

From: Andrew Janca <andrew.janca.2@outlook.com>
Sent: Monday, September 5, 2022 18:12
To: info@highfrontier.org; info@helena.org; tips@nationalreview.com
Cc: Janca, Andrew; Andrew Janca
Subject: [Please forward to Ambs. ----- & -----] 0/2 - (5 U.S.C. 2302) Strategic National Risk Assessment (the U.S. national risk assessment which disappeared). Doesn't include EMP attacks, but does include geo-magnetic storms.
Attachments: Attachment list 20220901.pdf

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Please select the Phish Alert Report button on the top right of your screen to report this email if it is unsolicited or suspicious in nature.

High Frontier, Helena [or National Review] -- Could you please forward this and the next two emails (this email just has the inventory for them, in case they don't come through) to Ambassadors ----- ? The addresses I used bounced.

Dr. -----, re
<https://www.afmissileers.org/resources/SiteUploads/54542334/20%20Sep%202020%20ICons%20Weekly%20.asd.pdf#page=54> p. 54: Space weather is identified in the seven page 2011 SNRA public summary (<https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-ppd8.pdf>) and assessed in the 2015 SNRA (next email), but EMP *attacks* are not. That was partly because of my error (I'd believed that acts of war were out of scope, and found out I was wrong near the end of the project) and partly because it was out of reach for us anyway (the analysis for a controversial risk has to be bulletproof the first time it is introduced, to survive critics -- we barely got space weather to the finish line). Email 2/2 has a little more information.

The UK national risk assessment does include EMP attacks [1]. They are assessed in the same probability bin (1 / 100,000 years to 1 / 500 years [2]) as a full-on nuclear war, but a lower consequence bin (I don't know why: other than pandemic-relevant detail pages, the newspaper published only this top-level matrix).

[1] UK national risk assessment matrix, <https://web.archive.org/web/20200424150850/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/24/revealed-uk-ministers-were-warned-last-year-of-risks-of-coronavirus-pandemic#img-2>, from the article (near the end)
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/24/revealed-uk-ministers-were-warned-last-year-of-risks-of-coronavirus-pandemic>. First column, first two rows.

[2] Bottom likelihood bin, 1 in 100,000 years (page 11 sidebar, <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/POST-PB-0031/POST-PB-0031.pdf>) to 1 in 500 years (page 9, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/952959/6.6920_CO_CCS_s_National_Risk_Register_2020_11-1-21-FINAL.pdf).

I am **NOT** speaking for my Department or agency, any past or present DHS organization, or any past or present colleagues.

The documentation (1/2) and context (2/2) follow. All the information on those emails is unclassified and non-security sensitive.

Thank you,

Andrew Janca
andrew.janca.2@outlook.com (this address)

From: Andrew Janca
Sent: September 2, 2022 1:46 AM
To: -----@hudson.org; -----@aei.org; -----@nationalaffairs.com; -----@nationalreview.com; -----@nationalreview.com

Cc: andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov; tips@nationalreview.com;----- @nationalreview.com;
-----@nationalreview.com; -----@nationalreview.com;----- @aei.org; andrew.janca.2@outlook.com
Subject: FW: 0/2 - RE: (5 U.S.C. 2302) Pandemics have been the #1 or #2 (after drugs) non-CBRN risk on DHS's list since 2011. The SNS was empty and the Nation was unprepared because we suppressed those risk assessments. We are still doing so.

Hello -- The documentation and context follow. The attachments dated June 27 are still current: nothing has changed since, I'm just a [very] slow writer. I'm sending the attachment list by itself first, so you'll know if something didn't come through.

