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**主讲人：**赫费（Otfried Höffe）教授

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**翻译小组成员及学号：张振锋（M201674584）张兴昌（M201674583）**

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| 1. The Comprehensive Theory of Peace  In the voluminous *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant emerges as an outstanding theoretical philosopher. His fame as a political philosopher, by contrast, is due to the sketch *Toward Perpetual Peace,* the length of which is equal to roughly 10 percent of the first *Critique.* Its terseness, however, belies its philosophical significance; acute brevity is rather a sign of its remarkable virtuosity. ·  The text is an eminently political treatise because it uses philosophical means to promote the political, or rather moral-political end of universal and unqualified peace among all states. Although Kant was probably prompted to write the treatise on political grounds by the Basel peace between Prussia and France (April 5, 1795), it is not an occasional essay [ *Gelegenheitsschrift* ]*.* It rather contains the main features of a complete legal and state philosophy, along with the principles for putting it into political practice.  The confidence of Kant's line of thought in the treatise on peace attests to the fact that he had been dealing with the issues over a long period of time. A cursory reader will discover Kant as a political thinker only in his later works. But on closer inspection, the portentous concept of a republic is already found in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B 372ff.; on a political reading, see chapter 12). The first and most decisive publication for the theory on peace, the "Idea" (1784), was published even before the first critical work on moral philosophy, the *Groundwork* (1785). Further occurrences of the concept of peace follow in the "Conjectures" (1786), in the third part concerning the right of nations of the *Common Saying* (1793), and, following :the treatise on peace, in the *Doctrine of Right* (1797, §§53-63 and *Conclusion*) and in the *Conflict of the Faculties* (Section 2).  Prior to the treatise on peace, perpetual peace is mentioned as a general goal in the *Proclamation* ... *of a Treatise on Perpetual Peace in Philosophy* ( 1787). It is also pursued by theoretical philosophy in its attempt to overcome those endless controversies among theories on the battle field of metaphysics familiar from the *Critique* (A viii). In addition, there are two texts that may come as a surprise to those well versed in Kant. The legal order responsible for establishing peace, a "cosmopolitan whole, i.e., a system of all states," is also discussed in the *Critique of Judgement* ( 1790) under the heading "On the Ultimate End of Nature as a Teleological System" (§83). And the treatise on religion (1793) mentions in the first section a state of "perpetual peace based on a federation of nations united in a world republic" (VI 34). Whereas other modern philosophers are conspicuously silent about peace, it is a fundamental theme not only of Kant's political thought but of his entire philosophy.  As can be expected of Kant, his thoughts in the treatise on peace are not only finely nuanced in their concepts and well argued. They are also embedded in the context of historical experience and even inspired by previous debates on peace. Kant's knowledge of social thought and the history of ideas does not cause him to sidetrack to other topics. He instead proceeds apace to the systematic crux of the matter.  The title of the treatise lends to the impression that it concerns a philosophically marginal topic, since peace was not a fundamental concept of philosophy prior to Kant. This is a surprising state of affairs, since from the beginning of time humankind has expressed the wish that men would tire of war and beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks (Isaiah 2:4). Unquestionably, Kant's concern for both comprehensive and abiding peace is an existential task of moral significance. But peace in philosophical debates has had to eke out the existence of a wallflower; it is seldom considered, let alone treated in a way commensurate with its importance. Reputable philosophers have produced ample literature on peace in Western thought ~~(cf. Raumer 1953; Janssen I975; Chaunu 1993; and Höffe 2002a, chap. 8)~~. But among the classical texts of philosophy, there are none that bear the term "peace" in their titles.  Only two reputable thinkers in the Occident have accorded peace more than marginal treatment. Around the dawn of Christian theology, Augustine developed the most important theory of peace for centuries to come in Book XIX of *De civitate dei.* But he places moral-religious issues in the foreground. His focus is on inner peace, especially peace with God, along with cosmic peace. Earthly peace in the sphere of right and law is reduced to an imperfect image. Almostfourteen centuries later, Kant advanced the second pioneering theory of peace from the zenith of Enlightenment philosophy. And he succeeded in uniting the most decisive lines of thought that previously ran parallel to one another: the line of thinking about right and the state inherited from Plato and Aristotle, on the one hand, .and Stoic cosmopolitanism, on the other. Kant, however, rejects the mostly apolitical character of the latter. He is familiar with the right of nations as it is discussed in early modernity. Nor is he ignorant of Augustine's idea of perpetual peace, but he no longer reserves it for the hereafter, and instead construes it as a task in this life, or more precisely, as a task of right in accordance with its moral concept. Therein lies Kant’s first great innovation: Peace becomes a fundamental concept of philosophy, no longer of theology, and its central concern is legal and political philosophy.  Kant understands the word "perpetual" to mean a particular quality of this life that makes peace unconditional or unqualified. Kant develops an ideal on the basis of this concept of absolute peace that is of decisive importance to international politics: the ideal of a truly global peaceful order that rests on a global legal order.  Despite the existential significance of peace and Kant's exceptional achievements, it is surprising that peace first attained the status of a fundamental concept only in Kantian philosophy. His legal and political philosophy, which is dedicated to peace, was initially discussed intensely over a period of several years. But in German idealism and ever since, it has been pushed to the background ~~(see seetion 8-4).~~  In the treatise on peace, Kant uses contemporary peace contracts as a methodological guide. Following their pattern, he presents a set of agreements that consists in six preliminary articles, three definitive articles, two supplements, and a two-part appendix. The second edition ( 1796) even contains a secret article, which plays on the subtle irony of requiring 协定abstinence from all secrecy.  