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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 Motivation

As the popularity of mobile communications devices increases, there is a growing tendency to use these as a convenient means of reviewing and revising documents on-the-move. Where these documents are of a confidential nature, particular attention must be paid to the fact that mobile devices are more vulnerable to compromise than traditional desktops, which are usually more extensively protected by the security measures implemented as part of an organization's internal network.

There are multiple mechanisms for keeping files secure on company servers whilst allowing employees the necessary permissions to work collaboratively with sensitive data as required. As the mobile device culture becomes more prevalent in the workplace, the addition of Mobile Device Management (MDM) applications empowers users to also access corporate data via their mobile devices whilst still allowing IT departments to retain a degree of control over data security.

Thus, it is acknowledged that maintaining the security of confidential documents can be challenging, even with the weight of a corporate IT infrastructure behind it. In this project, we seek to address the issue of allowing groups of users from different organizations (i.e. with no shared IT infrastructure) to collaborate securely on confidential documents and furthermore, to access these documents via a smartphone or tablet computer whilst minimizing the risk of exposing sensitive information to a potential attacker.

## 1.2 Project Aims

The primary aim of this project was to implement a scheme to facilitate secure sharing of confidential documents between a number of collaborators (typically less than 15), subject to the following constraints:-

- Groups are self-organizing and represent multiple organizations, hence they cannot draw on the support of any central IT services.
- The documents involved are confidential in nature and hence should be encrypted both in transit and at rest.
- Group members wish to be able to access documents on a mobile device running the Android operating system (which may involve use of public wifi) without compromising security
- The solution devised should use only well-tested cryptographic techniques and standard libraries and should minimize the amount of trust to be placed in a third-party.

Our secondary objective was to gain an understanding of the basic features of the Android platform, explore some of the techniques involved in developing for mobile devices and some of the challenges encountered in working in this type of event-driven environment.

In pursuit of these aims we developed a solution called SecurelyShare, consisting of a detailed design of the security components of the system and a prototype Android application to provide a platform on which to implement and evaluate the various security features. It was acknowledged that, in a live setting, documents would usually originate on a PC rather than on a tablet device and thus the system would also need to have a PC-based component. However, within the time constraints of the project it was considered infeasible to develop a fully featured system; our solution is submitted rather as a 'proof of concept'.

## 1.3 Overview of Report

The subsequent chapters of this report will deal with the design, implementation and evaluation of the project. Chapter 2 introduces some of the background material on key technologies used and presents an overview of the Android applications reviewed as part of our preliminary research. In the light of this research, Chapter 3 presents a detailed analysis of the problem, defines the threat model against which we are attempting to defend, and provides an outline of the final solution design. Chapters 4 and 5 provide details of the implementation, testing and management of the project, Chapter 6 reviews the security

features and finally Chapter 7 presents and evaluation of overall success of project and gives recommendations for future work.

# Chapter 2

## Background Material

In this chapter we will introduce some key aspects of the android architecture and its security features. We will also examine the features offered by the Dropbox API and finally we will look briefly at some of the commercial applications which were reviewed as part of our initial research and which offer some features similar to Securely Share.

### 2.1 Android Security Features

Android provides an open source platform and application environment for mobile devices. It has a layer based architecture whose foundational component is the Android Operating System. Based on the tried and tested Linux 2.6 kernel and modified by Google to include some additional features, it is the comprehensive user permissions model inherent in Linux that is responsible for providing the separation between applications that is a key feature of Android security. At installation time, each application is assigned a unique user ID (UID); at runtime each application is run as a separate process and as a separate user with its given UID. This creates an Application Sandbox, protecting any resources belonging to that application (memory space, files, etc.) from being accessed by another application unless specifically permitted to do so by the developer.

shabtai2010google May need to expand this a bit further but not quite sure how much detail is required and what is extraneous padding

Table 1. Security mechanisms incorporated in Android.		
Mechanism	Description	Security issue
<b>Linux mechanisms</b>		
POSIX users	Each application is associated with a different user ID (or UID).	Prevents one application from disturbing another
File access	The application's directory is only available to the application.	Prevents one application from accessing another's files
<b>Environmental features</b>		
Memory management unit (MMU)	Each process is running in its own address space.	Prevents privilege escalation, information disclosure, and denial of service
Type safety	Type safety enforces variable content to adhere to a specific format, both in compiling time and runtime.	Prevents buffer overflows and stack smashing
Mobile carrier security features	Smart phones use SIM cards to authenticate and authorize user identity.	Prevents phone call theft
<b>Android-specific mechanisms</b>		
Application permissions	Each application declares which permission it requires at install time.	Limits application abilities to perform malicious behavior
Component encapsulation	Each component in an application (such as an activity or service) has a visibility level that regulates access to it from other applications (for example, binding to a service).	Prevents one application from disturbing another, or accessing private components or APIs
Signing applications	The developer signs application .apk files, and the package manager verifies them.	Matches and verifies that two applications are from the same source
Dalvik virtual machine	Each application runs in its own virtual machine.	Prevents buffer overflows, remote code execution, and stack smashing

