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Dissociative Identity: An Objection to Baker's Constitution Theory

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Abstract One of the central problems of personal identity is to determine what we are *essentially*. In response to this problem, Lynne Rudder Baker espouses a psychological criterion, that is, she claims that persons are essentially psychological. Baker's theory purports to bypass the problems of other psychological theories such as Dissociative Identity Disorder and the problem of individuating persons synchronically. I argue that the theory's treatment of Dissociative Identity Disorder leads to untenable results, is invalid, and consequently fails to individuate persons.

Keywords Lynne rudder baker · Personal identity · Dissociative identity disorder · Material constitution

1 Introduction

The problem of personal identity is commonly split into two main questions, (1) what makes a person now, identical with something at a different time? (diachronic identity), and (2) what am I *essentially*? In this paper, I examine Lynne Rudder Baker's constitution theory of human persons, as it answers the second question.[1] Her view holds that we are essentially persons, defined as things that have a capacity for a first-person perspective essentially, but we are still material beings of flesh and blood. She argues for this thesis by explicating how human bodies *constitute* persons. Baker intends her theory to "show what is special about human persons

[1]While the constitution view primarily addresses the second question, it has immediate bearing on the first as well. Baker holds that personal identity over time is sameness of first-person perspective over time. See Chap. 5 of Baker (2000).

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without supposing that they are anything but material beings" (2000, 213). Thus, she proposes a materialist theory (roughly, for any concrete entity x, x is either a fundamental material particle or is ultimately constituted by an aggregate of fundamental material particles), while maintaining that we are essentially persons, which will avoid the problems associated with other psychological theories (theories holding that we have mental properties essentially, as opposed to bodily or biological properties essentially).

Among the problems traditionally associated with psychological theories of personal identity is Dissociative Identity Disorder (henceforth, DID), which Baker claims does not pose a problem for her theory. DID occurs when multiple personalities exist in one human body, which raises several theoretical questions for theories of personal identity. The most pressing theoretical question DID poses to theories of personal identity is: Can multiple persons exist in one human body?[2] Psychological theories must either explain why it is impossible for multiple persons to exist in one body (*pace* the compelling examples of DID) or explain how it is possible for multiple persons to exist in one body. There are problems associated with each choice. If a theory holds the latter, it could be the case that, as Eric Olson argues, the theory is incompatible with materialism: it seems that materialists must concede that if persons differ mentally, they must differ in some physical respect to account for this mental difference (2003, 336); however, in cases of DID, it seems that the persons do not differ physically since they share one body.[3] If a theory holds the former, it must explain *inter alia* how the seemingly different personalities in cases of DID belong to the same person, or more importantly (because DID provides an example for the theoretical question of whether multiple people can exist in one body), why it is *impossible* for multiple persons to exist in one human body.

[2] This thought—that it is *prima facie* possible for multiple persons to exist in one human body (according to psychological theories of personal identity)—is a preponderant view among philosophers (e.g., Baker 2000; and Nicholas Humphrey and Daniel Dennett 1989). (I say "*prima facie* possible" because many philosophers, including Baker, argue that multiple persons existing in one human body is impossible according to their psychological theory of personal identity.) Throughout the paper, I assume this *prima facie* possibility and that DID supports it. However, I should note that this assumption is controversial. For example, Jeanette Kennett and Steve Matthews argue that modern cases of DID (one of the main reasons for believing this *prima facie* possibility) can be explained by appealing to different disorders rather than explaining DID by way of multiple persons and that the burden of proof should be on those who support the "multiple persons existing in one body" thesis (2003).

