

# 德国古典哲学讲座讲稿翻译文本

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时间：2016 年 10 月 22 日

课程名称：Freedom II: The Actuality of Freedom

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<p>8.1 Two Thought Experiments</p> <p>According to a venerable principle of law that is shared by the western world with other cultures (e.g., <i>Koran</i>, Sura 7, Verse 42), no one can be expected to do more than he is capable of doing (<i>ultra posse, nemo obligator</i>). Should the expectations of autonomous morals fundamentally overtax someone, he is exculpated from the obligation. However, he is not entirely free of the obligation. As a practical, rational being, he is challenged to pursue the possibilities of practical reason to the end and that means to the level of morals. The individual can find himself, nonetheless, in an inhuman, even tragic situation. He can be subject to two competing demands: on the one hand, that of a morally universalizable maxim; on the other, that of a human nature that recognizes the relevant demand but is incapable of fulfilling it.</p> <p>What is to be investigated here is not the application question of whether or not there are persons in general or in particular situations who are overtaxed by the unreasonable demands of a morals of autonomy. There is no serious doubt about this possibility. The investigation of each particular case or type of circumstances, however, would extend well beyond the parameters of a fundamental ethics. As an ethics of the will, therefore, fundamental ethics undertakes only a preliminary task. It resists the inclination of a purely performance-oriented ethics to either under-challenge or over-challenge persons. If only performance counts, then a good outcome counts to the benefit of the one involved even if not so much he himself but, rather, fortunate circumstances brought about the performance. Furthermore, an eventual</p>	<p>8.1 两种思想实验</p> <p>根据一条古老的法律准则，它是由西方世界和其文化所共享的。（例如，古兰经，苏拉 7、42 节），没有人可以被期待去做超过他能力范围的事情。（过激的地方武装团队，尼莫债务人）应该。基本道德自律的希望应该使人负担过重，从义务而言他是无罪的。然而，他不是完全没有义务。作为一个实际的、理性的存在者，他面临着去追求实际最终原因的可能性的挑战，这意味着道德的水平。个人可以找到他自己，但是，在一个不人道，甚至悲惨啊的局面，他被两个竞争要求所奴役：一方面是一个道德上的可普遍化的准则，另一方面，一个人的本性就是意识到了相关的需求但是不能够实现它。</p> <p>这里要调查的不是应用问题其中的哪一个，不是一般的人，或者是在特殊的情况下，人在不理性的自由的道德要求下有着过重的压力。没有任何严重的华裔这种可能性。然而，对每一个特殊的案例或典型的境况的调查，将超越一个基本的伦理参数。因此，作为意愿的伦理，基本的伦理只是一个初步的任务。它抵制以纯粹的绩效导向的伦理的倾向，无论是将面临挑战或者是在挑战的人。若只有性能数据，那么一个好的结果数据对一个参与者带来的好处，即使对他自己而言并没有那么多。但是，幸运的情况带来的表现相反。此外，一个最终的失败最终是归因与他自己，当他去做任何他力所能及的事情为了获得一个更好的结果。</p>
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failure is attributed to him when he did everything humanly possible to accomplish a better outcome.

What will also not to be discussed is the already more fundamental question of whether or not a specific kind of morals, for example, a strict altruism, is too much to be expected of people. In any case, morals do not demand a strict altruism. It calls for sympathy, readiness to help, and benevolence, but not this further altruism, which expects the bracketing of the self. Crucial for a fundamental ethics is the even more fundamental question of whether or not moral autonomy constitutes for rational beings of the human kind a challenge that is foreign to lived reality, perhaps even contradictory of lived reality: Are rational beings who are shaped by sensuous appetites capable of free will whatsoever, or is this capacity a mere fiction?

In order to rebut a radical skepticism, we will undertake a thought experiment (inspired by Kant). It begins by taking the side of the skeptic in assuming the fundamental moral overtaxing of humanity only then to show that this assumption is by no means convincing. We begin, cautiously, with a discussion of the more modest, pre-moral freedom. Resuming the theme of Chapter 19, we discuss it in terms of the natural scientist who himself doubts the reality of practical freedom: One imagines a brain researcher – one could just as well imagine a journalist, businessman, or politician – who experiences so much pressure in his career that he is ready to engage in fraud. In light of such a temptation, one can ask the ruthless achiever how he would act if he knew that he would lose his position immediately were the fraud exposed and that he would never again be able to pursue his career as a researcher, journalist, businessman, or politician.

If we set aside the clinical case of an ingenious psychopath, the answer is obvious: A career as a scientist is aimed beyond one's discoveries at the respect one has from colleagues and beyond

将讨论的也不是这个：是否是一种特定的道德这个已经是更基本的问题。例如，严格的利他主义，它太多的被人所期待。在任何情况，道德都不要求严格的利他主义。它需要同情，乐于助人和仁慈，但不是更深程度的利他，这种期待排除自我的利他。

基本的道德的关键是一个更为重要的问题，道德自主性是否构成对人类理性的一种挑战，这是外国生活的现实，也许是生活矛盾的现实：理性地人被感性欲望的能力自由意志塑造将会怎样，或者这是一个虚构的能力吗？

为了反驳一个激进的怀疑论，我们将进行一个思想实验（受康德鼓励）。它从怀疑论一方开始，假设人类的基本道德负担过重，只有这样才能表现这个假设是没有说服力的。我们谨慎地开始，与一个更温和的，前道德的讨论。恢复第 19 章的主题，我们从自然科学的角度来探讨它，自然科学家他们自己怀疑实践自由的现实。一个想象为大脑的研究员——一个也可以想象为记者，商人或者政客——他们在他们的职业中经历着过重的压力，他已经准备实施诈骗。在这种诱惑的光芒下，一个无情的获得成功人他会如何行动，若他知道他将失去他现在的地位，如果欺诈被暴露，他将再也不能获得他作为研究人员，记者，商人，或政治家的职业。

如果我们把一个巧妙的精神病患者的临床情况下，答案是显而易见的：作为一个职业科学家的目标是超越人的发现在尊重人从同事和超越他们的尊重的人发现人的朋

<p>them to the respect one finds in one's circle of friends and even from the public. Apart from the curiosity that drives one's research, there is the hope that the career will one day bring a solid income if not a scientific prize, perhaps even self-respect. Whoever sees all of this (proverbially, "a golden future") clearly threatened, even the most ambitious person, will seek to control his ambition. Only a fool assumes that a professional guild can be taken to be a collection of fools not only temporarily but in perpetuity. As a consequence, we can reckon with pragmatic freedom (again, apart from difficult cases of illness) as a fact.</p> <p>One can even set aside the goal of a promising future or one's personal general well-being and be satisfied with the desire of a scientific career and thereby discover a contradiction – admittedly, no logical but an empirical-pragmatic contradiction: Because science lives from the repeatability of experiments and competition, one cannot count on the "lucky break" of a deposit without a testament or with a secure means for fraud. As a consequence, the denial of fraud is not only advisable from the perspective of life wisdom but also from the most elementary knowledge of the profession in which one wishes to pursue a career: Whoever constructs his scientific career on the basis of fraudulent means, thwarts with these means the very goal he wants to achieve. He succumbs to a serious technical error; he violates the technique of a research career.</p> <p>On both sides, then, on the technical as well as the pragmatic side, freedom hints at a principle that can serve as the motto for the argument with the freedom-skepticism of the brain researcher: "Precisely rejection of this waywardness was the highest command that I imposed on myself; I, free ape, acquiesced to this yoke." As appropriate in a debate with a scientific researcher, the principle arises out of a fictitious "Report to an Academy," written by a linguistically gifted, admittedly non-professional scientist, Franz Kafka (1919/1971)</p>	<p>友圈子，甚至从公共。除了推动一个人的研究的好奇心外，还有希望事业有一天能带来坚实的收入，如果不是科学奖，甚至是自尊。任何人看到这一切（众所周知，“金色未来”）明确的威胁，即使是最有野心的人，要控制自己的野心。只有傻瓜才会认为专业协会可以采取的是一个愚人的征收不仅暂时而是永久。因此，我们可以认为，务实的自由作为一个事实。（再次强调，除了困难的情况下，疾病）</p> <p>我们甚至可以抛开前途或个人总体幸福感的目标和满意的职业生涯的愿望，从而发现一个矛盾——诚然，没有逻辑但实证的矛盾：因为从实验重复性和竞争而来的科学的生活，不能指望“幸运的”存款，不是一份遗嘱或安全的手段诈骗。</p> <p>因此，否定欺诈行为不仅是明智的生活智慧的视角，也是行业中希望追求事业的最基本的知识：在欺诈手段的基础上建立科学生涯的人，这些手段会阻碍他想要的目标实现。他被一个严重的技术错误压垮；他亵渎了研究职业者的技术。</p> <p>从以上方面来看，然后，在技术以及语用方面，自由暗示原理，可以作为与大脑研究者的自由怀疑争论的座右铭：“严格地摒弃这任性是最高的命令，我要求自己；我，自由的猿，默许了这枷锁”。作为一个科学工作者的适当的讨论，这个原则产生于了一个虚拟的“向学院报告”，一个语言天才写的，诚然非专业的科学家，弗兰兹·卡夫卡（1919 / 1971）</p>
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One recalls: The author and hero of the report is an ape that was taken captive by a hunting expedition from the firm Hagenbeck on the Gold Coast and transported back to Hamburg in a cage. This ape reports a short five years later how he first learned social customs, namely to shake hands and to spit – he travels with sailors – to smoke a pipe, and how to uncork properly a bottle of hard liquor. Very quickly, he acquires the rudiments of language and cries out: “Hello!” A bit later he achieves “the average education of a European.”

More important to him than these skills is a personal accomplishment that qualifies as a “yoke,” that is, the highly painstaking self-development by means of which he reaches the status of a “free ape.” Confronted with the alternative at his arrival in Hamburg between the zoo or vaudeville, he chooses against the zoo, invests “all of his energy to get into vaudeville” and to that end embraces a radical “abnegation of every kind of self-will.” Because of a scar from a bullet, he is called “Red Peter.” He becomes a free ape through two technical imperatives. Because both are oriented towards relative well-being, they amount together to a pragmatic imperative.

Very elegantly, namely in passing and without any moral finger pointing, Kafka says: one who gets no further than pursuing solely one’s own well-being is no more than a free ape. Even when he belongs to the species homo sapiens, he is by far not yet a human being in the full sense. Red Peter himself seems to know that because he attributes to the “Honorable Members of the Academy” an ape status that they possibly – the ape leaves the possibility open with a gentle “so far” – haven’t “left behind.”

The first technical imperative takes the only truly live option under consideration: “If you want any realistic chance of escaping from a caged existence, then you must qualify for

一个回忆：该报告的作者和主人公是一个猿，被抓到在黄金海岸公司的哈根贝克打猎并装在一个笼子里运回汉堡。这猿报道短短五年之后，他第一次了解到社会习俗，即握手和吐 – 他跟水手 – 抽烟斗，如何开好一瓶硬白酒类。很快，他获得语言知识、呼喊着：“你好！一段时间后，他实现了“欧洲的平均教育”。

对于他而言，比这些技术更重要的是个人的成就感，有资格作为一个“奴隶”，这是高度的自我发展，通过这种方式，他达到了“自由猿”的地位。面对另一种选择，他抵达汉堡动物园或者是杂耍之间，他选择了动物园，投入“所有的能力进行杂耍”他的选择最终包含了一个激进的“每一种自我意志的克制。”因为子弹不留疤痕，他被称为“红色的彼得”。他成为了自由的猿类通过两种技术的要求。因为他们都是指向了相对幸福，他们都是实用主义的规则。

非常优雅地，即通过没有任何道德指向，夫卡说：一个追求个人的幸福而没有得到进步的人比不过一个自由的猿。即使他属于有智慧的人，他是到目前为止还没有完全意义上的人。红色的彼得自己似乎知道，因为他是“学院的荣誉成员”，一只猿的身份也就是他们可能地 – 猿留下了以一种温和的“到目前为止”的可能性展开 – 还没有被“保留”。

第一技术革命使得仅仅是真正的生存选择被考虑：“如果你想要从笼子里逃跑的任何现实的机会，那么你必须要有杂耍的能力，因为其他任何的替代方式似乎是不现实的。因为这里没有另一种机会逃跑在黄金海岸和在汉堡的动物园中，另一种选择是“只有新的笼子”。这个猿

<p>vaudeville since any other alternatives appear to be unrealistic.” Because there was no chance to escape on the Gold Coast and in Hamburg the zoo alternative is “only a new cage,” the ape sees in vaudeville the only possible route to his well-being and follows the pragmatic imperative: “If you want to achieve for yourself a relatively superior well-being, you must submit yourself to the thoroughly repressive rejection (the “yoke”) of one’s self-will.” Already at the pragmatic level, then, freedom demands a renunciation. Only through exertion, by education, above all by one’s own subordination to the pragmatically commanded renunciation, that is, through self-discipline, can one acquire true freedom</p> <p>This thought experiment doesn’t follow directly a widely shared strategy in the debate over freedom that itself is ensnarled in hardly resolvable difficulties, that is, in aporias. This strategy attempts indirectly to demonstrate that one could have acted differently. It depends upon a three-fold ability: that one contemplates alternative actions, considers these alternatives in terms of calculating their future advantages or disadvantages, and in light of these calculations can counter conflicting inclinations. Parenthetically: Kafka is not concerned with the usual education of a person but with the elementary education <i>to become</i> a person; in this case, to become a free ape.</p> <p>A second thought experiment now concerned with the reality of a completely moral freedom of the will takes us beyond the free ape to a free person. Once again, one imagines a researcher, but this time one who in the face of the same threat of losing his career is expected to circulate a lie about an, indeed, disliked but upright colleague. Should one ask the researcher whether or not he, no matter how great his joy in his profession and career, takes it to be possible to resist the expectation, the convincing answer might be: No one who is self-critically honest would risk guaranteeing that the researcher would actually refuse to lie. He would unquestionably acknowledge that the refusal to</p>	<p>知道杂耍是它幸福的唯一的可能的途径，遵循实用主义的要求：“如果你想为自己实现一个相对幸福的优越感，你必须服从彻底地压制性地拒绝一个人的自我意志（枷锁）。已经在实用主义层面，然后自由需要放弃。只有通过努力，通过教育，首先通过自己附属于放弃务实需要，通过自律一个人可以获得真正的自由。</p> <p>这个思想实验没有直接广泛共享的策略在辩论自由本身是难以解决的困难，这是一个疑难问题。这一战略试图间接证明，一个可能采取不同的行动。这取决于一个三倍的能力，考虑替代措施，认为这些方案在计算未来的优缺点，根据计算可以对抗冲突的倾向。顺便说一句：卡夫卡并不关心个人的普通教育而是关心对人的基础教育：在这种情况下，成为一个自由的猿。</p> <p>第二个思想实验现在关心的是一个完全的道德自由的现实，将我们带到超越自由猿到一个自由的人。再次，一个想象为研究员，但这一次，他面对同样的失去他职业的威胁，预计将流传一个谎言关于一个，事实上，不喜欢，但正直的同事。要问研究员他是否可以抵御预期成为可能，不管他有多大的喜悦在他的职业生涯。令人信服的答案可能是：没有一个自我批判的诚实的人会承担风险保证研究者确实会拒绝谎言。他无疑会承认，拒绝说谎是道义上的命令和现实可能。因此，他认为，充分的道德自由不仅是想象的，而且实际上是可以实现的，即使在现实中可能。叫人信服的答案可能是：没有恪守诚实之人会冒险保证，研究者事实上会拒绝撒谎。他会不假质疑地承认，拒绝撒谎是来自道德的指令且现实中也可能会做到。结果就是，他主张道德上的完全自由，绝不仅仅是可设想的，且是可实现的，更是在现实中可能的。</p>
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lie is morally commanded and realistically also possible. As a consequence, he maintains that full moral freedom is not merely conceivable, but is actually realizable, even in reality possible.

