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**自由（一）：行动自由和意志自由**

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| 1. Locating Moral Freedom  As with almost all of the fundamental concepts of human thought and life, the notion of freedom has multiple meanings. This is not primarily because of the ambiguities of language but because of the development of the natural and social world. Freedom at its core has a bipolar meaning. Negatively, it means independence. As “freedom from” in the sense of free from determination by others, it has an emancipatory character as a freedom from specific conditions. Positively, however, freedom means self-determination or “free for:” one establishes for oneself what one will do and provides oneself the impetus to do it.  According to the negative and emancipatory concept, the fewer the precepts and requirements placed on one, the more free one is. We are concerned here with a more or less; this notion of freedom is a comparative concept, and one can speak of different grades of freedom. In addition to the gradations of freedom in this sense, one finds an enormous spectrum of its application: a folksong says that thoughts are free and means by that that they are not censored. Research is free (art, as well) that is unrestricted by political restraints; another freedom is unrestricted by economic restraints, and a third form of freedom is unbound by any sense of usefulness. | 1.定义道德自由  正如几乎的所有人类思想和生活之基础概念那样，自由的概念具有多重意义。其主要原因并非是语言的含糊不清，而是由于自然的和社会的世界的发展。就其核心，自由有一个两极意义（a bipolar meaning）。消极上，它意味着独立。正如“自由来自（free from）”表明自由源于他人的决定，它具有一个摆脱性特征，就像从特殊状况中获得的自由。积极上，自由意谓着自我决定或者“自由为了（free for）”：一个人自为地决定他将做什么，并且为自己提供实施的内动力。  根据消极的和摆脱性的概念，一个人身上所施加的规范和要求越少，他就越自由。此处，我们被或多或少地相关联着；自由之概念是一种相对的观念，而一个人能谈论自由的不同程度。在不同自由等级的意义之外，也能发现它的广大适用范围：一首民谣主张思想是自由的，这意味着思想不能被审查。研究（艺术也是如此）是自由的，意味着它不被政治约束所限制；另外一种自由是不被经济所限制；第三种自由的形式是不被任何有用性所限制。 |

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| When it comes to free rhythm, the free market and free-trade, also in the case of “Free Churches” [Freikirchen1], free jazz, or freedom from debts, “free” means that one has detached oneself from something or from prior rules and burdens; in other words, that one has experienced limitations and overcome them. In this sense, one can be free who has not capitulated either to inner desires nor to the external “vanities of the world” like power, affluence, or prestige. According to a vagabond, someone is only truly free who is unattached to everything but the essential of human needs like food and drink, sleeping and rambling. Finally, someone who has been released from restricted conditions, especially prison or a compound, has a feeling of freedom.  [ Translator’s note: “Free Churches” is a term applied in the German speaking world to organized churches that are  separate from the official state churches (i.e., Lutheran and Roman Catholic churches). The term may also apply to reform movements within the official state church. ]  Let’s begin with freedom of action.  2. Practical Reason: Freedom of Action  2.1 Free Agency  Imagine that someone as he falls over a cliff reflexively attempts to catch himself by grabbing the person next to him and, thereby, causes serious injury to this other person. In a second incident, someone stumbles toward a vase and breaks it; and a third, where one falls on a switch and sets off an alarm. All three events can be described by an “on the one hand” and an “on the other hand.”  On the one hand, the persons involved are agents. Although the consequences are nothing that was intended, nonetheless, they are directly attributable to the individuals. The first is the direct cause for the affected person’s injury, the second for the damage to the vase, and the third for the alarm sounding. On the other hand, it is at least assumed that the falls are neither affected nor “orchestrated.” What the individuals caused is not under their power; they “couldn’t help it.” They are agents but not authors in the exacting sense of having intended the consequences; they merely accept them. Because the persons concerned neither wanted to have happen what happened to them, the fall, nor wanted what occurred because of their action, an injury to someone, damage to something, or the setting off of the alarm--to the contrary, they were surprised--one cannot hold them accountable for the specific actions. One can attribute the cause to them but not any intention.  The same is the case with successful consequences. The individual who by falling blocks a dangerous passage and protects others from danger no doubt caused the consequences. One cannot, however, attribute to him the benefit. He is merely the agent whom one neither praises nor condemns. He cannot assume any responsibility for the consequences.  One is more than a simple agent, however, who unintentionally falls off a cliff and in falling takes into consideration alternatives. When he contemplates even if only for a split second whether there is a bush or a person on the edge available to hinder the fall and, then, ends up causing an injury because he decided to grab the person, it may be that the consequence was unintentional. Nevertheless, the agent assumes responsibility because he acted with knowledge and intent since he met the characteristic conditions for freedom of action: he is aware of a range of options among alternative possibilities, seized upon one option, and simultaneously blocked the realization of other possibilities.  An initial taking stock here draws two conclusions. On the one hand, the fundamental level of personal freedom, the freedom to act, is joined to agency even though not every agency involves the freedom of action. Everything that occurs because of someone may count the “someone,” the agent, in a loose sense of the term as the author of what happens. The more demanding concept is realized where the simple agency escalates to intentionality, the actor becomes a free agent, and one can attribute to him free action including personal responsibility for the action. On the other hand, four meanings of freedom are manifest, which build on one another and demonstrate an increased freedom with each stage. We are concerned here with a unique, increasingly complex kind of activity. Since the first three stages are not characteristic for persons, they can be called preliminary stages. Nonetheless, because they are also found in humans, the frequently discussed anthropological question of whether humanity is “natural or an exception to nature” can be answered with a “both/and:” humanity is inseparable from nature but simultaneously rises above it; humanity clearly distinguishes itself from nature in which it nonetheless remains imprisoned.  A movement is free in the most modest sense when, like a free fall, there is no external impediment. At this first stage, freedom is entirely negative; it is an independence from external restraints. The activity associated with freedom at this stage that one can see in lifeless objects is not even a behavior but a mere movement. The ground for any such effect is simply a cause and by no means even a simple agent.  Freedom is enhanced when, by means of a moment of self-determination, it first becomes positive. According to this second preliminary stage, a sequence of movement is free, in the literal sense spontaneous, when it arises out of the agent itself. In this case, the appurtenant activity is reflexive but still has no conscious character. It is a self-movement (along with the corresponding freedom that it represents) that is already found in simple organisms but not in minerals. Nevertheless, it is “light years” from anything like what one experiences as peculiarly human freedom. One does find this stage of freedom, organic self-determination, in animals and humans when it comes to purely vegetative processes like digestion.  With the third preliminary stage, we encounter practical consciousness. At this point, for example with hunger and thirst, the reflexive moment is ramped up to a practical (admittedly at first only sensuous) self-consciousness, to feelings of pleasure and displeasure. This sensuous-conscious spontaneity opens up a whole new range of behavior. One can understand hunger and thirst as a warning signal to the brain in the form of a feeling of deficiency in food and drink that is combined with the drive to satisfy it. The feelings are originally only a drive and not yet an obedience to the drive that allays the hunger or appeases the thirst. This elementary practical consciousness is found by no means only with such highly developed species as primates but also in other animals although only at a rudimentary level. Nonetheless, the fact that it extends into the personal realm means that it constitutes a transition stage to the primary level, which consists of action and freedom of action.  