

PS 5

$$\begin{aligned} \ln w_i^V &= x_i' \beta^V + u_i^V & \sim u_i^V &\sim N(0, \sigma_u^2) \\ \ln w_i^N &= x_i' \beta^N + u_i^N & \sim u_i^N &\sim N(0, \sigma_u^2) \\ u_i^V &= \delta_0 + \delta_1 (\ln w_i^V - \ln w_i^N) + x_i' \delta_2 + z_i' \delta_3 - v_i > 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} a) \Pr(\text{being union} | x_i) &= \Pr(u_i > 0 | x_i) = \\ &= \Pr(\delta_0 + \delta_1 (\ln w_i^V - \ln w_i^N) + x_i' \delta_2 + z_i' \delta_3 - v_i > 0 | x_i) \\ &= \Pr(\delta_0 + \delta_1 (x_i' \beta^V + u_i^V - x_i' \beta^N - u_i^N) + x_i' \delta_2 + z_i' \delta_3 - v_i > 0 | x_i) \\ &= \Pr(\delta_0 + \delta_1 x_i' (\beta^V - \beta^N) + x_i' \delta_2 + z_i' \delta_3 > v_i - \delta_1 (u_i^V - u_i^N) | x_i) \\ &= \Pr\left(\underbrace{\delta_0 + \delta_1 x_i' (\beta^V - \beta^N) + x_i' \delta_2 + z_i' \delta_3}_{\delta^*} > \underbrace{v_i - \delta_1 (u_i^V - u_i^N)}_{\varepsilon_i^*} | x_i \right) \end{aligned}$$

where $\delta^* = \delta_0 + \delta_1 x_i' (\beta^V - \beta^N) + x_i' \delta_2 + z_i' \delta_3$

We need to assume $\delta^* \sim N$, because this doesn't follow directly from the assumptions stated in the PS.

$$= \Phi\left(\frac{\delta^*}{\sigma^*} \right) \quad \text{— probability of being in the union}$$

Expected union/non-union wage diff for a random person:

$$E(\ln w_i^V - \ln w_i^N) = E(\ln w_i^V) - E(\ln w_i^N) = \underbrace{(\beta^V - \beta^N) E(x_i)}_{\text{union wage diff}} + \underbrace{E(u_i^V) - E(u_i^N)}_{=0}$$

for a person who is in the union

$$E(\ln w_i^U | d_i=1, x_i) =$$

$$= x_i' B^U + E(u_i^U | d_i=1, x_i)$$

$$= x_i' B^U + E(E(\varepsilon_i^* | A > \varepsilon^*))$$

$$= x_i' B^U + T_U E(\varepsilon_i^* | A > \varepsilon^*)$$

$$= x_i' B^U - J_U \lambda(A)$$

$$E(\ln w_i^N | d_i=0, x_i) = E(\ln w_i^N | A < \varepsilon^*) = E(u_i^N | \varepsilon_i^* < 0) =$$

$$= x_i' B^N + T_N E(\varepsilon_i^* | A < \varepsilon^*)$$

$$= x_i' B^N + J_N \lambda(A)$$

$$= x_i' B^N + J_N \lambda'(A)$$

$$= x_i' B^N + J_N \lambda'(A)$$

Note that:

$$E(\varepsilon_i^* | A > \varepsilon^*) = -\lambda(A) = \frac{\phi(A)}{\Phi(A)}$$

$$E(\varepsilon_i^* | A < \varepsilon^*) = \frac{\phi(A)}{1 - \Phi(A)} = \lambda'(A)$$

Consider the

regression

$$u_i^U = T_U \varepsilon_i^* + \varepsilon_i^U$$

$$\text{where } \varepsilon_i^* = \varepsilon_i^U - \varepsilon_i^N$$

$$J_U = \frac{\text{cov}(u_i^U, \varepsilon_i^*)}{\text{var}(\varepsilon_i^*)} =$$

$$= \frac{E(u_i^U, \varepsilon_i^*)}{\text{var}(\varepsilon_i^*)} =$$

$$= \frac{-\delta_1 \delta_u}{\delta^2}$$

$$J_N = \frac{\delta_1 \delta_N}{\delta^2}$$

$$\lambda'(A) = \frac{\phi(A)}{1 - \Phi(A)}$$

$$E(\ln w_i^U - \ln w_i^N) = x_i' (B^U - B^N) + (J_U \lambda(A) + J_N \lambda'(A))$$

b) No, because we have a selection problem.

i.e. $E(u_i^U | d_i=1) \neq 0$ & $E(u_i^N | d_i=0) \neq 0 \rightarrow$ the exclusion restriction is violated for B^U & B^N , so the OLS estimator would be biased.

p. 290

see how I typed A before on p. 1

MLE

$$c) L = \Pr(d_i=1 | x_i, \theta; z_i) f(\ln(w_i) | x_i, \theta; z_i) \begin{cases} \ln w^U & \text{if } u_i^* \geq 0 \\ \ln w^N & \text{if } u_i^* < 0 \end{cases}$$

$$= \Phi(A) \cdot \phi(y - x_i' B^U) \cdot (1 - \Phi(A)) \cdot \phi(y - x_i' B^N)$$

We can either estimate the wage equations by MLE or by following the procedure described below.