Thank you,

Andrew Janca
andrew.janca.2@outlook.com (this address)

From: Andrew Janca
Sent: Monday, June 27, 2022 7:58 AM
To: -----@eenews.net <-----@eenews.net>; investigations@npr.org <investigations@npr.org>;
editors@sciam.com <editors@sciam.com>; tips@rollingstone.com <tips@rollingstone.com>;
tips@nationalreview.com <tips@nationalreview.com>; wsjcontact@wsj.com <wsjcontact@wsj.com>;
tips@latimes.com <tips@latimes.com>; covidtips@kff.org <covidtips@kff.org>; historiasph@gfrmedia.com
<historiasph@gfrmedia.com>; redaccion@elvocero.com <redaccion@elvocero.com>
Cc: andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov <andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov>; lockbox@washpost.com
<lockbox@washpost.com>; national@washpost.com <national@washpost.com>; news@unionleader.com
<news@unionleader.com>; tips@nytimes.com <tips@nytimes.com>; tips@reason.com <tips@reason.com>;
info@thebulwark.com <info@thebulwark.com>; -----@amgreatness.com <-----@amgreatness.com>;
scoop@motherjones.com <scoop@motherjones.com>; contactus@foxnews.com <contactus@foxnews.com>;
coverage-desk@voanews.com <coverage-desk@voanews.com>; info@truthout.org <info@truthout.org>;
-----@protonmail.com <-----@protonmail.com>; editorial@newsmax.com <editorial@newsmax.com>;
andrew.janca.2@outlook.com <andrew.janca.2@outlook.com>
Subject: 0/2 - RE: (5 U.S.C. 2302) Pandemics have been the #1 or #2 (after drugs) non-CBRN risk on DHS's list since 2011. The SNS was empty and the Nation was unprepared because we suppressed those risk assessments. We are still doing so.
Attachments: Attachment list 20220627.pdf

Hello -- I'm sending the follow-up next. I'm sending the attachment list by itself first, so you'll know if something didn't come through. It may be slow.

I'm writing some of you for the first time. Everything I've sent before is at
https://5usc2302.github.io/risk/5_U.S.C._2302_justification/Sent_in_July/index.html.

Truthout covered the SNRA in 2018, <https://truthout.org/articles/key-assessment-of-climate-threats-cyberwar-and-terrorism-goes-missing-under-my-former-boss/>.

Thank you,

Andrew Janca
andrew.janca.2@outlook.com (this address)

From: Andrew Janca
Sent: Tuesday, July 20, 2021 10:53 PM
To: -----@eenews.net; investigations@npr.org; editors@sciam.com; tips@rollingstone.com;
tips@nationalreview.com; wsjcontact@wsj.com; tips@latimes.com; covidtips@kff.org
Cc: mediainquiry@hq.dhs.gov; FEMA-News-Desk@fema.dhs.gov; andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov;
lockbox@washpost.com; national@washpost.com; news@unionleader.com; tips@nytimes.com;
tips@reason.com; info@thebulwark.com; -----@amgreatness.com; scoop@motherjones.com;

contactus@foxnews.com; coverage-desk@voanews.com; andrew.janca.2@outlook.com

Subject: Corrected version - RE: (5 U.S.C. 2302) Pandemics have been the #1 or #2 (after drugs) non-CBRN risk on DHS's list since 2011. The SNS was empty and the Nation was unprepared because we suppressed those risk assessments. We are still doing so.

Attachments: Substantiation of assertions in email text - 5 USC 2302 20210704 (corrected).pdf; Corrections indicated 20210720.pdf

Hello – I'm correcting a small error in figure 1. I also removed some parts that don't make sense, so it's shorter. The corrections are indicated in the second attached. I'll write again next week.

I'm cc-ing my organizations' public affairs not to suggest I'm speaking for them – I'm not, of course (I'm assuming it's obvious) – but so you'll know that you don't need to worry about keeping me anonymous from DHS or FEMA. I've been open with my management about my whistleblowing since 2013. These issues as they manifest internally are strongly normative, and norms are established or re-established in the open.

DHS, FEMA – I usually find a way to funnel whatever whistleblowing I do into a communication to committee staff so I can use FEMA's Report of Congressional Contact process to notify everyone who needs to know internally. I don't see a way to do that now that wouldn't seem contrived, because I'm not adding anything to what they already saw two weeks ago. I'll still forward this to my management and office lawyer, but please feel free to notify whoever else you think is appropriate.