The primary stage presents itself with three levels so that, more precisely, one can speak of three primary stages. What they share in common is the capacity, thanks to thought- and language-aptitude, to develop one’s own activities with their appropriate reflections; in other words, to act according to one’s own and not someone else’s reasons. For example, in the case of hunger and thirst, these reflections include when and how to satisfy one’s need; further, how one is to avoid other feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and not least the question, how one could avoid them: short-sightedly and insularly, or, rather, sustainably and with interconnectedness, or even, when it comes to more ambitious goals, with long-term renunciation. Such structurally complex behavior that is self-conscious with respect to thought and simultaneously a self-controlling and self-directed spontaneity is what is called action in the narrower sense of the word, which is characteristic of humanity. It encompasses not only making or producing, poiesis, but also action in the sense of praxis.  As a capacity to act (self-)consciously (“with representation”) and freely (“spontaneously”), freedom of action permits the attribution of actions and taking the agent to be of sound mind and a person capable of taking responsibility. Soundness of mind and personhood belong, therefore, together, but certainly not so narrowly that one could in any way deny personhood to persons without soundness of mind, for example babies, the mentally challenged, and those with severe dementia. In contrast, someone who acts only recklessly and carelessly is a person to whom one can accuse and attribute precisely these characteristics of riskiness and carelessness.  Where does freedom begin and end? Is someone acting freely who with a gun aimed at his head turns over his wallet to a robber?; is the captain free who in the midst of a violent storm seeks to save his ship and sailors by throwing part of the ship’s cargo overboard?; is the patient free after a serious accident to whom a medical doctor discloses: “We have to amputate your leg; we have no other choice?;” or the person who in honest self-defense shoots someone else? In each case the spontaneous answer is, “No!,” but upon closer examination this answer demands correction.  Without question none of these persons is a simple agent because each is free to refuse to hand over the wallet, to throw the cargo overboard, or to refuse the operation. When the perpetrator of violence doesn’t ask for the wallet but for the life of a stranger, a refusal seems even obligatory (see Chap. 22.1). Whoever refuses to turn over the wallet calls into play things that one usually values more than money. In light of this unexpressed assumption, one can maintain (as in the case of the captain or the medical doctor) that he has no choice. Nonetheless, he acts knowledgably: he sees an alternative reaction; and willfully: even when, driven by the terror of loss of one’s life, he reacts “automatically,” the action occurs on the basis of consent. An alternative kind of reaction occurs when someone suddenly confronted with danger is so powerfully affected that he is overwhelmed by a panic attack and acts only reflexively or, as if paralyzed, just stands there. (From the captain, of course, one certainly expects a “cool head.”)  16.2 Acting According to Reasons  According to a widely shared opinion, freedom is taken to be a “wild” freedom that acts just as impetuously as it does unreflectively and wantonly, and even delights in unbounded capriciousness. Because in fact a practical knowledge is constitutive for freedom of action, it at least rules out a pure unruliness, that anarchy that makes action unpredictable and surprises others, perhaps even the agent himself.  When it comes to practical knowledge, one must distinguish the concept of its indispensable minimum from optional additions. Optional are genuinely normative parts, those insights into norms, values, and principles that establish what is normative, practical knowledge. Its degree of knowledge (cognitive level) extends from normal moral consciousness to its carefully reflective form, and finally up to philosophical knowledge of principles. Likewise optional are those parts relevant to action but theoretical that are concerned with the description of a situation and with means-ends relationships. In contrast to a non-acting but pure epistemologically relevant knowledge, we are concerned here with a normative-practical knowledge. Both normative-practical and theoretical-practical knowledge increase free agency; they belong not merely to the basic level of agency. Only a third kind of knowledge is no longer optional with respect to norms, a practical knowledge that is concerned with what one does or does not do; this is “reflective-practical knowledge.” Where this kind of reflective-practical knowledge is absent, there is also no freedom of action because one doesn’t know what one is doing as in sleeping, contemplation, or in a certain respect as with Oedipus and the mentioned mushroom eater.  Knowledge does not need to be objectively valid and doubtless correct in these three cases. Sufficient is a presumed, even an only alleged knowledge, an agent’s opinion, a practical belief. Decisive is that the knowledge affects the action of the respective agent and that it consciously influences him. Neither may just somehow and somewhere happen but must come into play in his actual action. As a(eventually, only alleged) knowledge out of which the action arises, it has a practical and simultaneously subjective character.  Knowledge can be limited to the mere “what” of an action. For example, someone wants to overcome his lethargy and finally do something without determining the kind of action. Since knowledge influences only the motivation but not its nearer goal and the means to it, the corresponding freedom of action is limited. It is content with a freedom of exertion (libertas exerciti), which consists of the freedom to act or not to act, and does not include the freedom of discretion (libertas specificationis), which consists of the freedom to act one way or another.  If one asks about the cause in the case of simple agency, it is impersonal not in reference to a sub-human being (“Why did the bee sting?”) but in reference to a person, even oneself: “Why when I fell did I reflexively grab the ledge?” The “self” is turned here into the third person about whom one speaks and not with or to whom one speaks. Consequently, the answer consists in a practical knowledge independent of the agent and is an a-personal cause. In the case of the bee, the answer might be: “it was frightened.” One says the same of a person whether another or oneself: “He/I began to fall, panicked, and tried to cling to the next possible thing.”  As we have said, the situation is different when the falling individual thinks about whether he should grab onto the other person, who could be then injured, or grab the ledge, or rather the certainly seizable root rather than attempt to cling to the apparently slippery rock. Only at such a point is one confronted with multiple possibilities, weighs them against one another, and makes a decision. Even if to the most rudimentary degree, this free agency allows the question that appears to be improper when asked of the bee that stings out of nervousness, and altogether improper when asked of plants and animals (at least most animals). This is the question of accountability: “With what right did the cause occur?”  The question of accountability can be applied to all three grammatically possible persons and ultimately applies to one and the same person, the agent of the action. Whether singular or plural: in the first person, the agent asks himself: “Why did I grab the person and not the root?” In the second person, the agent is questioned by a victim and often with an undertone of upbraiding: “Why did you grab me and place me in danger?” Finally, a non-victimized third person, for example a judge, can ask the agent why he acted as he did.  