complex. The study does not provide any predictions on how climate change may affect migration, but lays out suggested steps that can be taken to further advance the “scientific knowledge of environment-migration relationships and their implications for their future.”

Conclusion

The perspectives from which to evaluate the risk of mass migration to the U.S. are numerous and diverse. The volume of potential literature inhibits the ability to gain a completely thorough understanding of the current research from all possible angles and disciplines. In selecting the literature for this review, we attempted to identify common themes and areas most relevant to risk assessment purposes.

This survey of recent surge events and the literature review indicate there is a strong likelihood of future surges to the U.S. Such surges are caused by complex structural factors that render ‘quick solutions’ unlikely.

Globalization, complete with cheaper access to technology, communication, and travel, will continue to lower the barriers to migration, and enable growth of the human smuggling “business.”

Further, the literature reviewed indicated that push factors are increasing, and that “tipping point” incidents—incidents that push the individual to migrate—are likely to increase and be more difficult to contain. Such tipping point incidents may include those caused by climate change, which creates more frequent and severe natural disasters, or by armed conflicts such as the recent coups, civil wars, and terrorist group territorial takeovers.

There were notable limitations in the literature as well. Other than the USCG’s National Maritime Strategic Risk Assessment, which was focused solely on maritime mass migrations, publicly available literature did not provide statistics or estimates on the total protection and response-related costs per migrant, or in the case of the Central American surge, per child. More evaluation is needed to understand the economic impact of protection and response actions in a mass migration. Reviewing the most recent Central American surge could provide useful insight into costs. However, it would be applicable only to child migrants, as the processes used for unaccompanied children are different than that of apprehended adults and family units.

²⁹⁰ Messick, M. and Bergeron, C. (2014, July). *Temporary Protected Status in the United States: A Grant of Humanitarian Relief that is Less than Permanent*. Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC. Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/temporary-protected-status-united-states-grant-humanitarian-relief-less-permanent>

²⁹¹ Fussell, E., Hunter, L., and Gray, H. (2014). *Measuring the Environmental Dimensions of Human Migration: The Demographer’s Toolkit*. Global Environmental Change (Impact Factor: 6). 28:182–191.

The literature reviewed did not provide an assessment of the U.S. Government's capabilities and responses to the 2014 surge, perhaps because the events are so recent as to render a complete assessment premature. To the extent the literature assessed the U.S. Government's actions, it tended to focus on policies and steady-state operations, not on the surge response.

One final limitation is that the literature reviewed mentioned, but did not evaluate in-depth, the possibility that the U.S. Government's response to migrants contributes to the mass migration problem. While there are a number of political commentators in recent years that have argued this case, due to bias, they were not considered as part of the literature review. Academic research is needed to evaluate whether the U.S. Government's programmatic service delivery is a potential Pull Factor and if so, how significant of a role does it play in mass migration scenarios.

Until recently, the U.S. Government's experience with migrant surges was primarily related to Haitian and Cuban migrants attempting maritime entries over the past three decades. Lessons learned from the recent Central American surge (2011-2015) should be reviewed. Further research and consideration should be given to how the U.S. Government's capabilities can be made more flexible, resilient, and comprehensive to address what many scholars believe will be a likely increase in U.S. mass migration surges.

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Negroponte, D. (2014, July). The Surge in Unaccompanied Children from Central America: A Humanitarian Crisis at Our Border. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/07/02-unaccompanied-children-central-america-negroponte>

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Literature Review: Industrial Accident (Explosion/Fire)

Synopsis

This qualitative risk assessment of the Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire hazard suggests that the risk of such incidents occurring is likely holding steady. It primarily assesses the risk of an Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire, of any size, occurring. Accidents that are so catastrophic as to require Federal support in its response are a small percentage of the overall occurrence of an Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire event. However, new technologies and emerging risks may create more complex disasters that require more complex preventive measures and responses; and we may see an increase in frequency of requests for Federal assistance in response to Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire incidents.

Within the scientific literature reviewed, new methodologies are being developed to better understand the domino effects of industrial explosions as well as the emerging risk of incidents triggered by natural hazards, which are called by the European Commission NaTech²⁹² disasters. Such methodologies should allow Federal, state, and local planners to better evaluate risks and enact prevention and protection mechanisms to reduce the risk, or at least the impact, of explosions in the future.

During the review of a draft of this paper, the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration identified additional sources of literature²⁹³ which address the multi-causal nature of major industrial accidents, and provide quantitative and semi-quantitative risk assessment tools. A limitation of this literature review was the inability to access and review these sources within the time constraints of the project. Future iterations of the SNRA should review these sources.

Several recent incident reports were reviewed, and the literature suggests that more needs to be done to reduce the risks of Industrial Accidents-Explosions/Fires. Current efforts in the Executive and Legislative branches may result in significant changes in the regulation landscape for the first time in decades. If proponents are correct, implementation will reduce risks of industrial accidents. It is too early to tell whether such changes will be enacted or what their ultimate effect on risk reduction will be.

Literature Review – Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire

Introduction

Event Description

Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire²⁹⁴ is a technological accident of an industrial nature, involving an industrial site or production facility (e.g., factories), that results in an explosion and/or fire.^{295,296,297,298}

²⁹² Natural Hazard Triggering Technological Disasters (NaTech)

²⁹³ The Occupational Safety and Health Administration recommended reviewing publications by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), which can be found at <http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-291237.html>

²⁹⁴ This paper was originally developed with a scope of Industrial Accident-Explosion. Based on feedback provided during review of the drafts of this working paper, Fire was added to the scope because there have been many incidents where the investigations could not determine whether

Event Background

Explosions²⁹⁹

The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) asserts that historically the term explosion has been difficult to define precisely.³⁰⁰ Depending on the focus of the standard, NFPA uses different definitions for an explosion. The broader definition is the sudden conversion of potential energy (chemical or mechanical) into kinetic energy with the production and release of gases under pressure, or the release of gas under pressure. These high-pressure gases then do mechanical work such as moving, changing, or shattering nearby materials.^{301,302}

Within that broad definition, there are two major types of explosions: mechanical and chemical.³⁰³ Sub-types of these explosions are differentiated by the source or mechanism by which the blast overpressure is produced.³⁰⁴

- Mechanical Explosion: The rupture of a closed container, cylinder, tank, boiler, or similar storage vessel resulting in the release of pressurized gas or vapor. The pressure within the confining container, structure, or vessel is not due to a chemical reaction or change in chemical composition of the substances in the container.³⁰⁵
 - The most common sub-type of mechanical explosion is known as a BLEVE—boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion. These are explosions involving vessels that contain liquids under pressure at temperatures above their atmospheric boiling points. The liquid need not be flammable. A BLEVE can occur in vessels as small as disposable lighters or aerosol cans and as large as tank cars or industrial storage tanks. While the initiating event can be caused by vessel failure, the explosion and overpressure associated with a BLEVE is due to expansion of pressurized gas or vapor in the ullage (vapor space) combined with the rapidly boiling liquid liberating vapor.³⁰⁶

the incident was a flash fire or explosion. Future SNRA iterations on this topic should study the fire aspects of this risk, as most of the literature reviewed for this paper was primarily focused on explosions.

²⁹⁵ For purposes of coordinating with the Strategic National Risk Assessment’s (SNRA) Quantitative Analysis, the categorization of this topic is based on the EM-DAT’s categorization and sub-typing. Since a Qualitative Assessment does not require comparison of numbers across the spectrum of potential disasters, the threshold used by the EM-DAT (e.g., 10 or more reported fatalities) is not included in this scope to allow for a more nuanced understanding of the risk posed to the U.S. by Industrial Accidents-Explosion and Fire.

²⁹⁶ EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database – www.emdat.be, Université Catholique de Louvain, Brussels (Belgium) [official citation]. EM-DAT is maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the School of Public Health of the Université Catholique de Louvain located in Brussels, Belgium (<http://www.emdat.be/frequently-asked-questions>), and is supported by the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) of USAID (http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/).

²⁹⁷ The EM-DAT’s other types of industrial accidents are chemical spill, collapse, fire, gas leak, poisoning, radiation, and other.

²⁹⁸ Explosions caused by terrorism attacks, armed assault, nuclear weapons, pipeline failures, and combustible/flammable rail cargo incidents are addressed by separate SNRA topical assessments and are outside the scope of this assessment.

²⁹⁹ This section is based on the definitions for the various explosions discussed in NFPA Standard 921, 2014, *Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations*. National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. See Chapter 23 “Explosions”. Accessed March 2015: <http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/document-information-pages?mode=code&code=921>

³⁰⁰ NFPA Standard 921, 2014, *Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations*. National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA. P. 921-215. Accessed March 2015: <http://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/document-information-pages?mode=code&code=921>

³⁰¹ A definition for “explosion” was not found in the EM-DAT’s glossary.

³⁰² NFPA. “NFPA Glossary of Terms: 2014 Edition”. (2014, September). See “Explosion” Definition for Document 921 (2014). Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.nfpa.org/got>

³⁰³ NFPA Standard 921 (2014). P. 921-215.

³⁰⁴ NFPA Standard 921 (2014). P. 921-215.

³⁰⁵ NFPA Standard 921 (2014). P. 921-215. See section 23.2.1 Mechanical Explosions.

³⁰⁶ This paragraph is a summary of NFPA Standard 921 (2014). P. 921-215-216. See section 23.2.2 BLEVEs and all sub-sections.

- Chemical Explosion: The generation of overpressure is a result of exothermic reactions wherein the fundamental chemical nature of the fuel is changed. Chemical reactions of the type involved in an explosion usually propagate in a reaction front away from the point of initiation.³⁰⁷
 - The most common sub-type of chemical explosion is the combustion explosion, caused by the burning of combustible hydrocarbon fuels, and frequently characterized by the presence of a fuel with air as an oxidizer. A combustion explosion may also involve dusts. In combustion explosions, overpressures are caused by the rapid volume production of heated combustion products as the fuel burns.³⁰⁸

Combustion explosions are classified as either deflagrations (sub-sonic blast pressure wave) or detonations (blast pressure wave propagates at a velocity faster than the speed of sound). Several sub-types of combustion explosions can be classified according to the types of fuels involved. The most common are flammable gases, vapors of ignitable liquids, combustible dusts, smoke and flammable products of incomplete combustion (backdraft explosions), and aerosols.³⁰⁹

Industries Commonly Affected by Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire

Industries affected by Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire are wide and varied, including the following examples:³¹⁰

- Chemical manufacturing
- Oil and gas industry—drilling and refineries
- Grain-handling
- Coal mines
- Lumber and wood products
- Food product
- Metal
- Plastic

Table 14: Table of Large Scale Industrial-Accident Explosions from 1989-2013³¹¹

Start	Location	Plant Name	Killed	Injured	Cause
10/23/1989 ^{312,} ^{313,314}	Pasadena, Texas	Phillips 66 Company polyethylene plant	23	314	Instantaneous release of >85,000 lbm of flammable material to the atmosphere that ignited during routine maintenance.

³⁰⁷ NFPA Standard 921 (2014). P. 921-216. See section 23.2.3 Chemical Explosions.

³⁰⁸ NFPA Standard 921 (2014). P. 921-216. See section 23.2.3 Chemical Explosions.

³⁰⁹ This paragraph is a summary of NFPA Standard 921 (2014). P. 921-216. See 23.2.3.1 Combustion Explosions and all sub-sections.

³¹⁰ List of industries pulled from The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. Combustible Dust Hazard Study. Report No. 2006-H-1 (2006, November). Retrieved March 2015, from http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Dust_Final_Report_Website_11-17-06.pdf.

³¹¹ Incidents were identified from EM-DAT, CSB Reports, and Subject-Matter Experts who reviewed drafts of this paper. This table is not exhaustive. It is intended to provide the reader a broad overview of major events involving explosions at industrial sites over the past 25 years. See footnotes for each event for the specific citations for the details listed for each incident.

³¹² U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA, September 24, 1991, Federal Register #56:48133.

Start	Location	Plant Name	Killed	Injured	Cause
07/05/1990 ³¹⁵	Channelview, Texas	Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO) petrochemical plant	17		Failed oxygen analyzer allowing excessive oxygen in a vapor space of a wastewater storage tank causing an explosion.
09/03/1991 ³¹⁶	Hamlet, North Carolina	Imperial Foods processing plant	25	54	Failure in a hydraulic line that powered a conveyor belt supplying the deep fat fryer vat spewing hydraulic fluid onto the vat gas-fired burners. Contributing to the deaths was the locked shut fire doors that prevented workers from escaping the fire.
09/10/1997 ³¹⁷	Columbus, Ohio	Georgia-Pacific Resin plant	1	4	Explosion may have been triggered by adding all the ingredients to the resin kettle (reactor) at one time instead of sequentially.
09/23/2001 ³¹⁸	Brookwood, Alabama	Jim Walter Resources #5 Coal Mine, Blue Creek coal seam	13	3	The first explosion most likely caused by a scoop battery that was damaged by a roof fall that short circuited and ignited methane gas. This was followed by a more powerful second explosion 55 min. later.
02/28/2004 ^{319,} ³²⁰	50 miles off Virginia coast	MT Bow Mariner, Owner: Odfjell ASA of Bergen, Norway; Operator: Ceres Hellenic Shipping Enterprises Ltd. Of Piraeus, Greece	21	6	Ignition of a fuel/air mixture either on deck or in the cargo tanks, that was within its flammable limits. Ignition source could not be precisely determined.
03/23/2005 ³²¹	Texas City, Texas	British Petroleum Texas City Refinery	15	180	Raffinate splitter tower was overfilled; pressure relief devices opened, resulting in a flammable liquid geyser from a blowdown stack that was not equipped with a flare. This release led to an explosion and fire.
01/02/2006 ³²²	Tallmansville, West Virginia	Wolf Run Mining Company, Sago Mine	12	1	Lightning strikes observed in the area at the time of the explosion. Lightning most likely ignition source that caused the accumulated methane behind a sealed section of the mine to ignite and explode. All other possible ignition sources discounted.

³¹³ Explosion and Fire at the Phillips Company Houston Chemical Complex, Pasadena, Texas, Chemical Engineering Department, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas 79409.

³¹⁴ U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series, Phillips Petroleum Chemical Plant Explosion and Fire, Pasadena, Texas; USFA-TR-035/October 1989.

³¹⁵ ARCO Spells Out Cause of Channelview Blast, Oil& Gas Journal, Vol. 89, Issue 2; January 14, 1991.

³¹⁶ U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series, Chicken Processing Plant Fires, Hamlet, North Carolina and North Little Rock, Arkansas; USFA-TR-057/June/September 1991.

³¹⁷ The Liaisons, Booth et al. v. Georgia Pacific Resins, Inc.; Final Report of Liaison's Investigation Georgia-Pacific Resins, Inc., Columbus, Ohio; October 2005.

³¹⁸ United Mine Workers of America Report: Jim Walter Resources #5 Coal Mine Disaster.

³¹⁹ United States Coast Guard Investigation Into The Explosion And Sinking Of The Chemical Tanker Bow Mariner In The Atlantic Ocean On February 28, 2004 With Loss Of Life And Pollution; December 14, 2005.

³²⁰ Tanker carrying ethanol explodes, then sinks off Virginia, claiming 21 lives, six rescued. Professional Mariner, February 2007.

³²¹ Investigation Report Refinery Explosion and Fire BP Texas City March 23, 2005; U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board; Report No. 2005-04-I-TX, March 2007.

³²² Report of Investigation Fatal Underground Coal Mine Explosion January 2, 2006, Sago Mine, Wolf Run Mining Company, Tallmansville, Upshur County, West Virginia; U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration, Coal Mine Safety and Health; ID No. 46-08791, May 9, 2007.

Start	Location	Plant Name	Killed	Injured	Cause
02/07/2008 ³²³	Port Wentworth, GA	Imperial Sugar Company, Manufacturing Facility and Sugar Refinery	14	38	The recently installed steel cover panels on the belt conveyor allowed explosive concentrations of sugar dust to accumulate inside the enclosure. An unknown source ignited the sugar dust, causing a violent explosion. The explosion lofted sugar dust that had accumulated on the floors and elevated horizontal surfaces, propagating more dust explosions and fires throughout the buildings and fires. The pressure waves from the explosions heaved thick concrete floors and collapsed brick walls, blocking stairwell and other exit routes.
04/20/2010 ³²⁴	Mississippi Canyon Block #252, Gulf of Mexico	British Petroleum, Macondo Well, Deepwater Horizon Rig	11	17	Well blowout during the mothballing of the well resulting in hydrocarbon fluid under pressure rising to the drilling platform contacting with an ignition source resulting in an explosion and fire.
04/05/2010 ³²⁵	Montcoal, West Virginia	Performance Coal Company/Massey Energy, Upper Big Branch Mine-South	29	2	Accumulated methane ignited by longwall shearer causing a massive coal dust explosion.
1/31/2011 ³²⁶	Gallatin, TN	Hoeganaes Corp – produces atomized steel and iron powders	5	3	Two Iron Dust (Combustible Dust) Flash Fires and One Hydrogen Explosion which also resulted in iron dust flash fires.
3/21/2011 ³²⁷	Louisville, KY	Carbide Industries – produces calcium carbide	2	2	Electric Arc Furnace Explosion
10/09/2012 ³²⁸	East Rutherford, NJ	US Ink	0	7	Combustible Dust Flash Fires and Explosion
04/17/2013 ^{329,} ³³⁰	West, TX	West Fertilizer Storage and Distribution Facility ³³¹	15	~200	Fire in wooden warehouse where approximately 20-30 tons of Ammonium Nitrate were stored. CSB and ATF investigations are still pending, but it is believed that the explosion yield was less than 30 tons. ³³² 200 homes damaged or destroyed, nursing home, 2 schools, and an apartment complex were demolished. Estimates that damages are \$230 million.

³²³ U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. “Investigation Report: Sugar Dust Explosion and Fire, Imperial Sugar Company” Report No. 2008-05-I-GA. September 2009. Retrieved May 2015: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Tanks_Safety_Study_FINAL.pdf. http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Imperial_Sugar_Report_Final_updated.pdf

³²⁴ Investigation Report Volume 1 Explosion and Fire at the Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Rig, Mississippi Canyon Block #252, Gulf of Mexico, April 20, 2010; U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board; Report No. 2010-10-I-OS, June 6, 2014.

³²⁵ Report of Investigation Fatal Underground Mine Explosion, April 5, 2010, Upper Big Branch Mine-South, Performance Coal Company, Montcoal, Raleigh County, West Virginia; U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration, Coal Mine Safety and Health; ID. No. 46-08436.

³²⁶ U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. “Case Study: Hoeganaes Corporation: Gallatin, TN Metal Dust Flash Fires and Hydrogen Explosion”. Report No. 2011-4-I-TN. December 2011. Accessed April 2015: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSB_Case_Study_Hoeganaes_Feb3_300-1.pdf

³²⁷ http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Final_Report_small.pdf.

³²⁸ U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. “Board Voting Copy of Case Study: Ink Dust Explosion and Flash Fires in East Rutherford, New Jersey” Report No. 2013-01-I-NJ. January 2015. Accessed April 2015: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/US_Ink_Case_Stud...Draft_Board_Vote_Final_Rev1.pdf

³²⁹ Accessed April 2015: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/West_Preliminary_Findings.pdf.

³³⁰ Texas State Fire Marshal’s Office. “Firefighter Fatality Investigation: Abbott Volunteer Fire Department, Bruceville-Eddy Volunteer Fire Department . . .”. Investigation FFF FY 13-06. May 2014. Accessed May 2015: <http://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/fire/documents/fmlodwest.pdf>

³³¹ <http://www.nfpa.org/newsandpublications/nfpa-journal/2014/march-april-2014/features/nfpa-400>.

³³² OSHA subject-matter experts.

Start	Location	Plant Name	Killed	Injured	Cause
6/13/2013	Geismar, LA	Williams Olefins Petrochemical Plant Explosion and Fire	2	114 ³³³	Still under CSB investigation: Equipment Failure. "Catastrophic failure involving a heat exchanger and associated piping which broke loose from a distillation tower." ³³⁴

Federal Government Roles

The **U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB)**³³⁵ is an independent Federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. Headquartered in Washington, DC, the agency's board members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The CSB conducts root cause investigations of chemical accidents at fixed industrial facilities. Root causes are usually deficiencies in safety management systems, but can be any factor that would have prevented the accident if that factor had not occurred. Other accident causes often involve equipment failures, human error, unforeseen chemical reactions, or other hazards. The agency does not issue fines or citations, but does make recommendations to plants, regulatory agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state and local governments, industry organizations, and labor groups. Congress designed the CSB to be non-regulatory and independent of other agencies so its investigations might, where appropriate, review the effectiveness of regulations and regulatory enforcement.

The **Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)**, Department of Labor, has the authority to set and enforce safety and health standards, which includes the ability to inspect worksites and levy fines.³³⁶ The Process Safety Management (PSM) standard is the OSHA standard that addresses the management of hazards associated with processes using highly hazardous chemicals. The requirements are addressed in specific standards for general and construction industries.^{337,338} OSHA is currently in the process of revising the PSM standard in response to the findings from the CSB and the President's 2013 Executive Order on Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security (E.O. 13650), which directed OSHA and other Federal agencies to modernize policies and regulations.

The **Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)** mission is to protect human health and the environment, and they do so by developing and enforcing environmental regulations.³³⁹ Pertaining to this topic, the EPA administers the Risk Management Plan (RMP)³⁴⁰ rule, which requires facilities that use extremely hazardous substances to develop an RMP. EPA is currently reviewing the chemical hazards covered by the Risk Management Program and determining if it

³³³ This number includes those hospitalized due to the subsequent Chemical Spill. See http://www.nola.com/environment/index.ssf/2013/06/geismar_explosion_and_fire_rele.html.

³³⁴ <http://www.csb.gov/testimony-of-rafael-moure-eraso-phd-chairperson-us-chemical-safety-board-before-the-us-senate-committee-on-environment-and-public-works-june-27-2013/>

³³⁵ Adapted from the CSB website. Accessed March 2015: <http://www.csb.gov/about-the-csb/>.

³³⁶ Adapted from OSHA Website: <https://www.osha.gov/about.html>.

³³⁷ 29 CFR 1910.119 for General Industry, and 29 CFR 1926.64 for Construction.

³³⁸ See www.osha.gov/SLTC/processsafetymanagement.

³³⁹ <http://www2.epa.gov/aboutepa/our-mission-and-what-we-do>.

³⁴⁰ Established by Section 112(r) of the 1990 Clean Air Act.

should be expanded to address additional regulated substances and types of hazards (E.O. 13650).³⁴¹

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Protection and Programs Directorate, Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), coordinates national programs and policies on critical infrastructure security and resilience. The office conducts and facilitates vulnerability and consequence assessments to help critical infrastructure owners and operators and state, local, tribal, and territorial partners understand and address risks to critical infrastructure.³⁴² **DHS IP's Infrastructure Security Compliance Division** is responsible for implementing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS),³⁴³ the Nation's program to regulate security at high-risk chemical facilities and prevent the use of certain chemicals in a terrorist act on the homeland through the systematic regulation, inspection, and enforcement of chemical infrastructure security requirements. Under CFATS, facilities that have been determined by DHS to be high-risk are required to develop and implement Site Security Plans (SSPs) or Alternative Security Programs (ASPs) that meet applicable risk-based performance standards (RBPS).³⁴⁴

Theme 1: Scientific and Academic Literature on Risk Methodologies for Industrial Accidents

There are a number of scientific and technological papers devoted to the study of explosions. The vast majority are extremely technical—delving into the physics of explosions and mechanisms that can help prevent, detect, or suppress an explosion—and are targeted at the scientific community, the owners and operators of industrial facilities, or the fire fighters that may have to respond to an explosion (or a fire that might lead to an explosion). Standards and regulations, as discussed below, continue to evolve and be strengthened, which leads to additional literature on the effectiveness of those standards.

A Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response article, “The Assessment of Risk Caused by Fire and Explosion in Chemical Process Industry: A Domino Effect-Based Study” by Farid Kadri, E. Chatelet, and Patrick Lallement, develops a quantitative risk assessment of domino effects³⁴⁵ caused by heat radiation and overpressure on industrial sites.³⁴⁶ The Europe-based study notes that accidents caused by domino effects are those that cause the most catastrophic consequences. The quantitative method developed in the study allows for the evaluation of the failure probability for each subsystem. The study defines three areas—zone of certain destruction, zone of possible destruction, and safety zone—that may be useful in the choice of safe distances between industrial equipment. The study concludes with the assertion that more quantitative assessment of risk and damage with probabilistic and deterministic modeling is needed.

³⁴¹ http://www2.epa.gov/rmp?_ga=1.184772905.122873663.1395699540.

³⁴² Adapted from the DHS, IP website: <http://www.dhs.gov/office-infrastructure-protection>.

³⁴³ DHS leads national implementation of the CFATS. In October 2006, Congress passed Section 550 of the DHS Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub. L. 109-295, authorizing and requiring the DHS to regulate security at chemical facilities that DHS determines are high-risk. To implement this authority, DHS issued the CFATS in 2007.

³⁴⁴ Adapted from the ISCD website: <http://www.dhs.gov/iscd>.

³⁴⁵ The authors note that the term “domino effect” does not have a generally accepted definition in the context of accidents in industrial plants. They define it as an accident in which a primary event propagates to nearby equipment (units), triggering one or more secondary events resulting in overall consequences more severe than those of the primary event. (see page 67, section 1.1)

³⁴⁶ Kadri, Farid, Chatelet, E., Lallement, Patrick. The Assessment of Risk Caused By Fire and Explosion in Chemical Process Industry: A Domino Effect-Based Study. Journal of Risk Analysis and Crisis Response, 2013, 3 (2), pp.66-76.

Kadri, Chatelet, and Lallement cite other recent research including R.M. Darbra, Adriana Palacios, and Joaquim Casal’s study, “Domino effect in chemical accidents: Main features and accident sequences” published in the Journal of Hazardous Materials in November 2010,^{347,348} which evaluated 225 accidents involving domino effects. The study showed that:

- Storage areas are the most probable starters of a domino effect (35%), followed by process plant (28%);
- The most frequent accident sequences are explosion-fire (27.6%), and fire-explosion (27.5%) and fire-fire (18%);
- The most frequent causes are external events (31%) and mechanical failure (29%);
- Flammable materials were involved in 89 percent of accidents, the most frequent of which was Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG).

Another European-based study published in 2011 examines the threat of natural hazards impacting chemical facilities and infrastructures. The authors, Krausmann, Cozzani, Salzono, and Renni, outline the ongoing efforts in the development of new concepts and tools for Natural Hazard Triggering Technological Disasters (NaTech) hazard and vulnerability ranking, risk assessment, risk-based design, and emergency planning and early warning. NaTech accidents are industrial accidents triggered by natural events, such as earthquakes, floods, and lightning.^{349,350} Krausmann, Cozzani, Salzono and Renni suggest that NaTech accidents will be exacerbated by climate change and is an emerging risk issue.

The Krausmann study found that a key challenge of NaTech accidents is that standards for industrial accident preventions do not explicitly address NaTech risk, nor do typical methodologies and tools for the assessment of risk. Their study proposes a risk methodology for NaTech. This new methodology for risk appraisal and characterization provide an approach for the ranking and the quantitative assessment of NaTech risk. These capabilities contribute to risk-based design, emergency planning, and early warning.

While there may not be industry standards for NaTech risks, the current U.S. regulations address these risks in part through the PSM standard, which requires process hazards analyses for foreseeable natural disasters such as floods and lightning strikes.

A 2004 study by the European Commission and United Nations, entitled “State of the Art in NaTech Risk Management”,³⁵¹ examined seven countries’ NaTech Risk Management, including the U.S. Though the date of the study, places it out of the time frame for this Literature Review, it is notable for its examples of NaTech incidents in the United States and summary of the U.S.’s mitigation efforts, including describing the roles and responsibilities of various U.S. agencies. The study found that there is “an increasing trend in this type of emergency” in the United States.

³⁴⁷ Darbra, R.M., Palacios, Adriana and Casal, Joaquim. "Domino Effect in Chemical Accidents: Main Features and Accident Sequences." *Journal of Hazardous Materials* 183.1-3 (2010): 565–573. Elsevier. Web. 1 Mar. 2015. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20709447>.

³⁴⁸ Full access to this article was not available. Information was obtained from the available abstract.

³⁴⁹ NaTech risk was acknowledged as an emerging risk in the European 7th Framework Programme Project iNTeg-Risk. See iNTeg-Risk: Early Recognition, Monitoring and Integrated Management of Emerging, New Technology Related, Risks, available at: <http://integrisk.eu-vri.eu>.

³⁵⁰ NaTech is a relatively new term. It appears to have gained momentum in the mid-2000’s, particularly among European policy and science leadership. It is not commonly used in the United States, however, U.S. experts and leaders have participated in dialogues on NaTech.

³⁵¹ European Commission, Directorate-General, Joint Research Centre and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. 2004. Report No. EUR 21292 EN. Retrieved May 2015: http://www.unisdr.org/files/2631_FinalNatechStateofthe20Artcorrected.pdf

During the review of a draft of this paper, the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration identified additional sources of literature³⁵² which address the multi-causal nature of major industrial accidents, and provide quantitative and semi-quantitative risk assessment tools. A limitation of this literature review was the inability to access and review these sources within the time constraints of the project. Future iterations of the SNRA should review these sources.

While the literature indicates NaTech incidents may be increasing most of the accident examples referenced in the literature reviewed did not result in an explosion or fire.^{353,354} The lone example from Table 14 above is the West Virginia, Sago Mine explosion in 2006, which is believed to have been caused by a lightning strike.

Theme 2: Recent Investigations and Calls for More Regulations, But Little Regulatory Action Thus Far

Combustible Dust

In 2003, three separate industrial explosions in the U.S. killed a total of 14 workers. The CSB investigations showed a common cause: combustible dust.^{355,356} This finding prompted the CSB to conduct a larger study, eventually published in 2006.³⁵⁷ The objectives of the study were to (1) determine whether combustible dust explosions pose a significant risk in general industry; (2) assess current efforts to manage those risks; and (3) recommend measures that may be necessary to reduce risks.³⁵⁸

The CSB identified 281 combustible dust incidents between 1980 and 2005 that killed 119 workers and injured 718, and extensively damaged industrial facilities. The incidents occurred in 44 states, in many different industries, and involved a variety of different materials. The CSB has concluded that combustible dust explosions are a serious hazard in American industry, and that existing efforts inadequately address this hazard.³⁵⁹

The study covered various industrial sectors (lumber and wood products, food products, chemical manufacturing) that handle and/or generate combustible dusts. But notably, the CSB excluded incidents involving grain-handling or other facilities currently regulated by the OSHA

³⁵² The Occupational Safety and Health Administration recommended reviewing publications by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), which can be found at <http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-291237.html>

³⁵³ Cruz, A., Katjiani, Y., and Tatano, H. "Natech Disaster Risk Reduction: Can Integrated Risk Governance Help?" *Risk Governance: The Articulation of Hazard, Politics and Ecology*. Edited by Fra.Paleo, Urbano. Springer, 2014. 441.

³⁵⁴ Phillips, B., Neal, D., Webb, G. *Introduction to Emergency Management*. CRC Press, 2011. P.115.

³⁵⁵ The CSB defines a dust explosion as a fire and/or explosion—fueled by any finely divided solid material—that harms people or property.

³⁵⁶ The NFPA definition of explosions that are dust-related is the bursting or rupture of an enclosure or a container due to the development of internal pressure from a deflagration. This definition is the common one used for NFPA's for industry or commodity-specific dust explosions: NFPA 61, Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food Processing Facilities; NFPA 484, Combustible Metals; NFPA 654, Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids; NFPA 655, Prevention of Sulfur Fires and Explosions; and NFPA 664, Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities. See "NFPA Glossary of Terms: 2014 Edition." See "Explosion" definition for documents 61, 484, 654, 655, 664. (2014, September). Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.nfpa.org/got>.

³⁵⁷ U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). "Investigation Report: Combustible Dust Hazard Study." Report No. 2006-H-1. November 2006. P1.

³⁵⁸ CSB. (2006). P6.

³⁵⁹ This paragraph adapted from the Executive Summary, of the "Combustible Dust Hazard Study." Report 2006-H-1. Published by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. November 2006. P1.

Grain Handling Facilities Standard; coalmines; non-manufacturing facilities, such as hospitals, military installations, and research institutes; and transportation.

OSHA initiated a combustible dust national emphasis program (DustNEP) in October 2007.³⁶⁰ The DustNEP conducts focused inspections at facilities that may handle or process combustible dust. Each OSHA Area Office randomly selects four facilities every year in which to conduct combustible dust-related inspections. Since 2007, OSHA conducted over 1,600 inspections in accordance with the DustNEP. Over 1,200 of these inspections resulted in citations and hazard abatement. OSHA considers the DustNEP to be very successful as it creates an enforcement presence in facilities handling and processing combustible dust that, without the NEP, would likely go many years without inspection.

In addition to the DustNEP³⁶¹, OSHA has been attempting to publish a comprehensive combustible dust standard since the CSB's report recommended it in 2006.³⁶²

A survey of literature published since the CSB report shows increased attention to the topic of combustible dust from the scientific and fire communities. Some critics argue, however, that not enough has been done to update regulations and enforcement mechanisms.³⁶³ From 2008 to 2012, the CSB documented 50 combustible dust accidents that led to 29 fatalities and 161 injuries.³⁶⁴

Currently, the NFPA is in the process of issuing a new standard—NFPA 652—to be published in the summer of 2015. The NFPA already has five combustible dust standards specific to industries, processes, and dust types. This new, overarching standard will “establish the relationship and hierarchy between it and any of the industry or commodity-specific standards, ensuring that fundamental requirements are addressed consistently across the industries, processes, and dust types.”³⁶⁵

Deepwater Horizon, New Technologies and the Petrochemical Industry’s Safety Culture

On April 20, 2010, an explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig. The CSB's final report, prepared in 2014, determined that:

The blowout preventer (BOP) that was intended to shut off the flow of high-pressure oil and gas from the Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico during the disaster on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on April 20, 2010, failed to seal the well because drill pipe buckled for reasons the offshore drilling industry remains largely unaware... The blowout caused explosions and a fire on the Deepwater Horizon rig, leading to the deaths of 11 personnel onboard and serious injuries to 17 others. Nearly 100 others escaped

³⁶⁰ The information in this paragraph was provided by OSHA and OSHA's DustNEP website: https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=directives&p_id=3830

³⁶¹ Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program CPL 03-00-008, 3/11/2008.

³⁶² An Opinion Editorial by the Chairman of the CSB: Moure-Eraso, Rafael. "The Danger of Combustible Dust." *The New York Times* 22 Aug. 2014. The New York Times Co. Mar. 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/opinion/the-danger-of-combustible-dust.html?_r=0.

³⁶³ An Opinion Editorial by the Chairman of the CSB: Moure-Eraso, Rafael. "The Danger of Combustible Dust." *The New York Times* 22 Aug. 2014. The New York Times Co. Mar. 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/23/opinion/the-danger-of-combustible-dust.html?_r=0.

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

³⁶⁵ Colonna, Guy. "Credible Risk." *NFPA Journal*. March 2015. Accessed March 2015: <http://www.nfpa.org/newsandpublications/nfpa-journal/2015/march-april-2015/features/dust>.

from the burning rig, which sank two days later, leaving the Macondo well spewing oil and gas into Gulf waters for a total of 87 days...the largest in offshore history.³⁶⁶

In a January 2011 Report to the President, the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling³⁶⁷ included the following conclusions:

- The explosive loss of the Macondo well could have been prevented.
- The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the entire industry.
- Deepwater energy exploration and production, particularly at the frontiers of experience, involve risks for which neither industry nor government has been adequately prepared, but for which they can and must be prepared in the future.
- To assure human safety and environmental protection, regulatory oversight of leasing, energy exploration, and production require reforms... Fundamental reform will be needed in both the structure of those in charge of regulatory oversight and their internal decision-making process.
- Because regulatory oversight alone will not be sufficient to ensure adequate safety, the oil and gas industry will need to take its own, unilateral steps to increase dramatically safety throughout the industry, including self-policing mechanisms that supplement governmental enforcement.³⁶⁸

The “systematic failures in risk management,” lack of “safety culture,” and need for regulatory reforms are consistent with findings from the CSB investigations into other industrial accident-explosion/fire events in the refinery and drilling industry. For example, a 2011 CSB study entitled, Public Safety at Oil and Gas Storage Facilities, found 26 explosions and fires from 1983 to 2010, killing 44 members of the public and injuring 25.^{369,370} These incidents differ from those traditionally thought-of as “industrial accidents” because they are not occurring at a plant or facility where employees report to work. Rather these oil and gas production and storage facilities tend to be located in rural areas. The CSB report found that children and young adults were the most common to visit, and the primary purpose for visiting without authorization was for recreational purposes such as “socializing, hunting, and driving all-terrain vehicles.”³⁷¹ Though in most cases, the members of the public would have been aware that they were trespassing, the CSB found they were “unaware of the explosion and fire hazards associated with

³⁶⁶ CSB Press Release, June 5, 2014. “CSB Board Approves Final Report Finding Deepwater Horizon Blowout Preventer Failed...” Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.csb.gov/csb-board-approves-final-report-finding-deepwater-horizon-blowout-preventer-failed-due-to-unrecognized-pipe-buckling-phenomenon-during-emergency-well-control-efforts-on-april-20-2010-leading-to-environmental-disaster-in-gulf-of-mexico/>.

³⁶⁷ National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (Commission). (January 2011). Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling: Report to the President. Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf>.

³⁶⁸ See page vii of the Forward. These are direct quotes from Report. There were two other conclusions that are omitted from this list because they are not relevant to this topic.

³⁶⁹ Note: these explosions did not reach the level of “large scale industrial accident-explosion or fire” included in Table 14. It is referenced to demonstrate the concerns about safety culture challenges within the industry.

³⁷⁰ U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). “Public Safety at Oil and Gas Storage Facilities” Report No. 2011-H-1. September 2011. Retrieved March 2015: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Tanks_Safety_Study_FINAL.pdf.

³⁷¹ Ibid. Page 21.

the tanks” and “unintentionally introduce[d] ignition sources for the flammable vapor, leading to explosions”.³⁷² CSB found that many of the incidents occurred at unfenced facilities that “did not have clear or legible warning signs as required under OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard, and did not have hatch locks to prevent access to the flammable hydrocarbons inside the tanks.”³⁷³ There were other findings and the CSB made six recommendations when it released the study in 2011. None have been implemented.³⁷⁴

A separate example of the lack of safety culture comes from an EnergyWire review of federal labor statistics. The oil and gas industry has more deaths from fires and explosions than any other private industry (see Figure 5). It employs less than one percent of the U.S. workforce, but in the past five years it has had more than 10 percent of all workplace fatalities from fires and explosions.^{375,376}




Figure 5: EnergyWire Graphic Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics³⁷⁷

Oil and gas production sites are not currently subject to OSHA’s Process Safety Management program, and OSHA does not have an industry specific standard for oil and gas, but regulates them under a wide range of standards and their General Duty Clause.^{378,379} For example, OSHA frequently cites oil and gas production facilities for 1910 Subpart S - Electrical and for Personal

³⁷² Ibid. Page 8.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ The CSB’s investigation webpage shows the number of recommendations made by an investigation report and the number that are “open” and “closed”. As of March 2015, the webpage showed all six recommendations remain “open.” Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.csb.gov/oil-site-safety/>.

³⁷⁵ Soraghan, Mike. "The Drilling Industry's Explosion Problem." *EnergyWire* 20 Oct. 2014. Accessed March 2015: http://www.eenews.net/special_reports/danger_zone/stories/1060007532.

