**德国古典哲学第一次讲座讲稿翻译文本**

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| Precisely at the pinnacle of the European Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant applied a central theme of his age, critique, to two other central themes of the epoch, reason and freedom. In so doing, he subjected the Enlightenment to a radical self-criticism. By shedding light on the Enlightenment (eine Auflkärung über Aufklärung), he undertook what to this day is a paradigmatic self-enlightenment. At the foundation are his famous questions: 1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope?    1.1. Cosmopolitanism  Cosmopolitanism immediately lends itself to the connection of philosophy with politics. According to today’s perception, someone is able to claim the honorary title of “cosmopolite” or “world citizen” who is able to cross national, and in addition ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and perhaps even religious boundaries. In this sense, we today employ the term cosmopolitan in a political sense. However, since its origins philosophy has understood the term in a far broader sense. The reason is obvious because the cognitive foundation for philosophy, wherever it is found and is developed, constitutes no ethnically bound (for example, Eurocentric) capacity. Its driving force as well as medium is that general, human reason that crosses all political borders.  This reason is thoroughly connected with experience. Even for Kant, the great advocate of the synthetic a priori, philosophy is by no means concerned exclusively with some pre-empirical thinking. The experience to which philosophy appeals is concerned with universal, human experience. Even when philosophy defends singular rights (for example, the right of small social units), in doing so it employs arguments that are universal in order to be convincing.  Although in essence philosophy transgresses all particular boundaries, none of its famous representatives is comprehensively cosmopolitan. The one and only standard-bearer exception is Kant. His unique status begins with the fact that all Eurocentric arrogance is absent in his work. To the extent that the philosopher is concerned with Europe whatsoever, he is interested above all for internal differences – in the lecture Physical Geography, he is interested in internal,geographical differences, and in the Anthropology (VII 316 f.), he is interested in differences of mentality. In both cases, he is concerned with Europe’s richness of variety rather than having a concern for what it uniquely holds in common and would allow the continent to place itself at the center of the world (i.e., to think Eurocentrically and to develop this feeling of Eurocentrism in terms of a feeling of superiority).  Rather than Kant’s thought reflecting Eurocentric superiority, it’s extraordinariness is manifest by a universal cosmopolitanism by which, in contrast to the way it was frequently conceived in his epoch (see, for example, Cavallar 2005, Cheneval 2002, Coulmas 1990, and Kleingeld 1999) as limited to economics and on occasion as extended to politics, he gives the term a far more comprehensive and fundamental as well as in many respects, new meaning. Cosmopolitanism is one of the driving forces that shape his entire philosophy, which, obviously, requires closer articulation.    1.2 The World Citizen from Königsberg  Kant’s cosmopolitanism encompasses his own intellectual biography even when at first glance it seems otherwise because our philosopher was born in Königsberg, was raised there under modest circumstances, attended school and the university there, and found his first employment as house tutor nearby. He returned to his home university as a lecturer, devoted four decades of teaching and research there, and died in Königsberg where he was buried in the tomb devoted to professors in the cathedral/university church.  His biography seems to be anything but that of a world citizen: He lived in the sticks, was entirely comfortable there, declined job offers to other universities (1769 to Erlangen; 1770 to Jena), and not once even travelled to the political and intellectual, German centers of his time (Berlin, Jena, and Weimar). Nevertheless, he is not only a world citizen, but he provides the very paradigm of what it means to be a world citizen – to be sure a provocative paradigm because he demonstrated how one can live and think as a cosmopolitan without being a nomad or a “global player.”    First of all, Kant is a world citizen in the sense of a citizen who already in his lifetime was known in many parts of the world. Today, some 200 years after his death, he fulfills absolutely the notion of what cosmopolitan influence means. Kant is literally studied worldwide: not only everywhere in Europe but also in many countries of Asia, in North and South America, and on the Pacific rim.  When it comes to this kind of cosmopolitan reputation, most citizens, even philosophy professors, lack Kant’s genius. However, every human being is capable of achieving the status of “small sibling” in terms of fame as well as his humanness – by means of integrity and a talented effort, everyone is capable of earning the respect of others as well as, in addition, a second respect that is just as important, self-respect.  It is often asserted that Kant led a pedantic life. In fact, he was entirely other than a dry, old bachelor. He filled only half of his day with lecturing and research. The other half he devoted to his social life that demonstrated him to be a world citizen in the public sense, namely, as an intelligent conversationalist who was eagerly sought out. However, Kant would not have become such an exceptional philosopher if he had only enjoyed the social life. In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, he developed a philosophy of “gregarious well-being” in “combination … with virtue” that encourages “true humanity” (VII 278).  In addition, Kant is a world citizen in a third sense capable of emulation by everyone. Thanks to a curiosity with respect to just about everything that can be found in life, in the world of politics, as well as science, Kant achieved for himself – so long as one brackets self-reflection – the status of what one could call a “the small sibling” of the Enlightenment (i.e., a broad knowledge of the world). This is the consequence of his insatiable reading: Kant read widely, much, quickly, and, nonetheless, intensively. For example, in order to study Rousseau’s pedagogical novel Émile in peace, he locked himself into his room for several days (see Borowski 1804, 94). In addition to philosophical writings, he held discussions with merchant friends and read travel reports. When it came to cutting-edge research in the natural sciences, he was so familiar with it that he held lectures on the science – he even contributed his own, respectable, research reports:  For example, he explained the North African and Monsoon winds and published a theory for Saturn’s rings as well as other galaxies. His reaction to the Lisbon earthquake was not Voltaire’s mocking of Leibniz’ defense of God. Rather, he undertook a purely rational explanation on the basis of subterranean transmitted explosions. Especially impressive is his purely scientific theory on the origin of the world. Under the motto, “Give me only matter, and I will build a world for you” (Universal Natural History and Theory of Heaven, I 229), he developed a rational explanation that was independent of any theological assumptions and that became known as the Kant-Laplace Theory, which obtained an important significance in astronomy.  