In its entirety, the treatise covers seven extensive and relatively independent issues: (1) Despite his general disparagement of war, Kant makes the effort to propose war reforms, so long as war remains a reality. War should not be "tamed," since it is absolutely illegitimate except as a defensive measure; but engagement in war should not exclude peace as a possible final goal. This idea of changing war for the sake of peace - or of war reform that plays a functional role in securing peace - has hardly any precursors. The six preliminary rules for carrying out this reform, the ·"preliminary articles," are directed at political protagonists: heads of state, governments, or parliaments. They point out violations of right that, for the purpose of establishing peace, in part must be stopped at once ("strict laws of prohibition"), in part "contain permissions, not to make exceptions to the rule of right, but to postpone putting these laws into effect, without however losing sight of the end" *(Peace* VIII 347). This "authorization to postponement" signals a theory of moderation and *kairos* that criticizes a policy of rash decision, but unfortunately no further efforts have been taken to develop a theory of this kind up to the present day.  Apart from the basic requirement of an unqualified peace (1st preliminary article), at least three further rules concerning war reform are still topical today. To begin·with, standing armies shall in time be abolished altogether; a principle of disarmament should replace that of an arms race (3rd preliminary article). No state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state because foreign states have the right to reform themselves (the prohibition of intervention: 5th preliminary article). Finally, since perpetual peace is possible only under the proviso of reciprocal trust, all hostility is to be prohibited "as would have to make mutual trust impossible during a future peace" (6th preliminary article). ·   1. The final rules or "definitive articles" contain the core tenets of Kant's theory of peace: the moral and a priori conditions of peace. Kant does not turn to political protagonists right away, but instead considers ''social systems," legal and state orders. He also indirectly refers to those who are responsible for them, namely, the constituent assemblies, governments, and the people of the state that authorize them.   Kant sketches a theory of public right that is comprehensive from a legal-moral perspective: (2.1) The first legal-political article discusses the relations between individuals and groups, (2.2) the second article on the right of nations concerns relations among states, and (2.3) the third article on cosmopolitan law explicates the relations between private individuals and groups and foreign states, along with the relations among states .that- unlike 2.2- the states do not owe to one another. The first definitive article thus contains Kant's. second major innovation in the ethics of peace. He links the idea of peace to the republic, a political novelty at the time that was first established in the United States and France. However, Kant had already spoken of a republic in the first Critique in relation to Plato: CPR B 372ff. ~~(cf. section 12 1).~~ Kant's reflections on the republic thus were influenced not only by the political developments of his time, but also by a long-standing tradition in political philosophy. The second and third definitive articles together constitute the third innovation, the cosmopolitan view of the republic and of peace that was foreign to Plato, on the one hand, and to France and the United States, on the other.  Incidentally, Kant had already spoken of "cosmopolitanism"·in the "Idea" eleven years prior to the treatise on peace. The theory of public right it sketches, however, has only two parts. It deals with the civil society corresponding to state right (with the obligation to "the greatest freedom" that "can coexist with the freedom of others"; "Idea" VIII 2 2) and with the federation of peoples belonging to the right of nations (VIII 24-26), but leaves out cosmopolitan right.  The global peaceful community that is required at the intermediate level seeks not only to end one war but to "end *all war* forever" *(Peace* VIII 356).Following the model of the domestic securing of peace, a world republic according to its positive idea is requisite (VIII 357), but it would differ from a "universal monarchy" in which all states coalesce into a single state. In his plea for a federation of peoples that always expands as a "negative surrogate" or second-best option, Kant argues that states would otherwise not concede to renouncing their sovereignty.  The termination and culmination of public right in cosmopolitan law does not supplant “national” civil law, but rather supplements it. Kant adheres to a complementary, not exclusive cosmopolitanism. Since this undermines Hegel's criticism in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (§209, remark), one might wonder why Hegel, who was younger, did not have a more discriminating position. Even Hegel's direct criticism of Kant's theory of peace (§§330-340, esp. §333) lacks philosophical and political acumen ~~(see section 8.4).~~  Whereas the right of nations is based on the recognition of relations which states owe to one another, cosmopolitan law concerns relations that are not owed, namely, transactions in the wide sense of *commercium* : voluntary, not exclusively economical exchange. However, cosmopolitan law concerns not the positive relations themselves, but only the small section of relations that actually are owed, since they, like right in general, are linked to an authorization to use force. Kant's cosmopolitan law, namely, consists in the authorization to offer engagement in commerce without eliciting hostile treatment. This kind of right- unlike philanthropy- depends on reciprocity. The legitimating basis of right is a theorem in Kant's theory of property. Since "all nations stand originally in a community of land, though not of rightful community of possession *(communio) ...* or of property in it," they each have a prior subjective right: the authorization "of offering to engage in commerce with any other" (MM §62).  