



Egmont Institute

Contribution

Call for Evidence on the *2025 Strategic Foresight Report* *Achieving Resilience* *by 2040*

Supporting research and findings

Hereinbelow five contributions are presented containing earnest reflections and perspectives on the central issues raised in the Call for Evidence regarding *2025 Strategic Foresight Report*. These inputs provided expertise and a supporting evidence base that informed the concise response submitted by the Egmont Institute to the CfE.

Egmont Institute – Contribution 1

As strategic foresight is based on collective intelligence; the Commission seeks evidence-based input particularly on the following questions:

- **Scope:** What are the main challenges to long-term EU resilience and what are the strengths on which Europe can build it?
 - One major challenge to EU resilience will be to tackle the multiple environmental crises: climate change, biodiversity loss, water resource scarcity, air/soil/water pollution, biogeochemical cycles perturbations, etc. (see ‘planetary boundaries’ concept). Those issues do not only lead to resource scarcity, public health degradation, and natural disasters, but they also affect social balance inside and outside EU and international geopolitical dynamics as they can generate conflicts which will impact the EU directly or indirectly.
 - A successful environmental transition and thereby reaching the EU’s climate and environmental objectives, will bring many opportunities to increase EU resilience (decrease dependency on fossils fuels, decrease health problems, reduce climate change impacts, etc.) but could also bring its own resilience challenges (dependency on new types of resources and technologies, risks of social imbalance during the transition process, etc.). The way EU will choose to make its transition will play an important role in its resilience level.

- Good adaptation to climate change is a key element for the resilience of the EU. Climate conditions are already changing, and the frequency of extreme climate events is increasing. Europe must adapt in order to increase its resilience. The European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA) (2024, EEA) provides a strong basis on which we can rely to prioritize action, as it identifies key climate risks and areas requiring urgent attention (some key adaptation priorities are flood management, heatwave preparedness and resilient infrastructure). A challenge, however, will be to work together efficiently at both the EU and Member State levels to ensure that Europe is well prepared for these increasing risks. In this context, the European Climate Adaptation Plan (ECAP) could be a key tool to bridge the gap between the priorities set by EUCRA and concrete action at the national level, fostering coordination and ensuring that adaptation measures are effectively implemented across Europe.

- **Imagine 2040:** How would you characterise a resilient EU in 2040?

In 2040, EU citizens live in a healthy environment, social cohesion is strong, economic activity allows everyone to live decently, EU is on track with its climate, environmental and social objectives, has adapted its critical infrastructures and areas and is prepared for extreme climate events and other crisis. Risk management is fully integrated into policymaking, allowing for proactive adaptation and crisis response.

At the international level, the EU has built strong and diversified partnerships, it has reduced its dependency on imports and exports wherever these entail negative socio-economic or environmental impacts, has derisked its external economic and trade relationships, in particular through rethinking strategic value chains and diversifying them. The EU is also an active player at the international level to help mitigate, adapt and react to environmental and other global crises.

- **Society and generations:** How can we ensure a resilient society and fairness between generations?

Same elements as above.

In 2040:

- EU manages, preserves and effectively restores its own natural capital in a sustainable way, making sure future generations will have access to, at least, the same level of natural capital (in terms of quantity and quality);

- The EU strongly reduces its dependency to the natural capital outside of EU (import/export of resources, food, etc.), taking into account planetary boundaries and social fairness;
 - The EU is on track with its environmental objectives, for example in terms of climate change and GHG emissions, it has a clear long-term vision and plan on how to stay on track and it has succeeded in putting into place the right tools to ensure a just transition, a sustainable access to the resources it needs (through the development of a bio-based and circular economy, local production/extraction plans to use and produce renewable resources such as biomass in a sustainable way and strong & diversified partnerships) and the development of a strong net-zero industry inside the EU.
 - The EU is prepared for natural disasters due to climate changes: All required physical adaptation and prevention measures have been deployed or are planned (incl. land planning measures), adaptation to climate change & resilience criteria's have been integrated in every new investment for several years now, emergency plans are clear and regularly updated and emergency services are well-trained and ready to intervene, citizens are aware of the risks and of the procedures in case of emergency, plans and funds are also secured to manage loss and damages due to unexpected events, etc. Investments in adaptation measures are made without increasing the public deficit for future generations as they did not cause climate change;
 - The EU is an active player at the international level to help mitigate, adapt and react to climate and environmental crises at the global level.
- **Long-term resilience:** Which critical policy actions should be initiated today to strengthen resilience in the EU by 2040?
- To reduce dependency on fossil fuels:
 - stay the course on climate change objectives by adopting an ambitious EU climate target for 2040 and review the EU's long-term strategy to 2050.
 - Focus on effective emission reductions and limit the use of CCS.
 - Also: specific policies are necessary to decarbonize the fossil carbon feedstock used in industry and to incentivize the use of renewable carbon sources (bio-based or based on direct air capture);