The answer in all three cases consists in a reflexive practical knowledge (it consists in providing practical reasons) and, indeed, in the reasons themselves, not in theoretical knowledge about practical reasons and not at all with respect to indifferent causes opposed to practical knowledge. One can attribute to the reasons the character of causes, as we’ve said, because they are mental events that bring forth actions that are visible events in a shared world (Davidson 1980, e.g., Chap. 3). However, the “ontological” question of the kind of being possessed by the reasons is not asked initially. Even someone who holds reasons to be causes hardly doubts that the essential reasons here, the arguments for and against an action, have the character of practical knowledge, which distinguishes them from the usual, knowledge-independent causes. Normal causes are external to the accountability of a person; they are external causes of accountability; practical reasons are in contrast internal causes of accountability. In contrast to external causes of accountability, causes based on reasons are subject to the choice between approval and disapproval. External causes actually change the world; reasoned causes have merely the potential to do so. Whether or not they actually change the world depends upon the subject who has accepted or rejected the reasons – silently or explicitly.  Practical reasons contain a demand character, and, therefore, one also speaks of imperatives. What is meant here is not the capricious command of an overwhelming power. The demands to close a window or to stop smoking have the status in a moral sense of imperatives only when in the background there is an argument, in this case: either one’s own or the other’s health, which justifies the demand. Whoever wishes to lead his life well in the technical, pragmatic, or moral sense must capitulate to the appropriate imperatives. Whether or not he does so in fact is another question.  2.3 Reasons and Pretense  Reasons can occur in combination with other reasons and constitute a network, in the end even a world, of reasons. This world can be valid only for a single individual or also for smaller or larger groups, finally for all of humanity. Furthermore, this world can establish order in different fashions. Not least, one can run up against compatibilities and also against incompatibilities, even contradictions.  With respect to the question of effectiveness, there are three known modalities. Practical reasons apply either possibly or actually or even necessarily. In the first case, they can be effectual (problematic-practical); in the second, they are actually so (assertorically-practical); and, in the third sense, something unavoidably occurs (apodictically-practical). These three levels of effectiveness or validity [Geltung] are certainly to be distinguished from the three levels of validity [Gültigkeit] even if one employs for both the same technical Latin language (Chap. 2.2): modal technical reasons are problematic, pragmatic reasons are assertoric, and truly moral reasons are apodictically valid.  Each of these three modalities occurs in at least three functions within the framework of accountability. (In addition, one can throw in an independent explanation of accountability.) Either reasons should justify the action as good and right, at least as “definitely defensible;” or reasons should excuse an action although it is not good. Finally they can expose an action as bad. In terms of function, then, there are justifying, excusing and,exposing, compromising reasons.  When it comes to more important decisions, it is often the case that a partly hasty and partly thorough evaluation of reasons with their respective negligent or attentive weighing of alternatives transpires in advance of a decision. One can compare this creative task with the construction of a geometrical figure. For a given goal one constructs in thought an action that one believes will lead to the goal and is in fact realizable. Because in many cases the goal cannot be achieved directly but only as a consequence of a long chain of events, the calculations for such a chain of events flow backwards from the goal until they – this, too, corresponds to a geometrical construction – reach the starting point, the agent. In contrast to a geometrical construction, however, practical calculation often has the character of an internal pushing and pulling. It is often the case that an ambivalence, equivocalness, and ambiguity prevails that is compounded by indecision and combined with an uncertainty that can endure even after the decision has been made. It is not necessary that the subject’s action-effective knowledge consist in a pettily ordered world of reasons.  Both aspects of practical knowledge (the knowledgeable and intentional moment, as well as all three modalities) and not least the three functions are susceptible to a double deception. In the aim of evading a goal, reproach, or even punishment or to accept an unearned praise, one can deceive others. Furthermore, one deceives even oneself when it comes to saving one’s self-assessment and self-worth, one’s carefully cultivated self-image of “moral integrity.”  There is a second hemisphere to the world of deception. It consists, as well, of two parts: deception of the other and of the self. With respect to unintentional self-deception, an agent can have in the rule only a partial clarity about events; other aspects emerge after the fact, while some become clear only after many years, and some things remain forever concealed. Not least, one can succumb to a deep disappointment, a fundamental illusion, or an ideology.  It may be that this huge world of deception is aggravating. Surprising, however, it is not. Subjective, practical reasons are far too important, too consequential, and of too serious consequence, even often existentially decisive for one to take them constantly only at face value. Like the still under-aged Briony in the novel by Ian McEwan, many a person is sheltered by means of “a ruthless, youthful light-heartedness, a self-serving forgetfulness well into puberty” (Atonement, Chap 1)  The capacity to intentionally mislead others even when one knows better, thus, the capacity to lie (additionally, the capacity to lie to oneself or to deceive oneself) appears to be specific to humanity. The only species that is capable of more than a rudimentary morals is just as capable, as well, of more than a rudimentary immorality. Whoever in fact never lies is a highly moral individual; whoever, in contrast, is incapable of lying is not in some respect even more moral; rather, he is not a human being.  Both hemispheres, of deception and of non-deception, constitute together a “world of reasons and pretenses.”  2.4 Levels of Practical Reason  Subjective-practical reasons have a fourfold individualizing index. A person P1 performs the action H1 in the situation S1 on the basis of the reason G1: in order to hinder the event, P1 grabs towards the cliff within reach. According to the individualizing index, there is a specific reason for every concrete action; individual actions have individual reasons. Already contained in their linguistic character, reasons have more than individual validity; they are a possible rule: Whoever (Pi) finds himself in a similar situation (situation segment Sa,i) and with the help of a cliff within reach (situation segment Sb,i) seeks to stop his fall (situation segment Sc,i) has a good reason (Gi) to grab towards the cliff (Hi).  However, what is the meaning of “good” here? The expression “good” says that the reason for the action, the justification, actually fulfills its task. Whoever in the given situation seeks to stop his fall does well to grab towards the cliff (it is a good thing to do). In the process, though, one aspect is consciously, the other potentially unconsciously open. Consciously open is the question of whether the grabbing toward the cliff was the only possible action and whether, in the case of multiple possibilities, it was the best possible action. This openness amounts to a prudence when it comes to the demand for justification; it is not unusual that justification is combined with a silent addendum; a higher demand would realistically not be meaningful. (When it comes to competitions or life and death struggles, “merely good” is not adequate.) The other, often unconscious, openness is concerned with the kind of justification: according to which kind of being good is the reason good? The answer involves the decisive role of the three levels of technically, pragmatically, and morally or categorically good  If the agency is determined by practical reasons, it achieves the rank of being rational. Once again, decisive here is not knowledge but the kind of reason that governs the action. To be sure, there is only one reason, the capacity to act according to reasons. This one reason, however, is concerned either with knowledge r with action. In the first case, it is called theoretival reason; in the second, practical reason. Their respective reasons are not necessarily moral. There are, in addition, technical and pragmatic reasons so that at first we are concerned here with the more modest practical reason and not with the more exacting, pure practical or moral practical reasons.  