The brain researcher must now ask himself whether or not he can formulate a decisive (contrary) experiment, an *experimentum crucis*, for this freedom in the sense of a complete freedom of the will. The philosopher doesn't know. In light of the curiosity for knowledge given at birth, he remains curious, to be sure, but also skeptical. How can one unhinge the world of should on the basis of insights from the world of being? The mere assumption that one could eventually disprove empirically the (full) freedom of the will already appears to be logically impossible. As long as the *experimentum crucis* has not been found, the brain researcher conducts himself like the mountaineer who already takes the promised view of the mountain peak to be a fairy tale although he has reached only a fore-summit and balks over the effort required to climb the summit itself.

At least preliminarily one can correct the brain researchers: To the extent they attribute to themselves ingenious experiments with deliberation, execution, and media-appropriate presentation, they are making claim to the lowest level of free will; in the widest sense, technical freedom. To the extent they pursue their personal well-being and scientific career together with honor and prizes with their experiments, they are taking into consideration an intermediate, pragmatic freedom. The same applies to the highest level, moral freedom: To the extent researchers remain fundamentally honest, even in those situations where dishonesty would remain forever concealed as if beneath a magic cape, they engage moral freedom. Only when the brain researchers reject these self-attributions and, indeed, not merely in debates but in their very lives, only when they hold themselves responsible neither for the ingeniousness of their experiments nor for their

脑科学研究者如今必须扪心自问，自己是否能够制定一种决定性的（对照）实验，一个 *experimentum crucis*（决定结果的实验），来研究完全的意志自由意义上的自由。哲人固然不知道。凭借着与生俱来的对知识的好奇，他当然葆有好奇之心，但却也存有怀疑之心。一个人如何做到根据来自持存世界（world of being）的洞见，使应然世界（world of should）分离出来？人最终会在经验上对完全的意志自由进行证伪的这种假定在逻辑上就显得不可能。只要那决定性的实验没有制定出，脑科学研究者就得像个认为应许的巅峰之景实为神话的登山者一样，尽管已经接近峰顶，攀爬此峰所需的气力却折损掉了。

至少在一开始，可以修正脑科学家：在他们把自己倾注深思熟虑，伴以饱满的执行力，辅之切当的呈现方式的开天辟地的实验归之于自己的层面上，他们所声称的是最低层次的自由意志；从广义上来说，即技术自由。在他们通过此实验所带来的荣誉和奖赏来追求个人的安居乐业的层面上，他们所考虑的是中间层级的自由，即实用自由。同样的类比还可以用于最高层级的道德自由至上：在脑科学家们即便于不诚信像在隐身斗篷之下永远可以隐匿无踪的情况下也能保持最基本的诚信的层面上，他们便拥有了道德自由。当脑科学家拒绝归因于自身，而且不但在论辩之中而且自己的生活之中拒绝归因于自身，当他们不对他们实验的原创性负责，不对自己作为一个专家的立场负责，不对他们所赢得的科学奖这种成就负责，不对自己公正管理自己科研院所之事负责，只有在这些情况下，非-脑科学家才必会害怕——卡夫卡的小说《报告》中还设置一个角色对此进行反抗——脑科学家在其研究之中消除了自由。

position as research professor, nor for the achievement of a scientific prize that they have won, nor, also, for the fact that they manage their institute fairly, only at that point must non-brain researchers fear – against which Kafka’s “Report,” however, makes one resistant – that the brain researchers have in their research eliminated freedom.

We can surely say that neural circuits define us without question but not to the extent that we must cease to speak of education, responsibility, and freedom. Neither does a person have complete disposal of the brain (at best psychological, pharmacological, or surgical procedures do) nor does the brain direct the brain; rather, a person with a brain directs his life. This disposal over one’s life, we can readily acknowledge, is within limits. However, because moral reason is not so closely bound to technical and pragmatic reason, the case of morals is not all so closely tied to these limits.

Were one to compare this second thought experiment with the results drawn from the first thought experiment, one discovers a tremendous advantage on the part of the second precisely because it is not dependent upon technical and pragmatic reason. One needs relatively a great deal in order to answer the first question: considerable knowledge of the world, creativity, and a rather high capacity for judgment. Hence, the ape decides against an attempted escape by springing into the water only after a careful analysis of the situation: How great is the distance to shore; with what kind of water currents must one calculate; how great is the chance that one can jump overboard without notice? Further, he must contemplate possibilities of action including difficult detours or escape routes. He must look well into the future and come to a circumspectly balanced conclusion. The case is similar with the researcher who is ready to engage in fraud: What arguments with which pretended data will result in making his otherwise hypercritical colleagues ready to accept the false claims? Finally, because only self-interest would hold

我们当然可以毫不怀疑地说，神经回路定义了我们，但绝不是在我们必须不再言说教育、责任和自由的层面上定义了我们。人不会对大脑有彻底全面的处置（至多也就是进行一些心理学、药理学或外科手术上的处理），大脑也不会指导大脑；毋宁说，是有大脑的人指导自己的生活。我们要承认，这样处置生活是有限制的。但是，因为道德理性和技术、实用理性的联系并不紧密，这个关于道德的例子并不完全有这些限制。

若有人将第二个思想实验与第一个思想实验的结果进行比较，他就会发现第二个实验的巨大优势，因为此实验并不依赖于技术和实用理性。一个人往往需要大量的背景才能回答第一个问题：大量关于这个世界的知识，创造力以及极高的判断力。因此，只有在仔细分析了处境之后，猿猴才否定了跳入水中逃之夭夭的企图：距岸边有多远；计算水流是哪种水平；有多大几率能神不知鬼不觉地跳下船？接下来，还要思忖包括崎岖的岔道和逃命的路线等在内的各种行动的可能性。必须从长计议权衡之后方得出结论。这种情况同准备使诡计行骗的研究者相似（这是在黑韩春雨么……）：何种含有假数据的论证会使他严谨精细的同事接受错误论断？最后，因为自利会使他掩盖其欺瞒之举，而此计谋需要他悉知其研究项目的“机械论层面的机制”以及研究的竞争对手。

him back from fraud, the scheme requires his intimate knowledge of the “mechanisms” of research and his research competitors.

In contrast, one can act on the honesty that is appealed to in the second thought experiment almost without knowledge of the world and without an empirical- pragmatic capacity for judgment. One need know only two things: that a lie is a lie and that no honest person constructs his future on the basis of a lie that harms his fellow human beings. One can, therefore, generalize: The cognitive effort required for a morals of autonomy is quite limited. The capacity for morals doesn't determine the amount of one's intelligence quotient: neither intellectuals nor scientists nor philosophers are in this respect superior to ordinary persons. The happy consequence: It is cognitively easier to be moral than it is to be happy. If one leaves (small) children, the mentally disabled, and psychopaths out of the equation, moral freedom is no illusion but something every person is capable of exercising.

## 8.2 A Prescriptive Fact

What kind of reality attests to these thought experiments? What was sought was a fact, the fact that invalidates the radical skepticism about morals. What was found was what one can name a real possibility, namely, the circumstance that one is able not only to refuse but also to avoid a lie. This real possibility is no normal fact. What it proposes is not that certain persons actually refuse to lie but, rather, that one is capable of judging, one even usually judges: Confronted with the alternative “a career at the price of honor” or “honor at the price of a career,” it is not only exceptional persons who point-blank say: Even when the first option is more attractive to me, I know that it is false. I even demand not only of myself but also of others the rejection of the first option. Should I myself in fact place my career first, there must be

与此相反，在第二课思想实验中，某个人也可以按照被要求应该具备的诚信来行事，而完全不需要关于这个世界的知识，也不需要经验一实用的判断力。此人只需知道两件事：谎言就是谎言，以及，诚实之人不会将自己的未来构筑在有损同伴的谎言之上。这样一来，就可以总结道：进行自律的道德所需的认知上的做为是有限的。道德上的能力也不决定某人的智商（这句话貌似原文就写错了）：不管是知识分子、科学家还是哲人在道德上都不优越于常人。着实令人欣喜的结论是：在认知上，行道德要比求幸福简单不少。除却孩童、智障、异于平常的心理变态之人，道德自由绝不是幻象，而是人人皆可习得之物。

## 8.2 一个作为规范的事实

怎样的现实印证了这些思想实验呢？我们所寻求的，乃是一个事实，一个能够使彻底的道德怀疑主义思想土崩瓦解的事实。我们所觅得的，乃是人们冠之以现实而可能之名的情形，就是说，在这种情况下，人不但可以拒绝而且可以避免说话。这种现实的可能之事并非常言之事实。这种提法中所说的不是指定的人真正地拒绝说谎，而是说，人要有判断之能力，即便常下判断之人也要如此：面对是要“以荣誉为代价的事业”还是要“以事业为代价的荣誉”这样的抉择，某人有如下之举也不显突兀意外，即他不假思索直截了当地说：即便第一个选项对我更具诱惑，我也知道那是错误之举。我甚至不但要求自己还要求他人拒绝第一个选项。若我真把事业放在首位，想必也定有道理和根据，但尽管如此，我却会觉得羞耻。甚至某个害怕自己会屈服于第一个选项之人也会坚决而明确地对此举进行谴责，且不仅仅是在把自己想象为受害者的时候才会如此做：基于中伤同事（哪怕厌恶的同事）的事业是断然不可接受的。



justifiable grounds, but, nonetheless, I will experience shame. Even someone who fears succumbing to the first option will unequivocally condemn it, and not merely when he imagines himself to be the victim: A career that is based on the defamation of a (disliked) colleague is not acceptable.

The freedom manifest here contains the manner of existence that belongs to morals: the should. This is no mere should that remains ineffective in the world of being. It comes to light in a judging and being judged that includes a feeling of shame; therefore, this is a should manifest in lived reality. In the face of the alternative between a career at any price even the price of dishonesty and honesty at any price that includes the price of sacrificing one's own career, unconditional career loss appears as a possible inclination, and unconditional honesty is declared to be a moral duty. At the same time, the closing argument will be made against the inclination and for the duty. Above all, one is not satisfied with a mere plea. Someone who makes such a choice expects with the first option a guilty conscience and that shame for which the commentary of a fraudulent insurance agent applies: "... sorrow elevates and tragedy ennobles. But shame eats away at you and debases you – it consumes your eyes, it drinks your blood and it bends your back." (Lars Saabye Christensen, *The Half Brother*, 2004, 502) The second option brings respect, even veneration. However, it is combined with the addendum: Simple respect can be earned by anyone; veneration, though, is earned only by someone who advocates for the second option but not out of an expectation of respect or pursuit of a gain in prestige.

Having accomplished this reconstruction, one is directly aware of the reality of moral freedom in the form of a spontaneous judging and being judged. In the case of being judged, shame occurs that can in turn be "embarrassingly and openly" manifest in blushing. Some are able to repress or hinder this visible signal. However, in their brains real activity can occur that is combined with a sense of being morally

此处显现出的自由包含了属于道德领域的存在方式：应当。这不是在持存之世界中失效的应当。它在包含有羞耻感的判断和被判断过程中显现出来；因此，这种应当是一种在活生生的现实中显现出来的应当。面对在以显得不诚信为代价的事业和以牺牲了自己事业为代价的诚信之间进行选择，无条件的失去事业就表现为一种可能的爱好，而无条件的诚实就被称为道德义务。与此同时，结论就会是反对爱好而赞成义务。综上所述，人不会仅仅满足于一个托词。某个选择第一个选项的人会有于心有愧，而这种愧疚正是评价不正派的保险代理人时使用的：“……苦痛陡增而悲剧频发。但羞愧吞噬你且贬斥你——它迷离你的眼睛，痛饮你的鲜血，使你的脊梁直不起来。”（Lars Saabye Cristensen *The Half Brother*, 2004, 502）而第二个选项给你带来尊重，甚至是崇敬。但是，它却包含有附加之物：任何一个人人都可以获得简单的尊重；而崇敬则只有那些主张第二个选项但又不指望获得尊重或追求在声望上有所提高的人才可以获得。

完成了这样的再现工作，就可以直接意识到那种在自发的判断和被判断形式之下的作为实在的道德自由。在被判断的情况下，羞愧出现在“尴尬且当众出现的”面红耳赤中。某些人可以抑制或止住这种可见的信号。然而，在他们的大脑中，真正活动的出现是与道德上的不安之感相联系的。只有众所周知的不动感情之人才会对这种羞耻感免疫。

uncomfortable. Only the proverbially hard-boiled person is immune to this emotion of shame.