Kant is in an even higher, fourth sense a world citizen; now in a truly philosophical sense. When it comes to every important building block of culture: (1) knowledge, (2) morality, (3) the unity of both the natural world and morality (i.e., freedom), (4) pedagogy, (5) sensus communis, including art, (6) self-evidently civic law, and not least (7) history, that is, for no less than seven regions of experience, he developed a cosmopolitan philosophy. This is the case not only with respect to Kant’s own “subjective” judgment but also “objectively” according to the professional criteria of what makes for a cosmopolitan thinker. In addition, the unity of the seven cosmopolitan dimensions has its own cosmopolitan character.  In order to be considered a true cosmopolitan today, though, a thinker must satisfy two conditions. On the one hand, although he may be regional in a historical sense (in the case of Kant, he had above all western roots), that is, in order to be truly cosmopolitan, one must free oneself from regional roots. On the other hand, a cosmopolitan cannot erase all cultural differences but must, on the contrary, hold himself open to differences. A cosmopolitan philosophy combines, therefore – first criterion, intercultural applicability with a recognition of cultural differences. To be sure, the emphasis must be placed on the first ingredient: Philosophy is cosmopolitan, namely worthy of globalization, but not without political institutions.  With respect to the moment that still hasn’t been addressed, politics, Kant has a moral concept. Initially, these are distinguished – second criterion – by means of three elements that are not indebted to politics in a material sense so that they are found already in the Critique of Pure Reason: (1) The challenge of a moral politics consists in a natural condition – that of the character of a state of war (Critique of Pure Reason, B 779 f.); (2) its moral conquest occurs by means of universalizable, fundamental principles that constitute a nation of laws (for Kant a republic); (3) whose goal consists in unconditional, in this sense eternal peace, that in addition qualifies in its moral character to be characterized as a “blessing” (Perpetual Peace, VIII 378). Kant presupposes that which can be denoted as the highest good: a congruence between (civic law) mores and (eudaimonistic) well-being.  A philosophy is in terms of its content, that is, with respect to its expressions, cosmopolitan when it combines its intercultural applicability with an openness to disparate cultures. It is in its procedures (i.e., methodically) cosmopolitan when it adheres to the named three formal elements of a moral politics. Finally, it is – third criterion – in a motivational sense cosmopolitan when it serves the common wellbeing of humanity in its entirety.  Because Kant’s philosophy, which yet needs to be demonstrated, adheres to all three criteria and because it is, additionally, not bound by the theme of civic law and politics, it contains a universal cosmopolitanism. Politics, though, doesn’t even constitute its center. Far more, it is its moral driving force that is the reason that not merely the individual elements but also their unity, in fact Kant’s entire thought from the foundation upward, is cosmopolitan.    1.3 An Epistemic World Republic  Not all aspects of Kant’s cosmopolitanism are apparent from the beginning. When it comes to his philosophical development, he begins with knowledge and then combines it with the second driving force, the judicative critique. When we take a look at Kant’s intellectual biography, we discover the first, epistemic cosmopolitanism very early. Already in his first publication, later in A new Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition, one reads about conflict as well as judicative, dispute settlement. However, long before his first publication, on New Year’s 1765, Kant describes in a letter the philosophical world of his day by means of the three formal elements of moral politics (Letters, X 53; Nr. 32). He emphasizes “the destructive disunity among purported philosophers,” concludes that “there is no common standard of measurement,” and demands as therapy an “effort to become unified” (see Announcement of the Program of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765-1766, II 308). In this respect, he proposed the cosmopolitan framework for a Critique of Pure Reason because all three elements of a moral politics are essential for its method.  The first Critique is cosmopolitan also in its content. Its fundamental principles, namely, are valid (because they are synthetically a priori) as generally, culturally and historically, independent. As it is stated in the “Architectonic of Pure Reason,” they (i.e., these fundamental principles) bring about that scientifically, common essence (Critique of Pure Reason, B 879) that takes on the rank of an epistemic world republic because it consists of the commonwealth of all human reason. Because in this case, particularities of our species play no role (except that in order to understand, we require the perception of representations, consequently, the moment of receptivity), this world republic doesn’t create merely a global validity (valid for our globe) but a truly cosmopolitan, all-encompassing order for the entire universe. Further, as we have already said, the benefit of epistemic freedom governs cosmopolitanism so that a kind of epistemic, highest good is achieved, and the first Critique has in fact as its motivation, a cosmopolitan character.  Finally, one also finds a cosmopolitan moment in that, when it comes to the three existentially important themes (God, freedom, and immortality), all epistemic citizens are on an equal footing so that the thinker by profession, the philosopher, possesses “no higher or broader insight” than “the great (for us, respected above all) masses” (Critique of Pure Reason, B xxxiii). What is expected is only what is held in common and what corresponds to the necessary openness to cultural differences: With its synthetic a priori, the epistemic world republic claims applicability to all epistemic worlds insofar as their knowledge requires the two epistemological roots in accordance with Kant’s theory – not only the root of understanding but also the root of receptive perception.  “International law” (ius gentium) meant at the beginning (in Rome) less the law that regulated the international relations among peoples (in the sense of states) but rather the law that constituted de facto recognition of all peoples. In this respect, Kant’s working out of the synthetic a priori elements constitutes the character of an epistemic people’s rights. Whether we like it or not: politically, we’re at first only nascent world citizens because a global lawful order is still being constructed. Epistemologically, though, we already live in an inter- and trans-culturally, shared world. Strikingly, what is epistemologically shared applies, according to Kant, to the sciences, mathematics, and physics. Because they’re grounded in universally valid elements (the same mathematics), quantum theory all the way to relativity theory are applicable for the research and teaching of physics everywhere.  However, for Kant what is important is not the universal recognition of the sciences but the a priori grounding of those sciences. It is because of those common a priori conditions that we are all epistemic world citizens (i.e., that we’re not only called to but, more importantly, capable of, a shared understanding of the world). In both respects (with respect to the challenge to and the capacity for a common understanding), everyone possesses the same faculty, that very reason that is in common to all people.  However, in the end Kant doesn’t make a case for a universalism that is limited to our species. In contrast to an epistemic, species egocentrism, he defends an allencompassing, universalism in the Critique of Pure Reason. Were it to be the case that in other parts of the universe there were rational beings, they would be subject to the same requirements. In this respect there is the potential (for example, were it to happen that [we had] contact with them by means of prime numbers over radio signals) that they would share with us a common, epistemic world-republic.  For such a world-republic, though, philosophy offers only a very limited framework that establishes the right to cultural difference in both the sciences and political communities: On the one hand, it is epistemically different cultures (i.e., the different special sciences) that fill in the blanks of the framework according to their respective methods and criteria. On the other hand, this strict self-limitation cautions restraint itself with respect to the adequacies of the special sciences that includes both political philosophy and politics. The common legal order that is required today in our age of globalization needs to be seen within a very formal framework. The filling in of the blanks to this framework according to the standards of its respective disciplines and experience (as well as with respect to the interests of one’s own culture) demands not merely philosophy but also politics. Yet, both philosophy and politics should profile the framework of this common legal order only to the extent that the consequent, single community retains a strong defense of differences.    1.4 Moral Cosmopolitanism  The epistemic peace established by the first Critique serves two “persons” – directly knowledge but ultimately morality. Because both constitute the foundation for legal philosophy and a philosophy of freedom, this sequence is necessary: first, a world citizenry is necessary and, then, (what is more important to Kant) a moral, world citizenry. Only under the assumption that these two steps have been taken can the third form (i.e., cosmopolitanism in a more narrow, political sense) be established.  Parenthetically: Kant’s own intellectual biography conformed to this sequence, which supports my thesis that biographical and genuine philosophical cosmopolitanism are combined by Kant: Beginning in the early 1760s, our philosopher was concerned with the fundamental principles of morality. At the same time (1762-1764), according to the witness of his personal library, he was studying legal philosophy. Beginning with the summer semester of 1767, he even held courses in legal philosophy (“natural law”). Nevertheless, within his critical philosophy, he concerned himself first with the epistemic cosmos and only afterward with morality and, finally, with the legal cosmos (at least, thematically).  However, according to the heretical reading represented by this present study, the Critique of Pure Reason is concerned not so much with knowledge as it is with morality. The canon of the first part of the “Transcendental Method” justifies why the development of the third part’s motivation to cosmopolitanism is elevated to a teleological cosmopolitanism: The “final goal” of reason (i.e., the ultimate goal beyond epistemic peace) is dependent upon three elements among which the theoretical interest is limited but, in contrast, the moral-practical interest is limitless (because it is concerned with the freedom of the will, immortality of the soul, and the existence of God (Critique of Pure Reason, B 826).  To be sure, the Critique of Pure Reason begins first, thematically, with epistemic cosmopolitanism and only afterwards turns to the thematically second, moral cosmopolitanism because the second requires the insights of the first (e.g., the notion of the synthetic a priori) to establish the difference between receptive intuition, spontaneous understanding, and genuine elements of reason; and not least, to establish the conflict between nature and freedom that is the third antinomy. The Critique of Practical Reason follows this thematic structure, as well.  The connecting link between the epistemic world and the moral world is the notion of a “final goal.” This notion enhances within epistemic cosmopolitanism its cosmo-political character. Without a final goal, the knowing subject is no cosmopolit; but only, as Kant would say, a cosmo-theoros [cosmo-observer]: Despite the Copernican Turn, he remains a mere observer of the cosmos to the extent that he stands over against it as a spectator. He becomes a member of the cosmos (actually, a fellow actor with the cosmos) only with the status as its final goal as a moral subject, namely, a morally accountable subject. It is precisely this status as a responsible person (and not first with the capacity to cross international borders or even with the establishment of global, political institutions) that elevates the person to the rank of cosmo-polit.  