

德国古典哲学讲座讲稿翻译文本

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1. Three Claims

Is Modernity still modern, that is, contemporary? Or should we turn our backs on it? Do we have to substitute Modernity's heroic visions of reason and enlightenment, of mastery of nature, and of comprehensive progress, for heroic anti-visions under the headings of "Postmodernism" and "Deconstruction", claiming the death of Modernity? Or should we rather first try to clarify the Project of Modernity, before we jump to any conclusions?

I propose that we replace the all-too-simple claim "Farewell to Modernity" with a certain task, the result of which is not yet given. Under the heading "A Touchstone for Modernity" we should discuss questions such as: How important is the concept of freedom for Modernity? Which notion of freedom is central?^[1] Last but not least: If freedom is endangered, is Modernity thereby endangered, as well? That means: If the importance of freedom, which is a central part of Modernity, decreases, does that mean that our contemporary world is not any more in need of freedom, and thus of Modernity? Or should we rather aim for a new understanding of freedom and Modernity, instead of simply getting rid of these notions?

1. 三种主张

现代性仍然是现代的，也就是说当代的？或者，我们应该背弃它？因为英雄的反愿景在“后现代主义”和“解构”的主题下宣称现代性的终结，我们就不得不替代对理性和启蒙、自然的掌控和长久的进步的现代性的英雄愿景吗？或者，在我们跳转到其他一些结论之前，我们不应再首先去尽力阐明现代性的研究课题？

我认为，我们带着一种必然的使命去取代这个再简单不过的、结果仍是不得而知的“告别现代性”的断言。在“现代性的基石”的主旨下，我们应该探讨如是之问题：自由观念对于现代性何以重要？哪一个自由的观念处于中心？最后但并非不重要：如果自由正面临危险，那么现代性也因而濒危？意思是说，如果处于现代性之核心部分的自由的重要性在不断地减弱，那么就确实意味着我们的当代社会不再需要自由以及如此之现代性？或者，我们不应再以一种对自由和现代性的新的理解为目标，取而代之的是简单地摆脱这些观念？

^[1] 关于翻译的注释：综观这次讲座，我为了明晰起见将仅仅谈及自由（freedom），因而涵盖了英语中“freedom”和“liberty”两个词的含义。我决定使用“freedom”以代替“liberty”，因为前者意义更为广泛，而“liberty”则通常仅在政治和法律的层面上使用。

My talk will deal with these preliminary questions. The *major claim* of my talk is that the concept of freedom is among the most important concepts for Modernity. Whoever wants to get rid of Modernity, therefore, has to get rid of the principle of freedom, as well. Abandoning freedom, however, seems to be implausible, if Marx's claim is correct: "no human being fights against freedom; one might only fight against the freedom of others"(Debatten über Preßfreiheit, in:MEW 1, 51;my translation). In any case, getting rid of the principle of freedom carries with it serious consequences. Thus, it might be sensible to first try to understand Modernity more thoroughly. In doing so – my *second claim* –, one encounters certain forms of self-endangerment which Modernity imposes on itself. These forms of self-endangerment, however, do not amount to an abandonment of Modernity altogether, but require certain immanent improvements.

Without a doubt, Modernity is a multi-faceted project which includes various internal tensions and which, in some sense, is even self-contradictory. For this reason already, freedom seems to be an adequate co-concept, since these three peculiarities of Modernity apply to the concept of freedom, as well: It is a multi-faceted concept with internal tensions and it is not free from contradictions.

These similarities, however, apply only to the surface of these respective concepts. The following considerations are more important: A vast amount of the projects which are essential to Modernity – one might even say: almost all of Modernity's projects and visions – are inspired by an idea of

我的演讲将处理这些基本的问题。其主要的主张是：自由对现代性而言是最重要的概念。因此之故，无论谁想摆脱现代性，都不得不也摆脱自由的原则。然而，抛弃自由似乎是难以置信的，如若马克思的主张是正确的：

“没有人反对自由；一些人或许只是反对其他人的自由”（*Debatten über Preßfreiheit, in: MEW 1, 51;my translation*）。在任何情况下，摆脱自由的原则会带来一系列严重的后果。因此，这对于首先去试图更彻底地领会现代性而言可能是明智的。在这样做时，我的第二种主张是，一旦现代性遭遇到某些形式的自危，那么现代性就强加于自身之上。然而，这些形式的自危不是等同于彻底抛弃现代性，而是要求某种内在的改进。

毫无疑问，现代性是一项多元化的课题，其包括各种各样的内部的紧张关系，甚至是某种意义上的自相矛盾。基于这个已有的原因，自由似乎成为一种充足的有限概念，因为这三种现代性的特性也适用于自由的观念：这是一种带有内部的紧张关系的多元化观念，它是由矛盾而生的不自由。

但是，这些相似性，仅适用于这些各自的概念的表面。以下的考虑更为重要：大量对现代性必不可少的课题——某些甚至可能表明：几乎所有的现代性的课题和愿景——深受一种自由的思想的启导。如果我们考虑到“解

freedom. This fact becomes even more clear if we take into consideration three closely related notions: emancipation, self-determination, and autonomy.

One can understand the Enlightenment in a number of ways: As a liberation from superstition and patronization exercised by the state and the church, as the emancipation from the force of nature and from hard work through the acquirement of new kinds of knowledge and skills, or as a self-determination by the people which results in the decrease of privileges, in the control of political power, and in democracy which promotes autonomy. In whatever way one may understand the Enlightenment, though, all these processes of emancipation, self-determination, and autonomy can be subsumed under the concept of freedom. This, however, does not imply that there is a single definite understanding of this concept. My claim that freedom is the principle of Modernity does not presuppose a uniform understanding of freedom. Rather, the opposite holds, my *third claim*: In order for the concept of freedom to function as a touchstone, we must clarify the ambiguities of the concept.

There is a further phenomenon which speaks against an all-too-simple diagnosis of Modernity: To assume a fixed core-understanding of freedom for the whole process of Modernity, for the process of its history of freedom, is naive: Most visionaries of freedom believed there to be a linear progress, that is, an ever-increasing measure of freedom in the world, for there eventually to exist a comprehensive and perfect "realm of freedom". Despite these beliefs, there are certain phenomena which speak against Modernity's optimism that prevailed for a long time. These

放”、“自决”和“自治”这三个密切相关的概念的话，那么这一事实会更加清晰。

人们能够用许多方法理解启蒙运动。例如一种来自于迷信和被政府与教会所实行的庇护的自由，例如通过获得的各种各样的知识和技能，从自然力和艰苦工作之中解放出来，或者例如一种导致了特权的减少、政权的控制和促进自治的民主的人民自决权。无论以什么方式，人们都可以理解启蒙运动，不过，解放、自决和自治等所有的这些进程都能够受容于自由的观念之下。但是，这并没有暗示出对这个自由的观念有一种单一而明确的理解。我的主张是，自由是现代性的基本原则，它并不预设一个统一的认识的自由。相反地，而我的第三个主张是：为了一种作为试金石之作用的自由的观念，我们必须澄明这一观念的含混不清之处。

有一种更甚的现象，其说的是对一个再也简单不过的现代性的判断：为了假定一个自由对现代性之全过程、对其自身之历史的过程的不变的核心理解。这是幼稚的。大多数自由的梦想家们认为，那里是一个线性的发展，即一种在世界之内不断增长的自由之衡量，目的是在那里最终存在一个全面而完善的“自由王国”。尽管有这些信念，但是某些说要反对现代性之乐观主义的现象已经盛行了很长一段时间。这些现象甚至有可能导致一种悲观的看

phenomena might even result in a pessimistic view. Conducive to such a form of pessimism are, for example: (1) dilemmas, that is, a predicament in which when you decide for one kind of freedom, you at the same time decide against another kind of freedom; (2) a dialectics of self-endangerment: that an increase in freedom necessarily turns over eventually into a decrease of freedom; and (3) aporias in the course of trying to achieve freedom and liberties, and to hold on to the achieved.

Faced with negative phenomena of this kind, we nevertheless should not talk down, or even forget, the mentioned accomplishments of Modernity. Furthermore, there are still pathbreaking innovations in other areas, for example in information technology, molecular biology, and neuroscience. But the trio of dilemmas, dialectics, and aporias, applies to these innovations, as well. Viewed from this perspective, without losing all their splendor, freedom and Modernity have to learn two things: self-criticism and an ability to reform.

There is a different objection against taking freedom as the principle of Modernity – or, if one assumes freedom to be essential to Modernity, against Modernity itself. This objection is grounded in the observation that the value of freedom and the approval of freedom seem to suffer from a decrease: In Social Ethics and in Social Philosophy, justice is now considered to be the key concept. If there still are theories of freedom that are noteworthy, they had to make way for theories of justice.

There are further competitors, for example, the functional differentiation and the alleged decrease of morality, in yet another way the globalization,

法。导向这样一种悲观主义的形式的是，例如：（1）两难的困境，即当你决定去赞成一种自由的同时，你又去反对另一种自由的困境；

（2）自危的辩证法：一种自由的增加必然会最终反转到另一种自由的减少；（3）两大疑难，即在尽力实现自由（freedom）和政治或法律形式的自由（liberties）的过程中的疑难，以及坚持不懈地去实现的疑难。

虽然面对着这种消极的现象，但是我们不应该贬低，或者甚至是忘记，所提到的那些现代性的成就。此外，在其他诸领域内，仍旧有许多开拓性的创新，例如信息技术、分子生物学和神经科学。但是，两难困境、自危的辩证法和两大疑难，这三者也都是适用于这些创新的。从这个角度来看，自由和现代性还没有失去它们的所有的辉煌，它们必须学习两样东西：自我批评和革新的能力。

有一种不同的反对意见，就是反对把自由看作现代性的基本原则，或者说，如果一个人假定自由对现代性而言是至关重要的，那么就反对现代性自身。这种反对意见是基于对自由之价值和似乎正在遭受减少的自由之认同的观察：在社会伦理学和社会哲学之中，目前正义正被认为是关键的概念。如果仍然存在某些值得注意的自由的理论，那么它们就必须为正义的理论让路。

还有更多的竞争对手，例如，功能分化，所谓的道德低下，以及以另一种方式出现的全

or the diagnosis of an ongoing disempowerment of humans: by means of the Copernican Turn the geographical disempowerment, in Darwin's theory the evolutionary disempowerment, and through Freud the psychological disempowerment, which is nowadays elevated to a higher level by neuroscience claiming the final farewell to our notions of responsibility and freedom.