One may not overlook that spontaneous judgment, including any of shame, is not the same as the (here only sketched) philosophical reconstruction. This proposed philosophical thought experiment does not pertain to moral consciousness itself but to the becoming conscious of moral consciousness. It either makes the skeptic aware of a phenomenon that he hasn't seen or hasn't taken into consideration, or it declares to him that (direct) moral consciousness possesses a consequence that wasn't clear to him.

Shame, even more, blushing and the mentioned brain activity, suggest that one consider moral freedom to be an everyday fact: a fact that allows itself to be demonstrated according to the model of scientific research if only by means of the appropriate interpretations. The suggested kind of judgment does not exist, however, like other usual natural events because it depends upon an antecedently acknowledged recognition. This antecedent element neither occurs with necessity nor does it always happen. It is, rather, something that should happen. Behind the usual moral should is a second level of moral should that in terms of its systematic significance constitutes an even superior level than this usual first level.

A usual moral "should" consists in a challenge to act whose consequence is the discussed kind of moral judgment. The new, unusual moral "should" can be seen by means of a further thought experiment. It might well be that no one can escape his conscience forever. Such can be the case, though, only where one has a conscience in the first place.

Now imagine someone who wants to be morally conscience-free. He attempts so to wean himself from the prick of conscience that it no longer

一个人或许不会忽略包括羞耻感在内的自发判断，而这与（此处仅是简单勾勒出的）哲学上的再现完全不同。给出的这个哲学思想实验并不属于道德意识本身而是属于对于道德意识的逐渐形成的意识。此实验只会，要么对某人没有看见或没有考虑到的现象产生伴有怀疑的意识，要么表明，（直接的）道德意识拥有一种于该人并不明见的结果。

羞愧，甚至面红耳赤或者大脑活动，都提示了一点，道德自由被认为是一种日常的事实：这个事实允许自己被科学研究的模型通过恰切的解释揭示出来。但是，同其他常见的自然活动一样，这里提出的这种说法并不存在，因为它依赖于一种在先就被接受的认可。而这种在先的元素既没有出现的必要也不会总是发生。毋宁说，它是某种应当发生。在这种常见的道德应当背后是一种第二级的道德应当，而就它对整个体系的意义而言，构成了远超于常见的第一层级的体系中的第二层级。

常见的道德“应当”在于对其结果是一种被加以讨论的道德判断的行为之挑战之中。这种新的、不寻常的道德“应当”能够用高级的思想实验的方法看见。很有可能的是，没有一人可以永远逃避自己的意识。但是，情况应是这样，那个人要先有意识。

现在，设想这样一个人，他想使自己在道德上免受意识的影响。他一直试图使自己斩断在意识的“淫根”以至

can arise. Should he be successful, he would be an amoral person in the strictest sense of the term. As a person who has become inaccessible to morals, he would be morally insensitive in the emotional sense, and in the cognitive sense he would be absent any moral conviction. Immune to all remonstrance, he would be singled out by his moral deafness and blindness, which were they to be widely dispersed would turn into moral barbarism. In opposition to these two forms of moral stupor, namely from a complete deficiency not only of moral feeling but also of moral conviction, morals raise their veto. It occurs in the form of a moral should of a second order that says: Moral stupor is not permissible; there should be moral receptivity; the former is morally prohibited, the latter morally commanded.

Morals are a fact only when a basic moral should is acknowledged. In contrast, someone who adheres to a moral emotionlessness and lack of moral conviction is excluded from the world of morals. Only someone who rejects this latter option and opens himself to moral commands and prohibitions enters into the moral world and finds himself exposed to the usual moral should: one is challenged by an obligation that one should fulfill and, in the case in which one doesn't, one experiences the prick of conscience and shame.

Entrance into the moral world involves, structurally speaking, a personal achievement that is subordinate to the moral command to bring about the moral world. As a consequence, morals are ultimately a fact [Faktum] in the original sense of the word. It is not simply given, merely present (that would be a "datum" in the original sense), but something that needs to be done. (At the same time, the doing is nothing necessary in the sense of an assembling in contrast to acting.) One can also speak of an actuality [Tatsache], namely a thing [Sache] that occurs bybeing done [Tat]. In addition, a (morally) commanded fact [Faktum] is present in a manner that one must formulate as a paradox: The moral world is a morally

意识再不能“勃起”（好羞射……）。若他成功，他就会成为严格意义上的没有道德的人。作为一个不可进入道德之境的人，他在情感上无道德感，在认知上缺失道德确信。因对所有规劝之言免疫，所以他会由于在道德上视而不见、充耳不闻而特立独行，若四散传播开来，这种行为就会演化成为一种道德不开化。与这两种形式下的道德麻木相对，即与完全缺乏道德感和彻底丧失道德确信相对，道德行使了自己的否决权。在第二阶的道德应当的形式下，会出现这样一种说法：道德麻木不被允许；应当有一种道德接受力；前者是道德禁令，后者是道德命令。

只有在基本的道德应当被承认了的情况下，道德才是一个事实。与此相反，某些执着于无道德情感和无道德确信的人，将被排除在道德世界之外。只有某些拒斥上述做法，并接受道德命令和禁令，才能进入道德世界并发现自己接触到了常见的道德应当：人会受到来自某种他应当履行的义务的挑战，而当他不能履行时，他就会经验到道德上的“淫根”和羞耻。

从大体结构上来说，进入道德世界需要个人达成一种成就，也就是服从道德命令并由此抵达道德世界。作为结果，道德是最终是一个字面意义上的事实（Faktum）。它不单单是被给予、被呈现的（这将会是一种原初意义上的“材料”），而且也是某种需要被完成的事情。（同时，做在与行动相对的整合的意义上又不是什么必要的事情。）人也可以说它是现实性（Tatsache），即一件做成了（Tat）才得以出现的事情（Sache）。另外，一件（道德上）被命令的事实（Faktum）是通过一种人必定将之描述为一个悖论的方式呈现出来的：道德世界是道德上被命令的现实性（Tatsache）。它由一个作为规范的事实（Faktum）的本体论上的特殊对象构成。而道德事实不外乎对于其本身而言“成为一个道德存在”是一条道德命令的道德存在在道德上的自我发展。

commanded actuality [Tatsache]. It consists of the ontologically special object of a prescriptive fact [Faktum]. The moral fact is nothing other than the moral self- development of a moral being for whom “to be a moral being” is a moral command.

One could maintain, to the contrary, that this argument is circular and therefore unacceptable. In fact, there are morals only when one subordinates oneself to a basic moral command, the commitment to be receptive to morals. This circular character comes through with the question whether or not there is such a thing as moral freedom because the answer is: There is moral freedom simply then when both sides, the individual and the social order, are working on the development of a fundamental moral receptivity. Why should they do so rather than dismantle and, finally, eliminate morals?

This question can be a more fundamental one than the popular: “Why should one be moral?” The prior question is directed not toward ontogenesis, the development of the individual, but in addition and primarily toward the phylogenic, the development of humanity: “Why should humanity develop the capacity for morals?” The accompanying question is: “Why should a moral capacity, once developed, be preserved?” This circumstance that the dual question of a moral should is itself an object of a moral should is appropriate, and it invalidates the charge of a circular argument: An entirely collective advantage, in other words, a socially pragmatic argument, can speak for morals. Ultimately, however, one can make an argument for or against morals not at a pre-moral level but only at the moral level itself. With respect to the question why there should be a freedom at the third and highest, truly moral level, the answer can only be: A human being may not incorporate any brakes into the developmental possibilities of practical reason; as a being with freedom and reason he may not belittle himself.

从反面来说，一个人可以认为，这种论证是循环论证，因而是不可行的。只有当人使自己服从于基本的道德命令且恪守命令为道德所接受时，才存在所谓道德。此论证中的循环特征伴随着以下问题而来，即是否存在那样一种道德自由，因为此问题的答案是：只有当个体和社会秩序两个方面都致力于基础道德接受性的发展时，道德自由才会存在。那么，问题来了，为什么这两方面都要发展道德，而不是消解并最终抹杀道德呢？

这一问题比热门的问题更根本：“为什么一个人应该成为道德的人？”先验的问题不指向个体的发生，个人的发展，而是从根本上朝向人类的发生、发展：“为什么人类应该发展关于道德的能力？”与此相伴的问题是：“为什么一种道德能力，一旦发展，就被保留？”道德应然的二元问题是道德应然自身的客体这一事实是恰当的，而且它使得对这一循环的论证无效：一种完全共同的优势，换言之，一种社会实用主义的论证，可以为道德论证。然而，从根本上来说，人们可以为道德做论证，或者不是在每个道德层面上，而是在道德层面本身反对道德。至于为什么自由应该在第三且最高的道德层面这一问题，唯一的答案是：人类不可能将任何停滞都包含在实践理性的发展可能性之中；作为一个自由且理性的人，他不可能轻视他自身。

One cannot in principle eliminate this belittling, to be sure. Humanity cannot so lightly forget the manner of judging described here, either. One can imagine only with difficulty how humanity is able to so effectively block the question with respect to practical principles that it not only frequently, but perhaps even as a rule, only rarely reaches the highest level of judgment. At the same time, what the methodological status of the moral fact specifies is also not unthinkable: Morals do not occur in the world like minerals, plants, and animals. Rather, they must be created by persons and must be created ever anew. A full freedom of the will is exclusively that which a should allows to be transformed into a being: an actuality [Tatsache] that should be.

This manner of existence rejects other points of view. The thought is rejected that morals exist in the form of moral values that occur as objective and eternal truths in a kingdom of the spirit for itself alone, independent from the moral subject, the human being. In contrast, moral objectivity, indeed, remains a given; it is even emphatically asserted. To that extent, a second position is also dismissed, that one-dimensional opponent to value ethics who reduces morals to mere conventions and, therefore, takes morals to be only historically and culturally valid. In contrast to such a strict ethical relativism, morals are time-transcending, trans-cultural, even independent of any species, in short: morals are absolutely, universally valid. Nonetheless, in contrast to a value ethic, morals can occur only thanks to the power of a basic recognition – more specifically: self-recognition, that is, thanks to the morally capable subject who contemplates reasons for what is right. Any mere show of values is, in contrast, entirely secondary.

The opinion that morals exists only because (a) God wishes there to be inalterable moral obligations also opposes the necessity of the basic recognition defended here. A morals based upon recognition is no voluntary product of a divine will. Not least, a psychological altruism is rejected that bases moral action in a feeling for

诚然，在原则上，人们不能消除这一轻视。人类不能如此轻松地遗忘判断在此所描述的方式。人们可以艰难地想象人类如何能够如此有效地限制关于经常且甚至作为一种达到判断最高层级的实践原则。同时，所谓道德事实说明的方法论地位也是不能想象的：道德并不是像各种矿物、计划以及动物那样出现在世界上。当然，它们必须通过人们建立，并且必须再次建立。意志的完全自由仅仅是一种应当允许被转化为一种存在：一种事实上的应当。

这种存在的方式拒斥其他意见的立场。这一思想被道德以作为主体的道德价值形式存在，并且在从道德主体、人类中独立出来的精神王国中它是永恒的真理。相反，道德客观性，事实上，是被给予的；它甚至强调断言。在这一背景下，第二种立场也被消解了，这种立场在空间上与将道德还原到仅仅是习惯并且将道德置于仅在历史上、文化上有效地境地的道德伦理相反。与这样一种绝对的道德相对主义相比，道德是超越时间、跨越文化，甚至关于任何物质的独立性，总之：道德是绝对地，普遍有效。然而，与道德伦理相比，道德之所以产生仅仅是因为基本认同的力量——特别是：自我认同，这就是，归因于能够思考什么是权力的理由的道德能力主体。任何仅仅关于价值的说明，相反，完全是次要的。

道德仅仅因为上帝希望不变的道德义务存在而存在的观点同样反对在此被否定的道德认同的必要性。建立在认同基础之上的道德不是神的意愿的自发产物。至少，一种心理学上的利他主义反对将道德行动建立在其他人的幸福感之上。诚然，幸福感是一种关于道德的不言而喻的成分，但是它不是建立在一种情感辩解的基础上。

the well-being of others. Well-being is, to be sure, a self-evident constituent of morals but not on the basis of a merely emotional apologia.

### 8.3 Morality as Escalation

There are three possibilities for the fulfillment of moral commandments. Either one ultimately does so out of self-interest as in the case of businesses that, out of fear that they might lose customers or might be victims of fraud, treat even inexperienced customers fairly. Included in this first possible manner of conforming to moral principles are those who are moral out of fear of punishment or in expectation of a reward. Second, one can act on the basis of a direct inclination. For example, one gives aid out of sympathy whether it be out of personal devotion to a friend or relative or whether out of a general empathy and goodwill as in the British ethics of feeling. Finally, one can act in conformity with the moral command as such, independent of either self-interest or inclination.

Obviously, one is not already acting morally where one fulfils the expectation of the moral command on the basis of just any reason. Mere conformity with duty, called legalism, is not sufficient to establish a person's moral status. At stake with legalism here is not a positive juridical legality but a moral legalism. Merely to act in conformity with duty without taking the reasons for one's actions into consideration, is, therefore, not yet unequivocally good. This meta-ethical criterion for morals, the unequivocally good, is only satisfied where one acts in accordance with what is morally right because it is morally right. Legalism (in the moral sense) escalates to morals where the morally right is pursued for itself and as such. Only when one acts on the basis of this escalation does one reach the highest level of morals, morality. That person possesses a moral

### 8.3 作为攀升之路的道德

存在有三种关于道德律令实现的可能性。有的人从根本上这么做是由于自身利益，正如因为害怕失去消费者们的各种商业活动，或者有可能是谎言的受害者们，公平地对待毫无经验的消费者们。包含在符合各种道德原则的首要可行的习惯是那些由于害怕惩罚或期望奖赏的行为习惯。第二，人们可以依据直接的倾向行动。例如，有的人是由于同情提供帮助，不管它是出于对一位朋友的个人关爱，还是出于一种普遍同感和如英国道德感般的有好。最后，有的人可以依照道德律令行动，独立于自身利益或倾向之外。

显而易见的是，在某人可以依据其他的理由实现有关道德律令期盼的情况下，他就不会依照道德行动。仅仅依靠责任，我们将它称之为法律主义，不足以建立一个人的道德现状。在此，法律主义重要之处不是一种积极审判的合法性而是一种道德的法律主义。仅仅依靠责任而没有将个人的行动原因考虑在内是不大好的。关于道德的元道德准则，非常准确地，仅仅是在某人的行动与所谓的道德权力相一致的情况下是满足的，因为它就是道德权力。在道德权力被它自身努力实现以及诸如此类的情况下，法律主义（在道德意义上）上升为道德。只有当某人依据这一上升之途行动时，他才能达到道德的最高层级，美德。这样的人拥有一种道德地位，他把这一上升的道德作为他人生的基本方向。

disposition who makes this escalated morals the fundamental orientation of his life.