Someone does not already possess practical reason (whether pure or in a broader sense) who knows merely how to evaluate his actions from the standpoint of the (technical, pragmatic, moral) good; only someone does who knows how to live according to good. This “knowing how to live” arises in three levels as a negative partial power, as a positive partial power, and as a completely sovereign power.  One has command over practical reason at the weaker level who regards the perspective of the good not as a neutral observer. A neutral observer possesses only a theoretical reason even when it is directed toward “praxis” as an object. Reason is first practical where one perceives the demands as affecting oneself, as applying to oneself, and feels subjected to them even when one doesn’t always adhere to them (Code word: weakness of the will). In the case of practical reason, the good is a should that is recognized by the individual involved; simultaneously, though, because of the actual acknowledgement of a should, it is a “Being.” This paradoxical manner of existence, the Being of a should, becomes clear where someone doesn’t conform to what should be according to the internal judgment of the subject – as one feels in cases of regret, remorse, or moral shame. Already at this first level, the level of a negative partial power, the good is no pure should, but it is at the same time a Being; it contains a descriptive-prescriptive double character (see Chap. 22.2): it has an experienced as well as a lived presence in the form of negative practical feelings.  Practical reason obtains a positive but also only a partial power when it finds recognition in actual action, but this is the case only occasionally, not dependably. Already at this second level, practical reason contains a complete presence and power but only transiently. With this positive partial power, the recognition of a should is combined with an obedience that corresponds to a positive practical feeling that is manifest as the satisfaction that one has lived up to the demand of the good without any weakness (of the will). Admittedly, such a feeling occurs only occasionally.  Reason reaches the third level – complete, sovereign power – when one practices ever again its recognition, when it is constantly renewed, and, finally, when it is made a solid component of the individual; then, it becomes a mark of one’s character.  Whether negative or positive – in the case of partial power, practical reason is recognized first “in principle.” Like a tree that has not yet set its roots, this level of recognition of practical reason cannot hold its own against the storm of anger, desire, or passion. Practical reason as a partial power is a (occasional or frequent) weakness of the will that is overcome when it possesses complete power. Obviously, partial or complete power is not a simple either/or. The presence of practical reason occurs far more in the form of innumerable gradations comparable to the continuous spectrum experienced with the force of wind. We focus here on four points on the scale of gradation: that of extreme weakness of the will whose practical reason is lost already with the slightest breeze, the usual weakness of the will, then the tolerably strong will, and finally the extremely strong will capable of withstanding a hurricane of temptation and seduction.  If practical reason maintains command, then one’s justifying reasons have simultaneously motivational power. So-called internalists attribute this motivational power to justificatory reasons; externalists reject them. This conflict – it can now be seen – can be solved only practically, not theoretically. According to the theory of action and its reasons, both options occur. Which of the two actually occurs in a particular situation is determined by an idiosyncrasy of the acting individual; it is dependent upon the power or weakness of his practical reason.  Philosophers of action and moral philosophers have engaged this theme since Antiquity. It appears under the theme of “weakness of the will” (Greek akrasia, Latin incontinentia; authoritatively, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VII 1-11; in addition, see Höffe 32006, Chap. 13.3). Such a weak will generally consists in one’s practical reason possessing too little power. In the case of moral weaknesses, the power of practical reason acknowledges morals (in contrast to evil) as its guiding light and offers competitive resistance to the storm that in the face of the competition is too weak. Otherwise than with vices, reason in the face of weakness of the will is only occasionally and not usually powerless. (One must here contradict Dante, who in his Divine Comedy attributes to weakness of the will sins like gluttony, avarice, and anger as habitual misconduct; for example, Hell, 5. Canto, Verse 55f.: “Lechery will so dominate you, / that its law allows desires.”) Within the framework of a nuanced phenomenology of moral weaknesses, the weak willed is not the one who pursues morally corrupt habits but the one who permits his good habits to be dissuaded not constantly but time and again by anger, desire, or passion.  As has been suggested, weakness of the will is sensibly understood as a deficiency of practical reason without assuming that the weakness has too little knowledge. It knows full well what would be the good thing to do; only, this knowledge is – temporarily – a useless possession; more precisely: it is comparable to a competency that doesn’t adequately assert itself. Whoever acts contrary to the good out of habit and without remorse suffers from a chronic wickedness, intemperateness, something like what Dante calls lechery which is difficult to cure. However, someone who, in contrast, is still capable of remorse and honestly regrets what has been done recognizes the good but only “in principle,” not through actual actions. He suffers “only” of a transient and frequently curable wickedness, precisely that of the weakness of the will.  3. Autonomous Reason: Freedom of the Will  3.1 Three Levels of Freedom and Remorse  Viewed negatively, practical reason is the ability to allow one’s desires to be governed ultimately neither by sensuous feelings of pleasure or displeasure, nor by the desires and dispositions of others, nor by authorities (including one’s tradition). Viewed positively, practical reason is the ability to comply with reasons and, also, to hold firm to these reasons as an imagined good against sensuous temptations and social distractions. Practical reason is set off from pure sensuousness and simple authority.  Let’s focus on the domain of sensuous impulses. Here practical reason rejects as its governing motive the current dominant popular needs and desires as well as the seductions from advertising and other persons. Nonetheless, practical reason calls one to action. Precisely because it consists in an instance of motivation that does not submit to the yoke of momentary pleasure and displeasure, practical reason demonstrates that it consists of a double freedom, negative as well as positive. It consists not merely negatively in freeing oneself from pleasure and displeasure as the final authority for one’s decision making. Positively it is an incentive that subordinates itself to the demands of reasons.  Motives of pleasure and displeasure such as hunger, thirst, sleeplessness, and sexuality (in short, sensuous motivations) may by all means have a certain power. It would be preposterous were humans to lose this drama that is often enough driven by strong passions with its dramatic and at the same time productive tension. “Practical reason” simply means not to grant superiority to sensuous motives and passions. It must, however, integrate the requirements of reasons; in other words, it must overcome pure immediacy to benefit from a motivating power shaped by the good. Whoever has done so has left behind the preliminary levels of freedom and finds himself at the three-part primary level with its equally three-tiered practical reason.  