Kant’s concept and criterion for morality, the universally recognized, and from many moral philosophers embraced, categorical imperative, constitutes the principle of our second, moral cosmopolitanism. With this principle, Kant places methodological cosmopolitanism into practice. With its help, he contradicts radical, ethical relativism, which doubts the very possibility of a universally valid morality. Simultaneously, he pursues the formal, political accent of his cosmopolitanism. Even if not entirely so artfully as in the first Critique, he addresses the heretofore competing positions and overcomes what seems like their [conflictual,] natural state to the advantage of a [reconciled] moral, lawful state. The proper principle here, the moral law or categorical imperative, requires (as is well known) the universalization of principles, of maxims, which are valid for all persons in every culture – including those life-forms capable of action. Universalization is, then, similar to the synthetic a priori in the first Critique, truly cosmopolitan: its theme, morality, encompasses not only our species but the entire world. | 确切地说，在欧洲启蒙运动的顶点上，伊曼努尔·康德将他那个时代的一个中心主题，即批判，运用于那个年代的另外两个中心主题上，即理性与自由。如此一来，他使得启蒙运动屈从于一种激进的自我批判。为了阐明启蒙运动，康德承诺了，对于这个时代，什么是一个典范的自我启蒙。作为基石的是他的几个著名的问题：1.我能知道什么？2.我应该做什么？3.我可以希望什么？   * 1. 世界主义   世界主义直接地导入自身于哲学与政治的联系中。根据今天的观念，一个人能够声称“世界公民”这一荣誉称号的，他是能够跨越国别的，以及种族的，语言的，文化的，甚至也许还有宗教的诸种界限的人。在这种意义上，我们现在在一种政治意义上采用世界主义者这个术语。然而，从其源头看，哲学已经在一个远为宽广的意义上理解这个术语。原因是明显的，因为对哲学而言认知的基础，无论在何处被发现与发展，都由无种族界限的能力构成（例如欧洲中心论）。它的驱动力以及媒介是跨越所有政治边界的一般意义上的人类理性。  这个理性紧紧相连于经验。甚至于康德，这个先天综合的伟大提倡者，哲学绝不专门地关怀前经验的思索。哲学声称的经验是相关于普遍的人类经验。甚至当哲学捍卫一些独特的权利时（例如，小的社会共同体的权利），通过做这些事它采用那些普遍的观点来达到确信。  尽管在本质上哲学越轨于所有特殊的界限，它的著名的代表人物中没有一个可以被理解为世界主义者。唯一的例外兼旗手是康德。他的独特的地位始于这个事实：所有的欧洲中心论的傲慢在其作品中是缺席的。在哲学家无论如何都是关怀欧洲这个程度上，他首先感兴趣的都是内在的诸种区分——在《物理的地理学》这份讲稿中，他专心于内在的地理上的不同，在《人类学》中，他专心于精神状态的区分。在这两个实例中，他关注于欧洲多样性的丰富，而不是关心它在普遍中独握的东西并允许欧洲大陆将自身放入世界的中心。（换言之，欧洲中心论式地思考并根据一种优越感发展出这种欧洲中心主义的感觉。）  与其说康德的思想反思欧洲中心主义的优越感，不如说它的非凡性显明于一个普遍的世界主义，其相反于在他那个时代频繁被构想受限于经济学以及偶然扩展到政治学的方式，他给予这个术语一个远为广泛与基础的，以及在许多方面中的，崭新的意义。世界主义是塑造其全部哲学的驱动力之一，显而易见地，这需要更仔细的阐明。   * 1. 来自哥尼斯堡的世界公民   康德的世界主义环绕着他自己一生的理智生活，甚至乍看之下它似乎是别的东西，因为我们的哲学家出生于哥尼斯堡，被抚养于那儿虔敬的氛围之下，在那上的中小学与大学，并且在那附近找到他的第一份职业，当家庭教师。他回到母校做讲师，在那奉献了四十年给教学与研究，最后死在哥尼斯堡，在那儿，他被埋葬于大学教堂里专用于教授的墓地之中。  他的一生看起来可以是任何身份，除了世界公民：他住在乡下，完全享受于此，拒绝其他大学的工作邀请（1769年到爱尔兰根，1770到耶拿），甚至没有一次前往过当时的德国政治与精神的中心（柏林，耶拿，以及魏玛）。无论怎么样，他不仅是个世界公民，而且提供了唯一的典范给成为一个世界公民所意味的东西——可以肯定是一个挑衅的典范，因为，他证明了一个人如何能够像一个世界公民一样生活与思考，而不成为一个流浪者或“全球演员”。  首先，康德是一个世界公民，在如此的关于一个公民的意义上，一个人在其一生中已经在世界的许多地方为人所知。今天，在其死后的两百多年，他绝对地达到了世界性的影响所意味的观念。康德真正地被全世界研究：不仅在欧洲的每一处，而且在亚洲，北美与南美的许多国家以及在环太平洋之上。  一旦说到这种世界性的荣誉，大部分的公民，甚至哲学教授，都缺乏康德的天才。但就名望以及人的特性而言，人类中的每一个都有能力获取“小兄弟”的地位——凭借正直与有才干的努力，每一个人有能力获得他人的尊重，以及除此之外，一种一样重要的尊重，自我尊重。  常常被提到的是康德过着一种学究式的生活。事实上，他完全不同于一个枯燥老朽的单身汉。他仅仅把一半的时间用于讲课与研究。另一半时间，他投身于他的社会生活，那在公共意义上证明他是一个世界公民，也就是说，作为一个知性的健谈者，他渴望被发现。然而，如果康德仅仅以社会生活为乐，他不会成为如此杰出的哲学家。在其《实用人类学》中，他发展出一种关于“与道德联合的社交快乐”的哲学促进“真正的人道”。  另外，康德是一个世界公民，在第三个意义上是能够为每个人所仿效。多亏一种对于在生活中以及在政治学与科学的世界中可以被发现的现有的一切的好奇心，康德为其自己获得了——只要一个人进行了自省——一个人能够称作启蒙运动的“小兄弟”这种地位（换言之，关于世界的广阔知识）。这是他永不满足的阅读的结果：康德的阅读，广泛，大量，迅速，但也集中。例如，为了平静地研究卢梭的教育小说《爱弥儿》，他把自己锁进房间好几天（见Borowski 1804,94）。除了哲学上的著作，他经常与商人朋友进行讨论，并阅读旅行报道。当谈到自然科学上的前沿研究，他是无比的熟悉，他可以就科学开讲座——他甚至贡献出自己的受人敬仰的研究报告：  例如，他解释了北非与季风并发表了一个理论关于土星环以及其他星系。他对里斯本大地震的反应不是伏尔泰对莱布尼茨捍卫上帝的嘲弄。相反，他采取了基于地下可传导炸裂的一个纯理性的解释。给人极深印象的是他关于世界原初的纯科学上的学说。依据这个格言，“只要给我物质，我将还你一个世界。”（《普遍的自然史与天堂理论》I229），他发展出一套理性的解释，独立于任何的神学假设，那就是广为人知的康德—拉普拉斯理论，这在天文学上具有重大意义。  康德是一个世界公民，在一个甚至更高的第四种意义上；现在是在一种真正地哲学意义上。当说到文化的每一个重要组成部分：（1），知识，（2），道德，（3），自然世界与道德（即，自由）二者的联合，（4），教育（5）共通感，包含艺术（6）自明的公民法律，特别是（7）历史，也就是说，由于多达经验的七个领域，他发展出一套世界性的哲学。这是那种情况不仅相关于康德自己的“主观”判断，而且“客观地”根据那种走向世界性思想者的专业标准。另外，七个世界性之维的统一体有其自己的世界性特征。  不过，在今天为了被当作真正的世界主义者，一个思想家必须满足两个条件。一方面，尽管他可能在历史的意义上是区域性的（以康德为例，他首先拥有西方的根源），也就是说，为了成为真正的世界主义者，一个人必须从区域之根中解放自己。另一方面，一个世界主义者不能擦掉所有的文化差异，而是相反，必须让其自身敞开于所有差异。因此，一种世界性的哲学联合—第一条标准—跨文化的适用性与一种对文化差异的识别。诚然，重点必须是被置于首要因素之上:哲学是世界性的，即，具备全球化的条件，但是不是没有政治机构。  相关于还没有讲到的时刻，政治学，康德有一个道德上的概念。起初，这些差异被区分—第二条标准—凭借在重要意义上并未受惠于政治学的三个要素，以至于他们已被发现于《纯粹理性批判》：（1）道德政治的挑战存在于一个自然的条件中——那种战争状态的特征。（《纯粹理性批判》B779f.）；（2）它的道德征服发生凭借着构成国家律法（针对康德共和国）的，普遍的化的基本原则；（3）它的目标是无条件的，在这个意义上永久的和平，另外，在它的被描绘为“祝愿”的道德特性中取得的。（《永久和评论》VIII378）康德预设了一种能够代表最高的善的东西：在习俗（公民法）与（快乐的）幸福之间的一致。  当一种哲学将它的跨文化的适用性与对异质文化的开放性联合起来时，这种哲学就其内容而言，即就其表达来说，是世界性的。当它坚持已提出的道德政治的三个形式要素，它在程序上（即方法上）是世界性的。最后，当它在其整体上提供那种人道的共同幸福，它—第三条标准—在其动机意义上是世界性的。  因为康德的哲学坚持所有三条标准，这尚需要被证明，而且也因为它不限于公民法与政治的主题，它包含了一个普遍的世界主义。政治也不能构成其中心。更多地，它的道德驱动力是理性，不仅是个人的因素而且也是他们的联合体，事实上，康德从这个基础而立起来的整个思想是世界性的。   * 1. 一种认识上的世界共和国   康德的世界主义不是所有方面都出现在起点。当说到他的哲学的发展，他始于知识，然后将其与第二驱动力，司法的批判。当我们审视康德的精神传记，我们发现首要的认识上的世界主义出现得非常早。已经在其第一部出版物中，后来在《关于形而上学认识的第一原理一个新的解释》，有人读到矛盾与司法的辩论解决。然而，在他第一部出版物之前很久，1765年的新年，康德在一封信中，以道德政治的三个正式的要素，描述他的时代的哲学世界（Letters，X53；Nr.32）。他强调“在自我标榜的哲学家们之间破坏性的分裂”导致了“没有一个共同的度量标准”并要求一种“努力寻求联合”作为治疗。（见《1765-1766冬季学期的讲座项目的通告》II308）.在这方面，他提出了一个世界性的框架给《纯粹理性批判》，因为道德政治的三个要素对于他的方法而言全是本质的。  第一批判是世界性的也在于其内容。换句话说，它的诸基本原理，是有效的（因为他们是先天综合）与一般上地，文化上地和历史上地独立的一样。因为它被陈述于“纯粹理性的建筑术”中，他们（也就是这些基本的原理）带来科学上地共同的本质（《纯粹理性批判》B879），以此呈现一个认识上的世界共和国的等级，因为它构成了全部人类理性的共同财富。因为在这种情况下，我们个体的诸特性不扮演任何角色（除非为了理解，我们需要表现的观念，因而，适应能力的片刻），这个世界性共和国创造的不仅是一个全球的有效性（对我们的地球有效）而且是一个对整个宇宙而言真正的世界性的，涵盖全体的秩序。更进一步，正如我们已经说过的，认识上的自由的利益支配着世界主义，以至于一种认识上的最高的善被获取，并且，第一批判事实上凭借它的动机具有了世界性的特征。  最后，一个人能发现一种世界性的时刻，因为，当谈到三个存在论上的重要主题（上帝，自由，不朽），所有认识上的公民都立于平等的基点，以至职业的思想家，即哲学家不比大众（对我们而言，首先受尊重的）“有更高或更宽的视野”。（《纯粹理性批判》Bxxxiii）。所被期望的仅仅是共同被把握的，并且，与针对文化差异的必要开放性相符的东西：凭借它的先天综合，认识上的世界共和国宣称适用于所有的认识上的世界，只要他们的知识需要与康德的理论—不仅理智的根源还有可接受的观念的根源—一致的两个认识论上的根源。  “国际法”意味着，在其起点上（在罗马时期）不是协调各民族（在城邦意义上的）之间的国际关系，而相反，是由各民族事实上的认可构成的法律。在这个方面，康德在先天综合诸要素之外的工作构成了一种认识上的人民权利的特性。我们喜欢与否：在政治上，我们首先仅仅是形成中的世界公民因为一个全球的法律秩序仍在建设中。但认识论上看，我们已经生活在一个跨文化与文化传输上的可分享的世界。令人惊奇地是，在康德这里，认识论上可分享的东西运用于科学，数学，物理学上。因为它们奠基于普遍有效的元素上（数学也一样），量子理论一直到相对论都能够在各处运用到物理学的研究与教学。  然而，对康德而言，重要的不是自然科学的普遍承认，而是那些科学的先天基础。这是由于，那些共同的先天条件，即我们是所有认识上的世界公民（换言之，我们不仅被称作而且更重要的是能够获得一个可分享的世界理智。）。在这两个方面（相关于普遍理智的挑战与达到普遍理智的能力），每一个人拥有同样的能力，那唯一的所有人共有的理性。  然而，最终康德没有为被限制于我们个性中的一种普遍主义提供证明。相对于一种认识上的人类中心主义，他在《纯粹理性批判》中捍卫一种围绕全体的普遍主义。可能有这种情况，在宇宙的其他部分有理性的存在物，他们一定被同样的需要支配。在这个方面，有一种潜在性（例如，可能碰到的是我们通过广播信号上的简单数字与他们建立联系）他们将与我们分享一个共同的、认识上的世界共和国。  但是，对于如此的一个世界共和国，哲学仅仅提供一个非常有限的框架，用来在科学与政治共同体之中建立文化差异的合理性：一方面，在认识论上有区别的各种文化（换言之，那种不同的特殊科学）依据他们各自的方法与标准充塞于这个框架的空白处。另一方面，这种严格的自我限制提醒了针对包含政治哲学与政治学的特殊学科之适当性的自身限制。在今天我们的全球化的时代里所需求的共同的法律秩序需要在一个非常正式的框架里被看到。这个框架空白之处的填充依据它的各自的学科与经验（以及相关于一个人自己的文化的各种兴趣）要求不仅仅有哲学还有政治学。还有，哲学与政治学都应该概述这种共同的法律秩序的框架仅仅达到如此的程度，即最后的单一共同体保留一种对种种差异的强烈捍卫。   * 1. 道德世界主义     第一批判中建立的认识上的和平提供了两种“人”——直接地知识但终极地道德。因为二者构成了法哲学与一种自由哲学的基础，这个顺序是必须的：首先，一个世界全体公民是必须的，然后，（对康德更重要东西）一个有道德的世界全体公民。仅仅在这两步被采纳的假设之下，第三种形式（即，在一个更狭隘的政治的意义上的世界主义）能被建立。  顺便说一句：康德自己的精神传记确定了这个顺序，这就支持了我的论点，生物学上的与天才的哲学上的世界主义被康德连接起来了：早在18世纪60年代开始，我们的哲学家就关注了道德的基本原则。同时（1762-1764），依据他的个人图书馆的证明，他那时正在研究法哲学。始于1767年夏季学期，他甚至开了门法哲学（“自然法”）的课。然而，在其批判哲学之中，他自己首先关心的是认识上的宇宙，然后仅仅随后是道德，最后，是法律的宇宙（至少，在主题上）。  然而，根据现在的研究所呈现出的少有的解读，《纯粹理性批判》不是那么相关于知识，因为它相关于道德。“先验方法论”的第一部分的标准证明了为什么第三部分针对对世界主义的动机的发展是被提升到目的论的世界主义：理性的“最终目标”（换言之，超越认识上和平的终极目标）依靠三种因素，在其中，理论的兴趣是被限制的，而相反，道德实践的兴趣是无限的（因为它相关于意志的自由，灵魂的不朽，以及上帝的存在）（《纯粹理性批判》B826）  确定的是，《纯粹理性批判》首先在主题上始于认识上的世界主义，并仅仅随后在主题上转向道德的世界主义，因为第二个需要第一个的洞见（换言之，先天综合的概念）来建立在可接受的直觉，自发的理智和天生的理性要素之间的区别；特别是，建立第三个二律背反自然与自由的冲突。《实践理性批判》也跟随这个主题结构。  在认识上的世界与道德上的世界之间可连接的点是“最终目标”的概念。这个概念在认识上的世界主义中拥有它的世界政治的特性。没有最终目标的认知主体不是世界政治家；而是，如康德会说的，仅仅为一个世界观察者：尽管有哥白尼式的转向，他保留了一个唯一的世界观察者，在他作为一个观众站在旁边反对它的程度上。仅仅在它的最终目标与道德主体，即一个道德上地负有责任的主体一样的状态下，他成为宇宙的一个成员（事实上，与宇宙一起的伴随行动者）。确切地说，作为一个有责任的人的这种状态（以及首先不是凭借跨国际界限的能力或甚至凭借全球的政治的机构的建立），提升这个人到世界政治家的行列。  康德对道德的概念与标准，普遍承认的并源自许多道德哲学家拥护的绝对命令，构成了我们的第二种的道德的世界主义的原则。借此原则，康德将方法论上的世界主义置入实践。借它的帮助，他反驳了怀疑一个普遍有效的道德的唯一可能性的激进伦理相对主义。同时，他追求对他的世界主义的正式的政治的关注。即使，不能完全地和在第一批判中一样巧妙，他处理迄今以前的竞争观点并克服那看似冲突的自然状态到达一种和谐的道德的律法的状态的好处。这里的恰当原则，道德律或绝对命令，需要（正如被广泛知道那样）在每一种文化—包括那些能够行动的生活形式—所有的人都是有效的原则的，准则的普遍化。普遍化类似于第一批判中的先天综合，是真正世界性的：它的主题，道德，不仅围绕我们的个性还有整个世界。 |

