

# 德国古典哲学第六次讲座讲稿翻译文本

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A study of Kant's practical philosophy of freedom requires yet two themes to be addressed before its completion: Kant's pedagogy and the thesis of humanity as the final end of creation; the latter in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Both culminate in freedom and morality in a new way. Furthermore, already as Kant's reflections on morality are multifaceted, these new themes broaden Kant's work in two additional ways. Because of them, at the latest, one must say that there is no philosophical ethics or moral philosophy in the entirety of western thought that is comparable to the wealth of topics or the thoroughness of Kant's project.

Kant's comprehensive awareness of the issues at issue stands out even in comparison to today's dominant representatives of moral philosophy and especially when one compares his work with other philosophies of the Modern Age. Morality is no single, delineated theme for Kant but plays a central role in almost every aspect of philosophy. When it comes to pedagogy, Kant develops four, systematic, bottom up, educational steps whose conclusion and final goal constitutes the development of freedom and morality. Further, the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* at first glance seems to have little to do with morality; in fact, in terms of new themes it has nothing to contribute in this respect. When one disregards the introduction, the project consists of four sections concerned with the aesthetic and three sections with the teleological power of judgment. However, all three sections in aesthetics have a significant connection to

在对康德的关于自由的实践哲学的研究完成之前，还需要处理两个主题：康德的教育学和“人类是创造的最终目的”的论点；后者见于《判断力批判》。它们都以新的方式置“自由”和“道德”于顶点。此外，尽管康德对道德的反思已经是多层面的了，但是这些新主题仍然在两个附加的层面上扩展了康德的研究。因为这种扩展了的研究，至少在整个西方思想中，没有哪种道德伦理学或者道德哲学比这些主题更丰富或者康德的计划更彻底。

康德对争议中的问题的全面认识使他即使和今天在道德哲学方面的权威代表，尤其是人们将他的工作和其它现代哲学对比时，他仍然可以脱颖而出。对康德来说，“道德”不是单一的、描述的主题，而是几乎在哲学的每个方面都扮演中心的角色。当涉及到教育学，康德制订了四个系统的、由下而上的教育步骤，它们的结论和最终目的构成了自由和道德的发展。更进一步，《判断力批判》一书乍一看好像和道德没有关系；事实上，在新的主题方面，它没有任何贡献。当人们忽视它的介绍，即这个计划是由四个涉及美学的部分和三个关于目的论判断力的部分组成的。但是，所有三个关于美学的部分都和伦理或者道德有重大的关联。对美者的分析中，美的理念被视为道德的表达；根据对崇高者的分析，它的重点是和道德相关的；根据纯粹审美判断的演绎，对自然美的兴趣允许人们对道德潜力的猜测；最后，审美判断力的辩证论宣称美是作为道德的象征。诚然，在下一个目的论的部分，康德发现只有在最后一部分，即方法论部分才和道德有重

ethics or morality. In the analytic of the beautiful, the aesthetic ideal counts as an expression of morality; according to the analytic of the sublime, its focus is related to morality; according to the deduction of pure, aesthetic judgment, an interest in natural beauty permits one's surmising a capacity for morality; finally, the dialectic of the aesthetic power of judgment declares beauty to be a symbol of the moral. Granted, in the next, teleological sections, one finds an important connection to morality only in the last section, the methodology. However, there the connection to morality occurs in two complementary ways. (On the meaning of ethics in the third *Critique*, see Höffe 2008 a.) Of these two complementary components, the first is indispensable for any study of Kant's practical philosophy of freedom: that humanity as a moral creature is the final goal of nature.

Here three themes intertwine that together and complementarily complete one another: Kant's moral anthropology, his philosophy of nature with respect to organic phenomena, and (along with the ensuing moral argument for God) his theory of teleological judgment. The conclusion of this study concentrates on Kant's moral anthropology. It correlates with his pedagogy. This is because an individual is not by birth the final goal of nature, but he becomes it only when he submits to education and by means of education's disciplining, cultivating, civilizing, and, finally, moralizing stages becomes a moral creature.

#### 6.1 Educational Goals: Cultivating, Civilizing, and Moralizing

The first discovery is negative: We know Kant as a revolutionary when it comes to fundamental philosophy, who, by means of his transcendental critique and its Copernican Turn, constructs what subsequently is an authoritative epistemic theory and theory of objects that, further, includes a legal and

大的联系。但是，这种和道德的联系发生在两个互补的方式上。（On the meaning of ethics in the third *Critique*, see Höffe 2008 a.）这两个互补的成分中，第一个是对任何研究康德关于自由的实践哲学不可或缺的：作为道德的生物的人类是自然界的最终目的。

在这里，三个主题相互交织，共同和互补来使彼此完整：康德的道德人类学，他的有关于有机现象的自然哲学，还有（随着对上帝的道德证明而来的）他的目的论判断体系。这项研究的结论集中在康德的道德人类学中。它关联到康德的教育学。因为一个个体不是生来就是自然的最终目的，而是只有当他接受教育和通过教育的训练、培养、文明化和最后的道德化阶段，他才变成一个道德的生物，（从而成为自然的最终目的。）

#### 6.1 教育的目标：培养，文明化和道德化

第一个发现是消极的：就基础哲学而论，我们知道康德是一名革命者，借助于他的先验批判和哥白尼式转向，他随后构建了命令式的认识体系和关于对象的体系，更进一步，还包括法律和政治伦理，以及历史哲学，尤其是宗教、美学和生物学哲学。康德以革命的、新的方式开辟的主题域是相当广阔的。但是，教育学似乎很难是当下的。如果人们

political ethic as well as a philosophy of history and, not least, a philosophy of religion, of aesthetics, and of biology. The thematic field that Kant cultivates in a revolutionary, new manner is remarkably broad. However, pedagogy hardly seems present. If one overlooks (as many Kant interpreters do) the terse reflections on moral education in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, one finds parenting (or pedagogy) thematized neither in the three *Critiques* nor in any of the other primary texts. Justifiably on this basis, no chapter is devoted to Kant in an exemplary work on the history of pedagogy, the two-volume work *Classics of Pedagogy* [*Klassikern der Pädagogik*] (ed. by H.-E. Thenorth<sup>2</sup>2010).

Nevertheless, the negative discovery is irritating and even disturbing. Kant is an important defender of the European Enlightenment from whom its, presumably most famous, definition comes: “Dare to make use of your own understanding!” (see *Enlightenment*, VIII 35) However, parenting (Kant speaks prudently, usually, not of education but of parenting) constitutes an important theme of the Enlightenment – apparent by the fact that such significant intellectuals of the age as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi are also (some even principally) educators. In many places, model schools were founded (for example, by Johann Bernhard Basedow in Dessau, which soon became the famous Philanthropinum (1774). Should we expect that such an extraordinary thinker as Kant would not be interested in pedagogy?

Whoever values Kant highly – and there are a host of good reasons to do so – will, happily, strike ore, to be sure in two remote areas. For one, in letters (for example, to Chr. H. Wolke, 28.3.1776 and J.B. Basedow, 19.6.1776), Kant praises the instituting of an Enlightenment pedagogy by Basedow and students like Campe. In addition, there are two short texts, *Aufsätze, das Philanthropin betreffend* [Essays

忽视（正如许多康德的解释者所做的）《实践理性批判》中对道德教育的简练反思，就既不会在三大批判中，也不会主要的文本中找到教养（或者教育学）的主题。无可非议地，在这个（“忽视”的）基础上，两卷本的《经典教育学》[*Klassikern der Pädagogik*] (ed. by H.-E. Thenorth 2010)在写教育历史中典范式的研究时，没有一个章节提及康德。

虽然如此，这个消极的发现是刺激的，甚至是让人不安的。康德大概是欧洲启蒙运动最有名的拥护者，源于他对“要敢于运用你的知性！”（see *Enlightenment*, VIII 35）这句话的定义。但是，教养（康德谨慎而经常地提到的不是教育，而是教养）构成了启蒙的一个重要主题，显然，事实上那个时代重要的知识分子如约翰·洛克，让-雅克·卢梭和约翰·亨里希·裴斯泰洛齐也（有的甚至主要地）是教育家。在很多地方，示范学校成立了（如约翰·伯恩哈德·巴泽多在德绍成立的学校，很快就成为著名的博爱学院（1774年））。我们应该期望像康德这样杰出的思想家不会对教育学感兴趣吗？

无论谁高度评价康德——有很多好的理由这么做——他们都会很高兴地肯定能在两个偏远的领域挖掘（康德有关教育思想的）金矿。举例说，在一些信里（比如，1776年3月28日写给Chr. H. Wolke的信和1776年6月19日写给J.B. Basedow的信），康德赞扬了由巴泽多和学生们（比如坎珀）创立的启蒙教育。此外，还有两篇短文：论文《关于慈善家》[《有关博爱学院的文章》](1776-1777; II 445 ff.)提出启蒙教育。然而常常有所

*Concerned with the Philanthropinum*] (1776-1777; II 445 ff.) that address Enlightenment pedagogy. Whereas usually reserved, Kant takes “heartfelt interest” (letter to Wolke) in this model school. The second remote area is Kant’s lectures on pedagogy that he first held in 1776/77 (i.e., in the so-called silent decade in which his *Critique of Pure Reason* [1781] matured) with the last in 1786/87, and then, after the appearance of his path breaking first *Critique* and his first critical writing on moral philosophy, in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785). Finally, there is the passage to which I referred in the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

As was common for the age, Kant took as the basis for his lectures a kind of textbook, the *Methodenbuch für Väter und Mütter der Familien und Völker* [*Methods Book for Fathers and Mothers of Families and Peoples*] (1770) from Basedow, whom he valued highly and who was influenced by Locke and Rousseau. This text placed great importance on three things: in the significance of education for the public and, therefore, for civic responsibility; in a common education for everyone; and on a strictly, child-oriented education. (On Basedow and Kant’s relationship to him, see LaVaque-Manty 2012).

However, Kant’s appreciation of Basedow did not hinder him, where necessary, to subject him to criticism (e.g., *On Pedagogy*, IX 448 f.). In any event he was able – as is obvious in his lectures on *Pedagogy* – to draw on his own experience not only from his own schooldays but also from the many years he spent as a home tutor with families in the region around Königsberg. In addition, Rousseau influenced him as is clearly manifest above in Kant’s call for a child- and age-appropriate education. Kant never prepared his lectures on pedagogy for publication. However, when it comes to an assessment of their content, one should not overlook two things: First, the lectures were already held in the pre-critical period so

保留，康德（在给沃尔克的信中）从这个示范学校中吸纳了“发自内心的兴趣”这一点。第二个偏远的领域是康德关于教育学的讲座，第一系列讲座在 1776/77 年举办（也就是，在所谓的十年沉寂时期，那时《纯粹理性批判》[1781]一书成熟），最后一系列讲座在 1786/87 年，即在他开创性的第一《批判》和第一本关于道德哲学的批判性著作《道德形而上学奠基》（1785）出版后。最后，还有我已经提及的在《实践理性批判》中的文章。

如同那个时代常有的一样，康德以一种教科书作为他讲座的基础：巴泽多的《给家庭和民族的父亲和母亲的方法书》（1770），作者对它的评价很高，他是受到洛克和卢梭的影响的。这本书非常重视三件事：公共教育以及公民责任教育的意义；对每个人的普通教育；以及严格地儿童导向的教育。（巴泽多和康德与他的关系，可以参看 LaVaque-Manty 2012）

但是，康德对巴泽多的欣赏没有阻碍他在必要的时候批评巴泽多（如，《教育学》，IX 448 f.）。无论如何，他能够——就像他在《教育学》讲座中显见的那样——利用它自己的经历，不仅来自他的学生时代，还来自他多年来在柯尼斯堡附近的家庭做家庭教师的经历。此外，卢梭影响了巴泽多，正如上文康德对于孩童和适龄教育的提倡中显现的那样。康德从来没有准备出版他的关于教育学的讲座。但是，就对它们内容的评估而论，我们不应该忽视两个东西：首先，讲座已经在前批判阶段举办了，因此和胡夫纳盖尔的观点（1988,47）相反，我们必须怀疑它们对康德先验哲学的贡献。第二，最后一系列演讲是在十八世纪八十年代发表的，因此更后的论文讨论的别的问题当然不会包含

that, contrary to Hufnagel (1988, 47), one must be skeptical of their attribution to Kant's transcendental philosophy. Second, the last lectures were delivered in the 1780s so that later theses in the work of others, of course, could not have been included in Kant's lectures (for example, neither Schiller and Schlegel's esteem of play and education in aesthetics, nor the debates in the 19<sup>th</sup> century on the humane or humanistic value of classical languages, nor, complementary, perhaps even alternative, educational themes).

