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DIRECT INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS: TYPOLOGY

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Freud's general formulation of dream genesis, upon which he appears to hinge his theory of dreams, is his assertion that a dream is the product of the "disguised fulfillment of a suppressed or repressed wish" (1900, p. 160). This formulation is the cornerstone of his clinical theory. The clinical theory assumes that psychological conflict is at the basis of neurosis, and that psychological conflict is exactly modeled in the dream. That is, the dream is the laboratory of neurosis.

In a general review of Freud's theory of dream interpretation, it is useful to distinguish a theory of genesis and a theory of translation. The theory of genesis addresses the source and the motivational foundation of dreams. The theory of translation deals with the mechanics of dream interpretation, much in the same way as grammars and dictionaries provide rules and referents for the translation of languages. In the general literature on Freud's theory, the theory of genesis and the theory of translation are treated as interdependent and overlapping. Nevertheless, the theories may be disentangled, just as what is written and the question of why it was written may be distinguished.

The problem with a wish fulfillment theory is that it constrains. In the limits it imposes, the dream is permitted only a self-oriented, affect-laden aim that tends toward discharge. If the imagistic language of dreams is understood as a general language that may express any variety of meaning, Freud's constraint is analogous to a constraint on the writing of English that it should only concern topics that suggest or lead to sensual release.

The contention that a dream, including Freud's dream of Irma's Injection, represents more than the fulfillment of a wish is furthered by investi-

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gation of the dream by an alternative method that approaches the dream as a general-purpose language (van den Daele, 1992b). This alternative approach is called the method of direct interpretation.

Direct interpretation provides an approach to the investigation of dreams that relies on analysis of dream texts without reference to an external metapsychology, such as that embodied in tension reduction. Investigation of dream texts reveals great diversity among dreams. Different dreams are constructed and organized in different ways, and consequently, the same dream image may have a different meaning or significance depending on the dream in which the image is located.

The assertion that dreams are of different types is a central theme of Harry Hunt's recent synthesis of the dream literature. In *The Multiplicity of Dreams*, Hunt (1989) postulates nine types of dreams: (1) memory-based, (2) somatic-medical, (3) complex narrative, (4) problem-solving, (5) nightmares, including posttraumatic and pavor nocturnus, (6) titanic, including self-state dreams, (7) archetypal and culture-pattern, (8) lucid, and (9) telepathic, including prophetic. With the possible exception of telepathic and prophetic dreams, Hunt argues that dreams reflect one of three quasi-independent cognitive functions. These are memory, narrative processes, or imagination. These functions are most closely mirrored in memory-based, complex narrative, and archetypal dreams, respectively. In accord with his scholarly and research orientation, Hunt devotes the preponderance of his discussion to these types of dreams. Since these dreams mirror fundamental cognitive functions, memory-based, complex narrative, and archetypal dreams are first among equals. Other sorts of dreams rest on an admixture of these cognitive functions, and therefore display characteristics identified with Hunt's primary types of dreams.

The author's typology complements the observations and generalizations offered by Hunt, and provides an alternative scheme that permits comparison and contrast of dream types within a common framework. In contrast to Hunt's approach to dreams, the author's point of departure resides in the pragmatic, syntactic, and symbolic coherences internal to the dream. Dreams that display different patterns of internal organization and content are sorted into different groups, and these groups are revised and refined to yield types. The typology arises from the empirical examination and interpretation of specific clinical examples informed by cognitive developmental psychoanalysis (van den Daele, 1989).

The dream types obtained by application of direct interpretation yield two major dimensions by which dreams appear organized. The first dimension is cognitive complexity and the second is pragmatic orientation. These dimensions are discussed below.

COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY OF DREAMS

Dreams differ in complexity. In pioneering research, Foulkes (1982) assessed the cognitive development of children and collected dreams from these children during REM and non-REM sleep. Foulkes discerned a regular relation between cognitive development and dream characteristics. In brief, Foulkes described the dreams of the two- to five-year-old preoperational child as composed of "static imagery" primarily responsive to changes of bodily state (p. 285). The five- to seven-year-old dreams contain "kinematic imagery" and simple story lines with action largely directed toward "nonself characters or entities" (p. 286). "In contrast, the dreams of the seven- to nine-year-old concrete operational child display an "edited" quality with a self character capable of independent thinking and feeling. Although the dream self is "not yet at parity with non-self characters" (p. 286), the dream self displays thought and feeling in the dream state. The nine- to thirteen-year-old displays longer dreams with "purely invented" people. Finally, the thirteen- to fifteen-year-old formal operational child displays new possibilities of self-representation such as "double self-representation" and greater abstraction. He operates in his dream productions as if "a zoom lens zeros in on discrete object representations" (p. 287).