Figure 2.1: Security mechanisms incorporated in Android [Shabtai et al., 2010a]

## 2.2 Dropbox API

Dropbox is a cloud storage service that also offers users automatic backup facilities, file synchronization across devices, and the ability to share files with other users. It provides multi-platform client applications plus a series of public APIs that enable different subsets of the Dropbox functionality to be integrated into third-party applications.

On the Android platform, Dropbox offers three APIs, described on its website as follows:-

**Core** The Core API includes the most comprehensive functionality including features such as search, file restore, etc. Although more complex than either of the other two to implement, it is often more suitable when developing server-based apps.

**Datastore** The Datastore API provides a means of storing and synchronizing structured data like contacts, to-do items, and game states across all the user's devices.

**Sync** The Sync API provides a file system for accessing and writing files to the user's Dropbox. The Sync API manages the process of synchronizing file changes to Dropbox and can also provide the app with notification when changes are made to files stored on the server.

For the purposes of the SecurelyShare app, although it offers the most basic interface to

the Dropbox server, the Sync API was deemed to support both the functionality required for the prototype and some additional facilities which could be implemented at a later date in order to improve the overall user experience.

Each app on the Dropbox Platform needs to be registered in the App Console and the developer needs to select which permissions the app requires. These permissions determine the type of data that the app can access in the user's Dropbox. For the Sync API, three levels of permission were available:

1. App folder: this creates a folder in the user's Dropbox with the same name as the app, all files relating to the app are kept here and access is restricted to this folder and its subfolders.
2. File type: the app is given access to the user's entire Dropbox but is restricted only to seeing files of certain types (documents, images, ebooks, etc.)
3. Full Dropbox: the app is given unrestricted access to the user's Dropbox

Developers are also able to submit a request to use a custom file extension with the File type permission.

## 2.3 Review of Related Work

was intending to include a summary of all the material relating to key distribution that I reviewed - not sure if I am going to be able to do this now

## 2.4 Review of Other Products

One of the security claims of cloud storage provider, Dropbox, is that user data stored on their servers is fragmented and encrypted using 256-bit AES. However, although users may feel reassured by these claims, it is also to be noted that since this encryption is applied server-side, the servers also have access to the keys required to decrypt this information. Furthermore, the Dropbox privacy policy states that,

"We may disclose your information to third parties if we determine that such disclosure is reasonably necessary to (a) comply with the law; (b) protect any person from death or serious bodily injury; (c) prevent fraud or abuse of Dropbox or our users; or (d) protect Dropbox's property rights."



It may therefore come as little surprise that there are an increasing number of client-side encryption applications available that integrate with Dropbox and other similar cloud services to ensure that, even if files are disclosed, the service providers would have no access to decryption keys. Although there are a significant number of encryption applications available for Android, most were discarded for consideration here as they are primarily designed for a single user to encrypt files prior to cloud storage and had little or no support for key sharing.

When trying to evaluate these products there appeared to be a marked absence of robust reviews from respected members of the security fraternity; many of the review that were available seemed to focus more on the usability of applications rather than on their security features. We chose three commercially produced applications to consider in greater depth, Boxcryptor, Viivo and SafeMonk. These were selected partly because they seemed to attract most mentions (although that may simply be due to the fact that they were commercial products and hence had larger marketing budgets), but also because we were able to find some level of technical description of the security protocols used. There was a common trend among the examined applications to use AES for encryption of user files and some implementation of RSA to manage the key exchange, All three applications used a central server for key management, although each was keen to stress that they had no access to key material that would enable them to decrypt user files.

need to put some more discussion of how they manage key sharing

There justification for storing the user's private key on the server was that it would allow the user to install the application on multiple devices and they both used password-based encryption (PBE) in order to secure the key on the server. Although the servers use key-stretching algorithms to derive the encryption keys, we should always be aware that users can be very poor at choosing strong passwords and at keeping them secure. (In a study of password reuse, Bonneau [Das et al., 2014] observed that 43 percent of users reused a password across multiple sites)

# Chapter 3

## Analysis and Design

In this chapter we will present some of the salient points from our initial analysis of the problem, detail the threat model against which we are trying to protect and any significant assumptions made which influenced our design decisions, and finally outline our solution design. It should be noted at this point that we had absolutely no prior experience of developing for (or even using) an Android device, therefore this phase was highly iterative. As our familiarity and understanding of the capabilities of Android platform increased and as the design evolved, we were able to revisit these assumptions and the threat model in order to strengthen the security of the overall system. It is for this reason that we feel that presenting this material in a single chapter is more reflective of the underlying process.