## 6.2 A Cosmopolitan Pedagogy

The editor of the lectures on pedagogy (as well as of the lectures in *Physical Geography*) was the Kant-biographer, Friedrich Theodor Rink, who taught at the University of Königsberg as professor for oriental languages after his studies with Kant. However, just how authentic the lectures are that Rink published is hardly determinable in any conclusive sense. (In Volume XXV of the Academy Edition, one can find different versions of the lectures.) However, given that there are many themes here that appear in Kant's published works and in the *Reflections*, there is little reason to be greatly concerned that they are distorted. Above all, the fundamental thesis can be taken to be authentic (i.e., the theme that appears unquestionably provocative to our contemporary pedagogy although in our globalization era highly welcome): "The basis for an educational plan must be cosmopolitan" (*On Pedagogy*, IX 448).

In truth, though, the thesis is provocative even for our era of globalization. Kant understands under cosmopolitan pedagogy not an education to an intercultural coexistence or to world citizens who are comfortable everywhere but who feel themselves nowhere at home. Kant's aim is more pretentious (and at the same time foundational in that it moves beyond dependence upon any particular culture or epoch). In substance, he is concerned with the

在康德的演讲中（比如，既没有包括席勒和施莱格尔在美学中对游戏和教育的尊重，也没有十九世纪那场关于古典语言中人道的和人文主义的价值辩论，抑或是互补的，甚至是可替代的教育主题。）

## 6.2 一种世界主义的教育学

教育学讲座（和《自然地理学》里的讲座）的编辑是康德的传记作者弗里德里希·特奥多儿·林克，他在跟随康德学习后，在柯尼斯堡大学担任教授东方语言的教授一职。但是，这些林克出版的讲座有多少真实性是难以在任何确凿的意义上查明的。（在学术版的第二十五卷，人们可以找到这些讲座的不同版本。）但是，考虑到这里很多主题都出现过在康德已出版的著作和《反思人类学》中，我们几乎没有理由十分担心它们是对康德思想的扭曲。首要的是，基本的论点可以看作是真实的（也就是说，这个主题毫无疑问是对当代教育的挑衅，但在我们今天的全球化时代却非常受欢迎）：“教育计划的原则必须是世界主义的。”（《教育学》IX 448）

事实上，这个主题即使在我们的全球化时代也是挑衅性的。康德明白，世界主义的教育不是为了跨文化的和平共处，或者为了让世界公民感觉在每一个地方像在家一样舒适。康德的目标更加自命不凡（同时康德教育学的基础超越了对任何特定文化和时代的依赖。）实质上，康德关心的是绝对命令的第二个基本规定，它要求人们不能把另一个人仅仅当作手段来利用（参见《道德形而上学奠基》IV 429）。

second, sub-formulation of the categorical imperative that obliges one to never use another person as a mere means (see *Groundwork*, IV 429).

An education that is to be oriented toward individuals addresses all three elements of our present chapter (cultivating, civilizing, and moralizing), and, as a consequence, is oriented toward that “world’s best and perfection, to which humanity is designed” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 448). In precisely this sense, an education is cosmopolitan: “Children should not be raised with our present situation in mind but with that future, possibly better, situation of the human species” (IX 444). In this sense, Kant integrates his pedagogy with his practical philosophy of freedom. When it comes to orientation toward the goal, Kant is full of hope, but not with respect to the present – only “in the long run.” Namely, he expects “that human nature will improve continuously through education ... This opens us to the prospect of a future in which the human species is happier” (*ibid.*).

Why does Kant call this kind of future oriented, steadily improving education cosmopolitan? It is self-evident that here one is not satisfied with merely private well-being, not even with the corporate well-being of one’s own nation. As we’ve seen, it doesn’t follow, however, that Kant assumes well-being in terms of a world government; global, political relationships are not mentioned. Even more startling, the expression “cosmopolitan” is concerned with the notion of the world contrary to the philosophical concept (see *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 866 f.; *Logic*, IX 24 f.). The concept cosmopolitan means “world” not as in other philosophical contexts in the sense of “the epitome of all appearances” or “the absolute totality of the essence of all things” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 447), but as the “relationship of all knowledge to the essential goals of human reason” (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 867).

一种面向个体的教育处理本章所提到的三种要素（培养，文明化和道德化），其结果指向“人类被规定要达到的世界的福祉及完善性”（《教育学》，IX 448）。正是在这个意义上，教育是世界主义的：“孩子受教育，不仅应当适合人类当前的状态，而且适合人类未来更好的状态。”（《教育学》IX 444）从这个意义上说，康德整合了他的教育学和关于自由的实践哲学。当谈到目标的方向，康德充满了希望，但不涉及当前，只是“从长远来看”。换句话说，他期望“人的本性通过教育而发展得越来越好……这为我们展示了未来更加幸福的人类的前景。”（《教育学》，IX 444）

为什么康德称这种未来指向的，稳步提高的教育是世界主义的？不言而喻，康德不满足于仅仅私人的幸福，甚至不满足于他自己国家的共同的幸福。但是，就像我们看到的，康德不随之假设幸福要依靠世界政府；他也没有提及全球的政治关系。更令人吃惊的是，“世界主义”涉及的是世界概念，和哲学概念相反（参考《纯粹理性批判》B 866 f.；《逻辑学》，IX 24 f.）。世界主义这个概念意味着“世界”并不像在别的哲学语境中从“全部现象的象征”或者“一切事物的总和的绝对总体性”的意义上（《纯粹理性批判》B447）说的，而是像“一切知识与人类理性的根本目的”的意义上说的（《纯粹理性批判》B867）



At the same time, with the expression “cosmopolitan” we engage the categorical imperative, but now in its element of strict generalization or universalization along with the second maxim of common, human understanding (“*sensus communis*”) that of the expanding manner of thinking in the form “Think from the perspective of the other” (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*, V 294): “Good goals,” it says, “are those that are acknowledged necessarily by everyone and that, simultaneously, can be everyone’s aim” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 450).

In the canon of the first *Critique*, Kant examines the ordered world as a whole, the cosmos. It is precisely in this non-political but, to a certain degree, “ontological,” cosmos-sense that constitutes the truly panoramic view of *On Pedagogy*, which overcomes every narrow perspective (even a species-specific perspective) to perceive the whole (Greek: *pan*). Further, the teleological meaning of the third *Critique* resonates here, as well, with its concern for the final goal of nature (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*, § 83; V 429 ff.): Education is cosmopolitan because it aims for the “world’s best” and, therefore, out of it “arises everything that is good in the world” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 448), whereby included in this “world” is the entire universe.

In his *Reflections on Anthropology* (No. 1170: XV 517), Kant contrasts the son of the earth with the world citizen: “The first is only concerned with business dealings and with things insofar as they have influence on our well-being. The second is interested in humanity, the world as a whole, the origin of things, their inner worth, [and (tr.)] final goals.” When it comes to Kant’s reflections on cosmopolitan education, the accent lies not on the second half of the word (political), but on the first element: on cosmos, here understood as the universe with its ultimately, moral order.

同时，随着“世界主义”的表达，我们保证的是绝对命令，不过现在通过严格的一般化或者普遍化和第二公共准则的因素，人们明白（“共通感”）扩大的思维方式是在形式上“从别人的观点来思考”（《判断力批判》，V 294）：“好的目标，”他说，“必然是那些每个人都认同，同时也可以是个人的目的的目的。”（《教育学》，IX 450）

按照第一《批判》的标准，康德视这个有序世界为整体的和谐。正是这种非政治性、但在某种程度上是“本体论的”宇宙意识构成了《教育学》中真正全景式的观点，它克服了从每个狭隘的视角（即使是“种特异性”的视角）来认知整体（希腊词：*pan*）的缺点。进一步地，第三《批判》中目的论的意义在这里产生了共鸣，它们同样都关心自然的最终目的（《判断力批判》§ 83；V 429 ff.）：教育之所以是世界主义的，是因为它的目的是为了“世界的完善性”，因此从中“产生出了世界上一切善的东西”（《教育学》IX448），借此，包含在“世界”里的是整个宇宙。

在他的《反思人类学》（No. 1170: XV 517）里，康德对比了大地之子和世界公民：“前者只关心商业往来和对我们的幸福有影响的事情。后者关心人类，作为整体的世界，事物的起源，它们的内在价值和它们的最终目的。”当谈到康德对世界主义的教育反思时，重音不落在这个词的后半部分（political），而是落在前半部分上：在cosmos（宇宙）上，这里它指的是宇宙及宇宙最终的道德秩序。

### 6.3 Pedagogical Anthropology

The philosophical background of cosmopolitan pedagogy is ambitious and diverse. It begins with a philosophical anthropology, contains, in addition, a moral philosophy and a philosophical teleology, not least, *overtones* of the philosophy of history, and its core consists of a genuine philosophical pedagogy.

Without any cumbersome introduction, Kant jumps directly into the core theme of his lectures – philosophical anthropology: “Humanity is the only creature that must be educated” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 441). This theme is reinforced by the *Reflections on Anthropology*: “Humanity is an animal that requires education. He must learn to speak (count), to walk, (and to protect himself), etc., and possesses no natural instinct for art” (XV 621).

The reason is obvious to Kant: Human beings lack instincts that are understood in the sense of that “*foreign reason*” that “provides already everything for [animals]” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 441). In this respect, humanity is not an animal but from the very beginning a humane creature capable of employing its own reason. The capacity, however, is initially only a potential; the individual is at first an *animal rationabile* that requires the development of its capacities in order to become actually an *animal rationale*. He requires, then, “his own reason” (*ibid.*) that acquires by means of its development its natural capacities.

The term reason is here taken in a practical, modest sense. As one finds in the *Doctrine of Virtue*, reason is the “capacity whatsoever to establish a goal for oneself” (*Doctrine of Virtue*, VI 392). Because this capacity of goal setting distinguishes humanity as *humanitas* from animals qua *animalitas*, the individual, according to Kant, has a moral duty to elevate himself to humanity. He has to develop his capacities precisely for this task: to develop from what at first is a merely animal individual to become a human individual. One does not become a true human being by oneself but only through effort and by means of an effort that the individual *is morally bidden to assume*.

Education is not merely specific to humanity but

### 6.3 教育人类学

世界主义教育的哲学背景是野心勃勃的和各式各样的。它开始于教育人类学，另外还包含了道德哲学和哲学的目的论，尤其隐含有历史哲学，并且它的核心包含真正的哲学教育。

没有任何繁琐的介绍，康德直接跳入了讲座的核心主题—哲学的人类学：“人类是唯一的必须被教育的造物”（《教育学》IX 441）。这个主题被《关于人类学的反思》强化了：“人类是一种需要教育的动物。他必须学习说话（计算），行走，（和保护他自己），等等，并不拥有艺术的自然本能”（XV 621）。

对于康德来说理由是显而易见的：人缺少在“外在的理性”的意义上理解的本能，即[这种本能]已经为[动物]安排好一切（《教育学》IX 441）。就这点来说，人类不是一种动物，而是从一开始就是一种能够利用它自己的理性的高尚的造物。然而，这种能力最初只是一种潜能；个体起初是这样一种合理性的动物，它需要发展它的能力以便成为事实上的理性动物。他需要凭借“他自己的理性”（同上）的发展来获得它的自然禀赋。

理性这个术语在这里被理解为一个实践的，朴素的意思。正如一个人在《德性论》中看到的那样，理性是无论怎样为自己确立一个目的的能力（《德性论》VI 392）。因为这个设定目的的能力把作为人性的人类从作为动物性的动物中区分开来，根据康德，人有提升他自己为人类的高尚义务。他必须为这个任务恰当的发展他的能力：从起初是一个纯粹动物个体的东西发展成为一个人类个体。一个人靠他自己不会成为一个真正的人类，而只能通过努力，而且凭借那种假定人有道德命令的努力。

教育对于人类不纯粹是特殊的而且也是必然



it is also necessary. As if chiseled in stone, Kant declares: “An individual can become a human being only through education.” He continues: “He is nothing but what an education makes of him” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 443). This is no pedagogical determinism that exonerates the adolescent, later the adult, from his personal responsibility. On the contrary, personal responsibility quickly plays, according to Kant, an indispensable role.