- Reduce our dependency on resources and diversify the type of resources we use. Efficient use of resources, eco-design et strategic prioritization/allocation of resource uses can play a significant role. Innovation is also key in order to develop technologies that are less resource-intensive and develop new types of materials;
- Secure and diversify access to key resources by developing circular economy, local production/extraction and strong & diversified partnerships for import/export;
- Develop new net-zero industrial sectors inside EU;
- Develop a strong just transition framework, making sure the transition is within everyone's reach, does not leave anyone behind, and wherein the opportunities of the transition are accessible to all;
- Resilient nature: Preserve and restore natural ecosystems in the EU. Provide space for nature, promote connectivity and promote diversification;
- Develop an integrated and systemic approach to risk assessment to address the complexity of the climate risks;
- Adaptation reflex: integrate adaptation to climate change within each project and each new investment;
- Develop a strong financing framework (public & private finance) for climate transition and climate adaptation;
- Develop and implement emergency plans & procedures for natural disasters;
- Develop and implement loss & damage management plans and funds;
- Regularly monitor technological, scientific and societal evolutions, trends and seeds of changes and evaluate how it can affect (positively or negatively) the transition.

- **Synergies and tensions:** What crucial synergies and tensions can be identified across various EU priorities which might, respectively, help or hamper EU's long-term resilience? How can we enhance these synergies and mitigate these tensions?
 - Tensions:
 - A strong focus on short term competitiveness objectives and the reduction of administrative burden could hamper the long-term viability and resilience of EU businesses and the achievement of long-term objectives.
 - EU deficit and debt rules encourage member states to reduce public expenditures while high amounts of new investment are needed to reach climate-neutrality and resilience goals, including from public actors.
 - Synergies:
 - Reaching the energy efficiency and climate objective has the potential to strongly improve EU resilience.
 - The new council directive on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the member states encourages member states to include in their national medium-term budgetary framework an assessment of the macrofiscal risks from climate change and its environmental and distributional impacts. This synergy could be enhanced by making this assessment mandatory.
- **Enhancing strategic foresight:** How could the European Commission further improve its approach to strategic foresight to increase its impact on designing EU policies for a desirable future?
 - The Commission has published foresight scenarios in 2023. It is mentioned in the report that those scenarios can be used in order to stress-test EU policies.
 - It would be very helpful to have a first analysis of how those scenarios have been used since then: Was it actually used to stress-test and improve some EU policy and in which case? how can this type of exercise be improved for future uses?
 - Article 6, §4 of the European Climate Law specifies that: "The Commission shall assess the consistency of any draft measure or legislative proposal, including budgetary proposals, with the climate neutrality objective set out in Article 2(1) and the Union 2030 and 2040 climate targets before adoption (...)". A similar idea could be used with the foresight scenarios, which could be regularly updated and systematically used to assess the resilience of a new measures.



- Increase communication around foresight analysis toward Member states, and create an active network on foresight data and practices to exchange views, to present ongoing studies and insights, so that actors in various member states can learn from each other and cooperate.
- Conduct recurrent horizon scanning per thematic (could be per sector for example), in order to share with/between MS what are the trends, new technologies and other seeds of changes identified that can affect it at short/medium/long term and that should be taken into account in today's policies.
- In addition to those explorative foresight exercises, which underline majors trends, risks and opportunities, quantitative and normative foresight exercises and scenario modelling are also key in order to inform policy making. Such exercises have already been widely used by the Commission for the energy sector with the energy scenarios developed at EU level, but could go even further by sharing detailed data at MS level including for non-energy sectors, gathering and comparing scenarios from different actors at EU level, and clearly linking scenarios with their potentials impacts (macro-economic impacts, resources consumption, investment needs, employment, etc.).

Egmont Institute – Contribution 2

The EU's foresight strategy should aim to make the EU a new model of environmental-social-economic governance, fully aware of the risks of climate change and turning these risks into opportunities to create new leadership for the future and for new and renewed partnerships: "If we are going to live in a world of disruption, we might as well embrace the disruption and get a head start on creating new models of society."

