Another Look At Dreaming: Disentangling Freud's Primary and Secondary Process Theories

Michael Robbins

J Am Psychoanal Assoc 2004 52: 355
DOI: 10.1177/00030651040520021201

j.apa

Michael Robbins 52/2

ANOTHER LOOK AT DREAMING: DISENTANGLING FREUD'S PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PROCESS THEORIES

The Interpretation of Dreams contains Freud's first and most complete articulation of the primary and secondary mental processes that serve as a framework for the workings of mind, conscious and unconscious. While it is generally believed that Freud proposed a single theory of dreaming, based on the primary process, a number of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and contradictions reflect an incomplete differentiation of the parts played by the two mental processes in dreaming. It is proposed that two radically different hypotheses about dreaming are embedded in Freud's work. The one implicit in classical dream interpretation is based on the assumption that dreams, like waking language, are representational, and are made up of symbols connected to latent unconscious thoughts. Whereas the symbols that constitute waking language are largely verbal and only partly unconscious, those that constitute dreams are presumably more thoroughly disguised and represented as arcane hallucinated hieroglyphs. From this perspective, both the language of the dream and that of waking life are secondary process manifestations. Interpretation of the dream using the secondary process model involves the assumption of a linear two-way "road" connecting manifest and latent aspects, which in one direction involves the work of dream construction and in the other permits the associative process of decoding and interpretation. Freud's more revolutionary hypothesis, whose implications he did not fully elaborate, is that dreams are the expression of a primary mental process that differs qualitatively from waking thought and hence are incomprehensible through a secondary process model. This seems more adequately to account for what is now known about dreaming, and is more consistent with the way dream interpretation is ordinarily conducted in clinical practice. Recognition that dreams are qualitatively distinctive expressions of mind may help to restore dreaming to its privileged position as a unique source of mental status information.

Freud's experience with an hysterical patient and his study of his own dreams (1900a,b) may be the clinical cornerstones of psychoanalysis. They served as the basis for his initial economic and topographic formulations about the nature of mind. His conclusion that there is a "royal road" running from the dream manifestation recalled upon waking, on to the land of unconscious fantasy and meaning, a road that can be traversed by the vehicle of associative decoding of symbols, has achieved the status of common wisdom and has permeated the arts and humanities, as well as the work of several generations of analysts. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud also articulated the distinction between primary and secondary mental processes, fundamental to his ideas about unconscious mental functioning, as well as to many of his other discoveries. In the pages that follow I endeavor to show that two entirely distinct hypotheses about the nature of dreams and their relation to waking life are embedded in what generally has been considered a single theory.

The incomplete differentiation of the two hypotheses about dreaming is part of a greater lack of clarity as to what distinguishes the primary and secondary processes, particularly the distinction between thought—the secondary process realm of the representational and symbolic—and primary mentation, which is sensory-perceptual and is responsible for the experience of concrete actualization or virtual reality. This confusion has been perpetuated by a tendency to mistake the dream proper for its waking rendition in ordinary language. The classical technique of dream interpretation is predicated on the assumption that dreaming and waking languages are qualitatively similar entities, each consisting of associatively decodable representational elements that have unconscious referents. I will argue that this is actually a secondary process model of dreaming. I believe that Freud did not fully explore the potentially more revolutionary hypothesis that dreaming represents a primary mental process involving hallucinatory actualization that is qualitatively different from the secondary process of representational thought that characterizes waking life.

Boston Psychoanalytic Society.

The author thanks Ramon Greenberg, Howard Katz, Lewis Kirshner, and Charles Spezzano for comments on earlier drafts. Submitted for publication August 22, 2002.

ANOTHER LOOK AT *THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS*

Although Freud's insights about the use of dreams in understanding the unconscious aspects of mind have had a profound impact on psychoanalysis, there has never been unanimous agreement either about his theory of why and how dreams are meaningful, or about his interpretive method. Moreover, the tendency to analyze dreams with a secondary process model has been associated with a gradual reduction of their importance in analytic work—from the royal road to unconscious meaning to one of many alternative routes. However, the hypothesis that dreams are meaningful expressions of mind is not necessarily isomorphic with the proposition that dreams are symbolically disguised representations of unconscious wishes, or with the technical recommendation that the wakeful person's associations to their elements is the route to discovering their meaning. Much of dream interpretation in everyday practice involves reflection about the dream as a primary gestalt expression of mind that is unique, rather than a cover-up for something else. To judge from their written reports, it is safe to say that both Freud and Ernest Jones (1916) analyzed at least some dreams in this way.

Jung (1931, 1934, 1945), whose interest in dreaming paralleled Freud's, was perhaps the first to view dreams as holistic dramatizations of mental states rather than as encoded expressions of repressed unconscious wishes. He believed that the unconscious content symbolized in dreams was not all of a secondary nature, due to repression and subsequent transformation of conflicted wishes, but also included primary elements related to collective human archetypes. Subsequent generations, including Fairbairn (1952), Piaget (1962), Greenson (1970), Kohut (1977), and Hartmann (1996), elaborated the idea that the dream is a snapshot dramatization or depiction, a kind of map of what is on the mind of the dreamer at a particular moment during the night, as contrasted to an unconscious disguise. Erikson (1954), French and Fromm (1964), and Greenberg and Pearlman (1978, 1999) consider the manifest dream to be an attempt to solve personal problems that is qualitatively continuous with such efforts in waking life using ordinary language. I believe that the two approaches to dreaming reflect two incompletely differentiated theories implicit in Freud's work.

Freud's Secondary Process Theory

The theory that has been most influential on the technique of dream interpretation is based on the economic and topographic models of mind. It outlines a bidirectional linear process that Freud described metaphorically as a royal road. Construction of the dream begins when latent unconscious wishes are obstructed from conscious awareness by a censor because of their conflicted nature, leading to the regressive "work" of arcane encryption, using mechanisms of condensation and displacement, that produces what Freud called the pictographic symbols that constitute the manifest dream and enable the sleeper to experience transient gratification of wishes that would be unacceptable if conscious in waking life. Analysis or interpretation consists of a waking rendering of the remembered experience of the dream into ordinary language, followed by an associative decoding of what Freud referred to as dream hieroglyphs, aimed at uncovering their unconscious meaning. "The dream-thoughts and the dream-content," Freud (1900a) writes, "are presented to us like two versions of the same subject-matter in two different languages. Or, more properly, the dream-content seems like a transcript of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression, whose characters and syntactic laws it is our business to discover by comparing the original and the translation. The dream-thoughts are immediately comprehensible, as soon as we have learnt them. The dream-content, on the other hand, is expressed as it were in a pictographic script, the characters of which have to be transposed individually into the language of the dream-thoughts" (p. 277). As the two languages referred to in his metaphor have a qualitatively similar substructure, they differ in the sense a foreign language does from one's native tongue. A. A. Brill translates the end of the passage somewhat differently: "the dream-content appears to us as a translation of the dream-thoughts into another mode of expression whose symbols and laws of composition we must learn by comparing the original to the translation" (Freud 1900b, p. 198). Elsewhere in the Strachey translation, which I will use in most of what follows, Freud (1900a) notes that "the productions of the dream-work, which, it must be remembered, *are not made with the intention of being understood*, present no greater difficulties to their translators than do the ancient hieroglyphic scripts to those who seek to read them" (p. 341). In this secondary process model of dreaming, the state of disguised hallucinatory wish fulfillment that enables the subject to circumvent realistic wakeful thought and in so

doing remain asleep is the symbolic enactment of a drama whose script resides in the repressed unconscious and can be recovered by the wakeful subject. Dreaming and waking thought, then, are continuous aspects of a qualitatively unitary mental process. Had Freud drawn what would seem to be the obvious conclusion from such a reasoning process—that dreaming, like the waking language in which the dream may be analyzed, is a secondary process phenomenon—he would have been compelled to confront a conflict with other ideas he had about dreaming, ideas I am about to summarize. It is this secondary process model that has dominated the clinical practice of dream interpretation.