[3] I do not mean to suggest that Olson is correct; I mention his argument simply to support my claim that, *if* psychological theories of personal identity—including Baker's theory—hold that more than one person can exist in one human body, then the theories must overcome challenging arguments. I should mention, however, that, as of now, neurological studies do not seem to provide strong evidence against Olson's argument. To asses Olson's argument, it seems that we would need to determine whether significant neurological differences correlate with different personality states. That is, if the psychological personal identity theorist holds that the different personalities in DID are different persons, we would expect significant neurological changes among the different personalities. Some studies find, for example, that SPECT imaging of the brain shows no significant changes in regional cerebral blood flow between different personalities of DID patients (Vedat Sar et al. 2001). Others find significant differences, e.g., differences in EEG (Annedore Hopper et al. 2002; and A. R., Lapointe et al. 2006), between personalities. To my knowledge, there is no conclusive evidence to support the hypothesis that multiple persons can supervene on changes in the same brain (corresponding with different personalities) since *inter alia* it is unclear *how significant* a neurological difference must be (and what kind of difference must take place) to support the hypothesis. It seems that Olson's argument poses at least a *prima facie* challenge.

DID, however, is easily explained by non-psychological accounts of personal identity, e.g., Olson's animalism and David Mackie's bodily criterion.[4] The non-psychological accounts claim that—even though DID may be evidence of two different psychologies present in one body or human animal—we are *essentially* human animals or human bodies, so in cases of DID, only one person is present, and more importantly, it is necessary that only one person can exist in one body or human animal. Consequently, one[5] problem of individuation (what distinguishes human persons at time *t*) is solved: human persons are individuated by spatially distinct human animals or spatially distinct human bodies. Thus, the non-psychological accounts claim to be superior to psychological accounts of personal identity because they can easily explain DID and how human persons are individuated at *t*. However, Baker claims that her psychological account of personal identity fairs equally well as the bodily accounts: she holds that it is impossible for two persons to exist in one human body and therefore human persons are individuated by spatially distinct human bodies.

I argue that DID is a problem for Baker's theory, like all psychological theories. On one possible reading of her treatment of DID, the account has untenable consequences and is inconsistent with her theory. On the other possible reading of her treatment of DID, the account is implausible. Moreover, her argument that it is impossible—according to her theory—for multiple persons to exist in one human body is invalid. As Baker's theory stands, it cannot rule out the possibility that one numerically the same body could constitute more than one person. Consequently, the possibility of multiple persons in one human body shows that her theory of individuation is false. I conclude that bodily theories of personal identity are superior to Baker's psychological theory in that they adequately explain DID and how human persons are individuated, while Baker's theory does not.

2 Baker's Constitution Theory

Though my critique primarily concerns the constitution relation, I must first briefly explain what a person is according to Baker, in order to show how we are essentially persons, which are constituted by human animals.

Baker's answer is that persons *essentially* have the capacity for a first-person perspective (hereafter, FPP). More precisely, X is a person if and only if necessarily, if X exists, X has the capacity for a FPP. A FPP, we are told, underlies all self-consciousness. "A conscious being becomes self-conscious on acquiring a first-person perspective—a perspective from which one thinks of oneself as an individual facing a world, as a subject distinct from everything else" (Baker 2000, 60). It is not only the capacity to distinguish oneself from everything else (e.g., by using first and third person indexicals), but to think of oneself *as* oneself. That is, experiences expressible by first-person indexicals like "I" must be attributed as thoughts *of*

[4] See Olson (1997) and Mackie (1999). Olson holds that we are essentially human animals, and Mackie holds that we are essentially human bodies.

[5] Baker states that the other problem of individuation is diachronic identity.

oneself, *belonging to* oneself: "I have a pain, and I am aware that I am the bearer of the thought, 'I have a pain.'" The conditions for a capacity for a FPP are as follows:

> An object x has a capacity for a first-person perspective at *t* if and only if x has the relevant structural properties [e.g., certain brain functions] required for a first-person perspective, and either (i) x has manifested a first-person perspective at some time prior to *t* or (ii) x is in an environment at *t* conducive to development and maintenance of a first-person perspective. (Baker 2000, 92)

Defining person using "capacity" allows those in comas, sleeping, not currently thinking in the FPP way,[6] and so on, to count as persons. For Baker then, having a capacity for a FPP is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a person. Following her, I will hereafter use "person" in the place of "a capacity for a FPP." Now that we have a basic understanding of the FPP view, we can examine how persons and human animals are related by constitution.