There are three levels to freedom corresponding to the three levels of the good depending upon the scope of the reasons contained in reason’s demands and not on the degree with which they are fulfilled, that is, not according to the power or powerlessness of practical reason. At the first level, the technical or functional good, reasons conform to a means-ends relationship. Whoever conforms to such laws appropriate to a practical activity has in this, but also only in this, respect a will; he has at his command a technical or functional freedom. Recall the example from the previous discussion of affluence in which one is able and must be willing to bring in more income than is expended. In this case, one does not exercise a technical freedom who already knows the relevant laws governing earnings (economic, stock market, etc.), or who has the wish to conform to such laws but does not possess the power to realize this wish. Only he is free who neither succumbs to a consumption addiction nor recoils from the effort required to increase his income. Such a person is able, in fact, to subjugate his lifestyle to the imperative “Earn more than you spend!”  At the second level, that of pragmatic-practical reasons, “good” means so much as “good for the well(-being) of someone.” The corresponding freedom extends not only to the ability to pursue the goal of the natural end of a species with a body and sense organs, admittedly a pre-moral end, but also to the ability to oppose internal as well as external resistance to the goal. In the case of affluence, when the goal contributes to one’s well-being, there belongs to practical freedom the ability to pursue a relativized understanding that recognizes that affluence alone does not make one happy. As a consequence, whoever is free in the pragmatic sense does not simply aspire to ever more affluence.  It is similar with a second example, career development. With respect to a career, one is technically free who has acquired and effectively applied the necessary knowledge and skills. To one’s pragmatic freedom in this case belongs the ability to pursue a career including its success, to continue it in anticipation of an enduring well-being or to know when to abandon it if there are slim chances of success either because of a lack of talent or because of superior competition. Pragmatic freedom also includes the capacity not only to know but also to live according to the knowledge that a successful career alone does not make one happy.  Obviously, there is still another level beyond pragmatic freedom. At the third, moral level, practical reasons push aside all consideration of one’s personal welfare. At this level the more fundamental, immediately functioning motivating powers (sensuousness) are repressed. The will becomes the sole ruling motivation; it is free as such, and not only in a particular respect. Freedom of the will comes into play only at this third, moral level. This freedom is defined by a special kind of practical reason, its highest normative level.  Whether or not the radical rejection of sensuous and social “temptations” constitutes a world-denying conception or is, to the contrary, an essential aspect of the world, perhaps it constitutes the core of everyday moral consciousness, is a question still to be considered. Furthermore, the question arises whether or not within moral justifications and the freedom of the will that accompanies them a binary division presses to the fore: an initial partial level, civic morals [Rechtsmoral], might constitute the common basis that all should acknowledge; in our example, this would mean that it would be improper to acquire wealth or to establish a career by deception. A second partial level, meritorious morals, would demand benevolence and charity beyond the mere avoidance of debt.  The three levels of freedom can be illustrated by the case of a person who wants to end his life by jumping from a bridge. We will assume that the person actually jumps and does not fall by mistake or is not pushed by another. We start with the preliminary level: the individual is in this first respect free when he in free fall is not thrown back over the railing by an extremely massive blast of wind. He is free in the second preliminary sense when the fall is a self-initiated movement and not the consequence of any push. Finally, the individual is free in the third preliminary sense when he is not so thoroughly under the influence of drugs that he has jumped only out of a dazed knowledge and desire, in a certain sense even unconsciously.  Insofar as the suicide is carried out with clear knowledge and desire, it can demonstrate volition with respect to the three primary levels of freedom: the technical level with respect to the effectiveness of the chosen means; the pragmatic level with respect to the appraisal of one’s life-situation; and morally with respect to the assumption of responsibility not only for oneself but also for others. While falling, the suicidal person can experience uncertainty in any if not all three respects and feel regret or remorse in three levels of increasing scope:  The broadest sense of technical remorse overwhelms the individual when he is suddenly uncertain whether or not on impact he can expect the desired sudden death. Perhaps – the person reflects--the bridge is not high enough, or the ground is not hard enough, so that he must fear becoming a paraplegic or a slow, agonizing death when he is discovered too late. Technical remorse involves the reflection: “I should have chosen a more certain means.”  The suicidal person experiences a second pragmatic remorse when during the fall he suddenly realizes an alternative way out of the mess that led to the jump. In the face of the new chances for life, even happiness, that occur to him, he thinks: “I should have thought through the options more carefully, or I should have sought advice.”  Finally, one can feel a moral remorse when he acknowledges actual meaning of a heretofore undervalued, perhaps even repressed, point of view. For example, he admits that, with the choice of suicide, he violates such high-ranking responsibilities as the care for his life-partner, child, or parents. Moral remorse amounts to the thought: “How could I place my own well-being above all other responsibilities?”  3.2 Autonomy as Pure Practical Reason  The suicide example with its levels of freedom and any possible remorse demonstrates once again how sober the concept of morals is that constitutes a philosophy of free will. Without any undertone of moralization, morals are equated with the highest level of practical reasons that corresponds to the highest form of value-estimation, an unconditional good. Only at this level is the potential for freedom fully exhausted as the capacity to act according to practical reasons. According to its philosophical concept, freedom of the will in the strict sense does not consist in a will that is undetermined and unconnected from practical reasons, even groundless as an irrational will. It means the ability to pursue practical reasons and to actualize this “willed” ability with respect to its third and highest level.  One can defend, of course, a broader concept of free will and speak of a modest first, a more demanding second, and a maximal third level of free will. Modest free will consists of the ability to sway one’s willing in light of some kind of benefit or detriment (technical freedom). The more demanding freedom of the will consists in the ability to sway one’s willing with respect to one’s own well-being (pragmatic freedom); however, the maximal or radical freedom of the will consists in the ability, in addition, to sway one’s willing by means of restricting one’s own personal well-being (moral freedom).  The three levels of freedom and practical reason are not necessarily connected. With respect to the ascending direction, this disconnect is obvious and is indicated by the examples of aspiration for affluence and career success: technical reasons (the first level), even when strenuously adhered to, are not “automatically” oriented towards a successful, happy life (the second level) much less toward morals (the third level). Such a connection is even conceptually, on the basis of a mere functional goodness, impossible. Neither do pragmatic reasons as such contain any connection to morals.  