


### 3.1 Task 1: Observing HTTP Request

We use HTTP Header live. Below is a GET request and a POST request. GET request for Alice's profile. POST request to add Bobby as a friend. Two parameters; the elgg ts and token.





### 3.2 Task2: CSRF Attack using GET Request

We need to construct a website that when visited automatically generates a GET request using the cookies from the elgg website. We will generate the GET request within an img.


I used the POST request from above to find Bobby's user id (43). Using this guid we will generate a GET request for Bobby. We know what a GET request looks like from HTTP header live tool.

I needed to add a html file to `var/www/CSRF/Attacker`. I had to login to root user to create "task1.html" into Attacker folder for the website. Like in the video I set height and width to 0 for the img.

```
root@VM: /var/www/CSRF/Attacker
<html>
<body>
<h1> Welcome to this page </h1>


</body>
</html>


"task1.html" [readonly] 7L, 148C
```



The GET request will now generate when ever the website is visited. This will only work for Bobby, because the guid must be correct.

If this were a real attack, we would need Alice to click the link while logged in to elgg. Ways to get Alice to click the link could be via email, through a message, or through a post. The message works well, because she has to be logged in to read anyways but is also suspicious. Since I played the role of both Alice and Bobby I simply visited the link while logged in with Alice.








You can see the before and after of Alice's profile. See has no friends and when she clicks the link a friend is successfully added. You can see the new tab for the csrfllabattacker.com/task1.html that was used.

### 3.3 Task 3: CSRF Attack using POST Request

I went to edit profile and made an edit. Using HTTP header live I got the POST URL and field information needed. To generate a POST request, we generate a form. The form is generated with the fields needed to make the edit, the correct guid, and URL. When Alice visits the website, the form is created and then automatically posted on her behalf.





With our malicious website ready, Bobby sends Alice a message including the link.



alice's inbox - CSRF Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

alice: CSRF Lab Site x alice: CSRF Lab Site x Edit profile: CSRF Lab Site x alice: CSRF Lab Site x Alice: CSRF Lab Site x alice's inbox: CSRF Lab Site x

Most Visited SEED Labs Sites for Labs

HTTP Header Live

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Referer: http://www.csrflabelgg.com/messages/inbox/alice  
Cookie: Elgg=oncrit9s198191cv6claa8md6  
Connection: keep-alive  
GET: HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 17:42:54 GMT  
Server: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)  
Expires: Fri, 20 Dec 2019 17:42:54 GMT  
Pragma: public  
Cache-Control: public  
ETag: "1501099611-gzip"  
Vary: Accept-Encoding  
Content-Encoding: gzip  
Content-Length: 866  
Content-Type: application/javascript; charset=UTF-8  
http://www.csrflabelgg.com/cache/  
Host: www.csrflabelgg.com  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86\_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0  
Accept: \*/\*  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Referer: http://www.csrflabelgg.com/messages/inbox/alice  
Cookie: Elgg=oncrit9s198191cv6claa8md6  
Connection: keep-alive  
GET: HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)  
Expires: Fri, 20 Dec 2019 17:42:40 GMT  
Pragma: public  
Cache-Control: public  
ETag: "1501099611-gzip"  
Vary: Accept-Encoding  
Content-Encoding: gzip  
Content-Length: 368  
Content-Type: application/javascript; charset=UTF-8  
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 20:13:04 GMT

Clear Options File Save Record

Data autoscroll

CSRF Lab Site

Activity Blogs Bookmarks Files Groups More

Messages

Inbox

Compose a message

Search

Blogs

Bookmarks

Files

Pages

Wire posts

Inbox

Sent messages

Powered by Elgg

alice: CSRF Lab Site - Mozilla Firefox

File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help

alice: CSRF Lab Site x alice: CSRF Lab Site x Edit profile: CSRF Lab Site x alice: CSRF Lab Site x Alice: CSRF Lab Site x alice: CSRF Lab Site x

Most Visited SEED Labs Sites for Labs

HTTP Header Live

Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Referer: http://www.csrflabelgg.com/profile/alice  
Cookie: Elgg=oncrit9s198191cv6claa8md6  
Connection: keep-alive  
GET: HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)  
Expires: Fri, 20 Dec 2019 17:42:40 GMT  
Pragma: public  
Cache-Control: public  
ETag: "1501099611-gzip"  
Vary: Accept-Encoding  
Content-Encoding: gzip  
Content-Length: 208  
Content-Type: application/javascript; charset=UTF-8  
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 20:13:03 GMT  
http://www.csrflabelgg.com/cache/  
Host: www.csrflabelgg.com  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86\_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0  
Accept: \*/\*  
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Referer: http://www.csrflabelgg.com/profile/alice  
Cookie: Elgg=oncrit9s198191cv6claa8md6  
Connection: keep-alive  
GET: HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)  
Expires: Fri, 20 Dec 2019 17:42:40 GMT  
Pragma: public  
Cache-Control: public  
ETag: "1501099611-gzip"  
Vary: Accept-Encoding  
Content-Encoding: gzip  
Content-Length: 368  
Content-Type: application/javascript; charset=UTF-8  
Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 20:13:04 GMT

Clear Options File Save Record

Data autoscroll

CSRF Lab Site

Activity Blogs Bookmarks Files Groups More

alice

Edit profile

Edit avatar

Blogs

Bookmarks

Files


Pages

Wire posts

Friends

Add widgets

Powered by Elgg




I sent a message from boby with the malicious link to Alice. Alice profile is blank, and then after clicking the link Alice profile brief description now says “boby is my hero”.

Question 1: Bobby can get Alice’s user id (guid) by visiting her profile and clicking “send message”. You do not even have to send a message, when the template to enter the message pops up, HTTP live header has a get request which includes Alice user id. “/messages/compose?send\_to=42” would reveal Alice guid.

Question 2: We need to know the user’s guid for this attack before they visit the malicious website. Because of this I do not think you could launch a CSRF attack on any and all user who visits the page. First, we would need to know the user id (guid) so that when they click on the website, the guid is included in the submitted form. There may be a way to automatically generate the guid upon visiting the website which re-directs to another website which uses the guid that was just retrieved and then use it to forge the request. That seems plausible, but I do not know if possible. So, again my answer is we do need to know the guid first, before the link is visited by the victim.

### 3.4 Implementing Countermeasure for Elgg:

I went to the gatekeeper function and commented out the top “return true;”.



I tried mounting the same attack, but it would not work. I tried a few times experimenting with adding the `elgg_ts` and `elgg_tokens`. The attack would not work. It appeared to be redirecting. The `ts` and token would both change. In the picture below, we can see the `elgg_token` and `elgg_ts` using the Inspection Tool.