³⁷⁶ The data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not offer granularity as to the cause of the fatalities. Explosions are grouped with fire related deaths. Also, while it is likely most of these incidents fall under the industrial accident umbrella, they could be caused by sabotage, work-place violence, terrorism, or other causes that are not within Industrial Accident definition.

³⁷⁷ Soraghan, M. (2014). Source of data is Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries.

³⁷⁸ Soraghan, M. (2014).

³⁷⁹ Smith, A. (2015).

Protective Equipment (PPE) violations.³⁸⁰ Likewise, the oil and gas industry receives exemptions from certain aspects of the EPA's regulatory framework.³⁸¹ As part of the activities directed by E.O. 13650, OSHA and EPA were to look into strengthening regulations.

New technology at the “frontiers of experience,” as the Deepwater Commission framed it, “involve risks for which neither industry nor government has been adequately prepared”.³⁸² While the Commission was referring to the relatively new deepwater drilling technologies, this statement applies to other technologies, for example hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling.

Since 2008, oil production has been on the rise and is now near its 1970 record high.³⁸³ The NFPA Journal reports that the increase is due to the “melding of two advanced drilling techniques that are used to stimulate production of oil and gas wells: hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, and directional drilling”.³⁸⁴ The NFPA asserts that the advanced extraction techniques are not inherently more dangerous than older drilling approaches, but the increase in drilling has increased the number of accidents.³⁸⁵ Unfortunately, there is no data on the number of fires and explosions at the new drilling sites.

The challenge is that the new drilling sites are often located close to populated communities, and increasingly, communities are moving closer to drilling sites. Not only does this increase the risk of the local community, but also puts local fire fighters in harm’s way. Local fire departments are more accustomed to fighting structure fires, and lack the “training, equipment, and tactical approach to handle the fire safely and effectively.”³⁸⁶

NFPA does not have specific standards for oil and gas drilling sites, but some existing standards would apply. As this is an emerging and growing risk, some have suggested that NFPA write guidelines for fire officials. Separately, the American Petroleum Institute (API) sets safety standards that most states and many Federal agencies have adopted as regulations. In July 2014, the API issued new “Community Engagement Guidelines” for drilling companies.³⁸⁷ It includes guidelines on engaging with emergency services and first responders.³⁸⁸ The NFPA Journal article ends with a personal account of how one particular fire department is making an effort to be prepared for the new challenges. It suggests that although the new and increased drilling is increasing the risk of fires and explosions, through proper planning and training and partnering with the drill owners, the risks can be mitigated.

In addition to the drilling hazards, there is also some new evidence that oil from fracking may be more volatile than traditionally drilled oil.³⁸⁹ Though outside the scope of this assessment, from

³⁸⁰ Information provided by OSHA.

³⁸¹ CSB (2011). P. 42.

³⁸² Commission. (January 2011). Executive Summary.

³⁸³ See U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil Annual, Historical Chart produced by the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Accessed March 2015: <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFUS1&f=A>

³⁸⁴ Smith, A. “New Frontier”. NFPA Journal. March 2, 2015. Retrieved March 2015 <http://www.nfpa.org/newsandpublications/nfpa-journal/2015/march-april-2015/features/fracking>.

³⁸⁵ Smith, A. (2015).

³⁸⁶ Smith, A. (2015).

³⁸⁷ American Petroleum Institute (API). Community Engagement Guidelines: ANSI/API Bulletin 100-3, First Edition, July 2014. Accessed March 2015: http://www.api.org/~media/files/policy/exploration/100-3_e1.pdf

³⁸⁸ API. (2014). P 7.

³⁸⁹ Sider, A. and Friedman, N. “Oil from U.S. Fracking is More Volatile Than Expected”. Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2014. Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/oil-from-u-s-fracking-is-more-volatile-than-expected-1403653344>

mid-February 2015 to early March, four trains hauling oil derailed in the U.S. and Canada causing spills and explosions.³⁹⁰ Most were hauling Bakken crude that was extracted by fracking, which some government tests showed is more volatile than other crude oil.³⁹¹ Investigations into these incidents are ongoing, and the cause of the explosions are unknown at this time.

More Calls for Updating and Strengthening Regulations

In 2013, an explosion at a fertilizer storage facility in West, Texas, killed 15 people, injured over 200, and damaged or destroyed over 200 homes, two schools, an apartment complex, and a nursing home. West is a small town and the explosion decimated it. Two months after the explosion in West, a fire and explosion occurred at a petrochemical plant in Geismar, Louisiana, that killed two workers and injured over 100 more.

These events renewed attention to the dangers of industrial explosions. In response, the President issued E.O 13650³⁹² on August 1, 2013, which directed DHS, OSHA, and EPA to perform a number of tasks to improve chemical facility safety and security. Congressional hearings^{393,394,395} were held and GAO issued several reports on chemical safety³⁹⁶ and chemical facilities³⁹⁷.

One of the tasks from the E.O. was to update chemical safety and security regulations, which have not been updated in decades. This is not an easy undertaking. A 2012 GAO study found that it took an average of seven years to develop and issue safety and health standards.³⁹⁸

Some within the chemical industry have stated their support for stronger regulatory oversight, but have less interest in promulgating new regulations.³⁹⁹ Some of this may be due to what is consistently called the “patchwork” nature of the current regulatory scheme, which is further complicated by multiple agencies (DHS, EPA, and OSHA) having various regulatory responsibilities. While the various positions and nuances of the debate are outside the scope of

³⁹⁰ Lowy, J. “Recent spate of derailments in the US, Canada deepens fear of possible oil train disaster”. Associated Press. March 10, 2015. Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2015/03/10/spate-of-oil-train-derailments-raises-safety-concerns>

³⁹¹ The API disagrees with this assertion.

³⁹² <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/01/executive-order-improving-chemical-facility-safety-and-security>.

³⁹³ Oversight of Federal Risk Management and Emergency Planning Programs to Prevent and Address Chemical Threats, Including the Events Leading up to the Explosions in West, TX and Geismar, LA: Hearings before the Full Committee on Environment and Public Works, Senate, 113th Cong. (June 27, 2013). Retrieved March 2015:

http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=64099921-ffdc-075c-1328-f94f2fb7bae6.

³⁹⁴ Oversight of the Implementation of the President’s Executive Order on Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security: Joint Committee Hearing of Environment and Public Works, and Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Senate, 113th Cong. (December 11, 2014). Retrieved March 2015: http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=b2085dfd-ecb0-3b54-db5e-d2ed8a7730eb.

³⁹⁵ West Fertilizer, Off the Grid: The Problem of Unidentified Chemical Facilities: Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security, House, 113th Cong. (August 1, 2013). Retrieved March 2015:

<https://homeland.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-west-fertilizer-grid-problem-unidentified-chemical-facilities>.

³⁹⁶ Moran, R. (2014). Chemical Safety: Action Needed to Improve Federal Oversight of Facilities with Ammonium Nitrate. Government Accountability Office, GAO-14-274. Retrieved March 2015, from <http://gao.gov/assets/670/663293.pdf>.

³⁹⁷ Caldwell, S. (2013). DHS Needs to Improve Its Risk Assessments and Outreach for Chemical Facilities. Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-801T. Retrieved March 2015, from <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-801T>.

³⁹⁸ See <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-330>

³⁹⁹ Testimony of Timothy J. Scott, Chief Security Officer and Corporate Director Emergency Services and Security, The Dow Chemical Company, Representing The American Chemistry Council at a hearing on: West Fertilizer, Off the Grid: The Problem of Unidentified Chemical Facilities: Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security, House, 113th Cong. (August 1, 2013). Retrieved March 2015: <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM08/20130801/101223/HHRG-113-HM08-Wstate-ScottT-20130801.pdf>

this assessment, what is germane is that there is agreement that the current regulatory system needs to be improved.

Finally, relevant to EPA's authorities, U.S. Senators David Vitter (R-La.) and Tom Udall (D-N.M.) introduced new legislation designed to fix the outdated chemical regulatory program managed by the EPA.⁴⁰⁰ The Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act⁴⁰¹ would update the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). It has been in development for several years and included negotiations with the industry, environmentalists, and affected communities. If enacted, it does not appear to affect OSHA or DHS's responsibilities.

It remains to be seen whether the bill will make it through Congress. The initial hearing demonstrated there are strong supporters, but also strong critics of the bill who believe it contains too many compromises.⁴⁰²

Conclusion

The Literature Review suggests that more needs to be done to improve the current regulatory scheme in order to further reduce the risks of Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire. Current efforts in the Executive Branch (related to the implementation of E.O. 13650) and the Legislative Branch (Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act) may result in significant changes for the first time in decades. If proponents are correct, implementation will reduce risk and/or mitigate the consequences of industrial accidents. It is too early to tell whether such changes will be enacted.

Within the scientific literature reviewed, new methodologies are being developed to better understand the domino effects of industrial explosions, as well as the emerging risk of NaTech disasters. Such methodologies should allow Federal, state, and local planners to be able to better evaluate risks and enact prevention and protection mechanisms to reduce the risk or at least the impact of explosions in the future.

The Literature Review highlighted two types of potential emerging risks:

1. NaTech: The European 7th Framework Programme Project iNTeg-Risk believes NaTech is an emerging risk that will likely increase due to climate change. Thus, we may begin to see new or increasing numbers of explosions caused by natural hazards (as compared to historic trends). While explosion as a potential event caused by natural hazards is part of the NaTech definition, existing literature tends to focus on other accidents, such as chemical spills. Currently, the overwhelming majority of industrial accidents resulting in an explosion are unrelated to natural hazards. This may, however, be an area relevant for future study. Additionally, future iterations of the SNRA should review the sources provided by OSHA which address the multi-causal nature of major industrial accidents, and provide quantitative and semi-quantitative risk assessment tools.

⁴⁰⁰ Press Release: Vitter, Udall Introduce Landmark Legislation to Protect Our Families from Toxic Chemicals. March 10, 2015. Retrieved March 2015: <http://www.vitter.senate.gov/newsroom/press/vitter-udall-introduce-landmark-legislation-to-protect-our-families-from-toxic-chemicals>

⁴⁰¹ S. 1009 text and current status can be found here: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/258283745/The-Frank-R-Lautenberg-Chemical-Safety-for-the-21st-Century-Act>

⁴⁰² See Transcript of Hearing: Frank R Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act: Committee on Environment and Public Works, Senate, 114th Cong. March 18, 2015. Retrieved March 2015:

http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_id=60d1e265-cdac-7629-3385-2d72dd8fe3eb

2. New technology at the “frontiers of experience,” as the Deepwater Commission framed it, “involve risks for which neither industry nor government has been adequately prepared”.⁴⁰³ Techniques such as “fracking” often occur close to suburban and urban communities. Some assert in the literature that the petrochemical industry has a poor record of safety and that the safety culture remains weak. Between the increase in drilling sites, and the potential weak safety culture, an emerging risk could be explosions at fracking sites near populated communities. The literature reviewed focused specifically on the new technology within the petrochemical industry; however, it is reasonable to assume other industries, particularly the chemical industry, are developing and implementing new technologies. It will be a challenge for regulators to keep up with emerging technologies.

This literature review primarily focused on assessing the risk of an Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire, of any size, occurring. Accidents that are so catastrophic to require Federal support in its response are a small percentage of the overall occurrence of an Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire event. This assessment leaves frequency calculations to the Quantitative Assessment. However, this qualitative assessment suggests that new technologies and emerging risks may create more complex disasters that require more complex preventive measures and responses. Thus, we may see an increase in frequency of requests for Federal assistance in response to Industrial Accident-Explosion/Fire incidents.

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⁴⁰³ Commission. (January 2011). Executive Summary.

U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). “Investigation Report: Combustible Dust Hazard Study.” Report No. 2006-H-1. November 2006. Retrieved March 2015, from http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Dust_Final_Report_Website_11-17-06.pdf.

Plant Disease

Synopsis

This qualitative assessment evaluates the risk of an unintentional plant disease outbreak resulting in a national level event. Three themes were identified from the reviewed literature: (1) globalization and threats from imported pathogens and pests; (2) climate change; and (3) cultural shifts—the impact of the organic and non-genetically modified organism (GMO) movements on plant disease.

Generally, the literature reflected that there is a constant battle against plant disease. One of the key risk factors about plant disease is its nature to evolve and mutate in order to gain resistance to pesticides and other mitigation techniques. The literature also reflected that the U.S. Government has an established and effective infrastructure to prevent, detect, respond to, and mitigate this evolving threat. The literature encouraged continued research to stay ahead of emerging plant diseases. While the threat is not necessarily increasing, it presents a dynamic landscape that requires close scrutiny.

Literature Review

Introduction

Event Description

For purposes of this assessment, Plant Disease is an outbreak of a plant pathogen or pest that has the potential to reduce or destroy plants so significantly that it results in a national level event. The scope of this assessment is primarily on unintentional outbreaks or accidental releases through commerce or a lab accident.⁴⁰⁴ For

purposes of this assessment, we are characterizing a national level event to be a plant disease outbreak of such significance that it has the potential to threaten the nation's food supply or cause substantial economic loss (reductions in exports and foodstuffs losses).⁴⁰⁵

Event Background

The Value of Plants

Plants play a vital role in our society.⁴⁰⁶

Healthy plant systems are necessary for the health and welfare of our citizens, animals, and economy. Stack and Fletcher argue that the “human, animal, and plant systems are



Source: USDA, Economic Research Service using data from U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Database.

⁴⁰⁴ Intentional outbreaks—caused by an adversary intentionally releasing a plant pathogen or pest—are considered an Adversarial Hazard and are addressed by other topics in the SNRA.

⁴⁰⁵ “More than two-thirds of cropland in the United States is devoted to the production of just four crop species—maize, wheat, soybeans, and cotton” - <http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/content/59/2/141.short>

⁴⁰⁶ Stack, James P. and Jacqueline Fletcher, “Plant Biosecurity Infrastructure for Disease Surveillance and Diagnostics”, pp. 95-105, Global Infectious Disease Surveillance and Detection: Assessing the Challenges-Finding Solutions, National Academy of Sciences Press. (2007).

intricately linked; the intersection of these three systems form the basis of our economy, our culture, and our standard of living.”⁴⁰⁷ We depend on plants in a number of ways that we often do not think about. Plants generate oxygen, provide food for us and our animals, clothe us through their fibers, shelter us with their timber, and increasingly power our technology through the fuels they provide.⁴⁰⁸

The agriculture sector produces sizeable exports that contribute to the U.S. economy. From 2006 to 2014, U.S. agricultural exports more than doubled. Demand from developing countries, along with higher farm commodity prices, explains recent growth in the value of U.S. exports. Foreign demand for wheat, soybeans, cotton, corn, and their processed products accounts for about half of U.S. export value. U.S. farm exports to developing countries are now more than double what are exported to developed countries. Purchases by developing countries consistently have been greater than developed countries since 1994.⁴⁰⁹ In the last century, the U.S. prosperity was due in part to its agriculture providing a “safe, inexpensive, and dependable food supply system.”⁴¹⁰

Plant Diseases

Destructive plant pests and pathogens come from a variety of sources including insect pests and plant pathogens such as fungi, oomycetes, bacteria, viruses, nematodes, protozoa, and parasitic plants.⁴¹¹ Currently there are several prioritized lists of high consequence plant pathogens and pests.⁴¹² Some of these lists have hundreds of agents. It is difficult to define a set of characteristics that identify which plant pests or pathogens could cause the greatest plant damage to the Nation’s ecosystem.⁴¹³ Furthermore, many plant pests and pathogens are resilient in the sense that it is not feasible to completely eliminate them from the environment.

The four primary crops grown in the United States are maize, wheat, soybeans, and cotton. Their production takes up more than two-thirds of cropland in the United States. Experts have raised concerns that “homogenization of the American agricultural landscape could facilitate widespread disease and pest outbreaks, compromising the national food supply.”⁴¹³

Diseases affecting the major food crops, “cereal grains (wheat, rice, and maize), tubers (potato, cassava, yam, and taro), and vegetable crops (dry beans, peas, lentils and other legumes as well as cabbage and other brassicas)” have the greatest affect on human populations.⁴¹⁴

⁴⁰⁷ Stack and Fletcher. (2007).

⁴⁰⁸ Stack and Fletcher. (2007).

⁴⁰⁹ The chart and this paragraph are from the USDA’s Economic Research Service. Retrieved April 2015: <http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/detail.aspx?chartId=40077&ref=collection&embed=True&widgetId=39734>

⁴¹⁰ Stack and Fletcher. (2007).

⁴¹¹ Fletcher, Jacqueline, et al., “Emerging Infectious Plant Diseases”, Chapter 18, Emerging Infections 9, Ed. W. M. Scheld, 2010, ASM Press, Washington, DC. Retrieved April 2015:

http://www.ars.usda.gov/SP2UserFiles/Place/66180000/Fletcher%20et%20al_2010_%20Emerging%20Infectious%20Plant%20Diseases_%20ASM%20Press%20ch18.pdf

⁴¹² Fletcher, J. (2010).

⁴¹³ Margosian, M., Garrett, K., Hutchinson, S., and With, K. (2009, February). “Connectivity of the American Agricultural Landscape: Assessing the National Risk of Crop Pest and Disease Spread.” BioScience Magazine. Vol. 59 No. 2. 141-151. Retrieved April 2015:

<http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/content/59/2/141.full.pdf+html>

⁴¹⁴ Fletcher, Jacqueline, et al., “Emerging Infectious Plant Diseases”, Chapter 18, Emerging Infections 9, Ed. W. M. Scheld, 2010, ASM Press, Washington, DC. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:63DWp_YlfIMJ:www.ars.usda.gov/SP2UserFiles/Place/66180000/Fletcher%2520et%2520al_2010_%2520Emerging%2520Infectious%2520Plant%2520Diseases_%2520ASM%2520Press%2520ch18.pdf+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

“Underdeveloped countries lacking infrastructure to detect and mitigate diseases,” have the greatest struggle, but diseases of these plants affect U.S. growers as well.

The “disease triangle” that characterizes all plant diseases consists of (1) a susceptible plant, (2) a virulent pathogen, and (3) a conducive environment. Without all three components, disease will not occur.⁴¹⁵ Plant diseases are categorized by symptoms. They can occur in the field or in storage.

U.S. Government Roles and Responsibilities

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is the lead Federal agency tasked with identifying, controlling, and mitigating the effects of plant pests and pathogens.⁴¹⁶ Specific to agriculture health, the USDA has the following responsibilities:⁴¹⁷

- Developing plant pest and disease exclusion systems and coordinating implementation across the interagency mitigating the risk of introduction of exotic plant pest and disease from foreign countries into the United States (foreign responders, equipment, supplies, and food).
- Developing and maintaining biosurveillance systems to detect exotic plant pests and disease and coordinating surveillance activities with local, state, tribal, and territorial governments.
- Identifying and confirming the presence of newly detected exotic plant pests and disease in the United States.
- Coordinating emergency response to newly detected plant pests and disease of economic or environmental significance with local, state, tribal, and territorial governments.
- Mitigating the interstate movement and potential spread of exotic plant pest and disease in the United States (applies to equipment and supplies moving in and out of quarantine zones, debris removal, and movement of agricultural commodities or soils).

A large infrastructure exists in the U.S. consisting of Federal and state agencies and related research laboratories responsible for surveillance, prevention, detection, and recovery from destructive plant pests and pathogens. This infrastructure regularly demonstrates that it can control and mitigate the effects of plant pests and pathogens in the environment.

Preventing and Interdicting Pests

The Department of Homeland Security assists, supports and enforces USDA regulations within the designated areas of responsibility such as the ports of entry. To mitigate the effects of destructive plant agents in the U.S., the USDA, through the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Plant Protection and Quarantine (APHIS PPQ), and the DHS, through Customs and Border Protection (CBP), share responsibility for preventing the introduction of new plant pathogens and pests into the U.S.

⁴¹⁵ Fletcher, J. (2010).

⁴¹⁶ In addition to their statutory responsibilities, the USDA is also the lead for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex. http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1914-25045-2457/final_esf_11_ag_and_natural_resources_20130501.pdf

⁴¹⁷ This only a portion of USDA’s plant health related responsibilities. This list is from ESF #11.

Detecting Outbreaks

The National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN) under the USDA provides infrastructure for the detection and diagnoses of destructive plant agent outbreaks. The NPDN collaborates with the National Institute for Food and Agriculture (NIFA) (formerly the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service [CSREES]), APHIS, and other organizations to detect outbreaks.

Responding to Outbreaks

To respond to a destructive plant agent, the U.S. set up the National Plant Disease Recovery System (NPDRS) within the USDA's Agriculture Research Service (ARS). NPDRS has the responsibility of responding to high consequence plant pests and pathogens with pest control measures and the use of disease resistant seeds. NPDRS gets seeds from the U.S. National Plant Germplasm System. NPDRS involves APHIS, NIFA, and state departments of agriculture.

Research

As of 2002, USDA and APHIS, were spending more than \$1 billion annually in research, risk assessment, and emergency response plans to outbreaks.⁴¹⁸ USDA's ARS and the U.S. Forest Service conduct in-house research and support basic and applied plant pathology research through formal (NIFA) and informal (APHIS) extramural grant programs. The National Science Foundation and other funding sources also fund basic research on plant-microbe interactions. Individual states fund plant pathology research at land grant universities (LGUs) in various academic departments (plant pathology, microbiology, horticulture, and agronomy, etc.). In addition, Cooperative Extension Service (CES) personnel conduct applied field research and provide advice directly to producers and serve as first responders to pathogen outbreaks.

Research is also sponsored and conducted by state agencies and private sector organizations. State Department of Agriculture (SDA) laboratories often addresses diseases and pathogens specific to the state's climate and commodities. Several large commodity groups, representing the agricultural production sector, collect "checkoff" funds from growers to support research on pathogens attacking that commodity, and seed companies monitor and conduct research on plant pathogens emerging in the U.S., as well as in countries where offshore nurseries are used to generate seed for subsequent planting in the U.S.⁴¹⁹

Literature Review

Globalization and threats from imported pathogens and pests

Plant disease outbreaks are not solely natural occurrences. Human actions are extensively implicated in the spread and outbreak of disease, thus making it difficult to determine the precise drivers, impacts, and regulations of the disease.⁴²⁰ Human-induced globalization is increasing the spread of plant disease; organisms are transported more easily as a result of extended trading

⁴¹⁸ Margosian 2009

⁴¹⁹ Fletcher, J. (2010).

⁴²⁰ Wilkinson, K., Grant, W., Green, L., Hunter, S., etc. (2011, May). "Infectious diseases of animals and plants: an interdisciplinary approach". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. Vol. 366, 1933-1942. Retrieved April 2015:
<http://classic.rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/366/1573/1933.full>

systems.⁴²¹ There are 10 new types of insects or pathogens introduced to American farms each year.⁴²²

Imported pathogens are considered an existing as well as an emerging threat to the U.S. agricultural scene. The threat of foreign pathogens to native vegetation has been recognized internationally and steps are in place to control this threat to an extent. Lessons learned have pointed to trends in diseases and their “ability to coevolve with new hosts and to rapidly exploit the environments with which they come into contact...” posing “...both a scientific and management challenge.”⁴²³ While recognized and actively mitigated, it was widely agreed that further research is necessary for continued management as new, exotic, and resistant pathogens emerge.⁴²⁴

Concerns were put forth not only for pathogens and pests brought in through food bearing plants, but also in recreational plants. As discussed below, any type of foreign agriculture can introduce diseases into the food supply.

Huge markets exist for international trade of live ornamental plants. Flowers and other ornamentals include a wide variety of plant species that host a multitude of diseases. The movement of commercial ornamental propagation activities to tropical offshore facilities has generated new pathways for movement of exotic plant diseases into the United States. For example, *Ralstonia solanacearum* race 3 biovar 2, a serious pathogen of potato and tomato designated a “select agent,” was introduced into the United States in 2003 on propagated geranium plants from Central America and again in 2004 from West Africa, causing growers to destroy their inventories. Because plant pathologists and regulatory authorities were concerned that the pathogen would threaten U.S. potato and tomato production if it escaped from nursery facilities, geranium growers who had received infested shipments were directed to destroy their inventories.⁴²⁵

Another concern with imports is the reintroduction of previously mitigated risks to plant health. The U.S. and most developed countries have encountered basic pathogens and have either wiped out the cause, or have developed plants that are resistant to common forms of the disease. In 1999, the developing nation of Uganda unwittingly re-introduced a strain of wheat stem rust, which was thought to have been eradicated. This instance provided “a humbling example of the capacity of pathogens to mutate in response to selective pressure, acquiring new virulence traits and overcoming resistance genes.”⁴²⁶

Climate Change

Climate change is another issue impacting the spread of diseases. Disease organisms may find more favorable conditions for reproduction and transmission as a consequence of global

⁴²¹ Wilkinson, K. etc. (2011, May).

⁴²² Margosian. (2009).

⁴²³ Potter, C., Harwood, T., Knight, J., and Tomlinson, I. (2011). “Learning from history, predicting the future: the UK Dutch elm disease outbreak in relation to contemporary tree disease threats.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. Vol. 306. 1966-1974 Retrieved April 2015: <http://classic.rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/366/1573/1966.short>

⁴²⁴ Magarey, Roger D., et al., “Plant Biosecurity in the United States: Roles, Responsibilities, and Information Needs”, pp. 875-884, Bioscience, Vol.59, No 10, November 2009. Retrieved April 2015: <http://bioscience.oxfordjournals.org/content/59/10/875.short>

⁴²⁵ Fletcher, J. (2010).

⁴²⁶ Fletcher, J. (2010).

warming. “Climate change affects disease transmission at three levels: firstly, it acts directly on the biology and reproduction of pathogens, hosts or vectors; secondly, it affects the habitats present in a region, the community of hosts that can live in them, and the lifecycles, or lifestyles, of those hosts; and thirdly, climate change induces social and economic responses, including adaptive and mitigating measures, which alter land use, transport patterns, human population movements, and the use and availability of natural resources.”⁴²⁷

It was found that even small changes to the ecosystem could “have large impacts on the incidence of infection in a population, as pathogens more successfully jump species.”⁴²⁸ There is a cyclical impact: increased agricultural production leads to increased greenhouse gases, which further exacerbates climate change, leading to further issues with plant disease.⁴²⁹

Cultural Shifts: The Impact of the Organic and Non-GMO Movements on Plant Disease

Consumers’ preference for food grown with minimal chemical pesticides has led to the presentation of GMOs into the agricultural scene. Due to the rise of pesticide-resistant pathogens and the introduction of foreign pests, “...chemical pesticide [use] continues to rise.”⁴³⁰ This rising incidence of plant diseases created a need for continued research in the area of biopesticides and other alternative strategies such as GMOs. However, consumer wariness of the use of these GMOs in food products makes the use of this as an alternative to pesticides difficult. More research should be done on the impact this has on the ecosystem and on end use products.

Some experts⁴³¹ have suggested the increased demand⁴³² for organically grown food and non-GMO food products may have an inadvertent negative affect on pests and diseases. The theory is that as more organic agriculture productions are stood up, it creates reservoirs for pests to thrive and provides time for pests to adapt to the pest-resistant GMO plants at a neighboring farm. No literature was discovered on this topic during the review. It is currently unknown what impact the increase of organic and non-GMO agriculture will have in the ecosystem.⁴³³

Conclusion

At this time, pathogen and disease concerns from developing countries do not directly affect our country but they have in the past. As the technology, crop productions, and import/export laws change, however, we will need to be vigilant in our methods of detection to ensure safety from new, or the reintroduction of eradicated, diseases that could impact agricultural supplies.

Generally, the literature reflected that there is a constant battle against the plant disease threat. One of the key risk factors about plant disease is its nature to evolve and change. The literature also reflected that the U.S. Government has an established and effective infrastructure to prevent, detect, respond, and mitigate this evolving threat. For a plant disease event to occur at such a

⁴²⁷ Wilkinson, K. etc. (2011, May). P. 1934.

⁴²⁸ Wilkinson, K. etc. (2011, May).

⁴²⁹ There is extensive information on this topic in the literature, however Climate Change is addressed as a separate SNRA topic, thus it is treated in a limited way in this assessment.

⁴³⁰ Wilkinson, K. etc. (2011, May).

⁴³¹ USDA Official

⁴³² The demand for organic food has seen double-digit increases each year for the past few years. USDA, Economic Research Service. <http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/organic-agriculture/organic-market-overview.aspx>

⁴³³ We were unable to procure additional information on the topic of the impact of GMOs on the evolution of pests versus organic methods that do not employ pesticides.

level that it meets the criteria for a national level event it would likely be intentional (i.e., bioterrorism) or the cascading affect of some other disaster. Climate change may be an example of the latter.

The literature reviewed included discussions on biowarfare, and the potential for the deliberate introduction of pathogens within our country by state-sponsored threat actors. However, the main takeaway is that the country needs to increase awareness and research into detection, mitigation, and response for “deliberate use of plant pathogens to inflict harm on a person, company, industry, or nation.”⁴³⁴ While additional information is available on this topic, it is not within the scope of the topic for this assessment.⁴³⁵

Though the U.S. Government’s approach to plant disease is well organized and effective, the literature encouraged continued research to stay ahead of existing plant disease as it continually evolves and mutates based on exposure to new resistant strains. The threat is not necessarily increasing, but it presents a dynamic landscape that requires close scrutiny.

⁴³⁴ Fletcher, J. (2010).

⁴³⁵ Intentional outbreaks—caused by an adversary intentionally releasing a plant pathogen or pest—are considered an Adversarial Hazard and are addressed by other topics in the SNRA.

Antibiotic Resistant Strains

Summary

Antibiotic-resistant pathogens, or "superbugs," are natural or man-made induced mutations created by the acquisition of new genes in disease causing bacteria resulting in the reduction or elimination of the effectiveness of antibiotics. Such resistant bacterium is presently a major public health threat and, if unresolved, threatens to evolve into a health security crisis. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported two million Americans acquire serious infections to one or more strains of antibiotic-resistant pathogens annually resulting in 23,000 deaths with many more dying from other medical conditions complicated by such infections.⁴³⁶ In addition to their direct role in combating infectious diseases, the prophylactic use of antibiotics is essential for a wide range of basic to complex surgical and medical procedures. As antibiotic-resistance grows, so does the possibility of losing such surgical and other therapeutic interventions due to an unacceptable high risk of postoperative or procedural infections. Additionally, the public health risk of endemic bacterial contagious diseases will increase proportionately with antibiotic resistance (e.g. Group A Streptococcus (GAS) or "strep;" pneumococcal pneumonia; bacterial meningitis; multidrug-resistant tuberculosis [MDR-TB]; etc.). There is also the added risk that the public confidence in scientific evidence based medical therapies could eventually be undermined causing patients to seek unproven and hazardous alternatives cures.

Antibiotic-resistant pathogens are a direct threat to the resiliency of the nation. This would include increased morbidity and mortality rates related to trauma and contagious diseases impacting: U.S. military personnel, public safety officers and health-care workers. Moreover, services provided by critical health infrastructures such as tertiary care centers, nursing homes, dialysis centers, etc. could be dramatically impaired due to healthcare-acquired (or nosocomial) antibiotic-resistant pathogens. Antibiotic-resistant pathogens increases the strain on limited medical and public health resources at all levels of government as well as carry significant future risk to domestic and international economies.⁴³⁷ This issue also presents an increased risk to a rapidly aging U.S. population who are more susceptible and vulnerable to infectious diseases. Current intercontinental commerce and travel provides ready opportunities for antibiotic-resistant pathogens to spread globally, severely limiting the ability of any one country to successfully tackle this issue in isolation. International cooperation will be required to avoid a post-antibiotics world.

Discussion

In recognition of the risk posed to the nation by antibiotic-resistant pathogens, the *National Strategy for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria* was released by the White House in

⁴³⁶ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the United States, 2013* (Washington, DC: US Department of Health and Human Services, 2013), p. 11.

⁴³⁷ British High Commission- Chaired by Jim O'Neill (December 2014) *Antimicrobial Resistance: Tackling a crisis for the health and wealth of nations,* United Kingdom. http://amr-review.org/sites/default/files/AMR%20Review%20Paper%20-%20Tackling%20a%20crisis%20for%20the%20health%20and%20wealth%20of%20nations_1.pdf

September 2014.⁴³⁸ This national strategy initiative was in direct response to CDC’s findings that an estimated 2 million people annually in the U.S. acquire serious bacterial infections resistant to one or more of the antibiotics, resulting in approximately 23,000 deaths.⁴³⁹ These numbers do not include those who die from other conditions that were complicated by an antibiotic-resistant infection. Antibiotic-Resistant is defined in this National Strategy as “...resistance results from mutations or acquisition of new genes in bacteria that reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of antibiotics.”

Simply stated, antibiotic-resistant pathogens are able to adapt, multiply, and cause diseases unimpeded by the use of one or more antibiotic therapies. Antibiotic-resistant pathogens result in increased severity of infection with greatly limited and more expensive treatment protocols – if treatment is available at all. Over usage of antibiotics is the primary cause for the increase in antibiotic resistance as select bacteria survives by developing mutant genes against which antibiotics have decreased effectiveness. Through reproduction and/or the exchange of genetic material between different bacteria such resistance may spread rapidly and unpredictably, potentially causing a wide scope of resistant infections. As antibiotics often belong to similar classes of medicines, specific resistance to one agent can result in resistance to an entire related class of antibiotics. In addition to circulating in human and animal populations, resistant bacteria can be also found in the human consumption food-chain.

As the risk of antibiotic-resistant pathogens grows, so will the associated morbidity and mortality rates, resulting in longer hospitalization stays, increasing the risk of compromising protection of surgical patients and others undergoing a wide-range of medical and dental procedures as well as an accompanying increase health care costs. The CDC has estimated annual excess direct health care cost of antibiotic-resistant pathogens to the U.S. economy at \$20-35 billion, including approximately 8 million additional days of hospitalization, with an annual lost productivity cost of \$35 billion.⁴⁴⁰

Inappropriate and overuse of antibiotics can exacerbate the selection resistant microorganisms to such an extent that “[t]he extensive use of antimicrobial drugs has resulted in drug resistance that threatens to reverse the medical advances of the last seventy years.”⁴⁴¹ This problem is compounded in hospitals, nursing homes, etc., where the widespread use of antibiotics, along with the close proximity among the sick, provides a fertile environment for developing and transmitting antibiotic-resistant pathogens, also known as nosocomial infections. This becomes a more pressing concern given the increased risk presented by a rapidly aging U.S. population that is more susceptible and vulnerable to infectious diseases while concurrently placing greater

⁴³⁸ The White House (September 2014) *The National Strategy for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria*, Washington, D.C.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_carb_report_sept2014.pdf

⁴³⁹ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the United States, 2013* (Washington, DC: US Department of Health and Human Services, 2013), p. 11

⁴⁴⁰ Roberts, RR, Hota, B, Ahmad, I, et al. “Hospital and Societal Costs of Antimicrobial-resistant Infections in a Chicago Teaching Hospital: Implications for Antibiotic Stewardship,” *Oxford Journal of Clinical Infectious Disease*, 49(8): 1175-1184, 2009.
www.tufts.edu/med/apua/consumers/personal_home_5_1451036133.pdf.

⁴⁴¹ Interagency Task Force on Antimicrobial Resistance, 2012. *A Public Health Action Plan to Combat Antimicrobial Resistance* - page 5. Washington, D.C. <http://www.cdc.gov/drugresistance/pdf/actionplan-2012.pdf>

utilization demand on such health-care facilities. The U.S. population aged 65 and over, currently at approximately 43.1 million, is projected to grow to 83.7 million in 2050.⁴⁴²

There is also the concern that antibiotic-resistant pathogens are being accelerated through the commercial practice of adding antibiotics to agricultural feed products to stimulate growth and/or for disease control in animals confined in crowded and unsanitary conditions, especially given that “approximately 80 percent of the antibiotics sold in the United States are used in meat and poultry production.”⁴⁴³ To illustrate in 2011, “ground beef from the Hannaford grocery store chain in New England was linked to 19 infections and at least seven hospitalizations, all caused by a strain of *Salmonella* resistant to multiple antibiotics, including amoxicillin/clavulanic acid, ampicillin, ceftriaxone, cefoxitin, kanamycin, streptomycin, and sulfisoxazole.”⁴⁴⁴ CDC has presently identified “carbapenem-resistant, *Enterobacteriaceae* (CRE), ceftriaxone-resistant *Neisseria gonorrhoeae* and *Clostridium difficile*,” within its highest or “urgent” threats.⁴⁴⁵

The following are included in the CDC’s second highest or “serious” threats category:

Multidrug-resistant *Acinetobacter*, Drug-resistant *Campylobacter*, Extended spectrum β -lactamase producing *Enterobacteriaceae* (ESBLs), Vancomycin-resistant *Enterococcus* (VRE), Multidrug-resistant *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*, methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA), Drug-resistant Non-typhoidal *Salmonella*, Drug-resistant *Salmonella Typhi*, Drug-resistant *Shigella*, Drug-resistant *Streptococcus Pneumonia* and Drug-resistant *Tuberculosis*.⁴⁴⁶

The third level, labeled “concerning” threats include:

Vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (VRSA), *Erythromycin-resistant Group A Streptococcus*, and *Clindamycin-resistant Group B Streptococcus*. CDC has also indicated that “Among all of the bacterial resistance problems, gram-negative pathogens are particularly worrisome, because they are becoming resistant to nearly all drugs that would be considered for treatment.”⁴⁴⁷

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead federal agency responsible for addressing and coordinating the whole of government response to this issue. The scale of antibiotic-resistant pathogens needs to be acknowledged as a global risk within the context articulated in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) *National Health Security Strategy 2015-2018*. “The health of the American people and that of the people around the world are more closely linked than ever before. Greater movement of people, animals, and goods across international borders increases the risk of exposure to health threats

⁴⁴² Jennifer M. Ortman, Victoria A. Velkoff, and Howard Hogan, U.S. Census Bureau, *An Aging Nation: The Older Population in the United States*, May 2014, Report Number: P25-1140. <http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/demo/p25-1140.pdf>

⁴⁴³ Congresswomen Slaughter Louise M. U.S. House of Representatives. “Confirmed: 80 Percent of all antibacterial drugs used on animals, endangering human health. <http://louise.house.gov/press-releases/confirmed-80-percent-of-all-antibacterial-drugs-used-on-animals-endangering-human-health/>

⁴⁴⁴ CDC. 2012. “Investigation Update: Multistate Outbreak of Human *Salmonella* Typhimurium infections Linked to Ground Beef. www.cdc.gov/salmonella/typhimurium-groundbeef/010512/index.html

⁴⁴⁵ The White House (September 2015) *The National Strategy for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria*, Washington, D.C. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/peast_carb_report_sept2014.pdf

⁴⁴⁶ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the United States, 2013* (Washington, DC: US Department of Health and Human Services, 2013), p. 7 & 22.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid

originating outside one's own country.”⁴⁴⁸ To underscore how wide-spread this issue is, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and European Medicines Agency (EMEA) in 2007, estimated 25,000 deaths attributable to infections due to selected antibiotic-resistant pathogens in the European Union, Iceland and Norway.⁴⁴⁹ And “In a study of resistance patterns of several common bacteria in China in 1999 and 2001, the mean prevalence of resistance among hospital-acquired infections was as high as 41%, and that among community-acquired infections was 26%.⁴⁵⁰

In an age of globalization, no country can on its own ensure the public health of its population from this risk. Every country is directly or indirectly vulnerable by forces driving international social, economic, and political interdependences such as immigration, travel, commerce, etc. Additionally, foreseen and unforeseen consequences may occur driven by natural and geopolitical crises (e.g. global climate change, conflict, mass refugee displacement, breakdown of other nation critical health infrastructure, etc.) which reduce the global resiliency to antibiotic-resistant pathogens.