If we take all that into account, why should we hold on to freedom as a key concept? The mere topic "theories of justice" itself does not challenge the principle of freedom, not even the predominant understanding of justice in terms of equality. For on the one hand, one could argue that there is a tension between equality and freedom, then propose that this is a necessary tension, and on this basis claim for an ongoing compensation of claims of freedom and claims of equality. On the other hand, if we look at Immanuel Kant, who is a highly important philosopher when it comes to justice, and at John Rawls, who is inspired by Kant and is the most important philosopher in the debates on justice of the last decades, then we see that for both of them, justice and equality belong together from the outset. For justice is defined in concepts of equal freedom. Justice starts to be a rival of freedom only when it is no longer essentially connected to freedom.

With regard to the further opponents, we should allow for different kinds of doubts. As I will try to show, the various disempowerments point at best at one side of the truth. And the functional differentiation, when contrasted with freedom, applies only to a very minor aspect of Modernity.

So why then take freedom as the guiding concept? According to a first, superficial argument, the

球化，或者一个人类的权利被持续剥夺的论断：通过“哥白尼转向”，地理权被剥夺；在达尔文的理论中，进化权被剥夺；并且通过弗洛伊德，心理权被剥夺。这是目前发展到更高层次的神经科学声称对我们的责任和自由的观念的最后告别。

假如我们把所有的这些因素都考虑在内的话，那么为什么我们还要坚持把自由看作一个关键的概念？那些单纯的“正义理论”本身并不挑战自由的原则，甚至是对就平等而言的正义也没有主导性的认识。一方面，人们可以认为，在平等和自由之间有一种紧张关系，然后又指出，这是一种必要的紧张关系，并在此基础上持续不断地提出一种对自由之声索和平等之声索的主张。另一方面，若是我们去看看一个相当重要的哲学家伊曼努尔·康德对正义的观点，以及一个备受康德影响的最重要的哲学家约翰·罗尔斯在过去的几十年里关于正义的争论，那么那时的我们就会发现，正义和平等从一开始就是一体的。因为，正义是在平等自由的观念中被定义的。只有当正义不再本质地关联到自由时，它才开始成为自由的竞争对手。

对于那些难缠的竞争对手，我们应该体谅他们的不同的疑虑。我将试图去揭示，那些各种各样的被剥夺权利的行为都是指向最好的真理这一边的。并且，在与自由进行对比时，功能分化仅适用于现代性的一个很小的方面。

那么，我们为什么要以自由为指导性观念

thematical scope of the debates should be broadened. According to a second, more important argument, the concept of freedom should neither be surrendered to a libertarian shortcoming in the debates of economics and social theory, nor should neuroscientists in the debates of moral philosophy, legal and social theory be allowed to simply argue freedom away.

Even more essential is a third argument, which at the same time spells out the third claim of my lecture: If we examine freedom, we examine guiding concepts and presuppositions of other debates, as well. In doing so, Modernity is examined more thoroughly as it would be the case if we took a different concept to be fundamental. The debate on justice, which has been revitalized by Rawls, for example, presupposes accountable persons who, being free from external constraints (negative understanding of freedom), aspire to have as much freedom as possible in order to successfully pursue their plans of life (positive understanding of freedom). Penal law with its concepts of accountability, responsibility and guilt, presupposes freedom, which is also true for civil law, politics, science, the ethics of economy, of research, and medical ethics, as well as for art, literature, and music.

2. Freedom: A Disturbing Concept

The self-endangerments of freedom only occur within the modern history of freedom. Certain internal tensions, however, are already present from the start. One of these internal tensions is expressed in the disturbing observation of a Modern theoretician of freedom: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains” (The Social Contract, 41). This opening line of the first chapter of The Social Contract (*Du contrat social*, 1756)

呢？根据第一种肤浅的论点，则辩论的主题范围应扩大。根据第二种更为重要的论点，自由的观念既不应该在经济学和社会理论的辩论之中被认定为是一个自由主义者的短板，也不应该在道德哲学、法律和社会理论的辩论之中被神经系统科学家简单地辩解为是自由的。

更为重要的是第三个论点，它同时阐明了我的演讲的第三种主张：如果我们审查自由，那么我们也深究那些指导性观念和其他的辩论的前提。在如此做时，现代性被更彻底地深究，因为现代性将是如是之情形，即倘若我们采用一种不同的基本的观念。例如，那种已经被罗尔斯赋予新活力的关于正义的辩论，其前提是负责任的人不受外在的约束（自由的消极理解），为了成功地追求他们的生活计划而渴望有尽可能多的自由（积极的自由的理解）。刑法与其义务、责任、负罪感和前提自由的观念，也适用于民法、政治、科学、经济伦理、伦理研究和医学伦理，以及艺术、文学和音乐。

2. 自由：一个令人不安的概念

自由的自危仅仅发生于自由的现代历史之中。然而，某些内部的紧张关系从一开始就已经出现了。其内部的紧张关系之一，在一位现代的自由理论家的令人不安的观察之中得以表达：“人是生而自由的，却无往不在枷锁之中”（《社会契约论》，41）。在《社会契约论》一书的第一章的开场白里 (*Du contrat*

leads directly into the center of the concept of freedom and thus into the center of Modernity itself. The opening line of Jean-Jacques Rousseau contains five claims about freedom and, at the same time, about Modernity. These five claims are supplemented by three further claims contained in the following sentence and in the context.

(1) Man “is” born free. Freedom, therefore, is no mere idea or an illusion, but a reality.

(2) It is “man”, and thus: “human beings” who are born free. In another work, Rousseau elaborates this point further in arguing that if a person would renounce freedom, this would be tantamount to renouncing her humanity, and thus, to renouncing human rights and even her own duty (cf. *Œuvres complètes*, III 356). Therefore, freedom is not merely a concept of a given epoch: Even if freedom is the key concept of Modernity, it has a higher, anthropological rank. Later on, we will take a look at the History of Ideas, which will prove this point: The concept of freedom did neither just fall from heaven, nor was it discovered or invented in Modernity. Freedom, rather, singles out the human being in the continuum of nature. And since it is the human being who has this special standing, freedom not only applies to the European Modernity, but to human beings as such, and therefore to every human being of any culture and time. This circumstance proves advantageous for our age of globalization: Since freedom is not the privilege of a certain culture, and is not tied to the self-understanding of the West, it is a cross-cultural, inter-cultural and in fact universal concept.

(3) Now the disturbing thing about freedom is that everywhere, we encounter the opposite: Although

social, 1756) 直接导入了自由观念的核心，从而也通达了现代性本身的核心。让-雅克·卢梭的开场白包含了五个关于自由的主张，同时也包含了关于现代性的观点。这五个主张被补充到三个包含了以下句子和背景的更深刻的主张之中。

(1) 人“是”生而自由的。因此，自由不是一种单纯的观念或幻觉，而是一种现实。

(2) 自由的是“人”，因此，“人类”的自由是天生的。在另一著作中，卢梭进一步地阐述了这一点，认为如果一个人会放弃自由，那么这无异于是放弃自己的人性，从而也是对人权的放弃，甚至是对她自己的责任的放弃（参见全集，III 356）。因此，自由不仅仅是一个特定时代的观念：即便自由是现代性的核心观念，它也具有一个更高的人类学的等级。稍后，我们再来看看《思想史》，这将会证明这一点：自由的观念既不是从天上掉下来的，也不是在现代性里发现或发明的。更确切地说，自由从自然的统一体中把人类引导出来。由于人类有这种特殊的地位，自由不仅适用于欧洲的现代性，而且也适用于人类的现代性，从而还对任何时代、任何文化的人类的现代性都适用。这种情况表明，自由对我们的全球化时代是有利的：因为自由不是某种文化的特权，所以它不依赖于西方的自我化的理解。事实上，自由是一种跨文化的、文化间的和普遍的观念。

(3) 现在，关于自由的令人不安的事情随

human beings are born free, we see them being in chains everywhere. These chains, as experience tells us, need not only be external chains – such as social or political chains –, but can also be of an internal, psychological, and even neural nature. Strong determinists even claim that these chains are bound so tightly around the human being and are not unlockable, that in fact we are not free at all. If they were right, and freedom was but an illusion, then this would change our life and our society radically, because this position fundamentally calls into question our common-sense ideas of freedom, responsibility, guilt, and blame.

If, however, this strong determinism is not justified – Rousseau's claim about being in chains –, two things follow: (4) Although human beings are born free, freedom does not seem to be a reality, but, rather, a capability – a possibility lacking actuality in a lot of regards, allegedly even in all regards. Without a doubt, humans have to develop a lot of capabilities they were born with, for example the capability of walking and speaking. In this sense, then, freedom, too, could be something which we are born with, but which we have to develop nevertheless: Something which loses its mode of a mere capability and turns into an actual reality only by means of development.

(5) Furthermore, for Rousseau it is not only the small child which is in chains, but rather the human being; and that means adults, too. It seems, then, that one might never achieve a total actualization of freedom; certain chains seem to remain with us in any case.