Kant is here emphasizing a qualified right of cooperation: The tradesman may offer his goods, just as the researcher may offer his knowledge or even the missionary his religion - but neither partner in the transaction may become violent. Aslong as the offer is made on foreign territory, the person making the offer merely has visiting rights, not the right to hospitality. This is the case regardless of whether individuals, groups, firms, or an entire people or state are at issue, or whether economic, cultural, tourist, or political interests are being pursued. In all cases, one may knock on others' doors, but one does not have a right to enter. Asin Bacon 's *New Atlantis,* a community may combine its generosity toward foreigners with a ban on immigration. Moreover, it may prohibit not only certain types of goods and services, but even trade altogether. Attempts to establish economical autarchy in a "closed commercial state," such as those proposed by Rousseau *(Projet de constitution pour la Corse,* 1764) and later by Fichte (1800) and Friedrich List *(Das nationale System der politischen Okonomie,* 1840) are just as valid from a legal-moral standpoint as a system of customs and dues that protects the national economy from undesired competition.  Regardless of whether cooperation is successful, both parties should be protected. The murder, enslavement, or theft of newcomers and, conversely, the subjection, exploitation, or enslavement of locals are not permitted. Kant's harsh reckoning of the colonial politics at the time is politically relevant. According to Kant's criteria, virtually all of the colonies established in modernity, ranging from South, Central, and North America to Africa and Australia, are clear examples of injustice, ' since "they counted the inhabitants as nothing" *(Peace* VIII 358).  Kant's qualified rights of cooperation consist in more than the merely' negative prohibition of unjust colonization, and in positive respects they are more than international private rights, notably, the right to commerce. Since rights of cooperation comprise research, culture, and tourism, they in fact amount to a demand that is particularly topical today in the age of globalization. All people have a modest right to a comprehensive community of cooperation, namely, universal visitor rights, but not the right to hospitality. This does not mean, however, that they must relinquish personal and collective particularities. Kant thus already combines a right to universal cooperation with a right to individual difference.   1. According to Kant's politico-sociological claim in the first definitive article, primarily two motives promote the establishment of a global peaceful federation: the negative motive of experience with the terror of war, and the positive motive of republicanism. Republics - which approximate constitutional democracies or democratic juridical states *[Rechtsstaaten],* but not all states with a division of power-avowedly have little inclination to wars of aggression. And according to the principle of imitation, the republican constitution instituted in *one* state will soon be assimilated by other states. Kant does not trace the inclination to peace among democracies back to. the heightened moral sensitivity of their civilians. Exemplary of his clear-headedness, he merely appeals to the capacity of democracies to allow their citizens more opportunity to pursue their self-interests (for criticism on this point, see chapter 10).   The first supplement ("On the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace") supplements the moral theory of peace with a teleological theory of nature. By drawing on ideas from his philosophy of history, notably in the "Idea" and the *Critique of judgment,* Kant outlines a social history : of mankind that is determined solely by nature, in particular by thediscord among human beings, but also by peace as a final end. He here turns to legal and state orders in the sense of social systems and their "naturally necessary" development, on the one hand, and to politicians and theoreticians of politics, on the other-hand; for they can no longer excuse their disinterest in a global peace order by presuming that it is unfeasible.  Heraclitus's renowned fragment declares war (in the wider meaning of tension and conflict) to be the mother of all things, that is, of all nature, even of its subhuman parts (Diels and Kranz, Fragment 2 2B80).  Kant limits his scope to human beings. He believes that discord is the decisive factor in the general development of culture ("Idea," 7, proposition: antagonism; cf. chap. g). Discord, namely, drives people to settle "even into the most inhospitable regions" *(Peace* VIII 363), advances culture (cf. CJ §83, V 388ff.), and even serves moral purposes, since it promotes altruism for the sake of the respective community and, in particular, prompts the transition from the state of nature to the rule of law and civil state: War compels people "to enter into more or less lawful relations" *(Peace* VIII 363).  War here manifests the cunning of (human) nature as a means to the final end of the abolition of war. But even if war is abolished, this does not mean we should fear social entropy, theslow stagnation of global society, for peace *does* not entail the dissolution of the multiplicity and rivalry between languages and religions or confessions, nor does it diminish commercial competition. The global rule of law and civil state is not *solely responsible* for global peace. Apart from political relations, there are also social and, above all, economic relations. But one does not have a right to enter these relations - they instead arise from voluntary action. The impetus for entering them is called the spirit of commerce according to Kant's second, socioeconomic thesis on the development of a global society. And "since the power of money may well be the most reliable of all the powers (means) subordinate to that of a state"(PeaceVIIL368) , a driving force toward globalization lies in the spirit of commerce or, we may extrapolate, in the benefits afforded by any cooperation whatsoever. The spirit of commerce, however, leads only to a world society and not to a federation of peoples, nor to a world republic.  The treatise on peace thus brings together four aspects of the securing of peace in a clear order of precedence: (a) The leading goal consists in the establishment of a federation of peoples or a world republic (see below, chapter 11). (b) The republican or democratic constitution of single states aids the establishment of a federation of peoples. This principle of democratization (in the sense of a democratic juridical state) is accompanied (c) negatively by "all the hardships of war" *(Peace* VIII 350) and (d) positively by the spirit of commerce, for it "can-not coexist with war" and "sooner or later takes hold of every nation" (VIII 368). The "great artist nature" thus makes use of the natural discord between human beings in order to "let concord arise even against their will" (VIII 360). Human beings come together in single states from assuredly selfish motives, and these states, in turn, first wage war with one another. But then, after time, they learn to live together peacefully due to their interest in commerce and prosperity.  