In conclusion the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides the leadership for ensuring that the “actions the United States takes domestically must be complemented by coordinated international action in order to ensure that resistant strains that arise in one part of the world are rapidly detected, diagnosed, and contained at the source of emergence. The United States and international partners must work to promote innovations in drug and diagnostics development, enhance stewardship of existing antibiotics in human and agricultural settings, and strengthen systems for detecting, diagnosing, and monitoring resistance so that reporting is timely, accurate, and transparent.”⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁸ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). (2015, February) *The National Health Security Strategy 2015-2018 (NHSS)*. Page 29, Washington, D.C. <http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/strategy/Documents/nhss-final.pdf>

⁴⁴⁹ European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control ECDC/ European Medicines Agency: *EMEA Joint Technical Report: The Bacterial Challenge: Time to React*, ECDC, Stockholm Sweden; 2009.

⁴⁵⁰ Heddini A, Cars O, Qiang S, Tomson G., *Antibiotic Resistance in China--a Major Future Challenge*. Lancet. 2009 Jan 3;373 (9657):30. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(08)61956-X. [http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736\(08\)61956-X.pdf](http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(08)61956-X.pdf)

⁴⁵¹ The White House (September 2015) “*The National Strategy for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant Bacteria*”, page 20. Washington, D.C. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_carb_report_sept2014.pdf

Emerging Infectious Diseases Other Than Influenza

Summary

Emerging Infectious Diseases (EIDs) with pandemic potential represents a major worldwide risk to global health security. Though there is no single universally agreed upon definition, EIDs can be understood either as new recognized diseases or “re-emerging” or “resurgent diseases” which are known and may have been previously controlled but are now reappearing with increasing occurrence, or threaten to increase over previously endemic or new population or geographic area. This also includes pathogens that have developed new attributes such as increase resistance or virulence. Of most concern are EIDs which have possible global pandemic risk where limited or no readily available therapeutic counter-measures are available. Leaving governments to rely on enhanced mass public health infection control practices such as protective travel and commercial restrictions, closing schools, or in worst case scenarios enforced quarantine for the affected population. If it is scientifically proven that a particular EID resulted from an accidental or deliberate release, then it could be anticipated that the U.S. government, private critical health care infrastructure stakeholders, as well as foreign governments will take countermeasures commensurate with the nature and scope of such a threat. Such a scenario may result in additional and unforeseen geopolitical consequences depending on the scale and scope of the event or incident.

Not including influenza outbreaks such as H1N1, examples of recent notable EIDs have included: Ebola; Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS); Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS). Combined, these EIDs resulted in the loss of millions of lives and billions of dollars. Causal factors include: microbial adaptation and evolution; demographic migration; new technology and industry; increased economic development and changing land use; greater contact between people and animals; international travel and trade; and the lack of adequate global public health infrastructure to carry out surveillance and control measures. Added to this list is the potential for bio-engineered EIDs resulting from future military conflict or terrorism. In addition to the human and economic toll, the Ebola epidemic in West Africa is very instructive of the risk that EIDs have to destabilize governance processes, ferment social unrest, overstress critical national health infrastructures, and restrict international commerce and travel.

Discussion

An emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) is defined as “infectious disease that is newly recognized as occurring in humans; one that has been recognized before but is newly appearing in a different population or geographic area than previously affected; one that is newly affecting many more individuals; and/or one that has developed new attributes.”⁴⁵² New and naturally occurring attributes can include changes in mode of transmission, incubation periods, severity of morbidity and mortality rates, etc. Additionally, there is the risk of man-made bio-engineering to be

⁴⁵² Institute of Medicine IOM, *Microbial Threats to Health: Emergence, Detection and Response*, 2003; and Fineberg and Wilson, “Emerging Infectious Diseases,” International Risk Governance Council (IRGC), 2010.

deliberately or inadvertently misused to create new or change existing pathogen characteristics sufficient to result in the direct or indirect endangerment of humanity.⁴⁵³

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) “approximately 75% of recently emerging infectious diseases affecting humans are diseases of animal origin; approximately 60% of all human pathogens are zoonotic.”⁴⁵⁴

Causes involved in the emergence of infectious diseases can be broadly categorized as “(1) genetic and biological aspects; (2) physical environmental factors; (3) ecological factors; and (4) social, political, and economic factors”.⁴⁵⁵ These complex and interdependent categorizations can be further defined into the following thirteen points:

1. Microbial adaptation and change
2. Human susceptibility to infection
3. Climate and weather
4. Changing ecosystems
5. Human demographics and behavior
6. Economic development and land use
7. International travel and commerce
8. Technology and industry
9. Breakdown of public health measures
10. Poverty and social inequality
11. War and famine
12. Lack of political will
13. Intent to harm⁴⁵⁶

The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), under the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), defines EIDs as infectious diseases that have newly appeared in a population or existed but are rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic range, or that are caused by one of the NIAID Category A, B, and C Priority Pathogens. Category A pathogens are those organisms/biological agents that pose the highest risk to national security and public health because they:

- Can be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person
- Result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public health impact

⁴⁵³ BioMed Central/Genome Biology. "On The Trail Of Rogue Genetically Modified Pathogens." Science Daily., 18 March 2008. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/03/080317191441.htm

⁴⁵⁴ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention - National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases “Emerging and Zoonotic Diseases — At a Glance” at <http://www.cdc.gov/ncezid/>

⁴⁵⁵ Institute of Medicine IOM, Mark S. Smolinski, Margaret A. Hamburg, and Joshua Lederberg, editor(s); “Microbial Threats to Health: Emergence, Detection and Response,” pages 53-54, 2003. Committee on Emerging Microbial Threats to Health in the 21st Century, Board on Global Health. National Academy of Sciences

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid

- Might cause public panic and social disruption
- Require special action for public health preparedness⁴⁵⁷

Examples include: *Bacillus anthracis* (Anthrax); *Clostridium botulinum* toxin (Botulism); *Yersinia pestis* (Plague); *Variola major* (Smallpox) and other related pox viruses; *Francisella tularensis* (Tularemia); Viral hemorrhagic fevers (Arenaviruses, Bunyavirus, Flaviruses, Filoviruses-Ebola); etc.⁴⁵⁸

Category B pathogens are the second highest priority organisms/biological agents because they are:

- Moderately easy to disseminate
- Result in moderate morbidity rates and low mortality rates
- Require specific enhancements for diagnostic capacity and enhanced disease surveillance⁴⁵⁹

Examples include: *Burkholderia pseudomallei* (Melioidosis); *Coxiella burnetii* (Q fever); Brucella species (Brucellosis); *Burkholderia mallei* (Glanders); *Chlamydia psittaci* (Psittacosis); *Ricinus communis* (Ricin toxin); *Clostridium perfringens* (Epsilon toxin); *Staphylococcus enterotoxin B* (SEB); *Rickettsia prowazekii* (Typhus fever); etc.⁴⁶⁰

Category C pathogens are the third highest priority and include emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of:

- Availability
- Ease of production and dissemination
- Potential for high morbidity and mortality rates and major health impact⁴⁶¹

Examples include: Nipah and Hendra viruses; Tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses; Tickborne encephalitis complex flaviviruses; Yellow fever virus; Tuberculosis, including drug-resistant TB; Influenza virus; Other Rickettsias; Rabies virus; Prions; etc.⁴⁶²

Emerging Infectious Diseases is an evolving and constant risk. However, the ability to significantly mitigate this risk is also progressing through the leadership provided by the Department of Health and Human Services in spearheading U.S. efforts in meeting the global challenges related to public health surveillance and detection, critical health care capabilities for timely and effective response. This includes sufficient resources and training to develop efficient information-sharing and research leading to the advancement of new diagnostics, vaccines, and pharmaceuticals which to address EID.

In conclusion, “The health of the American people and that of the people around the world are more closely linked than ever before. In such an interconnected environment, the best way for a country to protect its population is to prevent a health threat from emerging and spreading in the

⁴⁵⁷ National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) - “Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases - NIAID Category A, B, and C Priority Pathogens”- February 2015. <http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/BiodefenseRelated/Biodefense/Pages/CatA.aspx>

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid

⁴⁵⁹ National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) - “Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases - NIAID Category A, B, and C Priority Pathogens”- February 2015. <http://www.niaid.nih.gov/topics/BiodefenseRelated/Biodefense/Pages/CatA.aspx>

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid

⁴⁶¹ Ibid

⁴⁶² Ibid

first place. This means addressing threats early and at their source, before they spread more widely within and across borders; it also means that other countries, including the United States, should prepare for the arrival of such trans-national threats within their own borders.”⁴⁶³

⁴⁶³ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)-Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, “*National Health Security Strategy and Implementation Plan 2015-2018*” - February 2015. <http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Documents/nhss-ip.pdf>

Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment: Capability Target Visualizations

Introduction

The SNRA provides a strategic view of risk to support the collective understanding of the full range of threats, hazards, and challenges facing the Nation. With this in mind, the SNRA project team analyzed the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) received from jurisdictional partners to gain a better understanding of what capabilities requirements jurisdictions have identified and for which they are currently planning. The SNRA project team intends on comparing the effects identified across a broad range of risks from the SNRA, against the capabilities requirements identified in the jurisdictional THIRAs, to identify any correlations between national-level risk assessment and reported jurisdictional requirements. The following depicts the outputs from the THIRA analysis. The crosswalk between effects identified in the SNRA and jurisdictional capability requirements was not accomplished during the 2015 SNRA project and should be considered for future iterations of the SNRA.

Background

The THIRA is a four-step common risk assessment process that helps the whole community understand its risks and estimate capability requirements. FEMA Regions and jurisdictions identify risks in Step 1 of the THIRA process and map their risks to core capabilities to develop capability targets which define success. Capability targets provide a glimpse of the impacts regions and jurisdictions are preparing for across the Nation.

Analysis

The following graphs depict representative targets* in terms of absolute capability for selected core capabilities. Each core capability graph depicts a sample subset of capability targets on a logarithmic scale and incorporates isolines to show increasing levels of absolute capability requirements. Taken together, these graphs demonstrate the range of jurisdictional planning to deliver core capabilities across a wide range of threats and hazards.

**Representative targets depict a sample subset of submitted 2013 THIRA targets, as not all targets included comparable elements for analysis.*

Fatality Management Services

Figure 6 represents the range of 2013 THIRA targets that focused on initiating fatality management services within a set period of time. While the number of fatalities varied widely, most jurisdictions defined their success as initiating fatality management within 24 to 72 hours. Figure 1 shows a majority of the represented targets included impacts of 10,000 fatalities or fewer, while a smaller subset suggested potential impacts of higher magnitudes. Several of




Figure 7: Fatality Management Services

the targets with higher fatality impacts also identified time frames of 24 to 72 hours, indicating that these targets require greater capability to be successful.

Mass Care Services

A majority of Mass Care Services targets indicated jurisdictions' desires to achieve their targets within 72 hours or fewer; however, a third of representative capability targets included a range of 5 days to 8 weeks as sheltering objectives can vary widely depending on requirements. Likewise, the range of people requiring sheltering services ranged from several dozen to several million, indicating that jurisdictions are planning for a wide scale of impacts. The variation in Mass Care Services targets is likely due to the wide range of sheltering impacts identified in Step 3 of the THIRA process, as impacts are linked to the size and complexity of threat and hazard scenarios identified in Step 1 of the THIRA process.

Public Health and Medical Services

Figure 8 shows that approximately half of the represented Public Health and Medical Services targets included impacts of 10,000 to 100,000 people requiring treatment. The Public Health and Medical Services targets are correlated to time parameters, as they depict that the time required to achieve success increases with the number of people requiring treatment. Several targets requiring the most capability to be successful included longer-term actions, such as providing prophylaxis and treatment for an epidemic.

Housing

Similar to the wide range of targets to deliver Mass Care Services, Figure 4 depicts a wide variation in Housing targets to meet long-term housing




Figure 8: Mass Care Services




Figure 9: Public Health and Medical Services




Figure 10: Housing

requirements. People needing long-term housing varied widely from less than a thousand to several million, while time constraints ranged from 3 days to 4 years due to the nature of the Recovery mission area and Housing core capability. The wide variation in Housing targets is likely due to the size and complexity of threat and hazard scenarios selected by jurisdictions in Step 1 of the THIRA process and the unique displaced populations identified as potential impacts in Step 3.

Cyber-Risk Scoping Study for the Strategic National Risk Assessment

Summary

The Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) in the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) has worked with partners in NPPD to identify, scope, and provide preliminary assessments of the leading categories of risk from cybersecurity incidents, from 2015 and 2020.⁴⁶⁴ While, this analysis is not definitive, it provides the first known assessment of such risks that is entirely unclassified and is not focused on vulnerabilities or threat actors, but on the consequences of such incidents on the victims of the attacks and the United States. This study will inform the update of the Strategic National Risk Assessment that is being refreshed as part of the National Preparedness Goal led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

The February 2015 Worldwide Threat Assessment by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) summarizes the current state of affairs from a strategic perspective:

Cyber-threats to U.S. national and economic security are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication, and severity of impact. The ranges of cyber-threat actors, methods of attack, targeted systems, and victims are also expanding. Overall, the unclassified information and communication technology (ICT) networks that support U.S. Government, military, commercial, and social activities remain vulnerable to espionage and/or disruption. However, the likelihood of a catastrophic attack from any particular actor is remote at this time. Rather than a “Cyber-Armageddon” scenario that debilitates the entire U.S. infrastructure, we envision something different. We foresee an ongoing series of low-to-moderate level cyberattacks from a variety of sources over time, which will impose cumulative costs on U.S. economic competitiveness and national security.⁴⁶⁵

Both the ODNI and NPPD’s assessments reveal that within the last few years there have been significant changes to the availability and transparency of information about cybersecurity concerns in the United States (U.S.) This development allows us to create an analytic product which provides qualitative assessments with quantitative details that illustrate the trends of increasing risks. The consequence-focus of this analysis shows that, while some scenarios create significant direct burdens on individual organizations, the overwhelming majority of the consequences are experienced broadly throughout the U.S. by individuals, companies, not-for-profit organizations, and government authorities at all levels. While some scenarios can be clearly associated with financial losses, other scenarios may have greater risk. Much of this risk-burden comes from the high degree of uncertainty.

⁴⁶⁴ OCIA thanks U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), Industrial Control Systems-Computer Emergency Readiness Team (ICS-CERT), the Office of Infrastructure Protection, private sector partners, and the NPPD Front Office for their contributions, as well as the many Whole of Community contributors to the SNRA.

⁴⁶⁵ Clapper, James, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR - SASC_FINAL.pdf, accessed March 24, 2015

Background

The body of evidence available to the public regarding cybersecurity incidents and their consequences is notoriously limited; information is revealed, rather than observed, and these revelations give us an incomplete view. Despite this challenge, NPPD believes that there is greater knowledge about cybersecurity risks today than there was when the first Strategic National Risk Assessment was conducted in 2011 to inform the National Preparedness Goal.

The distribution of this knowledge is inconsistent; it does not reflect the risk itself, so much as the degree to which victims of cybersecurity challenges have been forthcoming. We consider this analysis a scoping study, as it provides insights into size, depth, cost and frequency of various aspects of the risk space, without meeting a requirement to put forward comparable measures of expected loss for different types of scenarios. Furthermore, a scoping study also allows the use of inferred resources, which have greater uncertainty associated with them.

The selection of scenarios should help analysts and planners recognize general categories of risk in cyberspace and understand specific examples of how these incidents have developed. We hope that the readers who use this assessment will include those focused on:

- Proactive investments in improved information security,
- Proactive investments in operational alternatives that make an organization less vulnerable in the event of a cybersecurity incident,
- Preparations for responding to an incident that affects the data and operations of the organization, and
- Discussions and decisions about how to engage effectively in the public-private partnership necessary to understand and manage security and resilience risks.

These scenarios also allow the reader to gain insights into what is observed by NPPD, without having to delve into classified information or distorting our view of the cyber-risk landscape. The assessments for the scenario types may reflect publicly reported examples, insights from NPPD's Industrial Control Systems Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), analogy, or the results of simulations and analysis. The scenarios themselves reflect concerns identified by different stakeholders, including:

- State and local inputs in the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA), which showed a high level of concern with the uncertainty and poor preparedness for cybersecurity incidents. The raw data for the THIRA sometimes reflected inconsistencies or infeasibilities that we allowed in this study as a reflection of how unclear this threat space is, and we adjusted to generalized scenarios of types that allowed a productive assessment.
- Research of publicly available reporting of incidents. Often, such research discovers instances of reported breaches or hints of problems that are not publicly discussed. Not all data is presented consistently or disaggregated sufficiently so that one can discern the characteristics of individual cybersecurity incidents. Such research clearly reveals the degree to which there is little consensus for how to assess the consequences of such events.
- Reporting in the ICS-CERT Monitor. These scenarios reflect anonymized reporting by partners and may provide a clear basis for why stakeholders are so concerned about cybersecurity risks that have not really fully materialized.

- Scenarios developed for exercises by the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) that represent shared concerns among key partners. Exercises allowed them to discuss how partners would deal with a challenge as it emerges. Unlike the state and local-generated scenarios, the information and data available to the NCCIC reflects a much clearer understanding of cybersecurity professionals about how such incidents might unfold. They also reflected a general lack of understanding of how to assess the consequences.
- Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA)-identified scenarios. Such scenarios were developed when we found a category of cybersecurity incident that was sufficiently well defined that analysis could improve the body of knowledge and understanding about the potential risks. In some cases, OCIA used simple logic models to clarify how the results of an as yet unseen cyberattack would be analogous to the effects of another type of event. It is certain that the societal and economic consequences could be greater than most of the consequence assessments presented here. But it is helpful for planners and analysts to think through the logic of how such events unfold.

This study focuses on the types of victims, what it costs them, and whether or not we as a nation should expect these losses to increase. Analysts in the cybersecurity environment may wish to study this and other referenced cybersecurity annual reports to gain better insights into how to prepare for such incidents, and hopefully, how to avoid them. This study should help all readers understand why we should manage these risks.

The summary of these scenarios includes the general category of the scenario type, some distinct manifestations that affect the risk, and NPPD's view of the risk trend from 2015-2020. The risk trend is a reflection of the combination of:

- frequency of incidents;
- strength, speed, virulence, of attacks; and
- value or scope of expected consequences – or both.

In scoping expected consequences we considered the pattern of vulnerabilities, the information and communications technology effects, the infrastructure functional effects (if they exist), and whatever organizational and societal consequences can be described.

It is extremely difficult to parse out the perception of the risk from the real risk in cybersecurity incidents. Our investments in cybersecurity pay off in increasing awareness. The increasing willingness of victims to report what is going on is believed to be an accurate reflection of real increasing risk. Some of these incidents, however, are discoveries that have been at risk for some time, but did not know it.

Those areas of the cyber-risk landscape that seem most uncertain may be prioritized to develop new analytic capabilities, improve information sharing, and to improve risk management and emergency response. The areas that seem to have more compelling evidence may be priorities for connecting the dots between the cybersecurity source of the risk, the operational activities that are impacted, and the executive decisions to manage risk across the enterprise.

Table 15 summarizes different categories of scenarios considered in this analysis, providing a qualitative assessment of the risk trend. These scenario types are described more fully in the pages that follow.

Category	Scenario	Risk Trend
National Security	Insider threat takes advantage of information security assumptions to facilitate a compromise of U.S. National Security Information and international standing	High, Increasing Slightly
	Sensitive but unclassified information is extracted by an adversary and used for intelligence	Moderate, Increasing Significantly
	Cyberattack interferes with availability of traffic flowing from a civil-purpose data source to a national-defense user	Unclear
	Supply chain corruptions result in hardware or software that has imbedded exploits to be triggered by time or a change in conditions	Unclear
Financial Services	Systemically important bank is subjected smokescreen DDoS campaigns and the extraction of customer PII and financial data	High, Increasing Significantly
	Payment system infrastructure is hacked, enabling criminals to increase the value of payments and create fraudulent means to receive payments	Moderate-High, Increasing Slightly
	Criminal hackers install malware in payment card systems for national retailer, extracting PII and financial information for customers over the course of several months. The information is sold on the black market	Moderate
Other data breach	Data breach extracts PII and other information from a government entity or not-for-profit	Moderate, Increasing Significantly
	Data breach extracts PII, financial information and personal health information from hospital or insurer	Moderate-High, Increasing Significantly
	Data breach extracts intellectual property from innovative businesses or R&D center	High, Increasing Significantly
Just DDoS	DDoS attack campaign that just impedes access	Low, Increasing Slightly
Attacks on ICS	Distributed campaign of attacks on natural gas pipeline system ICSs, timed to maximize the impacts on energy assurance	Unclear
	Cyberattack on ICSs in a drinking water systems result in contaminated water supply	Unclear
	Distributed and coordinated attack on ICSs used in drinking water system results in contaminated water supply and broken infrastructure	Unclear
	Complex coordinated attack on the grid is conducted so as to maximize physical damage and power outage	Unclear
Cyber-9/11 ⁴⁶⁶	Complex coordinated attack on significant infrastructure resulting in catastrophic outcomes	Unclear for utilities, High, Increasing for Financial Services
	Cyberattack leaves malware inserted in the control systems of many key infrastructures without further activation, such as is observed with an advanced, persistent threat	Unclear

Table 15: Summary of Cyber-Risk Scenarios

⁴⁶⁶ In most cases, when someone refers to a cyber-9/11 they are not connecting this to terrorism, but to the concept of a large-scale attack that has a broadly felt negative impact on the Nation and compels a change in the way that governments and individuals go about their business. Other references to this game-changing cataclysmic event have included “cyber-Pearl Harbor” and “cyber-Armageddon”.

National Security Scenarios

Introduction

It is very difficult to estimate risk for national security scenarios. There are intangible but sometimes existential values involved, such as national sovereignty, our ability to defend our homeland and interests in the event of hostility, the confidence of our people – and other nations – in our Government and our economy.

The question of risk is commonly determined for natural hazards, accidents, and random criminal acts as a function of likelihood and consequence. The frequency for such incidents is typically easy to discern based on observation of past incidents. However, for national security incidents there is a potentially large and unmeasurable gap between what is actually going on, and what is observed. Efforts to estimate such frequencies by observation will undoubtedly undervalue the risk dramatically. Efforts to estimate the real frequency of such incidents will be speculation.

This challenge is exasperated by the ambiguity of how to define the scope of an information-security-centric national security incident. It may be a single act of unlawfully collecting classified information or transferring it to a foreign national. Should it be the prolonged efforts over an entire career of acting in the clandestine service of a foreign government? Do we define it as the discovery or legal resolution of an espionage case in which the use of information technology (IT) was a primary means? Is it carrying out any intelligence operation through information and communications technology which once demanded human intelligence agents? Are some cyberattacks by nation-states an attempt to divert attention from some more subtle actions? Do sophisticated threat actors prepare complex overwhelming cyberattacks with physical system effects to obscure our ability to detect and defend against a physical attack? Do they use such attacks to remind other nations of their power to retaliate if they are not given full rein in other spheres of international influence?

In defining the impact of a national security incident, the primary measure may be a change of vulnerability. Our exposure as a nation is greater. There is also a cost. How do we account for the loss of the value of significant investments made to protect our nation?

What about nation-states' use of large volumes of sensitive-but-unclassified data to develop intelligence about the U.S.? The U.S. legal system and the Information Security Oversight Office recognize the responsibility of the U.S. Government to protect aggregated unclassified information with a classification in some cases. This is the recommended action in cases where the aggregate produces insights that warrant greater safeguarding of national security information. There is no mechanism to classify such information before it becomes aggregated, yet the use of modern cybersecurity exploits and Big Data analytic tools clearly enable foreign nations to develop the insights that our legal system expects us to protect as classified.

The lines between national security incidents and criminal acts become very blurred in cyberspace. When one considers the role of the foreign intelligence agents placed in the U.S. with false identities to function as spies and potential saboteurs during the Cold War, their assignments included tasks such as collecting information and preparing to disable the

Washington, D.C. electric grid and poison the public drinking water in the event of a superpower crisis.⁴⁶⁷ The alignment of their tasks with the pattern of sophisticated cyberattacks on critical infrastructure-type targets suggests that the cyberattacks may be serving some of the same purposes as the sleeper cells of the Cold War. Like sleeper cells, advanced persistent threats (APTs) and sophisticated threat actors have historically been associated with highly resourced nation-states. They are able to gain access to computer systems and stay in these systems without detection for long periods of time. In some cases we have observed these types of attacks being brought to conclusion with extraordinary complexity in short periods of time. This is believed to be the result of the attackers' patient preparation of malware and exploits and readiness to wait for the timing to fulfill the objective of the attacker. The association of particular threats to any given nation is rarely publicly made. The ODNI reported that:

Politically motivated attacks are now a growing reality with foreign actors reconnoitering and developing access to U.S. critical infrastructure systems which might be quickly exploited for disruption if the adversary's intent became hostile. In addition, those conducting cyber-espionage are targeting U.S Government, military, and commercial networks on a daily basis. These threats come from a range of actors, including: (1) nation states with highly sophisticated cyber programs (such as Russia or China), (2) nations with lesser technical capabilities but possibly more disruptive intent (such as Iran or North Korea), (3) profit-motivated criminals, and (4) ideologically motivated hackers or extremists. Distinguishing between state and non-state actors within the same country is often difficult—especially when those varied actors actively collaborate, tacitly cooperate, condone criminal activity that only harms foreign victims, or utilize similar cyber-tools.⁴⁶⁸

This connection was made by the U.S. Department of Justice recently, in the indictment of a team of Chinese military hackers, and again when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attributes the November 2014 Sony attack to North Korea. In the Worldwide Threat Assessment the ODNI highlights the growing number of computer forensic studies by industry experts that strongly suggest that several nations – including Iran and North Korea – have undertaken offensive cyber-operations against private sector targets to support their economic and foreign policy objectives, at times concurrent with political crises.⁴⁶⁹ Despite these recent cases of attribution, it is generally very hard to make the connection between any particular attack and a particular nation-state or threat actor with great confidence.

Complicating this analysis is the fact that increasingly the nation-state actors and the criminal element are using the same methods and tools. The threat of destroying data or damaging infrastructure was used in the past by criminals to extort payment from owners and operators of critical infrastructure. The majority of infrastructure-focused incidents can be traced back to advanced, persistent threats or sophisticated threat actors and are not accompanied by demands for money. The perpetrators are simply in our systems...waiting, sometimes for years before

⁴⁶⁷ Kalugin, Oleg, former KGB general, interviewed by Josh Rogin, for Foreignpolicy.com, *Ex-KGB general: Soviet sleeper agents were tasked with blowing up DC power grid; poisoning water supply*, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/07/12/ex-kgb-general-soviet-sleeper-agents-were-tasked-with-blowing-up-dc-power-grid-poisoning-water-supply/> accessed March 4, 2015.

⁴⁶⁸ Clapper, James, Worldwide Threat Assessment Report.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

they are discovered. Some national security-focused analysts give this a benign interpretation, seeing it as a present-day application of the theory of mutually assured destruction, which serves as a disincentive to nation-states to use powerful weapons and risk retaliation. Other analysts see this as a modern-day version of the Soviet illegals program⁴⁷⁰. Its secretive nature makes it less a disincentive, since it is not obvious, and more a contingency plan. The ODNI falls into this category, reporting that “Politically motivated cyberattacks are now a growing reality, and foreign actors are reconnoitering and developing access to U.S. critical infrastructure systems, which might be quickly exploited for disruption if an adversary’s intent became hostile.”⁴⁷¹

While the motivations of the individual nation-state intelligence services may be unknown, cyberattacks are affecting the civilian U.S. Government entities and the private sector and having a national security impact. Attacks that diminish the U.S. foundations of rule of law, respect for the privacy of the individual, intellectual property and economic security have the effect of degrading our national security. In most cases this is an indirect effect, thus, it is more subtle. This subtle erosion of our national values is difficult to manage because the victims cannot account for the idea that they are victims of well-planned foreign cyberattacks. We also have a hard time anticipating all of the systemic interdependencies among infrastructure sectors.⁴⁷²

Below is a small sample of the scenario space, each with a scoping assessment of the risk for the focus of the scenario. They are highly aggregated, limited by being completely unclassified, and by a lack of consensus for how to identify and measure the consequences. Scoping and contextualizing these risks is the first step to enable analysts to develop needed capabilities, for planners to begin to discern what response capabilities they lack, and to enable conversations about the value proposition for improving cybersecurity. Table 16 provides a more focused summary of the consequences, vulnerabilities and threats associated scenario 1. Subsequent tables will precede each scenario for the reader’s convenience.

⁴⁷⁰ The term “illegals” is used for intelligence staff officers who are recruited and trained to operate under deep cover in their target country. Unlike “legals” – intelligence officers who are given official diplomatic cover assignments and thus are protected by diplomatic immunity if discovered – illegals live and work seemingly ordinary lives, typically as immigrants with fake pasts. Illegals were expected to be ready to fulfill all manner of intelligence tasks when needed, from intelligence gathering to assassinations or sabotage, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities. For an article about this real, but rarely discussed practice, please see the Vanity Fair article, From Tradecraft to Sexpionage, Cold War K.G. B and U.S. Spies Concur: *The Americans Actually Happened.*, <http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/05/the-americans-real> accessed April 13, 2015

⁴⁷¹ Clapper, James, Worldwide Threat Assessment Report.

⁴⁷² Ibid. This point is made by the ODNI for some members of the private sector. NPPD believes this problem is more widespread.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Insider threat takes advantage of information security assumptions to facilitate a compromise of U.S. National Security Information and international standing	The direct effects of these types of scenarios are the uncontrolled loss of classified information. The consequences, in peacetime include loss of value of intelligence sources and methods, loss of public trust, loss of international standing, competitive advantage to adversaries, and more. During a time of conflict these consequences could lead to unnecessary casualties, economic losses, and the risk of impaired national sovereignty.	Ineffective screening of personnel. Overly connected and unmonitored access to data within protected systems. Ability to use portable devices to collect records and to remove portable devices undetected.	Foreign intelligence agencies Unstable personnel in the cohort with unfettered access Disingenuous or corrupted individuals with unfettered access

Table 16: National Security Scenario Type 1

As information systems have become the core of the knowledge management and information sharing capability of the U.S. intelligence community, insider threats have increasingly used them as tools for collection and espionage. Since the year 2000, of the seventeen cases where a U.S. insider was accused or convicted of espionage in connection with their unlawful release of national security information, nine of those cases appear to have been facilitated by the use of computer systems in the furtherance of their crimes.

Some of these acts, most notably by Edward Snowden and Private Bradley Manning, took advantage of significant access to classified information systems to gather a broad range of information and used portable media to extract the data from its authorized location.⁴⁷³

A comparatively low consequence profile for such an incident would result from smaller amounts of less critical information being provided to a single adversary without a strong competitive advantage against the U.S. In cases where more information was carefully analyzed and prioritized for a highly capable foreign adversary's use, the consequences are much higher. Cases where individuals may have worked on behalf of Russia (or the former Soviet Union), accepted the protection of Russia, or who have pursued disclosure policies that benefit Russia are good examples of instances where there is greater harm. Examples of higher consequence cases that have harmed U.S. interests and international standing include the efforts of Robert Hanssen, Manning, and Snowden.⁴⁷⁴

The minimum economic consequences of such attacks are the exposure of significant U.S. sources and methods that cost at least tens of billions of U.S. dollars to develop and maintain.

⁴⁷³ Edward Snowden was a contract computer professional who collected classified documents from the National Security Agency using his privileged access and then released portions of these documents publicly. Bradley Manning was an enlisted intelligence analyst in the U.S. Army who similarly collected classified documents and released them to the public through a website. Manning later underwent a gender transition and began using the name Chelsea.

⁴⁷⁴ Robert Hanssen was an FBI agent who spied for the Russian Intelligence Services.

Exposing our sources and methods enables adversaries to develop ways to avoid being monitored, significantly reducing the value of the national investment. In the event of actual hostilities the strategic and operational value of this information is inestimable.

Analytic judgments of this situation, not guided by classified information, suggest that it is reasonable to project that such risks are increasing. From 2015 to 2020, given that current international tensions are becoming more acute and economic competition in the international marketplace plays an increasing role the past pattern of incidents is likely to continue. Individuals with authorized access are increasing the sophistication of their abuse of this access. The consequences of the public release or unauthorized transmittal to foreign agents of classified information may reasonably be greater, as the balance of power is shifting and tense. As our culture becomes increasingly fragmented and some in society view this type of activity as heroic, we might expect this to increase in frequency. However, this increase in motivated individuals may be counterbalanced by increasingly vigilant information security and counterintelligence.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Sensitive but unclassified information is extracted by an adversary	Foreign intelligence services have large bodies of data useful for pattern analysis and future targeting. Often this is data about individuals with access to sensitive information.	Technical vulnerabilities vary. Management vulnerabilities include maintaining more PII, employment data, and other sensitive information than may be essential.	Foreign intelligence services conducting data breach attacks typically over the Internet

Table 17: National Security Scenario Type 2

Chinese intelligence efforts appear to take advantage of Big Data approaches to gathering unclassified information about individuals with access to classified information. Public reporting of the Anthem Blue Cross health insurance data breach attack revealed that there are strong indications the incident was perpetrated by Chinese hackers. Some have speculated about the value of the data on the large number of defense contractors at Northrup Grumman and Boeing whose personally identifiable information (PII) were gathered in the Anthem attack.⁴⁷⁵ This attack will have serious economic repercussions on Anthem, and, if it is found to have exposed personal health information, it could theoretically cost the company over \$800 billion, mostly in fines – which is likely to be an existential penalty. Limited regulatory tools meant to incentivize private companies to do all they can to safeguard individuals' data may also drive a wedge between the public and private sector in just such an area where collaboration is the only path to success. The more likely national security consequences of this attack may be that Chinese intelligence has large datasets that help them identify likely targets for further intelligence gathering.

Security researchers in Kaspersky Lab reported discovering a cyber-espionage campaign called “Caret0”, or “The Mask”, which in February 2014 had been active in 31 countries for 7 years. The campaign appears to have been authored by Spanish attackers, and targets primarily

⁴⁷⁵ Riley, Michael; Robertson, Jordan, Chinese State-Sponsored Hackers Suspected in Anthem Attack, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-05/signs-of-china-sponsored-hackers-seen-in-anthem-attack>, accessed March 3, 2015

government institutions, diplomatic offices and embassies, energy, oil and gas companies, research organizations and activists. Victims were in the Middle East and Europe to Africa and the Americas.⁴⁷⁶

It is possible that these attacks have a further destabilizing impact in the U.S. by creating incredible challenges for victim companies, who may believe they are using best known practices but are still successfully attacked. The 2015 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report notes that “...the reality is that if a determined, state-sponsored adversary wants your data, they’re going to get it unless another state-sponsored entity helps you defend it.”⁴⁷⁷ And yet, a political climate of distrust of companies and fear of new legislation or regulation establishes obstacles in the public-private partnership that must be engaged improve cybersecurity.

Attacks such as these that make use of large amounts of unclassified but sensitive data are likely to grow in frequency and sophistication over the next 5 years. The consequences of such attacks are likely to increase in two ways: the costs will increase for the direct victims (those experiencing the cybersecurity incidents), and the indirect victims (those whose personal information is being collected), and the U.S. will suffer a national security loss as adversaries gain valuable insights through the aggregation and abuse of sensitive but unclassified data.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Cyberattack interferes with availability of traffic flowing from a civil-purpose source to a national-defense user	National defense utilizers of civil data become blind to a normal data input. In peacetime this may conceal an individual incident. During a time of conflict this may significantly empower an adversary.	Technical vulnerabilities vary, but are decreasing through proactive management.	Most likely foreign military intelligence services in support of tactical operations.

Table 18: National Security Scenario Type 3

Still other cyber-attacks can be designed to interfere with the normal movement of data that keeps our national defense authorities informed of the lawful movement of accepted civilian traffic, such as the Automated Identification System used by maritime vessels. This is a route-injection or route hijacking attack. A route injection or hijacking occurs when a threat actor gains access to routers running Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and alters or injects their own route. Physical access is not necessary to exploit a vulnerability if the router can be found on the Internet. Filters are used to identify alternate data routes, but can be avoided by a savvy attacker. An incident such as this may obscure the situational awareness of defense authorities. Once detected, if the information flow is not restored, the detrimental outcomes are difficult to work around. It is not possible to replace a real-time data stream with snapshots and reporting by other

⁴⁷⁶ Kaspersky Lab, Kaspersky Lab Uncovers “The Mask”: One of the Most Advanced Global Cyberespionage Operations to Date Due to the Complexity of the Toolset Used by the Attackers, <http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2014/Kaspersky-Lab-Uncovers-The-Mask-One-of-the-Most-Advanced-Global-Cyber-espionage-Operations-to-Date-Due-to-the-Complexity-of-the-Toolset-Used-by-the-Attackers> accessed March 17, 2015

⁴⁷⁷ 2015 Data Breach Investigations Report, downloadable at <http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/?&keyword=p6922139254&gclid=CKb03ZXLisUCFbLm7AodFWQAgA>, accessed April 22, 2015.

means, such as email and phone calls. During a time of peace, such a cybersecurity incident may be an impedance or nuisance, but it may provide a significant tactical advantage during hostility. A recent risk assessment completed in a coordinated effort between DHS and the Information Technology Sector, outlines more detail on risks to Domain Name Servers (DNS) and Internet routing. Specific to this scenario, they have identified areas of vulnerability targeted by threat actors and offer potential mitigations and recommendations with regards to risk management.

While the risk and the risk trends for scenarios such as this are unclear in this discussion, government analysts systematically try to discern scenarios that are effective for planning and proactive vulnerability management. The consequences of an attack such as this would likely be minor during peacetime, but significant during a time of crisis. They would be less for some types of civil-purposes, and greater for others. There is no basis to assess the frequency of attacks such as these, nor is frequency very relevant to the risk. In cases such as this, proactive management of the vulnerabilities is the commonly accepted approach.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Supply chain corruptions result in hardware or software that has imbedded exploits to be triggered by time or a change in conditions	National defense agencies or defense contractors relying on software or hardware in sensitive systems lose access to reliable services when an exploit is triggered to execute an operation outside of the control of the system managers. During peacetime this may be mitigated by regular backups. During a time of conflict the loss of services may be timed to stress U.S. capacities just when they are needed.	Components or software manufactured or shipped through the control of adversaries	Foreign intelligence services controlling the operations or corrupt businesses seeking to profit by manufacturing counterfeit products without addressing known vulnerabilities.

Table 19: National Security Scenario Type 4

Analysts are concerned about the risks associated with supply chains. This includes the possibility that hardware or software may have originated in adversarial countries, or passed through adversary controls and now are corrupted with malware that may be activated at a later date. According to the CISCO 2014 Annual Security Report, “Malicious actors will seek out and exploit any security weakness in the technology supply chain. Vulnerabilities and intentional backdoors in technology products can ultimately provide them with access to the “full house.” Backdoors have long been a security issue and should be a concern for organizations, because they exist solely to help facilitate surreptitious or criminal activity.”⁴⁷⁸ Even in networks that may have an excellent perimeter security, with no connectivity to the Internet, the possibility that data could be corrupted or destroyed within the network should remain a significant concern.

This concern has led to long collaboration among the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Defense Industrial Base Sector. Proactive action has resulted in a pilot program to mitigate supply chain risk for the defense industrial base, recognizing that it is typically their acquisitions that are tainted, rather than their production. This

⁴⁷⁸ CISCO 2014 Annual Security Report http://www.cisco.com/web/offer/gist_ty2_asset/Cisco_2014_ASR.pdf Accessed March 11, 2015

pilot is meant to deal with “the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution, installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system.”⁴⁷⁹ The DOD pilot program will continue through FY 2017. It is not yet clear whether this pilot program will succeed in identifying and mitigating risks closer to the beginning of supply chains, or how successful it may be in light of the problem of counterfeit products entering the supply chain.