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| The third, fundamental form of the categorical imperative, concerned with the kingdom of ends, strengthens, of course, moral cosmopolitanism. It remains, however, apolitical because it functions without lawful and national institutions. The kingdom of ends is, namely, a totality of all, not personal, but rational goals insofar as the totality is viewed as a systematic whole (Groundwork, IV 433). Political in the strictest sense is the “bonding of humanity by means of mere laws of virtue,” a bonding that Kant discusses in Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason, which he acknowledges to constitute an internal, ethical community not an external, juridical community (Religion, VI 94). One of the arguments for this community (also called the “kingdom of virtue” [see VI, 95]) follows that of methodological cosmopolitanism. It speaks of an ethical, natural condition, which will be replaced by means of mere laws of virtue by a community of “ethical-citizens” (see ibid.). In contrast to the usual, community of lawful-citizens, this ethical society is a “system of well-meaning persons” (VI 98), who are shaped not by the force of externally imposed laws but by strict, yet un-coerced, internal laws.  The following distinction is decisive: In accordance with his division of duties into lawful and virtuous duties, Kant identifies two kinds of moral perfection, which are applied to two fundamentally different subjects. In the case of lawful-morality, the human species is subject to the obligations established within the external parameters of each particular state; in the case of virtue-morality, in contrast, the human species is primarily a natural subject that must cultivate itself, internally, to be a world citizen; secondarily, the latter consists of the totality of those persons who constitute the kingdom of virtue. By means of the first set of duties, humanity is pressed into coexistence even when its community is shaped by moral laws; with the second, the community shaped by moral laws is subordinate to the individual’s manner of thinking, his own views. In the first case, all that is necessary are moral laws that allow others to perform their duty (i.e., a coercive, lawful duty); which, when it comes to our latter case, is supplemented by duties of virtue.  One also finds the kingdom of virtue, as well, in teleological cosmopolitanism with its kingdom of ends. Kant extends the thought of a highest good to a communal good and declares that this species of rational beings is determined “objectively by means of the idea of reason” for the “promotion of the highest good of a community” (VI 97).  Let’s now return to the theme of moral cosmopolitanism! Unquestionably, it is demanding, even provocative, but also welcome once again in an age of globalization. The fact that Kant fundamentally sets aside all cultural particularities demonstrates, again, that he only at first glance appears to be a paradoxical person: a European world citizen. Kant is European because he reduces the commonalities of Europe to a common denominator -- above all, of Stoicism and Christianity in an epoch of European Enlightenment. Furthermore, he liberates the notion of these European elements from all Eurocentrism.  Two examples confirm this empirically: The forbidding of lying relevant to the law (deception) is found in all systems of law with which we are familiar. Furthermore, the ethical expectation to help those who are suffering does not occur just in Judaism and Christianity. Already in ancient Egyptian wisdom literature we find: “Help everyone! Set someone free whom you find in chains; be a guardian of the wretched. One calls good the man who does not close his eyes” (see Höffe 1998, Nr. 5). As well, the Koran says: “Pious is he who out of love for Allah gives his money to his dependents and the orphaned, the poor, and the son of [the false] way, the beggar, and those in prison” (ibid., Nr. 39).  The consequences of this observation are noteworthy: Kant exposes the philosophical foundations of a documentable, common inheritance of humanity, of a World Moral Heritage analogous to the World Cultural Heritage. Both of our examples, by the way, retain an openness to cultural differences. It is the particular order of penal law that decides, each in its own way, how deceit is to be defined according to the civic law and that decides the degree of deceit and how it is to be punished. The same is true for the obligation to aid others. Its philosophical grounds leave open the question who is to be helped in a situation of ambiguity (the parents, the children, the spouse) as well as the question of the extent to which the obligation to help others is to be stretched, whether it is to be done voluntarily, to the greater extent by taxes, or by force. In the end, it remains open whether certain circumstances in which help is not extended (and, of course, which circumstances) are subject to legal punishment.  1.5 Cosmopolitan Education  In his lectures on pedagogy (On Pedagogy), Kant provides his basic thesis: “Children should not only be educated with respect to the current circumstances of humanity but also with respect to a possible, improved, future condition of the human species (i.e., with respect to the idea of humanity and its complete realization)” (IX 447). To this fundamental thesis is added a second that essentially constitutes an appraisal of the first: “The construction of a pedagogical plan must be cosmopolitical” (IX 448). What Kant means with these two theses is demonstrated by his summary (see ibid.):  The broad goal of all upbringing (“the development of natural capacities”) consists, viewed from the side of the parents, in terms of their children fitting into “the present world even if corrupt:” Parents “are generally concerned only that their children be successful;” they “are concerned for the family’s financial well-being.” The other nurturer, the princes, “view their subjects exclusively as means to their ends.” What Kant means here is not that the princes are concerned to misuse their subjects for their private advantage, but, sympathetic to the princes, he means the cultivation of their subjects in “service for the state.”  