With respect to the descending line, there is a connection but no close interlinking: aspiration for affluence or a successful career according to the most strenuous avoidance of deception safeguards against a guilty conscience (that is, it eliminates some of the barriers to one’s own well-being, but it cannot guarantee a successful life). There is almost no positive connection between moral and technical reasons for action. Whoever refrains from all deception and every other moral misstep avoids indeed certain threats to affluence and career success but makes no constructive contribution to them either.  Between pragmatic and technical reasons for action, however, there is a close connection. Whoever wants to live happily must pursue and integrate happiness-conducive aspects like health, friendship, and professional success into his life-style; in other words, one must pursue technical-pragmatic grounds for one’s actions.  Above all, moral freedom does not include technical and pragmatic freedom. As is confirmed by the simplest experiences of life, the highest level of free will is not synonymous with full, personal freedom: a moral, thoroughly scrupulous person can lead a thoroughly chaotic but only barely successful life from the perspective of moral integration. At that point where practical reasons for action do not bear on a narrowly defined character model but, rather, on a larger range of life, one speaks of practical principles, as well as of maxims (see Chap. 20.3). Principles, for example the moral principle to help those in need, resemble laws, but they are distinguished from their prototype, natural laws, by means of two features: their object is personal actions, not natural events; and, according to the features of their occurrence, they do not have exclusive but, nonetheless, predominantly a character of should.  Where do practical reasons or principles come from; where do they originate? This is not to be taken as an empirical question. We are not concerned with an historical origin; that is, we are not asking why certain reasons develop an action-guiding power either in a single person (a question for biographers) or in a group or culture (a question for intellectual historians). We are asking about the origin of legitimation: where do reasons get their justification?  When it comes to morals, there are two decisive possibilities that constitute a strict either/or. If one takes reasons to be laws with respect to their rule-character and invokes the second paradigm for laws, civic laws, then one encounters either autonomy or heteronomy. Here, the opposite of autonomy is not authority but heteronomy. Within the conceptual framework of this project, the non-authoritarian character of reasons for action belongs to all levels of practical principles. It is a (self-evident) precept and not a distinguishing feature; even laws that are heteronomous in the legitimating sense are not authoritarian. When it comes to the law, auto-nomie means self-legislation: a corporate body in the public sense, for example a state, or a private subject, for instance a natural person, does not allow laws (nomoi) to be determined externally by an extraneous (hetero-) authority; rather it legislates the law for itself (auto-).  Where does the binding character of practical principles come from? Technical and functional grounds are nothing other than the demands of a particular field of action. They are specific laws governing an area of action that can be quite complex and in their “application” can demand a dizzying degree of judgment. Whoever adheres to such situational laws acquiesces to their previously established goals or interests. For example, someone who lives according to rules that result in his having much more income than expenditures acquiesces to an interest in affluence. Whereas the specific laws governing the focus of action are rational (hence, internal), their pre-established interest is established externally. A technical principle does not establish its own legitimacy; it obtains its obligatoriness externally. In this sense, as an external law in contrast to practical reason, technical principles have a heteronomous character.  One can also approach pragmatic principles as specific laws governing an area of action. The proper concern, one’s own well-being, does not have the typical limits of an area of action since it is not satisfied with a more or less delineated area of activity but with one’s entire life. Other than that however, pragmatic principles share the origin of technical principles: since they make a demand on practical reason (“Focus on your own well-being!”), their obligatoriness arises ultimately externally. Once again, we encounter an extrinsic legality. Its ultimate authority does not lie in the will (in the sense of practical reason) but in the previously given goal, one’s own well-being.  The alternative to heteronomy is autonomy, self-legislation, with the crucial addition: oriented toward practical reason, that is, the will. Autonomy is not meant here in the broader sense of some kind of self-commitment, say that one establishes as one’s own an (internal or external) demand. In everyday discourse, of course, this self-obligatoriness can be called autonomy. However, it consists in a weakened if also common understanding. Autonomy in the sense of the ethics of the will is more demanding. Within the capacity to act according to reasons and principles in general, one encounters the decisive question: is one concerned with a demand external or internal to the will?  What is meant by the second option, a lawfulness that is internal to the will? The answer is so difficult that many philosophers prefer not even to attempt a response. Some even go so far as to make an advance-defense, that is, to hold the concept of autonomy to be irrelevant and to declare the attempt to ground morals in the autonomy of the will to be very murky, perhaps even abstruse. One properly gives up, however, only when one has good reasons to do so. Before we engage objections in the next two chapters, let’s rebut here one objection to the freedom of the will. According to a popular counter-argument, freedom of the will rests upon a presupposition that is too strong. It pushes aside, namely, all “usual” concerns with sensuous desires, social conventions, and legitimate laws. Schopenhauer assumed that the thought of a pure practical reason attempts to secularize the conception of a religiously established moral law (Preisschrift über die Grundlage der Moral [On the Basis of Morals], § 4), Tugendhat agrees with him (2006 15)).  In truth, someone is not free in the exercise of his will who “wills what he wills irrespective of any precept. Freedom of the will also does not consist of some kind of wishing at a second level but in a specific kind of reflection. Rather, someone has at his command a modest conception of the freedom of the will who subordinates himself to principles of practical reason. However, only where the principles have an internal origin within the will are we concerned with the more demanding sense of autonomy. It is not someone who in the final instance allows himself to be shaped by the power of the appetites or passions, feelings of sympathy and antipathy, or a dominant custom, and, also, not one who chooses the best means to pre-given goals, but, rather, only someone who leads his life according to the laws of the rank of autonomy who is free in this sense.  The demand of morals is directed, indeed, toward a being who can discard neither his sensuous nature nor his historical-social origins. Precisely for this reason because one remains a being with desires, a history, and a social setting, morals have a should character. It consists in the challenge to admit one’s desires and one’s social dependence, even to affirm them as long as they don’t contradict morals, but not to allow them to be the final grounds of determination of one’s actions. Autonomy in this sense means to be more than a being with mere desires and social concerns and in this “more” to discover oneself.  The “more” does not include a casting off of the “less.” Besides, it is impossible for someone simply to lay aside the manifold conditions of his personal, social, economic, and political nature. One is prohibited from making a new start out of nothing. The freedom of the will consists neither in the rejection of vitality, sensibility, and social orientation nor does it pursue a “sincere” morals principally in terms of an escape from life, a lack of tradition or history, or a critique of a developed form of living. Like the freedom of action, the freedom of the will does not consist in indeterminateness but in a qualified obligation; in our case, it consists in giving oneself laws out of which one’s willing finally results. The autonomy of the will in this morally decisive sense is itself the origin of its willing so-and-not-otherwise. | 当涉及到自由的节奏、自由市场和自由贸易，同样在“教会自由”、爵士自由、或者借贷自由，“自由”意味着一个人已经将自己从一些事或者从前定的规范和负担中解脱出来；换句话说，一个人已经经验到了限制，并克服了它们。