While this type of attack does not require a great deal of tactical sophistication to accomplish a great deal of harm, it does require knowledge of vulnerabilities along with logical or physical access, or both. When corrupted software or hardware makes its way to systems that connect to the Internet, it is possible that backdoors could be used later to trigger whatever harmful outcome is intended by an adversary. In systems without backdoors, adversaries could use a “set it and forget it” approach, which results in data destruction, or sabotage of a system when certain system parameters are reached. This latter scenario type, while feasible, is likely to be less appealing to adversaries as it removes so much active control. Supply chain vulnerabilities are greater in countries where manufacturing of counterfeit products is more common, or where governments legally require the collaboration of the private sector. Under such circumstances the challenges of coordination may be less of an obstacle than subject matter experts in the IT Sector assessed in the 2009 IT Sector Baseline Risk Assessment.⁴⁸⁰ Their assessment that such attacks may be less frequent than other types of cyberattacks may be true, but the risks associated with tainted supply chains was sufficient for DHS’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications to establish an IT Supply Chain Risk Management program focused on addressing this challenge.

The effects of such attacks are simply that the adversary has accomplished a change of vulnerability. Instead of outside the fence, he is inside. The exploit that is triggered by any malware or further actions by an adversary is what would result in consequences, so they would greatly vary. The frequency of such attacks is unclear, but likely be less than common Internet-based attacks. This is a risk in which substantial efforts are now invested in controlling, and there are surprising discoveries of known vulnerabilities in newly acquired software. The efforts face greater challenges, however, in that it is difficult to find an unknown threat or vulnerability.

Financial Information and Other Data Breaches

Introduction

Financial-information-related cyberattacks have great value to both criminals as well as other adversaries. The increasing use of exploits that allow criminals to gather individuals’ personal identity information (PII) and their financial information has demonstrated that this is a growing industry. This information can be sold on the black market or turned around by a multidisciplinary criminal organization to create counterfeit credit or debit cards and used as quickly as possible, to get as much cash as they can before the fraud is discovered. This endeavor easily brings in millions of dollars a year to individual criminal groups, with relatively low risk.

⁴⁷⁹ Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Requirements Relating to Supply Chain Risk (DFARS Case 2012-D050) <https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/11/18/2013-27311/defense-federal-acquisition-regulation-supplement-requirements-relating-to-supply-chain-risk-dfars>, accessed March 11, 2015

⁴⁸⁰ IT Sector Baseline Risk Assessment, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp_it_baseline_risk_assessment.pdf, accessed April 24, 2015

Data breaches that result in the loss of financial information are not unique to the Financial Services Sector. In fact, financial institutions are probably best equipped to deal with the losses, as they can recover their costs through their lines of business and their practice of covering the fraud losses of their customers has resulted in this being a fairly managed risk, from the perspective of the Sector. Nevertheless, identity theft remains the highest consumer complaint, according to the Federal Trade Commission, and harm from the exposure of an individual's PII is difficult to calculate.

The actual fraud loss going to the criminals is just one type of cost, as noted, typically covered by the financial institution if an institution is involved. In cases where retailers are also involved, the retailers themselves pay for services to protect their customers for a period of time as well. Other types of organizations also maintain individuals' PII and financial information, and it is much less clear what sort of resources they can use to provide comparable protections to individuals whose identities and financial information are compromised.

Furthermore, organizations may be fined, depending on what regulations apply to them, and their tolerance for absorbing these penalties may vary. Another source of loss is the direct costs of responding to cybersecurity incidents, which are going up as the complexity of attacks goes up and the level of defensive resources are invested in an attempt match it.

When one considers these as campaigns of recurring, high-frequency attacks, some with real direct fraud losses, fines, and most with increases in operational demand on defenders' information security and data centers, the costs of these attacks are becoming increasingly burdensome. In many cases the requirement for public notice is established by the State where the victims are found. A requirement to notify all whose identity is exposed results in significant additional costs for the victim organization, as the very act of dealing with the notification process is expensive, let alone the additional consequences the institution may take from the perspective of public confidence in the institution. Surveys by cybersecurity companies produce results too aggregated to assist in understanding risks for scenarios, but they do indicate that the costs of responding to cyberattacks is increasing dramatically, in part due to the increasing prevalence of using a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack as a smokescreen to distract the cybersecurity staff while the criminals extract large volumes of data that they can then capitalize on. Forty percent of one survey's respondents reported losing more than \$1 million a day from these sophisticated combination attacks.⁴⁸¹

The concern about the level of cyberattacks against the U.S. financial services industry has increased significantly in the past few years. Information security threats prompted the Financial Stability Oversight Council in 2013 and 2014 to highlight operational risk, and information security in particular, as worthy of heightened risk management and supervisory attention.⁴⁸² In its 2014 annual report, the Council stated that mitigating evolving information security threats, effectively managing incidents, and promoting recovery efforts are critical to maintaining public confidence and reducing financial risk.

⁴⁸¹ Neustar, [2014 The Danger Deepens, Neustar Annual DDoS Attacks and Impact Report, http://www.neustar.biz/resources/whitepapers/ddos-protection/2014-annual-ddos-attacks-and-impact-report.pdf](http://www.neustar.biz/resources/whitepapers/ddos-protection/2014-annual-ddos-attacks-and-impact-report.pdf), accessed March 4, 2015

⁴⁸² The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was established to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States, promote market discipline, and respond to emerging threats to the stability of the financial system. FSOC consists of 15 members, including the heads of the Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, National Credit Union Administration, and Securities and Exchange Commission.

The protection of critical infrastructure (which includes banking and financial institutions) from cyber threats is a high national priority, but different understandings of the Financial Services Sector leads to varied priorities among the different stakeholders. While the individual customer may be greatly concerned about identity theft and the possibility of becoming a victim of fraud, the institutions may view this risk as managed through their absorption of the fraud losses. National Sector leaders have a global view, informed by the comparison of the retail payment system, through which passes approximately \$160 billion a day, to the wholesale payment system, through which passes \$16 trillion a day. They encourage the institutions' effective management of these observed cybersecurity risks, while trying to assure the continued prevention of more catastrophic attacks against the Financial Services Sector infrastructure or those Communications Sector and Information Technology Sector infrastructures that they depend upon.

At least one important state regulator is concerned about the potential that banks may be unable to manage them, and, as a result, there may be cascading systemic risk that spills from one bank to affect others, and that this may in turn affect the larger economy. In a February 25, 2015 speech at Columbia Law School, Ben Lawsky, the Superintendent of New York's Department of Financial Services stated that he is concerned that there will be an attack on Wall Street firms that could "spill over into the broader economy." "We are concerned that within the next decade, or perhaps sooner, we will experience an Armageddon-type cyber event that causes a significant disruption in the financial system for a period of time," calling such an event a "cyber 9/11." If the changes that the New York Department of Financial Services proposes are put in place it will create new requirements for all of the Wall Street banks and insurers.⁴⁸³ Since the majority of major financial institutions in the U.S. have a New York presence, this is significant.

There are many financial regulators at the Federal and state levels. In recent years as the global economy has become even more interdependent, the consensus guidance of international bodies of financial regulators has increased. Ultimately, the confusion and burden of many regulators creates an environment of distrust and a fear of being noncompliant. Compliance risk sometimes distracts organizations from other important risk management.

Simply reducing regulation is not necessarily the answer. Governments started regulating the financial services industry because of both criminal abuses and the realization that there are risks that emerge within markets or financial systems that propagate throughout the system of systems and into the larger economy. While activities that are highly regulated tend to be less profitable, which creates an incentive to innovate with new products, new payment platforms, etc., innovation is a mark of American strength. Today, within the financial services industry, much of these new innovations bring increasing exposure from cybersecurity risks.

Below are two scenarios which provide samples of this risk space. One highlights the potential for sudden and unexpected transitions to serious economic problems, the other highlights a risk that is becoming commonplace, expensive, and not always reported. There are many other scenarios that deserve assessment, but the potential consequences of these attacks can be so complex, and so fast moving that it is difficult to define and the available information for an assessment such as this is insufficient to provide value to planners. Such attacks may include

⁴⁸³ Kaja Whitehouse, USA Today, Regulator warns of "Armageddon" cyber attacks on banks
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/02/25/lawsky-goldman-sachs-banks/23995979/> accessed March 6, 2015

coordinated attacks on financial market utilities, securities or futures exchanges, etc. These scenarios may include attacks on the financial services infrastructure itself. The complexity of this sector, its increasing globalization, and its interconnection with current world events and individual perceptions make it difficult to develop a clear view of financial systemic risks.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
U.S. Systemically Important Bank is subjected to smokescreen DDoS campaigns and the extraction of customer personal identity information and financial data	Bank will absorb costs related to individual customers' initial credit monitoring and actual fraud, and costly incident management and notification activities. Additional soft costs relate to reputational risks for the bank, and substantial risk and time on the part of the customer, participating in the close monitoring of their credit and charges to their accounts, legal actions, and other uncovered expenses. If risks become intolerable and the public begins to distrust banks, problems for systemically important banks could have a destabilizing impact on the system of systems.	Interconnected systems allowing threat actors to infiltrate through smaller, less secure systems. Lack of oversight or management within organizations over newly installed technology and employees supporting.	Globally systemically important banks would logically be more likely targeted by criminals, terrorist groups, or agents of nation-states who are not well-integrated in the global economy. Risk of destabilizing the global economy is a disincentive to actors whose investments depend on financial stability.

Table 20: Data Breach Scenario Type 1

Systemically important banks (SIBs) are those banks that have met some threshold for heightened supervision based on the amount of assets they manage. Regulators are concerned that the role of these banks in the overarching financial system of systems is so great, that if some overwhelming stress impacts them and causes them to fail, the exposure of many other institutions to this failure could trigger another financial systemic risk event and potentially another global economic crisis such as was seen beginning in 2007. By requiring heightened supervision, related stress tests, greater capital reserves, and other risk management efforts to help them recover from their own incidents, rather than have a failure extend to others who are exposed to their problems, it is expected that the dominance of any one of these institutions will not lead to systemic reactions in the event that they experience shocks.

The international financial regulatory body, the Financial Stability Board, monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system. The Board was responsible for identifying which banks fit into the category of Global Systemically Important Bank (G-SIB). Many, but not all of these banks are headquartered in the U.S. There is no evidence that cyber threats target these banks in an attempt to destabilize the global economy, just that their health is important to the global economy. The following G-SIBs are headquartered in the U.S.:

Global Systemically Important Banks Headquartered in the U.S.	
Bank of America	JP Morgan Chase
Bank of New York Mellon	Morgan Stanley
Citigroup	State Street
Goldman Sachs	Wells Fargo

An additional 24 G-SIBs are not headquartered in the U.S., though, by definition, the stability of these other banks is vital to the interests of the U.S. economy.

The Dodd-Frank Act established a threshold for any banks or bank holding companies that imposes heightened supervision standards. Any such institution with a balance sheet of greater than \$50 billion is perceived in the international financial community as the equivalent of a U.S. domestically systemically important bank. Like the G-SIBs, there is no evidence that cyber threats are striving to destabilize the national or global economies through attacks on these banks. They are simply determined by legislated threshold to be of greater concern to avoid the potential that their failure may affect the larger economy.

U.S. Domestic Systemically Important Banks	
Ally Financial	KeyCorp
American Express	M&T Bank
BB&T	Northern Trust
BVA Compass	PNC Financial Services
BMO Financial Corp	RBS Citizens Financial Group
Capital One Financial	Regions Financial
Comerica	Santander Holdings USA
Discover Financial Services	Sun Trust Banks
Fifth Third Bank	U.S. Bancorp
HSBC North America Holdings	UnionBanCal
Huntington Bancshares	Zions

In a scenario of this type the target is a more capable defender, as it is one of the largest U.S. banks. The financial institution is hit with multiple campaigns of repeated DDoS attacks that serve as a smokescreen for data breach, which extracts customer financial information and PII. It is not uncommon that these attacks are so frequent that the victim bank has lost count; they are more than weekly. Some last for hours, others for several days. The institution must cover the losses of their customers, which they can recoup in part through fees and possibly insurance. They are very concerned about the hidden costs, such as the reputational risks, the churn of current customers going to other institutions and the potential that new customers would be put off from using their services in the future.

The Financial Stability Oversight Council's 2014 Annual Report contained at least six recommendations to stakeholders ranging from institutions to Congress for reducing cybersecurity risks. These recommendations include a demand for coordinated and collaborative Government-wide commitment and partnership with the private sector to promote infrastructure security and resilience, increased accountability through financial regulators of institutions' efforts to assess cyber-related vulnerabilities and to address gaps in oversight, increased engagement between institutions and private sector infrastructure cybersecurity providers, improved information sharing, and removal of legal barriers.

Banks have increased their investments in cybersecurity attempting to manage these risks yet they continue to experience them and incur additional costs. Occasionally, they have had to cover \$5M-\$10M real financial losses for customers who have become victims of fraud. They have observed that their shareholder value dips, but not for more than a few weeks. JP Morgan Chase announced plans, after experiencing the 2012 to 2013 DDoS attacks on the U.S. Financial

Services Sector, to increase their annual cybersecurity expenditures to \$250 million by the end of 2014. After they suffered a hacking intrusion in 2014, JPMorgan's CEO said he would probably double JPMorgan's annual computer security budget within the next five years.⁴⁸⁴

The sophistication of these attacks is increasing, not just in terms of the combinations of cyber threats used in perpetrating the attacks, but with organization of teams of people ready to promptly make use of stolen financial information. The consequences are increasing as the sophistication increases, but there are additional risks that may emerge if a systemic reaction is triggered. The frequency of such attacks for individual institutions is expected to increase between 2015 and 2020 and the number of institutions affected is also likely to increase. We have no expectation that an adversary would attempt to induce a larger systemic risk that would impact the global economy, but there are often unintended consequences in highly complex interdependent systems, and the risk of systemic responses remains a concern.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Retail Payment Service Provider is Hacked, Enabling Criminals to Increase the Value of Payments and Create Fraudulent Means to Receive Payments	Owners and operators of payment system infrastructure are apt to cover fraudulent payments and monitor the credit of impacted parties. Additional soft costs relate to reputational risk for the service provider, substantial risk and time on the part of customers and payees, participating in the close monitoring of charges to their accounts, evidence of identity fraud, legal actions, some of which is not covered by the payment service provider.	Lack of system awareness and understanding.	Criminal groups are most likely to attack payment service providers in an attempt to quickly siphon large amounts of funds.

Table 21: Data Breach Scenario Type 2

Payment infrastructure is complex and diverse, and innovations in how payments are made are sometimes better understood by international criminals than they are by many in the U.S. The feasibility of computer-enabled interference or manipulation of many of these systems is unclear. It is clear that some criminal hackers have figured out how to manipulate at least small portions of and turn it into a profitable criminal endeavor.

In one international hacking event that has been successfully prosecuted, a criminal group used sophisticated techniques to compromise the data encryption that was used by Royal Bank of Scotland's RBS WorldPay to protect customer data on payroll debit cards. Payroll debit cards are used by various companies to pay their employees. By using a payroll debit card, employees are able to withdraw their regular salaries from an ATM. Once in, the criminals raised the account limits on compromised accounts, and then provided a network of cashers with 44 counterfeit payroll debit cards, which were used to withdraw more than \$9 million from over 2,100 ATMs in at least 280 cities worldwide, including cities in the U.S., Russia, Ukraine, Estonia, Italy, Hong Kong, Japan and Canada. The \$9 million loss occurred within a span of less than 12 hours.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸⁴ Clapper, James, Worldwide Threat Assessment

⁴⁸⁵ 2008 attack through payment infrastructure, with international collaboration. <http://www.justice.gov/usao/gan/press/2014/10-24-14.html>

Financial infrastructure systems are complex. This payment card system is not common in the U.S. In addition to understanding how to successfully execute a cyberattack, this criminal enterprise had to identify infrastructure elements that operate in the background, figure out how to manipulate them, and develop and manage teams around the world to quickly complete the crime. The sophistication of attacks on portions of the retail payment infrastructure is multidisciplinary, challenging, but likely to increase. It was remarkable that RBS WorldPay and international authorities were able to respond as well as they did. Criminal groups are likely to be working on new attacks. The consequences of such attacks are also likely to increase as the motives for improving the criminal endeavor is to get away with more money. The frequency of such attacks is likely to increase as well, as the incentives to do them are significant.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Criminal Hackers Install Malware in Retail Payment Card Readers at a National Retail Chain	Here the costs are both economic and societal. Financial institutions and victims of identity theft shoulder the burdens with fines and recovery payments, along with the steps needed to rebuild and maintain credit.	Interconnected systems allowing threat actors to infiltrate through smaller, less secure systems. Lack of monitoring activities over legacy and newly installed technology.	Criminal hackers are the most likely threat actors.

Table 22: Data Breach Scenario Type 3

This portion of the retail payment system is part financial services and part commercial retail industry. Cybersecurity attacks here affect the card issuers, the retail chain, and of course, the customer. In this scenario type, criminal hackers install malware in retail payment card reader systems at a national chain, extracting PII and financial information for customers over the course of several months. The information is sold on the black market, and retailers and card issuers incur significant costs to compensate the affected customers, though the long-term impact for many customers remains significant. For some customers this impact is unnoticed or delayed; some criminals hold the stolen PII until the incident appears to have faded from public notice. Despite the fact that there are increasing notifications of these events, it is suspected that these events are now occurring without notice, as they are yet to be identified. Typically these crimes are discovered, by either actual fraudulent use of the customers' account details in online or telephone purchases that are challenged, or by the discovery of large amounts of customer PII and financial information for sale on the black market. A smaller percentage of these cyberattacks result in the quick manufacture of counterfeit physical payment cards.

There has been such an intense and broad set of cyberattacks against retailers in recent times that a multi-agency Government task force looked into these attacks to determine if there was evidence that they were a coordinated campaign designed to adversely affect the U.S. economy. In their two page report, the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force stated that they have not found evidence of overarching responsibility behind all of the attacks, but they underscored

that the global implications of the retail attacks and the economic impacts to private business and individuals cannot be overstated.⁴⁸⁶

Numerous efforts have been made to account for the costs associated with such events. In addition to the costs that are reported in cybersecurity industry surveys about dealing with the expense of responding to cybersecurity incidents (too aggregated to be used here), the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provides a useful estimate of the minimal costs associated with the loss of personal financial data that is sufficient to commit fraud. The intention behind the sentencing guidelines is not to estimate the actual financial losses that any individual company or affected customer experiences from the crime, but to provide a defensible approximation of the average combined costs for all stakeholders. Recent studies have suggested that any fixed cost per record is apt to produce an erroneous result.⁴⁸⁷

What are these costs? The company itself suddenly has to turn to corporate emergency response mode to address the incident, pay fines, fees, hire consultants, possibly notify victims, etc. It is the reputational costs, the opportunity costs of work that did not get done because of this attack, as well as churn that results as their customers go to competitors. In addition to these costs, many of the criminals turn around and use stolen identity information to file for tax refunds. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) reported that, while they estimate that they prevented \$24.2 billion in fraudulent identity refunds in 2013, they still paid out \$5.8 billion in fraudulent refunds—and that is just what they know about.⁴⁸⁸

To a degree, individuals bear similar costs when they become victims of identity theft. Even if no actual fraud takes place, the victim often has to invest time and resources to address his or her risk. They may cancel cards and increase monitoring of their financial information. If the data is used and an individual becomes the victim of identity fraud, the individual may suffer much greater losses. While financial institutions bear the burden for those fraud losses that may be promptly realized, it is not hard to see that once someone's PII and financial information is out in the domain of criminals, the possibility of long lasting harm is quite real. The Federal Trade Commission estimated that identity theft takes an average of 200 hours of work and six months to recover. Most of this work involves keeping track of creditors, correspondence and phone calls, working with law enforcement and working with credit bureaus. These efforts are needed to prevent the victim from being liable for the debts the imposter created in their name, if actual fraud occurs. Additional work is needed in the fight to recover an accurate credit score. Since credit scores are used to establish the interest rates one is charged and whether or not credit will be offered, without this investment the victim will continue to pay for years. In some cases, victims of identity fraud lose out on job opportunities because they appear to be unreliable. Victims of identity theft choose to do all this work to restore the true record of their credit. It may be a better alternative to being held responsible for these debts, but it is a real cost to the individual. And yet, once individuals do most of the work to set up their own monitoring, the actual effort is not likely to increase much if their identity is stolen a second time. Thus, the

⁴⁸⁶ Associated Press, U.S. retail cyberattacks not coordinated, shows government report, <http://m.tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/us-retail-cyberattacks-not-coordinated-shows-government-report-217998.html> accessed March 17, 2014

⁴⁸⁷ Verizon 2015 Data Breach Investigation Report, downloadable at <http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/>, accessed April 24, 2015

⁴⁸⁸ Robert. W. Wood, IRS Paid \$5.8 Billion in Fraudulent Refunds, Identity Theft Efforts Need Work, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2015/02/19/irs-paid-5-8-billion-in-fraudulent-refunds-identity-theft-efforts-need-work/> accessed March 18, 2015

costs per record would logically go down for the individual, who may actually pass on lower costs per record to the institution that lost their data. How many credit monitoring efforts are needed?

The difference between identity theft and identity fraud is that a victim of identity theft may not experience the actual losses associated with the criminal using their data to commit fraud.

Unfortunately, this distinction is not always clear in research and reporting on the topic; but this appears to be an important distinction. It reveals that the extraordinary work that both industry and individuals take on after identity theft occurs appears to be paying off. After a trend of increasing numbers of U.S. fraud cases from 2010 to 2013, the 2014 number of cases dropped 3 percent to 12.7 from 13.1 million cases in 2013. The total fraud losses dropped 11 percent to \$16 billion, from \$18 billion in 2013.⁴⁸⁹ As both the number of cases drops and the total lost through fraud is calculated, however, it is important that to recognize that the amount of time and money spent by companies and individuals to prevent these losses is not included in the estimates. It remains a big problem.

In view of the information above, it is clear that these losses are not all borne by the retailers or the card issuers, nor can they easily be accounted for. There is some additional societal cost and individual harm. But it is not reasonable to just directly utilize these Sentencing Guidelines as a proxy for losses. They are explicitly about unauthorized telecommunication access devices, and, while it is clear that payment card skimming devices fall within the guidelines, it is not clear how the Sentencing Guidelines would apply to hacks that did not use a card skimmer. The Sentencing Guidelines have no clear reference to the number of victims or number of records of an incident. The financial estimates that refer to these Guidelines seem to interpret the illegal extraction of the electronic record as an instance of the use of an unauthorized access device, which this analysis can neither endorse nor dispute.

While those that argue against the use of the Sentencing Guidelines suggest that it inflates the cost, it could be argued that the Sentencing Guidelines may undervalue the losses. As written, if the unauthorized access device is unused (i.e. only identity theft), the minimal potential loss is \$100 per affected account. If the data is used (i.e. unauthorized charges take place), the minimal potential loss goes up to \$500 per affected account.⁴⁹⁰ Thus, in addition to the costs accrued by the retailers and the card issuers for dealing with the cybersecurity incident itself, the minimal costs associated with the impact on the individual may be what is reflected in these loss estimates that refer to these Guidelines. If the Federal Trade Commission analysis is correct, the \$100 for the average American's 200 hours of work to clear up identity theft is clearly underestimating the harm.

The 2015 Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report has probably produced the most authoritative and understandable estimates of the insured costs for data breaches, through contributions from NetDiligence, which partners with cyber-insurance carriers to aggregate data on cyber liability insurance claims and produces its own *Cyber Liability and Data Breach Insurance Claims* study. Through this collaboration, Verizon was able to improve their loss

⁴⁸⁹ Javelin Strategy and Research, <https://www.javelinstrategy.com/news/1556/92/16-Billion-Stolen-from-12-7-Million-Identity-Fraud-Victims-in-2014-According-to-Javelin-Strategy-Research/d,pressRoomDetail>, accessed March 18, 2015

⁴⁹⁰ U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, <http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2014/2B1.1.pdf>, accessed February 24, 2015

estimation models and they realized that the cost of a data breach with a small number of records loss had a much higher per-record cost, whereas those breaches where an organization lost millions of records, had a much lower per-record cost. The evidence shows that the range of forecasted average costs for the same number of records still remains wide, typically more than an order of magnitude for the same number of records lost.

The Verizon model forecast that the average loss for a breach of 1,000 records would be between \$52,000 and \$87,000, with 95 percent confidence. The breach affecting 10 million records has an average loss forecasted between \$2.1 million and \$5.2 million. The confidence interval widens as the number of records increases to account for growing uncertainty. This means that the cost per record goes down as the number of records goes up, and the amount of uncertainty goes up as the number of records goes up.

This recent reporting reveals why it is wrong to try to rely on a single point estimate per record. Verizon concludes that the improvements to understanding this variation would probably be tied to collecting more and different data in order to make better models.⁴⁹¹ Some of the data that may explain the wide variations might include information about the cost as it relates to the organizations past experience with data breaches. If this is the first or the fifteenth data breach, we might expect that the institutional costs associated with dealing with the problem would reduce over time. Many other factors (type of organization, regulatory framework, etc.) may have an impact on costs beyond just the number of records.

In retail point-of-sale attacks that took place between 2013 and 2014 there were a number that made the news. On the lower end of the large data breach attacks, was the attack on Sally Beauty Supply, which affected just 282,000 customer cards. There were two attacks that affected less than a half million cards reported in 2014, and an additional three comparably sized retailers who did not report the number of cards affected.

There were two reported incidents in 2013–2014 where between a half million and a million customer records were affected. For example, the September 2014 Goodwill Industries attack exposed 868 thousand customers.

More alarming were the attacks on Harbor Freight (a tool vendor with 445 stores and nearly 200 million customers), Home Depot and Target. The number of compromised records for Harbor Freight is still unclear. Home Depot reported attacks that affected 56 million customers; they estimated their cost of the breach to be \$62 million.

It is reasonable to expect that as the value of these attacks goes up for the criminals, they will become an attack vector of choice and more sophisticated. We would expect that, unchecked, these attacks will continue to increase significantly in scale and scope, consequences and frequency during the next 5 years. This estimate of increasing risk may need to be moderated, however. Recent efforts of retailers and card issuers to reduce the possibility of such attacks have lead them to become more adept at discovering these incidents quickly, thus stopping the losses sooner and reducing the number of customers exposed. Efforts to clearly notify customers whose identity has been stolen also help keep them from becoming the victims of fraud as well.

⁴⁹¹ Verizon 2015 Data Breach Investigations Report; downloadable at <http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2015/> accessed April 24, 2015

Data Breaches Complicated by Other Factors

Introduction

Outside of financial institutions and retail businesses there are other types of data breach scenarios that have discernibly different outcomes and consequences. Many state and local governments, universities, utilities, healthcare organizations and other entities use online customer service systems or maintain databases with personal and financial information to allow automatic billing and telephone or online payments. All of these organizations hold PII and financial information, but may not be expected (or able) to cover the losses of individuals who become the victims of identity theft or fraud to the same degree as financial institutions or retailers may be. Just as the requirement to notify victims varies among states, the responsibilities of different types of organizations vary greatly as well.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Data breach extracts PII and other information from a government entity or not-for-profit, or health care entity	Consequences range from loss of PII to consumer confidence, not to mention the economic losses incurred by both the organization and the public.	Lack of adequate system protection, monitoring activities, and training of employees.	Criminal hackers are the most likely threat actors.

Table 23: Data Breach Scenario Type 5

When a commercial entity suffers from attacks that steal customers' PII and financial information they have some recourse and established processes to recoup these losses through fees and increases in prices. When a not-for-profit or government agency is subjected to the same attack, it is disproportionately painful. Summarizing the big victims in 2014, Advisen's Cyberrisk Network reported the U.S. Office of Personnel Management suffered such an attack in 2014, losing 5 million records, the U.S. Postal Service lost 3.7 million, and the Texas Health and Human Services Commission lost 2 million. By cost, the U.S. Marshals Service was found to have lost \$18 million, the Oregon Department of Employment lost \$16 million, and Miami-Dade county \$3.3 million. The University of Maryland lost \$2.6 million.⁴⁹² Goodwill Industries, noted earlier as a retailer subjected to a point-of-sale hack, as a not-for-profit has nowhere near the capability to absorb such losses as an ordinary retailer might.

In early 2015, the news of a significant attack on Anthem Blue Cross rolled out in pieces as the scope of the incident unfolded. At the time of this writing, Anthem reports that no individuals' personal health information has been compromised, but approximately 80 million current and former customers and employees of Anthem and other Blue Cross affiliates have had their PII and financial information stolen by the perpetrators.^{493,494} Anthem is offering the same

⁴⁹² Josh Bradford, 2014 by the Numbers, Record-Setting Cyber Breaches, <http://www.cyberrisknetwork.com/2014/12/31/2014-year-cyber-breaches/>, accessed March 5, 2015

⁴⁹³ <http://www.cyberrisknetwork.com/2014/12/31/2014-year-cyber-breaches/>

⁴⁹⁴ Kaiser Health News, FBI Closing in on Culprits Behind Massive Cyberattack on Anthem's Database, <http://kaiserhealthnews.org/morning-breakout/fbi-closing-in-on-culprits-behind-massive-cyberattack-on-anthems-database/> accessed March 5, 2015

protections of credit monitoring that retailers might under such circumstances. However, some analysts differ as to whether or not personal health information was compromised. If it is discovered that the data that was extracted included protected health information, in addition to the costs that Anthem is paying to deal with the incident, they will be required to pay penalties ranging from \$100 – \$50,000 for each violation up to \$1,500,000 in a calendar year.⁴⁹⁵ It is not yet clear how many calendar years may be in question.

While this scenario is very similar to other data breach scenarios, it is important to realize that the penalties for exposing personal health information are different and additional. The consequences of nearly the same incident seem to be greater when it involves healthcare information. The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2014 reported that Healthcare, Education and the Public Sector were ranked highest for the number of data breach incidents in 2013, accounting for 58 percent of all data breaches. However, these three sectors lagged way behind when viewed from the perspective of the numbers of identities exposed. The most lucrative way to steal identities is targeting retail, computer software, and financial institutions accounting for 77 percent of the identities exposed, compared to only 2.1 percent of the identities exposed through attacks on Healthcare, Education and the Public Sector.

Such data breaches experienced by the health care industry, not-for-profits, and government agencies may be increasing in scope, but not necessarily in sophistication. The outcomes of these attacks are not as obviously lucrative to the attacker. It is clearly more valuable to a criminal to target retailers or financial institutions, but the consequences of these attacks are different in many ways. Government agencies, education and not-for-profits are less able to invest in system protections, but even much less able to provide the same types of identity monitoring protections to individuals whose identities are exposed. Individuals may lose confidence in these institutions, and not-for-profits may suffer greatly in consequence to such a loss. Agencies may also suffer from the loss of public trust, but it is not existential to them. Individuals cannot easily shift to a different agency because one of them failed to meet their expectations. Thus, while it may be more costly and difficult for a company to manage the consequences of a similar event and compensate the affected customers, it is possibly worse for individuals to feel helplessly dependent on an agency to protect their information and have no recourse when the protections fail.

⁴⁹⁵ Ellen Tucker, Anthem Cyber Attack, The Importance of Data Security, <http://blog.capital.org/anthem-cyber-attack-the-importance-of-data-security/>, accessed March 5, 2015

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Data breach extracts intellectual property from innovative businesses or research and development center	The theft and/or destruction of intellectual property can set research and development within an organization back in their production, undermining pricing strategy and investment costs or takes them out of business.	Integrated systems that can be breached through lesser protected businesses. Lack of security (physical and/or logical), monitoring activities, and training of employees.	Criminal hackers, corporate espionage, and nation states interested in the intellectual property are the most likely threat actors.

Table 24: Data Breach Scenario Type 6

There are several examples of data breaches, including instances where intellectual property appear to be the target. There is no clear and commonly held method of evaluating the value of the loss of intellectual property. It is difficult to establish because there are so many competing issues involved. When someone steals a copy of intellectual property, the rightful owner still retains the use of this data. It still has some value to its rightful owner. Its value is greatly decreased if the theft results in a cheaper knock-off of their own product that undermines their pricing strategy in the market place. It could be even worse if every instance of the data in the rightful owners' databases is completely destroyed. When someone steals intellectual property, they do so because the thief recognizes that they will benefit from the results of the innovative research and development (R&D) that the victim has invested, potentially years' worth of work and in some industries, billions of dollars of effort. The pharmaceutical industry, for example, is noteworthy for having the legal right to have no other manufacturers use their formulation to produce generic drugs for twenty years, so that they can recoup their investments in R&D. In developing innovations, it is not just the time, effort and expense of creating something that works, but the cost associated with discovering what doesn't work that must be considered.

Assessments in this scenario type cannot have high confidence, because it is not common for victims to advertise their losses or for law enforcement to successfully identify and prosecute perpetrators of intellectual property theft. There have been numerous citations of large figures associated with the theft of intellectual property, most notably the 2013 estimate of over \$300 billion dollars a year – the value of the U.S. exports to Asia.⁴⁹⁶ But these estimates reflect an admittedly weak valuation capability, and they ultimately are tied back to the loss of all intellectual property in the U.S., including the manufacture of bootleg CDs, DVDs, designer purses and the like. Perhaps a more compelling consideration is the fact that, as cyberattacks by competitors or by foreign governments who provide the stolen data to their national industries continues, this loss of the value of their investment puts companies at risk of going out of business and costs the victim national economy significantly. As economic and political adversaries grow more sophisticated and confident in their ability to operate with impunity in U.S. networks, they are likely to recognize cyberattacks as a more efficient and effective way to

⁴⁹⁶ The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property,
http://www.ipcommission.org/report/ip_commission_report_052213.pdf, accessed March 5, 2015.

get what they are after. Cyberattacks have become the dominant focus of experts in field of intellectual property theft.

This problem is greater now than it ever has been, in part due to the interconnectedness of our economic world. This is reflected in global supply chains, multinational corporations and the heavy reliance on the Internet. These factors make it easier to access the intellectual property of a competitor, without the cost involved in a corporate espionage effort.

According to a figure cited in the President's 2006 Economic Report to Congress, 70 percent of the value of publicly traded corporations is estimated to be in “intangible assets,” that is, intellectual property. A 2012 study by the Department of Commerce found that protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights around the globe directly affects an estimated 27 million American jobs in intellectual-property-intensive industries, which is roughly 19 percent of the U.S. workforce, producing over one-third of America’s GDP.⁴⁹⁷

The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property noted that in addition to the direct losses felt by victims, if American intellectual property rights were respected overseas as they are here, the U.S. economy would add millions of jobs and restore incentives for innovation and investment, resulting in a significant growth to the U.S. gross domestic product. The U.S. Trade Representative’s “2012 Special 301 Report” points out that while Ukraine, Russia and India contribute significantly to the volume of intellectual property theft from the U.S., 50–80 percent of our loss is to China.⁴⁹⁸

Both Verizon, a broadband and telecommunications company, and Mandiant, a cybersecurity firm have conducted studies that point to overwhelming responsibility for cyberattacks aimed at economic espionage being attributed to state-affiliated actors in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These assertions were endorsed by the U.S. DOD in its 2013 report to Congress on Chinese military developments. Reinforcing the findings from the Mandiant Corporation, their report notes that the PRC “is using its computer network exploitation (CNE) capability to support intelligence collection against the U.S. diplomatic, economic, and defense industrial base sectors that support U.S. national defense programs.” It asserts that “the information targeted could potentially be used to benefit China’s defense industry, high technology industries, [and] policymaker interest in U.S. leadership thinking on key China issues,” among other things.⁴⁹⁹

It is because there is such strong consensus that there is a significant, under-discovered, under-reported and unmeasured risk associated with the loss of intellectual property through cyberattacks that the examples serve as exceptionally weak representations of the risks. Except in cases where victim organizations come forward publically to help prosecute criminals or draw attention to the issue, much of this is reported only confidentially, if at all.

Some cases help to clarify the scale of these losses, however. A single attack against RSA in 2011, the maker of the widely used SecurID tokens, which was traced back to China, resulted in

⁴⁹⁷ U.S. Department of Commerce, “Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: Industries in Focus,” March 2012.

⁴⁹⁸ Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), “2012 Special 301 Report,” April 2012, http://www.usit.gov/sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report_0.pdf; and Office of the USTR, “2013 Special 301 Report,” May 2013, <http://www.usit.gov/sites/default/files/05012013%202013%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf>.

⁴⁹⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013,” prepared for Congress, Washington, D.C., 2013, 36, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2013_China_Report_FINAL.pdf.

the compromise of at least three major defense contractors.⁵⁰⁰ The same attack compromised security at an estimated 720 companies, including 20% of the Fortune 100.⁵⁰¹ Through another series of attacks, dubbed operation Shady RAT, it was discovered that petabytes of highly proprietary information, including sensitive military and infrastructure data, had been siphoned off from the U.S. Government and its allies, supranational organizations such as the United Nations, and many other sovereign nations and independent organizations over a period of more than five years.⁵⁰² Former General Keith Alexander, then the commander of the U.S. military's Cyber Command, said that one U.S. company alone lost \$1 billion worth of intellectual property over the course of a couple of days.⁵⁰³

The onslaught of such attacks has been so significant that in May of 2014 a Federal grand jury indicted five Chinese military hackers, who for all intents and purposes appeared to be working to advance the ability of Chinese state-owned enterprises when they were negotiating with U.S. firms or unions. They are alleged to have stolen trade secrets and other sensitive business information, using cyber espionage for economic advantage.⁵⁰⁴ The Chinese were after Westinghouse Electric, U.S. subsidiaries of SolarWorld AG, U.S. Steel, Allegheny Technologies and Alcoa.⁵⁰⁵

Smaller cases are most likely to reach indictments and prosecutions. In one case, international hackers were charged with breaking into computer networks of prominent technology companies and the U.S. Army and stealing more than \$100 million in intellectual property and other proprietary data. The alleged cyber theft included software and data related to the Xbox One gaming console and Xbox Live online gaming system; popular games such as "Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3" and "Gears of War 3"; and proprietary software used to train military helicopter pilots.⁵⁰⁶

The New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post all disclosed that they believe their networks were compromised by intrusions that originated in China. A reasonable motive for targeting media is to identify reporters' sources for reporting that the Chinese government may not condone.

In another case, in August of 2014 a Federal grand jury indicted a Chinese national on five felony offenses stemming from a computer hacking scheme that involved the theft of trade secrets from American defense contractors, including The Boeing Company, which manufactures the C-17 military transport aircraft. The indictment alleges that the indicted Chinese national worked with two unindicted co-conspirators based in China to infiltrate computer systems and obtain confidential information about military programs, including the C-

⁵⁰⁰ Zeljka Zorj, "RSA Admits SecurID Tokens Have Been Compromised," Help Net Security, June 7, 2011, <http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=11122>.

⁵⁰¹ Brian Krebs, "Who Else Was Hit by the RSA Attackers?" Krebs on Security, web log, October 2011, <http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/10/who-else-was-hit-by-the-rsa-attackers>.

⁵⁰² Peter Bright, "Operation Shady Rat: Five-Year Attack Hit 14 Countries," Ars Technica, August 3, 2011, <http://arstechnica.com/security/news/2011/08/operation-shady-rat-five-year-hack-attack-hit-14-countries.ars>; and "Massive Global Cyberattack Targeting U.S., U.N. Discovered; Experts Blame China," Fox News, August 3, 2011, available at <http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/08/03/massive-global-cyberattack-targeting-us-un-discovered-experts-blame-china>.