The interplay of all four aspects not only ensures that all war is outlawed without qualification or reservation. Since the spirit of commerce causes an increase in prosperity, negative peace or the absence of war culminates in a positive peace. Peace of this sort is generally well known from diverse cultures, ranging from Greek *eirene* to Hebrew *shalom* and Roman *pax,* up to Germanic *fride.*  2. "Kingly People"  (6) In the second supplement, Kant engages in a theory-praxis discussion in order to underwrite a partial relationship between philosophy and political power. Under the heading "Secret Article for Perpetual Peace," he demands no less than the abolition of all secrecy and instead encourages free and public discussion "about universal maxims of waging war and establishing peace." In view of international political practice, this demand is revolutionary, comparable to the Copernican turn effected by the epistemology and theory of objects in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant confronts secret diplomacy, which as a practice was not restricted to his epoch, with the principle of publicity. This principle applies the general demand for publicity, or in the *Critique*, the demand that "everything" must submit to "free and public examination"(A XI, footnote), to national and international right. Every maxim of state right and of the right of nations must be examined as to its inner probity. And every maxim that does not withstand this test because it can be successful only in secrecy is prohibited by legal morals.  (7)The continuation of the theory-praxis discussion in the two-part appendix on "morals and politics" finally takes up a motif from the introduction: the conflict between philosophers "who dream a sweet dream" and statesmen proud of their worldly wisdom (Peace VIII 343). To the extent that Kant settles this conflict, he also bridges the gap between philosophy and politics.  The establishment of peace on this front is already discussed in the second supplement, where Kant responds to Plato's principle of the philosopher-king; according to which either philosophers must become kings or the so-called kings presently in power ought to engage in sincere and thorough study of philosophy, for otherwise there can be no end to the devastation of states. The core of Kant's response to Plato consists in a distinction. It corroborates both Plato's intention of promoting reason to its realization and his assumption of the compatibility between (moral) theory and (real) praxis (cf. Kant's *Common Saying* and *Conflict*). But it also separates the project of defining moral principles from their real application and entrusts philosophy only with the former task. In this way, Kant applies the division of labor that he espouses in general (cf. GMM IV 388f. and "Idea" VIII 21f.) to the political sphere. Political activity does not fall under the competence of philosophers, but its principles do; practical concretization and execution, in turn, are incumbent on the rulers.  By virtue of their moral character, the philosophical elements absolutely precede all other factors. As theoretical principles of peace, however, they do not provide instructions for political realization but rather depend on that power of judgment that is allegedly missing in Kant but here again is shown to be present (see chapter 3). Moral-political prudence is needed that passes judgment "as favorable circumstances arise"(Peace VIII 378) but that "takes the principles of political prudence in such a way that they can coexist with morals" (372). Kant illustrates this by the moral politician (VIII 372 and 377) and opposes him sharply to the political moralist, ''who frames a morals to suit the statesman's advantage" (372) . Kant calls "morals" that in this way have been subjected to self-interest the "twistings and turnings of an immoral doctrine of prudence" (375).  The fact that, for Kant, philosophers have a capacity to give counsel(VIII 368f.; cf. Conflict, I. Section, 4: VII 35), recalls the well-advisedness [eubolia] of Platonic philosopher-kings(Republic 1V428b). But unlike in Plato, their capacity to advise extends not to the entire domain of political rule but to a small, albeit fundamental sector. And therein lies Kant's first, epistemological [wissenstheoretisch] argument for the division of labor between philosophy and politics: They must be divided because the cognitive competence of philosophers does not extend to concrete politics. Philosophy does not grasp the conditions of reality or train the experience and judgment belonging to this competence, but it does discriminate what is feasible or effective. For this reason, Kant does not recommend employing philosophers as political advisers. But he recommends close attention to the "maxims of philosophers about the conditions under which public peace is possible" (Peace VIII 368). As legal-moral principles of human coexistence, these maxims correspond to the principles of political justice. Thus, Kant's version of the principle of philosopher-kings is tantamount to the commitment of politics to elementary principles of justice.  According to Plato, recognition of the good is inherent in knowledge of the idea of the good (Republic X 618c-d); such recognition is action guiding and all action is guided by recognizing a good. Kant's second argument, which plays on corruptibility, takes aim at this assumed unison between the *principium diudicationis* and the *principium executionis*. Even if philosophers had unlimited competence in giving counsel, they should still be denied political rule, since otherwise their actual competence in the free judgment of reason would be corrupted.  Plato would repudiate this objection with the argument that "his" philosophers’ reason is impervious to corruption, since it is what rules the soul (*Republic* VI 484aff.). Platonic philosophers have the distinctive feature of relating to themselves practically in such a way that they are invariably directed toward the good and just. They do not serve particular interests, nor are they constrained by them, and they defy all fame and power (cf. Republic I 347d, VI 499b-c, VII 521b, VIII 539e). Kant would reply that an absolutely assured rule of reason or complete eradication, instead of mere subduing, of power is conceivable but not realizable for finite rational beings such as human beings. He is here evidently indebted to Rousseau who, in the Social Contract (chap. II, 7), speaks of a higher reason that perceives all passions of human- beings and itself has none. Reason of this kind is reserved for the gods.  