在这个意义上，一个既不向内在欲望，也不向外在“世界之虚荣”（比如权力、金钱或威望）所投降的人，就是一个自由的人。从一名流浪者来看，一个除了必需的人类需要（比如食物、饮水、睡觉、闲逛）之外不依附于任何事情的人才是真正自由。最后，一个从受限环境（特别是监狱和高墙）中释放出来的人，拥有一种自由感。  [译者注：“教会自由”是一个术语，它在德国使用，用于向世界宣扬从政府官方教会中分离开的组织教会（比如路德和罗马天主教教会）。这个词也适用于在政府官方教会中所进行的改革运动。]  让我们起始于行动自由。  2.实践理性：行动自由  2.1自由的行为者  想象一个人，他从悬崖边摔倒并条件反射地通过试图抓住他身旁的人来稳住自己，因而导致了对这个他人的一系列伤害。在第二个事故中，一个人绊倒向一个花瓶，并打碎了它；在第三个事故中，一个人摔倒在开关上并启动了警报。所有三个事件，都可以用一个“一方面”和一个“另一方面”所描述。  一方面，所有涉及到的人都是行为者（agent）。虽然，这些结果并不是有意为之，但无论如何，它们都直接归因于这些个体。第一个人是受伤了的人的伤害的直接原因，第二个人是花瓶破碎的直接原因，第三个人是警报响起的直接原因。另一方面，至少可以假定这些摔倒既不是装模做样的，也不是“策划的（orchestrated）”。个体所引起的并不在其控制之下；他们“无法控制它”。他们是行为者但不是策划者，即已在结果导向上拥有确切意向的策划者；他们仅仅是它们的接受者。因为，相关人既不想使发生在他们身上的（事）之发生（摔倒），也不想要由于他们的行为而引起之结果（对于别人的一次伤害，损坏一些东西，或者启动了警报）——相反，他们对这一切结果惊讶不已——一个人不能使他们对这些特殊行为负责。一个人可以被归因成这些原因，即便他么毫无此产生结果的意向。  即便是具有好的结果的情况也一样。一个由于摔落从而堵住了危险通道并防止其他人遇到危险的个体，无疑也会产生结果。然而，这不能将好处归于他。他仅仅是一个行为者，既不应表扬也不应谴责。他不能为相应结果承担任何责任。  然而，一个无意中在悬崖边摔倒并且在摔倒过程中考虑到其它选择的人，不仅仅是一个单纯的行为者。即使他仅是在短暂的几秒钟之内沉思，是否这里有一颗灌木或者一个人够得着以阻止他的摔倒，并且之后，由于他决定抓住一个人结果导致一次伤害，这样的结果可能都不是无意的了。尽管如此，鉴于该行动者满足了行动自由的独特条件，又因为他根据知识和意图而行动，故该行为者要承担责任：在诸多可选择的可能性中，他意识到一系列的选择，抓住其中之一，并且同时阻止了其他可能性之实现。  这个最初的思量可以得到两点结论。一方面，个人自由的基础层次即行动的自由，与行为者相连，即使并非每个行为者都涉及到行动自由。由于某人而发生的每件事可以将“某人”亦即一个行为者，在广义上视作所发生事情的策划者。而更苛求的观念认识到，在单纯的行为性所质变为意图性之处，行动者也变为了一个自由的行为者，并且一个人能够赋予他以自由的行动，该自由的行动涵盖了对行动所承担的个人责任。另一方面，自由的四个意义得以确证，该四个意义建立于彼此之上，并展示出在层级上逐步增强的自由。在这里，我们涉及到一个独特的、复杂程度逐渐加大的行动种类。因为前三个层级对于人来说不是特性，所以它们可以被称作原始层级。尽管如此，因为它们也在人类中被发现，故这个经常被讨论的关乎人性是“自然本性（nature）的或是自然本性本性之一个例外”的人类学问题，能够用一个“两者都有（both/and）”来回答：人性与自然本性（nature）不可分割，但人性同时又高于自然本性；人性明显地将自身区分于自然本性，但是人性又仍旧囚禁在自然本性之中。  就像一次自由落体，就在最平常的意义而言，当没有任何外在干扰的时候，一个运动是自由的。在第一个层级上，自由是完全消极的；它独立于外在的限制。在这个阶段，人们能够从无生命的物体中看到的与自由相关的活动甚至不是一个行为，而仅仅是一个运动。任何一个这种结果之根据是简单的一个原因，甚至根本不是一个单纯的行为者。  凭借着自我决定，并在做出自我决定的那一瞬间，自由得到了增强，它首次变得积极。根据第二个原始层级，当一系列运动无意识的地起始于行为者自身之时，此一系列运动是自由的。在这种情况下，这个附属的活动是条件反射性的，但仍然没有意识的特征。它是一个已经在简单有机物中而不是在矿物中发现的自我运动（伴随着它所代表的相应自由）。尽管如此，它与一个人所经验到的诸如具体的人类自由之事，仍然相距甚远。当涉及到诸如消化一样的纯粹的生长过程时，在动物和人类之中，我们确实能发现这个层级的自由，即有机的自我决定。  在第三个原始层级，我们邂逅了实践的意识。在这点上，比如饥饿或口渴，反应的那一瞬间被提升为实践（当然最初还只是感官的）的自我意识，以及愉悦和不愉悦的感觉。这种感官意识（sensuous-conscious）的自发性开启了行为之一个全新的完整领域。一个人能够理解饥饿和口渴，它们是以缺乏食物和水分的形式来作为一个发送向大脑的警告信号，而该信号也总是伴随着满足它的动机。这些感觉在本源上只是一个动机，并不是一个对于缓解饥饿和调适口渴的动机之服从。这个初始的实践意识，绝不仅仅存在于高度发达的物种中，而且还可以在其他的动物（即便它们仅处于一个基本的水平）中被找到。尽管如此，该延伸到个人范围的事实意味着，它构成了朝向主要层级的中转阶段，这个主要的自由层级由行动和行动之自由所组成。  主要阶段部分将其自身展示为三个层次，所以，更精确地，我们可以称其为三个主要层级。它们的共同之处是一种能够按照人们合理的反思而发展他们的行动的能力（多亏了在语言和思想的天资）；换言之，按照自己的而不是按照他人的理由行动。比如，在饥饿和口渴的例子中，这些反思包括何时和如何满足一个人需求；进一步，一个人应如何避免愉悦和不愉悦的其它情感，特别是这个问题，即一个人怎么能避免它：要么短视和孤立地逃避，要么在互惠互利性下的长期持续地避免，要么甚至，当涉及到更有野心的目标时，通过长期的公开拒绝来回避。这种涉及到思想、也同时涉及到自我控制和自我指导的自发性（self-directed spontaneity）的如此结构化的复杂行为，正是在基于人性固有特征的狭隘字面意义之理解上，被称之为行动（action）。它不仅包括制作和生产创造物，也包括实践意义上的行动。  作为一种（自我）有意识地（“通过陈述”）和自由地（“自发地”）行动之能力，行动自由许可了行动之属性，并使行为者具有健康的精神，使个人能够承担责任。因此，精神的健康性和个体性就结合在一起，但这一定不是如此的狭义，以至于可以用任何方式否认那些没有健康精神的人的个体性，例如，那些具有精神障碍的婴儿，和那些严重痴呆症患者。相反，仅仅只是鲁莽地和粗心地行动的人是这样一个人，人们能够指责他，而且能精确地将这些风险性和粗心性的特质归于此人。  自由在哪里开始，又在哪里结束？被人用枪指着脑袋并把自己的钱包交给强盗的人是自由地行动吗？在暴风骤雨的迷雾中，试图通过扔掉部分货物来拯救他的船和水手们的船长是自由地行动吗？在遭受了一系列的事故后，一个被医生告知“我们必须切掉你的腿；没有其他选择”的病人是自由地行动吗？或者，一个确实想要自卫的人朝他人开枪，这个人是自由地行动吗？对于这些例子，自发的回答是“不是！”但是，依靠更深入的研究，这个回答需要被纠正。  毫无疑问，这些人中没有一位仅仅是一个单纯的行为者，因为他们有拒绝交出钱包，或将货物扔出甲板，或拒绝手术的自由。当暴力罪犯不是要钱包，而是要一个陌生人的生命时，拒绝看起来就是义务的（参看22.1章）。无论是谁，只要他拒绝将钱包拱手相让，那么他就把一种通常更重于钱的东西置于考虑之下。根据这个尚未表达的假定，一个人可以坚称他没有选择（就像船长和医生的例子一样）。即使如此，他也是依靠知识来行动:他知道一个可供选择的反应；而且也是意志坚决地行动：当他被失去生命的恐怖所驱使之时，他甚至“自动地”做出反应，而这个行动之发生建基于共识。当突然面临危险的某个人被极大地影响以至于他被恐惧的冲击所震慑，并仅仅之时条件发射地做行动，或者如果麻木了，就只能站在那儿的时候，一种可选择的反应诞生了（当然，就船而言，人们当然期待着一个冷静的头脑。）  16.2依据理性行动  根据一种广泛公有的意见，自由被理解为一种“野蛮的”自由，即如同未经反思地和肆意妄为地行为般情绪性地行动，甚至是对毫无节制的反复无常之青睐有加。事实上，因为于行动自由而言，实践知识是基本的，这种行动自由至少就排除了一种单纯的任性，而该无政府般的任性使得行为不可预测、使他人感到莫名其妙，甚至也使行为者自己感到惊讶不已。  当涉及到实践知识的时候，我们必须从供选择的附加部分（optional additions）中区分出它最不可分离的核心概念。此供选择的附加部分是真正的规范部分，它洞悉直入了那些建立起规范的、实践的知识之规范、价值和原则。它的知识程度（认知水平）从一般的道德意识延伸至道德的深刻反思形式，并且最终达到诸原则的哲学知识。同样，供选择的附加部分，不是与理论相关的、而是与行动相关的部分，这一部分与对状况之描述和目的-手段之关系（means-ends relationships）相关。与一种非行动的、但是与纯语言哲学相关的知识形成对照，我们这里所涉及的是规范—实践的知识（normative-practical knowledge）。规范—实践的知识和理论—实践的知识（theoretical-practical knowledge）都增加了自由的行为者；而这些行为者不仅停留在行为者的基础水平。只有第三种知识不再是供选择部分，该供选择部分与规范、和涉及到与一个人做与不做的实践知识相关；改第三种知识就是“反思—实践的知识（reflective-practical knowledge）。”这种反思—实践的知识在哪里缺失，那里就没有行动的自由，因为一个人确实不知道他在做什么，诸如睡觉、沉思，或者一定程度上的俄狄浦斯，和曾提到过的吃蘑菇的人。  在这三种情况下，知识并不需要客观地有效和毫无疑问的正确。充分性的是被假设的，或者说仅仅是被一个被断定了的知识，一个行为者的意见，一个实践的信念。对该反思的行为者之行动产生了影响的知识是决定性的，即这种知识可意识到地影响了他。这些知识中没有一个会就这样不论手段地点地发生，但是一定会在行为者的实际行动中生效。作为行动之所由来的（最终只是宣称的知识）知识，它具有一个实践的和同时是主观的特质。  知识能够被限制到一个行动仅仅是“什么”的范围。比如，某人希望克服他的懒惰，并且最终没有决定行动的种类就做了某事。因为知识仅影响动机，而不是切近动机的目标和动机之手段，所以与其（目标）相应的行动自由就是有限的。它满足于一种执行之自由（libertas exerciti），这种自由由行动和不行动来构成，而并不包含决定自由（libertas specifications）——这种自由由根据不同方式来行动的自由所组成。  如果有人追问造成简单行为者的情况的原因，此原因是非个人色彩的，即便它并不涉及一个次人类的存在者（“为什么蜜蜂叮人”）而是涉及一个人、甚至就是他自己： “当我摔落时，为什么我要下意识反应地抓住岩壁？”此处，这个“自我”在这里被转化为第三人称，关乎是我们所陈述的那个人，而不是我们所与之谈话的那个人。结果是，一种独立于行为者的实践知识构成了该追问之答案，而且这是一个某具体人（a-personal）的原因。在蜜蜂的例子中，答案也许是“蜜蜂受到了惊吓”。对于某个人而言，我们的回答也是如此，无论是其他人还是自己：“他/我快摔倒，受到了惊吓，并且试图抓住旁边可能的事物”。  正如我们已经说过，这种情况是不同的，即当一个摔倒的个体思考他是否应该抓住一个会因此而被伤害的其他人，或者抓住一个岩壁，或者抓住一个相当可靠的树根而不是试图靠向明显湿滑的岩石。只有在这种情况下，个体才面临多重选择，衡量孰轻孰重，并且做出决定。即使是在最基本的程度上，自由的行动者允许有对出于紧张性而叮人的蜜蜂的质疑，但是总而言之，对植物和动物做此追问并不合适（至少大多数动物）。这就是责任性的问题：“在何种权利下原因才得以出现？”  这个责任性的问题可以被应用于所有三个在语法上可能的人，并且最终指向一个并且是相同的人，即行动的行为者。不论单复数：对于第一个人，行动者追问他自己:“为什么我要抓住一个人而不是树根？”对于第二个人，行为者被受害者偶尔是带有谴责的暗指所质疑：“你为什么抓住我并把我置于危险之中？”最后，一个非受害者的第三人，比如法官，可以追问这个行动者，为什么他如其所做的这样行动。  所有上述三例的答案，就在一种反射性的实践知识之中（该反射性的实践知识，就在赋予了的实践理性之中）故所有上述三例的答案，确实在诸理性自身之中，而不是在关乎实践理性的理论知识之中，也根本不与同实践知识相对的中性诸原因相关。正如我们所说的，因为原因是精神事件，该精神事件在共享世界（a shared world）中产生了可见事件的行动（戴维森，1980，等等，第三章）一个人能把原因之特征归于理性。然而，这个被理性所控制的存在者之“本体论的”问题，并不是首次被问及。在这里，即使是将理性视作诸原因的人也很难怀疑此种本质的理性：支持或反对一个行为的根据，具有实践知识的特征，而这种知识将其区别于平常的、具有知识独立性（knowledge-independent）的诸原因。一般的原因是外在于一个人的责任性的；它们是责任性的外在原因；而诸实践理性是与此相对的责任性的内在原因。与责任性的外在原因相对比，建基于诸理性之上的原因，从属于同意与否这样的选择。诸外在原因现实地改变世界；而诸理性的原因仅仅有这样做的可能。它们是否现实地改变了世界，取决于接受或者拒绝理性的主体——是沉默地或者是充分表达地发声。  诸实践理性包含一种要求的特征，并且因此，一个人也谈到了绝对命令。这里所指的并不是一种势不可挡的权力之肆意命令。关窗户的要求或者停止吸烟的要求，只有在具有一个理性根据的背景下，才在绝对命令之一种道德意义中确有其地位，比如：无论一个人是为了自己的还是为了他人的健康，都为此要求做出了辩护。无论谁希望他自己在技术上、实用上、或者道德意义上都生活的很好，他就必须服从于恰如其分的绝对命令。而他是否在现实中做到，则是另一问题。  2.3 理性和伪装  理性能够与其他理性一起产生，并且构成一个网络，甚至最终成为一个理性的世界。这个世界能够仅对单个个体有效，或者也对或大或小的群体有效，最终对所有人类有效。更进一步，这个世界能够在不同的样式中建立秩序。特别是，一个人会（在此世界中）撞上可共通性和不可共通性，甚至是相互矛盾的情况。  之于有效性的问题，此处有三个已经知道的模型。即实践理性要么是可能地适用、要么是现实地适用、要么是必然地适用。在第一种情况下，它们能够有效（存疑的一实践的）；第二种，它们事实如此（断言的一实践的）；第三种，某事不可避免地发生（毋庸置疑的一实践的）。该正在-有效性（Geltung，能有效，但是还在发挥有效性的过程中，未完成）的三个层级一定要与完成-有效性（Gültigkeit，已经完成了的有效性）的三个层级相区分，即使一个人对这两种有效性采译了同一个专业拉丁词汇（2.2章）：情态的技术理性是存疑的，实用理性是断言的，而真正的道德理性是自明有效的。  在责任性的框架下，这三个模型的每一都个至少有三种功能。（此外，一个人能够在这三个模型中投入对责任性之一个独立的解释。）每种理性都应该为善的行动和对的行动，至少是为“清晰可辩护”的行动而辩护；或者理性应该宽恕一种即便是不善的行动。最后，理性能揭示一种坏的行动。依据功能，这里就有证明、原谅和揭示来组成诸理性。  当涉及到更重要的决定时，时常会有一个这样的例子，即在一个决定之前，会有部分草率的和部分彻底的理性之评估，对诸备选项分别做出或忽视、或深入地权衡。我们能将这种创造性的任务与一个几何形的结构相对照。对于一个我们在思想中构建而成的被给予的目标，一个为我们所相信的行动将会引向目标，并且该行动在事实上是可实现的。由于在许多情况下，目标只是作为一事件长链之一个结果而不能被直接地实现，故对此事件长链之计算自后向目标推导——这一点与几何建构相同——直到抵达起始处，亦即行为者。然而，与一个几何结构相比较，实践的考量时常具有一种内在张力的特质。时常发生的是，一种相互矛盾、模棱两可和含糊不清广泛地出现，它们由优柔寡断所复合而成，并同对不确定性之忍受（即便一个决定已经被做出）相结合。这是不必要的，即主体的行动有效的知识就存在于，一个鳞次栉比的理性之世界。  实践知识的两个方面（可理解的和有意图的瞬间，也就是所有的三个模型）尤其是三种功能，对于一个双重欺骗（double deception）来说是易受影响的。为了逃避一个目标、责备或者甚至惩罚，或者接受一个不应得的表扬，一个人能够欺骗他人。更有甚者，当涉及到对一个人自我评价和自尊之挽留、以及一个人精心塑造的“道德正直的”自我形象时，一个人会欺骗自己。  欺骗的世界是另一个半球。它同样由两个部分组成：对他人和对自己的欺骗。对于非故意的自我欺骗，一个行为者在规则上对于事件只能有一种部分的清晰性；而其它方面在事实之后浮现，其中一些若干年后变得更为清楚，而一些事情被永远掩盖。特别是，投降于一种深深的失望、根本幻觉和意识形态。  也许，这个欺骗的这个巨大世界正在恶化。然而令人惊讶的是，它其实并非如此。主体的实践理性是如此之重要，也能带来非常严重的后果，甚至对于一直只把实践理性作为面子工程的人来说，也在存在的意义上具有决定性。就像在伊恩•麦克尤恩小说中的仍处于未成年的布里奥妮，许多人以这样一些方式被溺爱:“一个野蛮而年轻的自由之心，一个青春期中自私的健忘”（《救赎》，第一章）。  即便一个人知道更好的情况，他也有故意误导他人的能力，因此，撒谎的能力（此外，还有向自己撒谎的能力或者是欺骗自己）看起来是人性的特点。具备一种非常基本的道德能力的唯一物种，也能够具备非常基本的不道德能力的物种。在现实中，无论谁永远不撒谎，那么他就是一个非常道德的个体；与此相对，无论谁不具备撒谎的能力并不是说他在某种程度上更道德，相反，他不是人类存在者。  两个半球，即欺骗和不欺骗的半球，共同构成了一个“理性和伪装的世界”。  2.4 实践理性的层次  主体实践理性包含四重个体化标志。P1这个人在S1的情形下根据理性G1，做出行为H1：为了阻止一桩事件，P1在够得着的范围内抓向悬崖。根据个体化标志，对于每一个具体行动都有一个具体的理性；个体化的心动具有个体化的理性。由于理性已经被包含在它们的语言学特征中，所以理性具有超出了具体化的有效性；它们是一种可能的规则：无论是谁（Pi）发现他自己在一个相似的情形下（子情形Sa.i），在够得着的悬崖的帮助下（子情形Sb.i）试图阻止自己的摔倒（子情形Sc.i），他有一个好的理由（G1）去抓向悬崖（Hi）。  然而，“善”在这里意谓着什么？在这里，“善”之表达是指一个行动的理由或辩护，确实能履行其任务。在给定的条件下，无论是谁试图阻止自己的摔倒都应该抓住悬崖（这是一件正确的事）。在这个过程中，虽然一方面是有意识地开放，但是另一方面却是潜在地、未意识地的开放的。有意识的开放就是追问是否抓住悬崖是否是唯一的选择，以及在诸多可能性中，这种选择是否是最可能的行动。当涉及到辩护之要求时，这种开放性产生出一种审慎；与沉默的附件相联结的辩护并不罕见；而更高要求可能在现实中没有意义（当涉及到竞争或生死挣扎，“仅仅善的”并不充分。）此外，常见的未意识的开放性涉及这样一种辩护：基于何种行为上的善，才是理性善？答案涉及到技术地、实用地、道德地或绝对地善之三个层次的决定性角色。  如果行为者被实践理性所决定，它就达到了理性存在者的级别。再次声明，此处起决定性的并非知识，而是这种统治行动的理性。诚然，行动之能力所依据的理性仅有唯一的一个。然而，这个唯一的理性，要么与知识相关要么与行动相关。在与知识相关的第一种情况下，它被叫做理论理性； 在与行动相关的第二种情况下，它被叫做实践理性。它们各自的理性不必然是道德的。此外，它们是技术的或实用的理性，所以我们在此处谈及的首先是更为适度的实践理性，而不是更严格、纯粹的实践理性或道德的实践理性。  