⁵⁰³ Ellen Nakashima, "In a World of Cybertheft, U.S. Names China, Russia as Main Culprits," *Washington Post*, November 3, 2011.

⁵⁰⁴ <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor>

⁵⁰⁵ Pete Williams, U.S. Charges China with Cyber-Spying on American Firms, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/u-s-charges-china-cyber-spying-american-firms-n108706>, accessed March 19, 2015

⁵⁰⁶ <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-members-international-computer-hacking-ring-indicted-stealing-gaming-technology-apache>

17 transport aircraft, the F-22 fighter jet, and the F-35 fighter jet.⁵⁰⁷ It is not yet known what the economic value of the loss of this intellectual property is, but it is clear that it provides a significant advantage to Chinese military aircraft producers.

The NextGov.com article on Federal agencies' capacity to bounce back from cyberattacks that wipe out data reported that those Federal agencies that protect intellectual property as part of their business invest to protect it. In a recent budget, the Department of Energy devoted \$218 million; the Pentagon—\$7 billion; NASA—\$86 million; and the tiny National Science Foundation—\$150 million for cybersecurity.⁵⁰⁸

It is reasonable to expect the frequency of such attacks to continue to increase between 2015 and 2020. It is likely that there will be an even greater increase in the following industries, based on their alignment with the Chinese 12th 5-Year Plan for National Strategic Emerging Industries:

- New energy auto industry
- Energy-efficient industry
- Advanced environmental protection industry
- Resource recycling industry
- Next generation information network industry
- Fundamental industry of core electronics
- High-end software and new information service industry
- Bio-pharmaceutical industry
- Bio-medical engineering industry
- Bio-breeding industry
- Bio-manufacturing industry
- Aviation equipment industry
- Satellite and its application industry
- Rail transportation equipment industry
- Marine engineering equipment industry
- Intelligent equipment-manufacturing industry
- Nuclear energy technology industry
- Wind energy industry
- Solar energy industry
- Biomass industry

⁵⁰⁷ Edvard Pettersson, Chinese Man Charged in Plot to Steal U.S. Military Data <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-11/chinese-citizen-charged-with-hacking-boeing-computer-in-u-s> accessed March 5, 2015

⁵⁰⁸ Alia Sternstein, NextGov.com, Most Federal Agencies Wouldn't be able to Bounce Back From a Sony Hack <http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/12/most-agencies-wouldnt-be-able-bounce-back-sony-hack/101658/> accessed March 5, 2015

- New functional material industry
- Advanced structural material industry
- High-performance composite material industry⁵⁰⁹

Cyber Extortion or Terrorism

Introduction

In recent years, we have seen attacks where the perpetrator was using their attack to influence others. This has been seen as a form of extortion by criminals, as a politically-motivated prank by terrorist groups, and as a threatening exercise of powers by nation-states displeased with the actions of companies in the U.S. While each of these manifestations has different direct effects, the indirect effect of a culture of supersized cyberbullying is a common result.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Victim's data is destroyed, encrypted, or the victim is extorted with the threat of loss of access to their data	The theft and/or destruction of data leading to economic losses to recover from threat actors or to rebuild what was lost.	Inadequate malware or virus detection. Lack of logical security, monitoring activities, data back-up, and training of employees.	Criminal hackers are the most likely threat actors, and, in some cases, those with political motivations.

Table 25: Cyber Extortion or Terrorism Scenario Type 1

There are many alternate approaches to conducting an attack like this. Sometimes the result is significant and existential to the organization that was attacked. In other cases it is a small incident in the history of an organization. Unfortunately, the easiest way out is often to pay the ransom.

In a smaller impact attack, a virus called Cryptowall managed to bypass spam filters and firewalls and infected the police-department computer system in Durham, New Hampshire, when an officer opened an infected attachment on an email. By the next morning, they had widespread problems on the computer systems. This type of attack uses software that encrypts a user's hard drive, restricting them from accessing their own data. It holds it with a timer and a threat of destruction, until they pay a ransom. The town refused to pay the ransom, and the manager of the IT systems took the department's computer system offline, dealt with the problem, and reloaded their system with the backup files.⁵¹⁰ Their success in managing through this incident was largely attributable to the way they backed up their files.

Another more sophisticated and actively managed attack had a much more devastating impact on its victim. The code-hosting company Code Spaces was hit by a DDoS attack and then extorted

⁵⁰⁹ Yao Lu, <http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2012/07/25/china-releases-12th-five-year-plan-for-national-strategic-emerging-industries.html#sthash.dqWt0NAX.dpuf>, accessed March 10, 2015

⁵¹⁰ Virus Infects Police Computer System In Durham NH, <http://boston.cbslocal.com/2014/06/06/virus-infects-police-computer-system-in-durham-nh/> accessed March 20, 2015

by a hacker who had gained control of the firm's Amazon EC2 control panel, hoping to get paid in exchange for returning control of operations to Code Spaces. Code Spaces refused to comply, and quickly regained control of the account by changing password. The hacker recognized what was happening, used back-up logins that he had created, and started deleting files. Code Spaces revealed that "most of our data, backups, machine configurations and offsite backups were either partially or completely deleted." They were put out of business.⁵¹¹

The case of the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack where large amounts of intellectual property PII and other sensitive information was stolen was more complex. Recent evidence suggests that the intrusion that prepared for this attack began more than a year prior to its discovery in November 2014.⁵¹² Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, speaking at conference at Fordham University, said the North Korean military's Reconnaissance General Bureau was responsible for "overseeing" the attack against Sony.⁵¹³ If this is true, it suggests that North Korea was watching for potentially offensive movies and began preparing to punish Sony well before they were ready to release the film.

In the case of the Sony attack, several exploits were used. The hackers extracted confidential data and then installed malware to erase data from the servers.⁵¹⁴ In the days following this hack, the perpetrators began leaking yet-unreleased films and started to release portions of the confidential data to attract the attention of social media sites, although they did not specify what they wanted in return.

Sony Pictures set aside \$15 million to deal with ongoing damages from the hack.⁵¹⁵ While Sony made substantial additional investments in cybersecurity after this attack, according to Assistant Director Joseph M. Demarest, Jr., the head of the FBI's Cyber Division, an attack like this would have "slipped and gotten past 90 percent of the net defenses that are out there today in private industry."⁵¹⁶

In such a data-destruction case, Government agencies would be in a particular trouble. As reported byNextGov.com, "a file-wiping attack such as the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack could bring major Federal departments to their knees, because most have no data-loss contingency plans, according to the latest figures on compliance with government cybersecurity laws. Further, unplugging systems to contain damage, as Sony did, would impair an agency's ability to carry out constitutional duties, some former Federal cyber-leaders say."⁵¹⁷ It is likely that targeted organizations will all have to learn how to operate in the trade-space between different types of risk.

⁵¹¹ 6 Recent Real-Life Cyber Extortion Scams http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/6-recent-real-life-cyber-extortion-scams/d/d_id/1278774, accessed March 20, 2015

⁵¹² Zetter, Kim (December 3, 2014). ["Sony Got Hacked Hard: What We Know and Don't Know So Far"](#). *Wired*. Accessed January 4, 2015

⁵¹³ FBI head details evidence that North Korea was behind Sony hack, <http://touch.latimes.com/#section/-1/article/p2p-82479451/> accessed March 20, 2015

⁵¹⁴ Palilery, Jose (December 24, 2014). ["What caused Sony hack: What we know now"](#). *CNN Money*. Retrieved January 4, 2015.

⁵¹⁵ Frizell, Sam (February 4, 2015). ["Sony Is Spending \\$15 Million to Deal With the Big Hack"](#). *Time*. Retrieved February 4, 2015.

⁵¹⁶ House Homeland Security Chairman Michael McCaul, "Preventing a 'cyber Pearl Harbor': The Hollywood hack attack revealed the need to upgrade cybersecurity," *The Washington Times*, January 8, 2015, <http://homeland.house.gov/news/mccaul-op-ed-preventing-cyber-pearl-harbor-washington-times>.

⁵¹⁷ Alia Sternstein, NextGov.com, Most Federal Agencies Wouldn't be able to Bounce Back From a Sony Hack <http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2014/12/most-agencies-wouldnt-be-able-bounce-back-sony-hack/101658/> accessed March 5, 2015

While the sophistication of these attacks varies and simpler individual attacks might be less consequential, in aggregate, a simple ransomware like Cryptolocker has affected at least 250,000 victims. Profits made from people complying with the demands can produce several million dollars per day.

The trend towards increasing complexity is likely to continue. The real consequences of these attacks vary by the organization, but as American work is commonly built on information and data, attacks that threaten to keep our data from us can be devastating. The ability of an organization to manage through such an attack and have a backup that cannot be affected by the same incident is critical to controlling its consequences.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Victim's web-enabled communications are hijacked by the attacker, who uses it to convey their own message for political purposes, or just to embarrass authorities	The consequences of these attacks are costs borne by the victim for regaining control and dealing with the bad publicity.	Lack of security (physical and/or logical), monitoring activities, data back-up, and training of employees.	Criminal hackers are the most likely threat actors.

Table 26: Cyber Extortion or Terrorism Scenario Type 2

In January 2015, Twitter accounts for WBOC, a Salisbury, Maryland-based television station, and the Albuquerque News Journal in New Mexico were both hijacked by a hacker claiming to be sympathetic to terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL. The hacker named "CyberCaliphate" used the Twitter accounts to post pictures and tweets throughout the day claiming to have classified information from Federal investigations into terrorist groups. The station's website was also hacked, with the top story being changed to one posted by "CyberCaliphate" before the station took it down. The station recovered control of its website on its own but had difficulty regaining control of its Twitter account.⁵¹⁸ A similar bout of attacks by ISIS sympathizers took place in March 2015 as well.

Other takes on this type of scenario have included taking over electronic highway messaging systems, modifying organizational intranets, and other efforts to pull pranks, embarrass or annoy the victims.

These types of attacks are not necessarily sophisticated but they are increasing in scope, with multiple organizations being attacked *en masse*. The consequences of these attacks are costs borne by the victim for regaining control and dealing with the bad publicity. However, the indirect consequences are not significant, except possibly to further the social divide between people who suspect others of being radical Islamists and those who are apt to be suspected.

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⁵¹⁸ Delmarva Now, WBOC Twitter, website hacked by ISIL supporters, <http://www.delmarvanow.com/story/news/local/maryland/2015/01/06/wboc-twitter-hacked/21341645/> accessed March 21, 2015

claiming to have classified information from Federal investigations into terrorist groups. The station's website was also hacked, with the top story being changed to one posted by "CyberCaliphate" before the station took it down. The station recovered control of its website on its own but had difficulty regaining control of its Twitter account.⁵¹⁹ A similar bout of attacks by ISIS sympathizers took place in March 2015 as well.

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Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS) alone	The consequences of these attacks vary based on the goals of the attacker and range from data and economic loss to a loss of public confidence.	Lack of security (physical and/or logical), monitoring activities, or redundancy.	Given the varied reasons for a DDoS attack, the threat could come from any number of actors.

Table 27: Cyber Extortion or Terrorism Scenario Type 3

In the recent past, many offered the opinion that a DDoS was unsophisticated and likely to decline as a source of cybersecurity concerns. It is true that many of the very powerful DDoS attacks experienced in recent years have served as a smokescreen that distracted the cybersecurity staff while sophisticated break-ins and data extractions took place. However, DDoS alone remains a useful tool for adversaries who simply want to punish their victim. The exploit gives an adversary the ability to deny a victim of the normal commerce that would take place over their website or to embarrass them in the eyes of the general public. For many adversaries this is either sufficient, or at least good enough for the time being.

In 2014, DDoS attacks increased in size and power. Incapsula, a security company that specializes in protecting company websites, reports that such attacks more than tripled from December through February over the same period a year earlier. Incapsula labels DDoS "the weapon of choice" for hackers these days, in part because technology is making it increasingly convenient and powerful.⁵²⁰ According to Verizon's most recent Data Breach Investigations Report, an attacker can rent a botnet for only \$10 an hour.⁵²¹ But a botnet is just one element in a successful, large-scale DDoS attack. A popular method of increasing the size and power of DDoS attacks is to use a domain name system (DNS) amplification attack to take advantage of

⁵¹⁹ Delmarva Now, WBOC Twitter, website hacked by ISIL supporters, <http://www.delmarvanow.com/story/news/local/maryland/2015/01/06/wboc-twitter-hacked/21341645/> accessed March 21, 2015

⁵²⁰ Downloadable PDF, <http://lp.incapsula.com/ddos-report-2014.html> accessed March 5, 2015

⁵²¹ Downloadable PDF, http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/2014/reports/rp_Verizon-DBIR-2014_en_xg.pdf , accessed March 5, 2015

open recursive or authoritative servers to flood a target with DNS-responsive traffic. This works by amplifying the responses, at a rate of approximately 70:1.⁵²² An attacker can design his attack using a variety of contributing tools in an effort to exhaust the targets' resources.

Recent examples include the Sony DDoS Sony's PlayStation Network and Sony Entertainment Network in August 2014. An attack of this sort does not just cost the company the resources necessary to defend against the attack. When their customers try to access their sites and are frustrated, they often move on. Gaming service providers are very concerned about churn, with their regular customers' moving to competitors.⁵²³ Two different groups laid claim to the August Sony attacks, adding a tweeted bomb threat against an executive's flight in one of these claims.

Another retaliatory strike was experienced by the St. Louis County, Missouri police department, when their website and email servers were brought down in apparent protests over the shooting of Michael Brown.⁵²⁴ A review of the Threat and Hazard Risk Identification and Assessment (THIRA) results provided to the Federal Emergency Management Agency reveals that state and local emergency planners look at incidents such as this as an indication of the potential use of this exploit as a way to complicate their responses in emergencies, such as the response to a natural disaster.

Other examples of DDoS attacks reported by Verizon include the 2012 and 2013 DDoS attacks on financial institutions claimed by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters. This group appears to have been protesting an offensive film trailer hosted on YouTube. CNN reported, however, that it may be that the group was simply jumping on the attacks to promote their protest, noting that Sen. Joe Lieberman placed the blame on Iran. The goals of the threat actors may not be as relevant as the impact of the incidents on the targets. The resources of major financial institutions make them better equipped to fight against such onslaughts, but the cost of these attacks was still significant.

Attacks on Industrial Control Systems

Introduction

Industrial control systems (ICS) support the efficient and safe operation of large complex interconnected physical systems, such as those in major manufacturing plants, water purification and distribution systems, pipelines transporting petroleum products or natural gas, systems operating the electrical transmission and distribution grid, etc. For much of this infrastructure, ICS integration is decades old, incorporated with the primary purpose of increasing system reliability, and focused on infrastructure operating requirements. At that time, cybersecurity risks associated with this internet-based technology was not foreseen as a measurable business risk – assessed as low risk or not well understood. Owners and operators also range in their corporate risk tolerance, which can be based on a multitude of factors that vary across industrial sectors and across individual companies. Fast forward to the present day, we now find the concerns over cybersecurity risks are leading topics of discussion on corporate Board agendas.

⁵²² Anatomy of a DNS DDoS Amplification Attack. <https://www.watchguard.com/infocenter/editorial/41649.asp>, accessed April 27, 2015

⁵²³ Charlie Osborne, Sony PlayStation Network struck by DDoS attack, bomb threat grounds executive <http://www.zdnet.com/article/sony-playstation-network-struck-by-ddos-attack-bomb-threat-grounds-executive/>

⁵²⁴ Dara Kerr, Ferguson, Mo., police site hit with DDoS attack, <http://www.cnet.com/news/st-louis-police-website-suffers-ddos-attack/> accessed March 5, 2015

It is noteworthy that the ICS-CERT FY 2014 Incident Response statistics showed that 55% of the incidents reported to them involved advanced persistent threats (APT) or sophisticated actors. Other actor types included hactivists, insider threats and criminals.⁵²⁵ Attack types include attempts to exfiltrate ICS information. There are several key factors that influence the consequences associated with cyberattacks on ICS: the speed of the operations of the infrastructure under attack, the role of humans in the decision making processes for the operation of the infrastructure, and the number of opportunities to mitigate the direct effects of an attack before the full range of possible consequences materialize. Such adversaries are typically associated with a high degree of uncertainty and risk, as they often will expend a great deal of resources establishing themselves within a control system without a direct economic or short-term political motive.

Over the past few years, tools such as SHODAN, Google, and other search engines have enabled researchers, and really, the general public, to discover and identify a variety of ICS devices that were not intended to be Internet facing. Adding to the threat landscape is the continued scanning and cataloguing of devices known to be susceptible to emerging vulnerabilities. The increasing body of public knowledge about ICS, coupled with these tools, lowers the level of expertise necessary to successfully locate Internet-facing control system. Many of these devices have not been configured with adequate authentication mechanisms, making it easy to directly access the systems by both opportunists and sophisticated threat actors. As tools and adversary capabilities advance, we expect that exposed systems will be more effectively discovered and targeted by adversaries. Clearly, it has become more important for asset owners and operators to audit their network configurations and properly install their ICS devices behind patched VPNs or firewalls, and yet surprisingly few do, until they discover a problem and seek help.

Owners and operators vary in the clarity with which they focus on this problem. Some systems have been hacked, but with no apparent outcome, suggesting this is not a real problem. Some owners and operators respond to this discovery with little concern, because nothing happened. Others respond defensively and take action, concerned about the reality of sophisticated threat actors possibly having an ability to sabotage their systems in ways they have not yet imagined. The ODNI reports that:

Russia’s Ministry of Defense is establishing its own cyber command, which—according to senior Russian military officials—will be responsible for conducting offensive cyber activities, including propaganda operations and inserting malware into enemy command and control systems. Russia’s armed forces are also establishing a specialized branch for computer network operations⁵²⁶.

The Worldwide Threat Assessment goes on to refer to private sector “computer security studies which assert that unspecified Russian cyber actors are developing means to access industrial control systems remotely. These systems manage critical infrastructures such as electric power grids, urban mass-transit systems, air-traffic control, and oil and gas distribution networks. These unspecified Russian actors have successfully compromised the product supply chains of three

⁵²⁵ ICS-CERT Monitor September 2014-February 2015

⁵²⁶ Clapper, James, Worldwide Threat Assessment

ICS vendors so that customers download exploitative malware directly from the vendors' websites along with routine software updates.⁵²⁷

If this undiscovered presence in their control system was used maliciously, the outcomes would vary tremendously based on the system, infrastructure subsector, the conditions surrounding the actual manipulation of the control system and more. Sometimes the adverse outcomes for the equipment and materials may be risks that may prove costly, but have low potential for life and safety impacts. Some sectors have such tight operating margins, that any costly errors are unacceptable. Other sectors have the margins available to exchange profits for safety and do so without concern that they could not make up the losses. Thus, owners and operators can range between highly risk-averse to accepting some forms of loss as a trade for avoiding others.

ICS-CERT conducts risk mitigation activities and incident response for critical infrastructure owners and operators. In FY 2014 Incident Response statistics reported that 55 percent of the incidents reported to them involved advanced persistent threats or sophisticated threat actors. Other actor types included hactivists, insider threats, and criminals.⁵²⁸⁵²⁹ When an organization is attacked by a sophisticated threat actor the organization is left with a high degree of uncertainty and incalculable risk. It is unclear to the victims what the adversary's motivations were. They doubt the explanations of computer security consultants and the Government. They wonder why these adversaries expend such a great amount of resources establishing themselves within this control system, without a direct economic or short-term political motive. Many find this type of uncertainty immobilizing. It is easier to deal with known problems than to try support decisions about such uncertain risks.

Illustrative of Government efforts to help clarify these risks, ICS-CERT and the FBI teamed up in 2014 to respond to sophisticated cyber-exploitation campaigns against U.S. infrastructure ICS. These campaigns involved different sets of malware, both of which used tactics to target and gain access to control systems environments. One of them, BlackEnergy, has been discovered within the controls that operate many infrastructure sectors. The BlackEnergy hacking campaign had been ongoing since 2011, but there is no evidence of any attempt to activate the malware to damage, modify, or otherwise disrupt affected systems. Havex, the other malware, also called Dragon Fly, has also been found in ICS. According to Joel Langill, security consultant and author of the *SCADAhacker* blog, "A lot of malware impacts control systems, like Conficker or Slammer," referring to two computer worms that caused headaches for tens of thousands of people using Microsoft. "Those have consequences on industrial environments, but ... Stuxnet, Dragonfly and now Black Energy have specific ICS payload components; they are targeting specifically industrial control systems. This is very disturbing."⁵³⁰

The Energy Sector led all others again in 2014 with the most reported incidents. ICS-CERT's continuing partnership with the Energy Sector provides many opportunities to share information and collaborate on incident response efforts. Also noteworthy in 2014 were the incidents reported by the Critical Manufacturing Sector, some of which were from control systems

⁵²⁷ Clapper, James, Worldwide Threat Assessment

⁵²⁸ ICS-CERT Monitor September 2014-February 2015

⁵²⁹ An insider threat is one or more individuals with access or insider knowledge of an enterprise that allows them to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in harm to the enterprise

⁵³⁰ SECURITY: Secret meetings tackle back-to-back energy-sector cyberthreats, <http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060008193>, accessed March 24, 2015

equipment manufacturers. The ICS vendor community may be a target for sophisticated threat actors for a variety of reasons, including economic espionage and reconnaissance.⁵³¹

The scenarios considered in this scoping assessment reflect a sample from the Energy Sector, based on the predominance of voluntarily reported incidents of this type to ICS-CERT. Owners and operators in the Energy Sector have noted the measurable value they receive in return for their partnership with ICS-CERT. In addition there is a scenario for the Water and Wastewater Sector. While water-system attacks are less commonly reported, state and local authorities have a high level of concern with them as is evidenced by their contributions to THIRA. There is no evidence that these types of attacks have been completed; which is to say, the results of ICS-CERT investigations into incidents of these types typically conclude that detection and mitigation mechanisms effectively employed prevented adversaries from fully executing intended attacks. The analysis below provides insights into the how the management of the targeted infrastructure may or may not provide a limiting effect on attacks of this type. It is likely that whatever alternate management controls owners and operators may have on the operation of their infrastructure would be severely stressed if there were coordinated complex attacks, as these alternate controls all rely more heavily on human operators.

In clarifying the potential impacts of cyberattacks on ICS, we have used a simple logic model and validated conclusions with representatives of the owner and operator community. This logic model focuses on identifying a series of related, but normally obscure conditions and effects, including:

- The role of information and communications technology in managing or monitoring the infrastructure's equipment;
- The direct effects of lost confidentiality (data breaches), integrity (altered data or co-opted control), and availability (destroyed data or denial of service) on the various infrastructure systems;
- The availability and limitations of alternatives, such as human operators or back up mechanical devices, to perform the functions that the ICS normally controls;
- The potential infrastructure functional impacts that may result;
- The availability and limitations of infrastructure management alternatives that may address the infrastructure functional impacts.

⁵³¹ ICS-CERT Monitor, September 2014–February 2015

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Distributed campaign of attacks on natural gas pipeline system industrial control systems (ICS), timed to maximize the impacts on energy assurance	While an individual attack on a pipeline system can be adequately managed, a distributed attack could lead to shortages and customer outages. This would create a loss of revenue for the utility company and could adversely affect consumers.	Distributed nature of pipeline control systems. Integrated nature of systems allowing less secure devices that are directly connected to the Internet to be breached, thereby granting access to the more secure ICS.	Criminal hactivists, terrorist organizations, and nation states are the most likely threat actors.

Table 28: ICS Scenario Type 1

Natural gas transmission systems are those that deliver natural gas from the processors to local distribution companies, also known as the utility. They may be likened to a system that keeps the warehouses stocked. Because they ship large volumes that get split to different distribution networks, the pipelines have a large capacity. They are typically located away from populated areas and require compressors every 50–100 miles to keep the gas moving at the required rate. If a few of the compressors are damaged or not functioning as required, the movement of the gas may slow or stop. Transmission pipeline operators stop the movement of gas if there has been an accident with the pipeline in order to make the repairs. Typically, customers are unaffected by these shutdowns because of the resiliency of the pipeline systems to work around an incident area and to deliver product through back-up alternatives. Similarly, cyber-disruptions impacting the movement of gas through a pipeline may reduce the amount of gas that can be delivered. However, this can be mitigated in the short-term by stored reserves or alternative gas delivery paths.⁵³²

Local distribution systems have many localized branches, with reduced pressure and capacity as the system gets closer to the customer. The features of the distribution system make it very unlikely that a single disruption in a pipeline would affect all of their customers. Most service disruptions would more than likely impact smaller customer sets, if at all, which may be isolated for response and recovery.

Since the management of natural gas demands a strong safety culture, the industry is well versed in emergency controls that can be applied across many situations. These mandated controls may be used to mitigate the direct physical effects of cybersecurity incidents as well. There are also natural limits on what might happen on a single pipeline. For example, if a pipeline ruptures, a single release could lower system pressure, thus reducing the potential for further physical damage. In most cases, if control systems are found to be corrupted, pipelines can also be operated manually without these digital controls, though at a diminished rate.

Some areas of the country are much more dependent on natural gas. The demand for natural gas for heating and power generation during a harsh winter may be sufficient to cause shortages when combined with an unexpected incident. When a shortage occurs, it is sometimes possible to move gas from areas with more stored capacity to areas with a shortfall by diverting flow from other pipelines. Similarly, major natural gas users usually have contractual agreements to switch

⁵³² Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, Natural Gas Cyberdependencies, February 3, 2015

from natural gas to another fuel supply in the event of shortage, and smaller customers can reduce their use through conservation. Natural gas utilities place a very high priority on avoiding any service disruptions and use all of the options available to them to keep customers supplied and prevent natural gas appliance lights from extinguishing.

Pipeline operators recognize that despite the robustness of the pipeline system and the standard practices for managing many types of emergencies, the impacts of a broad-scale attack on their systems must be taken seriously. Operators were confronted with this challenge when an active series of cyber-intrusions targeting natural gas pipeline sector companies occurred in 2011–2012. This single campaign from an unknown source was identified by ICS-CERT through the proactivity of owners and operators' reporting and effective information sharing. The campaign, which started in December 2011 with sophisticated, targeted spearfishing and continued for months, extracted data that could facilitate remote unauthorized operations.⁵³³

Since ICS are in place to facilitate reliable and efficient operation of pipeline systems that span long distances, they have the effect of reducing the number of operators needed onsite at compressor stations to control compressors. As a result the standard risk management techniques associated with onsite personnel and effective for individual events may become much more challenging given a coordinated and distributed cyberattack. Responding to such an attack would be much more stressful for the industry, testing the usefulness of mutual aid agreements within the industry if owners and operators perceive themselves simultaneously under the same attacks. There are limits to mechanisms that bring in reserve workforce and emergency responders with equipment. Response may be based on the availability of these assets. Some emergency response planners have noted that the challenges of dealing with declining budgets have resulted in decisions to reduce back-up resources and increasingly depend on mutual-aid agreements. These agreements have limitations, especially when considering the possibility of large-scale attacks that may affect multiple jurisdictions.⁵³⁴

Repeated and persistent efforts are being made to create an undetected presence of malware within natural gas pipeline systems. The scale and sophistication of these attacks appear to be increasing. The consequences of such attacks, if they were to result in active exploitation of the ICS and affected the operation of the pipelines, would be very challenging to the owners and operators. Most of these impacts are felt within the natural gas industry. It would be unlikely that such an attack would result in outages that affected the customers, unless the scale of attacks was so great that it overwhelmed the combined capabilities of the human operators. If there were a significant regional gas outage, especially if it were timed to maximize the negative impact on the population, the normal procedures would be to provide warming centers for those who are affected and then systematically manage the problem. Boulder County, Colorado experienced this problem in December 2013, when temperatures were in the single digits. Their experience, which affected 7,200 customers, provides a useful example.

The Red Cross opened warming centers to help those who could not manage the temperature drop in their homes. The utility called in extra resources from elsewhere in Colorado, and from

⁵³³ ICS-CERT Monthly Monitor, June/July, Gas Pipeline Cyber Intrusion Campaign-Update; http://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/Monitors/ICS-CERT_Monitor_Jun-Jul2012.pdf.

⁵³⁴ Deborah Strasheim, Mutual Aid a concern for region's fire departments, <http://www.theday.com/article/20140628/NWS01/306289976>, accessed March 6, 2015

four other states. The crews visited all customers and, turned off affected gas lines so the pressure in the lines could be restored. They were told they could not relight appliances themselves, as they would risk damaging the appliances or equipment, as well as placing themselves and their families in danger.

In summary, cyberattacks on natural gas pipeline systems continue. Data from ICS-CERT demonstrate the scale and scope of these attacks are increasing, though none of these have resulted in sabotage of the system. Nevertheless, the types of exploits observed reflect an evolving capacity to do so. The consequences of attacks that have physical effects are not likely to be devastating or have long-term impacts on customers. Natural gas pipeline systems must comply with the U.S. Department of Transportation pipeline safety regulations which are intended to prevent or minimize natural gas pipeline incidents. Owners and operators, government authorities and not-for-profits have demonstrated the capacity to manage gas delivery and reliability even during stressful periods. Attacks that combine cyber and physical tactics are much more likely to cause significant damage. Such attacks require more resources from perpetrators to understand pipeline operations, to assess pipeline infrastructure vulnerabilities and to gain access to the ICS.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Cyberattack on ICS in a drinking-water system results in contaminated water	The consequences of an attack on the water system would be minimal to the public given the amount of manual and system checks currently in place. However, any type of communicated risk can have an adverse effect on public confidence in the quality of the product and the organization providing it. The greatest impact would be to the water utility in an increased need for additional cybersecurity technology.	Distributed nature of pipeline control systems. Lack of monitoring or systems, logons, and third party vendors. Integrated nature of systems allowing less secure devices that are directly connected to the Internet to be breached, thereby granting access to the more secure ICS.	Criminal activists, terrorist organizations, and nation states are the most likely threat actors.

Table 29: ICS Scenario Type 2

Drinking-water systems often use ICS for storage, treatment, and distribution systems. These ICS are involved in monitoring the operations of the equipment, monitoring the quality of water, and controlling different functions to execute the operations of the system. Many water utilities have ICS that are isolated from general IT enterprise systems, but trends of increasing connectivity and automation are increasing cybersecurity risks. Water utility IT services may be remotely operated by external entities which could result in unsecure remote access leaving utilities unable to detect or prevent unauthorized access.⁵³⁵ Furthermore, it is not uncommon for utilities to maintain their electronic records solely for the purpose of operating safely and efficiently. They do not always consider the forensic value of recording logon events, assuring

⁵³⁵ Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Note: Water and Wastewater Systems Sector Cyberdependencies, August 22, 2014

individual usernames, or maintaining network monitoring systems and operating system records for later use.⁵³⁶

A cyberattack may cause a brief interruption or degradation within the drinking water and wastewater services. However, water infrastructure can be operated manually in the event of an incident, preventing prolonged inoperability. There is little risk of regional or national impact to public health and the economy from a single cyberattack against a water or wastewater system. A cyberattack that compromises control systems in a drinking water system is unlikely to have an immediate effect on customers, due to the existing water supply within the system.⁵³⁷

The effect of overtreatment is not toxic. The water will have chemical odors and taste, but it is not harmful to the public. The effect of under-treatment could result in pathogens being found in the water, but this still does not mean that the public will be impacted. The time delays between a gallon of water undergoing treatment and when it actually comes out of a faucet can be measured in hours or even days. This gives operators a chance to correct undertreated water while it is still in the transmission and distribution system. Even if all of the backstops fail, and undertreated water reaches the faucet, the outcome is comparable to other incidents, such as water-main breaks, electrical outages, which may force boil-water notices, or some other advisory not to use the water until the conditions have been cleared.

Risk perception is often a matter of perspective. National authorities may view boil-water or Do-Not-Use notices as a routine and appropriate action for water system operators who have operational problems. Many of the owner-operators, however, experience these problems infrequently and are more risk averse. Furthermore, they believe that the public would respond differently if the same notice went out because of a cyberattack.

Managing these risks are problematic as well. Sometimes they do not have as much control over their own IT systems as other infrastructure operators. The IT or cybersecurity staff at a water system may be limited in their authority. They are often part of a larger municipal enterprise with shared IT systems. This creates a layer of bureaucracy that may make it harder to execute needed changes within the enterprise architecture. The costs of cybersecurity are significant for a water utility. They do not have the authority to simply charge more for water to cover these expenses. Any rate hikes must be approved by an oversight authority, such as a planning commission. Finally, water systems often contract with third parties to manage and update their control systems. This model of operations may seem less costly, but it typically results in their devices being exposed to the Internet, leaving them uncertain about who is accessing these systems.

There have been instances where cyberattacks have had physical consequences in the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector. In one instance, the system that controlled a vital operating function was hacked by a foreign national, who used it as his own distribution system for email or pirated software. The unauthorized traffic used so much of the system's capacity that operations were impacted, but the facility was able to manage and the water quality was not impacted.⁵³⁸ In a more removed example, in 2000, at a sewage treatment plant in Queensland, Australia, a former employee of a software company hacked into the SCADA system releasing over 264,000 gallons

⁵³⁶ ICS-CERT Monitor, Water Treatment Facility Control System Anomalies, May-August 2014

⁵³⁷ CISR Note: Water and Wastewater Systems Sector Cyberdependencies

⁵³⁸ Jerome, Sara. *Water Sector Eyes Federal Cybersecurity Efforts*. Water Online. July 31, 2013, <http://www.watertechonline.com/doc/water-sector-eyes-federal-cybersecurity-efforts-0001>, accessed March 6, 2015

of raw sewage into the surrounding environment. The situation in Queensland is a noteworthy example as this vulnerability may be found in U.S. water and wastewater systems that have not taken extra measures to prevent it.

Also, cyberattacks could potentially result in breakage of pipes, treatment equipment, pumps, etc. If an attack were to result in breakage, the consequences would go up. Some state and local planners want to prepare for scenarios with distributed and coordinated cyber-attacks on ICS that result in water treatment failures and broken infrastructure. Such attacks have not been reported, but may be feasible. The concerns about water contamination are noted above. Broken infrastructure would add significantly to costs, and increase the stress on a sector with very tight operating margins. Concerted public and private collaboration has considered the possibility of such physically destructive attacks. The safety-engineering designs seem likely to intervene to protect pumps and valves. There is a low level of confidence that significant physical destruction is even feasible through attacks on the water infrastructure.

The costs of replacing broken equipment within a drinking water system will vary. As a rough planning guide, equipment that is concealed below the surface, delaying the recognition of the problem and requiring excavation to address it, will be more costly and disruptive to replace than comparable equipment closer to the plant. The costs and disruption increase significantly if this is in a highly trafficked area. This considers just the costs to the utility. If water service was lost in an area, the local and regional economic losses would be far greater. If there were a widespread outage, the time to repair and replace the damaged infrastructure could be significant.

It is important to maintain flow in water distribution systems. If pipes become empty, the external pressure on the pipes is not balanced by an interior pressure. This may result in seepage into the pipes and contamination of the water, which would be mitigated by a boil water notice. Some consider it is also feasible there might be fractures in older or more fragile pipes, and repairs, replacements and environmental impacts can be very costly.⁵³⁹

There have been no observed incidents of drinking water equipment breakage. Comparable equipment has been attacked with relatively minor consequences. In 2007, in Willows, California, a failure of physical security allowed a former employee to gain access to a SCADA system and install unauthorized software which damaged the SCADA system itself, but not the irrigation system it was managing.⁵⁴⁰ Another example of the potential harm that may stem from an information security problem was the 2005 failure of the Taum Sauk Dam in Missouri. This dam did not contain a drinking water reservoir, but rather a reservoir built on top of a mountain to facilitate hydro-generation. It was an earthen embankment dam that operated by releasing water during peak electrical demand hours, and then pumping the water back up during off-peak hours. There was a difference between the data reported by gauges at the dam and gauges at a remote monitoring system which led to water continuing to be pumped, even though the reservoir was already at maximum capacity. The resulting overflow led to a catastrophic

⁵³⁹ Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Note: Water and Wastewater Systems Sector Cyberdependencies, August 22, 2014

⁵⁴⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multiple Efforts to Secure Control Systems are Under Way, but Challenges Remain*, GAO-08-119T, October 17, 2007. Page 7.

release.⁵⁴¹ It may be rare for drinking water reservoirs to be situated this way, or for the status of drinking water reservoir to be monitored less closely. While this type of loss seems a plausible example of significant physical damage that could occur, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) subject matter experts maintain that the peculiarities of the hydroelectric reservoir involve conditions that cannot be found in water systems.

Individual cybersecurity incidents in the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector typically do not have offsite consequences, but when they do, the consequences are unlikely to be greater than those that arise occasionally from other causes, such as equipment malfunctions or flooding. All infrastructure sectors depend on drinking water and wastewater systems to some degree, and would not be able to function for extended periods of time without these systems. Any suggestion that there are likely to be cascading infrastructure consequences from individual cybersecurity incidents at water or wastewater infrastructure would be misleading and overstated, because a cybersecurity incident is unlikely to result in a significant denial of water or wastewater services. The potential for a temporary loss of water or wastewater services to have a cascading effect in another sector is small and localized, but could be significantly greater if coordinated distributed attacks impacted many parts of an individual large system, or affected many systems.

Cyberattacks on water and wastewater systems continue, with sophisticated actors often the perpetrators. It is not clear if the scale and scope of these attacks is increasing; if so, they are not increasing significantly. The consequences of isolated attacks that are actually able to contaminate the water system through under-or over-treatment are not likely to have a devastating effect. Water moves slowly enough through a system that there are opportunities to discover, through additional monitoring, that the water quality is incorrect and to intervene and flush the water before it is released. Attacks that result in physical damage or those that combine cyber- and physical tactics are much more likely to cause significant damage and costly consequences. Water system information security incidents continue to increase in frequency, though very few to date have had actual physical consequences. These, however, are not the type of scenarios where sophisticated actors have invested in developing the presence and capacity to sabotage the system. It is unclear if these exploits are actually increasing, or if it is just due to owners and operators revealing them at a greater rate. In either case, the sophisticated and coordinated attacks that result in devastating outcomes have not occurred.

⁵⁴¹ National Weather Service Weather Forecast Office, December 14, 2005 Taum Sauk Dam Failure at Johnson's Shut-In Park in Southeast Missouri. http://www.crh.noaa.gov/lxu/?n=12_14_2005.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Complex coordinated attack on the grid is conducted so as to maximize physical damage and power outage	The most serious consequences of a successful cyberattack on the grid would be associated with attacks that succeeded in destabilizing the grid by removing a large proportion of either generation or load resulting in rolling blackouts.	Distributed nature of electricity substations. Lack of monitoring or systems, logons, and third party vendors. Integrated nature of systems allowing less secure devices that are directly connected to the Internet to be breached, thereby granting access to the more secure ICS.	Criminal hactivists, terrorist organizations, and nation states are the most likely threat actors.

Table 30: ICS Scenario Type 3

In November 2014, Admiral Michael Rogers, the Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of the U.S. Cyber Command testified before the House (Select) Intelligence Committee that sophisticated attacks from nation-states had the potential to “shut down the entire U.S. power grid.”⁵⁴² Concern about cyberattacks on the electrical grid is reflected in a large number of the scenarios identified from a review of THIRAs.

Electric power networks are required to be resilient to the loss of any single component (including generation units, high-voltage transmission lines, and transformers) under the reliability standards developed and enforced by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), which oversees eight regional reliability entities and encompasses all of the interconnected power systems of the contiguous United States, Canada and a portion of Baja California in Mexico. Each of these regional entities is also required to maintain an “operating reserve margin” of available generation capacity that can be called up within minutes to mitigate the loss of generation sources due to an unplanned outage.

