TRUST AND KERBEROS

Network Security

Spring 2018

Lecture Notes

# WEAKNESS OF TLS

- TLS is worthless without trust

- If you go to https://yourbank.com, it better be "your bank"

- How do you know it is your bank?

REVIEW TLS HANSHAKS

CLIENT

SERVER

ClientHello

ServerHello
Certificate*
CertificateRequest*
ServerKeyExchange*

Certificate*
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify*
change cipher spec
Finished

change cipher spec
Finished

Application Data

Application Data

* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent

WHAT IS A CERTIFICATE?

- TLS specification (RFC) doesn't specify cert or cert verification

- The most common is X 509

KEY ELEMENTS

- Identifying Data
  - Names
  - Serial Number
- Chain Data
  - Who signed the certificate
- Public key
- Signature

PUBLIC KEY PRIVATE KEY

CERTIFICATE

Name: yourbank
Issuer: godaddy
signature

PUBLIC KEY

PRIVATE KEY

PROVING IDENTITY

Who are you?

CERT

I'm yourbank

VERIFY CERT:
- sbj = yourbank?
- chain trusted?

Ok, prove it (nonce)

{nonce}private_key

PUBLIC KEY

PRIVATE KEY

CHAIN OF TRUST

Godaddy public
key verifies cert

CERT

Name: godaddy
Signed by godaddy

Banking assoc public
key verifies cert

CERT

Name: banking_association
Signed by godaddy

Yourbank public
key verifies signature
on nonce

CERT

Name:Yourbank.com
Signed by banking_association

ROOT CERT

- The Root certificate is *self signed*

- It is signed by its own key!

- You have to "trust" somebody *axiomatically!*

CERT CHAIN VERIFICATION (INPUTS)

- The certificate chain

- The current date/time

- Policy information

- Root certificates

CERT CHAIN VERIFICATION (ALGORITHM)

- PKI parameters/algorithms

- Validity of the certificate (time/expiration)

- Revocation status (OCSP, CRL, etc)

- Issuer name matches next subject in path

- Policy checks

- Any intermediate certs are *CA CERTS!*

CHECKING CA CERTS

- A CA (Certificate Authority) cert should be marked

- Otherwise, you can do this:

    - ROOT

    - Signs, intermediate CA

    - Signs subject (e.g., "yourbank.com") *USED AS CA!!!!*

    - Signs fake subject (e.g., "wrongbank.com")

CERTIFICATE REVOCATION

- How do you revoke a certificate?

- Difficult: so long as the cert is properly signed, it is believed

- You can publish certificate revocation lists:

    - Uses just serial number

    - So make sure your serial numbers are actually unique!

    - But, until the new CRL is received, bad cert still usable

ONLINE CERTIFICATE STATUS PROTOCOL (OCSP)

- Certificates were designed to be used offline

- However, modern security constraints often necessitate OCSP

- Client can ask a server ('OCSP Responder') about a cert

  - Server can respond "Good", "Revoked", "Unknown"

  - Response is signed; however, *vulnerable to replay attacks!*

  - An extension permits nonces, but often not used for efficiency

  - Also, potential privacy losss

 - But, more efficient and timely than CRL

OTHER ALTERNATIVES TO TRUST?

- Sadly, there is no known way to create trust out of thin air

- In almost every case, there must be a trust basis:
  - Out-of-band communication (e.g., in real life)
  - Evolutionary trust over time with long-term identifiers
  - Third parties, including CA's, authentication/reputation servers
 - Crowds, such as distributed ledger

KERBEROS

- Kerberos vs TLS
  - Kerberos uses a trusted authentication server
  - Must be online. And, if compromised, entire system compromised
  - Provides mutual authentication, confidentiality, etc

- Basic components:
  - Authentication Server
  - Key Distribution Server (KDS)
 - Ticket Granting Service
  - Service Server

KERBEROS COMMUNICATION

KERBEROS PROTOCOL

Kerberos Operation

Authentication Server

Step 1

Ticket Granting Ticket : [client, address, validity, $Key_{(client, TGS)}]Key_{(TGS)}$

$[Key_{(client, TGS)}]Key_{(client)}$

Client

Step 2

TGT : service, [client, client address, validity, $Key_{(client, TGS)}]Key_{(TGS)}$

Authenticator : [client, timestamp]$Key_{(client, TGS)}$

Step 3

Ticket $_{(client, service)}$: service, [client, client address, validity, $Key_{(client, service)}]Key_{(service)}$

$[Key_{(client, service)}]Key_{(client, TGS)}$

Ticket Granting Server

Ticket $_{(client, service)}$: service, [client, client address, validity, $Key_{(client, service)}]Key_{(service)}$

Authenticator : [client, timestamp]$Key_{(client, service)}$

Step 4

1) **service** is the networked resource that the client is trying to access (e.g. Print Server);

2) **TGS** is the Ticket Granting Server

Print Server

PROTOCOL PRINCIPLES

- Note that the user's key never goes over the wire

- Note that pre-encrypted messages can be sent.
  - AS sends a message to A that only TGT can decrypt
  - Thus, TGT knows that the message sent by A MUST come from AS

- How scalable is this system?