Some challenges identified for the long-term EU resilience:

- Ensuring the continued prosperity of an economic sector while developing environmentally friendly activities that limit the risks of climate change
- The preservation and reinforcement of social welfare and social cohesion among all Europeans
- An age pyramid less favorable to economic development and territorial Defence and the risks of economic impoverishment
- The need for political, economic and innovative leadership that transcends the nationalist visions of EU Member States.
- Dependency on critical minerals based on the scarcity of supply, the cost of extraction (financial and environmental) and the importance of the material to European industry
- The geopolitical implications of critical minerals supply chains and the risks of over-dependence on a few dominant suppliers.
- The need to develop collective defence in an unstable world and as wars over natural resources increase.
- The requirement for armed forces to prepare for and respond to climate-related threats to ensure operational readiness in an increasingly volatile environment.
- The need to shift from reactive crisis management to proactive policies and envisioning the future

Some existing strengths could be highlighted:

- The EU acts as a stakeholder, honouring its commitments and helping to stabilise trade.
- The EU is leading an ambitious European Green Deal with a set of new policies and legislation
- Europe benefits from a high-quality infrastructure network (economic, communication and transport) that strengthens social, economic and territorial cohesion.
- A research and innovation sector with significant growth potential and a historic moment when the “potential brain drain” from the US could benefit European research.

Imagine 2040:

In 2040, after a tense period of conflict and economic and social collapse, the EU has positioned itself as a global pioneer through:

- The development of a global ethics on technology such as AI by legislating to prevent potential social excesses (fake news, radicalization, etc.) and by investing massively in the development of the tool in cutting-edge technical sectors (medicine, construction, climate change, biomimicry, etc.)
- The implementation of fair and sustainable extraction practices for critical minerals through innovative technologies and the development of legislation and regulatory framework in line with a societal and environmental balance
- The establishment of new democratic governance structures set-up through the creation of a civic service based on the establishment of a universal allowance for all citizens.
- The signing of bilateral agreements with partner countries where the issue of human rights and ethical standards matters remain central.
- Slowing down the privatization of social services and returning basic services to public administration.

As the world remains unstable, border control is being tightened, but the EU is investing in the creation of partnerships in order to stabilise the new world orders:

- Establishing preferential partnerships with the BRICS and rebuilding a diplomatic relationship with the USA.
- On its eastern flank, the EU is investing in mutually beneficial trade agreements with Russia
- The EU is taking the lead in developing regulatory tools to prevent the monopolisation of markets (particularly by single individuals)
- As organised crime has become a major global issue, the fight against it is a central focus of EU policy
- A European Defence is created with two central roles: security and resilience (ensuring defence, the power of deterrence, and the coordination of support management in the event of a climate crisis).

The development of a civic service encourages the establishment of intergenerational solidarity. This aspect of community service aims to coordinate solidarity on a local scale to ensure that the quality of life is maintained for the entire population, thus preventing the physical and cognitive decline of the elderly population (and the associated cost to social security).

Critical policy actions should be initiated today:

Support, at NATO level and in the context of financial investment in the reorientation of European defence, a reflection on the role of defence at European level in the management of the climate crisis and natural disasters.

Launch multilateral approaches to climate security and the management of critical minerals:

- Continue the Green Deal and pursue institutional reforms to integrate climate risks into security frameworks, increased investment in sustainable energy infrastructure, and greater economic equity in the global distribution of natural resources.
- Establish a multilateral dialogue on the risks of socio-political conflict that arise when natural resources or critical minerals are controlled or exploited by foreign entities, and its multiplier effects on regional stability.

Use the energy transition to limit dependence on fossil fuels and develop energy sovereignty based on an energy mix of renewables, nuclear energy and energy conservation.

- Develop action plans for energy distribution to deal with future crises.
- Create a European model of energy saving, new consumption models and inclusivity.
- Strengthen continuous training in ecological transition and innovation in terms of tomorrow's skills to promote maximum employment.
- Strengthen regulation to ensure compliance with social and environmental standards to force the development of a new social paradigm based on the EU acquis.

Improvement of policies aimed at social cohesion and the integration of migrants, through vocational training in the professions where there are labour shortages and in green job in response to the ageing of the European population and its impact on socio-economic conditions.

Egmont Institute – Contribution 3

European governance is driven by a myriad of different state and non-state actors with often discordant agendas and interests that are increasingly difficult to channel into common visions and implement. It operates in an extremely complex, volatile and unpredictable context and is faced with challenges that in their scope, depth and complexity exceed by far what the EU's founding fathers could have ever imagined the Union and her member countries' political institutions to cope with.