Baker claims that constitution is a general relation found everywhere: DNA molecules constitute genes, marble can constitute statues, and so on. She also claims that this relation applies to you and me. It shows how persons are related to human organisms, thereby explaining what a human person is, i.e., the human animal body constitutes the person.[7]

Constitution is similar to identity, but in important respects, it is not identity. [By identity, Baker means "strict identity": if $x=y$ they do not differ in any respect, including modal properties, and if $x=y \rightarrow \Box(x=y)$ (2002, 372).][8] Constitution, unlike identity, is a contingent relation. For example, a lump of clay, x, can turn into statue y, by a sculptor. We want to say, "x is identical with y." However, we can destroy the statue by molding it back into a lump of clay without destroying the lump of clay. According to Leibniz's law, the lump is therefore not identical with the statue. The constitution view attempts to account for the fact that two non-identical entities can share so many properties and spatially coincide—i.e., seem identical—without being identical; it purports to show that there is a relation between identity and separateness, namely, constitution. I will begin to explicate what exactly constitution is by explaining what accounts for the fact that constitution is not identity.

Using the example of the statue, we can ask, "why is the statue not identical to the lump of clay?" As implied in the example, they have different persistence conditions; the statue can be destroyed while the lump remains. But what determines an entity's persistence conditions?

According to Baker, an entity's primary-kind, or what it most fundamentally is, determines its persistence conditions. Thus, an individual has its primary-kind property *essentially* because it has the *de re* persistence conditions of its primary-

[6] It is unclear whether Baker thinks that every time we think, we use FPP. Thus, this point may be controversial, but the fact that those sleeping or in a coma do not think using FPP, is not.

[7] Persons are not necessarily human. It just happens that *we* are constituted by human bodies, but persons could be constituted by machinery, other biological organisms, etc. For example, a human person's parts could be slowly replaced with bionic parts; it would remain a person but not a human. However, if x is a human person, x is essentially embodied, i.e., x must be constituted by some material thing. See for example, Baker (2000, 92–93 and 107).

[8] See also, Baker (2000, 31).

kind property (Baker 2000, 40). That is, a thing without its primary-kind property—what it *fundamentally* is—ceases to exist. Every extant individual[9] has only one primary-kind, i.e., a kind to which it essentially belongs. For Baker, our primary-kind is person; if I lose the capacity for a FPP, I cease to exist.

Primary-kinds not only determine persistence conditions of entities, but also the constitution relations of entities. When x, which has one primary-kind, is under certain circumstances,[10] y, a new entity (and therefore new primary-kind), comes into existence. Baker often provides the example of the statue of *David*. A piece of marble, whose primary-kind is "piece of marble," was sculpted into a certain shape by Michelangelo, thereby creating a new thing, with a new primary-kind, "statue." The piece of marble now *constitutes David* whose primary-kind is statue. Likewise, when a human animal develops a FPP, a new entity comes into existence: a person (recall that constitution is a materialist theory, so the person is material).

Furthermore, when *David* or when a person, for example, comes into existence, what constitutes them does not cease to exist—recall that constitution is supposed to account for the resemblance of identity between entities. Instead, the two entities spatially coincide, and each retains its own persistence conditions determined by its primary-kind property.

But constitution is more than just spatial coincidence; the entities "share properties" with each other because constitution is a unity relation. These properties are shared in a very specific way: a property is derivative if it is had solely in virtue of being in a constitution relation; a property is nonderivative if it is had regardless of its constitution relation.[11] According to Baker, I am essentially a person; I therefore have my capacity for a FPP regardless of what I am constituted by, i.e., nonderivatively. However, I can still truly utter the sentence, "*I* have brown eyes." Though I am essentially a person, "having brown eyes" is a property of my body, which makes it a derivative property of mine. That is, person is my primary-kind, human animal is my body's primary-kind, therefore, I am a person nonderivatively and a human animal derivatively, and the reverse is true of my body. Although there are two primary-kind properties in this case, one thing has exactly one primary-kind. Something can have two properties that *are* primary-kind properties, but only one *as its* primary-kind property. This makes it the case that my body and I are both persons and that my body and I are both human animals. Does this mean that there are two spatially coincident persons and two spatially coincident bodies where I stand?

