

# **EIP-4844**

**The complete guide for the fee reduction magic.**

# Rollup Issues?

**The upload of L2 transactions using `calldata` is only  
for others to download and verify, and doesn't need  
to be executed by L1, why do I want to pay for that?**

Make `calldata` cheaper

vs


Design a new way to transmit the  
data, separating it from `calldata`

**What if we make calldata 10x cheaper?**

<b>Block Size</b>	<b>AVG Case</b>	<b>Worst Case</b>
As-Was	85 kB	1.875 MB
Make calldata 10x cheaper	> 850 kB	18.75 MB
EIP-4844 Using Blob	~ 1 MB	2 MB

- $30M \text{ gas} / 16 \text{ gas per calldata byte} = 1.875 \text{ MB}$
- $4096 * 32 \text{ bytes} * 16 \text{ per block} = 2 \text{ MB}$

# **Blob!**



[ ... 4096 elements ... ]


The value range is between 0~52435875175126190479447740508185965837690552500527637822603658699938581184513

# KZG Commitment

[ 1, 3, 2, 2 ]



interpolation



[ 7, 21, 48, 92 ]

get

[ 1, 3, 2, 2, 7, 21, 48, 92 ]




[ 1, 7, 21, 92 ]

erasure coding

[ 1, 3, 2, 2 ]



interpolation



[ 7, 21, 48, 92 ]

get

**Commitment (Hash)**

[ 1, 3, 2, 2, 7, 21, 48, 92 ]



erasure coding

[ 1, 7, 21, 92 ]

**Blob,  $P(\omega \wedge i)$  is equal to the  $i$ -th chunk of data ( $\omega \wedge 4096 = 1$ )**


# Versioned Hash for Forward Compatibility



```
def kzg_to_versioned_hash(commitment: KZGCommitment) -> VersionedHash:  
    return VERSIONED_HASH_VERSION_KZG + sha256(commitment)[1:]
```

VERSIONED\_HASH\_VERSION\_KZG = Bytes1(0x01)


# **Lifecycle of a Blob Transaction**



# Execution Layer Validation

- BLOB\_TX\_TYPE = Bytes1(0x03)
- VERSIONED\_HASH\_VERSION\_KZG = Bytes1(0x01)
- MAX\_BLOB\_GAS\_PER\_BLOCK = 786432

```
def validate_block(block: Block) -> None:  
    ...  
  
    # check that the excess blob gas was updated correctly  
    assert block.header.excess_blob_gas == calc_excess_blob_gas(block.parent.header)  
  
    blob_gas_used = 0  
  
    for tx in block.transactions:  
        ...  
  
        # modify the check for sufficient balance  
        max_total_fee = tx.gas * tx.max_fee_per_gas  
        if get_tx_type(tx) == BLOB_TX_TYPE:  
            max_total_fee += get_total_blob_gas(tx) * tx.max_fee_per_blob_gas  
        assert signer(tx).balance >= max_total_fee  
  
        ...  
  
        # add validity logic specific to blob txs  
        if get_tx_type(tx) == BLOB_TX_TYPE:  
            # there must be at least one blob  
            assert len(tx.blob_versioned_hashes) > 0  
  
            # all versioned blob hashes must start with VERSIONED_HASH_VERSION_KZG  
            for h in tx.blob_versioned_hashes:  
                assert h[0] == VERSIONED_HASH_VERSION_KZG  
  
            # ensure that the user was willing to at least pay the current blob base fee  
            assert tx.max_fee_per_blob_gas >= get_base_fee_per_blob_gas(block.header)  
  
            # keep track of total blob gas spent in the block  
            blob_gas_used += get_total_blob_gas(tx)  
  
        # ensure the total blob gas spent is at most equal to the limit  
        assert blob_gas_used <= MAX_BLOB_GAS_PER_BLOCK  
  
        # ensure blob_gas_used matches header  
        assert block.header.blob_gas_used == blob_gas_used
```




## Where?


- Application-specific protocols (eg. rollups) can require their nodes to store the portion of history.
- The Ethereum Portal Network (currently under development).
- Block explorers, API providers and other data services.
- Individual hobbyists, and academics.
- Third-party indexing protocols, eg. TheGraph.
- Other applications, eg. BitTorrent.

# **Optimistic Rollup Fraud Proof Verification**


## Non-interactive



## Interactive



# ZK Validity Proof



# Gas Accounting



```
def calc_blob_fee(header: Header, tx: Transaction) -> int:  
    return get_total_blob_gas(tx) * get_base_fee_per_blob_gas(header)  
  
def get_total_blob_gas(tx: Transaction) -> int:  
    return GAS_PER_BLOB * len(tx.blob_versioned_hashes)  
  
def get_base_fee_per_blob_gas(header: Header) -> int:  
    return fake_exponential(  
        MIN_BASE_FEE_PER_BLOB_GAS,  
        header.excess_blob_gas,  
        BLOB_BASE_FEE_UPDATE_FRACTION  
    )
```

- GAS\_PER\_BLOB =  $2^{17}$
- MIN\_BASE\_FEE\_PER\_BLOB\_GAS = 1
- BLOB\_BASE\_FEE\_UPDATE\_FRACTION = 3338477

Approximates  $\text{factor} * e^{(\text{numerator} / \text{denominator})}$  using Taylor Expansion



```
def fake_exponential(factor: int, numerator: int, denominator: int) -> int:
    i = 1
    output = 0
    numerator_accum = factor * denominator
    while numerator_accum > 0:
        output += numerator_accum
        numerator_accum = (numerator_accum * numerator) // (denominator * i)
        i += 1
    return output // denominator
```