Freud's Primary Process Theory

Freud's description in chapter 7 of the archaic form of mentation he called the primary process and illustrated with dreaming is one of his most original contributions to psychoanalysis. This protolanguage expresses mental activity during sleep in a sensory-perceptual mode, as happenings or actualizations that Freud thought of as hallucinatory wish fulfillments because of their conclusive nature and the absence of conscious reflection, and that are safe from real-life consequences insofar as the path to motor action is blocked. Freud posited that the primary process is the initial condition of mind, the substrate that is displaced and relegated to sleeping and to unconscious processes that create symptoms, parapraxes, and enactments in the course of development of the secondary process. This stands in contrast to the secondary process, which consists of conscious reflective thought, including symbolism and language. Whereas the primary process produces the illusion of experiences or actualizations, the secondary process accrues knowledge, involves thought, and with that brings the adaptive and defensive challenge of what to do with knowledge that poses a threat to one's growing sense of self, and hence leads to the creation of conscious and dynamically unconscious or repressed aspects of mind alongside its primary unconscious aspects. In this secondary sense, symbolic activity has conscious and unconscious aspects. Looked at in this way, dreaming is a unique way in which mind expresses itself under certain conditions, not a pictographic or hieroglyphic symbolic enactment of a script that is mentally represented but unconscious, or a regressive transformation or degradation of thought. As qualitatively distinctive expressions of mind supporting actualization and thought respectively, dreaming and waking languages should be related not by

linear causality, as in a secondary process model, but by analogy. This distinction is consistent with the definition in *Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts* (Moore and Fine 1990), in which the primary process is described as "the most primitive form of mentation; it seeks immediate and complete discharge, by . . . hallucinatory wish fulfillment . . . ," whereas the secondary process "operates with bound cathexis and verbal, denotative symbols" (p. 148).

Dreaming as a Protolanguage

Most discussions of dreaming explicitly or implicitly assume that it can be comprehended with a linguistic model or, to put it differently, that dreaming is a reflection of the developmental and existential substrate of thought and language. Freud frequently refers to dreaming as a language susceptible to translation into ordinary language, as a foreign language is into one's native tongue; in speaking of dream images as a kind of hieroglyphic or pictograph, he implicitly assumed they have representational and symbolic significance like the words of ordinary language. Numerous analysts spanning the history of psychoanalysis, from Jung through Lacan, have done likewise, as have prominent linguists like Roman Jakobson (1956). Authorities from the humanities (States 1992, 2000; Rupprecht 1999) use a linguistic model to analyze dreams, much as they might apply such a model to works of literature.

The elements essential to the dictionary definition of language include social or cultural communality and communicative intent. It is of interest that the dictionary definition does not include the use of words. The presence of symbols, signs, gestures, or the like—in other words, of representational elements—is deemed sufficient. The formal dream content that Freud called the manifest dream meets the criterion of cultural communality insofar as it is determined by the dreamer's sociocultural context, including the individual's developmental background and immediate experience (the day residue). Although the waking subject may elect for reasons conscious or unconscious to communicate a dream, it seems likely that the dream is not itself a communication. Remarking on the arcane quality of the manifest dream, Freud asserted that dreams are not intended to be understood. It is doubtless the case that some dreams reflect a mental state related to the wish to communicate something to a particular other; nonetheless, what is depicted in the dream as other persons and as communication actually represents various aspects of the solipsistic mind of the dreamer. Since

such a small proportion of one's dreams are remembered, I think it useful to distinguish between the waking person's conscious wish to reframe in ordinary language what is recollected and, for whatever reason, conscious or not, communicate it to another, and the actual solipsistic and unconscious state of dreaming. The few analysts who maintain that dreams are communications—e.g., Lacan (Dor 1998) and Kanzer (1955)—base their argument on the fact that ontogenetically, mental life and language are inextricably interwoven with the social world and relationships. However, not all linguists believe that communication is an essential ingredient of language (see, e.g., Akjamian, Demers, and Harnish 1984).

The work of Jung is particularly relevant here, as he seems to have viewed dreaming as a kind of linguistic process, and, as is the case with Freud, two embryonic theories appear fused in his writings. One regards dreaming as a language unto itself; the other sees it as a variant of ordinary language. Unlike Freud, Jung (1934) does not use the terminology of primary and secondary process. On the one hand he writes that "the manifest dream picture is the dream itself and contains the whole meaning of the dream . . . "; decrying "the false belief that the dream is mere facade concealing the true meaning . . . ," he concludes that "we would do better to say that we are dealing with something like a text that is unintelligible . . . " (p. 149). Elsewhere he writes that "the dream does not conceal; we simply do not understand its language" (1931, p. 92). His method of interpretation he describes as "taking up the context" (1945, p. 367). At the same time, there are plentiful indications that he viewed dreams as symbolic of unconscious thought, both archetypal in the sense of collective unconscious, and personal related to repression, and that meaning can be approached associatively as one would translate one natural language into another: "I therefore proceed in the same way as I would in deciphering a difficult text"; he adds that "dreams generally have a 'dramatic' structure" (1945, p. 367). A major point of difference from Freud seems to have been the belief that not all of the symbolized meaning necessarily relates to the dynamic unconscious and repression; that is, Jung did not postulate a topographic model and a dream censor.

Lacan has made the most significant contemporary effort to synthesize the phenomena of dreaming and psychosis—both of which Freud believed were based on the primary process—under the unifying rubric of language. He believes that the symbolic order, the language order,

and the law or social order are in many respects indistinguishable. Insofar as language is an inextricable element of the social order, it is inherently symbolic. He maintains that both the unconscious and dreaming are language structures (Lacan 1953): "the dream has the structure of a sentence, or, rather, to stick to the letter of the work, of a rebus; that is to say, it has the structure of a form of writing, of which the child's dream represents the primordial ideography, and which, in the adult, reproduces the simultaneously phonetic and symbolic use of signifying elements, which can also be found both in the hieroglyphs of ancient Egypt and in the characters still used in China" (p. 57–58). In his description of language, to which I do not pretend to do justice in this brief summary, Lacan draws on Freud's concept of primary process (principles of condensation and displacement) and Jakobson's division of language along two axes, the paradigmatic and the syntagmatic, corresponding roughly to semantics and syntactics. The paradigmatic axis is the symbolic or metaphoric dimension of language. It consists of signifiers that function metaphorically or symbolically according to principles of similarity or condensation. The syntagmatic axis functions by metonymy, or displacement/contiguity, to chain together the signifiers.