(6) Rousseau goes on in the next sentence: "One believes himself the others' master, and yet is more

处可见，我们遭遇到了反对：虽然人类是生而自由的，但又无往不在枷锁之中。正如经验所示，这些枷锁不仅有外部的——例如社会或政治的——，而且还有内部的即心理的，甚而是神经性的。强决定论者甚至声称，这些枷锁紧紧地束缚着人类，使我们无法解脱开来，其实，我们是根本不自由的。如果他们是正确的，自由不过是一种幻觉，那么这将从根本上改变我们的生活和我们的社会，因为这种态度从根本上说是在质疑我们关于自由、责任、负罪感和责任感的常识理念。

但是，假如这种强决定论是不合理的——卢梭关于人存在于枷锁之中的观点——，则有两种情况如下：（4）虽然人人生而自由，但是自由似乎并不是一种现实。然而相反的是，在很多方面，据称甚至在所有方面，它都是一种缺乏实现之可能性的能力。毫无疑问，人类必须发展他们与生俱来就有的很多天赋能力，比如走路和言谈的能力。从这个意义上来看，自由也可能是我们与生俱来就有的东西，因而我们必须发展它，只不过：自由失去了它自身的一种惟有的能力的模式，并且它只能通过发展而变为现实的东西。

（5）此外，对于卢梭而言，这不仅是一个处于枷锁之中的小孩，而且更是处于枷锁之中的人类，也意味着处于枷锁之中的成人。那么，似乎一个人永远也不可能实现自由的一种绝对的现实化；某些枷锁似乎在任何情况下都与我们同在。

（6）卢梭在下一句话里继续道：“一个

a slave than they” (The Social Contract, 41). Lessing will later modify this claim in *Nathan der Weise* (Nathan the Wise, Act IV, Scene 4), where the Young Templar says: “Not all are free that can bemoan their fetters”. And Goethe lets Ottilie write in her diary: “No one is more enslaved than the man who believes himself to be free and is not” (Wahlverwandtschaften, Elective Affinities, 151).

“Master” and “slave” are social concepts, more precisely concepts of law and politics. For the most part, the contemporary debates on freedom focus merely on freedom of action and freedom of the will, that is, on the freedom of accountable persons, in a word: personal freedom. Rousseau, however, who is such an essential philosopher for the concept of freedom, and many more philosophers before and after him, treat freedom in a much wider sense. Thus, if we do not want to cut down the scope of the debate in an improper way, we should examine not only personal freedom, but also economic, social, political, scientific, and artistic freedom.

(7) According to Rousseau, and also according to Lessing and Goethe, one can be “more a” slave than another person. Thus, it seems that freedom is a comparative notion. And indeed: There are different levels or grades of realized freedom, according to individual and cultural development: Some people’s life is more free than others, and some societies and some cultures allow for more freedom for their members than other societies do.

(8) The strong determinism which claims freedom to be an illusion applies in its usual form only to personal freedom. According to Rousseau,

人相信自己是别人的主人，然而，一个人更多的是他自己的一个奴隶而非别人是奴隶”（《社会契约论》41）。莱辛后来在 *Nathan der Weise* 中更改了 (*Nathan the Wise, Act IV, Scene 4*) 这种说法，在那里，年轻的圣堂武士说：“不是所有的自由都讥笑他们的镣铐”。歌德使奥蒂莉在她的日记里写下：“没有人比那个认为自己是自由的和不是自由的人更受奴役”。

“主人”和“奴隶”是社会概念，更确切地说是法律和政治的概念。在最主要的方面，当代的关于自由的辩论只聚焦于行动自由和意志自由，也就是说，只集中于对责任人的自由的辩论。用一句话来概括就是：个人自由。但是，如卢梭这样一个对于自由的观念至关重要的哲学家，与那些在他之前和之后的更多的哲学家一样，都是在更为广泛的意义上来看待自由的。因此，如果我们不想以一种不得当的方式去减少辩论的范围，那么我们就不仅要深究个人的自由，而且还要考察经济的、社会的、政治的、科学的和艺术的自由。

(7) 根据卢梭、莱辛和歌德的看法，一个人可能“更多的是一个”奴隶，而不是另一个人。因此，自由似乎是一个相对的概念。事实上：按照个人和文化的发展，实现自由有不同的层次或等级。一些人的生活比另一些人的生活更自由，并且一些社会和文化允许其成员比其他的社会和文化的成员更自由。

(8) 声称自由是一种幻觉的强决定论，只适用于个人自由。然而，依据卢梭的观点来

however, there are forms of self-deceit and illusions in social and political freedom, as well.

3. The Dual Core of Freedom

Within the abundance of phenomena of freedom, we can, as commonly known, distinguish between a negative and a positive understanding of freedom. This distinction I refer to as the dual core of freedom. Negatively, freedom designates the independence from coercion and heteronomy. Positively, freedom refers to the ability of a human being to decide on aims of his own and to choose the appropriate means for pursuing these aims. Positive freedom thus means the self-determination and the autonomy to live one's life according to one's own conceptions of the good.

There are, however, some phenomenons in which these two viewpoints cannot be adequately separated, for example in the case of the asthmatic who can fill his lungs unhindered. Another example: In the same instant in which the states of New England separate themselves from the English crown, they are free for political self-determination. Nevertheless, negative freedom, that is, the independence from coercion, has a certain priority. As Rousseau claimed, the freedom of a human being does not consist in the fact that one can do whatever one wants, but that one does not have to do the things one does not want to do. This pattern is already present in the subhuman sphere: In this negative sense, a bird flying freely in the air is free even when it is hungry or cold. Similarly, a dog is free when turned loose. The counter-pattern can be illustrated by a wild animal which is kept in a zoo cage: It can neither move within its own original environment, nor can it develop and live according to the laws of its species and the laws of self-preservation.

看，在社会和政治的自由中也存在着许多自欺和幻觉的形式。

3. 自由的双重核心

众所周知，在大量的自由的现象里，我们能够区分自由的消极理解和自由的积极理解。我把这种区分看作是自由的双重核心。在消极方面，自由特指源于强制和他律的独立性。在积极方面，自由是指一个人决定自己的目的，并选择适当的手段来追求这些目的的能力。积极自由，也意味着以已有的善的观念为准则去过一种自决和自主的生活。

可是，存在一些不能完全区分这两种观点的现象。例如，在哮喘患者可以填充他的不受阻碍的肺部的案例中。另一个例子是：在同一时刻，许多新英格兰的国家脱离英国的统治，他们是自由的政治自决。然而，消极自由，即源于强制的独立性，有某种优先性。正如卢梭所言，一个人的自由不在于他可以做自己想做的事，而在于他不必做自己不想做的事。这种模式已经在非人的范围内出现：在此消极意义上来讲，一只鸟在空中自由地飞翔是自由的，即使当它饿了或冷了时。同样，当一只狗丢失时，它是自由的。可以用圈养在动物园笼子里的野生动物来说明这种反模式：它既不能在自己原有的环境中移动，也不能根据其物种的规律和自我保护的规则来成长和生存。

By way of analogy, human beings are free when they leave a limitedness behind – jail, imprisonment in camps, their home, orphanage or pressing debts –, or when they manage to escape strict rules or other forms of dependency, and can now, finally, do whatever they like and what they want, including the possibility of doing so in excess.

Negative freedom usually has a dynamic character. A person achieves negative freedom through a process of getting rid of certain ties. In this way, then, negative freedom is emancipatory. Positive freedom, the freedom “to do something”, however, means that a given subject, a natural individual, a group or a political community, acts autonomously and takes its own route.

According to negative freedom, a person is more free to the extent that less obligations, ties, and constraints exist. Thus, negative freedom is a comparative concept. Since it is always given in a more-or-less, we can speak of different levels of freedom.

Some people who focus solely on the negative side of freedom tend to see it as a convenience to do what one considers to be worthwhile. Often, this convenience is understood not to refer only to a given option or a desire one might have, but also to the opportunity, additionally to the right and to the power to realize this opportunity. Understood in this way, freedom becomes a concept which has in every case the power to realize itself. Against this understanding, however, stands reality: for example, financial boundaries, limits of talent, as well as resistance and deficits of external nature. Additionally, other people, or certain conventions,

用类推的方式，当人类脱离监狱、阵营、他们的家庭、孤儿院或紧迫的债务时，他们是自由的。或者，当他们设法逃避严格的规则或其他形式的依赖时，并且无论他们喜欢做什么和他们想要做什么，现在可以做，最后也可以做，包括过度地这样做的可能性。

通常，消极自由有一个动态的特征。一个人通过一个摆脱某些关系的过程来获得消极自由。如此，消极自由是有助于解放的。但是，积极自由，即“做某事”的自由，意味着一个被给予的主体、一个自然的个体、一个群体或一个政治团体，自主地行动，并采取自己的路线。

按照消极自由，在某种程度上，一个人在义务少、关系少和存在约束时更自由。可见，消极自由是一个相对观念。因为，它总是或多或少地被给予，我们可以谈论不同层次的自由。

有些人只专注于自由的消极方面，往往倾向于把消极自由看作是一个人寻求有价值的东西的一种便利条件。通常，这种便利性被理解为：不仅指的是一个给定的可参考选项，或一个可能有的愿望，而且也指一个机会，即实现这个机会的另外的权利和权力。以这种方式来理解，自由成为了一个在任何情况下都有实现自身的力量的观念。然而，应立于现实以反对如是之理解：例如，金融界限，人才的限制，以及阻力和外在性的赤字。此外，他人或者某

may also limit one's freedom. And last but not least, often a person hinders himself in the pursuit of his freedom, in pursuing various projects which make other projects, maybe even more important ones, harder to pursue or even obstruct the pursuit of the latter. Therefore, an understanding of freedom as including the power to realize itself fails against internal and external barriers, the latter being natural as well as social barriers. Thus, in a livable and experienceable sense only that person is free who takes her freedom to be more than what that understanding implies.

Both of these core notions of freedom have an enormous realm of application: In a German folk song, it is said that thoughts are free ("Die Gedanken sind frei"), by which it is meant that thoughts can flourish without anybody censoring them. Thanks to human imagination, this kind of negative freedom, then, turns into positive freedom in creating free worlds of thought in which one can emancipate oneself from the constraints of reality. Even the simple mode of day-dreaming is already a form of this freedom. And talented writers, painters, sculptors and composers, all in their own way, create a new world which is not subject to the narrowness and constraints of reality. The positive freedom exercised in these cases is, yet again, a comparative notion: The person who is more imaginative is able to be more creative and more original as the person who is simply copying ideas which others have thought or produced before him.