Kant's argument in response to Plato is thus ultimately anthropological in nature and extends the anthropological component of moral philosophy, which Kant does not subsume under (empirical) anthropology(see section 5.2): Good rulers in a strict sense, that is, incorruptible rulers, do not exist, even if they are in Plato's sense free from the immense dangers of corruption, such as personal property and the predilection for supporting the well-being of one’s own family over general well-being. Even in communities of women or children or in cooperatives, man is still made "from such warped wood" ("Idea" VIII23; Religion VI 100) that he ''will always misuse his freedom if he does not have anyone above him" ("Idea," ibid.). By the same token, if the philosopher is granted power, he will be in danger of losing his intellectual independence. Plato, too, cautions against corruption through power (Republic VI 491 b-e) except in the case of the rule of philosophers. His ideal notion of the philosopher explains why he does not place any restrictions on their rule. Only in the *Laws* does he acknowledge that the rule of laws is a necessity due to the corruptibility of all human beings (IX 874e-875d; cf. Ill 631cff, IV 713c-714a).  Kant parts with Plato on a further point. Whereas only few people are suitable for philosophical activity according to Plato's *Republic*，"universal … human reason" is sufficient for philosophical reflection in Kant's view (*Peace* VIII 369). A democracy of reason thus replaces Plato's aristocracy of spirit (acquired from schooling in mathematics and dialectics). Common human reason surely cannot manage without schooling. But this does not entail intellectual aristocracy for Kant; philosophers do not possess any special capacities or insights and thus have no special rights. Deprived of office and privileged insight, philosophers are no more than the champions of "universal reason itself, in which everyone has a voice" (CPR, "Doctrine of Method," Chap. I, Sec. II: B 780). The treatise on peace also attaches importance to "universal…human reason" (VIII 369). To ensure that everyone is heard, universal freedom of speech is mandated in the second supplement of Perpetual Peace. Whereas Plato attaches importance to philosophical friends - the supreme, unwritten doctrine is accessible only to a closed circle of the initiated - Kant adheres to the principle of publicity and even grants it a transcendental status (*Peace* VIII 381).  People who submit themselves to the reform and heed to the principles of legal morals are awarded an honorific title that most perfectly expresses the democratization of the principle of philosopher-kings. Kant calls them "kingly people" (Peace VIII 369), because they submit their coexistence to right and right to morals. Accordingly, the *Doctrine of Virtue* asserts that a person of true, intelligible virtue is not only "free," "healthy," and "rich," but also "a king" (VI 405). For Kant, kings are truly moral persons, which may be either natural persons ("human beings") or collective persons ("people").  In the treatise on peace, the people take the place of Plato's philosopher-kings-outstanding individuals are replaced by the entirety of those who are both affected by and responsible for the affairs of the state. Undoubtedly, a people may be conferred the honorary title of a "kingly people" only if it submits itself to the requirements of legal morals. Kant does not justify any democracy whatsoever, but a democracy committed to legal morals, which only by fulfilling this condition is a "kingly democracy." If it is to be legitimate, it must rule itself according to "laws of equality" (*Peace* VIII 369) and ensure that "no one can rightfully bind another to something without also being subject to a law by which he in turn can be bound in the same way by the other" (first definitive article, VIII 350).  A people is kingly if every citizen is equally a king, but not in the sense of absolutist rulers unbound by laws. The citizen also does not need to be a truly moral person. It suffices that, as a legislator (directly or mediated by representatives), he does his utmost to support laws that do not conflict with legal morals and, as a "subject," to obey these laws. These conditions are commands of legal morals. Thus, "kingly people" are primarily distinguished not by their uncommonly advanced education, as Plato's kings with respect to mathematics and dialectics, but by their justice, which Plato also considers ultimately decisive (although he defines justice differently).  Kant devised his fourth innovation, the democratic interpretation of the principle of philosopher-kings, long before the treatise on peace. Already in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the very passage in which he rehabilitates Plato's concept of the idea, Kant transforms the personal requirement "that a prince will never govern well unless he participates in the ideas" into a criterion divested of all personal morals: A "constitution providing for the greatest human freedom according to laws that permit the freedom of each to exist together with that of others" is a "necessary idea, which one must make the ground ... of all the laws"(CPR B 373). Thus, already in the *Critique*, the just king is replaced by the just constitution of a people, now taken to be kingly.  3．Kingly Humanity  Since the human craving for peace is as old as humanity itself, it is not surprising that Kant's treatise on peace enjoys remarkable and in fact reputed precursors.  What makes Kant exceptional is not the occurrence of the idea of peace in his writings, but its distinct profile. This includes Kant's innovations with respect to previous proposals of peace plans, which are partly mentioned above: Kant does not pursue any political interests. Further, he develops a purely philosophical argument; he is just as remote from Erasmus's and Franck's appeal to the New Testament as from Augustine's relegation of peace to the hereafter. Kant does not anywhere conceal religious motives; in the treatise on religion, the idea of peace is explicitly described as "philosophical" and opposed to a "theological" chiliasm (VI 34). Further, Kant refrains from all political zealotry and acknowledges conflict as a fundamental element of the political sphere. Peace does not rule where vain love and friendship hold sway, in an eternal never-never land of freedom from conflict, but where conflicts are treated according to legal-moral principles. This is bound to a clear restriction. The peace Kant discusses is, as a mere protection of life and freedom, a legal task.  Kant removes other restrictions with ease. What humanity until now had known of peace was like a small isle in the great ocean of violence and war: Peace was both temporally and spatially limited. Wherever there was domestic peace or even fortress peace, national peace was lacking; and whenever national peace , there was no peace transgressing national borders; and even from an international perspective, "ecumenical" peace across all countries and cultures was inconceivable.  