The most serious consequences of a successful cyberattack on the grid would be associated with attacks that succeeded in destabilizing the grid by removing a large proportion of either generation or load. A cyberattack could theoretically be designed to disrupt power generation directly through its control system or by causing a precipitous drop in demand. This drop in demand could be achieved by disconnecting portions of the transmission network, which could cause generation plants to trip offline to avoid damaging the turbines. The consequences of an attack will depend on two factors: the amount of generation capacity taken out of service and whether the equipment is physically damaged. If a sufficient amount of generation is taken offline, low voltage and outage conditions could result. If equipment is physically damaged, restoration will take far longer than if it has only been disconnected. Even if equipment is not damaged, operators would still need time to investigate the causes, assess operability, and restart generators.

⁵⁴² National Security Agency Hearing of the House (Select) Intelligence Committee; Subject: "Cybersecurity Threats: The Way Forward," transcript at www.nsa.gov/public_info_files/speeches_testimonies/ADM.ROGERS.Hill.20.Nov.pdf, accessed March 5, 2015.

Transmission networks combine cyber-dependent control systems and the potential for high consequences from outage. The high-voltage transformers used in electric power transmission, in particular, would be expensive and difficult to replace if damaged. However, it is not clear that a cyberattack would be able to physically damage multiple transformers, because this equipment is protected by multiple protection layers, including some protection layers built into the transformers, specifically designed to minimize the damage to transformers.⁵⁴³ Replacing damaged extra-high voltage transformers would be expensive and logistically difficult as replacements can take up to 18 months to manufacture.

If enough generation is lost that the operating reserve margin is exhausted, the regional operators could call for utilities to shed load through voluntary conservation, exercising interruptible contracts, or implementing rolling blackouts as needed. Rolling blackouts are likely to be the worst-case consequence for the disruption of a small number of generation plants.

An attack on transmission network or generation equipment that disrupts a large number of assets on the network could have high consequences, perhaps similar to the 2003 Northeast Blackout, which affected an estimated 10 million people in Ontario and 45 million people in eight states in the U.S.⁵⁴⁴ This would likely require a very well-planned and sophisticated attack, because even though multiple systems may use the same control system protocols, the protocols can be implemented differently; each time a system operator sets up the control system, there should be a unique set of access controls (e.g., passwords). Disconnecting or damaging a sufficiently large amount of generation could cause widespread blackouts and “islanding” of portions of the grid still operating. In addition to the time needed for assessment, operators would need to restore power gradually to maintain the stability of the grid as more generation returned to service. In the event of a complete regional blackout, certain generation stations capable of starting up without using offsite power would be the first to be restored, so that they could provide the offsite power needed to bring other sites back online.

Although the system is resilient to unplanned outages of one or two assets, such as may occur in the normal course of operation, it is not designed to cope with an intentional attack on many assets. Outages of this length obviously pose health and safety concerns, would incur business disruption costs, and stress the backup power provisions for critical infrastructure. There is also the potential for added psychological impact associated with the fact that the outage was caused by a cyberattack. This will likely shake the public’s confidence in critical infrastructure security and perhaps infrastructure regulators.

Modeling and simulation of electric power is well-developed and is used for the daily operation of electric power networks, planning for future network conditions, predicting the impacts of

⁵⁴³ See for example GE Digital Energy, “Transformer Protection Principles,” www.gedigitalenergy.com/smartgrid/Mar07/article5.pdf, accessed March 9, 2015.

⁵⁴⁴ Although advances in reliability standards make such an event unlikely today, this is an example of a cascade set off by a software bug in a control room alarm system. At the peak of summer demands for electric power, a transmission line sagged into an unpruned tree. This cascaded into an outage that affected an estimated 10 million people in Ontario and 45 million people in eight states in the U.S. because control room operators did not receive the alarm and respond in time. The fluctuating power on the network caused more than 508 generating units at 265 power plants to trip offline. Secondary impacts were felt to communications (including 911 services), water infrastructure, and electric rail transportation. See U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, “Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations,” April, 2004, at <http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf>, accessed March 3, 2015.

impending or hypothetical hazards, and optimizing network restoration. In addition to utilities and their authorities, numerous National Laboratories, universities, Government entities and others use commercially-available models, sometimes tailored to answer particular questions.⁵⁴⁵ Thus, there is a wealth of information (historical data and modeling results) about how the electric grid might behave under various contingencies. Nonetheless, it is impossible to predict the outcome of any scenario with complete certainty. This is partly because the instantaneous conditions on the network can affect the outcome, and partly because it is impossible to know all the factors that will influence the decisions made by the people actually managing the grid.

Similarly, there is a wealth of information about cybersecurity and a strong motivation to protect the information and communications networks on which the electric grid increasingly relies. What is missing is a good understanding of how vulnerabilities in cyber infrastructure might play out in an attack scenario. This is likely to be a very thorny problem, as the answers will vary from region to region and perhaps, utility to utility, depending on the exact configuration of existing physical and virtual infrastructure.

For example, it is not clear to what degree a cyberattack could physically damage infrastructure. If damage is minimal, the impacts could be orders of magnitude less than the worst-case scenarios involving damaged high-voltage transformers. Even as widespread, disruptive, and costly as the 2003 Northeast Blackout was, most customers had power restored within 2 days. In contrast, although Superstorm Sandy affected a smaller number of customers, restoration required repairing or replacing a huge amount of equipment damaged by winds and flooding, and took much longer to complete. Still, the rate of restoration after Sandy was similar to that required for other strong, damaging storms; it took about 10 to 14 days to restore power to 95% of customers.⁵⁴⁶ Clearly, the degree of physical damage to the system will be a key driver in the duration of an outage and therefore the human, economic, and social impacts.

For this reason, scenarios that combine cyber and physical attacks are likely to have the greatest potential consequences. For example, a cyberattack could make a physical attack more difficult to detect and mitigate, while physical damage could delay restoration and thereby magnify the impacts of a cyberattack. Combined attacks may be cyber-enabled physical attacks (in which cyber means are used to get access to enable a physical attack) or a physical-enabled cyberattack (in which physical means are used to access a control system, thereby allowing the system to be maliciously altered). Either type could have serious consequences.

Cyberattacks on the grid continue, with sophisticated actors often the perpetrators. The scale and scope of these attacks may be increasing, but if so, not significantly. The consequences of attacks that are only able to impact individual generators, or which do not cause significant physical damage are unlikely to have a devastating effect. Attacks that combine cyber- and physical tactics are much more likely to cause significant damage and costly consequences, and it is unclear if such attacks are being planned. Electric grid cybersecurity incidents continue to increase in frequency, including attacks by sophisticated actors appearing to establish the

⁵⁴⁵ One example is the electric power analysis performed by DHS for hypothetical disaster scenarios or in response to real-world events. DHS is supported by the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, a joint endeavor of Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories. For more information, see www.dhs.gov/office-cyber-infrastructure-analysis.

⁵⁴⁶ Fahey, Jonathan, Associated Press, “Power Outages After Hurricane Sandy Weren’t Unusually Long After All,” November 16, 2012, at www.dailyfinance.com/2012/11/16/power-outages-after-hurricane-sandy-werent-unusually-long-after/, accessed March 3, 2015.

capability to sabotage the grid. The actual acts of sabotage are not attempted, however, and it is unclear if the risk of coordinated and effective sabotage of the grid through cyberattacks will happen.

Cyber 9/11

Introduction

There are quite a number of sources that have postulated that massive distributed attacks against infrastructure are expected, which would have massive debilitating effects on the U.S.. Starting back in 1991, when Winn Schwartau, then Director of the International Partnership against Computer Terrorism, warned against an electronic Pearl Harbor in his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Technology and Competitiveness of the Committee on Science, Space and Technology of the U.S. House of Representatives.⁵⁴⁷ Members of the 9/11 Commission called attention to the threat in “Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary of the 9/11 Commission Report.”⁵⁴⁸ Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano warned in January 2013 speech at the Wilson Center that a “cyber 9/11” could happen imminently. If it were to occur, it could cripple the country, taking down the power grid, water infrastructure, transportation networks and financial networks.”⁵⁴⁹

The most recent assessment of the U.S. Intelligence community reduces the expectation for such a scenario. In his February 26, 2015 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence stated that, “Rather than a ‘cyber-Armageddon’ scenario that debilitates the entire U.S. infrastructure, we envision something different,” …“We foresee an ongoing series of low-to-moderate level cyber-attacks from a variety of sources over time, which will impose cumulative costs on U.S. economic competitiveness and national security.”

Coincidentally, this speech followed a day after New York financial regulator Ben Lawsky predicted that a cyber-Armageddon would occur within the Financial Services Sector in the next decade. This reflects the importance of the viewpoint of those who are interpreting what is going on.

Complex coordinated attack on significant infrastructure resulting in catastrophic outcomes ...Interpreting the data

The Internet and American Life project conducted by the Pew research firm on the subject released its findings in Digital Life magazine in 2015.⁵⁵⁰ Their survey of 1,642 experts in the field found that 61percent believe that by 2025, there will a major cyberattack that has caused widespread harm to a Nation’s security and capacity to defend itself and its people. (By

⁵⁴⁷ The record of the proceedings <http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000018472172;view=1up;seq=14#view=1up;seq=1> , accessed March 6, 2015

⁵⁴⁸ Adam Goldman, 9/11 commission members warn of cyber attack threats, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/911-commission-report-authors-warn-nation-of-cyberattack-threats/2014/07/21/82d0fb84-10e5-11e4-98ee-daea85133bc9_story.html accessed March 6, 2015

⁵⁴⁹ Reuters, U.S. homeland chief: cyber 9/11 could happen “imminently”, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/24/us-usa-cyber-threat-idUSBRE90N1A320130124?feedType=RSS&feedName=technologyNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+reuters%2FtechnologyNews%28Reuters+Technology+News%29 accessed March 6, 2015

⁵⁵⁰ <http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/29/cyber-attacks-likely-to-increase/>

“widespread harm,” they specified significant loss of life or property losses/damage/theft at the levels of tens of billions of dollars.) Survey respondents provided the basis for their judgment, which the Pew researchers organized into four themes:

- Internet-connected systems are inviting targets. The Internet is a critical infrastructure for national defense activities, energy resources, banking/finance, transportation, and essential daily-life pursuits for billions of people. The tools already exist to mount cyberattacks now and they will improve in coming years—but countermeasures will improve, too.
- Security is generally not the first concern in the design of Internet applications. It seems as if the world will only wake up to these vulnerabilities after catastrophe occurs
- Major cyberattacks have already happened, for instance the Stuxnet worm and attacks in nations where mass opposition to a regime has taken to the streets. Similar or worse attacks are a given.
- Cyberattacks are a looming challenge for businesses and individuals. Certain sectors, such as finance and power systems, are the most vulnerable. There are noteworthy divides between the prepared and the unprepared.

The other 39 percent of the respondents believed that there would not be such a major attack by the year 2025. The justifications for their responses were grouped into the following lines of thought:

- There is steady progress in security fixes. Despite the Internet’s vulnerabilities, a distributed network structure will help thwart the worst attacks. Security standards will be upgraded. The good guys will still be winning the cybersecurity arms race by 2025.
- Deterrence works, the threat of retaliation will keep bad actors in check, and some bad actors are satisfied with making only small dents in the system so they can keep mining a preferred vulnerability and not have it closed off.
- Hype over cyber-attacks is an exaggeration of real dangers fostered by the individuals and organizations that will gain the most from creating an atmosphere of fear.

Perhaps the most interesting outcome of this research is insight into how individuals who seem to be experts in a field, maintain inconsistent knowledge of current events in their area of expertise, how they synthesize the large amount of information on the topic, and the potential role of biases in their responses. Regardless of anyone’s perceptions of what is actually happening and whether it will continue, decrease or increase, the fact is that vulnerabilities are constantly being discovered by both those who wish to take advantage of them and those who would like to see them managed. The time advantage goes to the offense, however, who may root undetected for months planning and laying the foundation for an exploit, where the defense must respond quickly and decisively, typically after a loss has occurred.

Insights gained over the last few years from cybersecurity specialists also reveal a disturbing blurring-of-the-lines between the capabilities of sophisticated state actors and cybercriminals who seek financial gain. Some of these commonalities include increasingly insightful use of spear-phishing emails, custom malware tools, crimeware that has been available for years,

persistent presence for years and attempted return after being kicked out, and a common and growing interest in collecting PII.⁵⁵¹

It is noteworthy that none of the respondents considered the ingenuity of infrastructure operators, normal emergency responses, the logical limitations of the how to combine interdependent outages of different infrastructures in their assessment. They also clearly segregated the Armageddon cyberattack from those attacks that are occurring and may yet occur within our Financial Services Sector.

The nearly coincidental dismissal of the threat of a cyber-Armageddon by the Director of National Intelligence and the prediction of an impending cyber-Armageddon by a financial regulator may ironically both be true, since so few recognize the financial services industry as an infrastructure sector, nor understand the concept and causes of systemic financial risks. Just as a few people demanding their funds from a bank may not be problem, but many of them doing so created runs on banks in the past, and just as a loss of confidence can spin out of control into a crisis of confidence, financial regulators must concern themselves with these sudden amplifications of problems within the financial services industry. They recognize the possibility that operational risks such as cybersecurity could lead to unexpected exposures or crises of confidence that institutions had not prepared for. It is this type of risk that may be most likely to lead to a cyber-Armageddon.

Scenario	Consequences	Vulnerabilities	Threats
Cyberattack leaves malware inserted in the control systems of many key infrastructures without further activation	The costs of constant scanning, cleanup and removal of malware that has not yet been used is significant but minor compared to the costs of dealing with the consequences of an actual attack that affects the operation of infrastructure. The consequences envisioned by a massive attack on key critical infrastructure are catastrophic, however, there is currently no evidence to suggest this is an imminent possibility.	Distributed nature of critical infrastructure ICS. Lack of monitoring or systems, logons, and third party vendors among utilities. Integrated nature of systems allowing less secure devices that are directly connected to the Internet to be breached, thereby granting access to the more secure ICS.	Criminal hactivists, terrorist organizations, and nation states are the most likely threat actors.

Table 31: Cyber 9/11 Scenario Type 16

The concern continues that some catastrophic attack that exploits vulnerabilities in much of U.S. physical infrastructure in a coordinated and felling strike. The reason for this continued concern is that it is common to discover that sophisticated adversaries have planted malware in systems and then just left, with a back-door to ease their access at a later date. An example of such

⁵⁵¹ Mandiant, M-Trends 2015: A view from the front lines, downloadable PDF at: <https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/threat-intelligence-reports.html>, accessed March 17, 2015

evidence is the recent discovery that the Sony data breach and wipe, while enacted suddenly, was found to have been started a year prior.

The scale, scope, and complexity of attacks on infrastructure may be increasing, or may simply be discovered at a greater rate. The lack of clarity between the rate of occurrence and the rate of discovery is an obstacle to understanding the frequency of such attacks as well. The costs of constant scanning, cleanup and removal of malware that has not yet been used is significant but minor compared to the costs of dealing with the consequences of an actual attack that affects the operation of infrastructure. But perhaps the greatest burden associated with this “partial attack” is the realization that an adversary has invested time and resources to be ready at a moment’s notice to deliver a decisive attack. The adversary has radically changed the game, the defender has already lost, and no one really knows what may yet be discovered.

Conclusion

The risks associated with cybersecurity incidents in the U.S. are better understood today than ever before. This is a result of improved reporting and increased analytic foundations for understanding consequences. The increased transparency has provided better insight into a larger portion of a risk landscape, though it remains comparatively unclear to risk managers and planners who may try to compare these challenges to more obvious and predictable hazards, such as natural hazards, accidents, and routine crime.

Unlike natural hazards, cyberthreats do not have a geospatial aspect that makes it easier to determine the likelihood, character, or the strength of incidents. Like accidents, many cybersecurity incidents are the result of human reliability failures. Unlike accidents, cyberattacks have malicious individuals attempting to lure victims into compromising themselves.

Like routine crime, many cybersecurity incidents are all about the money. Organized crime and major drug cartels have demonstrated that having intelligent managers of a major criminal endeavor can make it all the more lucrative. This may be even more so for cybercriminal groups. Cybercriminal groups provide the opportunity to unscrupulous people who could clearly make a very respectable income in the real economy to gamble for a much more extravagant return with fairly low risk. While the prosecution of cybercrimes is increasing, the cases are so complicated, often with so many different jurisdictions involved, that it would be unreasonable to suggest that the fear of prosecution is a substantial deterrent. Like other crimes where individual’s privacy and personal autonomy is violated, there is a culture of blame and shame for the victims of cybercrime that has created a substantial incentive for victims to hide, to try to deal with these attacks privately or with the assistance of cybersecurity consultants. The degree to which this incentivizes improved security, or to which improving security can sufficiently protect an organization is unclear.

Like terrorism and Nation-state competition, failures of cybersecurity give an adversary power. This power may be in the ability to control a message, silence free speech, or deny an organization the right to do its lawful business. It may be in the ability to systematically establish and maintain a presence in our networks that allows the adversary to extract the hard-earned value of intellectual property, and turn it over to their own enterprises, so they do not have to compete on a level field. It may make it easy to figure out who works in sensitive positions and what their personal challenges are, so that intelligence agents can focus their attention on subjects most likely to become useful spies. It may be the systematic mining of the computer systems that we use to manage and operate our complex infrastructures and industrial plants with

computer exploits which can be triggered at the convenience of the adversary, giving him an effective and distracting attack that may enhance some other activity. Like physical attacks by terrorists or nation-states, these politically and militarily driven cyberattacks lead to a loss of confidence in Government.

Given the diversity of adversaries, their intentions, the known and unknown dangers, and the persistence of the American public in moving so much of their lives and work into cyberspace, the comparison that may be most apt is the analogy of the westward expansion of the U.S. President Barack Obama made this analogy on February 13th, 2015. He cautioned against the expectation that the U.S. could expect the Federal Government to fill the role of the sheriff in this new frontier, and he encouraged broad collaboration and cooperation across government and industry in this challenging cybersecurity space.⁵⁵²

In addition to these efforts to help stem the attacks, owners and operators of systems may be able to find ways to decouple the cause and effect of cybersecurity incidents and the harms they currently produce. Planners may be positioned to make the case for cybersecurity investments in redundancies, backups, and quick-response capabilities. Researchers in the fields of human reliability may be able to identify ways to reduce the likelihood of human errors resulting in cybersecurity compromises. Agencies may systematically identify and evaluate networks where their information is exposed, and how the exposed information could benefit adversaries, as part of their enterprise risk management. Legislators and regulators may consider how to maximize the incentives for public/private partnership on the defense of government and industry systems and services; and encourage the growth of a cybersecure workforce and public. These distributed contributions reinforce the idea that a whole-of-community approach will improve the safety and security of U.S. interests in cyberspace.

⁵⁵² National Public Radio, Obama: Cyberspace is the New ‘Wild West’, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2015/02/13/385960693/obama-to-urge-companies-to-share-data-on-cyber-threats>, accessed March 23, 2015.

Strategic National Risk Assessment additional documentation

SNRA 2015 instructions to contributors

- Background & general guidance
- Qualitative data instructions
- Quantitative data (risk summary sheet) instructions

SNRA 2011 public summary

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The SNRA 2015 Working Papers and instructions to contributors are separate documents from the preceding Resource for Planners. They are included in this PDF binder to make it self-contained.

Two documents were distributed with the SNRA 2015 instructions: the seven-page December 2011 public summary that is included in this binder, and the unclassified version of the ~200 page SNRA Technical Report referenced as the SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings. The latter is identical to the second half of the May 2015 SNRA Technical Appendix (the Resource for Planners main document in this binder is a consolidated version of the 2011 and 2015 halves of that document), other than small corrigenda which are listed on p. 236 of the Technical Appendix. Technical Appendix page numbers are the same as those cited below, plus 232.

Strategic National Risk Assessment 2015 Update

Background & General Guidance

Background and Intent

In support of the continued implementation of Presidential Policy Directive 8: *National Preparedness*, the FEMA National Integration Center (NIC) is leading a review of the publicly disseminated findings¹ from the 2011 Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) for accuracy and relevancy. In doing so, the NIC is seeking assistance from stakeholders in the review process. This document provides general guidance for you, as a stakeholder, for participation in this process.

The intent of reviewing and updating the 2011 SNRA is to provide an updated national-risk picture for senior level decision-makers and to support the update to the National Preparedness Goal, a parallel effort underway. The 2015 SNRA will include updates from the 2011 version and additional considerations for evolving threats and climate change. FEMA intends to use unclassified information to the maximum extent possible to help ensure our ability to disseminate the summary to a wider stakeholder audience.

Documents of Reference

The following documents are those we will reference in support of the SNRA review:

1. **The 2011 Unclassified SNRA** (7 page unclassified public version; December 2011) – this is the document being reviewed and updated in 2015 (<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.pdf>).
2. **SNRA 2011 Unclassified PPD-8 Circulation draft** (FEMA provided) – this document is provided to stakeholders in the SNRA process directly from FEMA and for reference purposes only. It provides the unclassified basis (including risk summary sheets) for the SNRA summary document. This document is not to be distributed beyond those stakeholders involved in SNRA-related efforts.
3. **SNRA 2015 Risk summary sheet instructions and template** (FEMA provided) – provides detailed instructions for how to update a risk summary sheet with quantifiable information.
4. **SNRA 2015 Qualitative Data Instructions** (FEMA provided) – qualitative data submissions will primarily be used to support new content in the 2015 SNRA summary document, including evolving threats and climate change.

¹ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011, December). The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach toward a Secure and Resilient Nation (public summary) .

General Guidance for the SNRA 2015 Update Process

- Review the 2011 SNRA and the risk summary sheets contained within 2011 SNRA unclassified PPD-8 circulation draft.
- Submit feedback on the 2011 SNRA. If you determine that any of the findings in the document are inaccurate or are no longer relevant, please provide the data needed to defend any proposed corrections.²
- Submit updated risk summary sheets along with any supporting information for specific threats and hazards ONLY IF those updates would change the findings in the 2011 SNRA summary document or those updates are proposed as new threats and hazards. Please see the provided instructions for how to complete a risk summary sheet, and/or how to submit qualitative data for this effort. Please be sure to include all supporting data accordingly.
- If you have previously submitted this data to FEMA for another data call (e.g. National Preparedness Report), then **there is no need to submit it again**. However, please provide us with the POC and specific data call channel to which you submitted and we will coordinate directly through appropriate channels.
- The SNRA is not intended to include a definitive list of all risks, real or potential.
- FEMA is not seeking unsubstantiated opinions. All updated threats, hazards and findings which differ from the 2011 SNRA must be supported by quantitative data, qualitative data, or multiple subject matter expert statements supporting those opinions.
- The CLASSIFIED components to the SNRA are handled through a separate but coordinated process. Related questions can be sent to: PPD8-NationalPreparedness@fema.dhs.gov. Do not send classified content to this email address.

Questions to consider while reviewing the 2011 SNRA Summary Document

1. Do you have data to verify/back-up your position that the high-level findings from the 2011 SNRA summary should be updated?
 - a. If so, would the data **change** the December 2011 publicly disseminated findings **as they are written?**
 - b. If so, are you able to share your data? (A classified annex is available for classified information.)
 - c. If your data are quantitative, do they meet the same standards as the data in the 2011 SNRA?
 - d. If your data are qualitative, are they sourced and documented to the standards outlined in the Qualitative Data Instructions?
 - e. Does your data represent national-level risk, as opposed to sector-specific or regional risk?

² Requirements, instructions, and standards are provided in the technical instruction ‘SNRA 2015 Risk Summary Sheet Instructions and Template’, attached.

Submitting data to update the SNRA

If you have data that should update the findings and/or list of threats and hazards in the 2011 SNRA summary document, please send your data in a format suitable for integration into the SNRA development, as explained below and in supporting guidance (as referenced).

Submitting quantitative data

Reference the document titled, “SNRA 2015 Risk Summary Sheet Instructions and Template” for instructions on how to write an SNRA Risk Summary Sheet, and the minimal technical and documentary requirements for quantitative analysis in the SNRA. All new or updated **quantitative** data submitted by stakeholders in the 2015 review should align with the formatting guidance provided in the “SNRA 2015 Risk Summary Sheet Instructions and Template”.

Submitting qualitative data

See the document titled, “SNRA 2015 Qualitative Data Instructions”, which includes qualitative data requirements, instructions, and a template for accomplishing a concise literature review.

Risks identified and analyzed based on **qualitative** data may also be presented in the text of the summary document. All data, information, and sources provided and/or used for the review and update of the publicly disseminated SNRA summary are subject to public and/or peer review. The qualitative data requirements below explain what is needed in order for qualitative data submissions to be usable in the updated SNRA summary document. Specifically, the Qualitative Risk Package includes: a synopsis, literature review, and source materials (either physical or electronic copies).

Synopsis: Provide a synopsis of all your sources and the assessment based on your literature review in 150-words or less. Ensure that you cite sources of information using footnotes.

Literature Review: The Literature Review should follow the template provided. Source material should meet the following criteria:

- Should include 5 sources for each major topic area (i.e. fatality estimates from a tornado).
- Peer reviewed academic journals provide the best source for objective information.
- Government documents provide a good source for information.
- Trade journals provide an acceptable source of information, but the information is typically subjective.
- Source should be less than 5-years old. Sources over 5-years old could provide information that is no longer valid or relevant.

Source material: Submitted as either physical or electronic copies.

Department and Agency Action Items

1. Send your Department/Agency SNRA point of contact information (name[s], title, Branch/Unit/Division, Department/Agency, email address, and phone number) to the National Integration Center at: PPD8-NationalPreparedness@fema.dhs.gov by **Friday, February 13th, 2015**.
2. Submit all **UNCLASSIFIED** input, including completed risk summary sheet(s) and/or qualitative data to PPD8-NationalPreparedness@fema.dhs.gov no later than **March 5th, 2015**.

Strategic National Risk Assessment 2015

Qualitative Data Instructions

Introduction

The findings of the 2015 SNRA will be summarized for public dissemination in a product similar to the seven-page overview of the first SNRA published in December 2011. Qualitative data submissions will primarily be used to support new content in the unclassified 2015 SNRA summary document including evolving threats and climate change. If you have qualitative risk information that would be beneficial to this effort, please read the requirements and instructions below. Please keep in mind that our summary sections will be no more than $\frac{1}{2}$ - $1\frac{1}{2}$ pages long.

Please note, if you have previously submitted this data to FEMA for another data call (e.g. National Preparedness Report), then **there is no need to submit it again**. However, please provide us with the POC and specific data call channel to which you submitted and we will coordinate directly through appropriate.

Submit all input to PPD8-NationalPreparedness@fema.dhs.gov no later than **March 5th, 2015**.

Qualitative Data Requirements

The qualitative data requirements below explain what is needed in order for qualitative data submissions to be usable in the updated SNRA summary document.

Synopsis: Provide a synopsis of all your sources and the assessment based on your literature review in 150-words or less. Ensure that you cite sources of information using footnotes.

Literature Review: The Literature Review should follow the template provided. Source material should meet the following criteria:

- Should include 5 sources for each major topic area (i.e. fatality estimates from a tornado).
- Peer reviewed academic journals provide the best source for objective information.
- Government documents provide a good source for information.
- Trade journals provide an acceptable source of information, but the information is typically subjective.
- Source should be less than 5-years old. Sources over 5-years old could provide information that is no longer valid or relevant.

Source material: Submitted as either physical or electronic copies.

Literature Review Template and Example

What is a literature review?

A literature review goes beyond the simple summarization of an article, by actually providing a critical review of the article. A hypothesis relating to a specific topic provides the basis for the critical review. For example:

Topic: Hospital actions involving individuals with functional needs during disaster operations

Hypothesis: Hospitals currently lack an emergency management based framework for caring for individuals with functional needs during emergency operations.

The topic and hypothesis provide narrow guidelines for literature collection, helping to ensure the review of relevant literature. Additionally, since the literature review provides a focused objective, the number of pieces of literature is limited to a manageable amount (i.e. 30 instead of 300).

Limiting the literature to peer reviewed materials (i.e. scientific journals) is not necessary, but helps minimize bias and speculation. Minimizing bias and speculation assists in developing a factual understanding of the hypothesis. However, if materials other than peer reviewed sources are used such as industry journals, magazine articles, etc. the critique should mention potential biases and/or missing factual materials associated with the literature.

While it is important to write in “plain language”, literature reviews should be accurate. At times, accuracy in language will require the use of language and terms typically not considered “plain language”.

Helpful Questions:

- What is known about the subject?
- Are there any gaps in the knowledge of the subject?
- Have areas of further study been identified by other researchers that you may want to consider?
- Who are the significant research personalities in this area?
- Is there consensus about the topic?
- What aspects have generated significant debate on the topic?
- What is the current status of research in this area?
- What sources of information or data were identified that might be useful to you?

What is the benefit of a literature review?

Literature review provides an objective method for discovering relevant topics relating to a specific hypothesis. In addition, literature review provides a method for presenting vast amounts of information in a short, relevant format. By conducting a literature review more people are exposed to relevant materials in a manner that allows them to quickly familiarize themselves

with the material. Literature reviews also provide guidance on which documents are relevant to the stated subject and why.

Short, Descriptive Title

1. Introduction
 - a. Describe the risk and provide a short (2 – 3 sentences) description of the unique nature of the risk.
 - b. Identify themes (i.e. fatalities due to power loss), trends (i.e. increase in cyber-attacks), and provide a “big picture” of the literature.
2. First Theme (A theme is a broad word or phrase that synthesizes a narrow group of related findings. For example, a theme of “Resistance” would include types of resistance, resistance to whom, resisting what, etc.). Provide an overview of characteristics of the theme (commonalities, differences, nuances). *Try to keep to 2 or fewer paragraphs for each source.
3. Second Theme – follow a, b, c, and so on from above
4. Keep repeating with themes (only use identifiable themes; do not use non-relevant, minor themes)
5. Conclusion: *An evaluation/critique of the existing literature. Write enough paragraphs tying everything associated with the hypothesis together.*
 - a. What are the contributions of this literature to the field?
 - b. What are the overall strengths?
 - c. What are the overall weaknesses?
 - d. What might be missing?

Example: Hospitals, Individuals with Access and Functional Needs, and Emergency Operations

Introduction

Hospitals are a critical member of the whole community in many jurisdictions during and after emergency operations. However, the media often prints stories critiquing how hospitals treat individuals with functional needs during and after a disaster. Yet, the media does not always prove a reliable source for information. Often the media presents “facts” from unknown or unreliable sources. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) benefits from researching available literature associated with the subject of emergency operations that involve and/or affect hospitals and those with functional needs.

The primary challenge when researching literature regarding hospitals, and functional needs persons during emergency operations is availability. Few academic sources study hospitals, individuals with functional needs, and emergency operations. While other sources such as magazines and trade journals exist, the bias often present in these sources make them unreliable and as a result sources that are not peer reviewed were not considered.

Three main themes emerged from the literature reviewed. First, hospital emergency plans do not take into account functional needs persons during emergency operations with the exception of evacuations. Second, plans often neglect losses of caregivers associated with disaster operations. Finally, terms such as “functional needs” and “special needs” are ambiguous requiring local determination to be useful.

For this literature review, the foundational hypothesis is as follows: Hospitals currently lack an emergency management based framework for caring for individuals with functional need during emergency operations. While the preceding seems broad based on the ambiguity of “emergency operations” for this paper, “emergency operations” refer to any significant event that either directly or indirectly affects a hospital. Whether an event is an emergency operation relies on the capacity and capability of a hospital. For example, a 6-car accident in a rural community could severely stress the capacity and capability of a rural hospital. Conversely, a similar accident in a major metropolitan area could easily absorb such an accident.

Function based definition required for emergency management and planning

Simple, accurate language often presents a challenge to those who write plans and doctrine. Kailes and Enders noted that the term “special needs” appears simple and accurate, but lacks specific guidelines for inclusion or exclusion.¹ For example, “special needs”, also known as “access and functional needs” can include not only those in wheel chairs or the blind, but pregnant individuals and those without motor vehicles.²

Kailes and Enders conducted a review of literature including common definitions from sources including FEMA and Census 2000.³ The materials reviewed indicated that upwards of 49.99% of

¹ Kailes, J. I. (2007). Moving beyond “special needs”. *Journal of Disability Policy Studies*, 17(4), 203 – 237.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

the population of the United States falls in the broad category of “special needs” or “access and functional needs”. Kailes and Enders stated that with such a large portion of the population meeting the definition, created a situation where planning becomes impossible.⁴

One proposed method to correct issues associated without having a clear definition of “access and functional needs” is to use a flexible framework based on five essential functional needs. Kailes and Enders contended that using communication, medical needs, maintaining functional independence, supervision, and transportation (C-MIST) plans, which overcome issues associated to an imprecise definition become possible.⁵ However, Kailes and Enders fail to consider the local nature of emergencies.

While Kailes’s and Enders’s point about the imprecision of terms associated with individuals with access and functional needs, their approach fails to incorporate the critical local factor.⁶ Hogarth and Neil supported the preceding by noting that local capabilities are a critical consideration in any emergency.⁷ According to Hogarth and Neil (2001) when an emergency occurs, the resources you have will limit how you respond.⁸ For example, when their hospital ran an exercise that included an estimated 600 casualties the hospital discharged 48 patients deemed stable.⁹ Additionally, the staff converted several non-traditional areas (i.e. recovery rooms) into operating rooms.¹⁰

Hogarth and Neil’s article present potentially biased information given only a single exercise forms the foundation for their information.¹¹ However, Hogarth and Neil’s information does reinforce the notion of the effect of limited resources.¹² Griffies further reinforced the notion that resources are limited in emergencies.¹³ According to Griffies, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina the number of psychiatrists in New Orleans went from 196 to 22.¹⁴ Although the population in New Orleans dropped from approximately 480,000 to 240,000 the loss of psychiatric capability was significant.¹⁵ Overall, the psychiatrists went from one psychiatrist for approximately every 2,449 to one psychiatrist for approximately every 10,909.¹⁶

One of the key elements in the article comes from quantitative research conducted involving non-return factors involving physicians.¹⁷ Griffies (2010) reported that based on research, one of the major factors for physicians not returning after a major emergency is the perception of the effort required to reestablish a practice.¹⁸ While physician availability and return is not

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Hogarth, W. D. & Neil, G. F. (2001). Anatomy of a disaster: One hospital’s experience and recommendations. *CJEM: Journal of the Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians*, 3(1), 38 – 40.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Griffies, S. (2010). Health care infrastructure Post-Katrina: Disaster planning to return health care workers to their home communities. *Psychiatric Services*, 61(1), 70 – 73.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

necessarily associated with planning for hospital emergencies involving those with access and functional needs, it is a critical factor. A hospital that loses a significant portion of specialized care providers severely affects the ability to evacuate or care for those with “access and functional needs”.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the three articles reviewed provided three major themes. First, the ambiguity of who is included or excluded from the “access and functional needs” definition creates problems with planning for emergencies. It is possible to mitigate the ambiguity surrounding “access and functional needs” by providing an explicit definition. Another method for approaching the question of ambiguity is to reinforce the notion that local planners need to develop an understanding of their community. The first method could result in overlooking a population, while the second method ensures a tailored approach.

The second theme of limited resources is a familiar theme. However, two of the articles indicate that while the theme is common planners still overlook it when planning or conducting exercise. Moreover, in hospitals it is critical to understand that often those working in the hospital are the ones who will respond. Additionally, those in the hospital could be the only medical personnel available for several operational periods. The aforementioned factors limit the ability of a hospital to provide services to those requiring specialized care.

The final theme of loss of specialized health care professional relates closely to the second theme. Just like with the second theme, the final theme is a critical planning consideration since replacement of those medical personnel lost is unlikely. In the event replacements for medical personnel do not occur, planners would have to account for the ability to transport and/or care for those with special needs.

Overall, the articles reviewed provide a strong foundation for conducting more research. Yet, the articles often lack quantifiable data. To develop a better understanding of the real situation of hospitals when it comes to emergency planning incorporating those with access and functional needs requires quantifiable data.

References

- Griffies, S. (2010). Health care infrastructure Post-Katrina: Disaster planning to return health care workers to their home communities. *Psychiatric Services, 61*(1), 70 – 73.
- Hogarth, W. D. & Neil, G. F. (2001). Anatomy of a disaster: One hospital’s experience and recommendations. *CJEM: Journal of the Canadian Association of Emergency Physicians, 3*(1), 38 – 40.
- Kailes, J. I. (2007). Moving beyond “special needs”. *Journal of Disability Policy Studies, 17*(4), 203 – 237.

Strategic National Risk Assessment 2015 Risk Summary Sheet Instructions and Template

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Draft v. 1.0
6 February 2015



FEMA

Note: This document will be revised as the 2015 SNRA project progresses, to address specific challenges encountered by data providers.

How to Write an SNRA Risk Summary Sheet

The findings of the 2015 SNRA will be summarized for public dissemination in a product similar to the seven-page overview of the first SNRA published in December 2011. As we will be revising the publicly disseminated findings of a scientific assessment which has not yet received peer review or public scrutiny, we must accomplish this task with great care and an exceptional degree of transparency.

In addition to the small summary of findings, we anticipate that **the full unclassified technical and explanatory documentation** necessary to validate and substantially reproduce the 2015 SNRA, and the 2011 SNRA upon which it is based **will be closely scrutinized** by responsible leadership, reviewers in the U.S. risk science and policy communities, and state, local, tribal, and territorial planners and emergency managers. This is for three reasons:

- 1) FEMA's Whole Community orientation;¹
- 2) U.S. Government standards;
- 3) Quality control.

Requirements

The 2015 Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) will be used as the risk-based analytic foundation of the National Preparedness Goal. Its findings will be disseminated to the public. For these reasons, the 2015 SNRA will follow FEMA and U.S. Government information quality standards for highly influential scientific assessments of risk to health, safety, or the environment which are used to inform public policy.^{2,3,4,5,6,7,8} In the absence of the institutional capabilities for robust technical review which ensured a defensible assessment in 2011, the 2015 project will rely upon the peer and public review requirements of these standards as the primary means to ensure quality control for all material used to supplement, update, or revise the quantitative evidence base established by the 2011 SNRA.

¹ Fugate, Craig (2013, April 1). Administrator's Intent. At <http://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/31808?id=7252>.

² Obama, Barack H. (2009, March 9). Scientific Integrity: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies. At <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-heads-executive-departments-and-agencies-3-9-09>.

³ Office of Management and Budget, Office of Science and Technology Policy (2007, September 19). Updated Principles for Risk Analysis: Memorandum to the Executive Branch; at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/m07-24.pdf.

⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011, April). Risk Management Fundamentals: Homeland Security Risk Doctrine. At <http://www.dhs.gov/risk-management-series#1>.

⁵ Information Quality Act. Section 515, Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2001 (Public Law 106-554). At <http://www.fws.gov/informationquality/section515.html>.

⁶ Office of Management and Budget (2002, February 22). Guidelines for Ensuring the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Notice; Republication. *Federal Register* 67(36) 8452-8460. At <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/fedreg/reproducible2.pdf>.

⁷ FEMA Information Quality Standards. At <http://www.fema.gov/information-quality-standards>.

⁸ Office of Management and Budget (2004, December 16). Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review. At http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/fedreg/2005/011405_peer.pdf.