As Foulkes' description of developmental change demonstrates, dreams may be ordered for structural complexity in accord with cognitive development. As significant as Foulkes' contribution is to the developmental investigation of dreams, his research is tied to the study of children from ages two through fifteen and is restricted to a dream laboratory sample. Since he has approached dreams primarily from a purely empirical point of view, his description of dream material is largely restricted to its manifest content.

A General Scheme for Classification of Cognitive Complexity

The limitations of Foulkes' sample and the restrictions in dream content associated with dream laboratory research may be compensated by the integration of his results with dreams obtained from clinical samples and dream diaries of normal subjects (van den Daele, 1992b). Dream specimens may be interpreted by direct interpretation to reveal the operation of schema at a deeper level than material obtained through the categorization of manifest content. In Table 1, Foulkes' observations about the developmental characteristics of dreams are integrated with the author's analysis of several hundred dreams from patients and volunteer subjects.

The first level of cognitive complexity is labeled "amodal" to accord with Stern's observations about the earliest foundation of cognitive organi-

TABLE 1. Cognitive Development and Dream Characteristics

Level of Cognitive Development[1]	Dream Attributes
Amodal (Alpha One)	Absence of any imagery. Homeostatic, body-related motives, urges, surgent affects, primary emotions.
Amodal-Transitional (Alpha Two)	Brief static images or part-images, uncoordinated to coherent narrative perspective. No narration. Homeostatic urges, surgent affects, primary emotions.
Early Preoperational (Beta One)	Egocentric proto-narratives that portray usually plausible situations. Paucity of physical movement and social interaction. Few human figures, mostly animal representations. Sparse settings. Organic body-related motives predominate, particularly fatigue and hunger.
Later Preoperational (Beta Two)	Phenomenally-oriented sensory-motor contingencies or direct renditions of simple action-oriented scenarios. Appearance of human figures more frequent than animals, but animals common. Social interaction often involves parallel behavior or direct encounter. A "stranger" may appear. Little verbal activity.
Early Concrete Operational (Gamma One)	Concern with physical and social contingencies with emphasis on immediate emotion or consequence. Scenarios may involve several figures, human or animal, that make distinct contributions to event sequence, yet little or no endowment of others with independent reasons or feelings. Outdoor, recreational, and residential settings are common.
Later Concrete Operational (Gamma Two)	Exploration of concrete factors that operate in everyday personal, material, and social life. Examination of implicit or explicit rules of material and social evaluation. Material rules include economy, utility, expediency and the like and social rules include neatness, politeness, rightness, and the like. Representation of evaluative feeling through expressions displayed by dream people. Puns. Animal representations are relatively rare.
Early Formal Operational (Delta One)	Scenarios involve one or more characters, including the dream-self, which display reflective thought, feeling, or emotion. Thought and feeling are owned as the dream character's own. In the dream state, the dream-self may be viewed as distinct from the observing self. The dream displays an articulated unity of actors or scenes that arise from other than direct experience or comparison with a simple norm or utilitarianism.
Dialectic (Delta Two)	Contrasts two realities, the world as experienced by the dream-self and the world as experienced from an alternative perspective. Often each reality is portrayed with multiple interdependent facets. Self-structure or self-experience may be represented as metaphorically complex. Dream within a dream.
Systemic (Epsilon)	Allegorical, symbolic, and general philosophical representations with complex nuances that illuminate universal patterns that characterize the human condition and the natural order.

1. The Greek letters identify stages of cognitive development described in the *Manual for Codification of Ego Development* (van den Daele, 1992a). Ego development and dream development closely parallel one another.

zation. This is not to suggest that amodal organization is not active throughout the lifespan: It is simply the most fundamental in the organization of cognition. The intermediate levels are labeled in terms of Piaget's stages of cognitive development with the author's analogous stages of cognitive complexity indicated by Greek letters (van den Daele, 1989, 1992a). The final levels have no direct correspondence in Piaget's theory. The Delta Two mode of thought permits the contrast of two formally consistent perspectives simultaneously. The Epsilon level allows comparison of multiple "possible worlds." The final levels are properly "philosophical" in perspective.

Dream images and their nuances also vary in their complexity. Some images are like the paintings of great masters, so that a single image portrays a subtlety that cannot be captured in words alone. Structural intricacy and richness of imagery tend to covary. Dreams of greater complexity tend to address issues of greater generality for the inner world, for objective interests, or for social significances.

Unconscious Intelligence

The individual's developmental level of dream production allows comparison and contrast with his conscious application of intelligence. In some cases, a large disparity exists between conscious and unconscious intelligence generally, and in some cases, a disparity occurs only in reference to some particular problem area. If the level of complexity of dream production is consistently below that of ordinary thought, then this suggests an obsessive, routinized engagement with life issues. If the level of complexity of dream production exceeds that of ordinary thought, then this suggests potential functional ability, and the operation of a general "defense" toward knowledge associated with higher function.