Thus, it can be argued that dreams bear much resemblance to language. What is at issue is whether they reflect secondary process language, qualitatively similar to the language of waking life, as one's native tongue is to a foreign language, or a distinctive primary or primordial language template; a kind of *Ur-sprache*. Freud (1900a) predicted that "we may expect that the analysis of dreams will lead us to a knowledge of man's archaic heritage, of what is psychically innate in him" (p. 549). Linguistic universalists including Chomsky (1965) and Jakobson (1956), as well as contemporary psychoanalysts including Lacan (1953), have postulated such an archaic structure. Vygotsky (1934) considered it "evident that the transition from inner speech to external speech is not a simple translation from one language into another. It cannot be achieved by merely vocalizing silent speech. It is a complex, dynamic process involving the transformation of the predicative, idiomatic structure of inner speech into syntactically articulated speech intelligible to others" (p. 248). Drawing on this distinction, Blechner (1998) believes that dreaming is the true language of thought, associatively irreducible to more fundamental or latent unconscious contents.

Beginning with Freud, a number of authors have attempted to articulate the grammatical or syntactic structure of dreaming, and there is

general agreement that it is qualitatively distinctive from that of ordinary language. Dream language depicts causality in terms of sequence or contiguity, and contradiction, contrast, or conflict in terms of such things as difference in imagery or pace of action. There seems to be no way to depict time or to distinguish the past and memory from the present. In other words, dream language lacks the abstract, reflective, comparative, multilevel, or parallel-processing quality of ordinary language that enables such things as conflict, ambivalence, simultaneous conscious and unconscious thought, past and present tense, action and contemplation. French and Fromm (1964) summarize this distinctive feature of dream language as follows: "The logic that we miss in the dream work is the syntactical logic of speech—the syntactical logic that is essential for the framing and testing of propositions and reasoning from them. Speech was designed primarily for communication. When we dream, we are not particularly interested in communicating our thoughts to others or in reasoning from propositions. Therefore we can dispense with syntactical logic" (p. 162).

Inconsistencies and Ambiguities in Freud's Theory and Practice

As with so many of his conceptual discoveries, Freud was not consistent in his various elaborations of the primary and secondary processes. In some places he seems to be arguing that they are qualitatively different, thus implying that dreaming and waking languages might require separate theories, whereas elsewhere he seems to believe a single theory will suffice. Freud describes two aspects of dream language that distinguish it qualitatively from secondary process language. The first is that it renders mental activity in the form of an immediate but complex sensory-perceptual happening, in which the dreamer plays an active part (Freud 1911), rather than as reflective thought, which involves self-observation and is the basis of ordinary language (Bickerton 1990). Freud (1900a) describes "a complete hallucinatory cathexis of the perceptual systems" (p. 548). He also says that "the dream . . . represented . . . a situation which was actually present and which could be perceived through the senses like a waking experience" (p. 572); the "dream-work proper diverges further from our picture of waking thought than has been supposed. . . . ; it is completely different from it qualitatively and for that reason not immediately comparable with it" (p. 507). He notes that "the primary process endeavours to bring about a discharge of excitation in order that . . . it may establish a

'perceptual identity'" (p. 602). This essential aspect of dreaming is distinguished from "the secondary process, [which,] however, has . . . taken on . . . the establishment of a '*thought* identity'" (p. 602).

Freud did not always distinguish clearly between the primary and secondary processes as they contribute to dreaming, especially with regard to what constitutes mental representation. In section D of chapter 6, "Conditions of Representability," he refers to the sensory-perceptual happenings of the primary process as representational, claiming that the mind chooses images and even words in the dream according to their potential for carrying or representing unconscious wishes; in other places, however, he characterizes the hallucinatory actualizations as presentations, in contrast to the elements of thought, or representations. The confusion between neurobiologically based experiencing, on the one hand, and thinking and mental representation on the other, is again apparent in chapter 7, where Freud describes two features of a particular manifest dream: "One is the fact that the thought is represented as an immediate situation with the 'perhaps' omitted, and the other is the fact that the thought is transformed into visual images and speech" (p. 534).

Nor was Freud not consistent in his clinical practice. He maintained that what he calls the hieroglyphics or pictographs of dream imagery are susceptible to interpretation because they partake of the symbolic representational quality of ordinary language; "the keys are generally known and laid down by firmly established linguistic usage," he tells us (p. 342). Although he hypothesized that dream interpretation is a linear process of translation by association to the putative symbolic elements of the manifest content, in practice he often conceived of dreams as gestalt analogical presentations of a person's intrapsychic weltanschauung. For example, in describing his interpretation of one of his patient's dreams he remarks, "And after reflecting a little I was able to give her the correct interpretation of the dream, which she afterwards confirmed. I was able to do so because I was familiar with the whole of the dreamer's previous history" (p. 152). That he was not entirely convinced that the dream experience retains the abstract symbolic quality of thought, as well as the potential to enable the interpreter to associatively reconstruct the thoughts that inspired the dream, is suggested by another assertion: "As a rule the technique of interpreting according to the dreamer's free associations leaves us in the lurch when we come to the symbolic elements in the dream-content" (p. 353).

DREAMING AS AN EXPRESSION OF PRIMARY PROCESS MENTATION

Mental Representation and Symbolic Process

If dreaming is inherently representational and symbolic, then it must be a secondary process activity; if it is not, then dreaming must be the expression of a qualitatively different linguistic structure or protolinguistic process.

Analysts including Jones (1916), Freeman-Sharpe (1949), and Lacan (1968), as well as linguists including Jakobson (1956), liken dream language to symbolic processes present in ordinary language and manifested hyperbolically in poetry—in such tropes as simile, metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and onomatopoiea. Ernest Jones's attempt, a decade after publication of *The Interpretation of Dreams,* to reconcile what seem to me irreconcilable elements in Freud's formulation, seems quite confused. He seeks to account for experiential actualization in dreaming with a theory of mental representation that holds symbolization and concretion to be more or less identical: "A symbol is characteristically sensorial and concrete, whereas the idea represented may be a relatively abstract and complex one" (Jones 1916, p. 89); "Symbolism is always concrete . . . substituting a concrete sensorial image for a more difficult idea . . . " (p. 137). When he writes that "the basal feature in all forms of symbolism is identification" (p. 138), he means that a process of fusion leads to the formation of a concrete product or identity. The *thing* becomes identical to the *idea* and replaces it. *As* or *like* becomes *is*. On the same page, Jones implies that symbolization is actually a *regressive* process: "The over-profuse use of metaphors, as that of slang—which fulfills the same psycholinguistic function—is well known to be the mark of expressional incapacity; the person belongs to what, in association work, is called the predicate type." Von Domarus (1944) appears to have elaborated this concept crediting neither Freud nor Jones, when he coined the term *predicate identity* to refer to the concreteness and inability to symbolize that is characteristic of schizophrenic language, a subject to which I will return. Silberer (1951), another major contributor to the dream literature, seems to believe that the familiar statement that the manifest dream symbolizes latent content is equivalent to the statement that the manifest dream "is characterized by a tendency to replace the abstract by the concrete" (p. 208).

Because basic elements in dreams are superficially identical in their formal aspects to elements of mature adult waking language, it is easy to assume they have similar properties and serve identical functions. As the imagery in dreams may be quite sophisticated and include things that in waking life would clearly be symbolic, it is tempting but probably incorrect to assume that they have the same abstract quality within the context of the dream itself. Of words and speech, in particular, Freud says "it is true in general that words are treated in dreams as though they were concrete things" (p. 295). Kraepelin (1906), who made a decade-long study of his own dreams, made a similar observation.