Baker tells us that because constitution is a unity relation, having a property essentially and having a property derivatively are *ways* of having the *same* property—i.e., there are not two separate exemplifications of the property. To say that your body is a person is only to say that "you are a person (nonderivatively) and your body constitutes you" (Baker 2002, 374–75). While x constitutes y, it is as if they are identical. That is to say, x *really* has the properties of y at *t*, even if they are only had derivatively.

[9] Constitution is a relation between individual entities, not properties. See Baker (2000, 33–34).

[10] For example, the statue of *David* needs *inter alia* an art world to come into existence. Likewise, for a human animal to constitute a person, conditions conducive to the development and maintenance of a FPP—circumstances such as normal brain development—are necessary.

[11] For a more detailed account of derivate and nonderivative properties, see Chap. 2 of Baker (2000).

Because of this intimate relationship of constitution, persons also have a first-person relation to their bodies. This means that Smith, for example, "thinks of a biological body in the first-person way if he conceives of its properties as his own"—he can truly use first-person pronouns when referring to his body because he is constituted by it (Baker 2000, 93–4). Having a first-person relation with a body is what distinguishes the body (from all others) as *his* body.

We now have an account of Baker's constitution theory and can see how it allows her to have a materialist explanation of human persons, while claiming that we are essentially persons (psychological entities). In the next section, I will explain Dissociative Identity Disorder in order to show in subsequent sections why it poses problems for Baker's theory.

3 Dissociative Identity Disorder

DID occurs when two or more distinct personalities exist within an individual human body. The most recent diagnostic manual uses the following criteria to diagnose DID:

> A. The presence of two or more distinct identities or personality states (each with its own relatively enduring pattern of perceiving, relating to, and thinking about the environment and self).B. At least two of these identities or personality states recurrently take control of the person's behavior.C. Inability to recall important personal information that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary forgetfulness… (American Psychiatric Association 2000)

How DID is caused and whether it is diagnosed correctly is not pertinent to the purposes of this paper. What I rely on is that it seems likely that cases of DID do in fact occur, and therefore the theoretical implications of DID ought to be discussed and explained by theories of personal identity, as Baker and others[12] attempt to do. Even the *possibility* that multiple persons can exist in one body should be addressed by a theory of personal identity.

4 Dissociative Identity and Constitution

Baker claims that cases of DID—cases that pose problems for other psychological theories of personal identity—are not a problem for her theory. "If it were possible for a single body to constitute two persons at once, there would be two first-person perspectives on a single body" (Baker 2000, 108)[13]; Baker claims that this is impossible. Part of a FPP for a human person is having a first-person relation with one's body, which means, in part, that the body behaviorally expresses the person's intentional states. Baker claims that "[i]f S_1 and S_2 are two human persons, then it

[12] For example, Eric Olson (2003) and Kathleen Wilkes (1981).

[13] Baker's analysis of diachronic identity relies heavily upon this fact, that is, the fact that persons are defined in terms of having *a* FPP essentially. Baker claims that "person P_1 at t_1 is the same person as person P_2 at t_2 if and only if P_1 and P_2 have the same first-person perspective" (2000, 132).

must be physically possible that S_1 is making an enormous physical effort at a certain time and S_2 is totally relaxed at that time" (2000, 108; emphasis added). Baker states further that "it is not physically possible for a single body to express both enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time" (2000, 108). Thus, one body cannot constitute more than one person at one time.

She further claims that her handling of DID solves one problem of individuation: how there can be *two* separate things of the same kind existing at the same time. Her answer is simple: since only one body can constitute one person, human persons are individuated by being constituted by different bodies (I return to individuation in the next section). However, Baker's analysis of DID is either incompatible with the rest of her theory or leads to untenable results; moreover, it is invalid.