### 3.1 Overview

At the outset, the following key areas were identified that would need further research:

- finalisation of the threat model and main assumptions
- mechanism to be used for storage and distribution of shared documents
- security design, including any key generation and distribution schemes
- processes involved in setting up or managing groups
- design of the prototype application, including any steps required to protect sensitive key material

## 3.2 Problem Analysis

### Assumptions

As outlined in the introduction, Securely Share is intended for use by small, autonomous groups (typically of the order of 3-15 members) with a largely static membership. This factor was significant in enabling us to discard a number of complex key distribution protocols which were designed for much larger or more volatile groups. It was also envisaged that groups would have lifetime measured in months, rather than days, hence a small administrative overhead in setting up the group could be considered acceptable in terms of the group duration.

For practical purposes, it is likely that origination of sensitive documents would be carried out on a PC, as much for the practicality of typing as for any security reasons. Therefore we are aware that one or more desktop client applications would be required for any fully-implemented solution. For the purposes of this "proof of concept" project, it was decided that an outline version would be created in Java in order to verify the cryptography, but that time would not permit this to be developed and tested to a level where it could be submitted as part of the finished product.

As discussed in section 3.4 the decision was made to use digital signatures as part of the security design. This generates the requirement for every group member to have a certificate that can be used for authentication. It is left to the discretion of each group to determine whether this should be issued from a recognised Certificate Authority or whether self-signed certificates are to be allowed. (For small groups, the process of manually confirming the certificate fingerprint by telephone may be acceptable, for example.) In order to contain the scope of this project it was necessary to assume that each user either had, or was able to generate a public/private key pair and the associated certificate.

Finally, it was assumed that the user acknowledges the sensitivity of his data and has taken reasonable steps to protect it, including the deployment of a device locking code and strong passwords.

### Threat and Trust Model

For the purposes of this project, the following assumption regarding the threat and trust model were made:-

1. a group member may consider all other group members as trusted.
2. the Certificate Authority may be considered as trusted.
3. all data in transit or at rest on a third-party server is considered to be exposed to an attacker.
4. data at rest on the external storage of the device should always be considered as vulnerable to attack
5. data at rest within the application's internal storage is protected to some extent by the platform's in-built security mechanisms, although this should still be encrypted to protect against a casual attacker who is able to gain root access for the purposes of snooping in storage. The prototype is not required to implement software protection against a more sophisticated attacker, however we are aware that the use of hardware-based cryptography via a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) would ameliorate the effect of this type of attack.

### 3.3 Document Storage

When considering how to manage the storage and sharing of group documents, we initially considered implementing a custom web server. However, it was recognised that this option had a significant IT overhead, both in development and ongoing support and therefore did not fit with our requirements. It was deemed that a better solution would be to leverage the facilities already available via one of the widely used cloud storage services: Dropbox, Google Drive and OneDrive were considered.

Although in a production-level application it would be desirable to allow the user to choose which cloud storage service they wished to use, it quickly became apparent that to implement using multiple APIs was infeasible within the scope of this project. However, as the facilities offered by each were broadly similar, it was felt that developing for a single API in the prototype would be sufficient for the purposes of validating the concept. Dropbox was selected as it is widely used and is well supported in both Windows and Linux environments, the latter being important as this was the development and testing environment being used for the project.

As described in 2.2, Dropbox offers several version of the API for Android and the Sync API seemed to be the best match for the project requirements. Developers are encouraged to assign each application the least permissions possible, so initially App level permission was chosen. However, it came to light that this did not allow any access to shared folders

so the design specification was amended to use the File type permission. This presents a filtered view of the user's Dropbox folder, only permitting the calling application to see files of the specified types. One disadvantage of this is that although all of the user's folders can be seen, various folder operations (e.g. delete, share) are prohibited as the folders may contain hidden files.