Kant rejects all of these restrictions and instead vindicates a moral universalism of right and peace, that is, a global, both temporally and spatially universal peace. It is no coincidence that Kant's treatise is the most renowned plan for peace. Its four innovations and，in particular, the connection between the republic as a political innovation at the time and a truly global perspective, give rise to a plan of great political courage. If humanity would recognize it by establishing a legal order according to moral principles not only Within states, but also between them, then it would, as a whole, attain the status of kingliness.  Kant's treatise on peace contributes not only to political thought. It also contains a social utopia, or rather a (realistic) vision that is still compelling today for two reasons. First, it awakens latent utopian energy and overcomes that resigned loss of hope and vision that robs life of all magnificence and impoverishes the world. The experience that "human beings in general, or heads of state in particular, ... can never get enough of war" (*Peace* VII 343) is confronted by morally legislating reason, which "delivers an absolute condemnation of war as a procedure for determining rights" (VIII 356).  The treatise is also compelling because it allays the fears that "the idea of a perpetual peace cannot be realistic". Kant no doubt perceives this danger, and thus mentions "philosophers, who dream that sweet dream" (*Peace* VIII 343) and the possibility that the goal is "merely chimerical" or a delusion (VIII 368). In the treatise on peace he does not succumb to illusions of wishful thinking with respect to the good of human beings or the sagacity of their sovereigns. Instead, he expressly demonstrates that perpetual peace is not "an empty thought" (VIII 372) and "no empty idea" (VIII 386). Even those who find Kant's proof dubious cannot deny that the chances for realizing peace considerably increase under Kantian conditions.  A first condition amenable to realization rests on giving up the notion of a comprehensive utopia. In contrast with Augustine or with the first stage in the development of the Platonic polis (*Republic* II 369b-3 72c), Kant does not defend a comprehensive ideal of peace. In Plato's elementary polis, human beings live in peace not only with other human beings, but also with the gods, or even with nature (cf. Höffe 1997, chap. 4). Kant does not consider most of these dimensions of peace. Whereas Plato binds social peace to inner or personal peace, Kant places peace in the domain of right, where reference to personal attitudes is immaterial. The following dimensions are left out of Kant's conception of peace: (1) the peace of man with himself, that is, inner or personal peace, (2) its extension or deepening in religious peace in or with god, and further (3) peace in and with nature, ecological peace, and (4) that cosmic peace that has been so important since Augustine, in which all things attain a proper locus within a hierarchically constructed world order (De civitate Dei XIX 12f.). (5) Only social peace remains to be considered.  Even this dimension is understood in a moderate way. In German, the expression "Friede" (peace) is related to "free" [frei], "to wed or woo" [freien], and "friend" [Freund]. A derivative of the Indo-Germanic root *pri*- to love or to care for- it "originally refers to a state of love and care, with greater emphasis placed on the aspect of mutual help and support than on emotional attachment and affection" (Janssen 1975,543). The meaning of Friede later was narrowed down to (6) a negative social peace and signified only the (usually temporally restricted and spatially limited) deterrence of violence. Kant's (7) political and more precisely legal concept of peace leaves aside the first four dimensions and denotes something in between the comprehensive social concept and an extreme contraction of it: On the one hand, violence is deterred without any temporal restrictions or territorial limitation, while on the other hand, a moment of active help is added, but it is restricted to the single task of safeguarding right. In all three definitive articles in the treatise on peace, a negative concept of peace predominates: legal security.  The second aspect that is amenable to the realization of peace lies in the very concept of right: As mentioned above, Kant renounces the idyllic vision of the cessation of all conflict. The decisive anthropological fact of "unsocial sociability" is confirmed in the first supplement. Although passions such as "the desire for honor, power or property" are "far from admirable in themselves, "they resist the human "tendency to laziness" and induce him to take the first steps "from barbarism to culture" ("Idea," Fourth-Proposition). Kant thus does not only allow for conflicts but even welcomes them; but he condemns force as a means of resolving conflicts.  As a further aspect amenable to realization, the first supplement introduces the "great artist nature," which makes use of the natural discord between human beings in order to let "concord arise ... even against their will" (*Peace* VIII 360): Human beings unite from assuredly selfish motives in single states that at first wage war against one another, but after time, particularly due to interests in commerce, they learn to live in peace.  The fourth aspect amenable to realization is meant to contrast with former utopian visions such as Thomas More's *Utopia* and the vast array of political novels that emulate this model in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Because they give free reign to social and political imagination, they are rightly called "*voyages imaginaries*," or fictional voyages. Kant strongly opposes them by explicitly maintaining that the "sweet dream" is the dream of "philosophers," that is, precisely those whose metier requires them to employ concepts and argumentation. In Kant, reason rather than the imagination travels far. It elevates perpetual peace to the status of an "immediate" legal moral duty (*Peace* VIII 356, 1. 4; cf. 362, 1. 9; 364/9; 378, 11. 19-22). Apart from wars of self-defense (345), "war" is absolutely condemned "as a procedure for determining rights" (356). This categorical imperative of peace establishes peace that is in a moral respect *eo ipso* perpetual. The motto adhered to by most states stems from the Roman military theorist Vegetius(A. D. fourth century): "If you want peace, prepare for war" [*Si vis pacem, para bellum*]. Kant substantially counters this with the principle :If you want peace, prepare for- political- justice [*Si vis pacem, para iustitiam*]. In his own words: " [S]eek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its *justice*, and your end (the blessing of perpetual peace) will come to you of itself" (*Peace* VIII 378). | 1. 