Sciences and humanities are already called free when it is not subject to political constraints. They are even more free, however, when they emancipate themselves from economic interests, as well. This kind of negative freedom does only turn into positive freedom when science, and

些习俗, 也可能会限制一个人的自由。最后但并非最不重要的是, 往往一个人在追求自己的自由的过程中, 在追求其他的更加难以实现的或许是更重要的一些计划, 或者阻碍后者实现的各种计划的过程中阻碍了他自己。因此, 作为包括实现它自身的力量在内的一种自由的理解并不反对内部和外部的阻碍。后者是自然的也是社会的阻碍。因而, 在一种仅是舒适的和体验式的感觉中的人是自由的, 这个人把自己的自由看作超越了理解所暗示的什么。

自由的这两个核心概念有一个巨大的应用领域: 据德国的民歌 ("*Die Gedanken sind frei*") 所说, 思想是自由的。这意味着, 思想可以在没有任何人干预的情况下蓬勃发展。由于人类的想象力, 这种消极自由进而转变成积极自由, 在创造自由世界的思想中, 一个人可以从现实的约束中解放自己。即使是单纯的白日梦的模式, 也已经是这种自由的一种形式。而且, 有才华的作家、画家、雕塑家和作曲家, 都在以自己的方式, 创造一个没有狭隘和不受现实条件制约的新世界。在这些情况下, 这种发挥作用的积极自由仍然还是一种相对概念: 更富有想象力的人就是那种更具有创造力和独创性的人, 而不是那种简单地模仿他人已有的思想或者在他之前就已产生的思想的人。

当不受政治限制时, 科学和人文科学已被称为“自由”。可是, 当它们也把自己从经济利益之中解放出来后, 它们甚至更自由。当科学与人文科学遵循自己的规则、拒绝任何对功

humanities follow its own rules, rejects any commitment to utility and in this sense becomes an end in itself.

A person is free to a high degree when she not only emancipates herself from the up to now dominant rules, but also refrains from the external “vanities of the world” such as power, wealth, and stardom. She is more free still, when she additionally manages to overcome the power of her desires. This does not mean, however, that a person may claim this freedom who refrains from property but understands this refraining not as austerity, but celebrates it as an artificial performance, and in this way tries to gain public attention: Because this person, then, is subject to another constraint – the constraint of doing something spectacular, and own vanity surely is an additional factor.

A next observation I want to pose as a question: Is only that person free – and is she free at all – who lives according to the principle of preliminaryity, and who in doing so picks up a certain project, later takes on another one, and in this way continues to choose anew over and over again, always with the proviso to repeal her choices? Or is not rather that person free who wholeheartedly commits herself to a cause, and in this way – because of a reflective plan of life – is not in need of many of the more spectacular modes of emancipation? The Danish writer Peter Høeg describes this state in the following way: “True freedom is freedom from having to choose, because everything is perfect just as it is” (*The Quiet Girl*, 2006, 255). Deep peace and a tranquil state of mind results, including “a feeling of both freedom and release” (261).

利的承诺时，这种消极自由只会变成积极自由。在这个意义上，消极自由本身就变成了一个终结。

当一个人不仅将自己从目前占主导地位的规则之中解放出来，而且也尽量避免如权力、财富、和明星等外部的“虚无的世界”时，她的自由就会达到一个新的高度。此外，当她设法克服她的欲望的力量时，她也会更自由。然而，这并不意味着一个抵制财产但明白这种抵制不是作为俭朴而是作为一种虚假表演的人可以要求这种自由，并试图以此方式得到公众的注意。因为此时的这个人正在受到另外一个约束——做一些壮观的事情的约束，而且她自己的虚荣心肯定是一个额外的因素。

我把下一个考察当作一个问题提出来：个人自由仅仅是一个自由的人按照评估的原则而生活，并且如此这般地制定某种计划，然后再着手另一个计划，以及以此方式继续重新一次又一次地选择，又总是附带条件地废除自己的选择？或者，并非那个全心全意地打拼自己事业的自由的人，以及以此方式——因为一种反思性的生活计划——并不需要更多的更惊人的解放模式？丹麦作家 Peter Høeg 用以下方式描述这种情况：“真正的自由是自由地选择的自由，因为正如它所是的那样，一切都是完美的”（《安静的女孩》，2006，255）。深沉的宁静和思想结果的平静状态，包括“一种自由和释放的感觉”（《安静的女孩》，2006，261）。

We can recognize people who manage to come close to this sense of freedom already by their outer appearance: These people emanate tranquility and peace of mind. Additionally, they usually display a way of living which has the high rank of a moral virtue: the ability and the willingness to be generous. Already in Ancient Greece, generosity is said to be a sign of the morally free person: to act with one's material resources neither greedy, nor lavishly, but masterfully and generously (cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics IV, 1-3).

4. A Brief Glance at the History of Ideas

The concept of freedom ranks among those key concepts of occidental thinking which develop within Greek Antiquity, get enriched by Roman, Christian, and also Germanic thought, and eventually emerge within Modernity to take on the importance as Modernity's fundamental notion.

From the perspective of the History of Ideas (cf. Conze et. al. 1975, for Antiquity Raaflaub 1985), the legal and political understanding of freedom plays a distinctive role within this development. Historically, the concepts of "being free" and a "free person" go back to an Old Germanic word: "frija", Old Icelandic: "frjåls", which means: "with a free neck": Free is that person whose head is not cast into a yoke, and thus the person who is no slave or bondsman to another person, but serves only himself. These two notions, additionally, are etymologically connected with "friend", since they go back to the Indogerman root "prai", which means: protect, take care of, like, love, and is related to "friend". From this root, in Germanic the notion of "free" ("frei") develops as a concept of legal order: Free is he who belongs to "the cherished ones" and who is, thus, protected.

我们可以意识到那些设法通过他们的外表以接近这种自由感的人：这些人都是源自心灵的宁静与和平。此外，他们经常表现出一种具有高层次的美德的生活方式：气度非凡的能力和意愿。早在古代希腊，慷慨就已被认为是一个道德自由的人的一个标志：既不贪婪，也不浪费，而是乐善好施地使用一个人的物力（参见亚里士多德，《尼各马可伦理学IV》，1-3）。

4. 《诸观念的历史》简观

自由是西方思想中极为重要的概念之一；它肇兴于古希腊，丰富于罗马基督教时期、德意志思想，并最终融入到现代性之中并成为其基础性概念。

根据《诸观念的历史》一书的观点，从法律和政治的角度所理解的自由之含义在该术语的发展史上起着与众不同的作用。从发展史来看，“自由”和“自由人”的概念都可追溯到一个古老的德语词“frija”和古冰岛语中的“frjåls”，后者意为“自由的脖子”：自由即一个人的头不被置于枷锁之中，他因此不是另一个人的奴隶和保释人，而仅侍奉于他自己。除此，这两个古老的概念从词源学上讲都与“朋友(friend)”有关，因为它们都可从根源上一直往溯到印欧语系中的“prai”一词，它有“保护、照顾、及以及爱类似”的意思，并且也与“朋友(friend)”有关。由此开始，德语中的自由(frei)这一观念便发展为一个表示法律秩序的概念：自由即是一个人属于“那些保护他的人(the cherished ones)”，他因此

<p>“The cherished ones” are the other members of the community or a tribe.</p> <p>According to the Grimms Deutsches Wörterbuch (Vol. 4, 94) the German notion of “free” (“frei”) originally relates to the Latin “privus”, which means singulus, suus; and idios in Greek. According to that meaning, the free person is “his own, sui juris, and thus is not owned by another”.</p> <p>Similarly, in Ancient Greek thought a person is called free who lives for his own sake, and not for the sake of another person. According to this definition, which Aristotle surprisingly provides not in the Politics, but in his Metaphysics (I 2, 982b26), the human being is an end in itself. This fact opposes two misjudgments frequently made: Firstly, it shows that the idea of the human being as an end in itself, which is fundamental to Modern thought, is not invented by Modernity. And, secondly, it becomes apparent that the predecessors of this idea do not only stem from Judeo-Christian thought, but also from heathen, Greek and Germanic, Antiquity.</p> <p>As a political and legal notion, freedom has a merely particular meaning (this holds for the Greek as well as for the Roman and Germanic world equally): Only the “free person” has the privilege of being a full member of his community. Free is he who lives for his own sake and independent from external power, and is thus contrasted with the non-privileged, even discriminated persons; the socmen and hereditary servants, the bondsmen and slaves.</p>	<p>受到保护。“那些保护他的人”指的是该个体所在集体的或部落的其他成员。</p> <p>据格林所编的《德语词典》(1994 年第四卷), 德语中的“自由(frei)”刚产生时与一个拉丁词 “privus” 有关, 意为 “singulus”、 “suus” 或者希腊语中的 “idios”。由这层意思看来, 自由人指他 “从属于他自己, sui juris, 因此他不被他人所有”。</p> <p>在古希腊思想中也与此相似, 只有那些在生活中其所作所为皆是为自己而不是为他人的才能被称作自由的人。令人感到诧异的是, 这一定义是亚里士多德在《形而上学》给出的, 而非出自《政治学》一书; 我们可根据该定义发现, 人以其自身为目的 (the human being is an end in itself)。此事实驳斥了两种频繁出现的误解: 其一, 上述定义表明人以自身为目的的观念并非现代性的发明, 尽管它是现代性的基础; 其次, 可以明显地看到, 自由观念不仅起源于犹太——基督思想, 而且也源于异端思想、古希腊和德国思想。</p> <p>作为政治和法律上的术语, 自由仅有一种特殊的含义 (在古希腊思想中是这样, 在罗马德意志世界里亦复如是): 唯有 “自由人” 才有特权成为其所在社会的一个合法成员 (full member)。自由即一个人以自我为目的并独立于外在的力量; 因此, 这里的自由是与众多没有特权的人相比较而言的, 比如受歧视的人, 租赁土地的贫农, 以及世代代的奴仆、保释人和奴隶。</p>
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Since this legal privilege distinguishes the members of a community of blood and tribe, the free person is also distinguished from the stranger. Unlike the latter, the free person is protected from violence and oppression through others. For this reason, both fundamental notions of freedom come together in the Old European legal concept of freedom: In the negative respect, the free person is free from external force, and the positive respect, she is protected against external force by means of a common power. Furthermore, the free person is an equal participant in the political life and thus bears responsibility for the upholding of a common power.