The first question we must ask regarding Baker's analysis is what does Baker mean by "physically possible"? Does she mean "capacity" or "physical possibility"? Since both interpretations seem plausible,[14] I will examine each in turn.

First, Baker may mean "capacity," which would make her argument read as follows:

(1) If X is a human person (has the capacity for a FPP essentially and is constituted by a human body), then X's body has the capacity of expressing X's intentional states at any time.
(2) It is not the case that a single human body is capable of expressing enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time.
(3) Therefore, two human persons cannot share one human body.

If this is Baker's argument, then her analysis of DID has the untenable result that the completely paralyzed[15] are not human persons (i.e., their bodies are incapable of expressing their intentional states at a certain time; hence, they do not have the capacity for a FPP). First note that the clause "at any time" is needed in premise (1) to make the argument valid. Baker claims "[i]f S_1 and S_2 are two human persons, then it must be physically possible that S_1 is making an enormous physical effort at a certain time and S_2 is totally relaxed *at that time*" (2000, 108; emphasis added), which must mean—to make the argument valid—that *at any time*, a person's body must be capable of expressing its intentional states. That is, if a human person's body lacks the capacity to express its intentional states at a time, then it could be the case that two FPPs share one body and premise (2) is true (e.g., one body never expresses the intentional states of multiple FPPs at the same time). However, this means that since the bodies of those who are completely paralyzed, for example, are incapable of expressing their intentional states, they would therefore not qualify as persons. This result is obviously wrongheaded for a theory of personal identity to hold, so I do not feel the need to provide the implications of such a theory. What Baker fails to realize in her DID argument is that it *is* a fact that a person's body is

[14] Although Baker explicitly uses "physically possible," I will also examine "capacity" for a more charitable interpretation since many of her claims lead me to believe that she means "capacity." For example, she defines a human person as "*having the capacity* for a FPP essentially."

[15] It may also have the result that those in a coma, sleeping, among others, are not human persons. However, it is a stronger claim that, e.g., the bodies of those in a coma are *incapable* of expressing their intentional states. I will not argue for this stronger claim since holding that the completely paralyzed are not human persons is enough to show that Baker's analysis has untenable results.

incapable of behaviorally expressing its intentional states at a certain time (e.g., the completely paralyzed). Thus, it could be the case that, for example, multiple personalities X and Y are conscious FPPs at time *t*, but the body cannot behaviorally express X's intentional states at *t* (i.e., the body could be in a paralyzed state for X). Alternatively, it could be the case that while X is conscious, Y is unconscious (and vice versa), and therefore the body cannot express the intentional states of both X and Y at the same time. Thus, it is not the case that two human person's bodies must have the capacity to behaviorally express their intentional states at any given time. It seems that either a person *can* exist at a time where the person's body is incapable of behaviorally expressing its intentional states (e.g., the completely paralyzed), or persons do not have FPPs essentially.

Before moving on, however, I should address David Lewis's famous point about the context-relativity of "capacity" as a possible objection to my argument. Lewis claims, "To say that something can happen means that its happening is compossible with certain facts. *Which* facts? That is determined, but sometimes not determined well enough, by context" (1986, 77). Is there any context—leading to a different sense of the term "capable"—that would make a completely paralyzed body capable of expressing intentional states? Perhaps. It might be claimed that the completely paralyzed body has the "capacity" to express intentional states if we only consider the following facts: the body has a nervous system, musculature system, and so on, whereas, e.g., a rock does not.[16] However, this sense of "capacity" renders Baker's claim[17] that a human body is incapable of expressing both enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time dubious. If we take "capacity" to mean simply "compossible with the facts that a human body has a nervous system, musculature system, and so on," then there is no reason to think that a human body is incapable —in the sense being considered—of expressing both enormous physical effort and total relaxation (it is compossible with the considered facts). This possible response therefore fails: it refutes Baker's premise (2).