For any organising system (be it political, economic, or societal) to not only sustain in such context, but to turn its immanent challenges into opportunities and prosper, a set of specific skills is necessary. These include, most importantly, *openness* and *inclusiveness*, *agility*, *strategic sensitivity* and the ability to *adapt* in and to rapidly changing environments. This is particularly true for the governance system of the EU and its Member States, if the Clean Industrial Deal is to avoid the transition failure of the Green Deal.

However, the governance system of the EU and its Member States was designed fundamentally in the 1950s, inspired by governance concepts of the 1930s New Deal. They were designed for predictable (controllable) environments, and have largely failed to develop the above skills despite globalisation, technological progress and the socio-economic transformations that they triggered. Neither the EU institutions nor most of Member States administrations have yet undergone real systemic adaptation to the new contextual conditions and updated their political decision-making and -implementing systems. European governance has essentially remained unchanged to what it was half a century ago, stuck in logics of traditional top-down leadership and old regulatory trajectories seeking to *control* phenomena that however can no longer be controlled or regulated.

New approaches to governance and political leadership are therefore required that build on *management*, *orchestration* and *facilitation*, as well as *experimentation*, *co-creation* and *collaboration*. Managing innovation policy in a 4.0 context requires innovative political and administrative management, which in turn requires fundamental institutional, procedural and cultural redesign of EU governance at its various levels.

Debates often focus on the Commission as the main actor seemingly responsible of managing EU policies and driving governance reform. There is a structural lack of independent foresight as the basis alignment and for horizontal coordination and coherence in managing policies, inside EU and national institutions and between them.

Council and Commission need to refocus on their actual key tasks: Creating common visions and objectives on how to deliver prosperity to their citizens in an ever-more turbulent world where member states can no longer act alone. This requires a pragmatic and outcomes focussed approach, not primarily a legalistic procedural one. Objectives must determine methods.

In a more diverse Europe of 27 and more one day, one-size-fits-all approaches are mostly unsuited to realise common objectives. A stronger recognition of a multi-speed EU is needed, building on the concept of variable geometry. Differentiated integration approaches are required that better account for Member States idiosyncrasies rather than total harmonisation that may not fit to the national contexts. This needs a) better coordination within Member States, b) strengthening inter-governmental cooperation at European level, and c) re-thinking supranational leadership in favour of stewardship, orchestration and facilitation rather than top-down command and control.

Differentiated integration approaches stand in contrast with the Community Method with its focus on legalistic procedure that has proven increasingly unsuited to govern societies in situations of volatility and complexity. A new understanding of supranational leadership is necessary, based on *orchestration and stewardship*:

- ❖ **Orchestration:** Brings parties and resources together, channels responsibilities, and establishes *leadership groups*. Orchestration should be the task of the Commission, but these groups should be constituted by all relevant actors: EU institutions and Member States, business, research/academia, that collaboratively manage and co-create. Such approach can restore trust, allocate ownership, improve cooperation and thereby help make the system overall more flexible and agile.
- ❖ **Stewardship:** It is necessary to acknowledge that there are multiple agendas and interests in the EU that are not aligned and perhaps, there is even a distinct lack of intention to align them to protect vested interests. Alignment alone cannot overcome this problem; *active stewardship* is necessary to walk through the fault lines and unlock the blockages that hinder the creation of ecosystems.

Innovation policy (like most other modern policies) is by definition multi-disciplinary and spans across different policy areas. In the EU, this overlap is not always accounted for. Both in the Commission and in many national administrations, political objectives does not percolate (fast) enough from the hierarchy to the operational levels and horizontal coordination between the different Directorate-Generals or departments concerned with the same issue. This requires stronger efforts in national and EU administrations to better connect the dots in the EU's multi-layered governance system, vertically and horizontally.

To develop more strategic flexibility and coherence between EU and national policies, the Open Method of Coordination should be re-designed and politically more strongly recognised. Though not automatically translated into hard law, these can lead to such or inspire Member States adopting special solutions. Adapted to the digital age (e.g. in form of platforms), it can provide for flexible and effective inter-governmental cooperation on issues not or only partially within the EU competence but where the spill-over of economic, geopolitical, ecological or social developments require countries to cooperate in order to manage their individual interests in common.