Data providers should expect that the risk summary sheets documenting the source data and analysis supporting their top level estimates will be scrutinized by the public, experts in the U.S. risk technical community, and state, local, tribal, and territorial planners and emergency managers. Risk summary sheets that are accepted and used to inform the publicly disseminated short findings summary will be reproduced as an update/corrigenda section alongside the SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings, as opposed to incorporating them into a revised form of the 200+ page circulation draft. This is to make clear the distinction between the two assessments, and allow reviewers to assess the analytic choices of the 2015 project team by comparing its data and documentation with the material it supplemented or replaced.^{9,10}

U.S. Government risk assessment standards state that agencies should employ the best reasonably available scientific information to assess risks to health, safety, and the environment,¹¹ and that the depth or extent of the analysis should be commensurate with the nature and the significance of the decision.¹² In particular highly influential risk assessments, such as the SNRA, that are conducted to inform policy and doctrinal decisions on the scale of the National Preparedness System should favor quantitative methods where available data permits.¹³

Risk assessment is not a monolithic process or a single method. Because so many judgments must be based on limited information, it is critical that all reliable information be considered.¹⁴ These include information derived from qualitative analysis. The methods used in a risk assessment should be broad enough to inform the range of policy decisions for risk reduction for which they are used, and should be selected for what best informs those decisions.^{15,16}

However, if important judgments conflict with empirical data, that information should be discussed.¹⁷ This document is provided to ensure the appropriate and transparent documentation of all SNRA 2015 data, particularly but not limited to quantitative data, that will add to or alter the currently existing quantitative evidence base of the SNRA.

Risk Summary Sheets

The quantitative evidence base of the 2011 SNRA is documented in threat and hazard-specific **Risk Summary Sheets**. Risk summary sheets contain known information about the frequency of the national-level threat or hazard occurring and its potential impacts if it were to occur. Risk summary sheets may leverage already produced risk and threat assessments, data from the

⁹ This is to comply with USG information quality standards and basic standards of conduct. The integrity of the SNRA 2011 documentation will be ensured by review of the draft Unclassified Documentation of Findings by the original project team prior to public dissemination. OMB (2002) 8460 V.4; U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2011, January 11), DHS MD 10500: Research Misconduct; at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_10500_research_misconduct.pdf.

¹⁰ “The more important benefit of transparency is that the public will be able to assess how much an agency’s analytic result hinges on the specific analytic choices made by the agency.” OMB (2002) 8456 col.3.

¹¹ OMB (2007) 5.

¹² OMB (2007) 4.

¹³ OMB (2007) 5-6. This guidance refers to influential risk assessments by the definition (source footnote 28) which encompasses the SNRA or alternative analysis cited as the basis for public policy decisions on the scale of the NPS. The wording is paraphrased because the source refers to risk ‘characterizations’ as a term of art, but which has a different meaning as used within DHS.

¹⁴ OMB (2007) 3, 5, citing National Academies.

¹⁵ OMB (2007) 5.

¹⁶ DHS (2011) 20-21.

¹⁷ OMB (2007) 8.

historical record, or model and simulation data, as appropriate. Details of the origins of these data are also incorporated into each sheet, so that the risk summary sheet is more than a collection of numbers.

All risk summary sheets added, updated, or revised as part of the 2015 SNRA will

- 1) Provide quantitative estimates of frequency, as occurrences/year, and at least one impact measure. Uncertainties will be explicitly represented for each measure as low, best, and high estimates.¹⁸ Although the most appropriate methods for deriving frequency and impact estimates will vary between hazards, these estimates must have the same meaning as and be directly comparable to those in the current SNRA.¹⁹
- 2) Provide the unclassified data, analysis, and models used to derive the top level numbers from publicly accessible cited sources.²⁰
- 3) Describe the analytic judgments used in the selection and analysis of the data, including assumptions, defaults, and uncertainties; the rationale for these judgments; and the influence of these judgments, and other limitations, upon the top level numbers.²¹

This information must be documented in sufficient detail that an independent reanalysis could be undertaken by a qualified member of the public.²² Data providers should expect that the full documentation for the derivation of any estimates used to inform the updated SNRA findings and the revised National Preparedness Goal will be published along with the full unclassified SNRA 2011 documentation.²³

Detail

Unless indicated otherwise, page references in the following refer to the draft Unclassified Documentation of Findings, distributed to you with this information packet.

Risk summary sheets will

- 1) **Provide quantitative estimates of frequency, as occurrences/year, and at least one impact measure. Uncertainties will be explicitly represented for each measure as low, best, and high estimates. Although the most appropriate methods for deriving frequency and impact estimates will vary between hazards, these estimates must have the same meaning and be directly comparable to those in the current SNRA.**
 - a. Different methods of determining the top level estimates will vary by data and model availability between events. Some will be based upon historical incident data, some upon models, some upon subject matter expert estimates.

¹⁸ OMB (2007) 11-12.

¹⁹ OMB (2007) 5. Uniformity of meaning across measures is a threshold requirement for meaningful risk comparisons and prioritizations to be possible, *ibid.* p. 13 no. 1.

²⁰ OMB (2002) 8460, V.3.b.ii.B.i, ii.

²¹ OMB (2007) 8.

²² OMB (2002) 8460, V.3.b.ii.B.

²³ OMB (2007) 13. Although some estimates will not themselves be possible to publish because of classification or other security sensitive reasons, a full description of the methods used to derive these estimates will be. OMB (2002) 8460 V.3.b.ii.B. Example, draft SNRA Unclassified Documentation of Findings, adversarial events pp. 166-182 and appendices A-F, M.

- b. The impact estimates themselves will have standardized meanings identical to the consequence²⁴ definitions of the 2011 SNRA (pp 66-111).
- 2) Provide the unclassified source data, analysis, and models used to derive the top level numbers, in sufficient detail for a qualified member of the public to independently replicate those numbers.**
- a. Example: Hurricane risk summary sheet, pp. 133-136. This includes citations to publicly available sources (footnotes and Bibliography); the final data sets used, Tables 2-3, p. 134; description of how the data sets were derived from the cited sources, pp. 133-134; and description of how the top level numbers in Table 1 were derived from those final data sets, pp. 133-134.
 - b. Example: Dam Failure risk summary sheet Table 1, p. 157. This data table replicates a portion of a data table in a public USG document for which the citation is provided (footnote 33 p. 156). However, including this table in the risk summary sheet allows for the top level numbers to be directly replicated, makes clear which data were used to derive those numbers, and ensures the data will be available when the link to the original reference changes or when the original reference becomes difficult to find.
 - c. Note: Wikipedia is not an acceptable source.
- 3) Describe the analytic judgments used in the selection and analysis of the raw data, including assumptions, defaults, and uncertainties; the rationale for these judgments; and the influence of these judgments, and other known limitations, on the top level numbers to the extent you are aware of them.**
- a. These are the caveats you would want a critical reader to see when they turn to your risk summary sheet to find out the sources for your numbers.
 - i. Don't think too hard on this one. Most or all of the caveats that are specific to your analysis will be obvious to you.
 - b. Examples:
 - **Assumptions:** Radiological Substance Release Assumptions/Fatalities and Illnesses/Injuries, p. 158; Armed Assault Assumptions/Health & Safety and Economic Loss, p. 168.
 - **Defaults:** Biological Food Contamination fatality and illness multipliers, Assumptions/Fatalities and Illnesses, p. 146; Earthquake injuries/fatalities multiplier (23.5), p. 123 col. 2 paragraph 2.
 - **Uncertainties and limitations:** Interpretation of SNRA Results, pp 19-20; Significant Risks May Be Masked By Limited Data, page 24; Caveat box on bottom left corner of Figure 3, page 25; Psychological Distress appendix, Limitations section pp. 101-102.

²⁴ 'Impacts' as used in the 2015 SNRA correspond to the meaning of 'consequences' as used in the 2011 SNRA.

- c. Any caveats, limitations, or uncertainties that are common to the 2011 SNRA as a whole (stated in the body or appendices of the main report) do not need to be discussed in detail, because your risk summary sheets will be published alongside the 2011 documentation (either bound in a single very large PDF, or in a clearly labeled ‘volume 2’). Only discuss in detail those caveats, limitations, or uncertainties that are specific to the data and analysis that you are providing.

**Threats and Hazards in the Current SNRA
(Unclassified Documentation of Findings, Risk Summary Sheets)**

Natural Hazards

Animal Disease Outbreak	125
Earthquake	127
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Human Pandemic Outbreak	134
Hurricane	137
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Accidental/Technological Hazards

Biological Food Contamination	150
Chemical Substance Release.....	152
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Radiological Substance Release.....	162

Adversarial Events

Cyber Event affecting Data (Data as Target)	165
Cyber Event affecting Physical Infrastructure (Vector).....	167
Aircraft-as-a-Weapon.....	170
Armed Assault	172
Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food).....	174
Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)	176
Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack	178
Explosives Terrorism Attack.....	180
Nuclear Terrorism Attack.....	183
Radiological Dispersal Device Attack.....	185

Risk Summary Sheet Walkthrough²⁵

Description of the threat/hazard²⁶ which clearly defines its scope. If defined by a threshold (\$100 million, \$1 billion, one or more fatalities) this should be stated here, similar to SNRA 2011 event definitions (Table 2, p. 11²⁷).

Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	A ²⁸	B ²⁹	C ³⁰
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	D ³¹	E ³²	F ³³
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars	G ³⁴	H ³⁵	I ³⁶
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home for 2 or More Days	J ³⁷	K ³⁸	L ³⁹
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Calculated from other metrics	Not needed (automatically calculated)		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Constructed scale	Not needed (will be elicited from environmental SMEs)		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	X ⁴⁰	Y ⁴¹	Z ⁴²

The Data Summary table (referred to in this requirements document as ‘the top-level data’) is the basic requirement a risk summary sheet is intended to fulfil. The numbers are the output of the risk summary sheet.

The rest of the summary sheet explains how those numbers were calculated. It also typically includes nice things to know about the threat/hazard like qualitative descriptions, overview, narrative, potential mitigating factors... These add useful information, but they are not essential

²⁵ The actual risk summary sheet template is provided at the end of this document (page 29).

²⁶ SNRA 2015’s current designation for what SNRA 2011 termed “National-level Event”. Because this template adapts prior written materials, ‘threat/hazard’ is used interchangeably with ‘event’ in the following description.

²⁷ Unless indicated otherwise, all page references in the following refer to the draft (28 January 2015) SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings which was distributed to you with this information packet.

²⁸ Source for estimate A.

²⁹ Source for estimate B.

³⁰ Source for estimate C.

³¹ Source for estimate D.

³² Source for estimate E.

³³ Source for estimate F.

³⁴ Source for estimate G.

³⁵ Source for estimate H.

³⁶ Source for estimate I.

³⁷ Source for estimate J.

³⁸ Source for estimate K.

³⁹ Source for estimate L.

⁴⁰ Source for estimate X.

⁴¹ Source for estimate Y.

⁴² Source for estimate Z.

for documenting the one thing the risk summary sheet needs to produce: numbers. And the information needed to replicate them.

The risk summary sheet provides

- 1) Numbers in the Data Summary table;
- 2) Extended discussion of how you determined those numbers – sufficient documentation for anyone to replicate it from the sources you cite; and
- 3) Context.

General

- The best estimate frequency and the best estimate impacts should match each other, and match the definition of the threat or hazard at the top.
- Impacts represent the impact of a single event, not annualized impacts.
- However, with rare exceptions, a scenario cannot be used to represent a threat or hazard in the SNRA.
 - Example: A New Madrid magnitude 7.7 earthquake scenario, by itself, gives no information of the likelihood, relative likelihood, or impacts of earthquakes of other magnitudes or impacts in the United States as a whole.⁴³
 - Example: Scenarios were initially considered for many SNRA 2011 events. However, with the exception of Pandemic and Animal Disease (pp. 130, 121) their specificity prevented a defensible generalization to national risk as a whole. Volcanoes and tsunamis are represented by scenarios in the 2011 SNRA (pp. 139, 141) but were treated only qualitatively, and are not depicted in the charts or discussed in the detailed findings.
 - Additional description of when and how scenarios can and cannot be used in the 2015 SNRA is provided on page 26 of this document.
- Uncertainties in frequency and each impact must be represented by low and high estimates, in addition to a best estimate.
 - These will be tied to the choice of event definition and thresholds.
 - Inclusion of the data table(s) or the distribution(s) from which the low/best/high estimates were obtained will permit the selection of other thresholds from the same data by other users.
- In general, estimates provided using methods of lower evidential value will not replace existing 2011 SNRA estimates obtained from methods of higher evidential value.

⁴³ In some circumstances modeled scenarios can be used to provide factors or multipliers to bridge data gaps (see p. 25 of this guide).

- The primary criterion of evidential value in the 2015 SNRA is transparency, to permit scrutiny and replication.
- Peer-reviewed and U.S. Government sources are strongly preferred over other sources (page 24 of this guide).
- Events which currently have no data, no useable data, or no publicly communicable data – cyber, space weather, tsunami, volcano, adversarial events, quantitative data gaps for other current SNRA events, and threats and hazards not currently present in the SNRA – offer greater latitude for adding data of ‘lesser’ evidential value than comparatively data-rich events like hurricanes.
- Unclassified, fully unrestricted data is preferred over classified and FOUO data.
- Additional description of evidential value for data in the 2015 SNRA is provided on page 25, this guide.

Event Background

The sort of description and qualitative discussion that would be found in a well-researched non-quantitative survey of hazards goes here.

- Example: Explosives Terrorism Attack Event Background (pp 180-181⁴⁴). The discussion in this section is a lightly adapted version of a qualitative overview of explosives terrorism in a fact sheet for the public written by DHS and the National Academies.⁴⁵
- Example: Space Weather Event Background (p 141). Because this risk summary sheet is largely qualitative analysis, much of the remaining content would also be suitable for incorporation into the Event Background section if defensible quantitative estimates could be determined in this SNRA cycle.

Assumptions

Frequency (pp 66-73⁴⁶)

When estimating frequencies, the key question is ‘Frequency of *what*?’

The frequency must correlate with the impacts. In other words, if the frequency represents the annual average frequency of occurrence of a range of impacts for a particular hazard, the worst case or highest impact credible scenario in that range should not be represented as having that frequency.

⁴⁴ Unless indicated otherwise, all page references in the following refer to the draft (28 January 2015) SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings which was distributed to you with this information packet.

⁴⁵ National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security (2004), IED attack: improvised explosive devices. Retrieved from <http://www.dhs.gov/ied-attack-fact-sheet>. The FOUO-marked content it replaced also came from a qualitative comparative overview of terrorist attack types (Potential Terrorist Attack Methods: Joint Special Assessment”, DHS & FBI, 23 April 2008).

⁴⁶ See footnote 44.

The best estimate frequency should correspond to the occurrence of an incident having equal or greater impacts than the minimum threshold of impact that is specified in the event definition. In most cases, the minimum threshold will correspond or be close to the low estimate of the impact measure defining the event.

- Example: The SNRA considered hurricanes causing \$100 million or greater of direct economic damage within the United States.⁴⁷ Data for 78 hurricanes which exceeded this threshold in a forty year period were collected, and used as the data set from which the top level estimates of frequency, fatalities, direct economic loss, and injuries were calculated (Hurricanes, pp 138-139).
 - The best estimate frequency, the average frequency of occurrence of the set as a whole, was about two per year (p. 138; figure 3, p. 27). The fatality best estimate in the SNRA is 26 fatalities, the average of the set, because multiplication of the average fatalities by the best estimate (average) frequency gives the annualized risk of the set.
 - The reasonable worst case scenario in the set was Hurricane Katrina, causing 1,200 direct fatalities.⁴⁸ It would not be accurate to represent hurricanes in the comparative analysis of the SNRA as an event expected to cause 1,000-2,000 fatalities and which occurred on average two (1.9) times per year.
 - The risk of hurricanes causing fatalities on the scale of Katrina could be represented using the SNRA base data set, but it would be represented by the highest one incident of those 78 incidents, having a likelihood of $1/78 \times 1.9 = 0.024/\text{year}$ or a return period of 40 years.

For all events, the SNRA assesses the frequency and impact of threats and hazards occurring within the next 3-5 years within the United States. For events with limited data, historical frequency of occurrence outside the U.S. may be used if 1) it is representative of U.S.-only frequencies after being normalized (adjusted for total U.S. risk exposure relative to the rest of the world), and 2) if the fraction for normalization is reasonably clear and uncontentious. The fraction of relative risk exposure will be different from one hazard to another. Some possibilities include:

⁴⁷ Adjusted to present-day dollar values and risk exposure.

⁴⁸ The data source used reported fatalities directly caused by the storm, as opposed to fatalities caused by indirect or subsequent events, which is why the figure of 1,200 fatalities is lower than other figures (1,833) frequently cited.

U.S. share, relative to world, of	Fraction
Population:	0.0444 ⁴⁹
GDP:	0.224 ⁵⁰
SCADA IP addresses exposed to the Internet:	0.282 ⁵¹
Military spending:	0.394 ⁵²
Terrorist attacks, 1980-2012:	0.00356 ⁵³
Terrorist attacks, 1991-2012:	0.00252 ⁵⁴
Terrorist attacks, 2001-2012:	0.00126 ⁵⁵
Agnostic fraction (midway between 0 and 100%):	0.50

Historical incidents occurring outside the United States may be used as proxy data if they, and their relative distribution, are judged to be reasonably representative of present U.S. conditions. Data providers need to be extremely careful when broadening a historical data pool to include non-U.S. examples.

- For example, the Armed Assault (p. 168) and Explosives Attack (p. 176) events leverage world historical terrorist attack data from the START Global Terrorism Database for fatality and injury information. This is based upon an assumption that the relative distribution of fatalities and injuries from attacks meeting the criteria described in these risk summary sheets is similar between the U.S. and the world, within the order of magnitude precision of the SNRA.
- Mass casualty natural disasters and industrial accidents from the entire world are generally not sufficiently representative of conditions in the present-day United States. In particular, world statistics are dominated by disasters in the developing world, which generally cause substantially higher fatalities and lower property damage in dollar figures than in the U.S.

⁴⁹ World Bank (2014). World population. At <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL/countries> (retrieved 12 October 2014).

⁵⁰ World Bank (2014). Gross Domestic Product [GDP] (current US\$). At <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD> (retrieved 12 October 2014).

⁵¹ Infracritical (2014, October 1). Project SHINE Findings Report. Project SHINE (Shodan Intelligence Extraction). At <http://www.slideshare.net/BobRadvanovsky/project-shine-findings-report-dated-1oct2014> (retrieved 11 October 2014).

⁵² Table ‘Constant (2011) USD’, column ‘2012’, and table ‘Regional totals’, column ‘2012’, ‘World total (consistent data release)’. Stockholm International Peace Institute [SIPRI] (2014, June 27). SIPRI Military Expenditure Database [data file] [2014 database, version 2]. At http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database (retrieved 8 October 2014).

⁵³ Counts of U.S. (including Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands) terrorist attacks causing fatality or injury to persons other than the attacker, no other filters or aggregation applied, relative to all world attacks. Counts include 1993, for which START GTD includes only partial coverage. Counts using the online GTD interface will differ somewhat due to these differences, as will counts pulling data with other combinations of parameters. START Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (2013, December 13). National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Global Terrorism Database. Primary database ‘gtd_201312dist.zip’; 1993 file ‘gtd1993_1213dist.xlsx’; correction file (7 April 2014) ‘nhostkid supplement.xlsx’ [Data files]. From <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd> (retrieved 26 December 2013).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

Any use of historical data requires the assumption that the observation period and location are representative of likely U.S. conditions in the next 3-5 years. The same judgments noted above that are needed before using historical data from outside the United States are also necessary before using historical U.S. data from time periods which may not be generalizable – in terms of the frequency and impacts of the hazard being studied – to the present day.

Frequency should be provided in units of # of events per year (e.g., 1 event per 10 years or 0.1 events per year). The best estimate of frequency should correspond to a best estimate of how often the event, as defined, occurs. The high estimate of frequency should represent uncertainty regarding how frequently the event, as defined, occurs. The low estimate of frequency should represent uncertainty regarding how infrequently the event, as defined, occurs.

Low, best, and high estimates of frequency can be determined in different ways, depending on whether they are derived from historical incident data, a modeled distribution, direct subject matter expert judgment, or subject matter expert judgments taken from the literature.

Historical Incident Data

- The best estimate of frequency represents the historical average frequency of recurrence of incidents over a set time period.
 - Example: There were 5 events over a 20 year historical record, so the best estimate of frequency is the average number of events per year, 0.25 events per year or 1 per 4 years.
- The high estimate of frequency should be the maximum number of events occurring in a single year.⁵⁶
 - If no more than one incident occurs in any one year, the high estimate should be the inverse of the shortest interarrival time in the data set (the shortest number of years that two incidents are spaced apart).
- The low estimate of frequency should be calculated from the inverse of the longest interarrival time – the longest gap in years between any two incidents in the data set.
 - If every year in the data set is represented by one or more incidents, then the low frequency estimate is the smallest number of incidents occurring in any one year.
 - If every year in the time period studied has at least one incident, that may be an indication that the minimum impact threshold defining its scope may be too low to capture the *exceptional* incidents of a catastrophic level which the SNRA is intended to capture.

⁵⁶ Frequency uncertainties in the SNRA are intended to capture our limited knowledge of the frequency of the threats and hazards that the Nation will actually experience, and to capture that uncertainty from a preparedness perspective. Although a natural process with a constant underlying frequency will naturally result in long gaps between events and many events in one year (Poisson clustering), it is that variability of occurrence that communities and emergency responders will actually experience and need to be prepared for, as opposed to the long-term statistical average.

Modeled Frequency Distributions

- The best estimate of frequency should typically correspond to the mean of the distribution.
- The high estimate of frequency should typically be represented by the 95th percentile of the frequency distribution.
- The low estimate of frequency should typically be represented by the 5th percentile.

Subject Matter Expert Judgment


To have the same meaning as best estimate likelihoods for other hazards in the SNRA, the best estimate frequency for a hazard should represent the expected average frequency of occurrence of all incidents of that hazard falling within the scope defined by its thresholds and other measures.

- This means that the best estimate frequency should represent the estimated frequency of an incident having impacts corresponding to the low measures of impact, or greater, to occur in the U.S.
- For example, the best estimate frequency for the Animal Disease event of 0.1/year means that an animal disease outbreak in the U.S. having direct economic impacts of \$2.3 billion or greater (Data Summary, p. 121) is estimated to have an approximately 10% chance of occurring in any given year. This is made explicit in the risk summary sheet (Additional Relevant Information, p. 122, describing the examples of outbreaks in other countries in terms of their economic impacts and stating that the SNRA best estimate frequency is the estimated likelihood of an incident of similar or greater severity occurring in the U.S.).
- Subject matter expert (SME) judgment is best suited for hazards such as the SNRA 2011 Animal Disease event, where the occurrence of a hazard is a rare but well-defined event which can be expected to surpass at least some minimum level of impacts, given occurrence. In principle, such hazards define their own impact thresholds (which is why the Animal Disease definition does not need to specify an explicit numerical threshold).
 - However, it can also be used for hazards with continuous impacts, such as floods or non-nuclear terrorist attacks which can have impacts as low as zero given occurrence – so long as the SME explicitly specifies that the best estimate frequency is the expected frequency of occurrence of incidents exceeding the minimum threshold of the event definition.
- The low frequency estimate may represent fundamental (epistemic) uncertainty in the return period of the event as in the Animal Disease event (Additional Relevant Information, p. 122), an estimated or observed variability of recurrence for a hazard having a known return period, or a mixture of both (Pandemic low and high frequencies, derived from historical observation but representing epistemic uncertainty, pp. 130-132).

- The high frequency estimate may also represent fundamental (epistemic) uncertainty in return period, estimated or observed variability of recurrence, or a mixture of both.

No estimate, including low estimates, can have a frequency or probability of zero since this implies certainty regarding an uncertain event. Likewise no estimate, including high estimates, can have a probability of 100% since this also implies certainty and also corresponds to a frequency that is infinite.

Figure 1: Example: Frequency Estimates from the Literature⁵⁷



Estimates from the Literature

Multiple point estimates from the literature – which for rare events or events without historical precedent, may come from non-peer reviewed literature (with caution) – may be combined to represent the range of expert opinion (figure 1).⁵⁸ For numerous point estimates spread over at least an order of magnitude (a power of ten), the uncertainty will represent the range of expert opinion. The low and high estimates will ordinarily represent the low and high of the set of point estimates.

- For estimates provided by an analyst who is not him/herself a content area expert, the transparency of this method may make it a more defensible approach than other options. If the ‘raw data’ are taken from public sources, given a description of how it was derived the resulting estimate can be replicated from the data and the data themselves can be scrutinized.

⁵⁷ Lundberg (2013) p. 195. Lundberg, Russell (2013, September). Comparing Homeland Security Risks Using a Deliberative Risk Ranking Methodology. Dissertation, RAND Pardee Graduate School. At http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD319.html (retrieved October 2013).

⁵⁸ Examples of this approach done well may be found in Lundberg (2013), from which figures 1 and 2 in this document are reproduced. Figures 38 and 40 pp 195, 198, representing the spread among judgments found in the literature for the frequency (multiple estimates) and consequent fatalities (multiple modeled scenarios) for a terrorist nuclear attack in the U.S. Lundberg, Russell (2013, September). Comparing Homeland Security Risks Using a Deliberative Risk Ranking Methodology. Dissertation, RAND Pardee Graduate School. At http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD319.html (retrieved October 2013).

- A major limitation of this approach is that the resulting estimates can be strongly skewed by availability or selection bias. That is, the analyst's resulting estimate depends upon what s/he happens to find.
 - However, a large number of independent estimates may have value in aggregation by using their average, geometric average, or median for a best estimate ('wisdom of the crowds').
- A second limitation is that 'expert' estimates of frequency (and impact) are often skewed high. For a rare event with too little information or mainstream political interest for many rigorous or objective studies to have been conducted, the experts who shout the loudest often are those who believe the risk is greater than commonly understood.
 - A corollary to this is the 'Cassandra effect': Probability judgments can be biased high by the magnitude of judged impact – the vividness of the impacts should an event occur infects judgment of probability as well. Frustration can unconsciously increase the subjective judgment of probability of an especially catastrophic hypothetical event, the longer the advocates for addressing the danger of a risk unaddressed by society spend 'in the wilderness'.
- A third limitation is 'incestuous data':⁵⁹ multiple sources cite what is ultimately the same estimate, sometimes circularly.⁶⁰ The evidential value of this estimate could be considered to be proportional to the number of times it is cited, because each writer who cites it goes on the record as endorsing it themselves. However, the writers repeating the estimate are usually not subject matter experts in the field, and the multiple citation of the estimate may be driven by the effect of it being a number in an area of contention without many numbers.
- Use of multiple point estimates from the literature for frequency (or modeled scenarios for impact) was NOT considered to have sufficient evidential value to be used in the 2011 SNRA. Potential use of this method for some provisional estimates of the 2015 SNRA represents a departure from the 2011 standard.⁶¹

Because likelihood and impacts are essentially paired in the SNRA, general notes on impacts will be given next.

Impacts (General)

The most important thing is to make sure the impacts represent the impacts of a single event, as defined, given that it occurs.

⁵⁹ Sandia National Laboratories (2003, September). Page 4-15, Handbook of Parameter Estimation for Probabilistic Risk Assessment. NUREG/CR-6823, SAND2003-3348P, for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission: at <http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0329/ML032900131.pdf> (retrieved 5 February 2014).

⁶⁰ CENTRA Technologies, for DHS Office of Risk Management & Analysis (2011, May). Geomagnetic storms: an evaluation of risks and risk assessments. Risk Management Issue Brief, DHS: at <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-geomagnetic-storms.pdf> (retrieved 2 February 2015).

⁶¹ This is one reason why 2015 results will be documented in accompaniment to the results of the original 2011 SNRA, rather than replacing them in the documentation.

Uncertainty and variability are represented by low and high estimates, in addition to a best estimate (pp. 114-117).

As with frequency, any use of historical data from other countries or time periods requires the assumption that the observation period and location are representative of likely U.S. conditions in the next 3-5 years. A burst dam in China or a typhoon in Bangladesh may cause hundreds of thousands of fatalities. It is possible that an accidental or natural disaster in the present-day United States could cause fatalities on this scale, but it is far less likely.

Best estimate impacts have two meanings in the SNRA depending on whether they originate in a) historical incident data or modeled distributions, or b) subject matter expert estimates.

Historical Incident Data

- The best estimate should be interpreted as, given that an event occurs that meets the definition (or threshold), on average, what are the impacts?
- The high estimate should be interpreted as the maximum impacts per event, from the historical record.
- The low estimate should be the lowest impacts per event, from the historical record.
- Examples: Wildfire (pp. 144-145), Biological Food Contamination (pp. 146-147).
- Examples: Fatalities and injuries for Aircraft as a Weapon (pp. 166-167), Armed Assault (pp. 168-169), Explosives Attack (pp 176-178). Although the low, best, and high fatality and injury estimates are U//FOUO, they were derived from public data.

Modeled Distributions

- The best estimate should be interpreted as, given that an event occurs that meets the definition (or threshold), on average, what are the impacts?
 - This has the same meaning as it does for historical incident data. However, it is calculated differently, as a weighted average (p. 113).
- The high estimate should be the 95th percentile of impacts.
 - One way of relating this to historical data based SNRA analysis is that the maximum impacts from a historical record of 20-100 years will also roughly correlate to a 95th percentile. (That math is not exact, but it helps conceptually.)
- The low estimate should be the 5th percentile of impacts.
- Example: [Accidental] Radiological Substance Release, pp. 158-160.
- Most examples of modeled distributions in the 2011 SNRA are the CBRN events which leveraged data from the Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA).⁶²

⁶² DHS Directorate of Science & Technology (2011), Integrated CBRN Terrorism Risk Assessment (reference is SECRET//NOFORN).

However, the ITRA and its component assessments adapted a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) method originally developed for the nuclear power industry and other complex technological systems, so it is possible that additional accidental hazards in the unclassified SNRA could be modeled in this way.

The 5th/95th percentiles are conventional choices for capturing a standardized confidence or credible interval (90% central interval) from a modeled distribution. However, their selection for reporting purposes in an assessment such as the SNRA is ultimately a normative and policy decision, and different decision-makers may be interested in different percentile levels. Additionally, these percentiles are conditional on the choice of lower threshold of impact or impact that is used to define the scope of the event in the first place (pp 114-117).


To allow for current and future flexibility to investigate different thresholds and percentiles, please report the underlying distribution in sufficiently granular data to do so (half-order of magnitude bins have been used by the SNRA project in the past, but more granular data are welcome). This will allow different users in different contexts to select different thresholds and percentiles than those that will be reported in the static charts and top level data tables of the 2015 SNRA.

Subject Matter Expert Judgment

- The best estimate may, in principle, be provided as meaning an average. However, it is generally difficult for people to provide an accurate average, even with the aid of sophisticated elicitation techniques. People are usually much more accurate in estimating percentiles, in particular the median (50th percentile), or the mode (most likely value).
 - Subject matter experts should estimate:
 - Given event occurrence, what would be the most likely outcome (mode) in terms of the given impact measure?
 - Alternatively, given event occurrence, what would be the ‘middle of the range’ outcome (median)?
- The low estimate should be the *de facto* threshold of the event. Given event occurrence (the best estimate likelihood is the best estimate of this), what would be the lowest impacts possible/reasonably likely to occur?
- The high estimate should be the “reasonable worst case scenario”.

Estimates from the Literature

The same notes apply as for frequency (figure 2).

Figure 2: Example: Fatality Estimates from the Literature⁶³**Health and Safety (pp 74-87⁶⁴)**

Fatalities are fairly straightforward. They are usually the most definite or unambiguous impact measure, and are frequently the measure chosen for visual depictions of risk. They are also usually the easiest statistic or estimate to find.

Injuries and illnesses can be trickier. They are not always as easy to find as fatalities, and the lack of a definite natural threshold dividing “ill” or “injured” from “well” makes data difficult to compare across data sources. Even those data sources with a definition or threshold for the injuries or illnesses they count are often very incomplete.

The SNRA lumps all injuries and illnesses together. This is a major limitation, because by mixing injuries of all levels of severity it makes comparisons across hazards difficult. However, it can be useful for estimating hospital surge needs. A biological, chemical, or radiological terrorist attack may cause thousands of ‘walking well’ to flood area hospitals, while an earthquake can cause thousands of serious injuries requiring medical care. Both burden hospitals with thousands of patients needing triage and evaluation in the hours following an emergency.

If you *do* have a breakdown of injuries or illnesses by any measure of severity (in particular, numbers hospitalized) please provide it because that will help us in the future when we improve this metric. If you are not using a standard measure of some sort (e.g. having a definition that is posted somewhere), please provide your definition of severity level so we can translate it into other standard measures in the future.

If you are not providing a breakdown by severity level, please provide a definition of threshold severity for the illnesses and/or injuries you are including in your count.⁶⁵

⁶³ Lundberg (2013) p. 198.

⁶⁴ Unless indicated otherwise, all page references in the following refer to the draft (28 January 2015) SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings which was distributed to you with this information packet.

⁶⁵ Example: Footnote 7, Pandemic risk summary sheet (p. 134).

Injuries and illnesses, being a less rigorous measure in the current SNRA, can be estimated using a proxy multiplier (proportional to fatalities) if no good data source is available. Such a multiplier should come from one or more historical data points, or modeled scenarios, which are judged to be reasonably representative of other catastrophic occurrences of that hazard.

Direct Economic Impact (pp 88-95⁶⁶)

Economic impacts are frequently the most challenging measure in the SNRA for external analysts to assess.

Economic costs are calculated and represented in the literature in all sorts of incomparable ways. The most significant thing to avoid is:

Do not include Value of Statistical Life (VSL), lifetime lost wages or income, or other dollar-valued impact equivalencies in your economic estimates.

- VSL values differ from study to study, agency to agency, writer to writer. FEMA Benefit-Cost Analysis uses one measure, DHS is attempting to standardize another across the Department, while other agencies use measures of their own. Including them in reported direct economic impact numbers makes the numbers impossible to compare across studies and hazards, which undermines the purpose of conducting a comparative analysis in the first place.
- They create double counting – but only for some hazards and not others. Their influence on the economic numbers compared across hazards is invisible to the final reader.
- They conveniently align fatality and economic costs between disasters by padding economic costs with a portion proportional to fatalities. This obscures the real variation in direct economic impact between and within hazards, removing useful information.
- They impose a value judgment and an equivalency between impacts which belongs to the end user of the assessment, not the analyst. This is especially critical for a national risk assessment, which must make comparative judgments of national risk across many contexts for many decision-makers and many stakeholders having a diversity of values.

Please scrutinize all economic estimates obtained from literature sources to ensure that all economic figures attached to fatalities are removed.

The SNRA does report a cost per fatality of \$42,500 for one year lost spending.⁶⁷ However, we can apply this on our end.

⁶⁶ Unless indicated otherwise, all page references in the following refer to the draft (28 January 2015) SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings which was distributed to you with this information packet.

⁶⁷ This figure originated from the economic model of the 2008 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA 2008), which used a uniform distribution over the \$35,000-\$50,000 median family income bracket as defined by U.S. Government economic statistics. As the mean of a uniform interval is its midpoint and the tails of the distribution become insignificant for disasters causing more than a handful of fatalities, the midpoint of \$42,500 was adopted as a point estimate for the 2011 SNRA. The 2008 BTRA and many events in the 2011 SNRA also apply a figure of \$6,000 for funeral spending, but as this adjustment is inconsistently applied across events and rarely makes a significant difference on the order of magnitude precision of the SNRA, it may be neglected for the purposes of the 2015 iteration. DHS Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) Bioterrorism Risk Assessment 2008, Appendix E2.7: Economic Consequences, p. E2.7-34. (Appendix reference is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY; Extracted information is UNCLASSIFIED.)

Direct economic losses as currently defined by the SNRA include decontamination, disposal, and physical destruction costs, lost spending due to fatalities, medical costs, and business interruptions.

- Indirect economic impacts include costs incurred by the suppliers and vendors in the associated expenditure sectors for the industries impacted by the direct costs.
- Induced costs include those incurred due to reduced spending by households with members employed in any of the directly or indirectly affected industries.
 - Induced costs can also include substitution effects or likely transfers of economic activity from one set of sectors to another set, such as avoidance of air or other travel or altered transportation mode preferences to other sectors following an attack on the commercial air transport sector.

The current SNRA methodology compares only direct costs. Information on indirect and induced costs are welcome as they will be needed to improve the SNRA in future iterations, but direct costs are what the 2015 SNRA needs. As defined in the SNRA, direct costs include

Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction (DDP):

- Property damage (including building contents)
 - Including utilities, roads, other government sector
- Decontamination costs (for buildings not demolished)
- Disposal costs for debris
- Crop damage

Business Interruption:

- Lost sales, wages, other business costs directly caused by the event
- Example: 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. The \$10 million lost business costs for the 500 businesses within the 12 block immediate impact area which was restricted for approximately one week of investigation would be direct business interruption costs.⁶⁸ The lost economic activity from the 1-2 day citywide lockdown would not be included.
- Business interruption costs may be substantially reduced by the increased use of telework in recent years.

Medical Costs:

- The first SNRA did not establish a consistent definition for medical costs across hazards. However, fully reporting your sources and assumptions, including any injury severity level assumptions or data for the illnesses or injuries you report, will allow a more consistent harmonization in the future.

⁶⁸ Luna, Taryn (2013, April 27). Back Bay businesses affected by bombings are eligible for federal loans. Boston Globe [Boston.com]: at <http://www.boston.com/business/news/2013/04/26/back-bay-businesses-affected-bombings-are-eligible-for-federal-loans/BRSPuC0GboxQWAACCycGgl/story.html> (retrieved 7 September 2014).

- A good source for cost numbers are statistics provided by the HHS Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). Please ensure that the counts to which you apply any cost estimates correspond to the type of estimate (e.g. apply inpatient costs only to numbers hospitalized, not all injuries/illnesses).⁶⁹

One Year Lost Spending from Fatalities:

- \$42,500 per fatality.⁷⁰

Please err on the side of reporting more detail rather than less. This will enable harmonization of costs in the present and future iterations of the SNRA. Additional information on potentially finer-grained measures of economic impact – jobs lost, homes destroyed, critical infrastructure damage – will also be valuable for expanding the impact measures in future iterations of the SNRA, so please provide them as well if they are readily available (but don't waste effort obtaining them if they aren't).

In many cases, it will be clear that one or more components of the SNRA direct economic measure will dominate other components to an extent that they can be neglected, within the order of magnitude precision of the SNRA. For example, business interruption costs for the Wildfire event were judged to likely be insignificant in comparison with property and crop damage (Economic Loss, pp. 148-149). **All such assumptions must be explicitly stated.**

Please specify the year of the dollar value you are providing.

Social Displacement (pp 96-102⁷¹)

The SNRA measure of social displacement is the number of people who are forced to leave their home for a period of two days or longer. This does not include hospital stays, as that would represent double counting with the injury/illness measure.

The measure of social displacement used in the SNRA does not capture the significant differences between short-term evacuation and long-term permanent relocation, which is a limitation of the current analysis. Like injuries and illnesses, the SNRA displacement metric rolls up multiple levels into one metric. If you can provide additional detail on people made homeless, homes destroyed, or different evacuation durations, these may be very helpful for the 2015 National Preparedness Goal revision and will be very helpful for future iterations of the SNRA when this metric is revisited.

Displacement numbers may be provided by literature data sources. For some events, the USAID funded international disaster database EM-DAT may provide useful displacement numbers. If a judgment can be made that numbers of people displaced are likely to be far greater than numbers

⁶⁹ Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. H-CUPnet: at <http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov/> (retrieved 5 February 2015). Determination of

⁷⁰ See note 67.