I dreamed I was trying to find the social security number of someone quite close to me. On reflection I contextually deduced that I had actualized the sophisticated metaphor about "getting someone's number" (i.e, establishing a sense of who they are). A portion of a friend's dream involved going into a field. As she reflected that the overall theme of the dream was her concerns about her choice of career, she realized that the dream had actualized a waking metaphor: her *field* of work. It is not the case, however, that in the context of the dreams themselves the number search and the field image were symbolic. Another patient, an artist, dreamed he was painting a particular person's torso vivid green. As he contemplated the dream, he realized that he had actualized the saying "green with envy," which characterized his feelings about the person being painted. The fact that the mind of the dreamer is that of a sophisticated adult who has learned much about the world does not mean that the language of dreaming in which the images appear is equally sophisticated.

Representational thought and its related symbolic processes and concrete sensory-perceptual happenings are very different. Of course images of experience are registered neurologically from birth, but such registrations are not identical to the higher-order representations of secondary process thought. Rather, they function as part of subcortical patterns (Solms and Turnbull 2002). Eventually, with the development of thought, they may become symbolic or representational. MRI studies conducted by Fiebach et al. (2003) demonstrate that words learned early in development are encoded in auditory and visual centers of the brain, in contrast to words learned later, which are encoded in the inferior frontal cortex. Most analysts seem to accept Freud's proposition that the "craftsmen" of the dream work, condensation and displace-

ment, serve to collapse the boundaries that ordinarily separate the elements that characterize thought—abstraction, reflection, symbol, metaphor, and the like—from the experience of sensory-perceptual realization he called hallucinatory wish-fulfillment, a process that substitutes the concrete *is* for the symbolic *like* or *as*. Rather than being regressive mechanisms of symbol formation, however, these may simply be descriptions of what makes dreaming language qualitatively distinctive.

Others have questioned the symbolic significance of dreams. In their influential treatise on symbol formation the psychologists Werner and Kaplan (1963) also make note of how things, images, body postures, and sensations are substituted in dreams for words, yielding a concrete product. They cite examples from Freud's dreams, in one of which the concept of superfluity becomes something overflowing, while in another the concept of being manipulated literally becomes having one's hand shaken. They use a variety of terms to describe this process, including condensation, but do not consider the product to be symbolic. Bert States (1992), speaking from the perspective of literature about what he believes to be unique about dream language, cites Gertrude Stein: "This is rather like saying a rose is a rose is a rose; but what Gertrude Stein was trying to express in this famous tautology is the nonreferentiality of rose-ness. It is an immanently phenomenological piece of poetry designed to prevent our seeing a rose as a sign, or as having a significance that is outside of its being" (p. 10). Freud's oft-quoted aphorism is apt in this context, for in the primary process a cigar is just a cigar. To view it as a phallic symbol, we must render it into secondary process thought.

I dreamed I was buying chairs; in the dream I bought more and more, but somehow they looked cheaper and less useful, and when I tried to get rid of them no one seemed to want them. After casting my dream as a verbal script, I realized that its theme resembled my waking anxieties about the crashing stock market, and in a larger sense doubts I had about the wisdom of decisions I had made in recent years about the course of my life. Like so many of us, I had been investing my retirement funds in the stock market, with ambitions that became ever more grandiose as the market boomed. As it began to crash and I realized that greed had interfered with my selling and being satisfied with more-than-reasonable profits, I experienced conflict between selling and accepting the reality of a big loss in order to avoid the risk of an

even bigger one, and denying the reality of loss and buying more shares at a lower price in the hope of working financial alchemy to turn disaster into profit. I had also recently made a significant life change that was not working out as I had wished, and I was struggling over whether to make the best of the unsatisfactory situation or to make another and equally major change that would involve accepting my loss and trying to move on. Secondary process analogical thinking made me aware of the dream theme, and in that context I was able to deduce that two personal symbols of security in my waking life—"shares" of stock and "chairs" (my own special chair has always symbolized feeling at home)—had become parts of a larger happening. It was in the context of rendering the dream in the words of waking language and abstracting its theme that "my shares" and "my chairs" acquired symbolic significance. If primary process language is sensory-perceptual, motoric, and concrete, it seems to me that without resorting to "mechanism" explanations, a child who is learning language might well mistake "shares," an abstraction that is difficult to conceptualize, for the more common and daily experienced "chairs," especially as emotions related to security would seem to bring the two into conjunction.

Confusion of the Dream with Its Waking Language Rendition

One reason that it has not been easy to ascertain the presence of two distinctive theories of dreaming in Freud's work is the tendency to confuse the dream proper with its retrospective rendition into ordinary language, which, though necessary to bring the dream into the realm of thought and reflection, also transforms its linguistic structure, inevitably and irretrievably. Freud may not have fully appreciated the significance of his own observation that the dream, comprising hallucinated actualizations during the course of sleep and their fleeting memory traces on awakening, is itself fundamentally inaccessible to the thoughtful mind; what he called the manifest dream, retrospectively recollected and rendered into ordinary language in waking life, is different from the dream itself. Amnesia for dreams, the difficulty experienced, even by those who train themselves to recall, is very different from the difficulty remembering events of waking life that have been experienced by a conscious, self-aware subject, and is not merely the result of repression as Freud believed. Nonetheless, for purposes of interpretation Freud took the verbal product as the dream, and traced the subject's conscious associations to its various putatively symbolic

elements. There is of course no way to be certain that the associations are to the dream itself, rather than to the waking, secondary process language elements in which it has been rendered and the state of mind of the subject at the time the dream is recalled. In other words, the dream proper is readily confused with its rendition into ordinary language, rather than being perceived as a process and product unique unto itself. If one focuses on the distinction between the dream, which creates a delusional, hallucinatory sense of happening, and the waking recollection and rendering of the dream into ordinary language so that it can be thought about, then what Freud called the manifest dream is an expression complete unto itself in a language of its own, and not simply a facade or encrypted cover in ordinary language for repressed thoughts. The waking subject does not speak the language of the dream, and vice versa. The question "What does it mean?" can be answered only by a wakeful subject who is reflective about a predicate experience—namely, the rendering of a dream into ordinary language. If the dream possessed these attributes, it would be not a dream but a waking experience.

Findings from Neuroscience

The advent of functional neuroimaging technologies that depict brain activity in real time has added new dimension to the understanding of dreaming (Braun 1999; Solms 1995, 1999; Solms and Turnbull 2002). Solms and Braun take issue with Hobson's contention (1999) that dreams are meaningless products of periodic brainstem stimulation. Hobson's conclusions are based on REM state research in animals, so their applicability to dreaming humans is questionable to begin with. It seems ironic that even as he asserts that dreams are meaningless, he cites some of his own that seem quite meaningful in light of other information he provides.