The fact that morals is not satisfied with mere dutiful conformity to moral principles is significant because it means that morals are not found at the level of observable behavior or its rules. In contrast to (moral) legalism, one cannot determine morals on the basis of the action itself but only by means of the determining ground, by what is willed. For this reason, the unequivocally good consists in universalizability but not already with respect to what is actually done but far earlier in terms of the establishment of the ultimately decisive rule, the maxim, governing what is done. Nevertheless, many attempt to conceive of morals solely in terms of the concept of norms, values, or procedural regulations. Such a definitional strategy applies say to a value ethics, Utilitarianism, and an empirical-pragmatic variation of universalization as well as to discourse ethics. However, none of them reaches the level of morals in the strict sense. At best, they are satisfied with the morally right but not with the morally good, the good of the acting subject.

As a critique of this alternative and as an indirect confirmation of one's own position, one likes to accuse an ethics of morals that it distorts morals into a subjectivity of good intentions. The charge against a mere ethics of intention conceals two different objections although both are capable of rebuttal. On the one hand, someone who defends good intentions fosters a world of idle inwardness that is indifferent to every materialization, any real performance, in the real world. Marx and Engels take this attitude to correspond "entirely to the unconsciousness, dejection, and misery of the German bourgeoisie," who, because of their narrow-minded interests "incessantly are exploited by the bourgeoisie of all other nations" (The German Ideology Part III, I, 6. A). On the other hand, an ethic of good intentions permits the baptism of every action as good and right. In the sense of the often misunderstood Augustinian saying "dilige et quod vis fac" (love

道德不满足于仅仅忠诚地依据道德原则这一事实很重要，因为它意味着道德不是在可观察的行为或它的规律层面上被发现。与（道德的）法律主义相对，某人不能依据行动本身决定道德，而是只能通过决定依据的方式，通过所谓的意愿来决定。由于这一原因，美好组成普遍化，但是不涉及已经做了什么，而是早于终极原则、准则、支配原则建立的方式。然而，许多人仅仅通过规范、价值或者程序化规律的概念来构建道德。这样一种定义上的策略适用于价值伦理、功利主义以及与商谈伦理一种的普遍化经验实用主义的变种。然而，严格意义上，它们之中没有一个能够达到道德的高度。他们最多满足了道德权力，但是不满足美德，行动主体的美德。

作为对这一选择的批判，和对自身状况的间接确认，有人倾向于控诉道德的伦理标准，因为它把道德曲解为主观的善意。这个只针对伦理意愿的控诉隐含了两种不同的反对意见，尽管二者都能实现这一反驳。一方面，有人认为善意的养育了一个对真实世界中的所有物质化、所有真实表现都漠不关心的本质空虚的世界。马克思与恩格斯认为这个看法与“德国中产阶级彻底的意识不清、沮丧和痛苦”相一致，其原因在于他们“不断增长的个人利益被其他国家的资产阶级所利用”。(The German Ideology Part III, I, 6. A) 另一方面，善意的伦理标准允许对每个行动的洗礼，作为一种好的、正确的事情。作为一种常见的误解，奥古斯汀派修道士会说“爱，并且做你所意愿的事情”(In epistulam Ioannis ad Partho tractatus decem, VII 8)，仅仅对意图的限制只需要一个人对善的意识且缺乏客观标准。

and do what you will: In epistulam Ioannis ad Parthos tractatus decem, VII 8), restriction to mere intention appeals only to one's good conscience and lacks any objective standard.

As popular as this double critique is, it is grounded in misunderstanding. Intention consists in an attitude of willing that in turn is no mere wishing but includes the mobilization of all available means for the fulfillment of the intention. Neither a moral will nor the intentions of a life-attitude are indifferent to their externalization in their social and political worlds. Rather than constituting a hereafter to reality, they are the ultimate determining ground of one's actions, to be sure with the crucial restriction: so far as the determining ground is within the power of the subject. The actual action can lag behind the intention because of physical, mental, economic, and other shortcomings. In the case of one's offering assistance to someone, it can come too late, too ineffectively, or even be wrong.

No one can avoid such a danger. Every action or non-action occurs within the parameters of a field of forces that is dependent upon natural and social conditions independent of the will of the agent and not even entirely capable of surveyance. Furthermore, personal morals are concerned only with the range of responsibility of the subject, that is, with what is possible for him. As a consequence, the bare result, the objectively observable product, cannot be a standard of measurement for the morals of an individual, his morals. Personal morals are determinable not with the externalization, the perceptible action itself, but, rather, in the will at the base of the action. The alternative to a "mere ethic of intentions," a pure ethic of performance, takes humanity to be completely responsible for something, the actual outcome, for which it cannot be fully responsible. In a fundamental and consistent sense, a performance ethic is inhuman since it fails to recognize the fundamental human condition. This critique of an ethic of morals overlooks to a great extent that legalism is no alternative to morals but its

这一误解和双重批判同样流行。意图是由包含了意志的态度组成，这意志相反不仅仅是意愿，还包含了实现意图的所有方式的调动。不管是道德意志还是生活态度的意图，都对社会、政治世界中的外在部分毫不在意。与其为现实构建来世，个人行为的终极决定论更能确保决定性限制：决定论范围中包含了主体的权力。由于身体、精神、经济以及其他缺陷，实际行动要滞后于意图。在有人为他人提供帮助的情况下，意图的实现就更晚、更低效，甚至是错的。

没有人能避免这样的危险。每种行为或不作为都在环境力场的各种因素的作用下发生，因而依赖于自然和社会条件，独立于中介的意志，因此不能全部被观察到。此外，个人道德只关心主体责任的范围，和那些对他来说是可能的东西。因此，其结论，即能被客观地观察到的结果，这个人的道德无法成为衡量个人道德的标准。个人道德不是由外在、可感知的行为自身决定，而是在决定行为基础的意志当中。意图的纯粹伦理规范的选择，一个纯粹伦理的表现，人类对其中某些事负全部责任，但实际结果，人类则无法完全对其负责。从基础、一贯的意义上说，表现出的伦理，自它无法辨认基础的人类条件之时起，就是不人道的。这个对道德的伦理标准的批判很大程度上是在俯瞰，法律主义不是道德的选项而是它的必要条件。约翰·斯坦贝克在他的幽默小说《煎饼坪》中描述道，一个帮助受饥饿所威胁的家庭的混蛋是多么可爱啊！他们“搜刮了蒙特酒店的菜园”还享受了“一场伟大的偷盗游戏，摆脱了偷窃的标签，这个罪过”斯坦贝克轻描淡写到，“是出于利他主义。没有什么能够给予更深层次的满足。”然而，一个如此有趣的非法行为，却无法宣称其是道德的。完成建设性帮助的根基——道德合法，事实上只是对恶棍来说是麻烦的，但并不是不能实现。



necessary condition. John Steinbeck describes in his humorous novel, *Tortilla Flat* (1935, Chap. 13), how likeable scoundrels help a family threatened by hunger. They “plundered the Hotel Monte’s vegetable garden” and relished “a magnificent game of theft, free of the label of stealing, an offense that,” described by Steinbeck with a wink, “was performed out of altruism. There’s nothing that can impart a deeper satisfaction.” Such an enjoyable act of illegality, however, cannot claim to be moral because the morally legal, grounded in one’s accomplishment of constructive help, was in fact inconvenient for the scoundrels but not impossible.

Can there not be human beings who as honorable knights employ morally reprehensible means to accomplish the morally good? Does not literature from Robin Hood to Shen Teh in Bertolt Brecht’s play, *The Good Person from Szechwan*, rest upon such a moral sentiment? The moral philosopher is no moralizer, who condemns every deviation from moral principles as immoral from the get go. There is hardly any moral command that requires one to accept formidable oppression and exploitation without any resistance. In the event that all options have been exhausted, it could (!) be that, as a truly final option, one could take an action to be moral that would be considered immoral in normal circumstances; at least, it could be excusable. What is at stake is not illegality in spite of morals but (moral) legality itself: Deviations from moral principles are defensible only when they conform to principles at a higher level that, for their part, satisfy the test of universalization.

Another objection maintains that an action can be unintentionally illegal. Surely, this is a real possibility, but it doesn’t constitute an objection since an ethic of the will embraces the restriction: insofar as the agent has the power to act legally. It doesn’t deny either that one can intentionally or that one can take as acceptable having injured someone and still not somehow be accusable of inattention, thoughtlessness,

是否不应该像高贵的骑士一样用道德谴责的方式去完成道德的善？从罗宾汉到贝托尔特·布莱希特的剧本中的沈特，《来自四川的好人》等文学作品是否依赖于道德感觉？道德哲学家不是说教者，不是那些从出生起就把每个与道德原则有偏差的行为谴责为邪恶的人。由于需要人承受强大的压力并且没有任何阻力地行使它，因而很难有任何道德命令。在所有选择都已被穷尽的情况下，作为最终的选择，才可以（！）为了道德采取那些通常我们认为是不道德的行为；至少，它有可能被穷尽。处于险境的不是除开道德的违法行为，而是合法性本身：与道德原则相偏离的行为，只有在它们遵守了最高原则，对这一部分来说符合了可普遍化的测试时，才是可为之辩护的。

另一个反对意见认为一个行为可以是无意识的非法的。诚然，这的确是可能的，但是当道德包含有以下限制是它是部构建反对的：在这个范围里代理有权利合法地行动。它并不否认一个人可以无意识地或者这个人可以接受受伤的人并在一定程度上依旧无法集中注意力、不体贴、粗心大意、或其他一些有责任的错误。事件发生在无意，并且也没有间接的罪责。例如：一个减少一个人失误后果的尝试，可以导致另一个人的无意识地沦陷，没有它让一个人的错打破了另一个人的骨头。试图帮助一个人，包括一个道德上的合法行为，一个实