Next, Baker could mean "physical possibility," which would retain the validity of the argument; moreover, these are the terms she explicitly uses. The argument would read as follows:

(1) If X is a human person (i.e., has the capacity for a FPP essentially and is constituted by a human body), then it is physically possible for X's body to express X's intentional states at any time.
(2) It is physically impossible for a single human body to express both enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time.
(3) Therefore, two human persons cannot share one human body.

"Physical possibility" is usually taken to mean, "permitted by the laws of physics." But premise (2) does not follow from physical laws; the premise seems to follow only from the principle of noncontradiction—*if* physical effort and relaxation

[16] The context I consider is "narrow" in that it only considers a few facts. In many of Lewis's examples, the more facts we consider, the less capable something becomes. This is the case with the completely paralyzed; if we add, e.g., the fact that the completely paralyzed do not express intentional states, this would seem to make the completely paralyzed incapable of expressing intentional states. Thus, I believe that using a "narrow" context strengthens my argument.

[17] According to the "capacity" interpretation of "physically possible."

are contradictory intentional states—and the fact that we have never seen a human body express enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time. However, we cannot conclude that since we have not seen a human body express enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time, then it is *impossible* for a body to do so.[18] Furthermore, even though it seems unlikely that one body could express enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time because of the principle of noncontradiction (*if* they are contradictory intentional states), it is clearly *not impossible*. For example, we can imagine a human person in which one-half of the person's face and body express enormous physical effort (e.g., the face is grimacing and the muscles are flexed), while the other half of the face and body express total relaxation (e.g., the eyes are closed and the muscles are relaxed), which does not run counter to the principle of noncontradition. Indeed, there are actual cases of, e.g., stroke victims with partial paralysis on one side of the body, which demonstrates how this might look: the numerically same body can express enormous physical effort on one side of the body while the other side is totally relaxed (paralyzed).[19]

Thus, there is no reason to think that it is physically impossible that a human body express enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time: there are no physical laws disallowing a human body from expressing enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time, in fact, it is easy to envisage, as shown by the above example.[20]

However, Baker may respond that I have unfairly interpreted premise (2) of her argument: when she says "single body," she means "single *complete* body."[21] If this is Baker's meaning, then for the argument to remain valid, premise (1) must mean that it is physically possible for X's *entire body* to express X's intentional states at any time. This seems odd at the very least. It seems physically impossible for X's *entire body* to express some of X's intentional states. For instance, intentional states such as "intending to complete this paper" and so on seem impossible for an *entire body* to express. For example, how would the lower half of a human body express intentional states such as planning or writing? Thus, it seems that we have good

[18] It is not often thought that true statements entail possible statements. Thus, even if it is true that a human body cannot express contrary intentional states at the same time, it does not follow that it is impossible.

[19] A disanalogy could be that the partially paralyzed side of the body may perspire, which *may* indicate physical effort; however, we can assume that the effort has just begun so perspiration has not begun. Another disanalogy is that being paralyzed is not identical with total relaxation [however, since a body's intentional states must be sensed to be known, and since a totally relaxed body (e.g., sleeping) may look, feel, etc., the same as a totally paralyzed body, it is unclear whether we could always tell the difference]. My point is simply to provide a close example to demonstrate a general point: different parts of the numerically same body can, and do, express different intentional states (including the extremely different, perhaps contradictory, intentional states that Baker envisages). This general point shows that it is possible for the numerically same body to express both enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time.

[20] It may be physically impossible for a part of the body, e.g., an eye, to express contradictory intentional states at the same time; however, this does not show that an entire human body cannot express contradictory intentional states at the same time: different parts of the body can express contradictory intentional states at one time.

