

OCA FILE

HPSCT

Rep Shuster

OCA 3599-88



27 Oct 88

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Congressional Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20505
Telephone [redacted]

TO: Mr. Tom Smeeton
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Tom,

This is an unclassified copy of the book
review for Mr. Shuster.

[redacted]
House Affairs,
Office of Congressional Affairs

FORM 1533 OBSOLETE
2-86 PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(40)

Dist.

Orig - Addressee

1 - RR Chrono

1 - OCA Record

Red Horizons. By Lieutenant General Ion Mihai Pacepa. Regnery Gateway, Washington; 1987; 446 pp.

Prior to his defection to the US via West Germany in 1978, Lieutenant General Ion Pacepa had been chief of Romania's Department of Foreign Information (DIE in Romanian). This sensitive position gave Pacepa frequent contact with Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu and members of Ceausescu's immediate family and provided the basis for the book's numerous vignettes.

Pacepa's purpose in writing this book becomes clear within the first eight pages. The author claims that on 22 February 1972 Ceausescu launched "his most highly classified secret, codenamed - Horizon, operation that was intended to gain Western political support, money and technology." Pacepa was and apparently remains frustrated with the "incomprehensible Western mentality which fails to understand the nature and purpose of such devious Communist influence operations." This reviewer was surprised by Pacepa's citation of a February 1972 starting date for "Horizon" because in fact Ceausescu began playing upon the sympathy of the West shortly after coming to power in April 1965 and increased his appeals to the West in the wake of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Moreover, Pacepa's perception of the "incomprehensible Western mentality" regarding "Communist influence operations" seriously underestimates what CIA and most other Western intelligence and diplomatic analysis consistently understood about Ceausescu's predominantly self-serving mixed bag of tactics and aims, including his blatant interest in the acquisition of high technology. In short, the record will show that neither CIA analysts nor US policymakers were "taken in" by Ceausescu. The canard of Romania being a Soviet Trojan horse was as much canard in Brezhnev's time as in Gorbachev's.

Pacepa supplies much detail on the Ceausescu "royal family." He expounds on the often gross excesses of Ceausescu himself and Ceausescu's wife Elena or the problems posed by the Ceausescu offspring: Valentin, who apparently is disowned; Zoia, the daughter whose lovers Elena disparages; and Nicu, the younger son and a bonafide spoiled brat and sybarite. The reader must be prepared for feverish and tasteless descriptions rivaling those printed in the *National Enquirer*. Thus, we learn that Ceausescu often said that "oil, Jews and Germans are Romania's most important export commodities." We learn that Ceausescu has a mercurial temper, and his hero is Napoleon. In addition, Ceausescu likes American police thrillers, especially "Kojak", because "they shoot first and ask questions later." Pacepa resorts to pejoratives in describing Elena as yellow-toothed, slovenly, extremely quick tempered, very jealous and obsessed with pornographic films, particularly those taken clandestinely of wives of leadership members.

The general sets forth plausible details on Ceausescu's role in arranging the kidnapping by Yugoslav authorities on Romanian soil in August 1975 of Vlado Dapcevic, who was a prominent Yugoslav emigre opponent of President Tito. In addition, Pacepa describes Ceausescu's duplicitous role in luring the Hungarian Imre Nagy onto Romanian territory and later turning him over to the Soviets for eventual execution. According to Pacepa, Romanian party leader Gheorghiu-Dej had accepted Khrushchev's confidential demand to lure

Nagy out of the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest and secretly keep Nagy under arrest in Romania until a new Hungarian government was formed. Gheorghiu-Dej placed Ceausescu in charge of this operation. At that time (1956) the Moscow-trained Ceausescu was the youngest member of the Romanian party's Politburo.

Pacepa's official duties gave him a comprehensive overview of intelligence operations, both at home and abroad, and how these activities meshed with those of other members of the Warsaw Pact as well as with Yugoslavia. In this context, Pacepa's defection to the US provided the CIA and presumably allied intelligence services with an extraordinarily detailed understanding of Pact and Romanian tradecraft and operations.

Notwithstanding the above, a general's remembrances do not necessarily translate into a well done book. This reader would advise against accepting many of Pacepa's statements at face value, including his references to Romanian "agents" in certain old-line departments of the US Government. Moreover, the reader must endure a text that is repetitive and disorganized. Indeed, if trees could weep, they would have cause—for being made into paper for this book. With this caveat in mind, I would recommend Red Horizons only to those intelligence analysts and case officers who already have a reasonable understanding of the Ceausescu ruling style. For such officers, the book provides a good "feel" for the pervasive corruption and siege mentality which have become endemic within Romanian officialdom in what appears to be the closing chapter of the Ceausescu era.

FRANCIS E. STURWOLD