<p>carelessness, or some other responsible mistake. The event occurred unintentionally and also without even indirect guilt. For example, in an attempt to reduce the consequences of one's fall, one can cause another to fall unintentionally and without it being one's fault, and the other breaks some bone. In an attempt to aid someone, including a morally legitimate act, one can actually cause the other harm. In both cases, one indeed violates a moral obligation, and, ultimately one even violates the obligation against causing harm. One acts contrary to duty. However, a direct or indirect intention belongs to the morally relevant concept of action, at least, however, an intention to take responsibility for inattention and other mistakes.</p> <p>Neither an unintentional injury that is not one's fault nor an unintentional harm is an action in the strict sense. One is, indeed, the free agent of what is intended: in the one case, the attempt to reduce the consequences of one's fall, in the other, the intent of offering aid. However, when it comes to the consequent violation of duty, one is not a free agent but merely a simple cause so that one best speaks in such a case of a quasi-violation of duty. The consequent injury is a violation of duty; however, since it is neither intended nor merely accepted indifferently, it is not attributable to the agent. One can speak of legality and morals only with respect to the intended aspect of the event but not with respect to the completely unintentional part.</p> <p>In other words, from the perspective of the total event, one can satisfy morality but nonetheless contradict moral duty; morals and legality are concerned with different aspects of the total event. Should the assistance occur from a moral disposition, it satisfies the legal condition with respect to assisting another that can escalate the disposition to morals. In contrast, an unintentional and also not indirectly blameworthy injury of another does not have the character of an action; it is not subject to the concepts of legality and morals. In short: one can hardly speak of morals and simultaneous illegality.</p>	<p>际上可以引起其他的伤害。在这两种情况下，一个确实违反了道德义务，并且，最终，违反了义务造成了伤害。一种违背义务的行为。然而，直接的或间接的故意属于行为道德相关概念。至少是，一种意图对于注意力不集中和其他错误的责任。</p> <p>无意识地伤害不是一个人的失误，无意识的伤害也不是严格意义上的行动。事实上，什么是自由意愿，一个是：在一种情况下，试图减少一个人的堕落的后果，另一个，提供援助的意图。然而，当涉及到随之而来的责任，他并不是自由的代表，但仅仅在一种简单的原因下，那就是在那种情况下最好的发言准违背责任。</p> <p>由此产生的损害是违背义务。然而，因为它没有也不打算仅仅接受漠然，它不是因为代表。一个人可以说的合法性和道德，只有尊重的事件的预期方面，但不是尊重完全无意的一部分。</p> <p>换言之，从整个事件的各方面看，一个人可以满足道德，但是与道德的责任相矛盾。道德和合法性是与整个事件相关的不同方面。如果援助产生于一种道德倾向，它就满足了协助另一个可以升级为道德的倾向的合法条件。相反，另一个没有特征的行为。一个无意的，也不是间接地责备伤害；它不是法律和道德的概念。总之：人不能遵守道德，同时却违法。</p>
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<p>Contrary to Max Scheler's separation of a dispositional- and a consequentialist- ethic (1916/61980, Part I, Chapter III) and Max Weber's examination of an ethic of ultimate ends and an ethic of responsibility (Politics as a Vocation [Politik als Beruf]: 1919/1965, 46f), legality and morals are also not concerned with two in part or completely exclusive orientations. Moral action does not compete with legality but, rather, intensifies its demands. For these demands, mere fulfillment of moral duty is not sufficient; one must go beyond fulfillment of the duty to the determining ground for one's action. Morals is no backsliding of legality but rather an escalation and exceeding of legality: Complete moral action demands, first, that one act according to a moral command and, second, that one act only on that basis—because it is morally commanded. Not least, there is an objective criterion for the moral command, a strict universalization, which repudiates the charge of a merely internal standardless intention.</p> <p>8.4 A Moral Feeling: Respect</p> <p>Like many of its competitors, an ethics of the will has an objective standard. The alternative to these objective standards is a subjective or personal criterion that as a rule is called an ethical or also a moral feeling (sensus moralis, moral sense or moral sentiment). In the classical formulation by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, one means an organ that is responsible for morals, which performs two services at once. It recognizes the morally good (serving as a criteriological or judicative achievement), and it stimulates one to act in accordance with the morally good (serving as a motivational or affective achievement). Both</p>	<p>马克思·舍勒区分了意向性伦理学与结果论伦理学 (1916/<sup>6</sup>1980, Part I, Chapter III),</p> <p>而马克思·韦伯也考察了终极目的论伦理学与义务论伦理学的区别 (<i>Politics as a Vocation</i> [<i>Politik als Beruf</i>]: 1919/1965, 46f)。</p> <p>与此相反, 合法性和道德并不是两个部分或者说是两个完全排他的导向。</p> <p>道德行为并不与合法性相冲突, 毋宁说, 前者还强化了后者的要求。</p> <p>对于这些 (合法性) 要求来说, 仅靠履行道德责任并不够, 还需要进一步深入到行为之决定性基础上去。</p> <p>道德不是合法性的倒退, 而是它的升华和超越:</p> <p>彻底的道德行为首先要求人们按照道德命令来行动, 其次则要求人们仅以此为基础而行动——因为这是道德命令了的。</p> <p>最后, 道德命令不同于那种只不过是毫无标准的内部意图的要求, 前者有客观的标准——严格的可普遍化原则。</p> <p>8.4 一种道德感: 敬意</p> <p>和所有与之争鸣的理论一样, 意志伦理学有一客观准则。除这些客观准则之外, 有的则是一种主观的、个人的准则, 也被称作一种伦理学的、道德的感觉 (<i>sensus moralis</i>, moral sense or moral sentiment)。</p> <p>沙夫茨伯里、哈奇森和荷马的古典说法认为, 道德归因于人体的某一器官, 它同时具有两种功能。</p> <p>首先, 它能辨认道德之“善”(作为一种准则性的或判断性的成就);</p> <p>同时, 它鼓励人们按照这种“善”来行动 (作为一种动机的或情感的成就)。</p> <p>这两种假定的成就都直接而迅速地发生。</p>
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<p>achievements, one assumes, occur directly and immediately. As a natural foundation, both are said to constitute an altruistic inclination: empathy for others, sym-path-y, and the inspired well-being that results. As an immediate insight, moral feeling is close to being a pre-empirical, solely rational intuition, a pure intuition that sanctions what is morally good. However, it can only get close. Any sanctioning as a consequence of feeling depends, namely, upon the uniqueness of the person concerned. Therefore, it cannot be certain of that strict [rational] universality that is characteristic of the universalization test for morals.</p> <p>Nonetheless, one may not consider the ethics of feeling naïve. As was already the case with Shaftesbury in 1711, so too with Hutcheson in 1725 does ethical feeling consist in a feeling of a second order that reacts to feelings of the first order in terms of sanctioning or disapproval – depending upon whether or not the first-order feelings motivate one to benevolent and generally useful actions.</p> <p>In terms of what is perhaps the most sophisticated ethic of feeling, that of Adam Smith in 1774, the two components of sympathy, the affective and the criteriological, are supplemented by two further components. Because one cannot have direct experience of the feelings of others, sympathy cannot be a feeling that one contracts merely by being in the presence of another’s emotions like an infection by an emotional disease. It requires, in addition, a participatory imagination by means of which one can place oneself in the emotional state of the other. This third component reminds one of the productive fantasy of a novelist who, like Jules Verne, can travel to the moon without ever leaving France. Sympathetic imagination, however,</p>	<p>并且，它们作为一种自然的基础，据说构成了一种利他主义倾向：</p> <p>对与他人的移情、同情，及其鼓励去获得的福祉。</p> <p>作为一种直接地洞见，道德感接近于一种先验的、唯一的理性直观，一种裁决何为道德之善的纯直观。</p> <p>然而，它还仅仅是接近这种直观而已。</p> <p>任何作为感觉结果的裁决都依赖于具有特性的感知者。</p> <p>因此，它并不能确保严格的理性之普遍性，而后者却是检验道德可否普遍化的典型标准。</p> <p>尽管如此，并不可以说感觉论伦理学是幼稚的。因为早在 1711 年的沙夫茨伯里和 1725 年的哈奇森那里，伦理学意义上的感觉就已经包含了一种第二次序的感觉。</p> <p>这种第二次序上的感觉以支持或反对的方式回应了第一次序上的感觉。</p> <p>至于第二次序感觉是支持还是反对第一次序感觉，则取决于后者是否促进慈善的、普遍有用的行为。</p> <p>在 1774 年，亚当·斯密提出了一个也许是最精致的感觉论伦理学。</p> <p>在他那里，同情有两个要素—情感上的和准则上的。它们进一步由另两个要素所补充。</p> <p>由于人无法直接经验到他人的感觉，所以并不是只要别人的情感出现在眼前时同情感就能发生，像是感染了某种“情流感”一样。</p> <p>它还需要一种参与性的想象，通过这种方式人们才能将自己置身于他人的情感状态中。这种想象是第三个要素。</p> <p>这让人们想起像 Jules Verne 这样的多产幻想作家，可以“身在法国心在月”。</p>
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<p>should not create persons and narratives as does a novelist but so empathize with concrete human beings and their real relationships that one changes how one acts in one's own emotional world. One experiences others not only socially and not merely egocentrically, but one also acts differently whereby the "acting differently" involves one's "body and soul:" one becomes a different person.</p> <p>An effective social feeling by itself such as empathy runs the danger of being only partisanly active and acknowledging too much the suffering of persons close by and too little the suffering of those more distant. Adam Smith proposes a fourth component to avoid such a danger: the thought of the non-partisan observer. This component allows the advancement of one's own well-being and that of one's friends only to the extent that it is compatible with the needs and interests of all others.</p> <p>One comes close to a universalizability test in the ethics of feeling with this general compatibleness. There remain, however, three differences that together militate against the ethics of feeling. The first difference can be formulated as an alternative interpretation: Either one is concerned with the actual feeling of sympathy of a particular individual; then one cannot count on a general compatibleness. Feelings are merely subjective and, further, they fluctuate (are "labile") in the same individual, which leads to a relativism that is difficult to reconcile with morals; or the decisive moment resides in the general compatibility; then what counts is not the actual particular feeling of sympathy, but the general compatibleness. Similar to ideal discourse, sympathy has a normative demand that shoulders the load of a criterion and,</p>	<p>然而，同情感的想象并不像作家那样创造人物和故事，而是通过与具体的人类及他们关系的共鸣，让人们在他人情感世界中改变自己的行为。</p> <p>人不仅以社交的和自我的方式去体验他人，而且还改变其行动。</p> <p>这种“行动的改变”牵涉了人的“身心”，使他变成了一个不同的人。</p> <p>像移情这样的有效的社交感觉面临一种危险：它容易有所偏袒，并且对亲近者的苦难关注得太多，对疏远者的苦难关注得太少。</p> <p>为避免这种危险，亚当·斯密提出了第四个要素：无偏袒者的思想。这一要素要求人们只按照他同时愿意促进他人需求和福利的程度来促进自己及朋友的福利。</p> <p>通过这种兼容原则，人们接近了对感觉伦理学的一种可普遍化的检验。</p> <p>然而，还有三处不同对其有不利的影响。</p> <p>第一处不同可以表述为一种替代性的解释：</p> <p>如果人们关心某个特定个体的真实同情感，那么就不能指望一种普遍的兼容性。</p> <p>感觉仅仅是主观的，甚至在同一个人那里它都会变动（“不稳定”），这导致了一种难与道德相调和的相对主义。</p> <p>再如果说，这普遍的兼容性才是决定性的，那么真正有价值的就不是个体的真实同情感，而是这种普遍的兼容性。</p> <p>和理想的论述一样，同情有一种规范化的、能承担起一种准则的需要，并因此是一种带有前见的（prejudice）、规范化的预设。</p>
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<p>as a consequence, is a prejudice,a normative presupposition.</p> <p>A second difference to the ethics of feeling: The question of which needs and interests are reconcilable with generalization can be answered only from experience, which is not what is needed for a universalizability test. Because sympathy includes a normative demand in order to function as a moral principle, the judicative and affective capacities must be distinct. The moral philosophy defended in the present project substitutes for ethical feeling the internal attitude of the subject, that is, the ethical or moral disposition that wants as such what is morally required. What the moral requirement is, however, cannot be determined by a factual feeling either as empathy and benevolence or as a moral disposition; ultimately, the test of universalizability is solely determinative.</p> <p>A third difference to the ethics of feeling: The non-partisanship that occurs in sympathy doesn't just happen automatically. It requires an effort that raises the question for self-love: Why should one transform self-love into a strict, non- partisan empathy? Interest in empathy for others justifies only a limited, strategically applied empathy. One needs to develop it only to the extent that is required to generate an empathy in response. Because not the actual empathy but that which appears needful to others is what counts, all that is needed is a skillful pretending. The ethics of feeling cannot give an adequate answer to the question, why should one assume the moral standpoint of non-partisanship?</p> <p>These criticisms do not demand the complete rejection of moral feeling, but they do call for a new approach. Just as in the case of the criterion for morals, so also feelings must be determined exclusively by moral reason. This condition is</p>	<p>与感觉伦理学的第二处不同是：不与可普遍化原则冲突的需求和利益有哪些，这个问题只能在经验中得到回答。而经验却又是在可普遍化检验中不需要的因素。</p> <p>因为，为了起到一种道德原则的作用，同情有一种规范的要求：必须区分判断力和感受力。</p> <p>本研究中所辩护的道德哲学用主观内在的态度（同样由道德要求的伦理或道德的一种禀赋）替代了道德感。</p> <p>然而，道德所要求的内容并不由实际的感觉决定，也不是由移情或仁爱或一种道德禀赋决定；唯有可普遍化的检验才是决定性的。</p> <p>与感觉伦理学的第三处不同：同情的无偏袒性并不自动发生。它需要靠努力来发起对自爱的质问：为什么人们要把自爱转变成一种严格的、无偏袒的移情呢？</p> <p>移情中对他人的关切仅仅证明了一种有限的、策略性应用的移情。人们只需要在足以产生一种回应性移情的程度上来发展它。</p> <p>因为真正重要的不是真实的移情，而是那种看上去对他人来说是有用的移情。于是需要的只是一种巧妙的伪装。</p> <p>感觉论伦理学并不能够充分地回答这个问题：人为什么要设定这种无偏袒性的道德立场呢？</p> <p>这些批评并不要求人们完全抵制道德感，但确实在呼求一条新的途径。</p> <p>就像在谈及道德准则时，感觉只能由道德理性来决定一样。</p>
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<p>satisfied where one permits oneself to be motivated by nothing other than a moral law. Hence, in the case of a conflict, one's own well-being is overruled by the moral law. In contrast to the, to be sure, higher-level but empirically driven feeling of the British ethics of feeling, moral law does not respond to empirically specific perceptions but to an empirically independent object, the moral law. As a consequence, it excludes all self-interest and its empirically determined feelings. In addition, because there is an independent standard for the moral law, it is relieved of the task of determining what is morally right. All that remains is the readiness to obey the self-selected moral law, that is, to obey that motivational power that escalates legality to morals.</p> <p>In order for the truly moral feeling to displace the British ethics of feeling as described, it should be called respect -- although admittedly not in the sense of attention or warning but in the sense of appreciation and respectful acknowledgment. Further, morally unsurpassable appreciation is more precisely called moral respect. What is meant is that successful, free, and unequivocal consent out of the inner self that accompanies this only internally possible self- commitment to the moral. As an accompanying feeling, respect creates the connecting link between the purely rational, moral determination and action in the actual world. Because of this bridge function, it is moral, therefore, purely rational and yet experientable. Respect is the sensuous, experientable perception of the life-practiced acknowledgement of morals.</p> <p>Respect is what establishes that only a moral inwardness (see Chap. 5.4) is defensible: Whoever in the strictest sense of willing, namely, in the manner of empowerment to act, is convinced that a certain action, rule, or maxim is moral acts for no</p>	<p>只有当人们仅受道德法则激发时，情况正是如此。</p> <p>因此，在有矛盾的时候，道德法则凌驾于人们自身的幸福之上。</p> <p>与英国感觉论伦理学的高层次却只能被动经验的感觉相比，道德法则回应的不是经验之特殊知觉，而是独立于经验之外的东西——道德律。</p> <p>它排除了所有私利及由经验决定的感觉。另外，道德律有其独立的标准，所以免于判断什么在道德上是对的。</p> <p>剩下要做的只是准备听从自选的道德律，也就是说，听从让合法性上升为道德的动机性力量。</p> <p>为了让真正的道德感代替英国感觉论伦理学，应该把它称作“敬意”——不是从注意或警告的意义上，而是从赞赏和尊敬的承认之意义上来讲的。</p> <p>进一步说，道德上的不可逾越之赞赏更准确地应该被称为道德敬意。这意味着内在自我的这种成功的、自由的和明确的赞同之所以可能自我投身于道德之中，仅能是出自内在的可能性。</p> <p>作为一种附随的感觉，敬意把现实世界中的纯理性、道德判断及行为联系了起来。</p> <p>正是由于道德的这种桥梁作用，所以纯理性才能被经验到。</p> <p>敬意是对道德进行生活实践认识的、感觉上可经验的知觉。</p> <p>敬意支撑着那种认为只有道德本质才是立得住脚的理论：在最严格意义上的意志中，以一种许可行动的方式，人们都会相信某一具体的行动、规则或准则是一种道德行为。</p>
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<p>other reason than this conviction. Whoever doesn't and acts out of a weakness of the will is wanting in terms of this complete recognition, this action empowering conviction: He is lacking a moral will and moral respect.</p> <p>One surely should not overestimate the motivational power over which moral respect commands. Precedence must be given to the free acknowledgement of moral principles and their embodiment, the moral law. Moral respect can make it easier for the moral law to establish its place in the human will but only in the sense of a feedback strategy that is self-reinforcing. Because precedence is due to autonomous acknowledgment of the moral law, respect can be neither the grounds for acknowledgement nor its cause. It is simply an accompanying feeling that doesn't evoke the recognition but does strengthen the influence of the moral law. What is objective with respect to the moral law corresponds to the subjective in terms of moral respect. However, the moral law itself is now taken not as a standard of measurement but as an ultimate motivating power .</p> <p>When viewed phenomenologically, there are two sides to a moral motivation driven by nothing other than the moral law. Negatively viewed, this motivation subjects the natural longing for well-being to a humiliation: Appetites and self-love (egoism) lose their right to be the ultimate motivating power over action. Viewed positively, this motivation elevates to a purely practical reason that being that is capable of acting according to self-selected grounds as a practical rational being. To that extent, moral respect contains a reflective moment: the self-respect of a moral being in terms of its morals. With the feeling of respect, he</p>	<p>那些不这样做的或者是跟随意志之弱点行动的人，在这方面，这种行为表明：他缺少一种道德意志和道德的敬意。</p> <p>人们不能高估道德敬意所要求的那种激发性力量。</p> <p>对道德原则及其化身——道德准则的自由的确认，应当给予优先性。</p> <p>道德敬意可以让道德法则更轻松地在人类意志中占据一席之地，但仅是在一种自我强化的反馈性策略中的时候。</p> <p>因为优先性归因于对道德法则的自动确认，敬意既不是这种确认的背景也不是它的原因。</p> <p>因为它只是一种附随性的感觉，不唤起认知，但强化了道德法则的影响。</p> <p>对于道德法则来说，客观事物在道德敬意方面与主观事物是一致的。</p> <p>然而，道德法则本身在现在不是被当作一种衡量的标准，而是一种终极的激发力量。</p> <p>从现象学角度来看，道德动机的两方面仅由道德法则驱动。</p> <p>消极的来看，这种动机让自然的对幸福的追求蒙羞：喜好和自爱（利己）丧失了作为终极推动力的权利。</p> <p>积极的来看，这种动机上升到了一种纯粹实践理性的高度，能够按照自己选择的基础来行动，成为一种实践理性的存在。</p> <p>从那个程度上来说，道德敬意包含一种反思性的契机：一种道德存在者在道德方面的自敬。</p>