Braun's studies are based on normal subjects. PET scans indicate that the parts of the brain whose functioning would be required if Freud's theories about symbolism, with their secondary process implications, were valid, are relatively quiescent during dreaming. Braun (1999) states the findings as follows: "condensation and distortion represent the crux of the 'dream work'—camouflaging threatening material by transferring the latent into the manifest content. This process should require considerable mobilization of the brain's symbol-making machinery. And if there is any single region of the brain felt to be essential for self-monitoring, abstraction, and symbolic encoding, it would

be the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a region in which activity plummets at sleep onset and in which functional inactivity is destined to persist throughout the entire sleep cycle. . . . Furthermore, other heteromodal areas that play an established role in semantic processing and might be expected to participate in Freud's secondary dream work—perisylvian regions including the posterior middle temporal gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule—are relatively inactive during REM sleep as well." He finds that there is "no clear mechanism for some of the secondary processes proposed by Freud; that is, screening of impulses emerging from the unconscious, censoring these impulses or wishes, and encoding them in obscure but acceptable dream symbols." He concludes that the corollary "is that there is no latent content, that rather than metaphor or symbol, dreams consist entirely of what is manifest on the surface of the dream, not disguised and in need of decoding" (pp. 199–200). It is noteworthy that Braun, like Jung, whose doubts about whether dreams are symbolic of the repressed unconscious conflicts he quotes, believes nonetheless that dreams are psychologically meaningful.

Solms and Turnbull (2002) studied patients with lesions in various parts of the brain. They conclude their analysis with the observation that the areas of the brain that would appear to support secondary process symbolic activity are quiescent during dreaming. They note that the neural circuitry involved is entirely different than that in normal (nonpsychotic) waking thought, a finding that casts doubt on the belief that an hallucinatory actualization can be symbolic and representational. They describe the neural circuitry as consisting of various trigger mechanisms, of which the REM state is the most frequent, that activate sensory-perceptual areas in the posterior forebrain, quite distinct from the frontal lobes that play a central role in waking thought and associated motor activity.

A Primary Process Model of Dreaming

If dreams are not representational and symbolic, then what Freud thought of as regressive mechanisms of condensation and displacement that serve to create arcane pictographic symbols may simply be what distinguishes the protolanguage of dreaming from the secondary process language of waking thought. The converse hypothesis, that dreaming involves the regressive degradation of existing symbols to form concretely experienced actualizations, and therefore that conden-

sation and displacement are desymbolizing mechanisms, seems equally implausible, for dreaming begins at least as early in life as the acquisition of ordinary language. Dreaming is truly a primary mental process, as Freud noted when describing the dreams of his daughter Anna. Experimental corroboration of the contiguous parallel existence of this qualitatively distinct primal language in waking life is found in Fisher's elaborations (1956) of the experiment by Pötzl that Freud discussed in a footnote appended to *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1919 (1900a, p. 181). Subjects were exposed to subliminal perceptual stimuli and encouraged to recall subsequent dreams. It was discovered that elements of the imagery that the person had not been conscious of perceiving during the waking experiment were incorporated in their manifest content. Fisher found that the transformations or distortions of perception occur at the time of perception itself, and are consistent with the principles of primary process.

As qualitatively distinct languages, dreaming and ordinary language present alternative systematic expressions of mind, presumably analogous, if not causally related. Many questions remain as to their relationship. Because our capacity to attend to them is divided by the discontinuous states of sleeping and wakefulness, the two can never be compared at a given instant. In that respect the dream is much like the tree that falls in the forest with no one present to perceive the event. Developmental questions remain, as well. Freud believed that the wishful hallucinatory primary process state that characterizes the dreams of young children is developmentally continuous with the acquisition of representational capability and of language, an idea consistent with Piaget's stages of cognitive development beyond sensorimotor actualizations. This does not seem readily reconcilable with Freud's own observation that the primary process is not superseded by the development of secondary process language, but persists intact in adult life in what he called the system unconscious, to reemerge each night during sleep, and as a vulnerability to regression. Perhaps the work of Fiebach et al. (2003), suggesting initial registration of images in sensory-perceptual-emotional areas of the brain and subsequent elaboration in higher centers, might help account for the persistence of these parallel processes.

To summarize, a paradoxical belief—i.e., that a sensory-perceptual experience, a subjectively perceived happening or actualization without conscious thoughtful reflection, despite its imagistic resemblance to elements of thought, is a representational symbolic process—has made

it difficult to distinguish within Freud's theory of dreaming two distinct hypotheses based on primary and secondary process mentation, and to recognize that dreams are the product of a primordial linguistic structure qualitatively distinct from the language of waking life. The dream as an actualized experience substitutes *is* for *like* and leaves nothing to be symbolized or thought about. Blechner (2001) believes that dreams are the pure language of thought, in contrast to waking language, which involves a qualitative transformation. He says, however, that dreaming "is the representation of the experience without the experience" (p. 95), by which he means without the experiencing subject, whereas I would say that dreaming is the experience without its representation. Perhaps the fact that successful dreams express mental states that arise during the course of the night in terms of action resolution accounts in part for why they are ordinarily so difficult to remember in the morning, for nothing remains, at least at the moment, to think about. Another factor contributing to the difficulty of conscious recall may be that remembering a dream is not like remembering a waking experience; the dream was experienced in a predicative or subjectless state rather than through the lens of subjective awareness.

Corroboration from the Study of Schizophrenic Language

Corroborative evidence in support of the hypothesis that dreaming is structured like a qualitatively distinctive language comes from what at first glance might seem an unlikely source—namely, schizophrenic language. One of the more interesting observations that Freud made but never followed up in the course of his effort to explicate the nature of dreaming was of the remarkable syntactic and semantic similarity between dreaming and the language of schizophrenics. "My explanation of hallucinations in hysteria and paranoia and of visions in mentally normal subjects is that they are in fact regressions—that is, thoughts transformed into images" (Freud 1900a, p. 544). The Brill translation (Freud 1900b) adds that this process is "not entirely unrelated to the state of sleep" (p. 373). Freud (1900a) notes that the same reduction in censorship that triggers the primary process that in turn leads to the work of dreaming can also occur under pathological conditions in waking life, leading to a state of "hallucinatory regression. . . . To this state of things we give the name of psychosis" (p. 568). Early on he offers the pregnant comment that "we are working towards

the explanation of the psychoses when we endeavor to elucidate the mystery of dreams" (1900b, p. 66). Unfortunately, he never undertook this important task. A full century later, Hobson, Pace-Schott, and Stickgold (2000) conclude their review of neurobiological findings that distinguish waking consciousness from dreaming states by suggesting that "possibly REM sleep dreaming involves a normal physiological state of the brain analogous to psychopathological conditions in which limbic hyperactivation is combined with frontal hypoactivation" (p. 1351). Among the psychopathological conditions to which they refer is schizophrenia. Solms and Turnbull (2002), going even further, cite evidence from functional imaging studies and from persons who have undergone ventromesial leucotomy, a surgical procedure in vogue a century ago as a treatment for schizophrenia, that the same centers and pathways are involved in dreaming as in that disorder.

I recently reported a study of schizophrenic language (Robbins 2002) that would seem to provide corroborative evidence that dreaming is structured like a language qualitatively distinct from that of normal waking life. As background I note that while Freud (1915) was the first to note that in schizophrenia words are treated as things, many analysts, including Klein (1930), Segal (1957), Lacan (1955–1956), and numerous others (see the contributors to Kasanin 1944), have noted the concrete nature of schizophrenic language and its identity with things and actions. Nonetheless, consistent with the symbolic paradox I noted earlier, many of these selfsame analysts listen to schizophrenic language as though it were symbolic and couch their interpretations in a form that would require the schizophrenic to comprehend ordinary language, with its abstract referential qualities, in order to appreciate them (Robbins 2002).