In a borderline patient who I treated with this profile, the patient reported a dream in which she sat with an open book in an armchair, when above her and behind her she heard a voice say "depredated." She knew with absolute conviction that the voice referred to her, but she insisted that she had no conscious recollection of the word or its meaning. At this point in her treatment, the patient had long functioned well below the level of achievement and responsibility of her siblings; binged alcohol, cocaine, and amphetamines; and sought one-night stands of the *Mr. Goodbar* variety. Yet the patient had not come to grips with the pervasiveness of her difficulties. Consciously, she preferred to focus on narrow complaints about her job or chit-chat about others. The dream was the harbinger of a transformative shift in the patient's view of her condition and herself. "Dumbness" had served as a pervasive defense against knowledge of her waste of substance and potential.

As this example suggests, dreams of limited complexity, including amodal dreams, often may be most significant to psychoanalytic treatment because such dreams convey fundamental dispositions and affects that modulate the individual's relation to self and others. The occurrence of "primitive" dreams typically accompanies psychoanalytic treatment and is part of the treatment-induced regression in the service of reintegration.

PRAGMATIC ORIENTATION OF DREAMS

Dream types may be further grouped into categories or families of dreams. The identification of families reveals similarities among dreams, simplifies inquiry, and promotes developmental and theoretical comprehension. The proposed categories are consistent with the author's theory of natural distinctions of knowledge (van den Daele, 1975; 1989). According to this theory, knowledge is either subjective, modeled after the essence and pattern of the inner world; or objective, accorded with the form and organization of the outer world; or interpersonal, reflective of the requirements and expectations that arise in social relationships. In parallel to these distinctions, categories of dreams arise either from endogenous, exogenous, or interpersonal determinants. *Dreams of endogenous origin concern inner emotional regulation; dreams of exogenous origin relate to adaptation to physical reality; and dreams of interpersonal origin bear upon needs and expectations in human relations.* These categories are correlated with general divisions of the nervous system described elsewhere (Milner, 1967; van den Daele, 1990).

THE DREAM MATRIX

As discussed in preceding sections, dreams differ along two major dimensions. The first is cognitive complexity and the second is pragmatic orientation. Dreams vary from the "amodal" to the "systemic" levels of cognitive complexity and may arise from endogenous, exogenous, or interpersonal sources. The union of nine levels of cognitive complexity with the three primary categories of dreams yields a matrix of 27 types of dreams. The matrix provides a kind of "periodic table" for assignment of empirically identified dream types.

In the sections below, the major types of dreams by source and cognitive complexity are identified in table form. The types are ordered according to the approximate minimum level of cognitive complexity required to meet the definitional requirements of the type. Within each major category of dreams, three dream examples of different levels of cognitive complexity are provided to illustrate different types of dreams. The method of direct

interpretation is applied, and by application of this method, the category to which a dream is a member is confirmed.

The dream examples are derived from three sources: first, dreams reported in the clinical treatment of patients; second, dreams reported by students; and third, the author's dream diary which, to date, includes approximately 600 of the author's dreams collected over a period of 21 years.

DREAMS OF ENDOGENOUS ORIGIN

Dreams of endogenous origin arise from inner needs that include all the somatic needs, feelings and states accompanying organismic adjustments to maintain equilibrium and homeostasis, and the affective correlates to system regulation (Table 2). Dreams of endogenous origin mirror the inner world and are grouped into ten types of dreams. Five types that belong to this category—simple wish-fulfillment dreams (Freud, 1900, p. 122), traumatic dreams (Freud, 1920, p. 13), dreams of convenience (Freud, 1900, p. 124), self-state dreams (Kohut, 1977, p. 109), and self-esteem dreams (Kohut, 1971, p. 243)—are defined in the general literature on dreams. Kohut's self-state and self-esteem dreams are identified by Hunt with his category of "titanic dreams" (1989). These types of dreams are closely linked to organismic self-regulation or representations of internal state linked to self-regulation.

The order of dreams in Table 2 corresponds approximately to the developmental order of emergence of subjective types of dreams. From the structural perspective, need dreams are least complex and are developmentally the most primitive. These dreams harken to early experience prior to mediation of state by causal determinants. Traumatic dreams include some, usually repetitive, enactment of causal conditions accompanying emotion. Simple wish-fulfillment dreams and dreams of convenience involve some appreciation of means-ends relations linked to need satisfaction. Functional and part-object dreams are similar in structure to simple wish-fulfillment dreams, but usually involve some need state that is more complex or developmentally more advanced than that associated with organic needs. Self-state dreams are analogous to, and presume, some representation of the self. Self-esteem dreams are still more complex and implicate some investment of self-worth in some idealized image of self. Functional personifications, topographical/structural, and transformational dreams draw on relatively sophisticated, differentiated self-representations.