某些人确实并未拥有实践理性（无论是纯粹的还是在广义上的），即那些极少知晓如何用（技术的、实用的、道德的）善之观点来评估自己行动的人；仅有那些知晓如何根据善来生活（live）的人，才确实已经拥有了实践理性。在三个程度上，这些“知晓如何生活（knows how to live）”转升为一种消极的片面力量，转升为一种积极的片面力量，以及为一种彻底的统治力量。  谁不把善之观点视为一个中立的观察者，他就在较弱的程度上，位于实践理性之上并命令它。而一个中立的观察者仅拥有这种只是直接指向一个作为客体的“实践”的理论理性。在一个人把要求（demand）接受为自身的影响，接受为对自身的支持，并即便，当他并未总是坚持上述也主观性地感受着要求时（同义转换：意志之虚弱），理性首先是实践的。在这种实践理性中，善是一个被关涉到的个体所认识的“应当”；而同时，鉴于一个应当之现实的公开化，善也是一个“行为。”这个实际存在的矛盾方式，这个应该之行为，在某人并未符合其所应当依据的主体之内部判定时，变得清晰起来——例如，在某人感到后悔，懊恼，或道德上的羞愧时。在作为一个消极的片面力量的第一个程度上，善并非纯粹的应当，但与此同时善已经是一个行为；它包括一个描述-规定的怀疑特性（参见Chap. 22.2）：它和消极的片面感受之形式下的一个生活在场一样，是富于经验特性的。  当实践理性发现了在现实行动中的认知时，它获得了一个积极的也只是片面的力量，但这种情况也只是偶然的而非可靠的。在第二个程度上，实践理性已包括一个彻底的在场和力量，但也只是瞬时的。通过这种积极的片面力量，对一个应该之认知与对一个积极的片面感受相关联——这个积极的片面感受可证明为一种满足，即某人没有任何（意志上的）虚弱（weakness）而做到了善之要求。显然，这种感受只是偶然地发生。  当某人再三获得认知，当这些认知持续的更新，接着，当这些持续更新的认知成为这个个体牢不可破的一个组成部分；最终，成为一个人人格的标志时，理性达到了第三程度——彻底的，统治的力量。  在这种片面力量中，无论实践理性是消极的还是积极的，它首先“在原则中（in principle）”被认识到。就像一棵尚未扎根的大树，实践理性的认知之程度也不能支撑自己对抗愤怒、渴望或激情的风暴。作为一个片面力量的实践理性，它是（偶发的或频繁的）一个意志之虚弱，而当它拥有了彻底的力量时，它就克服了这个虚弱。显然，片面的或彻底的力量并不是一个简单的两者择一性的要么/要么（either/or）。这种实践理性之出场更多的发生在，与连续延展的范围相对照的无数各种等级的可被经验到的风暴之中。在这里，我们聚焦于位于此等级范围上的四个可立足之点：彻底的意志之虚弱，即其实践理性能被一阵最轻柔的微风吹散；一般的意志之虚弱；接下来是相当的意志之虚弱；最后是彻底的强力意志，可以同引诱与诱惑的飓风相抗衡。  如果实践理性保持着要求，那么一个人的辩证理性同时产生了触发行为的动机力量。所谓的内在论者把这种动机力量归因于辩证理性；而外在论者拒斥这种观点。这种并不为现在所见的冲突，只能被实践地而不是被理论地解决。根据行动之理论及其理性，两种观点都有效。而两种观点实际凑效于一个被行动个体之个人特质所决定的特殊场合中；这取决于他个人的实践理性之强力或虚弱。  自古代（Antiquity）以来，行动哲学家和伦理学家就被这个主题所吸引。该主题呈现于“意志之虚弱”这个主题之下（希腊语：akrasia；拉丁语：incontinentia；权威的，亚里士多德《尼各马可伦理学》第七章 第1-11节；此外，参见Höffe 32006, Chap. 13.3）。这样一个虚弱意志通常在于一个人的实践理性拥有过少的力量。在道德虚弱的情况中，这样的实践理性之力量也是极其软弱的：其承认道德（与邪恶相对）为指引之光，并承认道德在面对与风暴竞争时提供了竞争抗力。不同于惯有的恶习，理性仅仅是偶然地与且并非总是软弱地直面意志之虚弱。（在这里，一个人必须反驳但丁，他在《神曲》把意志之虚弱归因于诸如暴食、贪婪和愤怒的罪恶亦即习惯性的误导；例如，在Hell, 5. Canto, Verse 55f.中；“色欲将统治你，/它的法律许可渴望。”）在道德虚弱之种种细微差别的现象的之构造中，可见虚弱的意志并非一个人放纵道德上的堕落习惯，而是一个人许可他的善习被诸如愤怒、渴望或激情所并非持续不断地但是再三地拦阻。  如上所示，意志之虚弱是感性层面的理解，亦即实践理性之缺乏，它没有假定这种虚弱只有极少的知识。意志之虚弱充分地知晓所做之事何为善；然而它仅仅是——短暂的——一种无用的所有物；更确切的说，它好比一种无法充分维护自己的能力。无论谁不是出乎习惯的违背善且没有懊恼，都遭受着长期的邪恶，放纵，或者正如但丁所说的难以治愈的那种色欲。然而，谁仅仅只是“在原则上”而不是根据现实的行动认识到了何为善，则反之的仍能懊恼并且真诚地忏悔其所曾做之事。他“仅仅只”遭受着短暂频发的可治愈的邪恶，确切来说即遭受着意志之虚弱。  3.自律的理性：意志自由  3.1 自由和懊恼的三个程度  消极地看，实践理性是这样一种能力，即既不允许愉悦或不愉悦的感受，也不允许对他人的渴望或倾向，更不允许权威（包括他的传统）来控制一个人的渴望的能力。积极地说，实践理性是这样一种能力，即能遵守着理性，并且能在感官诱惑与社会消遣前牢牢坚守着被构想为善的理性。实践理性起源于纯粹知觉和简单的权威。  让我们聚焦于感性内在推动力的领域。在这里，实践理性拒绝了诸如来自广告和他者之引诱的流行需求和渴望的通用领地——而这种流行需求和渴望统治了动机。但是，实践理性呼吁着行动。确切来说，因为实践理性由一系列并不追求的瞬时愉悦或不愉悦感受之约束的动机所组成，它证明了它自己由一种双重自由所组成：积极的和消极的。实践理性不仅仅只是消极地由最终成为决定一个人行为的、本源自于其自身愉悦或不愉悦的感受所组成。积极来看，实践理性是一个自身从属于理性之要求的动机。  诸如饥饿、口渴、困倦、和性欲（简言之，感性动机）之类的动机一定具有一个确切的动力。如果说人类经常被伴随着戏剧性和与此同时产生张力的强烈激情所彻底驾驭却丢失了剧本，这一定是荒谬的。“实践理性”单纯意味着不要让感性动机和激情占据在优势地位上。然而，它必须是理性之要求的全部总和；换言之，它必须克服这种获利于被善（good）所塑形之动机性推动力的纯粹直接当下。谁做到了这一点，他就超越了自由的初始等级，并发现他自己置身于与第三层的实践理性相平行的第三程度。  有与善的三种程度相符合的三种自由的程度，它们取决于囊括理性之需求而不是它们所能履行程度的理性之范围，亦即，此三种自由的程度并不是根据实践理性的力量或者无力。在第一个程度上，技术的或功用的善之理性，遵照意图-结果的关系。谁服从这种律令，则在且仅在这种关系中适用于此种实践的活动，并遵守一个意愿；鉴于他的要求，他拥有技术的或功用的自由。回忆之前关于富人的讨论案例，该富人有能力且必须期望可以得到比预期更多的收入。在此情况中，此人虽已知这种关系律令控制了收入（经济的，股票市场的，等）却并未驾驭着一个技术的自由，或着，他希望遵守这样的律令却并未拥有现实化该希望的能力。仅仅只在他既不顺从于额外消费，又不为增长他的收入所要求的努力而畏惧时，他才是自由的。事实上，这样的人能够让他自己的生活方式服从这条绝对命令“赚比你所期待的更多的！”  在第二个程度，即实用-实践理性中，“善”甚至意味着“对他人之幸福的善（good for the well(-being) of someone）。”与之相符合的自由不仅是一种能力，即一种追求着具有肉身与感觉器官的物种的自然本性之终极，亦即一个前道德之终极的目标的能力，而且也是一个能抵抗针对该目标的内压和外压之能力。在这个富人的情况中，当目标导致了个人幸福时，它就从属于实践自由并有能力继续一个现实化了的理解，即认知到单独的富有无法让人快乐。结果，谁在实用感上是自由的，则不仅只是简单立志于更多的富有。  职业生涯发展是第二个与之类似的例子。在对一个职业生涯的尊重下，一个习惯性地与有效地应用这种必要知识和技能的人是技术自由的。而从事一个职业生涯的能力属于实用自由，在这个职业生涯中，包括了成功、包括了能维持对持久的幸福之希望、或者也包括，当他知道自己只有些微的机会（要么因为缺乏天分，要么因为残酷的竞争）获得成功时懂得放弃。实用自由同样包括了不仅是知道，而且还是能够根据这种知识生存的能力，即，知道一个成功的职业生涯无法单独地让人快乐。  显然，这里还有另一个超越实用自由之上的程度。在第三个道德程度，实践理性将所有关于个人福利的考虑都置于一边。在这个程度中，所有更基础的、直接起作用的刺激性推动力（知觉）都是被压制的。意志成为唯一的支配性动机；它本身就是自由的，而且不仅是在一个特殊的方面上。意志自由仅仅只在第三个程度，即道德程度上才开始运行。该自由被一种最高规范标准的特殊的实践理性所定义。  无论对感官的或社会的“引诱”之理性拒斥是一个为世界所不认可的观念，或与之相反，这种理性拒斥是世界的一个本质层面且也许还构成了普遍道德意识的核心，它仍然是一个尚需被思考的问题。此外，在与先前的二元区分之威压相关的道德辩护和意志自由中，也无论如何都会引发这个问题：一个初始的不全面等级，即公民法权道德[Rechts/civic moral]，也许构成了必须被所有人承认的公共基础；在我们的例子中，它将意味着基于欺骗的要求财富或建立职业生涯是不合适的。第二个不全面程度，即有价值的道德，将要求着超越了仅仅只是对债务之逃避的仁慈和慈善。  通过一个企图以跌落大桥的方式来结束自己生命的人的案例，我们可以解释这三种程度的自由。我们将假设这个人确实跳了，而且不是出于失误的跌落或被其他人所推下去的。我们开始于初级程度：当他在这个自由跌落行为中并没有被一阵极强的大风吹回到他头顶上的栏杆时，他就在第一个方面上是自由的。当该跌落是一个他自发的运动并且不是任何推撞的后果时，他在第二个初级感觉上是自由的。最终，当他并非在毒药的彻底麻醉下，即他的跳桥仅仅是出于一种茫然的知识或渴望，具有即便尚未意识但仍旧确切不移的感觉时，该个体在第三个初级感觉上也是自由的。  在执行自杀行动所需要的明晰知识与渴望中，可以演证与自由之三个初级程度相关涉的意志：技术程度，其与被选择的手段之效力相关涉；实用程度，其与对一个人生存处境之评估相关涉；以及道德程度，其与不仅是对个人而且也是对他者的义务之假设相关涉。当正在跌落时，该自杀者如果在这三方面中的任何一个都不能确切地经验，并在扩大了范围的三个程度上感到后悔或懊悔时：  在这个冲击中，当他突然不确切他是否能预期到他所渴望的突然的死时，最广义的技术上的懊恼就此席卷了这个个体。也许——这个人反省到——这座桥并没有那么高，或者地面并没有那么坚硬，所以他必然害怕成为一个截瘫，或者陷入一场当他被发现时已太晚了的缓慢的、痛苦的死亡。技术的懊悔与此反应相关：“我本应选择一个更确切可靠的手段。”  当他在跌落中，他突然认识一个不同于导致他跳桥的混乱方式的替代选择时，这个自杀者经验到了实用上的第二个懊悔。当面对一种发生在他身上的甚至是幸福的全新生活机会时，他想：“我本应该更谨慎的彻底思考我的观点，或我本应该寻求建议。”  最后，当一个人承认了为他所一直低估的，也许甚至是压制的观点的真实意义时，他感觉到了道德上的懊悔。例如，他承认，在选择自杀时，他违背了诸如照顾他的生活伴侣、孩子或父母的更高级别的义务。道德的懊悔占据了他的思考：“我怎么能把我个人幸福置于其他一切义务之上呢？”    3.2 作为纯粹实践理性的自律  这个论及了自由之种种程度和任何可能的懊恼的自杀实例，再次证明了组成意志自由之哲学的道德概念是何等冷静清醒。没有任何道德教化上的含混音响，道德被等同为实践理性的最高等级，其符合于价值评价的最高形式，即无条件的善。仅在此程度上，根据实践理性而来的，作为行动之能力的自由之潜能，才被彻底激发。据其哲学概念，在严格意义上，意志自由并不存在于未确定与的未与实践理性相连接的意志，也不存在于甚至是无理由的非理性意志之中。它意味着与第三个也是最高的程度相关的，能贯彻实践理性或现实化“意志的”能力。  当然，一个人可以为自由的意志之更广义的概念辩护，并谈论自由的意志之一个温和的第一程度，一个更高要求的第二程度，以及最全面的第三程度。最温和的自由意志，由根据某种利与弊来左右一个人意愿的能力所组成（技术自由）而。更高要求的意志自由存在于这种能力中，该能力出于对一个人的个体幸福之考虑从而左右其意愿（实用自由）；然而，除此之外，最全面的合理的意志自由存在于这种能力中，该能力凭借对一个人的个体幸福之抑制，来左右其意愿（道德自由）。  自由和实践理性的三个等级不是被必然地相联系。在等级递增的方向上，这种无联系是显而易见的，而且被对富裕和职业生涯的成功之渴望的实例所表明：即便奋力向前，技术的理性（第一等级）也不是“自动地”朝向了成功、幸福的生活（第三等级）也更弱地朝向着道德的生活（第三等级）。甚至仅仅是在功效性的善中，这样一个联系都不可能哪怕是观念上存在的。同样实用的理性本身也没有包含任何与道德的联系。  在逐级下降的线路上，有且仅有一些松散的互相联系：对富裕和职业生涯成功的立志，基于一种对抗良心不安的、对欺骗之禁令的最竭力躲避（也就是说，它消除了一些实行个人幸福的障碍，但并不保证一种成功的生活）。在为了行动的道德理性和技术理性之间，几乎没有任何积极的联系。谁若是克制所有的欺骗和每一个道德不端，他确实能避免富裕或职业生涯成功所引发的确切威胁，但该克制对于此两者也没有任何建设性贡献。  然而，在为了行动的实用理性与技术理性之间，有紧密的联系。谁想快乐地活着，必须从事于并融合有益幸福的诸如健康、友谊、和以他人生方式的职业成功的各个方面；换言之，一个人必须为了自己的行动追寻与技术-实用的根基。  首先，道德自由并没有涵盖技术的或实用的自由。最高级的自由的意志，并非完全的、个人的自由之同义词——这可以被一个最简单的生活经验所证明：一个道德的、彻头彻尾严谨的人，也能产生出一种被道德整体所透视成为彻底混乱的、仅能勉强称之为成功的生活。在这个观点中，为了行动的实践理性不能忍受被狭隘地定义为一种模范特质，而宁可，在生活的更广阔范围上，一个人谈及实践原则就像谈及准则（maxims）一样（参见Chap. 20.3）。原则类似于法律，例如在危难之中帮助他人的道德原则，但它们凭借两种特质被与其自然法的原型相区分：原则的客体是个人行动，而不是自然事件；以及，根据原则之发生状况的特质，它们并不具备唯一性，即便如此，原则却拥有占据优势地位的应当之特征。  实践理性或实践原则来自于何处；它们又起源于何处？这并不被看做是一个实证的问题。我们并不关心一个历史的起源；也就是说，我们并不追问，为何要么在一个单独的个人中（一个生物学家的问题）要么在一个群体或文化中（一个理智的历史学家的问题）确切的理性才发展出一种指引行动的力量。我们追问合法性的起源：理性在何处得其辩护？  当与道德相关时，有两种构成一个严格的要么/要么的决定性的可能。如果一个人在理性的规则尺度性特征（rule-character）方面把理性作为法律，以及在法律之第二范例即公民法律中引发出理性，那么接下来，他所遇到的要么是自律（autonomy）要么是他律（heteronomy）。此处，自律的对立面并非权威而是他律。在此表达的概念性框架中，这个为了行动的理性之非自律者的特征也属于实践原则的所有程度。这是一个（自明的）规则而不是一个区分的特质；而即便在合法性的意义上，作为他律的法律也不是权威方。当与法律相关时，自为-法律（auto-nomi）意味着为自己立法（self-legislation）：一个诸如一个国家或诸如一个自然人的一个私人性的主体有着公共感觉的合适身体， 并不允许法律（nomoi）被一个外来者（hetero-）外在地决定为权威；而宁可自为（auto-）合法化法律。  实践原则的这种约束性特征来自于何处？技术理性和功效理性之根据，除了是对行动之实践领域的要求外再无一物。他们是统治着行动领域的特殊法律，即他们可以变得极其复杂，并且在“应用”上可以要求繁多到令人炫目的判断程度。谁追随着此种情境性的法律，他就默许了它们的预设目标或兴趣。例如，某人根据这些规则生活并导致他拥有比其预期所更多的收入后，则默许自己对富裕产生兴趣。鉴于这种特殊的、统治着行动之聚焦点的法律是理性的（从今往后，是内部的），它们预先建立的兴趣被外部地建立了。一个技术的原则并未建立起自身的合法性；它是外部地获得其强制义务性。在这个意义上，作为与实践理性相反的外在的法律，技术原则拥有一个他律的特征。  人们也可以把实用原则倾向为一种统治着一个行动领域的特殊法律。自实用原则并不满足于一个或多或少地被描绘的领域、而是满足于一个人的整个生活以来，这个恰当地关注着人们的个人幸福就没有对行动领域的典型限定。然而除此之外，实用原则也分享着和技术原则同样的起源：自它们在实践理性上作出要求开始（“关注你的个人幸福！”），它们就最终外部地引发其强制义务性。再次声明，我们与一个外在的合法性相遇。最终其权威性并非位于意志中（就实践理性的意义而言）而是在预先给定的目标中，即一个人的个人幸福。  替代他律的另一重选择是自律，即为自己立法，对此有一个重要的附加说明：自律朝向着实践理性，换言之，朝向着意志。此处自律并不意味着某种更广义的自我保证，亦即说某人建立一个（内部的外部地）的要求，如同他全凭自身那样。当然，正如普遍说法那样，这种自我强制义务性被称之为自律。然而，如果也这样流行地去理解它，它的效力就会变弱。在意志伦理的意义上，自律有着更高的要求。在基于通常的理性和原则的行动之能力中，人们与这个决定性的问题相遇了：与一个要求相关涉的人，是外部地相关涉，还是内部地通向意志地相关涉？  在第二个观点上认为通向意志之合法性是内在的，是何种含义呢？对此的回答是如此的困难，以至于许多哲学家甚至是宁可不去尝试回应。还有一些逃避得如此之远，诸如做出一种预先的防御措施，即坚持认为自律观点是毫不切题的；又诸如声明这种企图都是非常模糊昏暗的甚至是神秘莫测的，即企图接近意志自律中的道德基础。诚然，仅在一个人有正当理由去这么做时，他的放弃才是恰当地。在余下来的两章招致异议前，让我们在此先反驳一个对意志自由的驳斥。根据一个流行的反驳论证，自由意志依赖于一个极其强烈的预设。亦即，它把所有对感性渴望、社会协定、和合法的法律之“通常”关涉置于一边。叔本华假设这种对纯粹实践理性思考，是尝试让被建立的僧侣道德法律还俗（Preisschrift über die Grundlage der Moral [On the Basis of Morals], § 4), 图根哈特同意他（2006 15））。  实际上，谁在运用其意志时“意愿他的意志与任何规则无关”，谁就不是自由的。同样，意志自由也不是由第二程度的某些意愿而是由一种特殊的反省所组成。这相当于，谁让他自己服从于实践理性的原则，谁就在其要求上拥有意志自由的恰当观念。然而，仅只有在原则与意志一道有内在的起源时，我们才在自律意义上与更高的要求相关联。并非谁在最后的例子中允许他自己被嗜欲或激情的强力、被同情或厌恶的感受、或统治的习俗所塑造，他就是自由的，以及，也并非谁在最佳手段上选择预先给定的目标，他就是自由的；而是仅有那些根据自律级别的法律来生活的人，在这种意义上才是自由的。  确实，道德之要求直接指向了一个既没有抛弃他的感性本质也没有抛弃他的社会-历史起源的存在者。确切来说，因为一个人仍旧是一个维持着其渴望、历史和社会背景的存在者，于此种理性而言，道德具有一个应当的特征。它由一系列挑战所组成，诸如承认一个人的个人渴望和社会依赖性，甚至只要它们并不违背道德就肯定它们；但并不允许它们成为决定一个人的行动所依据的最终基础。在这种意义上，自律是尽可能成为一个这样一个存在者：他更少向外渴望与关联社会，而是“更多”洞察自身。  “更多”并不包括逃避“更少”。除此之外，一个人将其个人的、社会的、经济的和政治的本性之各类状况简单地弃置一边也是不可能的。一个人被禁止无中生有地缔造新开始。意志自由既不包含对生命力、感性和社会适应力的拒绝，也不包含在“虔诚”的道德原则上的从事：其或者是为了逃离生活，或是出于缺乏传统或历史，或是在为了批评生活之发展形式。正如行动自由那样，意志自由并不由不确定性、而是由合格的义务所构成；在我们的例子中，它由一个并不基于对最终结果的个人意愿的、某人自己给定自己的法律所构成。在这种道德的决定意义上，意志自律就是它自身，其起源于就是如此-而且-除此无二的意愿（willing so-and-not-otherwise）。 |