I am not speaking for my Department or agency, any past or present DHS organization, or any past or present colleagues.

The unredacted information that these letters, attachments, and links communicate is explicitly within the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and communicated solely for its lawful purposes.

Thank you,

Andrew Janca
andrew.janca.2@outlook.com (this address)

From: andrew.janca.2@outlook.com

Sent: Sunday, July 4, 2021 11:56 PM

To: -----@eenews.net <-----@eenews.net>; investigations@npr.org <investigations@npr.org>; editors@sciam.com <editors@sciam.com>; tips@rollingstone.com <tips@rollingstone.com>; tips@nationalreview.com <tips@nationalreview.com>; wsjcontact@wsj.com <wsjcontact@wsj.com>; tips@latimes.com <tips@latimes.com>; covidthips@kff.org <covidthips@kff.org>

Cc: andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov <andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov>; lockbox@washpost.com <lockbox@washpost.com>; national@washpost.com <national@washpost.com>; news@unionleader.com <news@unionleader.com>; tips@nytimes.com <tips@nytimes.com>; tips@reason.com <tips@reason.com>; info@thebulwark.com <info@thebulwark.com>; -----@amgreatness.com <-----@amgreatness.com>; scoop@motherjones.com <scoop@motherjones.com>; contactus@foxnews.com <contactus@foxnews.com>; coverage-desk@voanews.com <coverage-desk@voanews.com>; andrew.janca.2@outlook.com

Subject: (5 U.S.C. 2302) Pandemics have been the #1 or #2 (after drugs) non-CBRN risk on DHS's list since 2011. The SNS was empty and the Nation was unprepared because we suppressed those risk assessments. We are still doing so.

Attachments: What's missing.pdf; SNRA letter to committee staff March 2019.pdf; SNRA FAQ 20190319 redacted.pdf; SNRA follow-up letter 20201016.pdf; Substantiation and context.zip; Attachment list 20210704.docx

Summary: The DHS/FEMA Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) is the science-based comparative national risk assessment of natural, accidental, and adversarial hazards that FEMA's National Preparedness System is based on. It has been locked up since 2011. (The SNRA's climate change analysis is the only Government climate study that I know of that has been suppressed by both parties.) While classification and disagreements with DHS HQ had much to do with that before 2015, neither has been an obstacle since. As far as I know, the decisions to suppress the science that FEMA's plans, requirements, and doctrine are based on have been made by DHS/FEMA itself since 2015.

I don't have the moral credibility or communication skills to solve this problem inside the Government. Everything I've tried has failed. That is why I'm writing you now.

The context and documentation for the statements above is attached. Larger files (all of which are already public information) are in <https://bd02.github.io/external>. I will forward this to the committee staff I wrote to before, to my Department and agency, and to the addressees and cc-ed on the forwarded email below tomorrow.

I am not speaking for my Department or agency, any past or present DHS organization, or any past or present colleagues.

The unredacted information that these letters, attachments, and links communicate is explicitly within the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and communicated solely for its lawful purposes.

Thank you,

Andrew Janca
andrew.janca.2@outlook.com

From: Janca, Andrew <andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2020 07:21
To: --- AUSA ---@usdoj.gov; --- POC GAO-20-297 ---@gao.gov
Cc: OGC <ogc@HQ.DHS.GOV>; FEMA-OCC <FEMA-OCC@fema.dhs.gov>; GAO-OIG Liaison <GAO-OIG.Liaison@HQ.DHS.GOV>; FEMA-GAO-OIG-LIAISON <FEMA-GAO-OIG-LIAISON@fema.dhs.gov>; Media Inquiry <MediaInquiry@HQ.DHS.GOV>; FEMA-News-Desk <FEMA-News-Desk@fema.dhs.gov>; Janca, Andrew <andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov>
Subject: 1/3 - What my agency (DHS/FEMA) is telling each of you is factually inconsistent with what we're telling the other

Hello – Recent statements that my agency has given GAO and the press factually conflict with sworn declarations that my agency has given in court.