The necessity of education means something else: Because of his lack of instinct, the individual has no access to a foreign reason; he cannot merely, but must, develop his own reason. This occurs by the schooling of natural capacities, which for their part does not occur by itself but requires external assistance (i.e., education). In this respect, education is meant in a broader sense. It begins with that “maintenance-”named care for the baby (see in this respect Hufnagel 1988, 44 ff.) that is coupled with “discipline” in which the child is in the role of “pupil” and is followed by “instruction along with the formation” of “apprenticeship” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 441).

To humanity’s uniqueness and necessity is added an optimistic flavor in Kant’s anthropology: According to our philosopher, good education is that by which everything that is good in the world arises. The seeds that lie in the individual must always be developed further. This thesis is not so simple as it might appear to a superficial reading. Contrary to a naïve optimism, Kant doesn’t deny that there is evil in the world. Kant also does not engage the question of evil for the first time in *Religion* with its theory of radical evil but already in a text in the philosophy of history, *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*. In *On Pedagogy* he says only: “One does not find the basis of evil in the natural capacities [*Naturanlagen*] of the individual. Only that is the origin of evil that does not submit nature to a rule. There are only seeds of the good in the individual” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 449; *Religion* will not speak of seeds of the good but of the capacity [*Anlage*] for the good in contrast to the inclination [*Hang*] to evil).

#### 6.4 Goal: Enlightenment

的。康德宣称：“一个人唯有通过教育才可成为一个真正的人。”这句话像刻在石头上一样确凿无疑。他继续道：“他什么也不是而只是教育使他成为的东西”（《教育学》IX 443）。这不是教育用决定论免除青少年的，以及后来的成年人的个人责任。正相反，根据康德，个人责任很快地扮演了一个不可或缺的角色。

教育的必然性同时还表明：由于缺乏本能，个体无法利用外在的理性；他不能只是，而是必须，发展他自己的理性。这种理性通过自然禀赋的训练得到发展，训练对他们来说不是通过它自己发生，而是需要外部的帮助（也就是，教育）。在这方面，教育意味着更广泛地意义。它开始于名为照顾婴儿的“抚养-”（在这方面见 Hufnagel 1988, 44 ff.），它与管教相结合，在这里孩子是扮演小学生的角色并跟着是“连同成形一起指示”的“学徒身份”（《教育学》IX 441）。

在康德的人类学中人类的独特性和必要性增添了乐观主义的特点：根据我们的哲学家，好的教育就是世界上一切善从中产生的东西。存在于人中的善的种子必须总是进一步被培育。这个命题由于可能似乎会肤浅的解读而并不这么简单。与天真的乐观主义相反，康德并不否认世界上存在恶，康德《宗教》里根本恶的理论最初也不保证恶的问题，而已经在历史哲学的一个文本里，《猜想的人类历史的开端》。在《教育学》里他只说：“恶的根据在人的自然禀赋中是找不到的。只有本性没有置于规则之下是恶的根源。在人里面只有善的种子”（《教育学》IX 449；宗教不会谈到善的种子而会谈到善的能力以与恶的倾向形成对照）。

#### 6.4 目的：启蒙

Kant by no means views education as an easy task. On the contrary, he declares the art of education along with the art of governing to be the most difficult inventions of humanity “whose achievement” “must be accomplished over many generations” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 446): “One generation must educate the next, and only the species, not the individual, achieves it” (*Reflections on Anthropology*, No. 2423: XV 621). In the process, education has to be accomplished appropriate to the age of the recipient: “When it comes to a child, one must [in the sense of “is allowed to”] educate him not as if an adult but as ... a child” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 481).

Because the art of education is so difficult and is accomplished only in the course of subsequent generations, one should not be surprised that Kant maintains that “even its idea is controversial” (*ibid.*). This idea, the central aim of education, has two sides. In terms of content, it is concerned with a hierarchy of educational achievement that **culminates in morality**; methodologically or didactically, however, pedagogy is concerned that the individual not be “merely trained, drilled, or instructed mechanically;” but far more, is “truly illuminated” [*aufgeklärt* (tr.) ] (IX 450): Kant’s cosmopolitan pedagogy seeks to achieve enlightenment [*Aufklärung* (tr.)].

Kant’s conception of enlightenment is well known. **When it comes to its dominant concepts:** maturity, thinking for oneself, and liberation by means of universal, human reason, one frequently overlooks that our philosopher does not simply define the essence of the *Siècle des lumières* but develops a new kind, as well as provocative, understanding of enlightenment:

According to Kant, the essence of enlightenment does not reside in what the word means metaphorically: that a heretofore, confused world achieves clarity or, according to the English term “enlightenment” and the French “*lumière*,” as if it were light brought to a dark world. For Kant, neither knowledge nor cognitive qualities are what count but, rather, achievements of character, namely, **intellectual effort** and courage are what is decisive to enabling thinking for oneself. *On Pedagogy* follows this thought when it says: “the ideal is

康德决不视教育为一个简单的任务。相反，他宣称教育艺术连同统治艺术是人类最困难的发明，“他的成就”“必须经过许多代人来实现”（《教育学》IX 446）：“一代人必须教育下一代，并且只有人类，而非个体，实现它”（关于人类学的反思，No.2423:XV 621）。在这个过程中，教育的实行必须适合于接受者的年龄：“当他是孩子时，一个人必须[在“被允许做”的意义上]不是把他当作一个大人而是当作一个孩子来教育他”（《教育学》IX 481）。

因为教育的艺术是如此之难并且只在后代之中才实现，所以不应该对康德主张“哪怕它的理念是有争议的”（同上）感到惊讶。这个理念，即教育的核心目的，有两方面。在内容方面，它关心教育的成果在道德上达到最高层次；但在方法论或教学法方面，教育关心的是人不“仅仅被驯服，被调教，或被机械地教导；”而是多得多，是“被真正地启蒙” [*aufgeklärt* (tr.) ] (IX 450)：康德的世界主义教育力图实现启蒙 [*Aufklärung* (tr.)]。

康德的启蒙概念是众所周知的。当谈到它的主要的概念：成熟，独立思考，以及凭借一般概念的解放，人类理性，一个人常常忽略我们的哲学家不是简单的定义 *Siècle des lumières* 的本质，而是发展了一种新的，并且也是有争论的，启蒙的理解：

根据康德，启蒙的本质并不在这个词所比喻的意思中：一个至今令人感到困惑的世界得到澄明，或者根据英语术语“启蒙”和法语“*lumière*，”仿佛它是带给黑暗世界的光明。对于康德来说，重要的既不是知识也不是认知能力，而不如说是德性的成就，换言之，独立思考是智力劳动和勇气成为可能的关键。《教育学》遵循这一思想并说：“理想是孩子们学会思考”（《教育学》IX 450）。同时，这表明康德认为启蒙的任务开始得很早，在儿童已经开始，并且原则上对全人类而言是一项终身的事业。

that children learn to think” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 450). At the same time, this demonstrates that Kant **views** the task of enlightenment **to begin very early**, already in childhood, and in principle is a life-long project for all humanity.

“Thinking” for Kant does not mean having just any reflections but, with the aid of understanding, to **achieve a totality**— a totality not only of concepts but also of judgments, and not last, of conclusions. In *On Pedagogy* these cognitive capacities occur by means of language, **both with respect to** the lower powers of understanding like the imagination, memory, and alertness and with respect to the higher powers of understanding like understanding, judgment, and reason (see X 475 ff.). Tellingly however, they are not singled out as one’s educational goal but apply to the broad (but systematically viewed, lower) educational goal, cultivation. **That**, which one would call a humanistic education, knowledge of classical languages and literature, **plays no role** although Kant himself was very competent in Latin. When it comes to capacities and accomplishments on which Kant laid weight, he did not emphasize what a philosopher needs: intellectual ability. Rather, he places practical goals in the foreground.

True to his fundamental interest in the practical (i.e., the capacity of goal-setting required for **truly** human development), the kind of thinking that one needs to learn is concerned “with the principles out of which all actions arise” (IX 450) (i.e., maxims that are not to be indoctrinated). The individual should achieve insight into them “for himself” (IX 455). “Thinking for oneself means to search for the highest touchstone of truth in oneself (i.e., in one’s own reason)” (*Orientation in Thinking*, VIII 146). For that reason, Kant says in *On Pedagogy*: “Maxims must arise in the individual himself” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 481). “To do something out of duty means: to **obey** one’s reason” (IX 483).

#### 6.5 Four Educational Goals

Up to this point of his analysis, Kant views two entities to be pillars of education, parents and princes, both of whom he acknowledges to be authorized to educate, but he takes them to be

“思考”对康德来说并不意味着仅仅进行一些反思，而是，在认识的帮助下，把握整体——一个不仅包含概念而且包含判断，并且最后包含结论的整体。在《教育学》中这些认知能力通过语言产生，它们同时包括认识的低级能力比如想象力，记忆力和注意力以及认识的高级能力比如知性，判断，和理性（见 X 475 ff.）。然而很明显，它们并不被挑选出来作为人的教育目的而是应用于广义（但系统地看，低级）的教育目的，培养。古典语言和文学的知识，即人称的人文主义教育并不重要，尽管康德自己非常精通拉丁语。当谈到康德强调的能力和成就，他没有强调一个哲学家需要的东西：智力能力。相反，他把实践的目的放在最显著的位置。

他在实践上的根本兴趣是真实的（也就是，设定目的的能力要求人的真正发展），一个人需要学习的那种思考与“来自产生所有行为的法则”有关（IX450）（也就是，准则不是被灌输的）。个体应该“为他自己”深刻理解它们（IX 455）。“独立思考意味着在自身寻找最高的真理的试金石（也就是，在一个人自己的理性中）”（《思维定向》VIII 146）。康德在《教育学》中说：“准则必须产生于个体自身”（《教育学》IX 481）。“出于义务做某事意味着：听从他的理性”（IX 483）。

#### 6.5 四种教育的目的

到目前他的分析为止，康德把两种实体作为教育的支柱，父母和君侯，他承认两者都被准许进行教育，但他不只是在此刻并且偶然地而且从根本上把他们看作不充分的。

inadequate not merely at the moment and contingently but also fundamentally.

Within the framework of the general goal of education (i.e., the development of natural capacities), parental education is concerned with facilitating the adaptation of children “to the present world, no matter how corrupt it is.” Parents “are concerned, generally, only that their children get ahead in the world;” they are “concerned for the household” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 447 f.). That could mean that the children will be dutiful, they will honor their parents, and, at home, will be cooperative. Such a trivializing assessment is corrected by Kant in that children should “get ahead professionally in the world,” for which, without doubt, one must learn far more. **At an elementary level**, one needs self-confidence as well as confidence in the world; further, one should be able to earn one’s living, which requires a good education and, additionally, requires the readiness to practice a profession, **not least** in the sense of “getting ahead” by means of that ambition that makes one successful in a career. Children have a lot to learn; trenchantly: They must come to understand, first, how to be an enterprising citizen (here, not as entrepreneur but a successful worker) and, secondly, how to be a fellow human being.