The EU regulatory system needs to develop new methods and procedures that can respond faster and more efficiently to challenges and opportunities in a “vuca” context. The following should be considered:

- ❖ *Open innovation ecosystems*: EU institutions and Member States need to more strongly pull actors and resources and abolish barriers which hinder interaction and co-creation within.
- ❖ Experimental arenas for innovation, innovation meeting points, need to be created: actors (orchestrated by the Commission) from the various relevant backgrounds can come together, take off their “medals” and test and *proto-type* regulatory solutions.
- ❖ The current EU impact assessment system, based mostly on theoretical assessments, need to be complemented with, or even replaced by, *real-world experiments* of proposed regulatory solutions.
- ❖ Regulation in a digital economy needs to be smart in that it sets less fixed rules but rather Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and allows for self-organisation.
- ❖ EU legislation needs to be *outcome-based*, posing restrictions only that are necessary to achieve the outcome. This includes the ability to *challenge legislation* when it does not work and abolish/revise it.
- ❖ The EU regulatory system needs to support *societal grass-root initiatives* and partner-up with them.

EU multi-annual policy programmes are not flexible enough to change in a “vuca” context (volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous). They are action-driven, not purpose-driven. This is a system-defect: multi-annual programmes are subject to Treaty-procedures and decided by Council and Parliament. An inter-institutional effort would therefore be necessary to make innovation policy programmes more flexible and outcome-based.



Innovation requires *strategically targeted funding* to support niches and (regional) innovation clusters. EU funding is too static and slow in allocating money where it is needed to support scale-up. A *rapid response funding system* should be put in place. Lastly, the Capitals Market Union initiative needs a stronger political push and commitment to overcome fragmentation in the EU financial market and better incentive private equity.

Public administrations have often inappropriate or outdated bureaucratic methods. Human resource policies in public institutions (EU and national) need to develop leadership skills for alignment of different views and interests, for open innovation and life-long learning. EU and national administrations need to make a determined effort to attract more technology talents into the public service and to train their staff to better connect the political with the operational/implementing levels.

Egmont Institute – Contribution 4

The core of the issue

It is important to give the triple environmental crisis the centrality it deserves when we address the issue of resilience. The underlying driver that is creating unprecedented amounts of uncertainty and risk in the international system is the breakdown of the ecosystems (and the associated looming tipping points). Those ecosystems were stable and predictable and have been supporting during hundreds of years the development of modern and complex societies. That support no longer exists. It is important to address ecosystem breakdown because all the threats and uncertainties that EU is facing the coming decades would be solvable within existing economic and political paradigm, if it weren't for the triple crisis. The triple crisis, however, is forcing us to revolutionize our social and economic systems and the thinking behind those systems.

It's not possible anymore to engineer ourselves out of the environmental crisis. The crisis is there, and it is going to change everything, including the potential pathways towards solutions. To limit the breakdown, to reverse it where possible and to adapt to the changes and uncertainties that are already built into the system technological fixes are welcome but won't be enough. We will need a moral revolution. We will have to redefine what a 'good life' is and reconsider values as solidarity, compassion and frugality. We will have to shift from abundance of competition, goods and energy to abundance of cooperation and equality.

And we will have to focus attention on our relationship with the living planet around us (instead of letting ourselves be fooled by powerful Silicon Valley oligarchs that want to make us believe in the nihilist fairytale of colonizing planet Mars (where we wouldn't survive a second)). We will need to listen more to ecologists, farmers, artists and urban planners and less to oligarchs and asset managers.

Main challenges and strengths

We don't like to change the systems. Because there is powerful and well-organized opposition to defend vested interest. Additionally, it is very human reflex to revert to the past in times of crisis. Nostalgia is a powerful and dangerous driver of political mobilization that risks making us move in the wrong direction.

We will have to collectively imagine new futures that we all can project ourselves in. And those futures will be vastly different of what many of us are hoping for. An uphill battle, but it is time to start the collective conversation about that desirable future. Only by starting the conversation will



we able to align a critical mass of the public opinion that we need to shift things. And it is by starting to live today according to that desirable future that things will move in the right direction.

And we have options, there are different pathways: the futures are not only doom and gloom. That future can also be a solarpunk future: A combination of technological progress and a lifestyle associated with drastically reduced energy and material consumption. (As per Wikipedia: *Solarpunk is a literary and artistic movement, close to the hopepunk movement, that envisions and works toward actualizing a sustainable future interconnected with nature and community. The "solar" represents solar energy as a renewable energy source and an optimistic vision of the future that rejects climate doomerism, while the "punk" refers to do it yourself and the countercultural, post-capitalist, and sometimes decolonial aspects of creating such a future*).