Examples of endogenous dreams of elementary cognitive complexity are provided by a set of dreams of a 27-year-old female patient. Early in treatment she reported awakening with feelings of dull foreboding associ-

TABLE 2. Representative Types of Endogenous Dreams

Dream Type	Brief Description
Need	Characterized by experience of undisguised feeling or need state associated with endogenous determinants.
Traumatic	Involves intense negative emotional states where emotion overrides adaptive dream action.
Wish-fulfillment	Portrays gratification of relatively direct, often emotional or biological, needs and desires (Freud, 1900).
Dreams of Convenience	A special case of simple wish dreams that counter hardship (Freud, 1900).
Part-object	Aspects of the self or others are depicted in a purely functional relation to need state.
Functional Personifications	Represents needs, attitudes, behavior, or aspects of the self in the guise of other animate and sometimes inanimate objects (Bonime, 1962).
Self-State/ Diagnostic	Reveals how the self is experienced (Kohut, 1971, 1977). Diagnoses and prognosticates physical well-being (Hunt, 1989).
Self-Esteem	Provides a real-time representation of the changes in self-state (Kohut, 1977).
Topographic/ structural	Provides a map of the inner organization of the self (Jung, 1930)
Transformational	Usually complex dreams that portray self-organization and transformation, typically with import for the self's general interpersonal relations and attitude to life (Jung, 1930).

ated with a state of paralyzed panic. The dream was without any explicit self-representation, action, imagery, or thought. Over the course of three years of treatment, the dream was repeated with gradual emotional and imagistic differentiation. In the early phase of differentiation, the patient reported brief static images in the form of contours, vague shapes, and proto-actions: "a dark edge . . . touch . . . feel hard . . . can't see." This was followed by the description of objects and a clearer orientation in time and space: "I stood by the dresser. The drawer was open. I could put my hand into it, but I could not see into it. I can't turn around." In the final phases of the dream differentiation, the patient reported explicit scenarios of early childhood experiences of repeated aggressive sexual manipulation and penetration by her father. The feelings of dread and panic were connected with explicit encounters in her bedroom. Within the dream typology, the dream series progressed from amodal representation of affect to direct renditions of traumatic action-oriented sequences.

An example of an endogenous dream of moderate cognitive complexity, comprised of a single scenario, is the "Dream of the Vacillating Pole":

I am near the top of a vacillating pole, such as one employed by circus acrobatics, to which is attached a dentist's chair. I am half in and half out of the chair and clinging for dear life because I am afraid to fall. I am petrified with fear. I am vividly aware of my position and the chair, which seems safe, but around me and below me is dark and indistinct.

What is present and what is absent in the dream are both significant. What is present is strong affect that immobilizes the dream self, along with a few well-demarcated, articulated images. What is absent is any differentiated interaction with a person. The strong affect and its nature, along with the absence of interpersonal relations, provide an uncomplicated example of an endogenous self-state dream.

The dream occurred near the onset of my first analysis. At the time, my life was unsettled. Like an acrobat, I had to do a balancing act. The analytic couch seemed like a dentist's chair insofar as it could induce pain, uncover raw nerves, and leave me dependent. I was not fully committed to the process because of uncertainties in my life, but at the same time analysis seemed my only refuge, and if I could get into the chair, I would have a secure status and position. I saw myself as alone in this matter, and the issue of my relation to analysis completely absorbed my subjective energies.

An illustration of an endogenous dream at an advanced level of cognitive complexity is the dream of "The Sacred Brotherhood":

It's as if a time of war. I know myself to be a member of some "sacred brotherhood." Although unseen, I sense the "enemy" advances. We, members of the brotherhood, occupy the future and survey peoples of an earlier time. We aim to warn our people, individuals within our membership, of approaching danger. We warn our first brother, but abjure him not to use violent resistance, or at least we do not provide him with the means to resist. We warn General de Gaulle, who at the moment of our visit is reviewing his troops. He does not seem to take us seriously, perhaps because I was speaking English, so I spoke some French like, "There would be grave destruction, or 'C'est terriblement'." Next we visit another of our brothers to warn him. He is the keeper of the ancient tripod. As I descend a circular stairway to an underground cavern, I observe the tripod in the center of the cavern on an elevated mound. It is inlaid with turquoise set in silver. We were anguished because we knew that he too would face the destruction, but we could not allow him to use violent means for his preservation. As I sensed this, a strong voice declared, "What binds one binds all."

The dream embodies a complex self-perspective with allegorical features. Other people in the dream occur as personifications of self aspects. The emphasis of the dream is on the proper attitude to encroachment of forces that would threaten or destroy the existing order. The dream exemplifies an endogenously derived transformational dream.