# **EIP-4844 Economics and Rollup Strategies**

# When should a rollup use the calldata or blob ?

**cost = base cost + delay cost**

	<b>blob</b>	<b>calldata</b>
delay cost	$aD$	$aD$
base cost	$P_0G + B$	$(P_0 + P_1n)G$

- a : delay cost per unit time
- D : unit time of delays
  - $D = R * T$
  - R : Transaction arrival rate
  - T : delay Block time
- G : L1 gas price
- P0 : base gas used
- B : Market-clearing price
- P1 : gas used per transaction
- n : number of transactions

# cost of blob

Suppose a rollup with rate  $R$  and post a blob every time  $t$   
Then, a blob contains  $Rt$  transactions

total cost  $T_B(t) = P_0G + B + \int_0^t aR(t - \tau)d\tau = P_0G + B + \frac{aRt^2}{2}$

per transaction cost

$$\frac{T_B(t)}{Rt} = \frac{P_0G + B}{Rt} + \frac{at}{2}$$

best time to post blob

$$t = \sqrt{\frac{2(P_0G + B)}{aR}}.$$

best per transaction cost

$$\sqrt{\frac{2(P_0G + B)a}{R}}$$

# cost of calldata

Suppose a rollup with rate  $R$  and post calldata every time  $t$   
Then, calldata contains  $Rt$  transactions

total cost  $T_E(t) = (P_0 + RtP_1)G + B + \int_0^t aR(t - \tau)d\tau = (P_0 + RtP_1)G + B$

per transaction calldata

$$Tr_E(t) := \frac{P_0G}{Rt} + P_1G + \frac{at}{2}$$

best time to post calldata

$$t = \sqrt{\frac{2P_0G}{aR}}$$

best per transaction cost

$$\sqrt{\frac{2P_0Ga}{R}} + P_1G$$


# Compare

set costs per transaction in both cases equal :

$$\sqrt{\frac{2(P_0G + B)a}{R}} = P_1G + \sqrt{\frac{2P_0Ga}{R}}$$

we get solution of B :

$$B = \frac{RP_1^2G^2}{2a} + 2P_1G\sqrt{\frac{RP_0G}{2a}}.$$



- **B > RHS :**  
**use calldata**

- **B < RHS :**  
**use blob**

# Equilibrium price B

Now, consider there are  $n$  rollup each rollup  $i$  has rate  $R_i$   
For simplicity, we suppose that  $P_0=0$   
To hit the target of  $k$  blobs per time unit

$$k = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{1}{t_i} = \sum_{i=0}^n \frac{\sqrt{aR_i}}{\sqrt{2B}}.$$

Solving  $B$  gives:

$$B = \frac{a(\sum_{i=1}^n \sqrt{R_i})^2}{2k^2}.$$

# Joining chains

Suppose two rollups join forces in posting blobs. There are three different type of profiles of these rollups in the equilibrium derived above.

1. Both two rollup use blob
2. One of rollup use blob, the other one use calldata
3. Both two rollup use calldata

# Both two rollup use blob

**Result :**

**Equilibrium price of blob will be reduced, up to half**

$$B = \frac{a(\sqrt{R_i} + \sqrt{R_j} + \dots)^2}{2k^2}$$

$$B_{joint} = \frac{a(\sqrt{R_i + R_j} + \dots)^2}{2k^2}$$

$$B > B_{joint} \geq B/2$$

# One of rollup use blob, the other one use calldata

**Result :**

**Equilibrium price of blob will be rised, up to 2 times**

$$B = \frac{a(\sqrt{R_i} + \dots)^2}{2k^2}$$

$$B_{joint} = \frac{a(\sqrt{R_i + R_j} + \dots)^2}{2k^2}$$

$$2B \geq B_{joint} > B$$

# The Nash Bargaining Solution

In this section, we take an axiomatic approach to the cost-sharing rule between rollups that decide to post blobs together

suppose there are two rollups i and j with transaction rate  $R_i$  and  $R_j$

set  $R_j = f^* R_i \quad 0 < f \leq 1$

$$\underset{B_i}{\operatorname{argmax}} (B_i + \text{cost}_{delay}^i - \text{cost}_i)((B_{joint} - B_i) + \text{cost}_{delay}^j - \text{cost}_j)$$


# observation

$$B_i^{best} \leq B_{joint} \frac{f}{1+f} + B_{joint} \frac{1+\sqrt{f}}{\sqrt{1+f}} \frac{1-\sqrt{f}}{\sqrt{1+f}} = \frac{B_{joint}}{1+f} \leq B_{joint}$$

- Larger rollups need to pay Blob fees that are less than their transaction ratio
- Large rollups pay more than half the blob fee


# **The impact before vs after EIP-4844**

# L1 Data Fee Reduction



Most of the rollups reduce their L1 data fee after the Cancun upgrade (March 13th, 2024).

# Something Special



Scroll scheduled the blob upgrade for April 29th, 2024.

# Optimism Income Statement Analysis

Financial statement	Apr 2024 Apr 1- Apr 30	Mar 2024 Mar 1- Mar 31	Feb 2024 Feb 1- Feb 29
Income statement			
Fees	\$3.96m	\$9.11m	\$5.85m
(Supply-side fees)	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Revenue	\$3.96m	\$9.11m	\$5.85m
(Expenses)	\$951.40k	\$132.47m	\$42.73m
(Cost of revenue)	\$138.71k	\$5.64m	\$5.70m
(Token incentives)	\$812.69k	\$126.83m	\$37.03m
Gross profit	\$3.82m	\$3.47m	\$147.90k
Earnings	\$3.01m	\$ -123.35m	\$ -36.88m

# New Business Model

- Rollup as a Service (RaaS)
  - SDK
  - No-code Rollup application deployment
- L2 Token investment
- Blobspace investment

# Thanks!

Q & A