However, both with parents and princes, what Kant finds lacking is the final goal, “the world’s best and perfectibility.” Parents and princes are satisfied, as has been said, with (1) discipline: the “taming of wildness;” (2) acculturation: “the acquisition of slickness;” and (3) civility with respect to “manners, good behavior [in the sense of skills, competency], and a certain cleverness.” However, the ultimate, decisive goal that is directed toward nurturing perfectibility (i.e., that has as its aim moralization) is absent. Only when this ultimate goal is included can a person “not merely be skillful with respect to all kinds of goals” but acquire “the disposition … that he only chooses good goals” (On Pedagogy, IX 450).  This task is also the concern of the second Critique’s methodology. It doesn’t develop moral philosophy’s method but the method for moral nurturing -- from which many German states today could benefit when it comes to their ethics-course offerings. The goal is extremely ambitious: “to bring about in us step by step the greatest and purist moral interest” with respect to the sanctity of duty (Critique of Pure Reason, V 159). What Kant critics often overlook but is developed in the methodology of the Doctrine of Virtue [in the Metaphysics of Morals] is that this duty is accompanied by a hearty and cheerful nature (see Doctrine of Virtue, VI 484).  Why does Kant call this schooling cosmopolitan? It goes without saying that all private, even public, happiness is relativized by it. Our philosopher here is also not speaking of the well-being of a world government because political relationships are entirely absent in the Pedagogy. This notion of “cosmopolitan” evokes far more the categorical imperative: “Good goals,” it is said, “are those that necessarily are acknowledged by everyone and at the same time could be everyone’s goals” (On Pedagogy, IX 450).  Like he had in the canon of the first Critique, Kant directs his attention to the whole world in the Pedagogy. What is important to him is the panoramic view that overcomes every narrower, even a species-specific, perspective as it seeks the perspective of the whole (pan). At the same time, we can hear a resonance with the teleological meaning of the third Critique – although this notion has yet to be developed here. Education is cosmopolitan because it aims for “the world’s best” and out of it arises “everything that is good in the world” (On Pedagogy, IX 448) – indeed in that “world” that is not limited to humanity but includes the entire universe.  In his Reflections on Anthropology (Nr. 1170: XV 517), Kant contrasts the child of the earth and the world citizen. The child of the earth “is interested only in business deals and with those things insofar as they influence happiness. When it comes to the latter [the world citizen], humanity1 is interested in the whole world, the origin of everything, their inner worth, and ultimate goals.” The accent belongs on the first element of the expression – on “cosmo” in cosmopolitan – here understood as cosmos, as the universe with respect to its ultimate, moral order.  This opinion reminds one of a passage from the Logic (IX 23 f.), which in turn has a counterpart in the architectonic of the first Critique (Critique of Pure Reason, B 866 f.). On both occasions, Kant speaks of a world-concept in philosophy, a “sensus cosmicus” (Logic, IX 24), whereby the term “world,” otherwise than on other occasions, is not understood in the sense of “inclusive of all appearances” or as “in the transcendental understanding, as the absolute Totality that is inclusive of all existing things” (Critique of Pure Reason, B 47). These definitions belong to the scholastic concept that is entirely contrary to philosophy although philosophy, to be sure, seeks a “system of knowledge” “as science” (B 866).  In the lectures Metaphysics of Morals (Vigilantius), Kant gives “school philosophy” a Greek title, which I haven’t found in the published works and is so unusual that an authoritative Greek dictionary, Lidell-Scott, doesn’t contain it. Kant here borrows a neologism, presumably from Christian Huygen’s text with the same name (1698): Whoever “concerns himself with nature with respect to the everincreasing knowledge of theoretical observation” is called cosmo-theoros, which in German according to the Opus postumum would be a “world observer” (XXI 53), whom Kant contrasts with the cosmopolitan.  Kant does not mean by cosmopolitan, as I’ve already said, anything like a highlyeducated, widely traveled, and urbane person, but, rather, someone who “observes nature around him in the practical sense of seeking to conform his own well-being in light of the whole” (XXVII, Vol. 2.1, 673). In contrast to cosmotheoros, devoted merely to knowledge, the cosmopolite distinguishes himself by his moral-practical attitude. Once again I stress, it is not the presence of political institutions that is decisive but that the individual is a person in the ambitious sense, which Kant spoke of at a pertinent point in the Opus postumum, as a “moral being.” The passage reads: “a man as (cosmopolitan) person (moral being) [is he] who is conscious of his freedom as a sensuous being (inhabitant of the world)” (XXI 31, §9). Again in contrast, the “cosmotheoros is the man who creates himself the elements of his world knowledge by means of which he constructs the world (as simultaneously a world occupant) in terms of his idea” (ibid.). (See XXI 101, where a contrast is made between “a principle of the forms [1] of personality in me and [2] the description of the world, cosmotheoros outside of me;” to this is added, thirdly, a system “of essences that are thought as constituting a system in me and outside of me.”)  The philosopher as world citizen does not simply push aside academic philosophy. Rather, he only relativizes it in that he is committed to the notion that all knowledge should be related “to the essential goals of human reason” (Critique of Pure Reason, B 867; see Logic, IX 24). This relationship is not achieved merely as a product of mere modo theoretico. As is too frequently overlooked, the wisdom in the notion of philosophy as world-citizenship consists not only in doctrines [Lehre] but also consists in to teach [zu lehren] by example (Logic, IX 24). The paradigm for this “teaching by example,” one dares say, is Stoic wisdom. According to the first Critique, the ideal of pure reason (i.e., the idea in individuo) is named, as well, the “god-man in us” (Critique of Pure Reason, B 596 f.).  The Logic passage continues: Reason’s essential goals are bundled in the famous questions for which “everyone is necessarily interested” (Critique of Pure Reason, B 868) as the architectonic of the first Critique discusses. Because Kant wants to cover all of philosophy with these questions (“1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What may I hope? 4. What is a human being?”), he represents explicitly when it comes to the goals of reason the thematic that is universal cosmopolitanism.  