According to Werner and Kaplan (1963), "The translation of abstract thoughts into concrete-pictorial language reflects the closeness of schizophrenic speech to the handling of linguistic forms in dreams" (p. 262). Schizophrenic language is remarkably similar to the virtual reality language of dreaming insofar as it creates concrete identities and experiences of actualization involving sensation, perception, and, in more compensated schizophrenic states, action, all in lieu of mental representation, conscious reflective thought, and the bearing of feelings. Schizophrenic language is one of equivalence, immediacy, and action, as contrasted with self-awareness, reflection, and communication.

Schizophrenia manifests itself on a continuum of regression and compensation. In its most regressed form, catatonia, it is characterized by sensory-perceptual identity (hallucination), by a kind of fait accompli mentation known as delusional thinking that is different from ordinary waking reflective thought, and by paralysis of verbal and motor expression. This resembles the state of sensory-perceptual identity and motor paralysis that Freud first noted in his discussion of dreaming. In the state of maximum compensation, at the other end of the continuum, the balance shifts toward a state that nonetheless has an underlying similarity, in that it reaches an identity or experience of actualization that precludes the necessity of mature thought. That state includes not only sensation and perception, as in dreaming, but also delusional enactment, including the characteristically arcane magical verbalizations.

From a pragmatic perspective, ordinary language serves to adapt the waking user to the world in which he or she lives. In contrast, schizophrenic language does not distinguish between mind and world, does not support conceptions of time, effort, process, sequence, or consequence, but instead enables its user to experience a delusional sense of omnipotent control that circumvents the necessity for thought and adaptation. It is felt by its user to possess the power to undo, reverse, and eliminate what would otherwise be painful thoughts and feelings, and even to erase and alter history, so that it is not necessary for that person to adapt to consensual reality. Thus, it is similar to dreaming, which circumvents the necessity to waken and to think.

Corroboration from Cultural Anthropology

Whereas Freud's hypothesis that dreams are representational, symbolic vehicles has acquired the status of universal truth in the Western world, it is a distinctly minority view in the larger context of cultures both past and present. Most believe that dreams are actual events involving encounters with other persons, a view that Westerners are quick to dismiss as primitive and unsophisticated. For example, Kracke (1999), a psychoanalytic anthropologist who has studied dreaming in non-Western cultures, analyzed the dreams of a woman from the Parantintin tribe, a group from the Amazonian basin who believe dreams are visitations from ghosts or evil spirits. Kracke notes that in the syntax of their language dreams are actual encounters with other persons who have spoken to the dreamer during the night and poses a

question: "in cultures that assign other meanings to dreams: supernatural messages, premonitions of the future, or acts of the soul while wandering outside the body—can we consider dreams also to have personal meaning to the dreamer such as we attribute to them in our cosmology?" (p. 257). What he seems to be setting out to prove is the universality of the hypothesis that dreams are symbolic manifestations of unconscious thought, and that the waking dreamer, appropriately instructed to treat them as thoughts rather than events, may be able to abstract significance from their symbolism. But perhaps the language of other cultures reveals a truth that is as opaque to Western eyes as unconscious meaning is to theirs, that dream language is qualitatively discontinuous from that of waking life, and portrays mental content as actual ongoing events involving other people, rather than as internal, reflective symbolic thought.

Dream Interpretation

If dreaming is couched in a language qualitatively different from the secondary process symbolic activity of waking language, then how is it that none of us doubt it affords a unique window into otherwise unconscious aspects of mind? More particularly, we might ask what we actually do when we attempt to discover this unconscious meaning.

The process of making sense of a dream begins with our translating it into a representational, verbally scripted narrative, as we would with any "real" waking experience, past or present. But rendering the dream as a verbally scripted happening is very different from reporting a remembered actual experience, because the relation of the mental state of the waking subject to the remembered dream and the relation of that same individual to a remembered waking experience are qualitatively different in that the latter included subjective awareness and thoughtful processing. So dream interpretation begins with a product and a mental state that are already qualitatively different from the dream experience. While the dream as dreamed and the dream as recast in waking language are presumably related by analogy (each reflects or expresses a snapshot of the person's mind), we cannot be certain, since waking language is applied at a later time, that we have recaptured the mental state of the dreamer. In other words, the two experiences are radically discontinuous, separated both by time and by mental state.

Keeping these things in mind, a first take on understanding the dream involves contemplating it as a whole, in terms of its possible

analogical relationship with ongoing life concerns of the dreamer. While the cigar of the dream is part of an actualization and not a symbol, contemplating its "meaning" within the context of a verbalized dream script may by inference reveal what elements *symbolic to the dreamer in waking life* might have been rendered as "cigar" experiences in the dream. Werner and Kaplan (1963) seem to have been aware of this symbolic paradox: "the 'latent thought' of dream images may render these images symbolic for the interpreting psychotherapists; for the dreamers the dream images are taken as such and are thus not symbolic" (p. 16).

In summary, four steps appear to be involved in dream interpretation. First is a secondary process rendering of the dream so that it becomes a verbally scripted drama, recognizing that what is being remembered is a predicative, subjectless mental state qualitatively different from an ordinary past waking experience. States (1992) believes that dreaming "is difficult to talk about precisely because it consists of having such experiences, and talking about them in almost any manner tends to draw one into a conceptual mode of thought" (p. 5). The second step involves contemplating this scripted drama as an analogical rendering of unconscious themes or concerns of current importance to the dreamer. The third step of interpretation depends on having arrived at a plausible hypothesis about what was on the dreamer's mind, and consists of speculation about context-relevant symbols of everyday life that may have been transformed into seemingly actualized experience. This is what States seems to be referring to when he says "the dream is the instantiation of a felt meaning . . . and what meaning one gets out of it on the waking side by way of interpretation is itself a new meaning (because a new symbolization) . . . " (pp. 10–11). The final step consists of applying psychoanalytic understanding to the content that has emerged in consequence of the reflective, analogical, and symbolic thinking enabled by ordinary language.

I dreamed I was entering the lecture hall where I was to give a presentation. Many people were already there, and among them I was surprised and pleased to see that some of the people whose opinions I value had come to hear me. I was feeling confident, even a bit jaunty. I saw my discussant, an older and well-respected person in our field, with his back to me, talking with two women. I was wearing a large, wide-brimmed Mexican-style hat as a sunshield. On it was a long straw attachment that resembled an arm. I thought I would go up to the dis-

cussant and throw the arm attachment around him, in a kind of joking gesture of welcome, but when I got to the group and tried to do it I discovered to my chagrin that it was not him at all, but a third woman, and that I did not know any of them. I backed away, and suddenly, to my horror, realized I did not have the manuscript of my paper and must have left it in my car, which was parked some distance away. I rushed to get it, passing out of the hall as a number of people entered and took seats for the lecture, which was to begin imminently. I began to doubt that I had even put the briefcase with my manuscript in the car, and I started to panic as I realized I was going in the wrong direction and even if I found the manuscript it would be impossible to get back to the auditorium by the time the talk was to begin.