[21] An anonymous referee suggested this possible reply to me.

reasons to doubt premise (2), but the reasons I have given to doubt the premise and the possible response are certainly not beyond reproach.[22]

Moreover, aside from my concerns with premise (2), Baker's argument is invalid: even if we grant that both of her premises are true, her conclusion that two human persons cannot share one human body does not necessarily follow. For example, imagine that X and Y are two human persons in one human body. Next, assume that Baker's premises (1) and (2) are true. We can still explain how X and Y are two human persons existing in one human body in accordance with her theory. Consider the following. It could be the case that while X is "out" (while X is conscious and the body expresses X's intentional states), Y is either unconscious or an "onlooker" (i.e., Y has phenomenological access to X's thoughts and actions) in a paralyzed state. Indeed, many cases of DID are described in this manner.[23] We might even suppose that while X is "out," the body is incapable of expressing Y's intentional states and vice versa. However, it is physically possible for the body to express both X and Y's intentional states *at any time*. There are at least three possibilities. First, if X is not intending (e.g., unconscious) at time *t*, then it is possible for the body to express Y's intentions at *t* and vice versa. Second, if X's intention is *compossible* with Y's intention at *t* (they are not contradictory), it may be physically possible for their body to express both of their intentions at *t*. Finally, X and Y could have the *same* intention at *t*, and it is therefore physically possible for their body to express both of their intentions at the same time.[24] Thus, if X has intention *i* at *t*, then Y *must* have *i* or an intention compossible with *i* at *t if* Y has an intention at *t* so that it is physically possible for their body to expresses both of their intentional states at the same time. Whenever the body is expressing X's intentional state, for example, it *is physically possible* for Y to express his or her intentional state [and must be possible according to Baker's premise (1)]. However, Y *must* express the *same* intentional state as X or a *compossible* intentional state because we are assuming that Baker's premise (2) is true: if it is physically impossible for a body to express contrary intentional states (e.g., physical effort and relaxation) at the same time, then this physical impossibility must constrain X's and Y's intentional states. To use Baker's example: if the body is expressing X's intention of physical effort, then it is impossible for Y to relax completely.

Baker may respond that it *is* possible for human persons to have intentions that are physically impossible for their bodies to express (or at least the intentions of physical effort and relaxation at *t*). However, Baker cannot espouse this response without abandoning her argument. Consider Baker's premise (2): it is *physically impossible* for a human body to express both enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time. Can Baker's persons intend this physical impossibility (make a great effort and totally relax at *t*)? If the premises of her argument are true,

[22] That is, I argue that we have good reasons to doubt premise (2), but the possible response to my argument *could* be defended even though I have given reasons to doubt it. Since Baker says little about intentions, it is open to her to argue that, e.g., writing a paper and planning to complete it, are *not* intentions, or that it *is* possible for an *entire* body to express these intentions (although I cannot imagine how the latter argument would go).

[23] For example, see Wilkes (1981).

[24] I am indebted to anonymous referee for this point.

they cannot. The premises of Baker's argument form an inconsistent triad with this possible response:

(1) If X is a human person (i.e., has the capacity for a FPP essentially and is constituted by a human body), then it is physically possible for X's body to express X's intentional states at any time.
(2) It is physically impossible for a single human body to express both enormous physical effort and total relaxation at the same time. (It is physically impossible for a single human body to express certain intentional states and certain combinations of intentional states at certain times.)[25]
(3) It is possible that X is a human person and has the following intentional states at *t*: make an effort and totally relax. (X is a human person and has intentional states that are physically impossible for X's body to express.)[26]

We can see that not all three propositions can be true. Either Baker's argument must be abandoned [reject either premise (1) or (2)] or she cannot use the above response to my claim that her argument is invalid [reject (3)]. Thus, Baker cannot use the above response without *de facto* rejecting her argument.

We have seen that Baker's premise (2) seems doubtful; moreover, her argument is invalid. However, I should also note that premise (1) is implausible when we consider Baker's theory as a whole. If we assume that premise (2) is correct for the sake of argument, we can still imagine the following account of DID: it is possible that, at certain times, it is physically impossible for a human person's body to express the person's intentional states. In other words, the human persons can still have the capacity for a FPP even if, at certain times, it is impossible for their bodies to express their intentional states. For instance, it could be the case that two FPPs, X and Y, are constituted by human body Z, and Z can only express the intentional states of X or Y at time *t* and never X *and* Y at *t*. Is this counterclaim to premise (1) plausible?