Since the protection which the legal community provides for its full members rests on reciprocity, all free persons are “in the same boat”. For this reason, the concept of freedom is related to the concept of solidarity. And this situation also explains the connection between “free” and “friend”: Since the free persons know each other, work with each other and protect each other, they are connected by a sense of friendship.

It is not only individuals who can be ends in themselves, but also social units. In this second, and again pre-Modern, understanding, the political community of Ancient Greece, the polis – a sort of city republic –, claims autonomy for itself: self-determination as self-legislation. This understanding of freedom implies an inner freedom as opposed to a tyranny, as well as an outer freedom: the independence of external domination. In this way, the Greek polis distinguishes itself quite self-confidently from other political communities such as the Persian Empire. Ever since Herodotus (cf. *Historiae* VII, 135-6) – and that means for over two and a half

由于这一合法特权区分了血缘社会和宗族社会的成员，自由人也区别于外域人(stranger)。不同于后者，自由人通过其他人使自己免于暴力镇压等情况。为此，古代欧洲思想中自由在两个方面的含义都汇流于法律层面的自由概念:在消极方面，自由人免于外在的力量;积极方面，他通过外在普通力量(common power)的方式使自己受到保护。更进一步说，自由人在政治生活中是平等的参与者，他因此而负有维护那种普通的外在力量的责任。

鉴于法律社会为其合法成员提供的保护依赖于互助互惠，那么一切自由人都是“同舟共济(in the same boat)”。因此，自由的概念和休戚与共有一定关联。这种状况也可以解释“自由(free)”和“朋友(friend)”之间的联系:既然自由人之间互知彼此、互帮彼此和互保彼此，那某种情义感就将他们联系起来。

不仅个人可以自身为目的，社会也可以自身为目的。在前现代(pre-Modern)时期的第二种理解中，古希腊政治团体的城邦——城市共和的一种——声称要施行自治:自我决策即靠自我立法。这种对自由的理解暗示出内在自由是对暴力的反抗，也暗示了一种外在的自由:即它独立于外在的其他政权。古希腊的城邦通过这种方式自信满满地将自己与其他政治群体比如波斯帝国区别开来。自希多罗德(Herodotus)以来——这意味着已有两个半世纪——我们欧洲便通过政治文化和自由民主来定义自己，它通过军事手段的形式在与马拉松、萨拉米和普拉塔的历史战争

<p>centuries – our continent defines itself through its political culture, a free democracy, which was defended with military means in the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Platäa. At the same time, the concept of freedom gets a new counterpart: Whereas in terms of inner politics the free person is opposed to the slave, in terms of foreign politics the Greek person (only the free Greek person, of course) is opposed to the non-Greek person, who gets downgraded to a “Barbarian”.</p> <p>In Late Antiquity, long after the Greek city-state has lost its political freedom, the Stoics – the leading philosophical school at that time – develop a radically new notion of freedom, which without a doubt is neither social nor political: It is the fundamentally apolitical idea of inner freedom, understood as a personal way of life which is independent from law and politics.</p> <p>A further notion of freedom, which is not fundamentally different because is is also apolitical, develops within Christian thought. According to the Epistle to the Romans, the human being is freed through Christ from sin as well as from being subject to death (6:21, 8:21). And to the Galans St. Paul writes that Christ has made humans free for freedom (5:1), and elsewhere, that freedom is where the Lord’s spirit acts. In these passages, the Stoic notion of pure inner freedom gets religiously elevated. Through this elevation, freedom enters the difficult issue of two factors which allegedly further freedom, but on first sight seem to threaten it: predestination and God’s grace. There is, however, one thing which is left untouched: the new religious or theological notion of freedom distinguishes once more by a superior, superlativistic rank, which cannot be excelled.</p>	<p>中捍卫自己。同时，自由概念有了新的与之相应的说法:既然自由人于国内政治而言与奴隶相对，那么就外国政权而言希腊人(当然指拥有自由的希腊人)就与非希腊人相对，后者已降格为“野蛮人”。</p> <p>在随后的古代思想中，即希腊的城邦失却政治自由之后的很长一段时间，斯多噶学派——一个当时极具影响力的哲学流派——发展出一套完全不同的、无疑既非社会也非政治的自由观念:它是基本与政治无关的内在自由，即把自由理解为一种个人的生活方式，同时独立于法律和政治。</p> <p>自由概念进一步发展于基督教思想中;这一阶段的自由基本并无差异，因为它也是远离政治的。根据《罗马书》(Epistle to the Romans)，通过基督自恶和被判死刑之后，人类就是自由的。圣保罗(St. Paul)写到，为了自由而使人类成为自由的(made humans free for freedom)。在这些文章中，斯多噶学派纯粹内在自由的观念得到了来自宗教方面的升华。通过这种升华，自由面临两方面的问题:前定论和上帝恩典，这从某种程度上说促进了自由的发展，但初看起来似乎威胁到了自由。但是，仍有一事并未触及:自由这一宗教或者神学的概念被一个至高无上、无法逾越的层级再次区别开来。</p>
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<p>Although primarily concerned with personal freedom, the Christian notion of freedom carries with it also a social and political content, albeit not a revolutionary content: Since the true, Christian freedom relativizes the importance of social order, St. Paul does not recommend to the runaway slave Onesius that he should emancipate himself from his (Christian) master Philemon. Rather, Paul advises in the Epistle to the Corinthians 1 that everybody should remain within their social status, since: whoever has been appointed a slave in the realm of the Lord, is freed by the Lord (1:7, 20, 22).</p> <p>The disempowerment of politics, which is inherent in this solely personal concept of freedom, is thus on the one hand itself disempowered – from a religious point of view, the difference between master and slave subsides –; and on the other hand is strengthened, even reinforced: Because, from a religious perspective, everybody is already free, legal emancipation appears to be irrelevant to a degree that one can simply forgo it. To be content with what is given and not to oppose legal discrimination is valid only under the premise in dubio pro positivo: to prefer the factually given in cases of doubt.</p> <p>The other apostle, St. Peter, considers this surrendering to fate to be even generally demanded: Christian freedom does not prove itself in the protest against state power, but in submission to it (1. Letter, verse 2, 13-17).</p>	<p>基督教的自由观念尽管主要着眼于个人自由，但它还是牵涉一定社会和法律的内容，不过其中并无重要之处:的确，自基督教的自由使得社会秩序相对化后，圣保罗向逃走的奴隶奥勒修建议，他不应该把自己从主人费勒蒙那里挣脱出来。但是，保罗也曾在《哥林多前书(1)》建议每个人都应维护自己的社会地位，因为无论谁在上帝国中被命为奴仆，那上帝就会赦免他。</p> <p>对政治的远离内在地依存于自由这一纯粹个人化的概念之中，因此从宗教角度看这种远离是由它自身所造成的;但另一方面它又得到了增强甚至加剧:因为，每个人就宗教的立场而言都是已经是自由的，那么法律意义上的解放在某种程度上说似乎就与之无关，他完全可以放弃法律。人们满足于所得到的东西，也不反对合法的歧视是有效的，唯有基于这一前提:in dubio pro positivo，即人们事实上更喜欢靠怀疑所得到的东西。</p> <p>其他使徒，比如圣彼得(St. Peter)，认为这种对于命运的屈服是通常是被要求的:基督教的自由并不反对政治的权力，而是服从于它。</p>
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5.Modernization

Within a long processes, which arguably still goes on, Modernity removes one privilege after another. Already from the perspective of the concept of freedom itself, this should not come as a surprise: Freedom, when applied to natural persons, on a fundamental level refers to the ability to act freely, out of one's own free will (Greek: hekôn; Latin: sua sponte). Obviously, this ability, as being part of the theory of action, is not conceptually tied to the legal status of a free person. And precisely for this reason, freedom entails revolutionary potential: The concept of freedom which originates in the theory of action contains the potential for a thematic universalization. This universalization renounces any privilege of certain groups, and ultimately, through the long history of the concept of freedom, leads to the understanding of freedom as an essential characteristic of all human beings.

In pre-Modern times, the Stoics are especially important for that development. The Jewish idea of humans as the image of God (which is also present in various other cultures) is important for this development, as well. And Christianity renounces all ethnical barriers. Albeit all that, all three of them – the Stoics, Judaism, and Christianity – rarely draw any consequences for legal matters. It is only in Modernity that freedom is transformed from a particular privilege into a universal claim of social and political relevance: Every individual human being and every society demands freedom.