I drew my agency's attention to the inconsistencies between the latter, and the information which my agency later communicated to GAO and the press, in February. My agency has not corrected them.

(I'm talking around the subject to some extent because the non-disclosure agreements that that unsuccessful correction attempt left me with limit what I can put in a cover letter with multiple recipients on my end. So I'm trying to say as much as I can without going into the protected content.)

These inconsistencies are public, but currently below the threshold of public awareness. Since I have pointed them out to others outside the Executive Branch (footnotes 10-12, SNRA follow-up letter 20201016.pdf inside the second attachment), I'm obligated to tell you too. I haven't contacted the journalist yet, but I'll work on that next.

The three public inconsistencies that are the easiest to start with are

- <https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6284501/28/1/public-employees-for-environmental-responsibility-v-united-states/> paragraph 8;
- <https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/706612.pdf> pp. 11-12, 28; and
- <https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1062857757> (if the link doesn't work there's a pdf copy in the second attached).

The connecting context is the DHS/FEMA Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA), the "risk basis" of the National Preparedness System and the subject of a briefed-but-pending FOIA litigation (1:18-cv-00158-CKK) that ---AUSA --- inherited in May. I helped FEMA update this risk assessment in 2015, and I signed off on the language that FEMA used to tell the public what it said. The FOIA case duplicates a FOIA request that I made in October 2016.

I have also worked on the National THIRA that is referenced in these parts. It is a very different kind of thing than the SNRA: neither product is capable of filling the role of the other. My agency's use of it to bury something else should not be allowed to discredit the honest work that my colleagues have done on it.

This email is 1 of 3. Attached to this and the next two emails are what I sent committee staff Friday before last (October 16), July 2020, and March 2019, including the unclassified SNRA itself. The last attachment to this email is the one piece from my February correction attempt (a FOIA for what FEMA later told GAO and the journalist) that I can share without restriction. I've redacted the protected content, but the rest will still be helpful for context. Additional context:

- GAO: Relevant context is GAO-11-873 and 16-371 (DHS context), 16-243 (risk comparisons), and prior reports referenced in GAO-20-297. The 'missing' methodology report I mentioned in the SNRA FAQ p. 6 (How does the SNRA relate to DHS' HSNRC?) is the missing documentation discussed in GAO-16-371. Declaration 28-1 in --- AUSA ---'s case discusses another GAO document in paragraph 10.
- DHS/FEMA public affairs [cc-ed]: Relevant context is <https://www.eenews.net/stories/1062824495>, <https://web.archive.org/web/20140502084541/https://www.llis.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/NPS-LLIS.pdf> 3-6, 3-7, 3-12, 3-16, <https://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/training/tcl.pdf> 460-463, SNRA 2011/15 and HSNRC 2013/17 pandemic and comparative analyses, QHSR 2014 Bio Study, and the QHSR 2014 homeland biosecurity national capability targets. The targets were classified in their final version: I believe this is why they disappeared, but I don't actually know.
- USAO: I will forward you the full February 18, 2020 packet (including the unredacted version of the last attachment) separately. The main differences with the Trusted Traveler case (<https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/16824447/113/state-of-new-york-v-wolf/> pp. 16-17, <https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/16824447/124/state-of-new-york-v-wolf/> p. 9) are 1) my agency did not correct the problematic filing when I pointed out its inconsistencies with other information; 2) my agency subsequently made those inconsistencies public (above); and 3) the real-world consequences of my agency's choices in your case.

The information these letters and attachments communicate is explicitly within the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 2302, and communicated solely for its lawful purposes.

I apologize for the awkwardness of this letter.

Andrew Janca, PhD
National Preparedness Directorate, FEMA
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Phone: (202) 786-0937
andrew.janca@fema.dhs.gov

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