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<p>experiences himself as essentially the same as all other morally capable beings. Paradoxically formulated: moral respect is simultaneously subjective and intersubjective. Whereas in the case of desire for well-being there are serious differences among persons, an individual, as long as he feels respect by means of the self-obligation to the moral law, is entirely equal to all other persons when it comes to this feeling.</p> <p>There is also the alternative feeling. Someone who violates morals experiences guilt that is, properly understood, not forced on one externally or authoritatively but is grounded morally: The individual rebukes himself. In that case where the violation of the moral law is clear and obvious, the rebuke escalates to the opposite of self-respect, that is, to self-condemnation. One who lives with respect for morals and makes it the cornerstone of one's character is in command of a moral ethos. A moral ethos consists in the acquisition of the feeling of moral respect as a fundamental life attitude.</p> <p>What is this moral reality that emerges with the moral orientation of life? The answer begins with a distinction among various levels of reality. At the very null- level, one can speak of the morally illiterate person, who recognizes neither theoretical nor practical morals. In both respects, morals are for him entirely foreign. He is in the literal and widest sense a-moral because he doesn't merely deny moral expectations as in the case of the anti-moralist but, rather, because of ignorance he is not even open to the alternative of accepting or rejecting moral expectations. He doesn't know even vaguely what morals are much less show any tendency toward moral behavior.</p>	<p>和这种敬意感一起，他以同样的方式感觉自己和感受所有其他的道德存在者。</p> <p>虽然在关于对幸福的追求这方面，不同的人之间有很大的不同，但只要认为这种约束自己听从道德律的道德敬意感对所有人都完全一样，那么就可以悖论般地说：道德敬意既是个人的又是个体之间的。</p> <p>还有另外一种感觉。 违背了道德的人感到愧疚，并不由于外界权威的压力，而是来自道德的最深层：个体指责自己。</p> <p>在明显的违背了道德法则时，这种自责上升到了自敬的对立面，成为了自我谴责。</p> <p>当人们带着道德敬意生活，并让它成为自己人格中的核心时，他就有了一种道德气质。</p> <p>道德气质就包含在那种把道德敬意感当作基本生活态度的做法中。</p> <p>和生活中道德目标同时出现的这种道德现实到底是什么？要回答它，首先要区分现实的一些层次。</p> <p>在刚开始的最低层次是一群道德“文盲”，他们既不知道理论道德也不知道实践道德。</p> <p>从这两个方面来说，道德对于他而言是完全陌生的。他处在一种毫不夸张的最宽泛的非道德之中，并不仅仅因为他像反道德主义者那样否认道德，更由于他几乎不可能接受或拒绝道德期冀。</p> <p>他甚至一点也不知道什么是道德，更不用说表现出任何的带着道德倾向的行为。</p>
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<p>At the first and weakest level morals have an exclusively theoretical and no practical existence. When it comes to the determinative practical aspect, this level is only preliminary; however, in contrast to the morally illiterate, it is more than nothing. The individual concerned knows, to be sure, that there is such a thing as a moral should, but he relegates it to a world other than his own; for himself and in his own life, he is in an extreme sense “morally non-musical.” Nonetheless, to the morally illiterate, he does know about morals; he is not theoretically but practically amoral: As a knowing subject, he is familiar with morals, but, as an acting agent, morals remain alien to him. Like the person who is not religious but, nonetheless, is familiar with the opinions and demands of religion without in any way accepting them, so, too, the theoretically moral person knows about moral obligations but doesn’t feel himself in any way subject to them. The difference here is that between knowing and acknowledging. The moral world of shoulds is for him an exotic culture: a merely known but, with respect to life praxis, completely meaningless reality.</p> <p>At the second level overall, but the first level in terms of the practical, reality extends to praxis. Unlike the lax adherent to a religion, one doesn’t merely know the moral kind of should but feels himself subject to it – however, not in any strict sense. Instead of a mere self-awareness, one encounters here a first, although yet weak, acknowledgment of personal moral obligation. However, in those circumstances where morals extend into the realm of self-interest, one quickly finds reasons why one can ignore the moral demand. One recognizes that morals constitute the highest level of obligation but does not take them with any real seriousness.</p>	<p>这种第一层次也是最弱层次上的道德，只有理论意义而没有实践意义。</p> <p>在具有决定性的实践方面，这种层次只是初步的。然而，与道德文盲相比，它还是有意义的。</p> <p>个体知道有道德之“应该”，但是，他把这种“应该”归于世界而不是自己。</p> <p>对他及他的生活而言，全然没有道德的音符。</p> <p>尽管如此，相比于道德文盲，他确确实实了解道德。他不是理论上的非道德而是实践上的非道德。</p> <p>他很熟悉作为一种认知对象的道德，但对作为行为之指导的道德却依旧陌生。</p> <p>正如那些不信仰宗教的人一样，虽然他们很熟悉宗教观点及要求，但却不一定就接受它们。</p> <p>所以，那种只在理论上知道道德的人也是一样，他并不觉得自己受到这些理论的约束。</p> <p>区别在于到底只是了解还是承认和接受了。</p> <p>道德世界的“应该”对于他而言是一种异域的文化，人们仅是对它有所了解，而在生活实践方面它们则被当作毫无意义的现实。</p> <p>在第二层次，现实性扩展到实践方面。</p> <p>不同于对宗教的不完全忠诚，人们不仅知道道德之“应该”，而且知道自己受它的约束—但是不是在严格意义上。</p> <p>不同于那种简单的自我知觉，人们首先认识到自己受道德约束，虽然这种感觉还很弱。</p> <p>然而，当道德扩展到了私利的领域时，人们就会迅速找到为什么自己可以忽视道德命令的借口。</p> <p>人们知道道德是最需要遵循的，但是并不太把它当真。</p>
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<p>With the third, already fairly strong level of reality, morals are acknowledged to a large extent. In the event that one violates the moral law, one is aware that one should not have. One has a bad conscience. Perhaps, one even experiences remorse, practices penance, and commits to improving one's behavior in the future.</p> <p>At a fourth, even more robust reality, moral behavior becomes a solid habit, a personality trait called "virtue." This level of moral reality can be encouraged and made easier with the aid of institutions without for that reason acknowledging those institutions to be in possession of a logical, authoritative superiority.</p> <p>At a still higher fifth level, one acknowledges moral obligations simply for the reason that they are moral obligations. At this level one acts out of pure and simple respect for what is moral.</p> <p>Should morals lose at this highest level all sense of should, would that mean that they have been transformed entirely into being? For at least two reasons and in two respects, the answer is: "No!" On the one hand, respect for the moral law is not something that occurs naturally but is the product of a basic should. On the other hand, a sober understanding anchored in reality acknowledges that given the parameters of human life, namely, given the constant presence of conflicting appetites, respect for morals could achieve only with difficulty the status of an absolutely invulnerable reality. In both respects, morals preserve their should character. After all, thirdly, a virtuous person can make mistakes. One who takes morals seriously demands that his should cannot be ineffective in reality. However, he remains</p>	<p>在第三层次，现实性已经是比较高层次的了，道德在很大程度上被承认。</p> <p>当某人违反了道德法则时，他知道自己本不该那样，觉得自己有一种不好的道德心。或许还会感到懊悔、进行忏悔，并鞭策自己在将来要改善自己的行为。</p> <p>在第四个层次，这种现实性更强。许多行为成了牢固的习惯，成了一种被称为“美德”的人格优点。</p> <p>习俗可以帮助更好更容易地达到这种道德现实性，出于这个原因，不必认为这些习俗掌握了一种逻辑的、有权威性的优势。</p> <p>在更高的第五个层次，人们仅因道德职责本身而认可它。</p> <p>在这一层次，人们出于对道德事物纯粹而简单的敬意而行动。</p> <p>在这最高的层次上，道德需要抛开所有的“应该”吗？那样是否意味着这些“应该”全都转变成了“已经是”？</p> <p>至少在两个方面、出于两个原因，回答是：“不！”。</p> <p>一方面，对道德法则之敬意不是自然发生的，而是“应该”的产物。</p> <p>另一方面，而这一认可立足于给予人们生活参量的现实之中，清醒地理解这一“认可”可以展现出喜好间的矛盾。</p> <p>道德敬意要达到一种完全无懈可击的状态还很困难。</p> <p>在这两个方面，道德都保留着“应该”的特征。</p> <p>第三方面，毕竟一个品德很好人也可能犯错。</p> <p>严肃认真对待道德的人会要求这种“应该”不能在现实中失效。</p>
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<p>skeptical that the moral should could ever dissolve into reality (being) without remainder and difference.</p> <p>8.5 Moral Grace</p> <p>In another thought experiment, all three points of view emerge: not only the prescriptive fact, but also the escalation of legality to morals, and, finally, the feeling of respect for morals. For the purposes of illustration, we imagine the dramatic situation that the two laws contradict one another: the moral law and that of one's own well-being. The much discussed conflict between duty and inclination consists precisely in this contradiction.</p> <p>By duty one does not mean just any capricious, even morally incompatible, perhaps even crassly immoral task. In contrast to a functional or even authoritarian concept, we mean here an exclusively moral duty. The other concept, inclination, characterizes the actually dominant, guiding aim of action in a person. As a mere guiding aim, it is indifferent to the moral question. Already for this reason, morals do not in principle forbid spiritual, mental, or physical indulgence including one's own well-being. Even Kant, who is often scolded for being rigoristic, speaks of a certain duty toward one's happiness (Doctrine of Virtue [Metaphysics of Morals, Part II], Introduction, Part V.B., VI 388). A repertoire of positive inclinations that are partly natural and partly acquired through upbringing such as a readiness to help and compassion is not something to be repressed but, to the contrary, is to be encouraged.</p> <p>A conflict with duty surfaces first with the question of scope. If inclinations count as the</p>	<p>然而，他仍需要保持怀疑，以防这种道德之“应该”或许真的在未加以提醒和区分的情况下消解于现实性（“已经是”）之中。</p> <p>8.5 道德魅力</p> <p>在另一个思想实验中，三种观点全出现了：规定的事实、由合法性到道德的升华、道德敬意感。</p> <p>为了更好地说明问题，我们想象一种道德法则与人们自身福祉剧烈冲突的状况。</p> <p>这一冲突还包含了那常被讨论的责任与倾向的矛盾。</p> <p>关于责任，人们不是指任何任性的乃至道德上不能容忍的甚或非常不道德的东西。</p> <p>相比于一种有用的或权威性的概念，在这里，我们专指道德责任。</p> <p>另一概念—倾向，标明某人行为的真实的导向性目的。</p> <p>这种仅作为导向的目的对于道德问题来说无关紧要。正因如此，道德并不在原则上禁止精神上、心理上及身体上的嗜好，也包括个人的福祉。</p> <p>甚至像康德这样经常被指太严厉的哲学家都认为德福应当一致。</p> <p>积极的倾向不该被压抑，而应当被鼓励。这一倾向是纯自然的，并部分地通过培养诸如助人、怜悯等情感而获得。</p> <p>关于责任的矛盾首先通过范围的问题浮现出来。</p>
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<p>decisive authority, in other words, if inclinations exclusively possess the license to establish one's guiding aim, then compliance with the moral law is only occasional and coincidental. An agreement without any exceptions with the moral law is possible only where inclination surrenders its exclusivity and, in the case of a conflict with the moral law, hands the license over to morals. That duty actually is privileged is manifest where duty and inclination are in conflict and duty triumphs.</p> <p>Our thought experiment of a conflict between duty and inclination is not governed by a false pathos that humanity is constantly confronted with the dramatic decision that it must incessantly chose against its inclinations and for duty. All that is said is the following: In order to understand, on the one hand, the full expectation of morals and in order to be able to determine, on the other hand, whether or not persons are not only legally right but also morally good, one must imagine such a conflict situation. Only with such a situation can the existential rigor of the moral imperative become clear, namely, the expectation that one unequivocally acknowledge the moral, even to accept a "humiliation" of one's inclinations.</p> <p>Everyday awareness of morals concurs: It is one thing to do something out of pleasure; it is something else to do something because it is morally expected. Duty has little if anything to do with a life of pleasure that seeks only the satisfaction of inclinations. Duty has its own law, the moral law, whereas the law of inclinations, if one can even call it a law, is that of one's own well-being. Fulfillment of one's duty only when it is to one's advantage contradicts the very concept of duty; however, the consequence is not that duty must always be a bitter pill. Nonetheless, the</p>	<p>如果各类倾向是决定性的权威，换句话说，如果唯有各类倾向可以决定人的主导性目的，那么，对道德法则的遵守仅仅是偶尔的、偶然的。</p> <p>在倾向与道德法则相冲突时，那种不带着任何道德期冀的协议要想可能，只能寄希望于倾向放弃其主导权，并把它交给道德。</p> <p>责任有事实上的优越性，但若认为责任与倾向冲突时前者胜出，则夸大了这种优越性。</p> <p>责任与倾向相冲突的思想实验，不受这样一类错误的言词支配。比如，认为人性不断面临着严峻的选择，责任与倾向二者不可得兼。</p> <p>正确的说法应该是这样的：一方面为了充分理解道德的期冀，另一方面，为了判断某人是否不仅在法律上是对的并且在道德上是善的，必须在想象中考虑两者相冲突的情况。</p> <p>只有在这种情况下，道德之必要的存在意义才能准确明晰。也就是说，希望可以明确的认识道德，乃至可以接受倾向中“令人羞耻”的部分。</p> <p>道德知觉每天都告诉自己：出于快乐做某事是一回事，而因其是道德期冀而去做某件事，则又是另一回事。</p> <p>如果做任何事情都是出于对快乐和对倾向的满足，那么责任就被忽略了。</p> <p>责任有其自身的法则——道德律。而各类倾向的法则——如果它可以被称为法则的话——则是关于自身之福祉的。</p> <p>“满足自己的责任”这一说法与责任概念本身就相矛盾，除非这一责任对他自己有利。然而，这并不意味着责任必须永远是一粒苦药丸。</p>
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<p>assumption of a contradiction between duty and inclination evokes an incisive and simultaneously influential critique in the couplet : “Gladly, I serve my friends, but, unfortunately, I do so only with interest/Hence, I am often rankled, that I am not virtuous.” The author of these lines, Friedrich Schiller, tries to overcome the conflict with the aid of the thought of a beautiful soul. This attempt fails as long as one takes it to be an alternative agenda to morals; it succeeds as soon as it for a moment emphasizes that the moral is not foreign to a beautiful soul even if it is often overlooked (for a closer analysis, see H öffe 2006).</p> <p>A beautiful soul elevates neither moral legality nor morals; in this respect there is no competition with moral excellence. Furthermore, other competencies like the art of living are not something to be added. When it comes to a beautiful soul, morals no longer struggle with an internal resistance in contrast to a “morals with a darkened brow.” This escalation to morals in harmony with sensuousness occurs in fact with pleasure; therefore, one can call it “beauty” or also “moral grace.” Whoever leads his life out of such grace, that is, out of a morally developed sensuousness (or a sensuously developed morals), is permitted to boast of a free and sovereign moral nature. He has become a maestro, a master of what it means to be a human being.</p> <p>Only someone who assumes in the case of opposition between duty and inclination that ultimately duty is fulfilled out of an inner struggle against inclination deserves Schiller’s reproach that the thought of duty can occur solely in accompaniment with a severity that shrinks back from all grace. The accusation, however, is as unjustified against Kant as it is unjustified against</p>	<p>尽管如此，关于责任与倾向冲突的假设引起了一种深刻的、同时也很有影响力的批评，表现在这一联句中：</p> <p>“两肋插刀为吾友，行事先需利我身；哀哉频被友人弃，呼作小人无品行。”</p> <p>句子的作者席勒尝试用美好灵魂的思想来解决这种矛盾。</p> <p>若把道德当作无关紧要的议程，则这种尝试就会失败；如果人们认为道德对于美好灵魂而言虽然常被忽略但并不陌生，则这种尝试就能成功。</p> <p>美好灵魂并不提升道德合法性或道德本身；从这方面来说，道德的优点是不能比拟的。</p> <p>进一步来说，不需要加进像生活艺术这样的能力特征来。在谈到美好灵魂时，相比于“黑夜乌鸦般的道德”来说，道德不会再受到内在的反抗。</p> <p>这种道德升华和知觉带着愉悦感一同发生。因此人们可以称之为“美好”或“道德魅力”。</p> <p>任何出于这种魅力、或者说出于一种成熟的道德感（亦或一种感觉的成熟道德）而生活着的人们，都能促进一种自由的、不折不扣的道德本性。</p> <p>这样，他就成为了一位大师，掌握了那些能使人之为人的东西。</p> <p>一些人认为在责任与倾向对立时，责任最后在与倾向的斗争中胜出。席勒指责他们，认为只有在猛烈地甩脱掉所有“魅力”之后责任才能显现。</p>
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<p>any other consistent ethic of duty. Only that person acts out of moral respect who makes respect of morals a part of his free behavior and therefore in “cheerful mind” adheres to the moral law. At the end of his lectures on Anthropology in a Pragmatic Sense [Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht], Kant himself says: “The cynic’s purism and the anchorite’s mortification of the flesh, without social good living, are distorted forms of virtue which do not make virtue inviting;” rather – one reads in astonishment – “being forsaken by the graces, they can make no claim to humanity” (VII 282)</p> <p>Schiller and one of his philosophical mentors, Kant, are united in their praise of the graces so that one could accept over and above their different formulations a complete, “beautiful harmony.” The question whether or not this harmony is in fact obtains is determined by the content and kind of existence of moral grace. The answer, then, consists in an “in part, Yes!; in part, No!” The question deserves an initial “Yes!” because the question with respect to morals escalates the mere fulfillment of duty to a free internal commitment; it deserves a second “Yes!” because this fulfillment of duty by a “cheerful mind” broadens the laws for an improved humanity. Just before the quoted passage, Kant says: “... anything that promotes sociability ... is a garment that dresses virtue to advantage ...” In opposition, though, the question demands a double “No!” First, when viewed with respect to content, an improved humanity doesn’t enhance what is decisively human, morals. Second, methodologically, Schiller’s moral feeling admits the role of an empirical moment of emotional approbation that excludes pure respect for the moral law.</p>	<p>然而，对康德及所有与他一致的责任伦理学而言，这种指责是不公正的。</p> <p>唯有那种让道德敬意成为其自由行动中的一部分并带着“精神愉悦”的人是出于道德敬意而行动的人，也是遵守道德法则的人。</p> <p>康德在他的《实用人类学》末尾说：“没有良好社会生活的犬儒主义纯粹派和肉体上禁欲的隐士派扭曲了美德，并使其不再有魅力；”——接下来的内容也许会让读者们惊讶——“那种让人们变得孤苦伶仃的所谓美德其实是没人性的。”</p> <p>席勒和他的哲学指导者之一——康德，都赞赏道德魅力，人们可以从他们的不同表述中找到一种“美好的和谐”。</p> <p>而这种和谐是否真的能获得则由道德魅力的类别及内容决定。因而这一问题的回答是“部分地可以也部分地不可以”。</p> <p>首先，“可以”。因为道德敬意把简单的履行责任提升为了一种自由的内在的承诺。</p> <p>另外，因为这种带着“精神愉悦”的履行责任充实了成熟人性的法则。</p> <p>正如在引文前，康德说：“任何提升社交性的东西都可以给美德锦上添花”。</p> <p>然而，从相反方面，回答则是“不可以”。因为从内容来看，成熟的人性并不促进道德。</p> <p>并且从方法论来看，席勒的道德感肯定了感性认知在经验中的意义，虽然它排开了对道德法则的纯粹敬意。</p>
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<p>Not least, the beautiful soul appears in Schiller to be a real possibility, which Kant doubts. His opposing reasons are not by any chance derived out of pessimism or misanthropy. They follow from the condition of application for the concept of duty: Because the human as a being with a body and needs has appetites that can oppose morals, the moral law is no natural law to which he must necessarily adhere but is an imperative that summons to compliance without one ever being entirely certain that one acknowledges it. The antonym to the moral disposition “in a struggle” is not the moral disposition “with ease” but the possession of a complete purity in the disposition. This occurs, however, only with that saintliness in the “ontological” sense for which not even a model behavior is sufficient, exemplified by the merciful Samaritan, Francis of Assisi, or Mother Theresa. It requires the pure intelligence of an angel or of a god, that is, of beings who are fundamentally different from humanity and whom Schiller hardly had in mind. As a consequence, one cannot exclude what the expression “in a struggle” means: the leftovers of pre-moral interests that lead into temptation. The possibility of temptation and, further, of seduction is something that no human being can escape.</p>	<p>最后，美好灵魂在席勒看来似乎是真实可能的，而康德则怀疑这种可能性。</p> <p>他反对的原因不是由于悲观或厌世，而是源于道德观念的运用。</p> <p>因为任何有血有肉的人都有与道德相冲突的欲望，道德法则并不是他的必须遵守的自然法则，而是一种呼求服从的命令，即使人们可能完全不认识它。</p> <p>与道德性情的“挣扎”相对立的不是性情的“轻松”，而是拥有一种性情的彻底纯粹性。</p> <p>然而，在 Francis 看来，这只伴随本体论意义上的至善而出现，甚至对于它来说一种模范性的行为都还不够。</p> <p>它要求一种对天使或上帝的纯理解力，也就是能理解一种与人性根本上不同的存在。这一点是席勒所没有考虑到的。</p> <p>结果是，不能排除“挣扎”的含义：充满诱惑力的前道德的利益残留。引诱和迷惑是任何人都不能逃脱的可能性。</p>
<p>8.6 Freedom in Institutions: Ethics</p> <p>Another partial alternative to the notion of morality [Moralität] and moral respect [moralische Achtung] is found in Hegel’s catchword, “ethical life” [Sittlichkeit]. As with Schiller’s notion of the beautiful soul, here we expect no program of straight opposition to Kant, but do, however, expect a supplementation. Perhaps Hegel’s reflection even contains a thought that is not</p>	<p>8.6 制度下的自由：伦理</p> <p>另一种有偏向的道德和道德敬意的观念是黑格尔的口号：“道德的生活”。</p> <p>和席勒关于美好灵魂的看法一样，这里也没有直接与康德对立，但确实有对他的补充。</p> <p>或许黑格尔的反思包含了一种对康德而言并不陌生的思想，不过对于那些只会增加体重的懒汉们则不同了。</p>