When registering SecurelyShare, text and document types were required but it was also necessary to have a file extension to represent our encrypted files. It would have been possible to submit a request to register custom file types with Dropbox but since time was of the essence, we elected to choose two less-commonly used ebook formats as a temporary measure, .xps (for encrypted documents) and .xeb (for encrypted group keys). The .xps extension was simply added to the filename of an encrypted file so that it was easy to recover the original file extension on decryption.

## Administration

Although Dropbox provides an excellent environment for collaborative working with its inbuilt mechanisms for file and folder sharing, this does bring with it the initial administrative overhead of creating a group folder and sharing it with all the members. As discussed, the Dropbox Sync API does not currently provide support for this in Android but it was deemed acceptable for our purposes that this process should be completed via the Dropbox website in the usual way.

## 3.4 Cryptographic Design

There are two main aspects to the cryptographic design as follows:

- the document encryption scheme
- the group key distribution protocol

### Document Encryption

As one of the central assumptions is that any third-party server cannot be trusted, it is essential that client-side encryption is used to protect our sensitive data. SecurelyShare uses a symmetric key encryption scheme and is currently implemented using the AES algorithm in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with a key length of 256 bits. A design requirement

was that references to algorithms and key lengths should be included as static variables rather than being hard-coded in order to provide an easy upgrade path or scope to make these user options at a later date.

Since a user of SecurelyShare may be a member of multiple groups at any one time, it is important that the decryption module is able to determine the correct key to use for each document. Initially we thought to capture this information based on the name of the containing folder but quickly realised that this was prone to error as, if a file became disassociated from its correct folder there would be no way of determining where it came from and hence reuniting it with the correct key. It was determined that each file should have a file header written to it made up of an integer containing the length (in bytes) of the group name, a string containing the group name and a fixed length Initialisation Vector - this would provide all the information required to decrypt the file.

## Group Key Distribution

By their nature, symmetric schemes require that all parties are in possession of the key, as the same key is used for both encryption and decryption. Where we are just sharing a key between two parties, methods such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [?] are widely used. However, the problem of group key distribution is much more challenging and has been the subject of multiple research papers (see 2.3). Although these papers present a number of interesting theoretical schemes with advanced features, our design goal was to produce a practical but secure implementation which matches requirements built with well-established cryptographic primitives and protocols.

Before generating the group key, a Java KeyStore should be set up containing the private key and corresponding certificate which is to be used to authenticate the group key on distribution. Each group member should supply a certificate which should then be imported into the KeyStore and finally the key generation module can be run.

A high-level description of the key-generation process is as follows:-

- generate a new symmetric key for the group
- for each user certificate in the KeyStore, encrypt a copy of the group key with the user's public key (as contained in the certificate) using RSA
- sign the encrypted key using the administrator's certificate
- save the encrypted and signed key to the group Dropbox folder

The use of digital signatures is required for each user to be able to validate that the

encrypted key they receive is the authentic one and not one substituted by an attacker. This is a vital part of the security protocol and hence has been included in our system design. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, due to some of the challenges encountered during the implementation phase, we were not able to implement this aspect of our design fully in the prototype.

Should I discuss choice of PKI over ID based scheme here or in evaluation

## 3.5 Android Prototype

### Encryption

As outlined in the Problem Analysis (3.2), it is unlikely that large documents will be originated from within SecurelyShare so our design just included a simple edit window for text input which can then be saved to Dropbox as an encrypted file. For completeness, and to aid testing, we also included the ability to encrypt a file which already exists on the device (although this is not to be encouraged as such files may have been exposed to an attacker prior to encryption).

### Decryption

Since tablet devices are ideally suited for reading documents, the major requirement of this app is that it is able to take encrypted documents stored in the user's Dropbox, decrypt them with the appropriate symmetric key and present the original text to the user in a readable format. Our requirements necessitated that this should be accomplished without the need to save the plaintext to disk on the device. Initially this seemed as though it would be achievable as the Android platform provides mechanisms for one application to provide data to another,. However, on deeper study, it transpired that none of these options was exactly right for our purpose. We considered a number of ways of modifying our design in order to overcome this challenge but all of them required some sort of modification to the third-party application. Eventually it was decided that we had to weaken our requirements or risk jeopardising the entire project time scale.

It was agreed that we could achieve our objective for simple text files by displaying the decrypted data in one of the Android-supplied Edittext widgets, which would enable it to

be read and, if required, edited saved again in encrypted format. For files requiring a more complex viewing and editing environment, for example those in Portable Document Format (PDF), we would write these temporarily to the external cache before broadcasting an Intent with the appropriate URI in order to allow the user to open this temporary file with one of the PDF readers installed on their device. The security implications of this and suggestions for future work are discussed further in Chapter 6.