This from a legal and social policy view point conservative attitude is undergoing fundamental change since the Renaissance. Now, one starts to understand freedom as the liberation from chains, namely the disengagement from estates-based and

5. 现代化

在现代性长期的发展过程中(无疑仍在继续发展), 它舍弃了一个又一个特权。从自由的概念自身来看, 我们对此不应感到惊奇: 当“自由”一词被用来修饰一个自然的人(natural persons)时, 它主要指的是能够自由行动的能力, 已经不仅仅指他自身的自由意志。很明显, 作为行为理论的一个部分, 这种能力在概念上讲与一个自由人的合法地位无关。因此更精确地说, 自由获得了巨大的潜能: 源于行为理论的自由观念具有一种能够在某个具体领域普遍化(thematic universalization)的潜力。这一概念在外延方面的扩大不再承认自由是某一群体的特权(privilege), 后来又经过长久的发展演变, 最终导致把自由理解为所有人都具备的一个重要特征。

在前现代(pre-Modern)时代, 斯多葛学派对上述发展起到了明显的重要作用。人作为上帝的图画这一犹太人的观念(这也表现在其他众多文化中)对于该发展也很重要。基督教扫除了了一切伦理方面的障碍。不过尽管如此, 这三者—斯多葛学派、犹太教和基督教—很少就法律问题得出任何结论。只有在现代性中自由这一概念才由特权转变为与政治和社会相关的普遍诉求: 每一个作为个体的人以及每一个社会都要求得到自由。

从法律和社会政策的观点看, 这种保守的态度自文艺复兴以来经历了根本的变化。现在, 人们开始把自由理解为对枷锁的摆脱, 也就是说, 脱离了房产、教权和传统的束缚。因

clerical boundedness as well as from the bounds of tradition. The notion of freedom, thereby, gets a new tint as well as a new weight, which increases even further in the epoch that we call Modernity, that is to say, since the Age of Enlightenment: In the name of freedom revolutions are instigated and fundamental reforms undertaken. The United States of America emancipate themselves from the British motherland in the Revolutionary War. The first principle of the French Revolution is *liberté*, freedom.

In any case, no matter if one takes on an individual or a legal or even a social perspective: In the end, special rights and prerogatives are not justifiable. Because of that, they cannot be uphold for a long time. In the recognition of this fact lies the essential modernization: Every human being and every political community is entitled to freedom. As a privilege of every human being, simply in virtue of being human, the concept loses its discriminatory power. The respective development – that, to adapt Hegel, firstly one, later some, much later many, and eventually all are free – could happen linearly. The actual history, however, includes fractions as well as regressions, but then again, luckily, multiple forms of progress which are both continual and jumpy.

The major steps towards emancipation are known: By renouncing privileges of aristocracy and other social ranks, by the abolition of slavery and similar institutions such as bondsmanship, every human being becomes a free legal person. By overcoming colonialism and satellite states, the societies gain political freedom. This freedom, however, is often but external freedom, since within themselves these societies still have to struggle with civil wars and dictators, with corruption and with immense

此, 自由之概念在此获得新的含义, 也获得新的厚重; 在我们叫做现代性的时代, 即是说自启蒙运动以来, 新的含义得到进一步加强: 以自由的名义, 诸多革命相继发生, 各种翻天覆地的变革也在进行。美利坚合众国在独立战争中摆脱英国统治从而解放自己; 法国大革命的首要原则就是 *liberté*, 即自由。

无论是从个人、法律还是从社会的角度看, 最终特权被证明在任何情况下都不是合理公正的。因为这道理, 它们不可能长久存在。意识到这一点便出现了现代化的首要原则: 每一个人以及每一政治团体都被赋予了自由。自由作为每一个人——仅仅因为他是一个人——的特权失去了带有偏见的力量。这种观念的发展可呈线性式的发生; 它由黑格尔提出: 刚开始只有一个人是自由的, 随后多了几个, 更久以后就有很多, 最终演变为所有人都是自由的。但是, 现实历史的既有一滴一点的微小进步, 也有部分的衰退低落, 但幸运的是, 还有众多形式的、或呈线性发展或呈跳跃式发展的进步。

自由走向解放的重要一步是众所周知: 在罢了贵族阶级及其他社会阶层的特权之后, 或者在废除了奴隶制及其他类似制度比如契约制之后, 每一个体都成为一个自由而合法的人。各社会通过殖民主义和其主宰国最终获得政治自由。不过, 自由在此经常指的是外在的自由 (*external power*), 因为在这类社会内部, 它们还不得不与内战和独裁者抗争、与腐败和无

poverty.

In these processes of emancipation, the dual meaning of “freedom” remains throughout: Legal as well as political freedom consists in the freedom from external constraints and external power as well as in the safety of a common political power, which is usually realized through a legal system and the respective public powers. In this sense, then, rules with the power to coerce and authorities, and thus “chains” in a certain sense, conceptually belong to the notion of freedom – which is what Rousseau tells us, too.

Whereas many debates on freedom focus only on very few issues, Immanuel Kant and German Idealism (especially Fichte and Hegel, not so much Schelling who was not very interested in legal and political issues) manage to tie all facets of the concept of freedom together and to enrich the concept. At least since this movement, freedom becomes a key concept of Modernity and covers Ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, the philosophy of religion and theoretical philosophy, last not least the philosophy of education and of art: Freedom has become the comprehensive key concept of Modernity.

As the focal point of the genuinely modern self-understanding, freedom stresses the individuality and self-responsibility of the human being. Freedom changes the social and political relations and its institutions. Freedom strengthens the rise of science, furthers the liberalization of economy, and develops the idea of human rights. Freedom transforms this idea of human rights from a primarily negative understanding – the rights of freedom as rights of defense – towards a political and participatory understanding, to positive rights

以复加的贫困抗争。

在解放的诸过程中，“自由”的双重含义一直贯穿始终：法律和政治上的自由包含于摆脱了外在限制及压迫的自由中，也在处于普通权力的安全中，尽管后者的实现通常依赖于一定的法律体系和与此相应的公共权力。

鉴于诸多关于自由的讨论仅仅局限于一定问题，伊曼努尔·康德和德国唯心主义（尤其是费希特活和黑格尔，但在谢林那里不很明显，他对政治和法律问题不感兴趣）决定将自由的所有方面综合起来，丰富了自由的内涵。至少自这次运动之后，自由成为现代性的一个重要概念，它涵盖了伦理学、社会哲学、政治哲学、宗教哲学、理论哲学，另外还有教育哲学和艺术哲学：自由已成为现代性的一个综合概念。

自由作为现代人理解自我的核心点，它强调人的个体性和自我的责任。自由改变着社会和政治的关系，以及内在的各组织机构。自由促进了科学的发展，刺激了经济的自由化程度，也发展了人权的观念。自由将此观念从主要指——自由的权力作为一种防卫的权利——消极的含义转变为政治和参与式的理解，转变为自由的积极权力和参与政治的权利。最后，艺术、文学和音乐的现代形式也依赖于自由。

of freedom and rights of political participation. Last but not least, the modern forms of art, literature and music rely on the concept of freedom, as well.

In talking about these high-ranking freedoms, one should, however, not forget the less spectacular forms of freedom, which are nevertheless of essential importance. For example, we want to be free of sorrows or loneliness. We want to safeguard the freedom of everyday life, that is, to move safely in streets and public places and to live in an apartment or house without fear of violence coming from outside. We want to be able to make deals without the need to pay so-called protection money. We want to sell products without being threatened by forgeries. And according to the saying “my home is my castle”, we demand a private sphere for ourselves in which nobody, neither persons nor business people nor the state, is allowed to enter without our consent.

6. Ambivalences and Self-Endangerments

Even a preliminary diagnosis of Modernity falls short if it refrains from dealing with phenomena of ambivalence and self-endangering.

There are, firstly, certain ambivalences of the concept of freedom which are independent of Modernity. The freedom of the fool, who can say what he wants, has the drawback that nobody takes him seriously, because everybody considers him to actually be a fool. This kind of ambivalence is present also in cases where one is set free from duties and responsibilities. Politicians who do not lay down their office themselves, but are forced to do so by external factors, and who thus have to give up involuntarily their habit of being asked for

但是，我们在讨论这些高层次的自由之时也不应忘记其他形式的不很显眼的自由，它们还是极具重要性。比如，我们想摆脱悲伤或孤独；我们想保护日常生活中的自由，也就是说，能够在街道上和公共场合安全地行走，能住在自己的公寓或房子里而不畏惧来自于屋外的暴力。我们想能够自由地做交易而不用交所谓的保护费。我们想买卖商品而没有假货的威胁。谚语有云，“我家即我之城堡”，我们为自己要求私人的空间，任何人——无论是个人还是商人还是国王——如果未经我们同意都不能进入。

6. 内在矛盾与自陷困境

我们对现代性进行基本的考察时倘若有意回避其内在的矛盾与困境，那么这种考察就是有缺陷的。

首先，自由的概念具有某些独立于现代性的内在矛盾。一个能说出自己想要什么东西的傻瓜，其自由的缺点就在于没有人会认真对待他，因为每个人实际上都真把他当成了傻瓜。这种内在矛盾也表现在如下情况中：某个人摆脱了任何的义务和责任；还未到卸任期限的政治家们，倘若由于外在因素被迫下台；因此，他们就得不得情愿地放弃某些习惯，比如有人会找他们咨询或者挑战他们；此时他们自由的同时也不自

and being challenged, are free and unfree at the same time. The prudent person in this case will be happy about the relief, the not so prudent will suffer from withdrawal symptoms, and the wise person will manage to work for a positive record at the end of the day. Such a person, in any case, is free because he is relieved of responsibilities and the constraints that come with it, but is at the same time unfree, since the relieve does not come about by own decision, but is forced on him externally. And ultimately, in a situation in which one is free from all responsibilities, all ties and all resources, the emancipatory force of freedom loses all positive value: The person who has lost everything does not enjoy an enviable form of freedom. It is only natural that those persons tend to be desperate.

In my talk, however, I am rather concerned with phenomena which arise in the course of modernization and which are distinct from the mundane case of a misuse of freedom. To control the more fundamental self-endangerment, one, firstly, has to recognize it. Then, one has to make a diagnosis. And finally, one has to try to navigate maybe even to overcome it in determinate negation based on this diagnosis. Or else, one faces the danger that freedom tries to complete itself when it – in believing to be really free when all its ties are ripped off – gets entangled in unnoticed and, therefore, uncontrolled new ties, namely self-endangerments, and, finally, strangels itself.