foreign to Kant but one that only receives more weight.

Hegel develops the notion of ethics with his characteristic dialectic. It allows the arrival at an ever more substantial form of free will; a concept shared with Kant. In the process, the fundamental conflict between duty and inclination recedes into the background to the advantage of an increasing content, an ever richer freedom of the will. The first level in the three step dialectic is that of (abstract) right. It can be formulated by the command to treat oneself as a person and to recognize all others as persons. In the institutions of this first, objective level, that is, property, contract, and penal law, the will is only externally free. At the next, subjective level of morals, the will is merely internally free. The synthesis of the two features, better: the achievement of the unity between the external and internal freedom, is accomplished only at the third level, that of ethical life. Its institutions – again a threefold – are the family, the economy and work world that are called “bourgeois society,” and a concrete state.

A philosophy of moral freedom is not searching for a general comparison and contrast between Kant and Hegel. Instead, it recalls something that much of the polemic against Kant inspired by Hegel overlooks: When it comes to the question of the existence of moral freedom and the prior question, how one is to think about them, the debate is not concerned with social freedom. Even when the development of moral freedom is made easier by certain institutions, this circumstance establishes only the right to a complementary, not to an alternative, theory. As it is, Kant’s systematic ethic, the *Metaphysics of Morals* begins with an ethic of rights that treats all three of the institutions