When it comes to what in Kant’s age was the second pillar of education, the princes, they “consider their subjects only as instruments for the accomplishment of their aims.” In this case, our philosopher is not thinking of a misuse of princely, private goals but, sympathetically to the princes, an education “for the state” (IX 448). Within this framework, **one is in the end a citizen so that education**, thirdly, serves the goal of learning to be a citizen of the state. Both entities, parents and princes, are not undertaking any small task. Nonetheless, Kant points to the absence of the decisive, cosmopolitan goal, the final goal, that he calls “the best for the world and perfection” (*ibid.*).

In this connection, the three educational goals emerge that are no alternative but are to be understood as complementary to, as well as adding to, one another **because they contain emergent, normative claims**. To these three comes a fourth goal; however, it is not a

在教育的一般目的的体系内（也就是，自然禀赋的发展），父母的教育旨在于促进孩子们适应“当前的世界，哪怕它多么堕落。”父母“通常只关心的自己的孩子在世界上生活好；”他们“关心的是家庭”（《教育学》IX 447 f.）。这可能意味着孩子们将会孝顺，他们会尊敬他们的父母，并且，在家里，会配合。康德对孩子应该“在世上获得专业上的成功，”的评价如此轻视是正确的，毫无疑问，一个人为了成功必须学习的更多。在基础的层次上，一个人需要自信以及对世界的信心；进一步，一个人应该通过好的教育具备谋生的能力，并且，此外需要准备好从事一项职业，尤其重要的是在“获得成功”的意义上凭借抱负使得一个人在事业上取得成功。孩子们要学习的东西很多；明确的说：他们必须首先懂得怎样成为一个有事业心的公民（这里，不是作为企业家而是作为一个有成就的劳动者），其次，怎样成为一个同胞。

在康德的时代，当谈到什么是教育的第二个支柱，君侯，他们“只把自己的臣民视为达成自己种种意图的工具。”在这种情况下，我们的哲学家在此并非指责君侯为一己私利而劳役子民，而是指对子民进行培养，使其“为国服务”（IX 448）。在这个体系内，**一个人接受教育到底因为是一个公民**，第三，完成学习的目的以成为国家的一个公民。实体，父母和君侯，都不是执行一些微小的任务。尽管如此，康德指出缺乏关键的，世界主义的目的，最终的目的，他称为“最好的和完善的世界”（同上）。

在这一点上，这三个教育的目的显示出没有相互替代的而被认为不但和另一个是互补的而且是相互加强的，**因为他们包含了紧迫，规范的要求**。随着这三个目的产生了第四个目的；然而，这不是一个积极的，而是唯一消极的目的。



positive, but solely negative goal.

From the side of parents and the state, education begins with (1) **disciplining**; it proceeds through (2) **cultivating**, and ends with (3) **civilizing**. Kant's decisive, cosmopolitan education seeks, however, more, namely (4) a successful education in morality, moralizing.

Kant depicts development not as a continuous process but **in the form of levels of achievement** for which understanding is required because it is not simply given by nature. These levels are not to be understood primarily as **biographical or ontogenetic**, but systematic even when the bulk of disciplining occurs **biographically prior** to one's arrival at the higher levels of educational. **Yet, something further remains important**. Although everything depends upon the development of understanding, Kant **places value**, as we've seen, not in a certain kind of knowledge but in capacities and skills and, to a certain extent, **in the value of potential**.

(a) *Disciplining*: The preliminary state, disciplining, is meant to change "the animality of humanity" (IX 441). Kant **takes up** a process of liberation (an emancipation) that occurs, however, not by means of external forces (e.g., social pressures or tradition) but liberates one from internal coercions. According to Kant, at first one lives under a "despotism of desires," which reminds one of Aristotle's definition of *bios apolaustikos*, a life of pleasures because it qualifies as a "kind of slavery" (*andrapodôtês*) (*Nicomachean Ethics*, I 3, 1095b19-22).

The contestation here, however, occurs without any moralizing undertone. Kant acknowledges a positive meaning to appetites because nature "gave them" to us "in order that we not ignore our animality or even harm it" (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*, V 432). What does he mean? When it comes to animality, he is not thinking of perversions or bestiality but of things that humanity **shares with** animals (i.e., the necessity to eat and drink, to seek shelter from the changes of weather, and for procreation).

It is these things that the individual should not ignore or harm but, rather, to be "free enough" with them so that "the goals of reason are fulfilled" (*ibid.*). The individual should not **seek liberation from desires and appetites** but, solely,

在父母和国家的另一边，教育开始于（1）训诫；经过（2）培养，并结束于（3）文明化。然而，康德核心的世界主义教育力图实现（4）成功的道德教育，即道德化。

康德不是把发展描述为一个持续的过程而是描述为成就的层次的形式，为其需要认识，因为它不单单是自然给予的。这些层次并不首先被认为是单个的人的或个体发生的，而是系统性的，甚至当训诫的大部分在他达到教育的更高层次之前就在单个的人身上产生了。但是，进一步的事情仍然重要。尽管一切都取决于认识的发展，康德重视的，正如我们看到的，不是某一种知识而是禀赋和技能，并且某种程度上，重视潜能的价值。

(a) 训诫：预备的状态，训诫，意味着改变“人类的动物性”（IX 441）。然而，康德主张解放过程（获得解放）的**产生**，不是通过外在的强制（例如，社会压力或传统）而是通过内在的限制解放人。根据康德，起初人生活在“欲望的专制”之下，它使人想起亚里士多德对享乐主义者的生命的定义，像“某种奴役”般限定的享乐的一生 (*andrapodôtês*)（《尼各马可伦理学》I 3, 1095b19-22）。

然而，这种主张在这里没有任何德性的涵义。康德承认嗜好的积极意义因为自然“把它们赋予”我们“为的是不忽视或者甚至伤害我们的动物性”（《判断力批判》V 432）。他是什么意思？当谈到动物性，他不是关心堕落或兽性而是人类与动物共有的东西（也就是，必须要吃和喝，为应对天气变化和繁殖寻找住所）。

正是由于这些东西人不应该忽视或者伤害，而是相反，使它们“足够自由”以便“理性的目的得到实现”（同上）。人不应该**通过欲望和嗜好寻求解放**，而是唯一地，从它们



to be free from their despotism. Formulated concisely in *On Pedagogy*, he should **tame them to the extent that they consist of a “wildness” that is “independent of laws”** (*On Pedagogy*, IX 449; see *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 737 f.). What is meant here by laws are not positive civic laws but “prescriptions of [practical] reason.” Whoever ignores these laws “is subject to every whim” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 442; see also 460). Hence, **wildness functions** as a stumbling block in need of understanding (or reason), and one achieves understanding and reason through discipline.

Neglect of this wildness, by the way, Kant took to be “a great evil” because one can make up for neglecting the next level (cultivating), but “wildness doesn’t permit its sweeping aside, and a lapse in discipline can never be compensated” (IX 444) for by something else. Whoever “is not cultivated, is raw; whoever is not disciplined, is wild” (*ibid.*), and as **a consequence is unsuitable**, namely, incapable, of choosing for oneself: “Our determination as human beings is that we rise out of our natural conditions as animals” (IX 492). Disciplining belongs biographically for this reason at the beginning of education.

Discipline should “not be servile” because it is concerned with cultivating the capacity for self-determination. “A child must always sense its freedom in that manner that it doesn’t hinder the freedom of others” (IX 464). Someone familiar with Kant’s legal ethics is reminded here of the principle of universally accommodating freedom (*Doctrine of Right*, § B). According to Kant, it is so important that he repeats the non-servile character of discipline: “Children’s wills must [in the sense of “can”] ... not be broken, but only ... guided” (IX 478).

At the preliminary level, the emancipation from the despotism of the appetites has two paradoxical sides to it. According to the well-known negative concept of freedom (*freedom from*), actual emancipation (disciplining) liberates one from the chaos that comes with ignoring laws. In the sense of a double negation, this dependence upon laws makes emancipation dependent which calls forth the challenge of positive freedom (*freedom for*). This “freedom for,” in turn, consists in the **capacity to subordinate oneself** to the prescriptions of

the专制中获得自由。《教育学》中简明的表述，他应该在包含有“独立于法则”的“野性”的限度内驯服它们（《教育学》IX 449; 见《纯粹理性批判》B 737 f.）。遵守法则在这里意指的不是积极的公民法律而是“[实践]理性的规定”。无论是谁忽视这些规定“都是受制于每一次心血来潮”（《教育学》IX 442; 同见 460）。因此，**野性作用**作为一个绊脚石需要认识（或理性），并且人通过训诫达到认识和理性。

顺便说一下，康德认为对野性的忽视是“一种首要的恶”因为人可以弥补对另一个层次（培养）的忽视，但是“野性无法去除，训诫的错失是无法由其他的东西补救的”（IX 444）。“未受培养的人是生蛮的，未受训诫的人是野性的”（同上），并且为自己做选择，**其后果是不适宜的**，换句话说，不能胜任的：“我们界定为人类是基于我们摆脱了动物的自然状态”（IX 492）。由于这个原因在教育的开端训诫属于个别人。

训诫不应该“是奴性的”，因为它是为了培养自己决定的能力。“孩子必须始终感受到自己的自由，只是他不要妨碍别人的自由”（IX 464）。熟悉康德的法的伦理学的人在这里会想到普遍任意的自由原则（《法的原理》§ B）。根据康德，他重申的非奴性的性格训诫非常重要：“孩子们的意志[在“能够”的意义上]...不是被驯服，而是仅仅被...引导”（IX 478）。

在预备的层次上，从欲望的专制中获得解放存在着两个矛盾的方面。根据著名的自由的消极概念（摆脱），真正的获得解放（训诫）把人从忽视规律的混沌中释放出来。从双重否定的意义上说，对规律的依附使获得解放不再独立，称为挑战积极自由（责任自由）。这个“责任自由”，反过来，主要存在于依照实践理性法规的**自律能力**，康德在他的道德哲学（换句话说，在《奠基》）中区分为技术的，实用的，和绝对的（或道德的）命令（《奠基》IV 414 ff.）。**从胡作非**