It needs to be underscored once more: Kant employs a paradox because cosmopolitan here is an apolitical concept. He calls “cosmopolites” not those persons who are capable of relativizing natural and cultural boundaries and who feel at home everywhere in the world. Rather, according to his provocative (because it is a moral) concept, a cosmopolite is someone who, according to the motto of the Critique of Pure Reason, serves the well-being of all of humanity. Once again in a very modern sense, Kant includes not only the present but also future generations and combines this view with a notion of development: The final goal of Pedagogy consists in a futurally, possible “moral” (IX 449) condition whereby not a civilized but a moral condition is meant. Methodically viewed, Kant is concerned with an “idea” that is offered in the form of a final goal that stands not only in contrast to but also above “the possible slow approximation of human nature” (ibid.).  Because the notion of the final end extends beyond the species, Kant’s educational plan contains the rarely noticed, cosmo-political perspective. At the same time the moral- is bound together with a teleological-cosmopolitanism. This is because as it says in the Groundwork, the individual does not exist merely “as an end in himself”(IV 428). He is to be judged here on earth, as well, the Critique of the Power of Judgment adds, “as the final goal of nature” in light of which “all other natural things constitute a system of ends” (Critique of the Power of Judgment, V 429).  1.6 Further Cosmopolitanism and Résumé  The claim for humanity as the final end of nature is easily suspected to be an example of species-egoism. Although according to Kant humanity has this rank as “the final end of creation” (Critique of the Power of Judgment, V 435), it is not as a biological species but as a moral being in possession of a special responsibility. Humanity as final end is not empowered according to a species-egoism but is committed to something with which no other being in the world is burdened – to a responsibility also for others, even for the non-human world. Simultaneously, a fourth theme is added to our cosmopolitan character: that unity of nature and freedom discussed in the Critique of the Power of Judgment but already addressed in the first Critique where it is treated in the canon as the final purpose of speculative reason.  In the third Critique we encounter with the catch-word sensus communis a further, now fifth cosmopolitanism. Kant understands under this catch-word the “idea of a common sense,” more precisely, a capacity of judgment that along with Kant’s three, already named maxims – “1. Think for oneself; 2. Think from the perspective of the other; 3. Be consistent with oneself at all times” – as it were, applies to the entirety of human reason (Critique of the Power of Judgment, V 293 f.) (In the Anthropology, Kant labels this kind of thinking pluralism in contrast to egoism and qualified it as cosmopolitical, namely, not to take the whole world to be oneself, but to view and to act in the entire world as a world-citizen” [VII 130].) Yet, sensus communis is among other things responsible for the power of aesthetic judgment (for judgment with respect to beauty in nature and art), which adds art to the cosmopolitan character.  Cosmopolitan is “naturally” the region that usually stands in the middle of everything and, therefore, may already be waited for impatiently. There are two reasons, though, not to start with it because this region is dependent upon a cosmopolitan, moral philosophy. The base legal principle that Kant develops, that principle which is generally compatible with freedom, takes up the moment of universalization in the categorical imperative (Doctrine of Right [Metaphysics of Morals], §5). This, in turn, presupposes a cosmopolitical, epistemological critique.  Europe is saturated with philosophical legal- and state-theories. What is amazing is that by all the great authors (from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes and Locke all the way to Hegel) the theory of an international legal-community in terms of a peacecollective is glaringly missing. This gap is all the more astonishing because both notions are already found in the Greeks: Humans and their communities since the beginning of time have been concerned with their neighbors and have not always lived with them in “vain love and friendship.”  The concept “world citizen” (kosmou polités), presumably, goes back to Socrates; unquestionably, it is documented in his student, Diogenes of Snope, and since Zenon of Krition, later Chrysipp, became a foundational concept for the Stoics. However, their philosophy is often apolitical. Even when it contains, as in the case of Zenon, certain political elements, they are by no means developed as in the case of the “national,” practical philosophy found in Plato and Aristotle. (For a concise overview, see Höffe 1999, Chap. 8.1.)  Despite the reflections, say, by Dante, Christian Wolff and Abbé St. Pierre, it is not until the high-point, and simultaneously turning-point, of the European Enlightenment that this gap is filled. A short treatise, Kant’s proposal for Perpetual Peace (1795), developed a so comprehensive and simultaneously, thoroughly thought-out theory that it remains to this day the decisive paradigm for all subsequent attempts. Whether philosophers, political scientists, or experts in international law, even economists – whoever wants a conscious theory appropriate to the problem of an international order of law is best served by becoming a student of Kant. The text is cosmopolitan on top of its primary theme of peace. Commencing with the challenge that every constitution should be a republican constitution, Kant’s claims are inter-culturally valid and at once open to cultural differences.    Only one aspect will be addressed here: In the second, definitive article dedicated to international law, Kant develops the challenging thought of his peace treatise and, perhaps, the most revolutionary part of his entire cosmopolitanism: the idea of a peace association of all nations (see Perpetual Peace, VIII 354 ff.).  Finally, cosmopolitanism emerges in Kant’s philosophy of history already in the title of its most important treatise for there in his Idea for a Universal History he speaks of a “cosmopolitan purpose”. Here, we undertake a résumé:  Obviously today, in an age of globalization a cosmopolitan philosophy is welcome. There, namely, where highly different cultures share the same world not merely “in principle” but in actual life visible to all, we need a thought that in a similar, visible manner is open to cultural differences. We don’t need an ethnocentric but inter- and trans-culturally sound argumentation. Were one to bind the argumentation to a normative minimum for cultural coexistence, to the elementary conditions for a lawful state and democracy, it can be called a political and, in terms of a global view, cosmopolitan: world-citizenry.  