广泛的和平理论   《纯粹理性批判》这部长篇著作使得康德成为一位杰出的理论哲学家。相反，他作为一名政治哲学家而闻名要归功于他的《论永久和平》，虽然其长度大约只有第一批判的百分之十。然而，《论永久和平》的简洁程度，遮蔽了其哲学意义，但这也在相当程度上表现了它的非凡技艺。  《论持久和平》是一篇非同寻常的政治论文，因为它使用了哲学的方法来推进政治，或者说在所有国家之间的普遍而无条件的和平这样一种道德-政治目的。虽然促使康德写这篇论文的政治原因很可能和普鲁士和法国之间的巴塞尔的和平有关，但它并不是一篇偶然的文章。它甚至可以说包含了一个完整的法律和国家哲学的主要特征，连同为了将其自身纳入到政治实践的原则。  康德对和平理论的思路的自信，证实了他事实上在此之前的很长一段时期就已经在着手解决这类问题了。一个不草率的读者，也许只会在康德的晚期作品中发现他的政治哲学。但仔细的检查后便会发现，那些关于一种共和国的预示性的概念早已在《纯粹理性批判》中就建立起来了(第二版 第372ff; 关于政治的篇章，见12章）。《世界公民意图中的通史理念》作为第一篇，也是最重要的关于和平理论的出版物，它的出版时间甚至要早于第一本道德哲学的关键著作《道德形而上学奠基》（1785）。这一概念进一步出现于《人类历史起和平源推测》（1786），在《论俗谚》的第三部分的国家权利中（1793）以及在和平理论之后的，《法权论》（ 1797，§§53-62 和结语）和《科系之争》（第二部分）。  在和平理论之前，永久和平作为一种总目标在《宣言…一篇关于永久和平理论的哲学论文》（1787年）中被提及到。同时，它也类似于《纯粹理性批判》（A viii）里提到的，在理论哲学中试图克服的各种学说间争论不休的形而上学战场。另外，我们还可以在康德广为人知的文本中发现两个可能作为惊喜的文本。用于建立和平的法律秩序，“世界性的整体，一个广涉所有国家的系统”，在《判断力批判》（1790）中的“作为目的论系统的自然最终目的” (§83)标题下也有所论述。《单纯理性限度内的宗教》（1793）的第一部分中也提到了“在一个世界的共和国中的，基于国家联盟的永久和平”(VI 34)。和平这一概念，不仅仅是康德的政治学说的一个基本主题，也是他整个哲学基本主题；然而，其它的当代哲学家们却明显对此保持着沉默。  如同可以预料到的，康德和平理论中的思想，不仅仅细微到它们的概念和充分的论证。它们还根源于历史经验的背景和以往关于和平的争论的启发中去。康德的关于社会思想和概念史的知识没有使他偏向其它主题。相反，他继续快速地找到了这一问题的系统症结所在。  该论文的标题给人以一种涉及哲学的边缘性话题的印象，因为和平不是康德之前哲学的一个基本概念。这是事态令人吃惊，因为人类从时间之初就表达出这样一种希望：人类厌于战争，将剑铸为犁，把矛打成修剪的钩子。（《以赛亚书》 2：4）。毫无疑问，康德关切的全面而持久的和平，是道德意义上的一种存在主义的任务。然而，关于和平的哲学争论却不得不竭力维持一种“壁花”式的存在；它很少被虑及，更别说以一种与其重要性相称的方式被对待。西方思想中，著名的哲学家们创作了丰富的的关于和平的文献~~（劳默尔 1953年；扬森 1975年；Chaunu 1993；赫费 2002a，第二章）~~。但在经典的哲学文本当中，没有一个在标题上出现“和平”一词的。  只有两位著名的西方思想家给予了“和平”比仅仅作为边缘性哲学更多的对待。在基督教神学的曙光下，奥古斯丁在《上帝之城》十九卷中发展了几百年来最重要的和平理论。但他将道德-宗教问题置于最显著的位置。他关注的焦点是内心的和平，尤其是与上帝的和平，以及宇宙的和平。在权利和法律范围内的尘世的和平被归为是一种不完美的影像。大概十四世纪以后，康德从启蒙哲学的顶峰推进了和平的第二个开创性理论。他成功调和了两条原来互不相关的最重要的思想路线：一条是继承自柏拉图和亚里士多德的，关于权利和国家的思思想；另一条则是斯多葛学派的世界主义思想。然而，康德拒绝了后者的那种非政治性。他熟悉国家的权利，正如它曾在早期现代性中被讨论。康德也不是忽视奥古斯汀关于永久和平的理念，但是他不再将其留于彼岸世界，转而将它诠释为一种现世的任务，或者更确切地说，一种与其道德观念相一致的权利的任务。这里有康德的第一个伟大创新：和平不再只是神学概念，而变成了哲学的一个基本概念，并且它关注的中心在于法律和政治哲学。  康德将“永久”一词理解为使和平无条件或无限制的一种现世特性。康德在绝对和平这种概念的基础上，发展了一种对国际政治而言具有重要意义的理想：一种建立在全球法律秩序上的真正的全球和平秩序的理想。  尽管和平的存在主义意义和康德的卓越成就，令人惊讶的是，和平这一概念仅在康德哲学中才第一次拥有了基本概念的地位。他致力于追求和平的法律和政治哲学，在最初的几年里引起了激烈的讨论。但是，在德国唯心主义时期及其后，它就被放在一边了。  在和平理论中，康德把现代的和平契约作为一种方法论的指导。通过它们的模式，康德提出一组共识，它由六个临时条款，三个确定条款，两条附论，以及由两部分组成的附录构成。在1769年的第二版中甚至包含了一条秘密条款，它呈现了对所有秘密的戒律要求的巧妙讽刺。  整体来看，论文总共涵盖了七个广泛和相对独立的问题：（1）尽管康德一般对待战争的态度是轻蔑的，但康德努力推动战争的改革，只要战争在现实中仍然存在。战争不应该被“驯服”，因为除了被用于自我防卫外，它是绝对不合法的；但战场中的协定不应该将和平作为一种可能的最终目的排除在外。为了和平而改变战争的这种想法--或者说战争改革对确保和平有着职能作用--这在康德以前几乎没有任何先兆。进行这种改革的六条初步规定（“临时条款”），都是针对政治领导人的：国家元首、政府官员或国会。它们指出了，为了实现和平这一目的，一方面，必须及时制止对权利的侵害（“严格的禁律”）；另一方面，“包含权限，但不是对权利规则构成例外，而是将这些法律的生效时间推后，但又不失去对于其目的的见解。”（《论永久和平》 VIII 347）这种“授权的推迟”标志着一种折中的理论和批评那草率的政策的契机，但遗憾的是，并没有进一步的努力能将这样一种理论发展至今。  除了一种无条件的和平的基本要求（第一条临时条款），至少有三条更进一步的关于战争改革的规则，在今天仍然受到关注。首先，常备军应当及时地予以完全废除；军备竞赛应当被裁军原则所替代（第三条临时条款）。其次，任何国家都不应用武力去干涉另一个国家的宪政和政府，因为后者有权自行完成改革（第五条临时条款：干预的禁止）。最后，应当禁止所有“必然使得未来和平中的相互信任成为不可能” （第六条临时条款）的那些敌对行为，因为永久和平只有在相互信任的前提才是可能的。  （2）最终规则或“确定条款”包含着康德和平理论的核心内容：道德与和平的先验条件。康德没有立刻转向政治领导人，而是转向对“社会制度”、法律和国家秩序的思考。他也间接指向那些应该对它们负责的人：政府以及授予他们权力的国民。  康德起草了一种从法律-道德方面综合而来的公权理论：（2.1）第一条法律-政治条款讨论了个人与群体之间的关系，（2.2）第二条条款讨论的是国家权利所涉及的国家之间的关系，而（2.3）第三条关于全球法的条款阐明个人和团体与其他国家的关系，以及国家之间的关系——不同于2.2——国与国之间互不相欠。因此，第一条确定条款包含了康德的第二个关于和平伦理学的主要创新。他将和平的理念与共和政体联系起来，后者是当时在美国和法国首次建立起来的一种政治新事物。然而，康德在第一批判中已经针对柏拉图的理想国：《纯粹理性批判》第二版372ff。因此康德对共和的反思并不仅仅受于他所处的时代的政治发展的影响，也包含着长久以来的政治哲学传统。第二、第三条确定条款共同构成了康德的第三个创新，这种关于共和的世界主义观点；它的和平，一方面不同于柏拉图的思想，另一方面又不同于法国和美国的政治创新。  顺便提一下，康德在发表《论永久和平》的十一年前，就已经在《世界公民意图中的通史理念》中提出过“世界主义”的这一说法了。然而，它所起草的公权理论，只有两个部分。它处理与国家权利（对“最大的自由”的义务，可以“与他人的自由共存”，《理念》VIII 2 2）相一致的公民社会和属于国家权利（《理念》VIII 24-26）的人民的联盟，但是略去了世界性的权利。  世界的和平共同体，在中级目的的要求不仅仅是结束某一场战争，而是“永久地结束所有战争”（《论永久和平》VIII 356）。在和平的这种国内安全模式下，一个根据其积极观念的世界共和国是必要的（VIII 357），但它又不同于一个由所有国家联合成的单一国家的“普遍的君主制”。在他的总是会拓展为一种“消极的备选项”，或者次优选项的人民的联盟中；康德认为，否则国家就不会在主权上让步。  世界法中公权的最终到来和高潮并没有取代“国家”的公民法，而只是补充了它。康德坚持称，这是一种互补的，而非排他性的世界主义。由于这削弱了了黑格尔的《法哲学原理》（§209，注释）中的批判主义，人们可能会思考，为什么更年轻的黑格尔在当时没有一个更具鉴别能力的观点。即便是黑格尔对康德和平理论的直接的批判（§§330-340, esp. §333），也缺乏一种哲学和政治学的敏锐性。  国家的权利是基于对国与国间有责任关系的认识的，而国际法是关于国与国间无责任关系的，即在广义的“商业”下的交易： 自愿的，不完全是经济交换的。但是，国际法关注的不是它们间的积极关系，而是具有相互责任关系的一小部分，因为它们，就像一般情况下的权利那样，是与武力使用的授权联系起来那样。康德的国际法，即包含授权提供一种不会引起敌意的商业协定。这样一种权利（不同于慈善）是在互惠下实现的。权利的合法基础是康德的财产理论下的一个原则。因为，“所有国家最初联合成一种土地的共同体，而不是作为财物的合法的共同体（*communio*）...或者它其中的财产的共同体”，但他们都有一种先天的主权：“为与任何其他国家进行贸易”（MM §62）授权。  康德在这里强调了一种关于合作的限制性权利：商人提供他们的商品，正如研究人员提供他们的知识，甚至如传教士普及他们的教义——但在这种交易中，任何合作伙伴都不会施暴。只要这种提议被用于别的国家，推动这种提议的人就只拥有访问权，而没有作为东道主的权利。这种情况不管个人、团体、企业、整个民族或国家是否有分歧，经济、文化、旅游或政治利益是否受到追捧。在所有情况下，人们都可以敲别人家的门，但却没有进入的权利。正如[培根的《新亚特兰蒂斯](http://www.baidu.com/link?url=L5vWmFmZgew33rAPjXc2CNEpaFZy03vu9wJXlrCIP0yuKxkLmPuh3EaOSuNNavw6)》说的，一个共同体可能既对外国人慷慨相待，又对移民实施禁令。此外，它不仅可以禁止某种类型的商品和服务，也可以禁止所有贸易。试图建立“封闭的商业国家”的经济专制，正如卢梭（《科西嘉宪法草案》，1764年）以及后来的费希特（1800年）和弗里德里希•李斯特（《政治经济学的国民体系》，1840年）提出的，仅仅是用作一种从法律-道德视角的保护国内经济免于不希望出现的竞争的海关税系统。  不管合作是否成功，双方都应当受到保护。谋杀、奴役或外来者的盗窃，和与之相反的臣服、剥削或当地人的压迫都是不允许的。康德对当时殖民政治的严酷清算是与政治有关的。根据康德的评判标准，几乎所有基于现代的殖民统治，从美洲南部、中部和北部到非洲和澳洲，都是这种不公正的明显的例子，因为“他们视原住民为无物。”（《论永久和平》VIII 358）  康德的关于合作的有限权利不仅仅包括消极的对不公正殖民的禁止上，而且在积极方面，它们也不限于国际私人权利，尤其是商业贸易的权利。由于合作的权利包括科研、文化和旅游，它们实际上可看作是一种当今这个全球化的时代的特别关注的要求。所有人都有一种温和的在广泛的共同体之内的合作权利，即普遍通的访客权利，但不是作为东道主的权利。然而这并不是说，他们必须放弃个人和集体的特殊性。因此，康德在这里已经把普遍合作和个体差异的权利结合起来了。  （4）根据康德在第一条确定条款中的政治-社会学主张，推动建立一个全球和平联盟主要动机有两个：消极层面的对战争的恐惧体验和积极层面的共和主义。共和国 —— 近似于宪政民主或民主法制的国家*[Rechtsstaaten]*，但并不是所有权力公然分开的国家就少有发动侵略战争倾向。根据效仿的原则，在一个国家建立的共和宪政会很快被另一个国家所借鉴。康德没有将民主国家中和平的倾向追溯到公民的高度的道德敏感性。他清楚地表明，他只是呼吁民主国家能让他们的公民有机会去追求他们的自身利益（关于这一点的批评，见第10章）。  第一条附论（“关于永久和平的保证”）用自然目的论补充了道德和平理论。通过利用在他的历史哲学中的，尤其是在《理念》和《判断力批判》中的理念，康德描绘了这样一个社会历史：由自然本性唯一决定的人类，不仅仅通过人类之间的不和谐，也通过作为最终目的的和平（推动社会历史的发展）。他在这里一方面在社会制度和它们的“自然必然性”发展的层面转向了法律和国家秩序，另一方面，又转向了政治家和政治理论家；因为他们不能再用现实的不可行作为理由来为自己对全球和平秩序问题的漠不关心开脱了。  赫拉克利特在他的一些著名箴言中称战争（在广义上包括矛盾和冲突）是万物，即，一切自然物，甚至它的类人的部分，之母 (Diels and Kranz, Fragment 2 2B80)。  康德将他的范围缩小到人类这一领域。他认为，冲突是整个人类文化发展的重要因素（《观念》，7，命题：敌对；第九章）。冲突驱使人们在“最荒芜之地”（《论永久和平》VIII 363）栖居，发展文化（参见CJ §83, V 388ff），甚至为道德目的服务，因为它促进为了各自的共同体的利他主义，特别地也促进从自然的国家到法治和文明的国家的转变：战争迫使人们“进入一种更符合或更不符合法律的关系中”（《论永久和平》VIII 363）。  战争在这里表现为一种（人类）本性地狡黠，作为最终废除战争的手段。但即使战争被废除，也不意味着我们应该担心社会熵，即全球社会的缓慢停滞；因为和平并不会消解不同语言、宗教或忏悔间的竞争和多样性，也不会削弱商业竞争。全球法治和文明国家并不单独地对全球和平负责。除了政治的关系，还有社会，以及最重要的经济的关系。但是谁也没有权利随意干涉这些关系——它们的建立是全凭自愿的。根据康德的第二篇关于全球社会发展的社会经济学论文，促使进入这些关系的动力叫做“商业精神”。“由于金钱的权力可能是所有从属于国家的权力（手段）中最为可靠的”（《论永久和平》VIII 368），全球化的驱动力在于“商业精神”或者我们可以推论，任何合作的动力都在于它能够带来的好处。然而，这种商业精神，仅仅带来了世界社会，而不是人们的联盟或世界的共和。  因此，在关于和平的论文中，以明确的先后顺序汇聚了确保和平的四个方面：（a）主要目标是建立一个人民的联盟或世界的共和国（见下文第十一章）。（b）单一国家的共和体制或民主宪政有助于建立起人民的联盟。这种民主化的原则（在一个民主法制国家的意义上）总是（c）消极地受到“所有战争带来的困难”（《和平》VIII 350）而又（d）积极地被商业精神所促进，因为它“不能与战争共存”又“迟早会对每一个的国家有影响”（VIII 368）。“伟大的自然如同艺术家般”利用人类间的天然不和，来“让和谐违反他们的意志出现”（VIII 360）。人类从单一的国家聚到一起，毫无疑问是带着自私的目的，继而，这些国家首次交战。但随后，他们又学着彼此和平共处，因为他们都对商业和繁荣很感兴趣。  上述的四个方面的相互作用不仅仅保证了所有战争都是无限制或无保留地不合法的。由于商业精神促进了繁荣，消极意义的和平或战争的缺席，最终带来了积极意义的和平。这样一种和平，通常是不同文化间的共识——从希腊的*eirene*到希伯来的*shalom*和罗马的*pax*，直到日耳曼的*frid*。  2.“高贵的人”  （6）在第二条附论中，康德致力于一种理论-实践探讨，来呈现哲学与政治力量之间的部分关系。在“永久和平的秘密条款”这一标题下，他主张废除所有的秘密而鼓励人们对“关于发动战争的普遍准则和和平的建立”进行自由和公开讨论。