Step 1 Reduced form probit / participation equation (union status equation)

d) substitute the equations for $\ln w_i^U$ & $\ln w_i^N$ into u_i^* and estimate the probit by MLE.

From this you get $\hat{\delta}_0 + \hat{\delta}_1(B^U - B^N) \cdot \hat{\delta}_2$ | $\hat{\delta}_3$

δ^U δ^N δ^T

Step 2 estimating the wage equation

run the wage regression, using estimates from step (1).

$$\ln w_i^U = x_i' B^U - \gamma_u - \lambda(A) \rightarrow \text{estimates from step 1 enter here}$$

This gives you an estimate of B^U .

$$\ln w_i^N = x_i' B^N + \gamma_n - \lambda(A) \Rightarrow \text{get estimate of } B^N$$

e) reestimating the "structural" probit to retrieve $\delta_0, \delta_1, \delta_2$ using estimates from step 2
 → plug the estimates ~~to~~ from the wage regression back into the probit from step 1 to get the structural ~~and~~ probit estimates

f) • Returns to education are higher in the non-unionised sector → for people with higher education it's better not to be in the union.

• HE has a higher return in the unionised sector

• males receive higher wage than females, but the tilt is smaller in the nonunionised sector

→ black-white wage tilt smaller in unionised sector

- HLT has a less negative effect in unionised sector

g) in Table 1 it's $-\frac{\phi(i)}{\Phi(i)}$, in table 2 it's $\frac{\phi(i)}{1-\Phi(i)}$

So both selectivity variables/truncation effects are possible, meaning we only observe the upper section of the union wage distributions.

Positive truncation effect stem for the fact that individuals self-select into sector that pays him better than the average person

h) it seems to be the most important factor explaining the union status

1) Table 6 \rightarrow the biggest predictor of unionisation is the union non-union wage differential

Table 6 tells us that unions may prefer to higher educated workers, even though they themselves would prefer the non-unionized sector. The same results hold for the "race dummy"

Table 7 gives net effects on the union status.

There is difference b/w Table 6 & 7 when it comes to education; ~~unions~~ ^{unions} prefer to choose more educated workers, but ~~more~~ educated workers prefer the non-unionized sector and the net effect is negative.

Unions tend to discriminate against non-whites, but the returns of non-whites are greater in the unions

than non-unions & the net-effect is negative

\rightarrow constructed by plugging back estimates of the wage equations into "reduced form probit"

②

b) This is essentially a SUR model.

We have two separate equations where the error terms are assumed to be correlated across equations.
In the case of bivariate probit we have:

$$y_1 = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y_1^* > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$y_2 = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } y_2^* > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} \epsilon_1 \\ \epsilon_2 \end{bmatrix} | x \sim N \begin{bmatrix} 0 & \rho \\ 0 & \rho \end{bmatrix}$$

$$L(B_1, B_2) = \left(\prod P(y_1=1, y_2=1 | B_1, B_2) \right)^{y_1 y_2} P(y_1=0, y_2=1 | B_1, B_2)^{(1-y_1)y_2} \\ P(y_1=1, y_2=0 | B_1, B_2)^{y_1(1-y_2)} P(y_1=0, y_2=0 | B_1, B_2)^{(1-y_1)(1-y_2)}$$

↳ the advantage is that estimating the two models jointly we gain efficiency compared to if we estimated them separately by OLS

d) First they try different values of rho (correlation) between the error terms affecting C & errors affecting Y. to see what value the negative affect of C on Y becomes 0 & afterwards positive.

Then they try to bound the effect from below by assuming that the correlation of observables with C is the same as the correlation of unobservables with C
i.e. part of mortality related to observable & part related to unobservables are assumed to have the same relationship with C.

$$\text{Proj}(c' | x'y, \varepsilon) = \phi_0 + \phi_1'y x'y + \phi_2 \varepsilon \rightarrow \begin{array}{l} \text{lower bound } \phi_1'y = \phi_2 \varepsilon \\ \text{upper bound } \phi_2 = 0 \end{array}$$

↑
Upper bound holds be the uncalculated effect assuming c is exogenous.

In the end they provide the framework on analyzing the relative strength of selection on unobservables \geq selection on observables are

$$\frac{E(E|c=1) - E(E|c=0)}{\text{var}(\varepsilon)} = \frac{2 E(x'y|c=1) - E(x'y|c=0)}{\text{var}(x'y)}$$

If $\lambda=1$ - selection on observables is the same as selection on unobservables

