pre_pt ⊕ block → ct_block

↓ AES-ECB key

ct_block

ct_block = ct_block ⊕ pre_ct

ct += ct_block

pre_pt = block

pre_ct = ct_block

a → 猜

b. dec_tab

a == b.




IV + ct.




问询

求接到 a

得 b.

再接到 b.

求 a.

IV.

IV







msg forge

$b_1 \oplus m_1$

$b_2 \oplus m_2$ ⇒ publock.

$b_3 \oplus m_3$

enc_msg

msg → the ... a message.

IV ⊕


prev_pt = pt_block.
prev_ct = block
give-
use giveme_flag.
giveme_flag.
pre_block =
pre. =
IV + encmessage.
a IV
mess
prev_pt = block
prev_ct = ct_block
givemm_flag
pt
ct
dec.





tsb_encrypt:




tsb_decrypt:



then check $IV == m_n$ $pt = m_0 + \dots + m_{n-1}$

return unpad(pt) ← here is the problem with the crypto system.

we can change the last byte of $IV, C_0, \dots, C_n$, to keep $IV == m_n$, the same time, the last byte of pt changes. so len(unpad(pt)) = 1. and makes $a == b$ much easier by bruteforce first byte of IV (remember to change every block first byte to make IV =