The dream occurred at a when time I was preparing for an actual presentation. The discussant depicted in the dream was a man who had been considered for that role in fact, because of his particular expertise, but rejected because of his flamboyant style and tendency to use such occasions as opportunities for self-promotion. After rendering the dream as a verbally scripted drama and contemplating its analogical relation to my waking concerns, I could begin to see an overarching theme, my mental struggle about wishes to be center stage and special, the envy of those I perceived as having achieved such status and the attention that comes with it, and feelings of anonymity and self-doubt related to a concern that I might have nothing of value to say. (In making presentations I tend to feel excessively dependent on my written text, as though I have no confidence about my inner substance.) I was then able to see that some of the peculiar imagery in the dream represented dramatizations of what in waking life are for me symbols. The discussant, I realized, symbolizes for me the success, attention, and oedipal victory that I envy. "Sunshield" and the transformation of the discussant into a woman seem to condense conflicting elements of admiration, envy, and threat, along with a sense of fraudulence and disappointment, all related to an idealized father figure. What is important is that these elements are symbolic in the ordinary language of my waking life or, to put it differently, that although I can represent the mental state of the dream in the ordinary language of conflict, reflection, ambivalence, and symbolism, in the language of the dream I have experienced a happening with a resolution, however unsatisfactory, that eliminated at least for the moment the need for wakeful thought.

A patient dreamed that a small bat had gotten into her apartment—or perhaps it was a bird or butterfly. She experienced herself as less terrorized than she would have anticipated (she had on more than one occasion been abjectly terrified to discover an insect in my office or a bat in her apartment), but she was nonetheless afraid it would get in her hair. Where ordinarily she would have fled and hidden herself, now she opened the front door and the bat flew out. But there was a hole around the handle, and the bat, transformed into a butterfly, flew back in and alighted on the doorframe. When she awoke from her dream she realized that the hole in the door reminded her of a hole around a pipe in the wall of her apartment, through which mice sometimes enter.

Through a complex process including my identifying and interpreting various postures she assumed and interactions she engaged in with me while recounting the dream in words, we cast the dream experience in the form of a thematic script. Gradually we recognized that some of the dream experiences were a kind of enactment of what in waking life were meaningful personal symbols. To begin with, as she recounted the dream her hands locked behind her head, elbows extended outward. As a child she had been rejected and violated physically and emotionally by a psychotic mother, and after a lengthy period of her analysis hitherto repressed and disguised memories had emerged of her having been tied to the bed and sexually abused by her father. The posture she assumed was one that had originally led us to discover that she was unconsciously enacting the childhood states of being tied up and attacked, and huddling protectively to defend herself; it was also a representation of the self-control she exercised by inhibiting all emotional expression and spontaneous action. She was well aware that holes are typical vaginal symbols. She began to wonder why she was so terrified of bats, and to realize that in her waking life they were symbolic of being *bat*tered and of the psychotic process (being "bats") with which she knew her mother had been afflicted, and which she had more recently been able to own and fear in herself. We had established some time ago that butterflies symbolized a sense of beauty and good feeling she intermittently and increasingly experienced as a consequence of our analytic work. The bat getting in her hair, she realized, was a concrete enactment of the commonplace metaphor for frustration and anger. At this point in the interpretive process she had fantasies of getting me on the floor, where I would huddle in terror while she

kicked me in the genitals. She then remarked that something within her was changing for the better. She was becoming more receptive to positive experiences and to my feedback; because she felt more able to identify her interests, to exercise judgment and control over who and what she did and did not want to let inside her physically, cognitively, and emotionally, and to express anger and say no appropriately, she could now tolerate experiencing wishes to be emotionally and physically closer to me. But there were times in relation to me and to things like the mouse getting into her apartment when she still found herself shocked and confused, and tended to react in old ways, by withdrawing, shutting down awareness, and misdirecting rage.

This same patient told me another dream in which she was lying on the floor of the office of a female therapist who had replaced me, feeling distraught because I was not there. The therapist began to soothe her by patting her on the back, but my patient gradually became aware that the woman's hand, which felt like a paw, with claws, had slipped under her shirt and pants, and she awakened in a state of anxiety. Reflecting on the thematic coherence of her verbal description, she realized that despite substantial conflicting emotions she had recently been experiencing my presence as soothing. After realizing the analogy between the dream and the issues of closeness she was struggling with, the waking symbolism of being "pawed" occurred to her, along with intrusive sexual connotations associated with early experiences with both her parents.

The Function and Significance of Dreaming

The Interpretation of Dreams was the product of an early stage in the development of Freud's theories during which he was elaborating the economic and topographic models of the mind. The issue preoccupying Freud at the time was how to understand the mind in unconscious conflict. His discovery that dreams might be focal (if particularly arcane) symbolic specimens of repressed libidinal wishes whose guises appeared penetrable by his associative method led him to develop the secondary process way of looking at dreams, but at the expense of incompletely elaborating the hypothesis that dreams are the expression of a qualitatively distinct primary process. One untoward consequence of contemplating dreams from this secondary process perspective has been the growing consensus of many analysts, illustrated by the report of the Kris Study Group (Waldhorn 1967), that

dreams are not the royal road to unconscious conflict, but only one of many roads that, so to speak, lead to Rome. In the century since Freud's Dream Book was published, economic and topographic theories of mind, as well as the preoccupation with mental conflict and its manifestations, have become less central to analysis, while attention to the self, to the relationship, and to the discovery and construction of meaning has become more so. Freud's belief that dreams preserve sleep by enabling disguised symbolic fulfillment of conflicted libidinal wishes that might otherwise become conscious and waken the sleeper is no longer tenable if we accept the primary process theory of dreaming as a qualitatively distinct protolinguistic expression of mind.

The primary process model of dreaming can lead to understanding and appreciating what is truly and uniquely valuable about dreaming, and distinguishes it from other avenues to unconscious meaning. Considered from this perspective, the dream—as best we can comprehend it in waking thought and secondary process language—may indeed be said to be a royal road. It can serve as a quasi-independent check and balance, a kind of supervisory third in the sense of "someone" speaking another language, that orients analyst and analysand with regard to the analysand's basic mental state, and in so doing provides unique clues as to whether the analysis is on track.

If dreaming is not a disguised fulfillment of repressed wishes, then what are its functions with regard to sleep? I suggest we reconsider Freud's proposal (1900a) that "the wish to sleep . . . must in every case be reckoned as one of the motives for the formation of dreams, and every successful dream is a fulfilment of that wish" (p. 234).

I sustained a painful chest injury and was having considerable difficulty sleeping. During a brief period of sleep I dreamed that I was at my computer and on the screen was a horizontally ordered, numbered series of boxes indicating levels of pain. I discovered that I could delete pain level by level, by clicking the mouse. I awoke in considerable pain. This transparently wish-fulfilling dream was not symbolic. In the ordinary language of my waking life the delete key on the computer had unconsciously come to symbolize getting rid of what I didn't need, want, or like. My sleeping mind was preoccupied with the problem of pain management, and the dream was a partially successful effort to make the problem—not the pain—go away so that, at least for a while, I might remain asleep.

