

$\text{prev-pt} \oplus \text{block} \rightarrow \text{ct_block}$
 $\downarrow \text{AES-ECB key} \downarrow$
 ct_block

$\text{ct_block} = \text{ct_block} \oplus \text{prev-pt}$

$\text{ct} \neq \text{ct_block}$


$\text{prev-pt} = \text{block}$

$\text{prev-pt} = \text{ct_block}$

$a \rightarrow \text{输入}$
 λ

$b. \text{dec-ctb}$

$a = b$




IV

IV

give me flag

mac



msg forge

$b_1 \oplus m_1$
 $b_2 \oplus m_2$
 $b_3 \oplus m_3$


publock

enc-msg

$\text{msg} \rightarrow \text{dec}$

... a message

$IV \oplus$



prev_pt = pt_block.

prev_ct = block

give -


use given-flag, given-flag.

IV + encrypt message:
mess a LV

or 2

prev_pt = block

prev_ct = ct_block



$[iv] [iv]$


$iv = 0$

$[iv] (merg) [iv]$

$0 \times 4 \times$

flag

$[iv] \cdot 2v^{\wedge} b$



$h_{00} \quad iv \oplus sh = m_0 \oplus sh$

$m_1 \rightarrow mac \quad D^{\wedge}$


$m_0 \quad C_1 \quad C_2 \quad C_3 \quad C_{iv}$

$m \quad iv \quad iv! \quad m_0 \quad m_1 \quad m_{iv} \quad 2v \cdot \oplus$

$C_0 \oplus C_1 \oplus C_2 \oplus C_3 \oplus C_{iv} \quad m_{iv} \quad [iv \oplus C_0] \oplus m_{iv} \quad C_0 \oplus (2v \oplus iv)$

$\oplus \oplus \oplus \oplus$
^ block

$2V$
 IV
 m
 EV
 $\rightarrow 20$
 m^1 byte
 p p p




P $2V$
 c $2V^*$
 m_1
 m_2
 m_3
 $(G \oplus C_2)$
 $D^1 D^1$ byte
 $byte$

b^1 48^1
 48^1 $48^1 (63-63p)$

63
 16
 63

47 47
 $(63-15)$
 $19 (63-63p) \times m$


tsb_encrypt:



return $iv + C_0 + \dots + C_n + C_{2v}$.

tsb_decrypt:

$iv = msg[:16]$ $msg = msg[16:]$.



then check $IV == m_n$ $pt = m_0 + \dots + m_{n-1}$

return unpad(pt) ← here is the

problem with the crypto system.

we can change the last byte of IV, C_0, \dots, C_n , to

keep $IV == m_n$, the same time, the last byte of
pt changes. so $\text{len}(\text{unpad}(pt)) = 1$, and

makes $a == b$ much easier by brute force first
byte of IV (remember to change every block first
byte to make $IV =$