就国际政治实践而言，这一主张是革命性的，正如在《纯粹理性批判》中的认识论和客体理论所实现的哥白尼革命。康德把秘密外交这样一种当时并未得到规定的实践，置于公开性原则之下。这一原则对国家和国际权力施行了对公开性的普遍要求，或者正如在《纯粹理性批判》中所提出的‘一切’都要服从于‘自由和公开检验’（《纯粹理性批判》第一版 第XI页，脚注）。政府以及国家权力的每一条准则都依据其内在的合法性而被检验。一个原则，如果不能通过这种考察且由于它只能在秘密条款下取得成功，那么它就是被道德律所禁止的。  （7）在关于‘道德律和政治原则’ 的两部分的附论中，这种持续的理论-实践探讨，最终契合于在序言中所提出的这一主题：梦想美好世界的哲学家与以尘世智慧为傲的政治家之间的争论（《永久和平论》 第八卷 第343页）。虽然某种程度来说，是康德发现的这种对立，但是他同时也架通了哲学与政治学之间的鸿沟.  在第二条附论中已经探讨了在这方面的和平的建立，康德在这里对柏拉图的哲学王原则进行了回应。根据柏拉图的观点，要么哲学家成为国王，要么那些目前在位的王们应该致力于虔诚而彻底的哲学学习，否则城邦将永无止境地损毁下去。康德对柏拉图的回应的核心在于区分。他同时证实了柏拉图促进理性的实现的意图和他的（道德）理论与（现实）实践兼容的设想（参见康德的《论俗谚》和《系科之争》）。但是它也将定义道德原则的任务与它们的现实运用分离开来，并只把前者委托给哲学。这样一来，康德就使一种他大体赞成的劳动分工（参见《道德形而上学奠基》 第四卷 第388页f和《世界公民意图中的通史理念》 第八卷 第21页f。）适用于政治领域。政治活动并不在哲学家们的能力范围内，但是政治活动的原则却是；相反，政治原则的具体的实践和执行却是统治者的职责所在。  基于他们的道德角色的德行，哲学的因素绝对是先于所有其他要素的。然而，和平的理论原则并不对政治的现实化提供指导，而是依赖于某种‘看法’的力量；据说康德遗漏了这种‘看法’，而此处又显现出来进行说明（参见第三章）。政治-道德的审慎需要‘作为有利条件出现’的看法，而是‘使政治审慎的原则以这样一种方式，使它们能够与道德原则共存’。康德通过道德的政治家与政治的到的家之间的鲜明对比来表明这一观点，其中政治的道德家是那种‘假称道德以合于其政治家的利益的人’，康德认为这种情况下道德就服从了个人的私利，这是‘审慎的扭曲的不道德学说’。  事实上，在康德看来，哲学家有给出忠告的职（《和平》VIII 368f；参见 《科系之争》, 第一部分, 4: VII 35），这使人想起柏拉图式的哲学王的明智建议。但是与柏拉图不同，在康德这里哲学家们的谏言并不扩展到政治统治的整个领域，而仅仅限于一个小的但却是基础性的部分。这里有康德关于政治与哲学之间的劳动分工的第一个认识论观点：它们必须被分开，因为哲学家的认知能力并不延伸到具体的政治问题上。哲学并不关注现实的情况，也不培养哪些属于这种能力的经验和‘看法’，但是它却要区分什么是可行的与什么是有效的。出于这种原因，康德并不推荐雇佣哲学家作为政治顾问，但是他要人们密切注意这一点“哲学家的原则是一种只有在它之下公共和平才有可能实现的条件”（《和平》 VIII 368）。作为人类共同体的法律-道德原则，与政治正义的原则是相一致的。因此，康德对于哲学王的原则的观点就相当于政治学中关于正义的基本原则的许诺。  在柏拉图看来，对善的‘回忆’是内在于关于善的理念的知识的（《理想国》 X 618c-d）；这样的回忆是行为导向的，而且一切行为都由对善的认识所指引。康德的第二个观点呈现在腐败性上，他瞄准了principium executionis和principium diudicationis之间的一种假定的一致。即使哲学家在谏言上具有无限的能力，他们仍然要被拒绝于政治统治，因为否则的话，他们依据理性进行自由判断这一实际能力就会腐败。  柏拉图会否认这种反对意见，在他的观点里，哲学王的理性是不朽的，因为这种它是灵魂的主宰（《理想国》 VI 484aff.）。柏拉图主义的哲学家有一种明显的特征，他们实际上把自己视为永远朝向善和正义。他们并不为了某种特殊的利益，也不受限于这些利益；而且他们藐视一切名望和权力(《理想国》 I 347d, VI 499b-c, VII 521b, VIII 539e)。对此，康德会回应称，一种绝对可靠的理性的统治，或者说，一种完全消除了权力而不是仅仅抑制权力的统治，对于有限的理性存在者尤其是人类来讲，只是可设想的而非可实现的。他在这里明显受到卢梭的影响，卢梭在其《社会契约论》(第二章, 7)中谈到了一种更高级的理性，这种理性可以理解人类所有的激情，但它自身却不具有任何激情。这样的理性存在于诸神之中。  因此，康德回应柏拉图的观点在本质上基本是人类学的，而且扩展到了作为人类学的组成部分的道德哲学上；虽然康德并未把道德哲学归于人类学：严格意义上的好的统治者，即不腐败的统治者并不存在，即使柏拉图认为他们有免于腐败这种危险的能力；正如个人财产以及人们对支持自己家庭的幸福的偏爱。即使在妇女团体、儿童团体或者合作的团体中，人也依旧是“由弯曲的木材” (《世界公民意图中的通史理念》 VIII23; 《单纯理性限度内宗教》 VI 100)制成的，因此他“如果没有人限制着他，他就经常会误用他的自由” (《观念》 ibid.)。同理，如果哲学家被赋予权力，他会处于丧失其独立理智的危险之中。柏拉图同样也想过通过权力来反对腐败(《理想国》 VI 491 b-e)，但哲学王统治的情况并不包括在内。他关于哲学家的理想概念解释了他为什么不对哲学家的统治加上任何的限制。只在《法律篇》中，他才承认法治的必要性；因为所有人都具有腐败的可能性(IX 874e-875d; cf. Ill 631cff, IV 713c-714a)。  在某种更深远的意义上，康德是部分同意柏拉图的。在柏拉图的《理想国》中只有少数人适于从事哲学活动；而在康德看来，“普遍的…人类理性”足以进行哲学反思(《和平》 VIII 369)。因此，一种民主理性取代了柏拉图的精神贵族（由数学和辩证法的后天教化获得）。普通的人类理性肯定不能不经教化就满足民主的要求。但是这并不能使康德同意理智的贵族；哲学家并不拥有任何特殊的能力或者洞察力，因而就不拥有任何特权。没有官职和一种特权的洞察，哲学家不过是“每个人都具有的普遍理性本身” (《纯粹理性批判》, "先验方法论" 第一章, 第二部分: B 780) 的拥护者。和平理论还强调了“普遍的…人类理性” (VIII 369)的重要性。为了确保每个人都被倾听，普遍的言论自由在《论永久和平》的第二条附论中是作为强制执行的。柏拉图强调哲学圈子的重要性（至高的，不成文的学说只对于这个开创者的封闭圈子是可以通达的）；而康德坚持公众性原则，甚至赋予它一种先验的地位（《和平》 VIII 381）。  那些认可这种改革并且听从道德立法原则的人被授予一个荣誉头衔，这个头衔就很好地表达了哲学王原则的民主化。康德把这些人称为“高贵的人”（《和平》 VIII 369），因为他们把人类的共同体置于正义并把正义置于道德之下。于是，康德的‘美德学说’就断言一个具有真实的，理智的的德性的人不仅仅是‘自由的’，‘健康的’和‘丰富的’，而且就是所谓的‘王’。在康德看来，‘王’就是真正道德的人，这种人既可以是自然人（人类），也可以是社会的人（人民）。  在和平理论中，‘高贵的人’取代了柏拉图的哲学王——杰出的个体被受国家事务影响和对国家事物负责的那些人的整体所取代。毫无疑问，只有自觉服从道德立法要求的人才会被被授予‘高贵的人’这样一个荣誉头衔。康德并不是在为随便什么民主辩护，而是这样一种服从道德立法的民主，满足这一条件的民主才是一种‘高贵的民主’。如果要让这一民主合法化，那么一定要依据‘平等法则’(《和平》 VIII 369)来统领自身，并且确保“无人能够在不依据法律的情况下正当地约束别人的自由，而在这种法律下他自己转而也会被其他人以同样的方式束缚” (first definitive article, VIII 350)。  一个人是高贵的，当每个公民都平等地作为一个‘王’；但是不是在那种不被法律约束的绝对的统治者意义上的王。公民并不需要成为一个真正道德的人。他作为立法者（通过代表而直接或间接立法）尽其最大的努力确保法律不与道德立法相冲突，并且作为‘臣民’来遵守这些法律，这便已经足够了。这些条件是道德立法的要求。因此，‘高贵的人’并不主要通过其特殊的先进教育来区分（正如柏拉图的哲学王通过对辩证法和数学的崇敬），而是通过他们的正义，这种正义柏拉图也认为是具有根本地决定性的（虽然他对正义有不同的定义）。  早在和平理论之前，康德就设计好了他的第四了革新，即对于哲学王原则的民主化解释。在《纯粹理性批判》康德恢复柏拉图理念的概念那一段中，康德已经把“一个君王永远不能统治好除非他参与到理念中去（一个君王只有在充分把握了理念后才能成为一个好的统治者）”这样一种对个人要求转变为一种剥除了所有个人道德的标准：“宪法依法保证最伟大的人类自由，并允许每个人的自由与其他人的自由共存”，是一个“必要的理念，它构成了所有法律的基础（《纯粹理性批判》B 373）”。因此，在《纯粹理性批判》中公正的国王就已经被那现在被我们视为高贵的人的公正的体制所取代。  3.高贵的人类  人类追求和平的历史同人类自身一样古老，所以难怪康德的和平理论会备受瞩目且被视为先驱。  使康德如此特殊的并不是他作品中的和平理念，而是这一理念的独特轮廓。这包含有康德对于前人的所提出的和平蓝图的创新，这在之前就已经部分地提到：康德并不追求任何政治利益。进而，他发展了一种纯粹的哲学观点；他既不同于伊拉斯缪斯和弗兰克对《新约圣经》的呼吁，也不同于奥古斯汀将和平置于来世的观点。康德在任何地方都没有遮蔽宗教动机；在其宗教理论中，和平理念明确被描述为“哲学的”而不是“神学的”千禧年说（末日降临时）的和平（VI 34）。更进一步，康德拒绝一切政治狂热，并且认可冲突作为政治领域的基本要素。和平既不会存在于虚伪的爱与友善摇摆不定的地方，也不存在于远离争端的自由的永恒梦幻岛；而是在那按照道德法原则处理争端的地方。这有一个明确的限制。康德所讨论的和平仅仅是一种保护生命和自由的法律任务。  康德轻松地移除了其他诸多限制。人类至今所知道的和平不过是暴力和战争汪洋中的一个小岛：这种和平同时受到时间和空间的限制。在有家庭和平乃至城堡和平的地方，就缺少国家和平；在国家和平主导的地方，没有一种和平能越过国家的界限；即使从国际的视野来看，超越所有国家和文化的“世界范围的”和平也是不可思议的。  康德否认所有这些限制，并转而论证了权利与和平的道德普遍主义的正确性，即一种全球化的，在时间和空间上都普遍的和平。康德的和平理论成为最有声望的和平蓝图并非出于偶然。它的四个创新，以及尤其是把当时作为政治革新的共和政体与一种真正的全球化视野连接起来的观点，唤起了巨大的政治勇气的蓝图。如果人类意识到建立一种不仅仅在国内而且在国家间的出于道德原则的法律秩序，那么人类就能作为整体达到高贵者的地位。  康德的和平理论不仅仅致力于政治思想。它也包含一种社会乌托邦，或者说是一种（现实的）美好愿景；这种愿景至今还因为两个原因而仍然具有吸引力。第一，它唤醒了潜在的乌托邦能量并且克服了希望和愿景的那种不可挽回的丧失，这中丧失夺去了生命所有的壮丽并让整个世界都变的贫瘠。“一般人类，或者特别是国家领袖，...永远不会厌倦战争” （《和平》VII 343）这种经验之谈受到为道德立法的理性的质问，它“传达了对于作为获取重要权利的手段的战争的彻底谴责” (VIII 356)。  这一理论具有吸引力还因为它减轻了“永久和平不可能实现这种观念”所带来的恐惧。康德无疑知觉到了这种危险并因此提及“哲学家是做着美梦的人” （《和平》 VIII 343）以及这种目标成为 或者一种幻想的可能性（VIII 368）。在和平理论中，康德并没有沉浸于人类的善或者君主的明智这样的有希望的思想所带来的幻像之中。反而，他清楚地表明永久和平并不是“一种空想”(VIII 372)和“无意义的理念” (VIII 386)。即使那些认为康德的论据并不可靠的人也无法否认在康德哲学的条件下，实现和平的机会获得了相当大的增加。  服从现实化的第一个条件在于放弃一个广泛的乌托邦的概念。与奥古斯汀和柏拉图城邦发展的第一个阶段(《理想国》 II 369b-3 72c)相反，康德不为一种广泛的和平理想辩护。在柏拉图的初级城邦中，人类不仅与他人而且与神乃至与自然都能和平相处（cf.赫费 1997, chap. 4）。康德并未过多地考虑和平的这些维度。柏拉图把社会和平与内部或者个人的和平结合在一起，而康德把和平置于正义的领域，在这里个人态度是无关紧要的。以下维度是在康德的和平概念之外的：（1）人与自身的和平，即内部的或个人的和平；（2）和平在宗教领域的扩展或深化，即在上帝之中或与上帝的和平；（3）在自然之中和与自然的和平，即生态和平；（4）自奥古斯汀以来就已经非常重要的宇宙的和平，其中所有事物都在世界秩序的等级结构（《上帝之城》 XIX 12f.）中拥有自己的位置；（5）只有社会和平被留作考察对象。  即使这一维度也要用一种温和的方式来理解。在德语中，“Friede” （和平）与“自由”[frei],“出嫁或吸引”[freien],以及“朋友”[Freund]有关。德语语系的衍生词根*pri*（去爱或去关心），“原指一种爱和关心的状态，在相互帮助和支持方面比情感依附和爱慕有更多的强调” (Janssen，1975，543)。Friede的意思后来被狭隘地定在（6）一种消极的社会和平，而且仅仅意指这种（一般受时间限制和空间限制）对于暴力的抑制。康德的（7）政治的和更确切地法律的和平概念把前四种维度抛开一边，在广泛的社会概念和它的一种极端缩写形式之间加入了某种东西：一方面，暴力不管任何时间限制或者地域限制而受到抑制；另一方面，主动帮助仅仅作为限制于保卫权利的单一任务被加入进来。在和平理论的全部三个限定性条款中，一种消极的和平概念占据主导：法定的安全。  服从于和平的现实化的第二个方面在于这样的正义概念：正如前面所提到的，康德宣布放弃那种停止所有争端的田园牧歌愿景。“非社会性社交”在第一条附论中被确认为一个重要的人类学事实。尽管诸如“对荣誉，权力和财富的渴求”这些激情并不在它们自身内受到敬仰，它们却拒斥人类的“懒惰倾向”并刺激人迈开从野蛮到文明的第一步("Idea," Fourth-Proposition)。因此，康德不仅允许争端而且欢迎它们；但是他谴责以武力来解决争端的方式。  作为服从于现实化的第三个方面，在第一条附论中介绍了“伟大的艺术家本性”，它利用人类间天然的不和谐，来 “使和谐出现...尽管违背他们的意愿” (*Peace* VIII 360)：一个国家中的人是由确定的自私动机联合起来的，他们起初会发动战争互相反对，但随后，特别是由于商业利益，他们学会了和平相处。  服从于现实化的第四个方面是为了反对先前的乌托邦愿景，如托马斯·莫尔的《乌托邦》以及在十六世纪和十七世纪大量涌现的模仿这一样本的政治小说。由于这些愿景在社会和政治设想中没有任何统治，他们正确地被称为“在想象中航行”或虚幻的航行。康德强烈反对他们这样的观点，他明确坚持“美梦”是“哲学家”的梦想，也就是说，确切地说是那些其职业要求他们运用概念和论证的人的梦想。在康德这里，理性而非想象力走得更远。它把永久和平提升到一种“最接近”合法的道德责任(*Peace* VIII 356, 1. 4; cf. 362, 1. 9; 364/9; 378, 11. 19-22)的地位。不属于自我防卫的战争（345）都要被彻底地谴责为“为了重要权利的手段”（356）。这种和平的定言命令建立了一种道德方面的永久和平。“如果你想要和平，做好战争准备” [Si vis pacem, para bellum]，这是个被大多数国家坚信的格言，它源于罗马军事理论家维特修斯（公元4世纪）。 康德用这一原则来从根本上反对这一观点：如果你想要和平，做好（政治）正义准备[Si vis pacem, para iustitiam]。用他自己的话来说：“把纯粹实践理性的王国和它的正义放在首位，那么你的末日（永恒和平的赐福）将会亲自找上你” (*Peace* VIII 378)。 |