<p>practical reason that Kant in his moral philosophy (namely, in the <i>Groundwork</i>) differentiates into technical, pragmatic, and categorical (or moral) imperatives (<i>Groundwork</i>, IV 414 ff.). <a href="#">Independence from the despotism of lawless desires succumbs to a dependence upon three levels of emerging, normative requirements.</a> Disciplining prepares the way for an individual as a free- and rational creature with respect to three levels of ever increasing freedom and reason.</p> <p>However, emancipation by means of disciplining is insufficient. One needs something positive (i.e., potential) in order to be liberated from the obstructing barriers to one's capacity to use one's understanding (or reason). The three main levels of education aid the development of this potential. At the same time, these three main levels correspond precisely to the three kinds of imperatives mentioned above: cultivating corresponds to the technical, civilizing to the pragmatic, and moralizing to the categorical imperatives.</p> <p>(b) <i>Cultivating</i>: From the perspective of the philosophy of history and socio-anthropology, Kant takes the next two goals of education, cultivating and civilizing, to be “<a href="#">fruits of the unsociality [Ungeselligkeit] that demands from within oneself one's disciplining</a>” (<i>Idea of a Universal History based on the Principle of World-Citizenship</i>, VIII 22). In this fashion, a fundamental element of Kant's philosophy of history (i.e., antagonism qua unsocial sociality) plays a role in his philosophy of education.</p> <p>When it comes to the first primary level (cultivating), one cannot think in terms of what we today mean by “cultivating,” which for us today consists in distinguishing oneself by means of good conversational skills, by looking beyond the horizon of one's profession, and, rather than be fixated on one's livelihood, by being open to things like music, art, and literature. What Kant means by cultivating serves the education of skills. According to his text on the philosophy of history (<i>Conjectures on the Beginnings of the History of the Human Race</i>), the history of the cultivation of humanity begins with the fall and is its consequence. According to the <i>Critique of the Power of Judgment</i>, skill is “the most distinguished,</p>	<p>为的专制中获得独立，需要屈服于对显现的、规范的必要条件的三个层次的依赖。训诫为作为自由和理性的造物的人准备了增进自由和理性的三个层次。</p> <p>然而，通过训诫获得解放是不充分的。为了从对人的能力的妨碍壁垒中解放出来以便使用人的认知（或理性），人需要积极的东西（也就是，潜能）。教育的三个主要层次促进了这种潜能的发展。同时，这三个主要层次正好对应上面提到的三种命令：对应技术的培养，对应务实的文明化，和对应定言命令的道德。</p> <p>（b）培养：从历史哲学和社会人类学的观点，康德认为另外两个教育的目的，培养和文明化，是“要求<a href="#">在人自身内训诫的非社会性 [Ungeselligkeit] 的产物</a>”（《关于一种世界公民的普遍历史理念》VIII 22）。照这样看，康德的历史哲学的基本原理（也就是说，作为非社会的社会性的对抗）在他的教育哲学中发挥了作用。</p> <p>当谈到第一个基本层次（培养），人们不会按照我们今天用的“培养”的意思思考，“培养”对我们今天旨在通过良好的社交技能，开阔的专业视野使自己变得杰出，并且，不如说专注于人的生活，通过广泛接触像音乐，艺术，和文学之类的事物。康德是把培养当作技能教育。根据他的历史哲学文本（《关于人类历史起源的猜想》），人类培养的历史开始于人类的堕落并且是它的结果。根据《判断力批判》，技能“无论如何，对于达成目的是最显著的，能力的本质条件”（《判断力批判》V 431）。技能允许人在情况需要时去做他想做的事情。康德在这里强调完全的和真正的能力：“人必须不只是看起来拥有做事情的技能，到头来却</p>
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<p>subjective condition of capability, whatsoever, for the advancement of goals” (<i>Critique of the Power of Judgment</i>, V 431). Skills allow one to do what one wants to do as the circumstances require. Kant places weight here on thoroughness and true ability: “one must not merely <i>appear</i> to possess skills to do things that in retrospect one is incapable of achieving” (<i>On Pedagogy</i>, IX 486).</p> <p>“Given the quantity of goals” (what is meant is their heterogeneity), “skills are in a certain respect unlimited” (IX 449 f.). A good education procures a versatile, possibly even, well-rounded adroitness. On the one hand, such skills liberate one from a too narrow attachment to whatever the needs of the moment are; thereby opening one up to an ever-changing world. As a consequence, the establishment of a “canon” of educational knowledge that is often narrow is for this reason not irrelevant, but at best it is secondary and simultaneously time consuming, moreover, serving only narrow interests. In addition, such a canon runs the risk of replacing the earlier discussed <a href="#">function of disciplining</a> by focusing merely on “learning” a canon. Furthermore, it limits learning of other things in addition to the canon. On the other hand as we will see, there are elements, even core elements, of a canon to be learned that are presented in <i>On Pedagogy</i> (for example, elementarily reading and writing [X 475] and, more demanding, a “catechism of right” [see below]).</p> <p>The <i>Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals</i> emphasizes this openness. From the lowest imperatives, the technical, which are the imperatives of skill appropriate to the educational level of cultivating, it says that “as a youth one cannot know, what goals we are going to have to achieve.” For that reason, “parents seek preferably to allow their children to learn ever so many things and are concerned that they cultivate skill in the usage of the means to achieve whichever goals they might encounter” (<i>Groundwork</i>, IV 415). <i>On Pedagogy</i> adds another, complementary perspective: It is necessary to “practice” the respective attitudes in order to learn skills (<i>On Pedagogy</i>, IX 466).</p> <p>(c) <i>Civilizing</i>: Here we are not to think of civilization in contrast to a higher-ranking culture. One will not find in Kant any opposition</p>	<p>没有实现的能力”（《教育学》IX 486）。</p> <p>“给出目的的数量”（意思是它们的差异性），“技能在某种意义上是无限的” (IX 449 f.)。好的教育实现多方面的，甚至可能，全面的才干。一方面，这种技能把人从眼前需要的过于狭隘的依附中解放出来；从而向人展示一个千变万化的世界。因此，教育方面学科“标准”的制定常常是狭隘的，由于这个原因，是不相关的。但是它至多是次要的并且同时还耗费时间，而且仅仅服务于狭隘的兴趣。另外，这样一个标准冒着代替早先讨论的<a href="#">训诫作用</a>的风险，导致仅仅专注于“学习”一个标准。再者，它限制了学习除标准之外的其他东西。另一方面，我们会看到，在《教育学》中存在有标准的要素，甚至其核心要素（例如，基本的阅读和写作 [X 475]，以及要求更高，“问答教学法的权利”[见下文]）。</p> <p>《道德形而上学奠基》中强调这种开放。从最低级的需要，即技术，它是适合技能培养的教育层次的需要，它说“由于人在年幼时还不知道，在生活中我们会碰上哪些目的。”于是“父母就试图先让孩子学各种各样的东西，并为运用这些针对各种各样随便什么目的的手段之熟巧而操心”（《奠基》，IV 415）。《教育学》增添了另一个补充观点：为了学习技能有必要“实践”敬重的态度（《教育学》IX 466）</p> <p>(c) 文明化：这里我们不考虑把市民文化与更高级的文化对比。在康德那里不会发现任何纯粹地商业的-技术的市民文化与智性文</p>
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between a merely commercial-technical civilization and an intellectual culture. In fact he reverses the sequence because he speaks of civilizing as subsequent to cultivating. It is more appropriate to understand the notion of civilizing from its essence, from “*civis*,” the citizen, but not in the sense of a citizen in a state. What is meant is the person as a social creature: Civilizing is aimed at a comprehensive socialization.

Here there are several, important, partial goals: First, the person must be “**prudent**” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 450). Kant counts under prudence something that realistically and unthinkingly appears to contradict what is the primary moral aim, the prohibition against using a person merely as a means to an end. Here we are told that one should learn how to use “all persons to achieve ones final goals” (*ibid.*), which unquestionably leads to instrumentalization. However, this is only immoral, when “merely” (i.e., exclusively) instrumentalization is what counts. It is clear, however, that exclusiveness is inapplicable in this passage; although it does suggest, expressed paradoxically, that a social creature is permitted to be thoroughly antisocial. Kant intertwines in any event inter-subjectivity and subjectivity. For this reason, Sagou (2009, 44) speaks only a half-truth when he says that “civilizing reins in boundless competition.” However, he is correct when he adds: “a harmony ... and a renouncement of competition would stymie the progress of culture” (*ibid.*).

Kant speaks of two kinds of prudence. The one, **worldly wisdom** [*Weltklugheit*], is not concerned with something like cosmopolitan **character**. Rather, it consists in the “art of bringing our skills to the other” [“unsere Geschicklichkeit an den Mann zu bringen”] (*On Pedagogy*, IX 486) or according to the *Groundwork*, in the skill to influence others to achieve one’s own intentions (*Groundwork*, IV 416). Kant’s further discussion of world wisdom is confusing because it sounds like Machiavelli. Namely, one should “conceal one’s intentions and make oneself unreadable by others, but others one should thoroughly investigate ... Here belongs dissimulation (i.e., concealment of one’s mistakes).” Admittedly, Kant holds this to be only “allowed occasionally” because, he acknowledges, “it borders closely on disingenuousness” (*On*

化之间是对立。由于他认为市民文化是处于培养（文化）之后的，事实上他转变了这个次序。这样理解文明化概念的本质是更恰当的，即 “*civis*”，也即公民（市民，城邦意义上的公民），但不是国家中的公民这种意义上的。作为社会的造物的人是什么意思：文明化的目的在于全面的社会化

这里有一些重要的，局部的目的：首先，这个人必须成为 “**聪明的**” （《教育学》IX 450）。实际地和不假思索地看来，康德认为聪明是类似与那种基本道德目标的东西相矛盾的东西，这种基本道德目标就是反对最终把人纯粹作为一种手段的禁令。这里我们被告知人应该学习怎样利用 “所有人来达到他的最终目的”（同上），这无疑地通向了工具主义。然而，当 “纯粹的”（也就是，唯一地）工具主义是重要的，这不过是不道德的。然而，唯一性在这篇文章中显然是不适用的；尽管它的确暗示了，自相矛盾的表达了，一个社会的造物被允许变成完全反社会的。康德实际上纠缠于主体间性和主观性。因此，当 Sagou(2009,44)说 “文明化控制了无限的竞争”时，他仅仅说出了一半真理。但是，当他补充道：“竞争上的和谐...与放弃将会阻碍文明的进程”（同上），他是对的。

康德谈到了两种聪明。一种是 **世俗智慧** [*Weltklugheit*]，它与那种世界主义的 **品质** 无关。相反，它在于 “把我们的技能用于别人身上的艺术”（《教育学》IX 486）或者根据《奠基》，在于影响别人来达成自己意图的技能（《奠基》IV 416）。康德的关于世俗的智慧的进一步讨论是混乱的，因为它听起来像马基雅维利。也就是，人应该 “掩饰自己的意图，使自己看不透，但又能够洞察别人...这一点属于虚伪（例如，隐瞒自己的缺点）。” 康德固然认为这仅仅是 “迫不得已”，因为他承认，“它十分接近于虚伪”（《教育学》IX 486）。

*Pedagogy*, IX 486).

In the *Groundwork*, Kant subordinates worldly wisdom to another kind of prudence, “private prudence.” The latter counts as superior because it unites to one’s own enduring advantage all of one’s aims **for whose achievement one seeks to influence others** (*Groundwork*, IV 416). Finally, one serves with one’s civilizing, as well, not merely one’s fellows but also oneself; namely, one serves one’s natural aim, one’s well-being. Whereas one **makes out well** in the social “world” thanks to one’s worldly wisdom, private prudence is concerned that one’s social success serves one’s own (“private”) long-term welfare. In both respects, civilizing belongs to enlightened self-interest.

More graciously said, society is a “system serving mutual advantage” or, less graciously, a system of “mutual exploitation.” In any event, society requires a social **compatibleness**, for which in my opinion he speaks of three levels (see *On Pedagogy*, IX 450): (1) Elementary compatibleness is concerned that the individual “fit into a human society;” (2) an intensification: “that he is liked,” and (3) still another intensification, that one can serve not only society but also oneself; namely, that one “has influence:” initially, that one fits in, then achieves respect, and finally exercises influence – even power.

In addition to prudence, two partial goals (“manners” and “courteousness”) are concerns of education’s second, primary level. By manners one is not to understand something like table manners and correct forms of addressing others, but, similar to the “manners” (customs) in Hobbes’ *Leviathan* (Chap. 11), the way that one interacts with others. According to Kant’s discussion, manners involve a time index because they are concerned with “the ever changing taste of an epoch” that, for example, “not so many decades ago [loved] conforming to ceremony” (*On Pedagogy*, IX 450). “Manners” is supplemented by the other partial goal (“courteousness”) in terms of a certain aptness and not in the sense of being an obedient child.

As the guiding principle for manners and courteousness as well as the criterion (even slogan) for civilizing, Kant proposes: “We must

在《奠基》中，康德把世俗智慧归属于另一种聪明，“私人的聪明”。视后者为更高级的是因为它结合了人自己的持久的优点和人的所有试图**影响他人**的成就目标(《奠基》，IV 416)。最终，人不仅仅促进了他朋友的而且也促进了他自己的文明化；换句话说，促进人的自然的目标，也就是促进幸福。鉴于人在社会性的“世界”中表现出色多亏了人的世俗智慧，私人的聪明也就意味着人的社会成功促进了人自己的（“个人的”）长期幸福。

较为客气地说，社会是一个“发挥相互优势的系统”，或不太客气的说，是一个“互相利用”的系统。不管怎样，社会需要社会性的**共存**，在我看来，他为此谈了三个层次（见《教育学》IX 450）：（1）初级的共存意味着人“适应人类社会；”（2）进一步：“他被喜欢，”（3）更进一步，他不仅可以服务社会而且可以服务他自己；换句话说，他“有影响力：”首先，人适应，然后获得尊重，最后运用影响力—甚至权力。

除了聪明，教育的第二个基本层次还考虑了两个局部的目的（“风度”和“礼貌”）。人并不是要通过风度了解诸如餐桌礼仪和称呼他人的正确方式，而是，熟悉霍布斯的《利维坦》中的“风度”（风俗），即与他人打交道的方式。根据康德的讨论，风度标志了一个时代，因为它们意味着“一个时代的易变的鉴赏”，例如，“在几十年前，人们还在交往中喜爱讲究礼仪”（《教育学》IX 450）。从某种才能的角度而不是从成为一个顺从的孩子的意义上，“风度”辅之以另一个局部目的（“礼貌”）。

作为风度和礼貌的指导原则，以及文明化的准则（甚至格言），康德提出：“我们不可



not be troublesome to one another; the world is large enough for everyone” (IX 469). This can mean two things: first, people in competition with one another should not overdo it in order that opponents not become enemies but “civilized competitors;” second, when one merely is disturbing others, one had best stop. Admittedly, this ought not to have the consequence that one is “always alone.” On the contrary, Kant places value in gregariousness and friendship (IX 484) (i.e., *things that he in his own life sought as a generous host and in his Anthropology presents out of rich personal experience as a philosophy of successful dinner parties with his notion of a good meal in good company* [*Anthropology*, VII 278 ff.; on “civilizing” see also VII 151 ff.]).