Because of ambivalences and self-endangerments which are specific of Modernity, an appropriate theory of freedom should not be statist, but should remain dynamical and flexible, and in this way should understand Modernity as an open process. We can, for this purpose, divide Modernity into

由。这种情况下，小心谨慎的人会因被迫卸任感到高兴，不是那么谨慎的人就会遭遇卸任后的茫然和无所适从，而聪明人则会为了良好的行为记录继续工作到最后一天。后一种人是自由的，因为他会为责任以及随之而来的限制感到安慰，但同时他又是不自由的，因为这样的安慰并不是出于自己的决定，而是外在因素强加于他的。并且，在这样一种情形下，即他没有了任何责任、关系和资源，自由的解放的力量便失去一切积极的价值：失掉一切价值的人不会喜欢令人心生嫉妒的自由。自然而然，这样的人会趋向绝望。

不过我的讲座会特别关注现代化过程中出现的一些现象，它们不同于滥用自由的平庸案例。欲想控制更为基础的内在困境，我们首先得识别出它，其后对其进行考察厘清，最后基于这样的考察我们才有可能在确定错误的情况下控制甚至克服出现的困境。否则我们会面对这样的危险：自由自己一步步走向灭亡——想象一下自由的所有关系都被砍断，此时它是真正自由的；它在未被觉察、因而是无法控制的新的关系即内在困境中被束缚纠缠着；最终它自缢身亡。

因为内在矛盾与自陷困境是现代性所特有的，所以适宜的自由理论就不应是武断的，而应充满活力、富于弹性，这样我们就应不现代性理解为一个开放的过程。以此为目的，我们就可把自由划分为三个阶段，这呈现出现代性

<p>three phases, which present Modernity as the synthesis of a dialectical triad:</p> <p>In the first phase – the thesis –, freedom dominates in the course of its universalization as the powerful vision that all will be wealthier, better, and more beautiful in the future. Here we have such heroic paintings as “Liberty leading the people”, which Delacroix painted for the French July-Revolution in 1830, the overthrow of the reactionary king Charles X., and which later became famous under the title “Freedom at the Barricades”. No less heroic are the lyrics of the revolutionary working-man songs, for example: “Brothers, towards the sun, towards liberty” (“Brüder, zur Sonne, zur Freiheit!”). With regard to the history of Philosophy, one may here recall Plato’s Metaphor of the Sun, where the sun figures as the idea of the absolute good.</p> <p>Within the next phase – the anti-thesis –, the ambivalences and self-endangerments which I sketched above begin to appear. As a result, the heroism of the first phase subsides. The visions of freedom and Modernity are being curtailed, a more pointed critique only perceives the negative. Writers in the first third of the twentieth century, like for example Georg Trakl, are almost obsessed with decay – which in his case is not limited to the decay of the principle of freedom. In a similar vein, Oswald Spengler in his two-volume <i>The Decline of the West</i> (1918-1922) sketches a quite dystopic history of advanced civilizations, and his book turns out to be a long- and bestseller.</p> <p>Less relevant are the dystopias by economic historians such as Neil Ferguson (2008), because they confine the decline geographically to Europe and North America, and thematically to the loss of</p>	<p>辩证发展的三个过程。</p> <p>在第一阶段——正题——自由在其普遍化的过程中统治着那些富于感染力的幻想——一切事物将来都会变得更加富实、美好和漂亮。比如有一幅极具英雄色彩的绘画“自由领导人”，这是德拉克罗瓦(Delacroix)于1830年为法国七月革命所作——当时推翻了保守的国王查理十世——随后以“自由路上的阻碍”为题而闻名于世。这种英雄色彩稍微弱一些的是传唱于工人间的革命歌谣：“弟兄们，向着太阳，向着自由”（“Brüder, zur Sonne, zur Freiheit”）！回顾一下哲学史，在此我们会想到柏拉图关于太阳的比喻：其中把太阳比喻为绝对善的理念。</p> <p>在下一阶段——反题——我在前面描述的内在矛盾与困境开始出现。其结果是，第一阶段的英雄主义有所缓弱。对自由与现代性的幻想在降低，更为尖锐的批评仅仅触及到其否定性的一面。二十世纪前三十年的作家们几乎对腐朽产生迷恋，比如格奥尔格·特拉克尔(Georg Trakl)，不过在他那里并不局限于自由之原则的衰败。与此风格相似，奥斯瓦尔德·斯宾格勒(Oswald Spengler)在其两卷本著作《西方的没落》(<i>The Decline of the West</i>)中描绘了发达文明极其衰颓的一面，该书随后成为一部经久不衰的畅销书。</p> <p>与此不很相关的例子是经济史学家们所描绘的非乌托邦，比如尼尔·弗格森(Neil Ferguson)，因为从地理位置上说，他们把这种没落仅仅局限于欧洲和北美洲；从内容上说，他</p>
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<p>economic and subsequently political power. Surprisingly, these accounts cut out the substantial economic and cultural (fictional, musical, architectural, design) potential and underestimate the long-term attractivity of democracy, rule of law, and human rights.</p> <p>In any case, the self-endangerments of freedom and Modernity are much better dealt with by other authors, such as Hans Jonas in his late reply to Ernst Bloch's three-volume <i>Prinzip Hoffnung</i> (The Principle of Hope, 1938-1947, published 1954-1959). In <i>Das Prinzip Verantwortung</i> (1979) (The Imperative of Responsibility, 1984) Jonas is "in search of an Ethics for the Technological Age". Jonas's theory, however, is ready to admit for an eco-dictatorship, which his enthusiastic followers frequently tend to overlook. Therefore, Jonas is ready to abandon the very freedom on which Modernity rests.</p> <p>This negative mindset, which luckily did not develop into an attitude of total despair, is today being superseded by the third phase, which amounts to a form of synthesis. It is the attempt to master the self-endangerments. In the case that this third phase will prove to be successful, the negative attitude of a prophetic skepticism can be replaced by a new optimism. This optimism, of course, will be more modest than the optimism of the first phase. In this way, some, but only some heroism can be regained.</p> <p>As a first example for ambivalence and self-endangerment, let us take a look at Gutenberg's innovation of movable type printing which was one of Modernity's key technical innovations. Within a short period of time, this innovation</p>	<p>们关注的仅是经济的回弱，其次是政治影响力。令人惊讶的是，这类描述无视该地区庞大的经济和文化实力(科幻、音乐、建筑、设计)，也低估了民主、法律法规以及人权所具有的持久的吸引力。</p> <p>在另外一些情况下，其他作者解决起自由和现代性的问题来就要好得多，比如汉斯·尤纳斯(Hans Jonas)在晚年回应恩斯特·布洛克斯(Ernst Bloch's)的三卷本著作《希望的原则》(<i>Prinzip Hoffnung</i>, 创作于 1938-1947 年，出版于 1954-1959 年)。在《责任的命令》(1984)中，尤纳斯欲为技术时代寻找一种伦理学。但是，他的理论准备承认一种独裁政权(eco-dictatorship)，这是经常为其热衷的跟随者所摒弃的。因此，约纳斯准备遗弃现代性赖以存在的自由。</p> <p>幸运的是，这种带有否定倾向的心绪并未发展成为一种完全绝望的态度，而被第三个阶段——以正题的形式出现——所取代。其中包含有欲克服困境的尝试。这种情况下，这三阶段将会被证明会成功的，而代替先知般怀疑主义的否定性态度的将是一种新的乐观主义。当然，这种乐观主义比起第一阶段要谦逊得多。通过这种方式，只会滋生一点，仅仅是一点英雄主义。</p> <p>为说明自由和现代性的内在矛盾与自我困境，第一个例子我们来看古腾贝格(Gutenberg)关于可移动式打字机的创新。这是现代社会的一项重要的技术创新。在短时间内，这项技术导致书籍及其他印刷媒介变得较为便宜，因此</p>
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results in books and other print media getting cheaper, and thus faster distributed. In this course, the cultural, and in the same way political, supremacy is undermined which up to this point had been confined to a few libraries of monasteries and the nobility. Thus, a technical freedom – the free use of types – is transformed into a cultural and political freedom, since a huge part of society now had free access to print media, which – due to the high rate of illiteracy – additionally incorporated many speaking pictures and comic strips. This free access, in turn, later supported the Reformation, which in a certain way was another process of realizing freedom, since it provided freedom with a greater audience. This, however, at the same time led to a consequence opposed to freedom: the outbreak of the religious wars. Luckily, already within itself, the Reformation developed a way of overcoming these dangers, since it also inspired the Law of Nations and motivated the peace treaty of 1648 in Münster and Osnabrück. As a means of overcoming a long period of war, a peace treaty definitively counts as an addition to freedom. In this case, it is even furthered by the fact that the Peace of Westphalia established a juridical realm for Europe, which albeit various breaches is still a valuable model of a peaceful coexistence of different states.

Gutenberg's innovation is a complex example for self-endangerment, since the self-endangerment in this case does not immediately appear, nor does it have the last word. The process, rather, can be divided into five phases. A (1) technical freedom furthers (2) cultural and political freedom, which in turn (3) furthers another process of freedom, Reformation, in whose course (4) wars appear, which endanger freedom, but later can be settled by a (5) peace treaty, which is yet another gain of

得到迅速传播。在此过程中，这就削弱了文化的同样是政治的至上地位，因为当时获得知识的途径还有于那么几个仅有的修道院和贵族的图书馆。因此，技术自由——打字机的免费应用——转化为文化自由和政治自由；因为，社会上的很大一部分人现在有了免费的途径来印刷书籍，此外——由于高文盲率——其中不乏有声的图画 (speaking pictures) 和连载漫画。这一免费的途径反过来声援了随后的宗教改革，就某种程度而言这也是另一个实现自由的过程，因为它为更多的读者提供了自由。但是，这同时也导致了自由的反面：宗教战争的爆发。幸运的是，宗教改革的内部已经发展出克服这类危险的办法，因为它催生了《国家法》(*Laws of Nations*)，促使明斯特(Münster)和奥斯纳布吕克(Osnabrück)之间签订了和平条约。作为一种避免连年战乱的方式，和平条约肯定是自由的助推剂。在此案例中，如下事实进一步促进了自由的发展：《威斯特法利亚条约》为欧洲建立了司法的领域，不过各种形式的违约仍然是不同国家和平共存的有益参照。

就自由的内在困境而言，古腾贝格的创新是一个复杂的例子，因为这种困境在其中并非旋即出现，而且也无最终定论。但是，这一过程仍可划分为四个阶段。(1)技术自由促进了(2)文化自由和政治自由，这反过来(3)促进了另一类型的自由：宗教改革；在此过程中(4)宗教战争爆发，但它随后平息了，通过(5)和平条约，这又获得了另一种自由。显然，其中的每一阶段

freedom. It is clear that each of these phases would be in need of a more thoroughgoing examination, and especially the Reformation cannot simply be interpreted as a process of freedom. But since these remarks are only meant to be introductory, we need not get further here.