Europe has strengths. Many of us believe in the power of equality and the rule of law. Many of us believe that private initiative and strong public regulation are a powerful combination. Many of us believe in the need to protect minorities. Many of us believe in science. Many of us believe in collective action. These are the unique qualities of the European 'way of live' that we have to name, cherish and strengthen.

Egmont Institute – Contribution 5

What are the key possible drivers behind the EU's need for greater future resilience, both in terms of possible future shocks and long-term developments?

- Ongoing key drivers: consequences of climate change/extreme weather/environmental degradation and geostrategic and geoeconomic tensions;
- Loss of leverage of EU at the global level, Breaking up of traditional coalitions (cooperation with US) and cooperation frameworks, internal weakening of EU, NATO without US;
- Breaking up of multilateral framework, international rule-based order;
- EU main target of culture war by global conservative alliance, polarisation and isolation of EU, more pressure on energy and resources security of supply, weaponisation of economic relations, digital services, cyber and hybrid warfare;
- Loss of control over AI;
- Demographic shifts, in combination with migration pressures. Shortage of skills in Europe.

Which capacities do we currently possess, and which should we aim to develop by 2040, particularly those we are currently lacking, to enhance EU resilience?

- Given differences of risks and threats between Member States, need for adequate national capacities, analysis, preparedness and resilience plans (principles of subsidiarity and proportionality);
- Cooperation, coordination and networking at EU and NATO level is indispensable in terms of preparedness, resilience and response. EU cooperation to be complementary with NATO work, avoid overlap, in particular in following up on base line requirements. Member States implementation of EU and NATO base line requirements to converge in one National Resilience Plan;

- Improve quality of policies and measures, using of evidence as well as foresight based strategic policy development. In parallel to work at Ms level, also at EU level we need a holistic approach covering the full risk cycle:
 - Identification and anticipation of threats via an EU level risk assessment, early warning;
 - Cooperation to be underpinned by joint analysis and horizontal playbooks by type of crisis;
 - Strengthening of preparedness through exercises on the ground, not only table top exercises;
 - Political and strategic direction, coordination by IPCR. Important guidance from Niniisto report and Preparedness Union Strategy;
 - Comprehensive, whole of government approach at the level of strategic policy development and strategic steering (IPCR), giving overall direction to work in sectorial tools, such as UCPM, ERCC and military command structures;
 - Systematic evaluation and lessons learned from crisis response operation;
 - Optimise civilian and military cooperation and synergies, while building on/respecting existing structures and procedures. This will facilitate dual use investments. Integrate security and safety policies and procedures, where necessary and useful.

Which vulnerabilities could hinder our resilience by 2040, potentially pulling us back?

- Weakening of existing alliances and cooperation frameworks, such as NATO. Reduced regional and global engagement and solidarity. Importance of contingency planning and need to have our own plan at national and EU level;
- Internal political fragmentation within the EU; critical attitude and internal division towards necessary reforms and improvements of joint operational procedures and structures;
- Comprehensive approach is key at strategic level and level of political direction. At the operational level keep focus on actual crisis response, making a distinction between addressing structural long-term challenges and actual crisis management. Avoid blurring those lines, at the risk of creating overlap, duplication with fora and instruments, addressing those structural long-term challenges;

- Dependency on critical infrastructure, affected by coalition shifts and weaponisation of connectivity and digital services. Need to strengthen substantially, at high financial and societal cost, strategic autonomy in terms of infrastructure and digital services (need for European Bigtech, interconnections, cables, digital services, observation, telecommunications, satellites – to be determined), in addition to costly effort to enhance defence capabilities and industry. Prepare public opinion for impact on society and income;
- Multiannual Financial Framework and strategic priority choices at EU level, most likely also ongoing budgetary pressures at Member States level;
- Multitude and scale of crises, risks of getting overstretched at EU and MS level.

How would you define a resilient EU in 2040?

- An EU that has the internal strength, cohesion and means, supported by a joint will to act together and adequate institutional balances, to be prepared to respond effectively to upcoming known and unknown threats and challenges;
- The EU capacity should be supported and complemented by agreed and institutionalised cross border cooperation with neighbours and allies;
- As threats/crises are increasingly complex and often the consequence of weaponisation, a whole of society approach, underpinned by civil-military cooperation and involvement of citizens and the private sector, should be the rule. Buy-in of the population is to be ensured by a deeply rooted risk culture, nurtured by effective awareness raising.