Insightful, as well, is the idea from the third *Critique*, where Kant says: “Were one to be all alone and abandoned on an isolated island, one would clean neither one’s hut nor oneself, and one would neither pick nor plant flowers for decoration. It occurs to one only in society to be more than a mere person but also ... a refined person” (*Critique of the Power of Judgment*, V 297), which one can translate as “gentle-man.” Kant adds that this is “the origin of civilizing.” (Stated ironically: the gentleman wears a flower in the buttonhole of his suit.)

Nonetheless, something is missing in Kant’s rich reflections on education: With the exception of a rather alien-to-art comment regarding music (that music is good “only for one reason,” namely, “to make us popular” [*On Pedagogy*, IX 449]), aesthetic education that later is so important to Schiller and Schlegel is entirely absent in *On Pedagogy*. One can hardly attribute this simply to the fact that his theory of aesthetics was not published until three years after the last presentation of his lectures on pedagogy. Kant develops his fundamental ideas long before they find expression in actual publications.

(d) Moralizing: Kant is no Knigge. Adolph Freiherr Knigge’s (at the time well known but today rarely read, two volume work) *Über den Umgang mit Menschen* (On the Social Interaction of Persons) (1788) appeared shortly

以相互烦扰，世界对我们所有人来说都足够大” (IX 469)。这意味着两方面:首先，为了确保对手成为“文明的竞争对手”而不是成为敌人，人们在互相竞争中不应该做得过分；其次，如果他纯粹是在妨碍别人，他最好停下来。当然，这不应该导致“总是自己独处”的结果。相反，康德强调合群和保持友谊（例如，诸如康德在他自己的生活中，以一个慷慨的主人身份，在好朋友中间举行一次盛宴，在既分享美食，又分享出于丰富的个人经验的《人类学》知识的 [《人类学》VII 278 ff;同见论“文明化”VII 151 ff.]）。

第三批判的观点是深刻的，康德说：流落到一个荒岛上的人独自一人既不会装饰他的茅屋也不会装饰他自己，或者搜寻花木，更不会种植它们，以便用来装点自己。而是只有在社会里他才会想起他不仅是个人，而且还...是一个文雅的人（《判断力批判》V297），即人们把它翻译为“绅士”。康德补充说这是“文明化的开端。”（讽刺的是：这种绅士在他外套的钮孔中别了一朵花。）

尽管如此，在康德的关于教育的丰富反思中还是缺少了些什么：除了对艺术相当陌生的关于音乐的评论（音乐“只是为了一种原因”是好的，换句话说，“为的是使我们受人欢迎”[《教育学》IX 449]），后来对席勒和施莱格尔如此重要的审美教育在《教育学》中完全缺失了。人们几乎不能简单地把这归于这样一个事实，即在他开的最后一次关于教育学的讲座的三年后，他的美学理论才发表。早在实际出版这些表达之前，康德就已经发展了他的基本观点。

(d) 道德化：康德不是柯尼格。在康德的《论教育》出版不久，阿道夫·柯尼格男爵的（那个时代很著名但现今却很少有人读的两卷本著作）《论人的社会互动》（1788）就

after the publication of Kant's *On Pedagogy*. It goes far beyond what one used to learn in dance class. However, in opposition to any limiting of education to the already ambitious goal of civilizing, Kant shows, clearly enough, that he is, above all, a moral philosopher. Already in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he says: "in this fashion, the ultimate goal of nature's wise concern for us in having furnished us with reason is actually only staged for the purpose of morality" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 829). As the case with the three *Critiques*, Kant's philosophy in *On Pedagogy* also culminates in moral reflections.

When it comes not only to what for Kant is the most prized but also indispensable goal of education, moralization, all echoes of derogatoriness are missing. The third pedagogical level involves choosing (selection): "A person shouldn't be adept at everything" (*On Pedagogy*, IX 450). He is not to be a jack-of-all-trades, who, to be sure, understands a lot but also without scruple is open to everything. Rather, he should be reared morally and, consequently, "only choose nothing but good goals" (*ibid.*).

In ethics and public discourse today, morality is limited to social morality. In provocative contrast, in the course of Kant's lectures, duties begin with duties owed to oneself. However, "these do not consist of one's acquisition of fashionable clothes, ... but that a man internally has a certain dignity that ennobles him above all creatures." With respect to the corresponding duty that the "dignity of humanity is not to be denied his own person" (*On Pedagogy*, IX 488 f.) belongs such things as one is not to be a drunk, is to avoid all types of immoderateness, and is not to subordinate oneself "obsequiously to another."

"Duties owed to others" are placed by Kant only in second place, and he discusses them as "veneration and respect for the rights of others" that "a child should come to learn very early" (IX 489). The rights of humanity are nothing less than "the apple of God's eye on earth." For example, when a child encounters a more needy child, he should not "out of pride [push him] aside or away." Should it nonetheless occur, one ought not to rebuke the child or appeal to his

问世了。它远超人们在舞蹈课堂上通常所学到的东西。然而，与任何将教育限制在文明化的既定宏图之上的做法相反，康德非常清楚地表明他首先是一个道德哲学家。早在《纯粹理性批判》中，他就说到：“以这种方式，那关心并用理性来装饰我们的大自然的智慧，其最终的意图实际上只能被设定为道德”（《纯粹理性批判》B829）。正如三大批判，康德《论教育》中的哲学也是以道德反思为至高点。

如果人们发现，对康德而言，道德化不仅仅是最珍贵的，而且是教育不可或缺的目标，那么一切诽谤之声就会消失。第三个教育阶段包含选择（拣选）：“人不应该擅长于一切事务”（《论教育》IX450）。他不应是一个愿意接受一切事物的万事通（jack-of-all-trades），即那种的确知道很多却又缺乏思量的人。毋宁说，他应该从道德上来培养，从而“不选的别的而只选择善的目标”（同上）。

在当今的伦理学和公共话语中，道德只限于社会道德。与此截然不同，在康德的演讲中，义务开始于对自己的义务。然而，“这些义务并不在于让自己衣着光鲜，……而是在于，人在内心有某种尊严，这种尊严使它比也切造物都更高贵。”与之相应，“不在他自己的人格中否认人性的这种尊严”（《论教育》，IX488f）就是他的义务，譬如不酗酒，避免各种各样无节制，不使自己“对他人卑躬屈膝”。

“对他人的义务”被康德置于第二位，并且他将之视作“孩子应该尽早学习的对他人权利的敬畏和尊重”（IX489）。人性的权利正是“上帝眼中地上的苹果”。譬如，当一个孩子遇到另一个更穷的孩子，他不应该“傲慢地[把后者]推开或赶走”。然而，万一他这样做了，那么人们就不应该指责他或诉求于他的移情，而是“用同样的傲慢和姿态去对

<p>empathy, but “treat him with the same pride and gesture” (IX 489 f.).</p> <p>Finally, Kant criticizes what is surely not unimportant for the theme of civilizing with its core concern to “educate citizens:” that what is absent in schools is “promotion of the education of children with respect to integrity, namely a catechism of rights” (X 490). His example: “When someone ought to pay his creditor today, but, moved by the sight of a needy person, gives him the money owed to his creditor.” To the question “is that correct?,” Kant gives the uncompromisingly, clear answer, “No!” To do so is unjust” (ibid.).</p> <p>Kant emphasizes here something that today is a frequently ignored distinction between a debtor and a meritorious action; further, between the primacy of a debtor’s legal duty and a meritorious duty of virtue: Before one is philanthropic and gives to the poor, one must first pay one’s debts. Legally, Kant introduces as virtues of duty: integrity, propriety, and peacefulness; in contrast, meritorious virtues consist of generosity, beneficence, and, surprisingly, also self-control (X 492).</p> <p>When it comes to the first three goals of education, Kant is optimistic in comparison to his age in that he considers that disciplining, cultivating, and civilizing have been broadly achieved. When it comes to the fourth goal, however, he shares Rousseau’s pessimism: “We live at a point in time of discipline, culture, and civilization but by no means in an age of morality” (IX 451). In his philosophy of history he says, as well: “We are cultivated to a high degree when it comes to art and science. We’re civilized to the point of annoyance ... However, when it comes to considering ourselves moral, there we leave much to be desired” (Idea of a Universal History based on the Principle of World-Citizenship, VIII 26). Kant continues: To this end, the state is jointly responsible when it comes to “the sluggish effort with respect to cultivating the internal formation of the manner of thinking of its citizens.” He then adds in what for him are unusually dramatic words: “Everything that is good but is not accompanied by a moral disposition is nothing but sheer phoniness and lustrous wretchedness” (ibid.). To be sure, Kant’s later legal philosophy will</p>	<p>待他”。</p> <p>最后, 康德评论道, 对以“教育公民”为内核的文明化的主题而言, 并非不重要的东西是: 学校缺少“能促进把孩子塑造得正派的东西, 亦即一种权利问答手册”(X490)。他举例说: “如果某人今天本来应向其债权人还钱, 却被一个穷困潦倒的人的样子所打动, 把本属于其债权人的钱给了那穷人”。问题是: “这样正当吗?” 康德给出了坚定的、清楚的回答: “‘不!’ 这是不正当的”(同上)。</p> <p>在此, 康德强调了一种今天常常被我们所忽视的区分, 即债务人和功绩行为; 进一步说, 则是债务人的法定义务的优先性和德性的功绩义务。一个人在其博爱和助贫之前, 必须先偿还自己的债务。康德合法地引入尽责的德性: 正派、中规中矩和平和; 相反, 功绩的德性则包含慷慨、慈善、令人惊奇的还有自制(X492)。</p> <p>当谈及前三个教育目标时, 康德是乐观的, 它认为训诫、培养和文明化在他的时代已被广泛完成。然而, 当到第四个目标时, 他便成了罗素式的悲观主义: “我们生活在训诫、培养和文明化的时代, 但还远远不是道德化的时代”(IX451)。在其历史哲学中, 他同样说道: “我们已在很高的程度上通过艺术和科学而被培养。我们已文明到不堪重负……但是, 认为我们已经道德化, 那还差得很远。”(《关于一种世界公民观点的普遍历史的理念》VIII6)。他继续说道: 对这个目的, 如果国家“怠于致力培养其公民的内在的思维方式”, 那么它是要负连带之责的。随后, 他以一种对他而言罕见的戏剧化语言的补充说: “一切未嫁接在道德上的善的意念之上的善, 都无非是全然的幻相和硬装的体面”(同上)。当然, 康德后来的法哲学将会对什么属于权利和什么属于德性做出区分, 并且将会关注独立于内在动机的外部行为的合法性(《法权论》VI231)。</p>
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distinguish between what belongs to rights and what belongs to virtue and will content itself with the legality of external actions independent of their internal motivation (Doctrine of Right, VI 231).