Let us turn to a second example. The freedom with regard to external nature – the process of mastering nature – has up to now resulted in a risk society which severely limits freedom. If conquering nature necessarily leads into a risk society remains to be shown. Another question to be addressed is in how far a good amount of freedom can be maintained or gained anew in such a society.

Thirdly: In the early ages, legal freedom is largely content with the negative rights of freedom. The insight that real freedom involves positive rights of freedom as well, has created a social state, which albeit its surely justified existence threatens freedom in three respects. Firstly, bureaucracy evolved in the creation of the social state and became more and more complex, as well as social legislation which became more and more dense. Both bureaucracy and social legislation thus create boundaries and even constraints. Secondly, there is the danger of a social state which initially was thought of as being subsidiary – capacity building – turning into a maternalistic welfare-state. In this course, another danger lurks: There are citizens who no longer take their society to be a community in which everyone has to give their share. Rather, they merely utter claims and in this vein, solidarity and reciprocity are in danger of turning into egoism and one-sidedness. And last but not least, the still growing costs already amount to a huge national debt, which, when turned over to the next generation, will result in severe limitations of their

都需要我们严格彻底地考察，尤其是宗教改革不能简单地说是是一个获得自由的过程。但是，考虑到所涉及的这些话都仅仅是导论性的，那我们在此就不必深究了。

再来看第二个例子。对于外在自然(即征服自然的过程)的自由目前已经导致了一个危机四伏的社会，这严重阻碍了自由。有待表明的是征服自然是否必然会导致社会的风险。另一个需要说到的问题是在这种社会中，我们距离维持或重获数量可观的自由有多远。

第三个例子。在早些时候，法律层面的自由主要满足于消极自由方面的权利。深刻的洞见是，真正的自由同时也包含积极自由方面的权利，这导致了社会型国家的产生，不过其无疑合理的存在在三个方面威胁着自由。第一，在社会型国家的产生过程中也产生了官僚制度，并变得越来越复杂，同时社会法规也变得越来越紧密。官僚制和社会上的法律法规都为自由产生了限制甚至束缚。第三，在社会型国家(通常想到的是提升能力是次要的)中存在着转化为母系福利型国家(maternalistic welfare-state)的危险。在此过程中暗含另一危险:其中有些公民不再将本来每个人都得向其贡献自己力量的社会看做集体。相反，他们仅仅是发表言论，长此以往，社会内部的凝聚力和互惠互利的精神就处于利己主义(egoism)和片面性的危机之中。最终，不断增加的开销依然成为一笔巨大的国债，当下一代执政时，它就会对这一代人的自由形成严重阻碍。

freedom.

The undoubtedly justified overcoming of all privileges of social ranks is partly responsible for another danger of the social state. But this overcoming cannot be reduced to the aforementioned danger of the social state. Without being necessary, citizens tend to severely limit their activities to such things as voting, paying income tax, and do not engage in any other kind of political participation. And there are even non-voters and citizens who do not pay taxes over a long period – these citizens not even fulfill the minimal contribution they are required to. In this way, they decline to “minimal citizens” which surely is not what the modern struggle for political freedom had envisioned.

The forth and last example is concerned with personal freedom. In Kant’s Ethics of the Will, personal freedom achieves its philosophical peak, and maybe even a peak which is fundamentally unsurpassable and may only be refined. Against this Ethics of the Will, certain processes of naturalization had been launched over the course of history, both philosophically and from sciences and humanities. These processes aspire to declare freedom to be an illusion, and suggest that we should get rid all together of freedom, and of the notions of responsibility and guilt which are closely connected to it.

From this broad spectrum of topics, the project on freedom I am working on right now examines four aspects: The freedom from natural constraints, political freedom, economic and social freedom, and personal freedom.

对社会诸阶层所有特权的无疑是合理的取消应为社会型国家的另一个危险承担部分责任。取消特权不能降低上述提到的社会型国家的危险。因为没有必要，有些公民常常把自己的政治活动仅仅局限在投票、纳税等事情，而不再参与任何种类的政治活动。而且，甚至还有一些人不参加投票，有些公民长期不纳税——他们甚至没有履行社会要求他们做到的最微小的贡献。以此看来，他们拒绝成为“最微小的公民”——这绝对不是为政治自由而不懈抗争的现代社会所期望的。

第四个也是最后一个例子着眼于个人自由。个人自由在康德关于意志的伦理学那里达到了它在哲学上的顶峰，甚至有可能就是顶峰，基本上不可超越，只能对其稍加完善。由于反对这种意志的伦理学，某些关于自然主义的理论(the process of naturalization)开始出现在历史的进程里，其中既有哲学的，也有自然科学和人文科学方面的。这些理论雄心满满地宣称自由仅是一个幻想，并且我们一并放弃自由，以及那些与责任和耻辱密切关联的概念。

通过一系列广泛的话题，我目前所进行的工作已经考察了自由的四个方面：自然限制条件下的自由、政治自由、经济与社会自由以及个人自由。

7. Comments on Method

My attempt to use the principle of freedom as a touchstone for Modernity is not an empirical, but a philosophical project. More specifically, it is rooted in practical philosophy. Nevertheless, I apply the methodological principle of *sozein ta phainomena* which calls for data from experience, as well as from other branches of science such as social and political science. And counter to the widespread neglect of the historical dimension, I take the history of philosophy seriously, which amounts to a second methodological principle. In this manner, I try to make classical passages like the one from Rousseau speak for our present purpose.

When we encounter aporias, they are not to be understood literally: They are not dead-ends. Rather, we should understand them as preliminary perplexities and roads not yet paved. If we start from the hypothesis of an essential connection between Modernity and freedom, the question arises due to certain experiences if freedom should be perceived as a potential, for example a technical, social, political, or artistic potential, whose realization is not necessarily valuable. Thus, can freedom also have bad consequences? And are these consequences so bad in nature that they even challenge the principle of freedom itself? In any case, I follow a third methodological principle in my project, namely *diaporesai*: to recognize and to work through difficulties.

Once the aporias have been dealt with, the question arises as to what they imply for freedom and Modernity: for their evaluation, their value, and their sustainability? Without a doubt, the idea of freedom has, aside from its anthropological and

7. 方法评述

我把自由的原理视为现代性的基石这一尝试并非经验的，而是一项哲学的工作。更具体地说，这项工作植根于实践哲学。尽管如此，我运用了 *sozein ta phainomena* 的方法论原则 (methodological principle)，这需要来自经验的材料，同时还需要来自科学的其他分支比如社会学和政治学的材料。与普遍忽视历史的维度不同，我审慎地对待哲学的历史，这成为我的第二个方法论原则。通过这种方式，我尽量让那些经典文本来为我们的讲座的目的发声，比如那篇来自卢梭 (Rousseau) 的文本。

当我们面对哲学上的困惑时，不能单从字面上理解：这些困惑不是无法解决的。相反，我们应当将其理解为初始的疑难问题和还未铺设的道路。倘若我们从现代性和自由之间的重要联系这一假设开始，那根据经验产生的问题便是：如果自由应当是一种潜能，就如技术的、社会的或者艺术的潜能一样，其实现并非必然有价值，因此，自由也能产生不好的结果吗？这些后果从本质上说会坏到甚至威胁到自由自身的原理吗？无论如何，在考察中紧随而来的是我的第三条方法论原则，即 *diaporesai*：即识别困难并解决之。

困惑一旦消除，产生的问题便是：就现代性与自由而言，上述困惑暗指什么？它们的评估？价值？或者它们的持存性？无疑，即便抛开自由这一理念的人类学和时代的含义，它仍

<p>epochal meaning, also an existential weight. Because of this, it is not only philosophers who are in charge of examining freedom, but also the reflective common sense, political debates, a number of sciences like psychology, and neuroscience, social, legal and political science, as well as humanities.</p> <p>Additionally, we should not forget the important writers of literature. I already quoted Lessing and Goethe in this talk. A third one, Friedrich Schiller, was even appointed honorary citizen of the young French republic due to the importance that Schiller assigned to freedom in his dramatic work. Contrary to the opinion of some thinkers who like to provoke, there are no sciences or other competence outside of philosophy which by themselves alone are responsible for a thorough and complete treatment of freedom. Starting with the clarification of concepts, and going on with provocative intermediate conclusions up to constructive work of thought, no thorough consideration, no veritable theory of freedom and Modernity can go without philosophy.</p>	<p>具有生命的厚重(existential weight)。鉴于此，不仅哲学家在考察自由，而且还有一般意义上的反思性的活动，政治辩论、很多类科学比如心理学、神经科学、社会和政治科学，以及人文科学。</p> <p>除此，我们也不应忽视文学领域内的那些重要作家。讲座中我已经引用了莱辛和歌德。第三位是弗里德立希·席勒，他因在戏剧作品中传播自由的重要性甚至被年轻的法兰西共和国授予荣誉市民的称号。与那些喜欢标新立异的思想家的观点相反，在哲学之外便无其他学科有能力独自担负起全面彻底地考察自由的重任。哲学开始于概念的澄清，紧接着以某些具有争议性的结论为中介，直到获得建树性的思想；倘若没有哲学，也就没有彻底审慎的思考，关于自由和现代性的真正理论就不会形成。</p>
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