Consider Baker's claim that those who are totally paralyzed still have a first-person relation to their bodies "if they can entertain the thought 'I wonder if I'll ever be able to move my legs again,'" or if they can have thoughts about how "photogenic" they are, or make any first-person reference to their body as *their* body (Baker 2000, 94). These criteria illustrate several things. First, it shows that Baker cannot mean "capacity" in her DID argument without being inconsistent: the argument would be inconsistent with her claim that the totally paralyzed can have a first-person relation to their bodies. Second, it shows that, at certain times, persons must *only* have the capacity to entertain certain thoughts (in order to have a first-person relation with their body). This greatly weakens the case for premise (1): Why think that it must be physically possible that a person's body express his or her intentional states at any time, if the constitution relation only requires the capacity to entertain certain thoughts? Since premises (1) and (2) seem doubtful, and given that

[25] I have added the parenthetical remarks in order to generalize Baker's premise (2). I do this to show that regardless of whether we use Baker's formulation of premise (2) or generalize premise (2), an inconsistent triad is formed.
[26] Note that the parenthetical generalized version of (3) is inconsistent with (1) ([2] is unnecessary).

the argument is invalid, I conclude that it *is* possible that one body can constitute multiple persons according to Baker's theory.

Thus, Baker's theory must face the questions posed by DID anew. If her theory holds that one body can constitute multiple persons, she must explain how this is possible and attempt to avoid the problems associated with this view (e.g., Olson's argument). Alternatively, if the theory maintains that only one human body can constitute one human person, we are owed an argument for why this is so (because I have shown that her argument against the possibility of multiple persons existing in one body fails).

5 Implications of Dissociative Identity Disorder for Constitution

Now that we see that Baker's theory does not successfully rule out the possibility that one body can constitute multiple persons at one time, we can proceed to explicate how this affects the theory.

As a consequence of my arguments, Baker's theory of individuation, which distinguishes human persons by counting human bodies with FPPs, fails. Because Baker fails to rule out the possibility that one body can constitute multiple persons, she cannot use her theory of individuation. That is, it is not *necessary* that one human body can constitute only one person. Consider persons X and Y. At time *t*, body Z constitutes both X and Y. X is a person who has a first-person relation to human body Z, and so does Y; therefore, X and Y are both human persons. As I have shown, Baker's theory holds that both X and Y are human persons, but her theory of individuation will only count one human person in this case, which is clearly wrong; X and Y are *both* human persons. Her theory of individuation therefore fails to individuate all possible human persons.

Thus, Baker's psychological theory must face the difficult questions posed by DID and develop a plausible theory of individuation to accompany this analysis. As Baker's theory stands, non-psychological theories of personal identity are superior in that they easily explain DID and how persons are individuated at a given time, while Baker's theory does not.

6 Concluding Remarks

I have shown that using the constitution relation to explain DID is either implausible, conflicts with Baker's theory, or leads to absurd results. Moreover, I have shown that her argument for the impossibility of multiple FPPs on one human body is invalid. Consequently, it seems that Baker's theory of individuation is false, i.e., it fails to individuate all possible human persons. All psychological theories of personal identity face the challenge of explaining DID. The constitution view provides a remarkable attempt at this, but as I argued, it fails at several stages. However, I do not claim that this task is impossible; perhaps Baker or friends of the constitution theory (or another psychological theory) will find a way around the problems posed by DID, but more work must done to find an acceptable psychological theory of personal identity that provides an adequate analysis of DID. Theories of personal

identity are constantly challenged by new technology, new scientific findings, and by the arguments of philosophers; to remain viable, the theories must adapt to provide answers to these new challenges. And psychological theories of personal identity have yet to adapt to the challenge of DID, a challenge that non-psychological theories clearly respond to.

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