The psychological motivation to preserve sleep evolves from the physiological need to sleep, whose function and mode of operation are beyond the scope of this investigation. We might say that during infancy and childhood this is a primary unconscious need. As we become sentient beings, this physiological need gradually gains representation as a wish most of us adults who occasionally experience insomnia are quite conscious of at various times in our lives, in the form of an awareness that if we think or worry too much about the cares of the day we will not be able to sleep. The mind of the dreamer, like that of the schizophrenic, creates a language that serves to circumvent the thought processes that are an essential aspect of adaptation to the waking "real" world. They are the languages of the un-thoughtful mind. Schizophrenic language creates the delusions and hallucinations that enable the waking subject to avoid dealing with the problems of real life by rendering them nonexistent or solved. The mind of the sleeper converts the urges to think (Solms 1999) that recur at intervals during the night and might otherwise require expression in waking thought and ordinary language, as well as related actions, into the dreaming language of hallucinated, concretely actualized events. Dream language renders mental activity in a primitive linguistic form that obviates the necessity to think, feel, and act, and hence to be awake.

> Sleep that knits up the ravell'd sleave of care,
> The death of each day's life; sore labor's bath,
> Balm of hurt minds, great nature's second course,
> Chief nourisher in life's feast.
>
> MACBETH, II.ii.33–36

REFERENCES

AKJAMIAN, A., DEMERS, R., & HARNISH, R. (1984). *Linguistics: An Introduction to Language and Communication.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

BICKERTON, D. (1990). *Language and Species*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

BLECHNER, M. (1998). The analysis and creation of dream meaning: Interpersonal, intrapsychic, and neurobiological perspectives. *Contemporary Psychoanalysis* 34:181–194.

——— (2001). *The Dream Frontier*. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press.

BRAUN, A. (1999). The new neuropsychology of sleep: Commentary. *Neuro-Psychoanalysis* 1:196–201.

Chomsky, N. (1965). *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.* Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dor, J. (1998). *Introduction to the Reading of Lacan: The Unconscious Structured Like a Language.* New York: Other Press.
Erikson, E. (1954). The dream-specimen of psychoanalysis. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 2:5–56.
Fairbairn, W.R.D. (1952). *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality*. London: Tavistock.
Fiebach, C., Friederici, A., Muller, K., von Cramm, D.Y., & Hernandez, A. (2003). Distinct brain representations for early and late learned words. *NeuroImage* 19:1627–1637.
Fisher, C. (1956). Dreams, images, and perceptions: A study of unconscious-preconscious relationships. *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 4:5–48.
Freeman-Sharpe, E. (1949). *Dream Analysis.* London: Hogarth.
French, T., & Fromm, E. (1964). *Dream Interpretation: A New Approach*. New York: Basic Books.
Freud, S. (1900a). The interpretation of dreams. *Standard E*dition 4/5.
——— (1900b). *The Interpretation of Dreams,* transl. A.A. Brill. New York: Gramercy Books, 1996.
——— (1911). Formulations on the two principles of mental functioning. *Standard Edition* 12:213–226.
——— (1915). The unconscious. *Standard Edition* 14:166–215.
Greenberg, R., & Pearlman, C. (1978). If Freud only knew: A reconsideration of psychoanalytic dream theory. *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 5:71–75.
——— ——— (1999). *The Interpretation of Dreams*: A classic revisited. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues* 9:749–765.
Greenson, R. (1970). The exceptional position of the dream in psychoanalytic practice. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 39:519–549.
Hartmann, E. (1996). Outline for a theory on the nature and functions of dreaming. *Dreaming* 6:147–160.
Hobson, J. (1999). The new neuropsychology of sleep: Implications for psychoanalysis. *Neuro-Psychoanalysis* 1:157–183.
——— Pace-Schott, E., & Stickgold, R. (2000). Consciousness: Its vicissitudes in waking and sleep. In *The New Cognitive Neurosciences,* ed. M. Gazzaniga. 2nd ed. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 1341–1354.
Jakobson, R. (1956). Two aspects of language and two types of aphasic disturbances. In *On Language,* ed. L. Waugh & M. Monville-Burston. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 115–133.
Jones, E. (1916). The theory of symbolism. In *Papers on Psycho-Analysis.* 5th ed. London: Balliere, Tindall & Cox, 1948, pp. 87–144.
Jung, C.G. (1931). *Analytic Psychology: Its Theory and Practice,* transl. R.C.F. Hull. New York: Random House.

——— (1934). The practical use of dream-analysis. In *Collected Works: Vol. 16,* transl. R.C.F. Hull. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 139–162.

——— (1945). On the nature of dreams. In *Collected Works: Vol. 8,* transl. R.C.F. Hull. New York: Random House, 1959, pp. 363–379.

KANZER, M. (1955). The communicative function of the dream. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 36:260–266.

KASANIN, J., ED. (1944). *Language and Thought in Schizophrenia.* New York: Norton.

KLEIN, M. (1930). On the importance of symbol formation in the development of the ego. In *Love, Guilt and Reparation & Other Works 1921–1945.* London: Hogarth, 1975, pp. 219–232.

KOHUT, H. (1977). *The Restoration of the Self.* New York: International Universities Press.

KRACKE, W. (1999). A language of dreaming: Dreams of an Amazonian insomniac. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 80:257–271.

LACAN, J. (1953). The function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis. In *Ecrits: A Selection,* transl. A. Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977, pp. 30–113.

——— (1955–1956). *Seminar: Book III. The Psychoses,* ed. J.-A. Miller; transl. R. Grigg. New York: Norton, 1993.

——— (1968). *The Language of the Self: The Function of Language in Psychoanalysis,* transl. A. Wilden. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

MOORE, B., & FINE, B. (1990). *Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

PIAGET, J. (1962). *Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood,* transl. C. Gattegno & F. Hodgson. New York: Norton.

ROBBINS, M. (2002). The language of schizophrenia and the world of delusion. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 83:383–405.

RUPPRECHT, C. (1999). Dreaming and the impossible art of translation. *Dreaming* 9:1–27.

SEGAL, H. (1957). Notes on symbol formation. *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 38:39–45.

SILBERER, H. (1951). On symbol-formation. In *Organization and Pathology of Thought: Selected Sources,* ed. D. Rapaport. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 208–233.

SOLMS, M. (1995). New findings on the neurological organization of dreaming: Implications for psychoanalysis. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 64:43–67.

——— (1999). The new neuropsychology of sleep: Commentary. *Neuro-Psychoanalysis* 1:183–195.

——— & TURNBULL, O. (2002). *The Brain and the Inner World.* New York: Other Press.

STATES, B. (1992). The meaning of dreams. *Dreaming* 2:1–13.

——— (2000). Dream bizarreness and inner thought. *Dreaming* 10:1–15.

VON DOMARUS, E. (1944). The specific laws of logic in schizophrenia. In *Language and Thought in Schizophrenia,* ed. J.S. Kasanin. New York: Norton.

VYGOTSKY, L.S. (1934). *Thought and Language.* Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962.

WALDHORN, H. (1967). The place of the dream in clinical psychoanalysis. In *Indications for Psychoanalysis,* ed. B. Fine, E. Joseph, & H. Waldhorn. Kris Study Group Monograph 2. New York: International Universities Press, pp. 52–106.

WERNER, H., & KAPLAN, B. (1963). *Symbol Formation: An Organismic-Developmental Approach to Language and the Expression of Thought*. New York: Wiley.

56 Kestrel Lane
Amherst, MA 01002
E-mail: mdrobbinsmd@comcast.net