Within the framework of the task of moralizing, Kant considers it “infinitely important ..., to instruct children from youth to detest vice” and not to leave this task just to the preacher (On Pedagogy, IX 450). What needs to be learned when it comes to this revulsion is the proper reason for the revulsion; in other words, once again, everything depends upon morality. Here it is not enough to assume that “God has forbidden [vice].” Kant rejects this assumption with two arguments: first, with an apologia: that vice “otherwise would be allowed if God had not forbidden it;” second, with an argument that rigorously eliminates any excuse: “that God could well make an exception once.” He excludes these options because: “God is the most holy being and desires only what is good” (X 450 f.).

In place of the relevant external, theonomic explanation (i.e., that something is a vice because God has forbidden it), Kant places an intrinsic justification that implies autonomy: Vice is “in itself worthy of revulsion,” which by the way God also grasps. God as the most holy being “requires that we should practice virtue for its inner worth and not because it is expected of us” (ibid.).

## 6.6 On the Worth of the Individual

At each of the three levels of education, the individual obtains a specific worth, according to Kant. What he calls the “scholastic” education in skill “provides him with value in his own eyes as an individual” (On Pedagogy, IX 455). By means of “pragmatic” education “in prudence, he learns to be a citizen” (ibid.). Again, Kant is not thinking here – only – of a national citizen who is concerned with public issues. In my opinion, he also isn’t referring merely to the bourgeois, material consumer. Indifferent with respect to the alternative bourgeois or citizen, Kant defends an expanded notion of citizen and says: “because he obtains a public worth” (ibid.).

在道德化的任务的框架内，康德认为“极为重要的是……，从小就教会孩子们厌恶恶习”，并且不要把这项任务仅仅留给布道人（《论教育》IX450）。这种厌恶感的产生，所需要学习的是厌恶的恰当理由；换句话说，一切再次都依赖于道德。在此，假定“上帝禁止[恶习]”是不够的。康德通过两个论证拒绝这个假定：首先，是一个辩解，“如果上帝没有禁止它的话，它[恶习]亦是被允许的”；其次，是一个严格地消除一切借口的论证，“上帝大有可能制造一次例外。”他排除了这些选项，因为：“上帝是最神圣的存在者，而且只希望好的东西”（X450f）。

为了取代这种相关的外在的、神律的（theonomic）解释（即某物之所以是恶的，乃是因为上帝禁止它），康德提供了一种蕴含自律的内在辩护：恶习“因其自身而值得厌恶”，并且顺带说一下，上帝也理解这个辩护。上帝作为最神圣的存在“要求我们践履德性，乃是因为德性的内在价值，而不是因为他的要求”（同上）。

## 6.6 个体的价值

根据康德，教育有三个层次，在教育的每一个层次中个体都可以在其中获得一定的价值。“校园的”技能教育“对个体来说也具备一定的价值”（《教育学》IX 455）。通过在聪明方面的实用的教育（家庭导师），“他学会成为了一个公民”（同上）。此外，康德这里所说的“公民”不是指的仅仅从事于公共事业的国家公民。在我看来，他并不关注可供选择的有产者或者公民，康德提倡的是一个更为扩充的公民的概念，并且主张通过聪明的塑造后他成为一个公民，并“由此获得一种公共的价值”。

According to this expansion of the notion “citizen,” the individual learns two things: “not only to direct his interests at civic society but also to invest himself in civic society; in other words, to defend his interests in competition but also in a social sense, in terms of being a fellow citizen (ibid.). This “not-only but-also” one can establish a balance between I-myself and member-of-a-community: One becomes a member of a cooperating polity in that one not only fits in but also pursues one’s own goals.

At the highest level, moral education, the individual “finally achieves a worth in the eyes of the entire human species” (ibid.). Nonetheless, here it is not so much the species “human being” that matters as it does its essence, humanitas. It is precisely this worth that corresponds to the educational plan devoted to cosmopolitanism.

Kant understands the task of education to citizenship as liberal in two respects: First, he is not of the opinion that one can be directly educated to citizenship. Before that can occur, he must cultivate himself as a self-responsible individual by means of discipline and cultivation. The prudence necessary for citizenship status consists “only” in the “capacity to convince others of his skill” and “all prudence presupposes skill” (ibid.). Second, the final goal of education does not consist in citizenship but that one become a moral person.

Kant sketches education to a moral person in the methodology of the Critique of Practical Reason. The methodology does not develop a theory of philosophical, moral reflection, but a theory of moral education, namely, “how one acquires laws of pure, practical reason in one’s human disposition (i.e., how one can make objectively, practical reason also subjectively practical)” (Critique of Practical Reason, V 151). Our contemporary school curriculum of “ethics” could learn a great deal here. With sovereign brevity, Kant distinguishes two phases in moral education: a pragmatic and, in a more narrow sense, moral education. By the second phase, he emphasizes not only legality but also the intensification to morality.

Further, Kant presents a weighty alternative to the usual practice today that discusses morality

根据康德的扩充了的公民概念，个体可以学到两件事情：在公民社会里不仅可以获取利益而且也需要奉献自己。换句话说，不仅要在竞争中捍卫自己的权益而且也要有集体的意识成为一个“公民同胞”。由此就在“自我”与“公民社会成员”这两个方面达到了一种平衡：作为公民社会的成员，他不仅要为了自己的意图去驾驭公民社会而且也要适应公民社会。

在最高的层次上是道德的教育，在道德的塑造中，个体“最终获得了就整个人类方面的内在的价值”（如上），但这并不是最重要的，因为它的本质仍然是“人本主义”。它的真正价值在于它与有利于世界主义的教育计划相一致。

康德所说的教育的任务是在两个方面塑造自由主义的公民：首先，他并不认为一个人可以直接地被教育成公民，在此之前，他必须通过训诫和培养使自己成为一个可以担负自我责任的个体，训诫的必要性是因为它可以让一个人在外在理性的控制下防止自己的动物性偏离人性，将人置于人性的法则之下。第二，教育的最终目标不是塑造公民而是将人塑造成为一个有道德的人。

康德在《实践理性批判》的方法论中概述了教育的终极目标是使人成为有道德的这样一种思想。这个方法论不是发展了一个哲学的道德反思理论，而且也发展了道德教育理论，那就是“一个人如何获得纯粹的法则，以及人性中的实践理性（也就是，人如何产生客观的实践理性和主观的实践理性）”（《实践理性批判》V 151）。我们在当代的学校的伦理学课程中可以学到很多。简单的说，康德区分了道德教育的两个阶段：一个是聪明的实用教育，另一个从狭义的范围上来讲就是道德教育。通过第二个阶段，他不仅强调了教育的合法性，而且也强化了教育的道德性。

进一步地，康德针对日常实践中的道德困境向我们呈现了一种更大的可能性（在 Wood



in light of dilemmas (see Wood 2011). For Kant, it is more important to draw on the inclination to reason that one finds also in youth “to pursue with pleasure even the subtlest examination of proposed practical questions” (Critique of Practical Reason, V 154). It also proves valuable to provide “an example for the determining characteristic of pure virtue:”

“ One tells the story of an honest man – incidentally, not a person of means –, whom one wants to motivate to join in the defamation of an innocent person. One offers money ..., he rejects it ... Then one begins with a threat of loss ..., in this manner my young audience is able to be ... elevated ... step by step from mere approval, to admiration, and then to astonishment, and finally to great veneration and the lively desire to be able to be like such a person ... Therefore, morality certainly has more power over the human heart, the more purely it is portrayed” (V 155).

Because adherence to the moral law evokes self-respect, “the law encourages duty by means of positive worth” because it “permits the feeling” of positive worth and increasingly provides “easier access” into the child’s way of thinking (V 161). This goal is the highest and most demanding: “to bring about” “in us step by step the greatest, although pure, moral interest” in the sanctity of duty (V 159). As is added in the methodology of the Doctrine of Virtue (§ 53) (something eagerly and frequently overlooked by Kant critiques), to the sanctity of duty belongs a “true and cheerful disposition.”

#### 6.7 “A Child Should ... Learn to Work”

One might want to ignore all the other goals of education in light of the superior goal of education, moralization. That would raise the danger that, to be sure, one rears an honest and cooperative, all around honest person, but, otherwise, he is unsuitable for life. Kant avoids this danger because he sketches the three educational goals prior to discussing morality: these three goals are the taming of wildness, the acquisition of skills, and civilizing (including life-prudence). The fact that they precede the educational goal of morality is because of an objective necessity:

In order to be honest, one must have something

2011 中可见)。对于康德来说，更为重要地是利用人在青年时的理性倾向去“追求快乐甚至是对已经提出来的实践问题进行敏锐的考察（《纯粹理性批判》154）。这个为纯粹德性的决定性特征提供案例很有帮助。

“有一个人讲述了这样一个故事，有一个老实人，他不是富人，有另外一个人想要鼓动这个老实人加入到对一个无辜的人的诽谤行动中，并许诺给他钱，这个老实人拒绝了，然后，这个人就对老实人进行了一系列的恐吓，最后老实人还是坚持了自己。在这种情况下，大家可能都比较欢欣的，慢慢地认同老实人的做法，接着有对他为什么会这样做感到惊奇，最终有对他形成了一种更大的尊敬感并从内心里也希望成为那样的人... 因此，道德比人类心灵具有的力量更大，那么它所拥有的纯粹性也就越多。

因为坚持道德律所以唤起了自我尊敬，“道德律通过积极的价值来鼓舞责任”，因为它允许对内在的积极的价值的感觉和为进入到小孩式思维方式提供了便捷之道（161）。这个目标是最高层次的也是要求最高的：在我们身上一步一步地“去招致”在圣洁的责任中的最伟大的也是最纯粹的道德兴趣（159）。正如在《道德主义》的方法论中（康德的三大批判所完全忽视的）增加的：圣洁的责任属于“真实完美的人性”。

#### 6.7 “一个孩子应该...学会工作”

人们可能会忽视所有其它的教育目的，即考虑教育的更高目的，道德化。毋庸置疑，教育会培养人们诚实的和合作的品质，但是不能教会他们生活的本领，这种情况肯定是非常不乐观的。康德提出了教育的三大目标，将教育立于教化之上，有效地避免了这种危机。这三大目标即驯化野性、学习技能和文明生活（包括处事谨慎）。这三大目标立于教化的教育目标之上是出于客观需要：

为了表现出忠诚的品质，人们往往直话直

to say; in order to be cooperative, one must understand what it means to help those who are destitute. By means of a systematic “beforehand,” one must be able to choose goals, then to learn capabilities and skills in order to pursue those goals; not least, one must cooperate with one’s peers in living together. One can choose “only sincerely, good goals” thanks to a good disposition acquired through the framework of this systematic “beforehand.”

In the course of educating a child to be successful at living, Kant speaks of a “future citizen” (On Pedagogy, IX 454). In the process he places special significance on the capacity to submit to “lawful restrictions” but nevertheless “to serve one’s own freedom.” The child needs to learn both: “to tolerate constraints to his freedom” (and to this goal “to sense early on the inescapable resistance of society), and “to make good use of his freedom.” However, when it comes to the exercise of this freedom, one must “not be [dependent] on being provided for by others” (ibid.).

Kant takes it to be obvious that the future citizen is to be a material consumer to the extent that he “must be concerned to provide for his own livelihood” (ibid.). (Kant doesn’t ask today’s relevant question whether this is also true of women.) Children should not think that they will later (what they now take for granted in their parents’ home) “receive food and drink without having to be [here in the sense of “must”] concerned about it themselves” (ibid.). On the contrary: “It is of greatest importance that children learn to work” (X 471; see “A child should play, ... but he must also learn to work:” IX 470, also IX 477).