The dream occurred a month before my 35th birthday and more than a year and a half before I entered psychoanalysis. Although I had been interested in psychoanalysis since undergraduate school, I had no conscious plan or intention to pursue psychotherapy or psychoanalytic training. The dream appears to look beyond conscious awareness to major challenges to the self concept and the process of its reorganization. The perspective of the dream self embodies both time, future and past, and prospective transformation, future self-sense as a member of a group bonded by a larger purpose. The dream self conveys to self aspects the inevitability of their destruction, both the arrogant de Gaulle and the tradition-laden keeper of the tripod, but counsels no resistance. The voice that declares the unity of self-organization counsels no half measures and operates in a manner consistent with Jung's archetype of the self (1930).

DREAMS OF EXOGENOUS ORIGIN

Representatives of this major family group have received relatively little attention in the clinical literature, perhaps because such dreams oftentimes may be given little clinical import. Dreams belonging to this category appear to make frequent appearance in the dream samples obtained in sleep laboratory investigations (Foulkes, 1982; Hunt, 1989). The defining feature of exogenous dreams is that these dreams address external reality or objectively defined problems. Exogenous dreams that address sensory-motor transactions may be infused with affect or emotion appropriate to physical encounters, but otherwise dreams that engage more abstract objective issues often possess a quality that Ernest Hilgard describes for the "hidden observer" (1977). That is, the dreams tend to be relatively disinterested, emotionally neutral assessments and evaluations of objective reality. Information conveyed in these dreams may be known or unknown to the conscious mind. Exogenous dreams are provisionally divided into seven general dream types (Table 3).

The order of dreams in Table 3 corresponds to the developmental emergence of exogenous dreams. Simple movement dreams are least complex and suggest primary dispositional tendencies to action-oriented behavior. Excitation dreams engage surprise and "rough and tumble" activities. Mastery dreams implicate aims directed toward adaptation to the objective world. Outer-realistic dreams involve coordination of action and events. Diagnostic and assessment dreams require about the same minimum level of developmental maturity with evaluation of state, action, or behavior in relation to some criterion or norm. Finally, inferential dreams involve the coordination of still more complex lines of observation and implication.

Numerous dreams of exogenous origin of elementary cognitive complex-

TABLE 3. Representative Exogenous Types of Dreams

Dream Type	Brief Description
Movement	Motor actions and action tendencies experienced in kinetic form.
Action	Enactment of sensory motor coordinations.
Excitation	Delight in speed, motion, physical prowess, and agility.
Mastery	Aims at mastery of external reality by anticipation, practice, or development of new stratagems through rehearsal.
Outer-Realistic	Examines contingency relations between physical actions and external elements.
Assessment	Represents schematic relations that hold for adaptive behavior. Compares objective performance or attributes to some criterion.
Inferential	Provides an imagistic analogue to some process of induction, deduction, or inference about thought or things that coordinate multiple rules and/or perspectives.

ity are reported by Foulkes (1982): "Some guy swimming . . . swimming and baseball at high school (Foulkes, 1982, p. 99)." The dreamer is a six-year, eight-month-old boy whose dreams Foulkes chose as typical of the sample. In general, boys' dreams at this age largely concern exploration, adventure, and mastery of external events.

An example of a dream of exogenous origin of intermediate cognitive complexity is the "Packing for a Trip" dream:

> I am packing a suitcase to go on a trip. It is an old brown striped leather suitcase, forties style. I am anxious that I will forget something so I am packing very carefully and methodically so I won't forget anything.

The dream was reported by a 47-year-old female doctoral student just prior to her comprehensive examinations. The trip refers to her future career. The suitcase portrays the dreamer's concern about her age and the learning she is required to do, but otherwise it identifies an ample, but practical, cognitive competence. She is afraid she will forget something on the examination, so she is careful and methodical in her study. With its emphasis on objective evaluation and a standard of performance, the dream concerns "assessment" (Table 3).

An example of a dream of exogenous origin of advanced cognitive complexity that displays an intricate interweaving of actions and reflections is the "Dream of the Mechanized File Room":

> I am waiting in a highly mechanized file room. With the push of some switch, file drawers open and a device photographs page after page with the aid of a

mechanical separator. The whole business is accomplished at high speed and is going on at several files simultaneously. Like Spock, I feel no fear, "Most interesting, Captain." Two ladies come into the room: one I was with and one who ran the file room. I saw with the push of a button one could project slides of children or events or the past, and the pièce d'résistance was a three-dimensional boy, projected holographically in a file drawer. He stood in the file's top drawer. I compared him a number of times with a two-dimensional slide projected near the file, and, indeed, my eyes had to accommodate: He was three-dimensional.