In this respect, Kant’s philosophy is a depiction of a multifaceted cosmopolitanism. Along with its uniting theme, morality, this cosmopolitanism makes the Königsberg philosopher so important for a globalized world, that someone from Tübingen can introduce his passion for the poet, Friedrich Hölderlin and adapt Hölderlin’s words for philosophy: “You must study [Kant’s … cosmopolitanism], even when you have no money to buy a lamp and oil and only have time between midnight and the rooster’s cry ...” | 第三，与目的王国相关联的绝对命令无疑进一步支持了道德的世界主义。但这个王国仍是非政治的，因为它的运作无需法律和国家机关。换言之，该目的王国尽管不是私人目的的集合，却仍是由理性目的结合而成的一个系统整全（《道德形而上学奠基 》，IV 433）。在最严格的意义上说，政治（共同体）是“仅仅遵循德性法则的联合体”，康德在《纯然理性界限内的宗教》中讨论过该联合体，他承诺要建立一个内在的、伦理的，而不是外在的、律法的共同体。（《纯然理性界限内的宗教》 ，VI 94）。支持建立这种共同体（亦称作“德性王国”<见 VI, 95>）的其中一个论证可以从方法论的世界主义中推导出来。该论证涉及一种伦理的自然状态，这种状态将被“伦理公民”共同体的纯粹德性法则所取代。（同上）。这种伦理社会不同于一般的由律法公民组成的社会，它是“一个具有善良意念的人们的体系”（VI 98），其形成不是靠外在强加的法律效力，而是靠自愿的内部法则。  康德接下来区分了两个关键概念：他区分了两类道德完善性，二者分别应用于两种截然不同的对象，这与他对律法义务和德性义务的区分相一致。首先，在律法伦理的情况下，人类屈从于个别国家所强加的外在义务；相反，在德性伦理情况下，人类原是一种自然主体，必须内在地将自身培养成世界公民；另外，后者正是由那些构成德性王国的公民所组成。通过第一种义务，人们被强迫共存，无论其共同体是否依道德律建成；在第二种情况下，依道德律建成的共同体从属于个人的思维方式、从属于他/她自己的意愿。在第一种情况下，所需的只是迫使他人履行职责的道德法则（例如一种强迫性的法律责任）；这在第二种情况下被德性义务所取代。  在目的论的世界主义及其目的王国中也可找到德性王国的位置。康德将至善的理念扩展为一种公共的善，并且宣称有理性的存在者的每个物种“在客观上都注定要趋向一个共同的目的，即促进作为共同的善的一种至善。”（VI 97）  现在让我们回到伦理的世界主义的主题。伦理的世界主义无疑是不易实现又极富争议的，但在全球化时代它也将再次受到欢迎。康德从根本上搁置了所有的文化特殊性，这一事实再次证明了他并不像第一眼看上去那么的自相矛盾：他绝不是一个所谓的“欧洲的世界公民”。诚然，康德可称作“欧洲的”，因为他在欧洲启蒙时代将欧洲公民---特别是那些斯多亚主义者和基督徒还原为一个公分母。此外，他还将所有这些欧洲元素集成的概念从欧洲中心主义的窠臼中解放了出来。  上述观点可从经验上用两个例子来证明：在我们所熟知的所有法律体系当中都能找到与禁止说谎（欺骗）相关的法则。此外，对受困者施以援手的道德期望也不仅仅局限于犹太教和基督教。早在古埃及的智慧文学中就有：“帮助所有人！为囚徒脱困，为可怜人护航。不冷眼旁观才称得上好人。”（Höffe 1998, Nr. 5）。可兰经亦有云：“所谓虔敬，即出于对真主之爱，布施于亲戚、孤儿、穷人、庶子、乞丐、囚徒”。  我们可以通过上述考察得出非常重要的结论：康德阐明了一种哲学基础，它是可记录的、共同的人类遗产的根基，这种世界道德遗产可类比于世界文化遗产。此外，这两个例子也并未扼杀文化差异。毕竟要定义欺骗行为还需要刑法；衡量欺骗程度轻重，决定处罚裁量还需要民法。帮助他人的义务也是如此。其哲学根基并不涉及一些具体问题，如在不明确的情况下，要帮助谁（父母、子女、还是配偶）？要帮到什么程度？是否应该自愿？是应该靠收税还是靠强制？说到底，在特殊情况下（当然，还必须考虑在何种情况下）袖手旁观是否有罪仍是悬而未决的。  1.5 世界性的教育  在教育学系列讲座中（《教育学》），康德的中心论点是：“孩子们受教育，应当不仅适合人类当前的状态，而且适合人类未来更好的状态，亦即适合人性的理念及其整个规定。”（IX 447）在此基础上，康德又加入了另一条评估性的论点：“一种教育计划必须被设计成世界主义的” (IX 448)。康德在接下来的摘要中进一步阐明了上述两个论点的意义：  在父母看来，所有教育（自然能力的发展）通常都是为了使孩子适应“当前世界，哪怕它是个堕落的世界”：父母“通常只关注子女能否成功；他们关心的是家庭的财富”。而另外的教育者—君侯“只把自己的臣民视为达成自己种种意图的工具”。康德在此并非指责君侯为一己私利而劳役子民，而是指对子民进行培养，使其“为国服务”。  但康德发现，无论是父母还是君侯的教育都缺乏最终目的，即“世界的福祉及完善性。”如前所述，家长和君侯满足于（1）训诫：“对野性的驯服；”（2）培养：“造就技能”；（3）文明，“为此要求风度、乖巧和某种聪明”。但那指向教育完善性（如作为道德化目标）的最终的、决定性目的缺失了。只有当这种最终目的包括在教育当中，一个人才“不仅为达成各种各样的目的而有技能，而且还获得只选择完全好的目的的意念”（《教育学》 IX 450）。  这项任务也是第二批判方法论部分所关涉的。该部分实际上并不涉及道德哲学的方法，而是关于道德教育的方法---今天许多德国的州在开设伦理课程时仍受其影响。其目标极为远大：“在我们心中逐渐地产生最大的，也是最纯粹的道德兴趣”。（《实践理性批判》V 159）在康德的批判中经常忽略却在《德性论》的方法论（《道德的形而上学导论》）中展开的是如下观点：义务是通过顽强和愉悦的本性达成的。（见《德性论》VI 484）  为何康德将上述教育称为世界性的教育？它无疑与所有私人的、甚至是公共的福祉相关。康德在此也不是指对于一个世界政府的福祉，因为在教育学中完全不涉及政治关系。这个“世界主义者”概念更多的是唤起对绝对命令的意识：“好的目的就是必然为每个人所认同的目的，是能够也同时是任何人的目的”（《教育学》IX 450）。  正如在第一批判的法规部分中所做的那样，康德在教育学中将其注意力指向整个世界。对康德而言重要的是全景视角，该视角纵观全局，克服了所有狭隘的，甚至是种族特异性的视角之不足。同时，也让我们回想起第三批判中的目的论的意味-但在这里不能进一步展开论述。教育之所以是世界主义的，是因为其目标是“最完善的世界”以及从中产生的“各种美好之物”（《教育学》IX 448）---实际上这个“世界”不限于人类世界，还包括整个宇宙。  康德在《人类学反思》(Nr. 1170: XV 517)一文中将地球儿童与世界公民两相对比。地球儿童仅对做买卖，以及那些对其幸福有影响事物感兴趣。而世界公民则感兴趣于整个世界、万物起源及其内在价值、以及终极目的。世界公民(cosmopolitan)这一术语的重点在第一个词根上,即“cosmo”，在这里该词根应按照希腊语的宇宙一词来理解，词中的内涵意义包括终极的、道德秩序。  上述观点不禁使人想起《逻辑学》(IX 23 f.)中的一段论述，这在第一批判的建筑术部分也有相应的表述(《纯粹理性批判》, B 866 f.)。在这两个地方，康德都谈及一个哲学的世界概念，一个“感性的宇宙”或尘世概念（《逻辑》IX 24），这里的“世界”和其他地方的意义不一样，不能被理解为“包括所有表象（的概念）”，也不是“在先验理解中，包括一切实存之物的绝对整体”（《纯粹理性批判》B 47）。这些定义是经院的，与哲学完全相悖，尽管哲学无疑也追求“作为科学的知识体系” (B 866)。  在道德形而上学讲座中(Vigilantius)，康德用一个希腊语词来命名“经院哲学”，这个术语在任何出版的文献中都没出现过，甚至在权威的希腊语字典中（Lidell-Scott）也未收录。也许康德所造的这个术语取自克里斯蒂安·惠更斯的同名著作(1698)：无论何人“只要关心自然，尊重通过理论观察而不断增长的知识”就可被称作世界理论家（cosmo-theoros），在康德遗著中，这种人被称作“世界观察者”（XXI 53），与世界公民概念相对。  正如我之前所说，康德所指的世界主义者并不是那种受过良好教育、四处游历的城市人，而是那些“以实践的眼光去观察自然，以求满足自身福祉，而这福祉又是以全体福祉为根据的” (XXVII, Vol. 2.1, 673)。不同于全心投入知识的世界理论家，世界主义者拥有道德-实践态度。我再次强调，政治机构在这里并不是必须的，最重要的是个体要成为人，用康德遗著中的一个贴切的术语表达就是“道德存在者”。“人（世界主义者）作为人（道德存在者）在于他作为感性存在者（世界居民）意识到自己的自由” (XXI 31, §9)。康德接着继续对比，世界理论家为自己创造世界知识的要素，通过这些要素他在理念中构建世界（同时构建世界的居民）。（见XXI 101 该部分对比了1、自我人格的形式原理2、对外部世界描述的形式原理；3、被设想的，在我之中和我以外构建体系的本质系统。）  康德作为世界公民不是简单地将理论哲学束诸高阁。相反，他认为“所有知识都应该与人类理性的基本目标相关联”，理论哲学也不例外。这种关系不能仅仅作为理论模型的产物来获得。作为世界公民的哲学概念中的智慧经常被忽视，它不仅仅存在于学说中，也存在于榜样中（《逻辑学》 IX 24）。这种榜样的范式就是斯多亚派的智慧。在第一批判中，纯粹理性的理想（个体的理念）也被称作圣贤。（《纯粹理想批判》 B 596）  康德在《逻辑学》中继续写道：理性的根本目的集中在四个著名的问题中，正如在第一批判的建筑术部分所言，这些问题是“每个人都必然感兴趣的”（《纯粹理性批判》B 868）。由于康德想通过这些问题涵盖所有哲学（“1、我能知道什么？2、我应该做什么？3、我可以希望什么？4、人是什么？”），所以当他谈到理性的目的时，他明确地描绘了普遍的、世界公民主义的主题。  需要再次强调的是：康德在此显示出不一致，因为这里的世界主义者的概念是一个非政治学的概念。康德所说的“世界公民”不是指那些有能力超越自然和文化界限的人，也不那些四海为家的人。而是指那些根据道德概念，根据纯粹理性批判的标准，为全人类福祉服务的人。从一种非常现代的视角来看，康德不仅将现在，还将未来的后代纳入考量，并将这种观点与发展的概念结合起来：教育学的最终目的是由未来的、可能的道德状况构成的。从方法论角度看，康德主要着眼于一个理念，该理念以最终目的的形式给出，它不仅对立于，还超出于“人类本性的可能的逐渐逼近”。  由于最终目的的概念跨越种群，所以康德的教育计划包含了极少被注意到的世界政治观点。同时道德世界主义也与目的论世界主义结合在一起。这是因为如《道德形而上学奠基》中所言，“个人并不仅仅作为个人自身目的而实存”（IV 428）。“我们可以将人作为这个尘世上所有其余的自然事物与之相关而构成一个目的系统的那个自然最终目的来看”。（《判断力批判》 V429）。  1.6 其他面向的世界主义和概要  上述将人视作自然最终目的的断言很容易被定性为一种人类中心论。 尽管康德将人类定位为“创造的终极目的”（《判断力批判》V 435），但这里的人不是指生物学上的人类，而是拥有特别责任的道德存在者。人类之所以是终极目的不是因为人类中心论，而是因为它肩负了地球上其他存在者都无法承担的责任——一种对他者，甚至对非人类世界的责任。同时，第四个主题也被引入世界主义中：即自然与自由的统一性，该主题在《判断力批判》中已经被探讨过，而在第一批判的纯粹理性的法规中就曾被视为思辨理性的最终目的。  我们在第三批判中所见到的那个引人注目的术语---共通感（sensus communis）就是第五种世界主义。康德将其理解为“一种共同的感觉的理念”，更准确地说是一种判断能力，其他三条已被命名的准则包括“1、自己思维；2、站在别人的地位上思维；3、任何时候都与自己一致地思维”---可以说这种能力也适用于全部人类理性（《判断力批判》V 293 f）。（在《实用人类学》中，康德将这种多元思维与自我主义对举，认为这种思维才称得上是真正的世界主义的思维，即不是把自己当作将整个世界囊括在自己自我之中的人，而是当作一个纯然的世界公民来看待和对待。[VII 130]）然而，共通感和其他因素一并构成审美判断力（对自然和艺术之美的判断），这使得艺术也成为世界性品格的一部分。  世界主义者常常“自然地”充当中间地带，因此也许早已被人们焦急地等待了。但是有两个原因使得人们还需等待，首先它依赖于世界主义的道德哲学。康德的基本法律原理，该原理通常与自由一致，汲取了绝对命令的部分普遍性（法权论）。这又反过来以一种世界主义的认识论批判为前提。  欧洲充斥着哲学的法律和国家理论。但让人吃惊的是所有这些伟大作家（从柏拉图、亚里斯多德到霍布斯、洛克，一直到黑格尔）都明显地遗漏这种以和平联盟为名的国际法律共同体理论。上述概念其实在古希腊已经出现，这使得此理论真空更显奇特：人类及其共同体自形成之日起便一直关注其邻人，而与邻人共处也不总是靠“虚情假意”。  “世界公民”概念也许可追溯至苏格拉底；毫无疑问，该概念在其学生斯诺皮的第欧根尼的学说中已有记录，并且自克里森的芝诺起，经克律西波斯发扬后，成为了斯多亚派的基本概念。但他们的哲学通常是非政治的。即便在涉及某些政治话题的情况下，如芝诺的学说，它们也没有被发展成柏拉图和亚里士多德的实践哲学中的“国家性”概念。（见Höffe 1999, Chap. 8.1.）  尽管一些哲学家如丹特、沃尔夫和阿贝圣皮埃尔都曾对此做过反思，但一直到欧洲启蒙运动的最高潮，同时也是转折时期，上述理论空白才被填满。康德通过《永久和平论》（1795）这篇小论文将一种全面的，同时也是深思熟虑的理论推出来，该理论时至今日仍是后世种种尝试的完美范本。无论是哲学家、政治科学家、国际法专家、还是经济学家---只要想用一个自觉的理论来解决国际法律秩序问题都应该向康德求教。该论文的主题虽然是和平，但背后还是世界主义。康德主张每个国家的公民宪政都应当是共和制的，这个主张一方面是跨文化有效的，另一方面为文化差异留下地盘。  只有一个方面要提一下：在这第二篇明确地以国际法为主题的论文中，康德提出了饱受争议的和平条款思想，也许这是康德整个世界主义思想中最富革命性的：国家间的和平联邦理念（《永久和平论》VIII 354 ff）。  最后，康德的历史哲学早已显现出世界主义思想，在他的最重要的、关于宇宙历史的一篇论文中，他谈到“世界主义的目的”。下面我们来概览一下：  在全球化的今天，世界主义哲学显然会受欢迎。在这里，截然不同的文化在实际上，而不是“原则上”分享着同一个世界，因此我们需要一种思想，它以相似的、可见的方式对文化差异开放。我们需要一种不同文化间的、跨文化的合理理论，不需要种族中心主义的理论。如果一个人为了文化共存，将这种理论与最小化规范结合，为了合法国家和民主，将其与基础状况结合，在全球化、世界主义的角度看来，他就可以被称作政治上的世界主义者。  由此可见，康德哲学可被称为多面向的世界主义思想。而这种思想又有一个统一的主题---道德性，它使这位来自哥尼斯堡的哲学家在全球化的今天依然举足轻重。最后让一个来自图宾根的人，来介绍康德最爱的诗人荷尔德林，并将其作品改编成哲学语言：“你必须学习（康德的世界主义），即使你买不起灯油火蜡，即使你要起早贪黑...” |