This expectation cannot be taken to be only economic. Far more, it is an important facet in Kant’s general understanding of the task of education: to encourage independence and self-reliance of the individual. For Kant, this activity has nothing less than an anthropological rank: “Humanity is the only animal that has to work” (IX 471). This “must” is not a matter of compulsion. Kant expressly asks: “Whether heaven could not have done better for us, if it had provided everything in advance, allowed its mere discovery, so that we would not have to [again, in the sense of “must”] work?” His

说; 为了表现出协作的品质, 人们须明白帮助需要帮助的人的意义何在。通过系统地“预知”某事, 人们需要选择目标, 再学习相关技能, 来实现这些目标; 尤其重要的是, 人们须学会与同龄人协作, 与他们和平共处。若人们通过这种系统的“预知”而培养了良好的品行, 那么他们也可以选择“简单又良好的目标”。

在教育孩子学会生活的过程中, 康德提出了“未来公民”的概念(《教育学》IX 454)。在教育过程中, 他大力提倡“合法制约”, 而不仅仅是“个人自由”。孩子们需要学会: “对自由的合理制约”(并实现这样的目标, 即“尽早感知社会中无法避免的困难”)以及“享受自己的自由”。但是, 当人们享受自由时, 也必须有所付出, “不能只享受他人的劳动成果”。

康德认为很明显在未来公民将会成为一个物质消费者以至于“他必须为了生计而尽最大的努力”(同上)(康德没有回答今天这是否也适用于女性相关的问题)孩子认为他们之后将不会“收到吃的和喝的, 孩子们也有必要为自己担忧”[这里的意思是“必须”](认为住在他们父母家是理所当然的)。相反: “孩子学会去工作是非常重要的”; 看“一个孩子玩是应该的, 但是他也必须学会去工作”。

这个期望不能只从经济这个层面上来看。更长远来说, 这是康德对于教育使命的大概理解的一个重要方面: 倡导独立自主和自力更生。对于康德来说: “这个活动不逊于一个人类学等级: ”人类是唯一的必须劳动的动物。”这个“must”并不是强制的问题, 康德明确地问: “如果事先一切都已经提供了, 仅有的发现也已经被允许, 天堂是否会做的更好呢? 因此我们可以不必工作? 他清晰而强有力的回答: “不! 因为人类需要去完成任务”。这样的理由也许是不对的, 然后, 思考: 亚当和夏娃生活在伊甸园

<p>answer consists of a clear, “No!” because “humanity demands the accomplishing of tasks.” It would for that reason be incorrect, then, to think: Were Adam and Eve to have stayed in paradise, they would have done nothing other “than eating together, singing Arcadian songs, and observe the beauty of nature.” The “boredom would surely ... have martyred them” (ibid.).</p> <p>The business of learning to work is directed (simply stated) especially at two groups. Because in his day there was no generous welfare state, Kant doesn’t show an interest in one direction, providing youth with incentives to be capable of fulfilling a profession in the future. Kant only addresses the other side of the coin. He wouldn’t envy the playboys and playgirls of the world; rather he would feel sorry for them. They remain what is already contained in their labels (“boys” and “girls”), and, in Kant’s opinion, are what threatens the children of rich parents and the child of princes, “to be children their entire lives” (IX 454).</p> <p>Included in this sense of remaining a life-long child is, of course, someone who is well educated but incapable of earning his own livelihood. Without making it a specific point but stated clearly in terms of consequences, Kant rejects an education that seeks merely edification but no education. Stated polemically: He does not advocate that students be highly educated in the humanities and as social-scientists in a manner that makes them unfit for work.</p> <h3>6.8 The Bottom Line</h3> <p>Let’s balance the books: Kant combines the different goals of education into a general goal that we can call “education to personhood.” What Kant means by “personhood” is a “free acting agent” where we find our four levels: (1) free from the despotism of appetites, one is capable of wanting to control one’s own nature; (2) with capabilities and skills, including being equipped with prudence and social skills, the individual is able to pursue self-established goals that are compatible with the goals of others. To free action belongs, as well, also (3) the capacity to provide for one’s own livelihood whereby (4) the three citizenship roles that I</p>	<p>里，他们除了“一起吃、一起唱田园式的歌，一起欣赏大自然的美丽”而外，什么都没做。那么“他们必定感到无聊”（同上）。</p> <p>学会工作的任务尤其是针对两个群体的。因为他认为他生活的国家没有慷慨的福利。康德并没有展示在某一方面的兴趣，他激励年轻人在未来要有能力去成就自己的一番事业。康德仅仅强调了硬币的另外一面。他没有羡慕世界上的花花公子和花花姑娘，而是为他们感到遗憾。他们仍然保留着他们各自标签里的所属（男孩们和女孩们），并且，在康德的观点里，“什么威胁了富裕父母的孩子和诸侯们的孩子”“将会伴随孩子的整个人生”</p> <p>当然，在这个意义上保持做一个终生的孩子，就是指他们很好的教育却不能维持自己生计的人，没有看懂专门的意图却清晰阐述专门的结果，康德拒绝仅仅致力于启迪却没有教育的教育模式。有争议的是：他不提倡学生在人文科学领域深造，因为像研究行为的社会学家，他们却不适合参加社会工作。</p> <h3>6.8 底线</h3> <p>我们来对比一下这些书：康德把教育的不同目的结合进了一个一般目的，我们可以称之为“人格性教育”。“人格性”在康德那里指的是“自由行动的存在者”，我们发现这里有四个层次：（1）摆脱欲望的专制，人能够控制自己的自然本能；（2）潜能和技能，包括具备聪明和社会技能，人能够致力于自己确立的，并与他人的目的相共存的目的。同样也属于自由行为的是（3）保障自己生活的能力 借此（4）另一点上我区分的三种公民身份角色呈现为：经济公民身份，国家公民身份和世界公民身份（赫费 2004）。</p>
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have at another point distinguished are present: economic citizenship, state citizenship, and world citizenship (Höffe 2004).

In his discussion of the general goal of personhood, Kant expressly emphasizes three tasks: (1) A freely acting creature is able to maintain himself; (2) he is a member of society; and (3) he experiences in himself an internal worth. Herewith, one can once again recognize the three roles of citizenship. At the same time, Kant rejects that kind of education that pursues exclusively only one aim (i.e., economic interest that only is concerned with professional ability); he also rejects a privileging of communicative and social action that views the individual as only a social creature; finally, he rejects an idealistic moralism that recognizes only the personal value of the individual. Because a prudent education holds morality to be the dominant but not exclusive goal, it is concerned, in contrast, with all three dimensions: with professional ability, social agility, and a moral capacity that constitute together the indispensable dimension of a practical philosophy of freedom.

#### 6.9 Prospectus: The Moral Creature Humanity as Ultimate End

In his methodology to teleological judgment, Kant presents one of the most provocative propositions of his entire corpus. Humanity is given the title: Legitimate Lord of Nature (Critique of Judgment, V 435; on a title as legal ground see Doctrine of Right, VI 260). Even if he defends the thesis only for the individual as a moral creature, an anthropocentrism is expressed that today one would readily criticize as an arrogance of speciesism. According to an alternative pathos-centrist perspective, with its focus on the capacity of suffering, and according to a biocentrist perspective, all living creatures are on an equal footing.

Kant enters the conflict clearly and uncompromisingly on the side of anthropocentrism. First of all, he presents the thesis, but in the course, he makes what is a barely noticeable but momentous change. He doesn't place humanity at the center of the physical world; on the contrary, he declares the

在康德关于人格性的一般目的的讨论中，他特意强调了三个任务：（1）一个自由行动的造物有能力养活他自己；（2）他是一个社会成员；并且（3）他在他自身中体验到一种内在价值。因此，人能够再一次识别出公民身份的三种角色。同时，康德拒绝那种仅仅只致力于一个目标的教育（例如，经济学教育的兴趣只关心专业能力）；他也拒绝交际的、社会的行为的特权，它把人视为只是一个社会的造物；最后，他拒绝那种只承认人的个人价值理想的道德主义。因为一个聪明的教育把道德作为主要的但不是唯一的目的，相反，它关注所有的三个维度：关注专业的能力，社会的机敏，以及共同构成自由的实践哲学的不可或缺的维度的道德能力

#### 6.9 内容说明：道德生物的人作为终极目的

在他的目的论判断力的方法论中，康德提出了他的文集中最具争议的命题之一。人在标题中被标出：合法的自然之主。尽管他仅仅出于个体作为一个道德的生物而为其论点辩护，在今天，人类中心主义将会很容易被指责为自大的物种主义。根据另外一种悲悯中立派的观点，这种观点关注遭受痛苦的能力，根据生物中立派的观点，所有的生物都处于同等的地位。

康德明显而坚决地陷入了支持人类中心主义的冲突中。首先，他表达了他的论点，但是在此过程中，他做出了一个虽不明显但极其重要的改变。他未将人类置于物理世界的中心位置；相反，他声称人类作为一个以自身为目的的纯粹目的，就等级的目的而言，构成了自然的全部的绝对最后目的。

species to be a pure end as an end in itself that, when it comes to the hierarchy of ends, constitutes the absolute final end of the entirety of nature.

Already the architectonic of the Critique of Pure Reason defines humanity as final end (Critique of Pure Reason, B 860 ff.). The Groundwork declares humanity as an end in itself (Groundwork, IV 429), which the Critique of Judgment places within the context of nature as a whole for which the Groundwork, as a mere moral philosophy, has no interest: Teleological judgment [in the third Critique (tr.)] takes nature to be a systematic whole, and only this observation can generate the provocative thesis that humanity, and only it, is not merely a final end but, simultaneously, an absolutely, ultimate end in the sense of an ultimate purpose. At all events, new in the third Critique is an interweaving of Kant's moral anthropology with a normative philosophy of nature.

Anthropocentrism, which today is criticized, can be defended in two ways. A merely theoretical anthropocentrism claims solely an objective priority of rank, whereas, in contrast, a practical as well as normative anthropocentrism claims a priority of right. The combined anthropocentrism advocated in the Critique of Judgment justifies the priority of right by means of the priority of rank. Given humanity's idiosyncrasy that it can by itself willfully establish ends for itself and given the circumstance that "on earth" only humanity possesses this capacity, Kant extrapolates humanity's priority of right to be the Lord of Nature (Critique of Judgment, V 431).

As is known, more than half-a-century before Kant, Descartes called humanity "maître et possesseur de la nature," "lord and possessor or proprietor of nature" (Discours de la method, Part VI; see Höffe 1993, Chap. 8.2). To be sure, Kant ignores Descartes' second aspect (the proprietary status), but he adopts the first (the ruler status) and adds to it a legal-moral emphasis: Given its special status, humanity possesses a legal-moral entitlement. However, the question arises whether Kant has not succumbed to an erroneous conclusion (in the sense of the "is-ought" fallacy), which takes something that is (here, the possession of a

在《纯粹理性批判》的建筑术中早已将人定义为最后目的(Critique of Pure Reason, B 860 ff.)。《奠基》声称人是目的本身(Groundwork, IV 429),《判断力批判》将目的置于整全的自然语境中,对于《奠基》来说,作为纯粹的道德哲学,没有任何利益:目的论判断力把自然当作一个系统的整体,只有这种看法才能形成富有争论的论点,该论点认为只有人不仅是最后目的而且同时是绝对地终极目的,在终极意图的意义上。在第三批判中新的事件是,康德将道德人类学与规范的自然哲学交织在一起。

今天被批判的人类中心主义,可以以两种方式得到辩护。仅是理论的人类中心主义主张唯一客观的等级的优先性,然而,与之相反,实践的同时也是规范的人类中心主义主张法权的优先性。而混合的人类中心主义提倡在《判断力批判》中通过等级的优先性正名的法权的优先性。表明人能够通过其自身任意地为其自身建立目的的特质,并揭示“在地球上”只有人才拥有这种能力的情况,康德将人的法权的优先性推至自然之主的地位(《判断力批判》V 431)。

众所周知,在康德半个多世纪之前,笛卡尔将人称作“自然的主宰和所有者”(Discours de la method, Part VI; see Höffe 1993, Chap. 8.2)。可以肯定的是,康德忽视了笛卡尔的第二个方面(所有权地位),但是他采纳了第一个方面(主宰地位)并为其添加了合法的-道德的重点:表明其特殊地位,人拥有合法的-道德的授权。然而,问题是康德是否不会屈服于一个错误的结论(“是-应当”谬误),即从某物是什么(拥有一种能力)得出它应当怎样(一种道德权利)的结论。



capacity) and draws a conclusion about what ought to be (a moral right).	
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