What is present and what is absent in this dream are also significant. What occupies a central portion of the dream is the elaborate mechanism of the file room with its representational capacities. The attitude of the dream self is consciously inquiring with no fear in this unusual environment. Again, no differentiated interpersonal relations occur in the dream. People who appear occur only in a functional role. The dream is a relatively direct exogenous inferential one.

The dream occurred at a time when I was working on my theory of cognition. The file room is a gloss for memory storage. In memory, information is sorted by categories. In working memory, sets of information within categories are completely encoded. This is characterized by high-speed, multiple parallel processing. This view of the mind and its capabilities engrosses and intrigues me. Memory, however, is mediated by purpose: either personal, the lady I am with; or systemic, the lady that runs the file room. Memory responds to intention, and intention can call forth any sort of memory, including memory as substantive and complex as that associated with direct earlier experience. This three-dimensional capacity may be compared and contrasted with a two-dimensional approach to storage. (This contrast corresponds to my later distinction between image mind and cognitive mind.) Although memory is mediated differently by these aspects of mind, both may provide a veridical representation, except the representation associated with the cognitive mind does not possess the same depth.

RELATIONAL DREAMS

Relational dreams arise from innate dispositions that potentiate and organize interpersonal relations. These dreams address social interactions and commonly entail themes involving the interplay of dispositions, expectations, and norms (Table 4). Relational dreams occur at various levels of organization and sophistication, beginning with natural dispositions and concluding with transformational and archetypal dreams. This family of dreams is given variable recognition and emphasis within different clinical

TABLE 4. Representative Relational Types of Dreams

Dream Type	Brief Description
Interpersonal Dispositional	Expresses inchoate embodiment of species conspecific imperatives.
Abandonment/Loss	Involves affect associated with attachment or loss.
Punishment	Suggests fear and guilt and flight for safety.
Idealization	Embodies some relation, state, or object as an exemplar.
Social Normative	Provides a schematic framing of interpersonal relations and expectations by reference to "natural" or "fundamental" expectations.
Object-Relational	Addresses the relation of the self or aspects of the self to other people with emphasis upon expectations, hopes, norms, and idealizations.
Complex Social Scenarios	Considers the complex interrelation of multiple actors in relation to the self's status and purpose.
Philosophical	Reflects on human situation. Displays irony toward social expectations and norms.
Archetypal	Expresses an allegorical formulation of universal issues that pertain to human purpose (Jung, 1930).

theories. One aspect or another is often highlighted, but few theories recognize any commonality to this group.

The developmental progression of relational dreams corresponds to the order in Table 4. Interpersonal imperative dreams are earliest and provide the "ground" for later relational dreams. Idealization and punishment dreams entail the application of fundamental interpersonal schema to human relations. Object relational dreams are more fully developed and involve complex interactions and expectations. Philosophical and archetypal dreams necessitate general frameworks within which the self and its relations to others and society is examined.

An example of a relational dream of elementary cognitive complexity is the dream of the "Pregnant Man":

> Two men, one is pregnant. He's being made fun of, threatened by a group of five-year-old boys.

The dream embodies a simple schema of social expectation based on gender differences. The dream arose early in my analysis during a time when I was dealing with issues related to custody of my child. I suspect what Horney (1931) termed "womb envy" played a role in the genesis of the

dream. With its elementary structure, the dream provides an example of a categorical normative dream.

An example of a relational dream of moderate cognitive complexity is the dream of "Like the Rest":

> Sitting in the group home visiting the former clients some years later, [a client] asks for some time to express some feelings regarding my move. . . . She explains that while the other therapists were able to listen to her and she did feel comfortable working with them, she felt that they were only listening and not helping her work through the anger she has toward her father for abusing her. She explains that I, like the rest of the people she attempted to trust, abandoned her.

The dreamer is a 35-year-old female psychotherapist who changed jobs and left her former patients. The text of the patient's statement to the therapist suggests that the good quality of the therapist's relation to the patient caused the patient a greater disappointment than might have occurred if she were "only listening." The dream is object relational in type.

An example of a relational dream of higher-order complexity involving current and past interpersonal interactions with inner and outer reflections is the "Dream of Images and Visions":

> I'm with Q. and she introduces me to a woman with blond short hair who I take to be blind. This woman is siting and talking about her ideas to us, to another woman, or to us both. I then say, "But I am blind too, but unlike the blind who cannot see, I see images and visions." And at that moment, I see this magnificent vision of this city—like Damascus or Jerusalem with the towers where one prays—very clear and panoramic. I say to Q., "I have this vision, let me tell you about it." She replies, "Not here. Come over here." I started to tell her again since I was filled with delight at this wondrous vision, and she said again. "Not here. Over here." Apparently she did not want me to distract this woman with her talk. I thought, maybe Q. believes this woman is somebody socially important. So I became angry with Q. and told her in unequivocal language that she "did not support me," that she was "more concerned with her image." I think she was dumbfounded over the strength of my outburst. Then some older man appeared on the scene who looked like B. and sort of got me in a hammerlock, but it didn't hurt, and hustled me up some stairs and said something like "You can't talk to a lady like that" and hauled off to hit me in the jaw. I thought I should have defended myself, but I didn't think he could do much damage.