⁷¹ Unless indicated otherwise, all page references in the following refer to the draft (28 January 2015) SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings which was distributed to you with this information packet.

of people injured (this will be true for some threats/hazards but not for others), EM-DAT's 'Total Affected' measure may be used as a reasonable estimate for social displacement.⁷²

Please attempt to provide some estimate (low, best, and high) for displaced (2+ days) persons, however rough. This may include a judgment that displacement is expected to be minimal or zero for most incidents of the threat or hazard for which you are providing data, if that judgment seems reasonable. Displacement estimates, along with fatality and injury/illness numbers, are needed to calculate the psychological distress metric of the SNRA.

Psychological Distress (pp 103-109⁷³)

The SNRA psychological distress measure does not need to be separately estimated by data providers, since it is automatically calculated from the fatalities, injury/illnesses, and persons displaced according to a formula (p. 105). The formula includes a multiplicative factor that was elicited from SMEs for the events in the first SNRA. However, as the factor ranges only from 1.0 to 1.3, the results are not very sensitive to an inappropriate selection.

The set of factors elicited for the 23 events of the first SNRA follow a regular pattern, which in lieu of a new elicitation we will likely apply to new events as provisional estimates pending future review by subject matter experts.

Provisional Assignment of Event Familiarity Factors for Candidate National-level Events

	Event Characteristic	EFF (C _{EF})
	CBRN terrorist attacks	1.3
	Conventional terrorist attacks other than gun attacks (Explosives, Aircraft as a Weapon)	1.2
	Conventional terrorist attacks primarily using firearms (Armed Assault)	1.1
	Unintentional disasters of human origin, involving toxic substances evoking special dread, such as poison gas (Chemical Substance Release, Radiological Substance Release)	1.1
	Other unintentional disasters of human origin (Biological Food Contamination, Dam Failure)	1.0
	Earthquakes	1.1
	All other natural hazards, including disease	1.0

⁷² Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (2011). EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. [Data file]. Brussels: Université Catholique de Louvain. Available from <http://www.emdat.be>.

⁷³ Unless indicated otherwise, all page references in the following refer to the draft (28 January 2015) SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings which was distributed to you with this information packet.

Environmental Impact (pp 110-114⁷⁴)

Environmental estimates will likely be elicited for all events as a group from a panel of environmental SMEs, similar to the first SNRA.

For the purposes of the SNRA, environmental risk is defined as the potential for adverse effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the depletion of natural resources.⁷⁵

Environmental effects within urban areas and all human health effects are not included within the scope of this environmental impact measure, because these impacts are already addressed separately in the other impact measures for the SNRA.

⁷⁴ Unless indicated otherwise, all page references in the following refer to the draft (28 January 2015) SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings which was distributed to you with this information packet.

⁷⁵ This definition is aligned with the EPA's definition of environmental risk. Accessed at: <http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAters/terms.html>.

Additional Notes

Requirements for Use of Data and Experts in the SNRA

The 2015 SNRA is likely to be one of FEMA's most scrutinized analytic products. More importantly, it is going to be used to drive and support important decisions related to national preparedness. To this end, given the extreme timelines and data-gathering requirements, great care must be taken with all information (both quantitative and qualitative) used in, and output from, the SNRA.

To meet the standards for both policy and scientific defensibility, the SNRA must rely on credible data and expert judgment for all quantitative information. The SNRA will rely on the best available estimates of frequency and impact from peer-reviewed literature and/or other government assessments. Risk summary sheets will contain comparable and credible data sources which meet the following criteria:

1. Relevance (i.e. the source must provide direct and unambiguous support for any quantitative and qualitative characterizations);
2. Technical expertise and reputation of the author (i.e., the author is a subject matter expert according to the criteria below, e.g. education, training, published research, awards, recognition, and leadership of relevant societies);
3. Evidence of peer-review (i.e. the publisher verifies the accuracy of the information by checking the citations, references, footnotes, and bibliography); and
4. Timeliness (i.e. the information is sufficiently recent that it is not outdated and unsuitable for use).

Some threat/hazard areas are characterized by deep uncertainty and strong divergence of opinion between subject matter experts (SMEs), such that use of subject matter expertise may not narrow or shift the range of opinion elicited from or provided by non-experts. These divergences can equally affect models dependent on SME input to fill key knowledge gaps. In these instances, a collection of multiple estimates (even point estimates) from a diversity of sources may provide more informational value than a single model or expert.⁷⁶

Where sufficient and appropriate data sources are not available in the literature, the SNRA will accept estimates of frequency and impact from contributing partners that are elicited by defensible standards and defensible selection of subject matter experts. Effective and defensible expert elicitation requires criteria for the identification of, and access to, a sufficient number of appropriate specialists and generalists who can provide meaningful expertise. The criteria for subject matter expertise are as follows:

1. Strength of technical knowledge in the event type domain or impact category (i.e., education, training, and published research);

⁷⁶ Use of multiple point estimates from the literature for frequency (or modeled scenarios for consequence) was NOT considered to have sufficient evidential value to be used in the 2011 SNRA, for which the majority of the other text of this section was originally written. Potential use of this method for some provisional estimates of the 2015 SNRA represents a significant departure from the 2011 standard.

2. Work experience in the event type domain or impact category (e.g. years of experience working in relevant federal agencies and/or academic departments);
3. Reputation in the event type domain or impact category (e.g. demonstrated by awards, recognition, and leadership of relevant societies);
4. Ability to provide quantitative and/or qualitative analysis or judgment on the frequencies and/or impacts of the event (threat/hazard) the providing agency is providing data to replace or add.

To meet the standards for both policy and scientific defensibility, data and expert judgment (numeric and non-numeric) will only be used in the SNRA for those events that meet the criteria above. Events for which neither credible data nor credible expertise exist that meet the criteria above cannot be characterized in the SNRA, and will be handled in some other fashion to meet PPD-8 requirements.

Evidential Value

In general, estimates provided using methods of lower evidential value will not replace existing 2011 SNRA estimates obtained from methods of higher evidential value.

- The primary criterion of evidential value in the 2015 SNRA is transparency, to enable public scrutiny, communication with the primary stakeholders of the SNRA and the National Preparedness System, and effective peer review.
 - Subject matter expert estimates will be given equal evidential value to the outputs of models, if the models cannot be scrutinized and replicated by Federal analysts or other peer reviewers. Both are essentially ‘black box’ estimates for which the derivation can be traced back only to the point where it came out of the expert’s brain or the model.
 - This is primarily an issue with proprietary models.⁷⁷
 - However, estimates and factors derived from proprietary models can be used as corroborating or supporting evidence for estimates derived by transparent methods. Additionally, estimates from multiple independent proprietary models may be used in combination as a basis for primary estimates provisionally used in the 2015 SNRA.
 - Unclassified, non-FOUO estimates will be given preference over classified and FOUO estimates, unless the latter estimates have a clear record of substantially stronger evidential value as documented by the public reports of independent

⁷⁷ “National policy should not be based on methods not fully available to the government.” JASONs, for DHS Directorate of Science & Technology (2011, November). Impacts of Severe Space Weather on The Electric Grid, pp. 2, 7. MITRE report JSR-11-320: at <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/spaceweather.pdf> (retrieved June 2012).

external peer reviews⁷⁸ and meet the substantial reproducibility standards of U.S. information quality guidelines for influential scientific assessments.⁷⁹

- This means comparable evidential value sufficient to answer the question being asked. In the case of the 2015 SNRA that means low/best/high triplets for frequency and measures of impact.⁸⁰
- The 2015 SNRA will use the best available data and analysis to inform its estimates.⁸¹ This means that there is more latitude for adding new or replacement estimates to events which currently have no data, or no data which can be used for the primary functions of the SNRA.
 - For events which currently have no useable paired frequency and impact data (cyber, space weather, tsunami, volcano) or data that can be communicated to and validated by public stakeholders (CBRN events and adversarial event frequencies), data obtained by any method which can be traced back to its origin and validated in a transparent fashion is very likely to be useable – as proxy estimates for stakeholder communication, at a minimum⁸² – in the 2015 SNRA. Filling these data gaps will increase the utility of the 2015 SNRA for informing the revision of the National Preparedness Goal.

Regardless of the degree of uncertainty we may have about them as analysts and data providers, likelihood and likely impact judgments will be applied to each and every event in the SNRA. If the SNRA does not provide them, the decision-makers using the SNRA will.

Likelihood and impact judgments in the SNRA are made explicit in a way that stakeholders, political leadership, and technical reviewers can scrutinize, and which are expressed in quantitative terms having the same, unambiguous meaning for all audiences.⁸³ Where the SNRA leaves gaps in key variables which it is too cautious to assess, the decision-makers who use the SNRA will base the decisions which they do not have an option not to make upon their own implicit and unarticulated risk judgments in a non-transparent, undocumented, and ambiguous way.

⁷⁸ OMB (2002) 8459-60, V.3.b.ii. Agency-sponsored peer reviews that are employed to help satisfy the objectivity standard of information quality for data and analysis which cannot itself be directly disclosed to the public are to be conducted in “an open and rigorous manner.” OMB (2002) 8459-60, V.3.b.i.

⁷⁹ OMB (2002) 8456-57.

⁸⁰ Classified risk analyses are expected to be used to inform the more detailed information needs of discussions informing Prevention and Protection Core Capabilities, in particular setting quantitative targets, as part of the larger Goal revision effort. These will be documented in a classified annex to the 2015 SNRA.

⁸¹ OMB (2007) 9.

⁸² As used in the terrorism risk assessment method of the RAMCAP J-100 standard. Pp 103-110, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) (2011, December 20). A regional resilience/security analysis process for the Nation's critical infrastructure systems. ASME Innovative Technologies Institute: at http://www.wbdg.org/pdfs/asme_resilience_infrastructure_dec2011.pdf (checked 6 February 2015).

⁸³ ‘Quantitative risk assessment methodology’. Risk Steering Committee (2010, September). DHS Risk Lexicon, 2010 edition. At <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexicon-2010.pdf>.

Scenarios

- With rare exceptions, a scenario cannot be used to represent a threat or hazard in the SNRA.
 - Example: A New Madrid magnitude 7.7 earthquake scenario, by itself, gives no information of the likelihood, relative likelihood, or impacts of earthquakes of other magnitudes or impacts in the United States as a whole.⁸⁴
 - Example: Scenarios were initially considered for nearly all SNRA events. However, with the exception of Pandemic and Animal Disease (pp. 130, 121⁸⁵) their specificity prevented a defensible generalization to national risk as a whole. Volcanoes and tsunamis also represented by scenarios in the 2011 SNRA (pp. 139, 141) were treated only qualitatively, and are not depicted in the charts or discussed in the detailed findings.
- If the risk is dominated by a single, fairly compact and generic scenario, that scenario can represent the best estimate of impacts.
 - Example 1: Human Pandemic Outbreak (pp 130-132). The pandemic scenario of 25% attack rate (25% of the U.S. population becoming ill) is inherently generic enough to be representative of influenza pandemics in the U.S. in general. It is not tied to a specific location, attacker, weather pattern, or time of day.
 - Note that “ill” is specifically defined, footnote 7 p. 130. This is very important because it defines the scope of the event.
 - The one way it is not generic is its magnitude. It was chosen as a reasonably most likely scenario by subject matter expert judgment.⁸⁶
 - Example 2: Animal Disease Outbreak (pp. 121-122). This was based upon a specific modeled scenario from the literature of a large outbreak in California. However, this scenario was judged to be representative of all moderately-large

⁸⁴ In some circumstances modeled scenarios can be used to provide factors or multipliers to bridge data gaps. For example, the data sources the SNRA leveraged for the Earthquake national-level event provided normalized historical incident frequency, fatality, and direct economic damage loss, but not injuries. The injury distribution was constructed as a proxy measure by multiplying the distribution of fatalities by 23.5, the ratio of (Level 1-3) injuries to (Level 4 injury) fatalities in the New Madrid scenario (SNRA unclassified documentation of findings p. 123).

Use of factors in this manner

- 1) Should be sparing;
- 2) Must be informed by SME judgment that the impact measures are reasonably correlated, and that their relation in the scenario is representative of other incidents of that hazard (the relation between fatalities and injuries in the New Madrid scenario may be representative of earthquakes elsewhere in the United States, but the relation between fatalities and direct economic damage would not be); and
- 3) Should not be used to construct measures for fatalities or direct economic damage from other measures with limited data, because of their greater interest to stakeholders (an assumption used to construct a measure of secondary interest may be acceptable to stakeholders, but an assumption used for a measure of primary interest may not be). See OMB (2007), footnote 33.

⁸⁵ Unless indicated otherwise, all page references in the following refer to the draft (28 January 2015) SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings which was distributed to you with this information packet.

⁸⁶ It is actually one of two base scenarios, the ‘Moderate’ scenario discussed in the National Planning Scenarios pandemic scenario. A second scenario, which SMEs recommend be used in planning factors together with the ‘Moderate’ scenario, is a ‘Severe’ 1918-scale scenario causing 2 million fatalities in today’s U.S. population. This higher scenario may have been an appropriate choice as well.

outbreaks, whether originating in California, Texas, or some other state. The scenario in the literature was used as a proxy, not as the actual National-level Event. Why this is significant:

- The estimated likelihood of occurrence of an outbreak of that magnitude anywhere in the U.S. is 1 in 10 years (best estimate frequency).
- The likelihood of occurrence of an outbreak of that magnitude in California is some fraction of that.
- The SNRA is intended to assess risk to the U.S. as a whole, so it is the likelihood of the first bullet which needs to be determined.
- If the risk from a hazard cannot be reasonably determined to be dominated by a scenario which is attached to a particular region or context smaller than the national scope of the SNRA, a scenario cannot be used to represent the total risk to the Nation from that hazard.
 - Example 3: The Tsunami national-level event (pp 142-143) is represented by a specific scenario, a 15 meter maximum height Cascadian Subduction Zone tsunami affecting the Oregon coast. The SNRA project team were unable to determine how representative this scenario was of the total tsunami risk to the Nation, in terms of the fraction of national risk presented by Oregon tsunami risk, earthquake-induced tsunamis, or 15 meter height events. Although the numbers for this specific scenario are reported in the risk summary sheet and data tables (Appendices B-G, K), they were not included in the comparative analysis of the SNRA or depicted in the charts because there was insufficient information for a comparison (Risks Requiring Additional Study/Tsunamis and Volcanoes, p. 36).
 - Example 4: The Volcano national-level event (pp 145-147) also represents a specific scenario, an eruption of Mount Rainier in Washington State. The fraction of total risk to the Nation from destructive volcano eruptions represented by this scenario also could not be determined, and so volcanoes could not be included in the SNRA's comparative analysis or charts.
- If a consequence scenario⁸⁷ is suspected to represent a dominant fraction of the total risk to the Nation from that hazard but its frequency cannot be determined in a defensible fashion, it cannot be assessed in the SNRA.
 - Example 5: A chemical accident causing 4,000-20,000 fatalities comparable to the 1984 chemical plant disaster in Bhopal, India is a scenario of concern to many policy makers, and one which a national risk assessment would be expected to focus upon. However, the single point estimate of frequency located by the SNRA project team (Figure 1 and text, p. 154) was judged insufficient to assess a defensible likelihood for the occurrence of this scenario in the United States. Only the smaller-scale accidents reflected in defensible (authoritatively sourced

⁸⁷ In this context a “consequence” model or scenario has a different technical meaning as a generic risk modeling term, than “impact scenario” which is used as a descriptor of asteroid impact consequence scenarios in particular.

and recent enough to be representative of present-day risk) U.S. historical data (p. 158) were capable of being assessed and represented in the SNRA.

- Example 6: U.S. policy makers who are concerned about space weather risk tend to be relatively focused on the catastrophic \$1-2 trillion economic damage scenario consequent to the destruction of hundreds of key electric transformers (*Space Weather Economic Impacts/Effects on Electricity Supply*, p. 141). This gives the SNRA a fairly well defined, compact scenario to investigate. However, as the SNRA could not determine defensible estimates of the likelihood of that scenario, it could not be assessed in comparison with other hazards in the 2011 SNRA (*Highly Uncertain Risks*, pp. 35-36).
- The key question which the SNRA attempts to answer is the likelihood of different hazard scenarios with different impacts. Because of the maturity and sophistication of computational disaster modeling, any number of disaster scenarios can be modeled in great detail in a rigorous fashion. However, consequence-only models usually do not give information on the relative likelihood of different levels of impact for a disaster, which is necessary for determining what scale of disaster dominates the national risk from that hazard for different measures of risk. Without this information, not even the most sophisticated consequence models of threat or hazard scenarios of concern can be compared against other threats and hazards in a comparative risk assessment such as the SNRA.

How to Evaluate an SNRA Risk Summary Sheet (Checklist)

1. Event definition.
 - a. Is it clear, concise, and analytically meaningful?
 - b. Do the frequency and impact data match the event definition?
2. Frequency.
 - a. Is frequency provided in units of # of events per year? (e.g., 1 event per 10 years or 0.1 events per year)
 - b. The best estimate of frequency should correspond to a best estimate of how often the event, as defined, occurs. This could be derived from a historical average over a set time period, or subject matter expert judgment.
 - i. Example: There were 5 events over a 20 year historical record, so the best estimate of frequency is the average number of events per year, 0.25 events per year or 1 per 4 years.
 - ii. Example: Where there is a model that outputs a frequency distribution, we have incorporated the mean of that frequency distribution as the “best estimate”.
 - iii. Example: Subject matter expert judgment should provide the estimated frequency of occurrence of incidents resulting in impacts at or above the minimum threshold of the impact defining the scope of the event.
 - c. The high estimate of frequency should represent uncertainty regarding how frequently the event, as defined, occurs.
 - i. Example: One could look at the inverse of the shortest interarrival time, or the maximum number of events per year over a historic record.
 - ii. Example: Where there is a model that outputs a frequency distribution, we have incorporated the 95th percentile of that frequency distribution as the “high estimate”.
 - iii. Example: Subject matter expert judgment may represent uncertainty in the true frequency, or estimation of how many times the event, as defined, might occur in one year (a particularly bad year).
 - d. The low estimate of frequency should represent uncertainty regarding how infrequently the event, as defined, occurs.
 - i. Example: One could look at the inverse of the longest interarrival time, or, the fewest # of events per year over a historic record.
 - ii. Example: Where there is a model that outputs a frequency distribution, we have incorporated the 5th percentile of that frequency distribution as the “low estimate”.
 - iii. Subject matter expert judgment may represent uncertainty in the true frequency, or (the inverse of) an estimation of how many years could go by between two succeeding occurrences of the event – the reasonably longest ‘dry spell’ or gap between successive occurrences.

3. Impacts.

- a. The most important thing is to make sure the impacts represent the impacts of a single event, as defined, given that it occurs.
- b. The best estimate should be interpreted as, given that an event occurs that meets the definition (or threshold), on average, what are the impacts?
 - i. For events leveraging subject matter expert judgment for their estimates, the best estimate may represent the ‘most likely’ (mode) outcome or the median (50-50) value outcome, given occurrence of the event as defined.
- c. The high estimate should be interpreted as either:
 - i. The maximum impacts per event, from the historical record.
 - ii. The ‘reasonable worst case scenario’, from literature estimates and/or subject matter expert judgment.
 - iii. The 95th percentile of impacts, from a model/simulation (the idea is that the max impacts from a historical record of 20-100 years will also roughly correlate to a 95th percentile – but obviously that math is not exact).
- d. The low estimate should be interpreted as either:
 - i. The lowest impacts per event, from the historical record.
 - ii. The 5th percentile of impacts, from a model/simulation.

4. Other quirks.

- a. Pay attention to how fatalities, injuries/illnesses, and economic impacts are defined.
 - i. Are latent fatalities included? (e.g. cancer)
 1. We do not have a consistent way of counting these, but if this applies to your event please document them in the risk summary sheet (whether or not you include them in its top level estimates) for differential treatment in a future iteration of the SNRA.
 - ii. What counts as an injury/illness?
 - iii. What was included in direct economic impacts? If direct and indirect are included together, they need to be separated for comparability to SNRA events.
 - iv. Direct economic impact numbers will use the definition pp 20-21 of this requirements document.
- b. Make sure all data sources, citations, and other needed information are provided so that the analysis can be replicated.
 - i. Wikipedia is unacceptable as a data source.⁸⁸
 - ii. U.S. Government sources are preferable.
 - iii. Peer-reviewed sources are also preferable.

⁸⁸ However, Wikipedia is highly recommended as a research starting point to find citable data sources.

Threat/Hazard Name

Description of the threat/hazard which clearly defines its scope. If defined by a threshold (\$100 million, \$1 billion, one or more fatalities) this should be stated here, similar to SNRA 2011 event definitions (Table 2, p. 11⁸⁹).

Data Summary

Category	Description	Metric	Low	Best	High
Health and Safety	Fatalities	Number of Fatalities	A ⁹⁰	B ⁹¹	C ⁹²
	Injuries and Illnesses	Number of Injuries or Illnesses	D ⁹³	E ⁹⁴	F ⁹⁵
Economic	Direct Economic Loss	U.S. Dollars	G ⁹⁶	H ⁹⁷	I ⁹⁸
Social	Social Displacement	People Displaced from Home for 2 or More Days	J ⁹⁹	K ¹⁰⁰	L ¹⁰¹
Psychological	Psychological Distress	Calculated from other metrics	Not needed (automatically calculated)		
Environmental	Environmental Impact	Constructed scale	Not needed (will be elicited from environmental SMEs)		
LIKELIHOOD	Frequency of Events	Number of Events per Year	X ¹⁰²	Y ¹⁰³	Z ¹⁰⁴

Event Background

The sort of description and qualitative discussion that would be found in a well-researched non-quantitative survey of hazards goes here.

⁸⁹ Unless indicated otherwise, all page references in the following refer to the draft (28 January 2015) SNRA 2011 Unclassified Documentation of Findings which was distributed to you with this information packet.

⁹⁰ Source for estimate A.

⁹¹ Source for estimate B.

⁹² Source for estimate C.

⁹³ Source for estimate D.

⁹⁴ Source for estimate E.

⁹⁵ Source for estimate F.

⁹⁶ Source for estimate G.

⁹⁷ Source for estimate H.

⁹⁸ Source for estimate I.

⁹⁹ Source for estimate J.

¹⁰⁰ Source for estimate K.

¹⁰¹ Source for estimate L.

¹⁰² Source for estimate X.

¹⁰³ Source for estimate Y.

¹⁰⁴ Source for estimate Z.

Assumptions

Frequency

Describe the sources and methods used to obtain the low, best, and high estimates of frequency. Use footnotes or endnotes.

Health and Safety

Describe the sources and methods used to obtain the low, best, and high estimates of fatalities and illnesses or injuries. Use footnotes or endnotes.

If your injury/illness data have a more granular breakdown (more/less severe, Hazus Level 1-4), please provide those numbers in a table here.

Direct Economic Loss

Describe the sources and methods used to obtain the low, best, and high frequency background here. Use footnotes or endnotes.

Please provide the breakdown of your direct economic estimates by component:

- **Decontamination, Disposal, and Physical Destruction (DDP):**
 - Property damage (including building contents)
 - Decontamination costs (for buildings not demolished)
 - Disposal costs for debris
 - Crop damage
- **Business Interruption:**
 - Lost sales, wages, other business costs directly caused by the event
- **Medical Costs**
- **One Year Lost Spending from Fatalities**
 - \$42,500 per fatality¹⁰⁵

If your direct economic loss figures have a granular breakdown (homes destroyed, jobs lost), please provide those numbers in a table here.

Social

Describe the sources and methods used to obtain the low, best, and high estimates of persons displaced for 2 or more days. Use footnotes or endnotes.

If your displacement data have a more granular breakdown (short term, long term, homeless), please provide those numbers in a table here.

¹⁰⁵ Note 67, this document.

Psychological

The estimates will be calculated from the fatality, injury/illness, and displacement estimates using a pre-defined formula (Appendix G). However, please feel free to write qualitatively about the psychological impacts of your threat/hazard.

Environmental

The estimates will be elicited from subject matter experts. No text is required here.

Potential Mitigating Factors

Please describe potential mitigating factors, as desired (see SNRA 2011 risk summary sheets for examples¹⁰⁶).

Additional Relevant Information

Please provide additional relevant information, as needed. Large data tables may go in this section, or under a previous section. If you do provide large data tables here, switch this section with the References/Bibliography. Alternatively, the data tables could be put in an annex/appendix.

References/Bibliography

If complete citations are provided in the footnotes, this section is not necessary. It is recommended, however, to keep references straight.

It can also be used to list ‘References consulted but not cited’, in order to show that you’ve covered the bases/done your homework and didn’t just pick the first references Google turned up. This can be very helpful later, so that other experts don’t waste their (and your) time sending you references which they hadn’t realized you had already examined.

¹⁰⁶ Draft Unclassified Documentation of Findings appendix J.

The Strategic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach toward a Secure and Resilient Nation

Overview

The Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) was executed in support of Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8), which calls for creation of a National Preparedness Goal, a National Preparedness System, and a National Preparedness Report. Specifically, national preparedness is to be based on core capabilities that support “strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk¹ to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.”

As part of the effort to develop the National Preparedness Goal and identify core capabilities, the Secretary of Homeland Security led an effort to conduct a strategic national risk assessment to help identify the types of incidents that pose the greatest threat to the Nation’s homeland security. Representatives from the offices of the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, as well as other members of the Federal interagency, supported this effort. The assessment was used:

- To identify high risk factors that supported development of the core capabilities and capability targets in the National Preparedness Goal;
- To support the development of collaborative thinking about strategic needs across prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery requirements, and;
- To promote the ability for all levels of Government to share common understanding and awareness of National threats and hazards and resulting risks so that they are ready to act and can do so independently but collaboratively.

The subsequent pages provide an overview of the unclassified findings and the analytic approach used to conduct the SNRA. It should be emphasized, however, that although the initial version of the SNRA is a significant step toward the establishment of a new homeland security risk baseline, it contains data limitations and assumptions that will require additional study, review, and revision as the National Preparedness System is developed. These limitations are discussed below, and future iterations of the assessment are expected to reflect an enhanced methodology and improved data sets.

Strategic National Risk Assessment Scope

To inform homeland security preparedness and resilience activities, the SNRA evaluated the risk from known threats and hazards that have the potential to significantly impact the Nation’s homeland security. These threats and hazards were grouped into a series of national-level events with the potential to test the Nation’s preparedness.

¹ The DHS Lexicon defines risk as the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated consequences. Accessed at: <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexicon-2010.pdf>

SNRA participants – including Federal agencies, DHS Components, and the intelligence community, among others – developed a list of national-level events (see Table 1) for assessment in the initial SNRA. The events are grouped into three categories: 1) natural hazards; 2) technological/accidental hazards; and 3) adversarial, human-caused threats/hazards. For the purposes of the assessment, DHS identified thresholds of consequence necessary to create a national-level event. These thresholds were informed by subject matter expertise and available data. For some events, economic consequences were used as thresholds, while for others, fatalities or injuries/illnesses were deemed more appropriate as the threshold to determine a national-level incident. In no case, however, were economic and casualty thresholds treated as equivalent to one another (i.e., dollar values were not assigned to fatalities). Event descriptions in Table 1 that do not explicitly identify a threshold signify that no minimum consequence threshold was employed. This allows the assessment to include events for which the psychological impact of an event could cause it to become a national-level event even though it may result in a low number of casualties or a small economic loss. Only events that have a distinct beginning and end and those with an explicit nexus to homeland security missions were included. This approach excluded:

- Chronic societal concerns, such as immigration and border violations, and those that are generally not related to homeland security national preparedness, such as cancer or car accidents, and;
- Political, economic, environmental, and societal trends that may contribute to a changing risk environment but are not explicitly homeland security national-level events (e.g., demographic shifts, economic trends). These trends will be important to include in future iterations of a national risk assessment, however.

Table 1: SNRA National-Level Events

Threat/ Hazard Group	Threat/Hazard Type	National-level Event Description
Natural	Animal Disease Outbreak	An unintentional introduction of the foot-and-mouth disease virus into the domestic livestock population in a U.S. state
	Earthquake	An earthquake occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 Million
	Flood	A flood occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 Million
	Human Pandemic Outbreak	A severe outbreak of pandemic influenza with a 25% gross clinical attack rate spreads across the U.S. populace
	Hurricane	A tropical storm or hurricane impacts the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses of greater than \$100 Million
	Space Weather	The sun emits bursts of electromagnetic radiation and energetic particles causing utility outages and damage to infrastructure
	Tsunami	A tsunami with a wave of approximately 50 feet impacts the Pacific Coast of the U.S.
	Volcanic Eruption	A volcano in the Pacific Northwest erupts impacting the surrounding areas with lava flows and ash and areas east with smoke and ash
	Wildfire	A wildfire occurs within the U.S. resulting in direct economic losses greater than \$100 Million

Threat/ Hazard Group	Threat/Hazard Type	National-level Event Description
Technological/ Accidental	Biological Food Contamination	Accidental conditions where introduction of a biological agent (e.g., <i>Salmonella</i> , <i>E. coli</i> , botulinum toxin) into the food supply results in 100 hospitalizations or greater and a multi-state response
	Chemical Substance Spill or Release	Accidental conditions where a release of a large volume of a chemical acutely toxic to human beings (a toxic inhalation hazard, or TIH) from a chemical plant, storage facility, or transportation mode results in either one or more offsite fatalities, or one or more fatalities (either on- or offsite) with offsite evacuations/shelter-in-place
	Dam Failure	Accidental conditions where dam failure and inundation results in one fatality or greater
	Radiological Substance Release	Accidental conditions where reactor core damage causes release of radiation
Adversarial/ Human-Caused	Aircraft as a Weapon	A hostile non-state actor(s) crashes a commercial or general aviation aircraft into a physical target within the U.S.
	Armed Assault	A hostile non-state actor(s) uses assault tactics to conduct strikes on vulnerable target(s) within the U.S. resulting in at least one fatality or injury
	Biological Terrorism Attack (non-food)	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and releases a biological agent against an outdoor, indoor, or water target, directed at a concentration of people within the U.S.
	Chemical/Biological Food Contamination Terrorism Attack	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and disperses a biological or chemical agent into food supplies within the U.S. supply chain
	Chemical Terrorism Attack (non-food)	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires, weaponizes, and releases a chemical agent against an outdoor, indoor, or water target, directed at a concentration of people using an aerosol, ingestion, or dermal route of exposure
	Cyber Attack against Data	A cyber attack which seriously compromises the integrity or availability of data (the information contained in a computer system) or data processes resulting in economic losses of a Billion dollars or greater
	Cyber Attack against Physical Infrastructure	An incident in which a cyber attack is used as a vector to achieve effects which are “beyond the computer” (i.e., kinetic or other effects) resulting in one fatality or greater or economic losses of \$100 Million or greater
	Explosives Terrorism Attack	A hostile non-state actor(s) deploys a man-portable improvised explosive device (IED), Vehicle-borne IED, or Vessel IED in the U.S. against a concentration of people, and/or structures such as critical commercial or government facilities, transportation targets, or critical infrastructure sites, etc., resulting in at least one fatality or injury

Threat/ Hazard Group	Threat/Hazard Type	National-level Event Description
	Nuclear Terrorism Attack	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires an improvised nuclear weapon through manufacture from fissile material, purchase, or theft and detonates it within a major U.S. population center
	Radiological Terrorism Attack	A hostile non-state actor(s) acquires radiological materials and disperses them through explosive or other means (e.g., a radiological dispersal device or RDD) or creates a radiation exposure device (RED)

The SNRA participants identified the events listed in Table 1 as those with the potential to pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation and formed the analytic basis of the SNRA. In some cases, tornados may also become national-level events that pose significant risk. Table 1 is not a complete list of risks that exist and will be reconsidered in future iterations of the assessment. Additional threats and hazards, such as droughts, heat waves, winter storms, rain storms, and different types of technological/accidental or human-caused hazards, can also pose a risk to jurisdictions across the country and should be considered, as appropriate, in preparedness planning. Non-influenza diseases with pandemic potential and other animal diseases should also be considered. In addition, assessment participants identified a number of events for possible inclusion in future iterations of the SNRA, including electric grid failure, plant disease outbreak, and transportation system failure.

Overarching Themes to an All-Hazards Approach

The results of the SNRA are largely classified and include a comparison of risks for potential incidents in terms of the likelihood (calculated as a frequency—i.e. number of events per year) and consequences of threats and hazards, as well as an analysis of the uncertainty associated with those incidents.² The assessment finds that a wide range of threats and hazards pose a significant risk to the Nation, affirming the need for an all-threats/hazards, capability-based approach to preparedness planning. Overarching themes include:

- Natural hazards, including hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, wildfires, and floods, present a significant and varied risk across the country.
- A virulent strain of pandemic influenza could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans, affect millions more, and result in economic loss. Additional human and animal infectious diseases, including those previously undiscovered, may present significant risks.
- Technological and accidental hazards, such as dam failures or chemical substance spills or releases, have the potential to cause extensive fatalities and have severe economic impacts, and the likelihood of occurrence may increase due to aging infrastructure.

² The full results of the SNRA are classified.

- Terrorist organizations or affiliates may seek to acquire, build, and use weapons of mass destruction. Conventional terrorist attacks, including those by “lone actors” employing explosives and armed attacks, present a continued risk to the Nation.
- Cyber attacks can have their own catastrophic consequences and can also initiate other hazards, such as power grid failures or financial system failures, which amplify the potential impact of cyber incidents.

These findings supported the development of the core capabilities, as well as the establishment of capability targets for the Goal. In addition to the above findings articulated in the National Preparedness Goal, the SNRA found that:

- Many events have the potential to occur more than once every 10 years, meaning that the Nation’s preparedness will likely be tested in this decade.
- Although historic events provide a useful perspective on homeland security risks, the changing nature of society and the risk landscape means that the Nation must also be prepared for new hazards and threats or for events that result in greater consequences than have occurred in the past.
- Within an all-hazards preparedness context, particular events that present risk to the Nation—such as nuclear attacks or chemical releases—require additional specialized response activities.
- Some events, such as explosives attacks or earthquakes, generally cause more localized consequences, while other events, such as human pandemics, may cause consequences that are dispersed throughout the Nation, thus creating different types of impacts for preparedness planners to consider.

Analytic Approach

The SNRA drew data and information from a variety of sources, including existing Government models and assessments, historical records, structured analysis, and judgments of experts from different disciplines. The information was used to assess the risk of identified incidents as a function of frequency³ and consequence—specifically, *With what frequency is it estimated that an event will occur, and what are the consequences of the incident(s) if it does occur?*

The SNRA examined the consequences associated with six categories of harm: loss of life, injuries and illnesses, direct economic costs, social displacement, psychological distress, and environmental impact. This multi-faceted view of potential consequences draws attention to the broad and often interdependent effects of incidents that require whole of community preparation and cooperation across the homeland security enterprise. For instance, community resilience relates to both mitigating human and economic consequences and addressing the psychological and social distress caused by the incident within the community. Similarly, other types of resilience involve withstanding environmental and infrastructure degradations to ensure that essential services continue to be delivered.

³ Frequency was used in the SNRA to capture likelihood because some events have the potential to occur more than once a year.

The SNRA relied on the best available quantitative estimates of frequency and consequence from existing Government assessments, peer-reviewed literature, and expert judgment. Where sufficient quantitative information was not available—such as data related to the frequency of high-consequence space weather—events were assessed qualitatively. The estimates of the frequency and consequences for each of the events considered were compared where appropriate. No effort was made to create a single “risk judgment” for any event type because it was deemed infeasible to aggregate all consequence types into a single metric. Instead, the assessment treated consequence categories separately (i.e., economic consequences are reported separately from fatality consequences). This allowed stakeholders to apply their own expert judgments to the findings and decide how those findings should inform core capability targets in the Goal.

All sources and estimates were documented to promote credibility, defensibility, and transparency within the assessment. Uncertainty in frequency and consequences was explicitly included in the analysis by representing low and high bounds in addition to best estimates. Examples of sources of uncertainty include incomplete knowledge of adversary capabilities and intent, variability in possible event severity and location, and lack of historical precedence.

Because the assessment was performed at a strategic national level, it provided the ability to draw rough comparisons of the assessed events—with an order of magnitude—to view the broad differences in risk across events. Given the uncertainty inherent in assessing risks at a national level and the lack of information about some of the events included—many of which are likely to occur very infrequently—the assessment was designed to avoid false precision. Instead, the assessment identifies only those differences in risk that are still significant despite the associated uncertainties.

Limitations

The analysis of available information—even if that analysis is imprecise and contains a wide degree of uncertainty—supports better decision making, as long as key limitations and assumptions are noted. Participants designed the SNRA to capture the best information the Nation has about homeland security risks to support the development of the National Preparedness Goal while recognizing the limitations of conducting such analysis in a shortened time frame.

- This is a *strategic national* risk assessment. As such, it does not present a full view of the risk facing local communities. To complement preparedness planning, it is necessary to consider national and regional risks, many of which differ from region to region.
- Given PPD-8’s emphasis on contingency events with defined beginning and endpoints (e.g. hurricanes, terrorist attacks), the current SNRA does not explicitly assess persistent, steady-state risks like border violations, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and intellectual property violations, which are important considerations for DHS and the homeland security enterprise.
- Information about the frequency and consequences of the events included in the SNRA is at varying stages of maturity, with additional work required in some areas to ensure that event data can be appropriately compared. Where substantial additional research is warranted, events are discussed qualitatively and are not compared with other events.

- The SNRA methodology does not explicitly model the dynamic nature of some of the included hazards. For example, terrorists' evolving tactics in response to changes in defensive posture are not included.
- Experts consulted about psychological consequences emphasized caution in the application of the SNRA's measure of psychological distress, and stressed the need for additional research. The Department of Homeland Security and its partner organizations leveraged previously funded social and behavioral research to better understand how to anticipate, prepare for, counteract, and mitigate the effects of terrorist acts, natural disasters, and technological accidents. Additional research is required to further explore psychosocial factors that enable resilience in individuals, organizations, and communities and at the societal level.
- For national-level events where historic data was used as the basis of analysis, the risk from low-likelihood, high-consequence incidents may not be adequately captured. This is particularly true for technological/accidental hazards. Further study is needed to better characterize these risks at the national strategic level.

Impacts and Future Uses

The SNRA was executed in support of PPD-8 implementation and has served as an integral part of the development of the National Preparedness Goal, assisting in integrating and coordinating identification of the core capabilities and establishing a risk-informed foundation for the National Preparedness System. Participants mapped the core capabilities identified in the Goal to the events assessed in the SNRA to identify any additional core capabilities that may need to be included. In addition, the SNRA can be used to inform discussions on priorities for capability investment decisions. Finally, the SNRA results will be used to drive other preparedness priorities at the national level.

In addition, conducting a Strategic National Risk Assessment will support the National Preparedness System by providing a consolidated list of “national level events” for consideration and augmentation for Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment processes at multiple jurisdiction levels.

Conclusion

Although the development of the SNRA is an important first step, further analysis through the execution of regional- and community-level risk assessments will help communities better understand their risks and form a foundation for their own security and resilience. The Nation’s preparedness is dependent on a whole-of-community understanding of risk and comprehensive consequences at and across all levels of government. In conjunction with Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial partners, the SNRA will be expanded and enhanced and will ultimately serve as a unifying national risk profile to facilitate preparedness efforts.

Strategic National Risk Assessment

Strategic National Risk Assessment

Resource for Planners



Unclassified Findings and Consolidated Technical Appendices

Compilation 17 July 2015

Resource
for
Planners



FEMA

SNRA Working Paper

This consolidation of the SNRA 2011 and 2015 unclassified technical documentation into a single integrated volume was prepared by the SNRA project team to make the SNRA supporting documentation easier to understand and use. It is not part of the documentation of record. Please refer to the June 2015 SNRA Findings, Technical Appendix, and Working Papers, and the classified SNRA Technical Report for the documentation of record of the 2015 SNRA.