黑格尔用他独特的辩证法发展了伦理学。它深入到了自由意志更基本的形式。

在这过程中，责任与倾向间基本的矛盾消失了，这有利于内容更充实和意志的更大自由。

三段式中第一层次是抽象的权利。

它是指把自己和其他所有人都当作人来对待。

在这个客观的第一层次上，也就是财产、契约、刑法等方面，意志只是外在的自由。

在道德的第二个主观的层次上，意志只是内在的自由。

两种特征的混合体更好一些：外在和内在自由的联结，但这种联结是在第三层次（道德的生活）上才实现的。

它的制度包含三部分：家庭、经济和被称作“中产阶级社会”的工作世界，以及一个具体的国家。

道德自由哲学并不寻求在康德和黑格尔之间进行广泛比较。

相反，它受黑格尔口号鼓舞而试图反对康德：当谈到道德自由之存在及优先性等问题时，并不涉及到社会自由。

甚至当某个制度让道德自由更容易发展时，也只建立了一种暂时性的权利学说，而不是一种可供选择的权利理论。

康德的系统性伦理学—《道德形而上学》，刚开始便提出了一种权利伦理学，威胁到了黑格尔伦理学体系全部三个方面。

<p>in Hegel's ethic. The family plays, admittedly, a systematically more significant, and the economic and work world a far greater role for Hegel. In contrast, Kant's theory of the state has a dimension of international law and world citizenship that is put aside too quickly by Hegel.</p> <p>Hegel (or more carefully formulated, a dominant Hegel interpretation) acknowledges the Kantian concept of morals, which understands the individual to be free as a person capable of the legislation of a moral law and of its recognition. However, this person is free only in an abstract manner: indeed rigorously, but in the first place empty of content, second, disinterested in all consequences, and third, condemned to impotence with respect to the shaping of the social world; fourth, the abstract person tends towards a terror of pure disposition.</p> <p>These accusations have in fact already been rebutted; therefore, all that is required is a short recollection. The circumstance that the universalizing principle refers to maxims, that is to substantial principles and for which a fundamental ethic is not responsible for determining their content, speaks against the supposed content-emptiness of Kant's moral person. Instead of normative deliberations, a universal principle requires descriptive, in part anthropological, in part historical-cultural experience to which an ethic of maxims is itself expressly open. The universalizability test undertakes "only" a moral selection and dignification.</p> <p>The dual accusation of an idle inwardness, that of a supposed disinterestedness in consequences and of a consequent powerlessness to shape the [social] world, is countered by the concept of the will</p>	<p>在黑格尔那里，家庭的部分变得更系统、更重要，经济和工作世界也有了更大的意义。</p> <p>相比而言，康德的国家理论包含了国际法和世界公民的维度，而黑格尔则把这一维度推到了一边。</p> <p>黑格尔（准确说是主流黑格尔解释）认同康德主义的道德观念，即认为个体是自由的，作为道德法则上的健全能力人并有健全判断。</p> <p>然而，这种自由只是抽象的：确实严格，但首先，缺少内容；</p> <p>其次，对任何结果都漠不关心；</p> <p>第三，在塑造社会世界时无作用；</p> <p>第四，抽象的人倾向于有一种可怕的纯粹性情。</p> <p>事实上，这种指责已经被反驳了；因此，需要的只是一种简短的回忆。</p> <p>可普遍化原则需要参考大量不源自基本伦理学的准则来决定其内容，这与康德内容空虚的道德上的人相对立。</p> <p>不同于规范的深思熟虑，普遍原则要求描述性的经验（部分地人类学的和历史—文化的），很明显地，准则伦理学对这类经验开放。</p> <p>可普遍化检验“仅仅”从事道德选择及荣誉授予。</p> <p>意志本身反驳了对懒散本质的双重指责（漠不关心结果、无力改变社会世界）：简单的希望只需要一种有助于事态之积极的感觉就能得到满足，不用做什么来保护或引起这种事态，在这方面它仍无关紧要。</p>
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<p>itself: A mere wish is satisfied with a mere positive feeling in favor of a state-of-affairs; it undertakes nothing to preserve or to bring about the state-of-affairs; it remains in this respect indifferent. In contrast, the will is necessarily engaged; it is manifest by the application of one's own powers and means, which, in the case of the moral disposition, leads to a fundamental attitude that governs one's life. In no fashion is morals, as it sometimes is caricatured, imprisoned in an internal world. It is manifest in actions that as such intervene in the social and natural world and, as a consequence, shape them. (Hegel's frequently quoted and often misunderstood sentence in the preface to the Philosophy of Right [Rechtsphilosophie]: "What is rational is real; and what is real is rational" appropriately applies far more in opposition to the Romantics than it does to Kant; for Hegel's own understanding of the sentence, see the Encyclopedia [Enzyklopädie], § 6.) If necessary, a moral will opposes a situation of injustice and is not satisfied with mere verbal protest but works toward a transformation of the circumstances. The source from which the transformation is initiated and from which it draws its power, however, is the will that, in turn, acts on the basis of moral principles.</p> <p>8.7 Metaphysically Free Metaphysical</p> <p>Two concepts essential for an ethics of the will, the autonomy of the will and pure practical reason, stand under suspicion that is politically deadly for philosophy: They are supposed to be metaphysical. Today, one is accustomed to label notions "metaphysical" that because of their age are worthy of honor but because of their lack of convincing power are taken to be long outdated.</p>	<p>相比而言，意志则必须考虑进来：人自己的能力和方法让它显现了出来。这在道德性情中导致了一种掌管生活的基本态度。</p> <p>道德不可能被禁锢在内在世界中。</p> <p>这种对社会和自然世界的插入体现在了行动中并且改变了它们。</p> <p>（黑格尔的常被引用也常被误解的《法哲学》前言中的话：“合理的就是现实的，现实的就是合理的”，与其说与浪漫主义对立不如说与康德对立。）</p> <p>若有必要，道德会反对不义的情况，并且不满足于口头抗议而着手于改变这种状况。</p> <p>首倡者是给予这种改变力量的源泉，接下来给予这种力量的则是意志在道德原则基础上的行动。</p> <p>8.7 无形而上学意义的形而上学</p> <p>意志伦理学有两个重要的概念：意志自治和纯粹实践理性。</p> <p>它们被怀疑在政治上对哲学是致命的：它们应该是形而上的。</p> <p>今天，某人被贴上“形而上学”的标签而被指责，不是因为它年代久远值得骄傲，而是因为缺乏说服力并且已经过时很久了。</p>
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It would be wise, then, to avoid such incriminating concepts, even to avoid an ethics of the will.

Against such wisdom, however, speaks the fact that the expression “metaphysics” is equivocal and that a fundamental ethics cannot avoid two of its meanings. A fundamental ethics undertakes such a thorough investigation of its object that it is in an respect a fundamental philosophy. Its object has a metaphysical character because, as the absolute good, it transcends nature (physis) and, therefore, goes beyond (meta) what is at home in nature (see Chap. 3.5).

As is well known, the history of metaphysics commences with a critique of metaphysics.

Aristotle’s collection of philosophical essays that employs the title “metaphysics” for the first time presupposes a critique of the prior- and archetypal metaphysics (Plato’s doctrine of ideas). Aristotle’s alternative, his substance ontology, has for its part a metaphysical character, but it plays no significant role in his ethics. That which matters to a great extent for the historical model of the [Aristotelian] eudaimonistic ethics of teleological aspiration applies completely to the systematically developed theory of part two of this present study. Themes like being as being and the absolutely highest being, God, are entirely absent.

Teleology is, indeed, indispensable for an ethics of aspiration; however, not the often criticized teleology of nature, but a teleology of action. Nevertheless, an ethics of aspiration fulfils the condition that one can call the formal kernel of metaphysics. Taken with respect to the practical world, it is a theory of ultimate reasons, a theory not only with respect to the highest object, happiness [eudaimonia] but also with respect to the

因此，避免这类错误的观念和一种意志伦理学乃是明智之举。

与这种智慧相对的说法认为，“形而上学”是模棱两可的，而一种基础伦理学无法避免它的两种意义。

基础伦理学对其客体做了彻底的调查，它是一种出于蓄意的基础哲学。

其对象具有形而上学特征，因为作为一种绝对的善，它超越了自然（自然之理）也超过了（变化）那些在自然中的熟悉的事物。

众所周知，形而上学的历史开始于从对它的批评。

亚里士多德哲学文集首次用“形而上学”的标题并预设了对先前形而上学（柏拉图理念论）的批判。

亚里士多德的物质本体论部分地有形而上学特征，但在这在他伦理学中却无关紧要。

真正重要的是，将亚里士多德主义目的论伦理学的历史模范充分应用到系统的当前研究的两个部分当中。

而诸如作为存在的存在及绝对的最高存在—上帝等主题，则根本没有在这里出现。

目的论与渴求伦理学的确无法分开。然而不是饱受批评的自然目的论，而是行为目的论。

尽管如此，渴求伦理学让人可以认识到形而上学的精髓。

关于实践的世界，它是一种最高理性的理论，不仅关系到最高层次的对象—幸福，而且关系到整体，因为渴求目的论全部的实践最终都由幸福联结到了一起。

<p>whole because all aspiration-theoretical praxis is ultimately held together and encompassed by happiness [eudaimonia]. In the formal and still today hardly obsolete sense of a fundamental philosophy of praxis, a thorough ethics of aspiration has the status of a practical metaphysics. That leads to the paradoxical situation that a eudaimonistic ethics is metaphysical in a metaphysically free sense. It renounces every theoretical and every other metaphysic foreign to its object. It investigates its object, humanity's orientation toward goals, so thoroughly, namely, all the way to that goal beyond which no other can be thought so that one can speak of a metaphysical character. Its metaphysical portion quantitatively considered, however, is extremely meager. Its investigation is limited in this study to a part of chapter 6, above all, section 6.2. The reason lies in the ultimately practical interest that ethics is no end in itself. Because it ultimately serves action, it investigates its "metaphysical" object, eudaimonia, in such a multifaceted and realistic fashion that it discusses a host of other, no longer metaphysical, and also not quasi-metaphysical objects, namely, the moral (character) virtues and intellectual virtues of wisdom.</p> <p>It looks no different with the ethics of the will. If one reserves the notion "metaphysics" for its traditional forms, its definitive Kantian form is non- metaphysical because it overrides all prior metaphysics. Nevertheless, the literal meaning of meta-physics, the transcending of (natural) experience, necessarily is preserved insofar as one reflects at least in part in a non-empirical manner about fundamental questions. This observation applies to other attempts at foundational thinking. Habermas' theory of communicative reason, for example, consists in the attempt at a non-empirical</p>	<p>在一种正式而且当下尚未淘汰的基础实践哲学那里，彻底的渴求伦理学具有实践形而上学的特点。</p> <p>这导致了一种矛盾：幸福论的伦理学是一种无形而上学意义上的形而上学。</p> <p>它宣布自己的研究对象与任何目的论及其他形而上学都无关。</p> <p>它非常彻底地研究作为其对象的人性目标，所以能够谈论这一目标的形而上学特征。</p> <p>然而这种充分考虑到形而上学还很贫乏（这一研究在本课程第 6 部分尤其是 6.2 节里面讨论过了）。</p> <p>原因是，在终极实践利益方面，伦理学本身是没有终点的。</p> <p>因为它最终服务于行动，它以如此多面和现实的方式研究它的“形而上学”对象-幸福。</p> <p>幸福并且不再是形而上学的或准形而上学的对象，而是道德(品格)和智慧理解力的美德。</p> <p>这看上去与意志伦理学没什么区别。如果保留“形而上学”的传统形式，其限定性的康德式形式则是非形而上学的。，因为它凌驾于之前所有形而上学之上。</p> <p>尽管如此，形而上学的字面意思还在基础性问题上以非经验的方式，保留了必然性、超越（自然）经验的含义。</p> <p>这种观察同样应用于其他基础性思考。</p> <p>比如，哈贝马斯的交流理性尝试寻找一种非经验性的理解导向的行动。</p>
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<p>theory of understanding-oriented action. Such an attempt belongs to the second, practical side of the alternative between an empirical and a pre-empirical, hence, metaphysical theory. The same applies to the third part of the present study. Its fundamental concepts, will, duty, categorical imperative, and moral respect, also legality, morals, and moral grace, belong to a fundamental philosophy, but one of a practical, not a theoretical nature.</p> <p>Why should one speak of metaphysics at all? The primary reason lies in the essence of the object. Since morals are independent of sensuous appetites, they transcend already with their very concept the kind of nature decisive here (not theoretical but practical sensuousness). It is not a philosophical discipline, ethics, that is first and foremost metaphysical, but its object, morals. This peculiarity begins with that notion common to an ethics of aspiration and an ethics of willing: the absolute good. The difference between an ethics of eudaimonia and an ethics of autonomy is not about metaphysics, also the difference is not genuinely of an ethical but of an action-theoretical nature. In terms of the notion of aspiration, what counts is an insurmountable goal, precisely eudaimonia; in terms of the notion of willing, what counts is an indisputable origin, autonomy.</p> <p>Despite the difference between eudaimonia and autonomy, both kinds of ethics are related to metaphysics in a similar manner. Namely, both are metaphysical in a metaphysically-free fashion. On the one hand, they consist in a genuinely practical, fundamental philosophy that is to a great extent independent of a theoretical, fundamental philosophy. On the other hand, their fundamental notion, for the one, eudaimonia, for the other,</p>	<p>这一尝试属于形而上学（即经验与先验间的替代品）的第二层次的、实践的方面。</p> <p>这还可以应用到当前研究的第三个部分——它的基础性概念：意志、责任、绝对命令和道德敬意，还包括合法性、道德和道德魅力，这些概念从属于实践的基础哲学中。</p> <p>到底为什么要谈形而上学呢？首先是因为客体的本质。</p> <p>道德独立于感觉的喜好，它的概念中在实践上包含了一种决定性，而这也让它超越了感觉之喜好。</p> <p>最早和最重要的形而上学并不是作为哲学学科的伦理学，而是它的研究对象——道德。</p> <p>这一特性，和渴求伦理学及意志伦理学一样，始于至善这一概念。</p> <p>幸福伦理学与自治伦理学的区别不在于形而上学或伦理学的真诚，而在于行为——理论的本性。</p> <p>对于“渴求”来说，重要的是一种不可超越的目标，即幸福；</p> <p>而对于“意志”来说，重要的是一个无可争议的起点，即自治。</p> <p>虽然幸福伦理学和自治伦理学之间有所不同，但两者都以同样的方式关联着形而上学，即都是一种无形而上学意义的形而上学。</p> <p>一方面，它们包含一种很大程度上独立于理论之外的实践基础哲学。</p> <p>另一方面，它们的基础概念——幸福和自治——都肯定是非经验的，并且包含一种形而上学特征。</p>
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<p>autonomy, has a definitely non-empirical, and to that extent a metaphysical character.</p> <p>Today, one prefers, admittedly, a simpler, anti-metaphysical ethics. However, a fundamental and simultaneously presuppositionless reflection runs into a complicated situation. Whether concerned with a theoretical-aspiration ethics of happiness or a theoretical-willing ethics of freedom – both require such a radical grounding that they have a metaphysical character in two respects: intentionally in terms of fundamental philosophy and thematically in terms of a non-empirical foundation. However, for both, neither theoretical philosophy nor a theologicalsh element is essential so that they are in terms of normal understanding metaphysics- free; as a whole, however, they consist in a metaphysically-free metaphysics.</p>	<p>今天的人们更喜欢一种简单的、反形而上学的伦理学。</p> <p>然而，一种无预设的基础性的反思会陷入到复杂的状况中，无论是否涉及“理论—渴求”之幸福伦理学或“理论—意志”之自由伦理学。</p> <p>这两者都要求一种根本性的基础，以至于在两个方面有了形而上学的特征：基础哲学之意图和非经验基础的主题。</p> <p>然而对于两者来说，理论哲学与神学要素都不重要。</p> <p>所以按正常的理解，它们都没有形而上学的意义。但若把两者看作一个整体，它们就包含了一种无形而上学意义的形而上学。</p>
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