In this dream, particular individuals are involved in an interplay of expectation and response. The dream addresses a current social perception and an earlier norm for proper behavior. The dream is divided into two major segments. The first part dramatizes otherwise elusive, but significant,

sources of mutual dissatisfaction. The second part of the dream entails "punishment for transgression," which calls forth a childhood norm. The occurrence of these two segments implies an intrapsychic struggle between later and earlier modes of regulation of social conduct. The dream suggests the struggle is not yet settled, but that the earlier absolutism is weakened. Overall, with its multiple actors and consideration of the self's purposes, the dream is a dream of complex social scenario because a dream is to be characterized by its major emphasis.

"The blond woman who is blind" is an image that stands for a sort of fashionable intellectual narcissism, which was then current. "I see images and visions" suggests that I would separate myself from this category, and the reference to Jerusalem implies that I see the big picture. The dialogue with Q. refers to a real person and transparently suggests that she is more concerned about proper form than our relation. I am angered by this because I feel she finds me socially gauche. The strength of my resentment consternates Q. The dream implies that Q. and I make dramatically different assumptions about the world and that she is actually unaware of the effects that her social preoccupation has on my pride. The remainder of the dream directly alludes to inner reaction to my display of temper in the person of B., who was a significant male figure in my early socialization. His severe recriminations do not have the force they once might have possessed.

DREAM TYPE AND DREAM COMPLEXITY

Dream types may be ordered by source and minimum cognitive complexity. Need, movement and interpersonal dispositional dreams are dreams whose content is largely determined by natural tendencies preconfigured in the nervous system and they require only amodal representation. In dreams organized at this level, tendencies are conveyed as a tropism or self sense toward action (Gendlin, 1986). Visual imagery is unnecessary. A second group of dreams requires at least amodal-transitional organization. Traumatic, action/excitation, and abandonment dreams combine massive arousal with imagery linked to the associated situation. A third set of dreams—wish fulfillment, mastery, and punishment or fear dreams—involves elementary functional coordinations characteristic of early preoperational thought. Convenience, part-object, functional personifications, outer realistic, and idealistic dreams imply later preoperational competence. A fourth group of dreams—self-state, diagnostic, and idealization dreams—requires at least early concrete operational organization. These dreams necessitate some enduring self and other representations that permit at least dichotomous contrasts between desirable and undesirable

states. A fifth set—self-esteem and object-relational dreams—possesses greater representational complexity and implies internal standards or norms by which dream constructions are organized. This competence is associated with the application of later concrete operational intelligence. A sixth group of dreams—topographical-structural, transformational, inferential, and philosophical dreams—employs complex schemes by which retrospective, contemporaneous, and prospective experience is organized. These dreams require at least formal operational intelligence.

The cognitive complexity assigned to these dream types represents *minimum complexity*. A particular type of dream may vary from its minimum to any higher level of organization. This applies to all types of dreams, but may be illustrated by the idealization type dream. As defined in Table 4, the idealization dream "embodies some relation, state, or object as an exemplar." In Table 4, the minimum cognitive level for an idealization dream corresponds to the early concrete operational stage. At this level, an idealization dream would instantiate some absolutized, valued characteristic into some other who bears some usually benign relation to the self. In the "Dream of Exchange of Consciousness" that I had when I was about 20 years old:

> I am aware of a young and fair woman, and we are in love. In the dream only we two exist wrapped about by a soft and indefinite void. We embrace, and in the moment of our embrace, we exchange consciousness. At the moment of exchange, for a moment, consciousness is all, like a shining and ineffable light. Then she is now me; and I, her. She experiences the world exactly from my eyes, and I experience the world from hers. I awake with a feeling of joy and completeness.

The dream articulates an ideal of complementary awareness and unity of vision. The "young and fair woman" is not a specific individual, but an idealized object who stands in an idealized relation. The relation with the woman is not merely functional because the relation of the dreamer to the woman involves his whole self. The dream is clearly an idealization dream, yet the dream organization occurs at a dialectical level of organization, with the contrast of two perspectives being a major feature of the dream structure.

COMPOSITE DREAMS

Dreams commonly display reference to "mixed" categories. For example, dream elements associated with endogenous self-regulation of affect may occur alongside interpersonal interactions. Usually when thematic material connected with different categories occur in the same dream, the-

matic material from one category is subordinated to the other. Self-state may be subordinated to object relations, if self-state features predominate; or conversely, object relations may be subordinated to self-state, if object relational features predominate.

How "mixed" thematic material is subordinated and organized, that is, what category is predominant, is highly salient to comprehension of unconscious processes. Different people have different styles of unconscious subordination and integration. For example, as Kohut discerned in the narcissistic disorders (1977), individuals may characteristically assimilate interpersonal relations to self-state. Conversely, as Roland's cross-cultural examination of Asian personality suggests (1988), people may predominantly assimilate self-state to interpersonal relations.

The dream "Sliding Down the Sandpile" provides an example of a composite dream:

> I was sitting on top of a large sand dune—I was sliding down, fearing there was going to be a landslide. Meanwhile, I was talking to Dr. about the examination results. She was suggesting that the cutoff point was going to be raised, and I started to feel bad. I started to think my scores, even though they were pretty high, were not high enough, and started feeling bad about it, then I woke up.

The dreamer is a 28-year-old female graduate student. The dream correlates endogenous and exogenous sources of information. The part of the dream in which the dreamer expresses fear of a landslide provides an appraisal of endogenous self-state. The part of the dream that concerns a raised cutoff point describes an exogenous appraisal. In the dream, self-state is subordinated to a conjectured objective event, to paraphrase, "If the cutoff is raised, even though my scores are high, I'm going to experience a slide of self-esteem." Objective performance and staying on top play an important role in this student's psychological economy. Of course, other elements of the dream are suggestive, such as sitting on sand, providing a plausible transitional symbol between inner state and outer reality.

ANALOGIZING DREAMS

Dreams may possess content that appears to belong to a category different from the actual category that the dreams reference. Such dreams analogize aspects of the individual's experience. Analogizing dreams may be discriminated from dreams whose categorical reference possesses face validity by careful inquiry into the affects and emotions accompanying the dream. Although the following two examples appear to be exogenous dreams, they are dreams that describe endogenous self-state.

The first dream is titled "My Stalled Car":

It's raining. Having trouble starting the car—it floods and won't start.

The dream was reported by a 41-year-old female school teacher whose car was in need of repair. The day before the dream, it rained. Yet the affect accompanying the dream is colored by a sense of hopeless abandon and subdued desperation. In fact, the teacher was out of work and had been turned down for a job.

The second dream is dubbed "Getting So Tired":

My friends and I were playing tennis, then I was running in a race, then I was playing field hockey, I was getting so tired. That's all I can remember.

The dreamer was a 28-year-old female who was faced with constant competitive demands and whose life pace was quite frenetic. The friends she mentions were high-school friends. The dreamer feels caught up in a whirl of events determined largely by conformism to external requirements, much as she did when she was in high school.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The dream typology assorts dreams into three major categories: dreams whose origin is endogenous, exogenous, or relational. Dreams of the first type arise from somatic needs, feelings, and states that accompany organismic adjustments to system requirements. Dreams of the second type are initiated by kinetic and dispositional tendencies toward engagement and exploration of the outer world. And dreams of the third type derive from interpersonal dispositions to interaction and relationship with other people. Within each category, dreams may occur at different levels of complexity.

The dream typology permits the integration of psychoanalytic observations about the dreams from a variety of perspectives within a common framework. Freud's view that a dream is a wish fulfillment finds its primary niche in endogenous need, wish fulfillment, and convenience dreams. Kohut's observations about self-state dreams and inner regulation (1971, 1977) are accommodated to the middle range of endogenous dreams, and Jung's individuation dreams (1930) occupy the advanced range. Similarly, Bonime's interpersonal approach to dream interpretation (1962) is encompassed by relational dreams of the middle level. In addition, types and modes of dreams that are only infrequently encountered in clinical psychoanalysis are accommodated.

The dream typology suggests that different psychoanalytic theories are like the position papers that might have derived from the fabled committee of learned blind who were commissioned to determine the appearance of an elephant. Each individual got a hold on some part, but could not see

the whole; so for each, the part became the whole. The psychoanalytic theorist is in exactly an analogous position because, in fact, he is blind to the extent of the unconscious and is constrained to what he can infer. What he can infer depends on cohort, client population, and how he calibrates his observations. The result has been procrustean interpretation, dissention, and a remarkable stasis in the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious.

The theory of the unconscious that arises from the method of direct interpretation reflects a differentiated inner world with variegated landscapes of images and frameworks. The derivatives of the unconscious are determined by complex decision rules, symbol systems, and syntax. Images and dreams possess a primary autonomy from the conscious mind and arise through the configural mind, which serves the construction and synthesis of experience and knowledge. The derivatives emerge out of common human nature conjoined with concrete human experience. For this reason, dreams and images appear universal. As Freud rightly believed, the universal images of dreams and generalized derivatives of the unconscious reveal the deep determinants of human nature, but with a vastly richer scope than Freud envisioned.

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