## Key Management

When first installed on the Android device, the SecurelyShare application will create two keystores and save them in the application's private storage. The Certificate keystore contains a copy of the user's private key and corresponding certificate chain and the Group keystore is the place where all the group keys will be stored. KeyStores are mechanisms designed for securing cryptographic artifacts, encrypted using Password Based Encryption (PBE) with a user supplied password.

As described above, the group key is created by the group administrator and a file is generated for each group member containing a copy of the group key encrypted with the private key contained in the Certificate KeyStore. Before the user can begin creating or reading documents for the group, this key must be imported into the Group keystore on the device. The user selects his file from the Dropbox folder containing the encryption keys for the group, the app decrypts this with the user's private key and stores it in the Group keystore using the group name as an alias.



# Chapter 4

## Implementation

### 4.1 Development Environment

An early challenge encountered in this project was setting up a suitable development environment. Initially the intention was to use the Android Development Tools plug-in for Eclipse, as this was an extension to an already familiar IDE, however, difficulties were encountered with the school computers and finally we elected to switch to Android Studio (Beta) as suggested on the Android Developers website [?].

Since the main rationale for the Android application was to allow users to read documents away from the PC, we felt that the application should be optimised for use on a tablet. As a difficulty arose in getting the device emulators to work on Linux, it became necessary to purchase a physical device for the purposes of the project. Budget too was a significant consideration; therefore the device chosen was a Hudl 7" tablet running the Android 4.2.2 Jelly Bean operating system. For the purposes of this project, it was decided that we would develop and test for this device. This meant that we were restricted to API 17, which eliminated the need to include any backward compatibility but also precluded using features of the latest Android releases as it transpired that there was no upgrade path available for this device. This fact turned out to be highly significant in a later stage of the project.

## 4.2 Initial Development

It was felt wise to begin by developing a very simple application in order to gain some familiarity with the complexities of the Android architecture and its API. This initial application enabled us to input some text, encrypt it (using "convert to upper case" in lieu of encryption) and write it to the application storage.

The next stage was to introduce actual encryption, for which we needed to investigate the Java Cryptography Architecture(JCA). Although the choice of algorithm was determined as part of the design, we were mindful of the fact that many security weaknesses are introduced by poor implementation. As [Schneier, 1998b] states,

'And just as it's possible to build a weak structure using strong materials, it's possible to build a weak cryptographic system using strong algorithms and protocols'

For this reason we decided that we would initially develop and test the Java classes to be used for encryption and decryption in the more familiar Linux environment before porting to Android. Linux also provides a simple command line interface which was valuable for inspecting the binary (or hex) content of encrypted files to aid debugging.

## 4.3 SecurelyShare Prototype

In undertaking this project we were keen to understand more of the tools and techniques of Android development, therefore we attempted to incorporate a number different user interface components including alert and custom dialogs, fragments and ActionBar menus.

### Initialisation

The Initialisation Activity is run the first time SecurelyShare is installed. The user is asked whether they wish to import a KeyStore from backup and asked to set up a master password. In the current implementation, the import option must be chosen as the Certificate keystore needs to be created on a PC, either in Linux using `keytool` from the command line or using a program called Portecle [Portecle.sourceforge.net, 2014]. An empty keystore is created for the group keys and the user is asked to confirm to proceed. We used




Figure 4.1: Set Master Password

## Main Activity

The home page consists simply of four buttons for moving to the other main activities in SecurelyShare. We recognise that this is somewhat visually unappealing and duplicates the menu options included in the Action Bar, however, in line with our design goals, it was felt better to focus on improving security features rather than visual appeal at this stage.




Figure 4.2: Basic home screen

The user is invited to enter the Master password upon opening the application and, having decided that we would not require the password to be re-entered to access each file, it was necessary to ensure that this data was available wherever needed. Although the option of writing the password to the `SharedPreferences` database, from whence it could be accessed by other activities, would have been an easy solution, we did not feel that this represented good practice. Further research revealed this to be a contentious question, with experienced developers divided as to whether this was best done by extending the `Application` class or by use of the Singleton design pattern. As the guidance from Android Developers website

states that 'there is normally no need to subclass Application. In most situation, static singletons can provide the same functionality in a more modular way' [?], we decided to use this approach but recognise we may not have completely understood the full complexities of this problem at this juncture.




Figure 4.3: Dialog to request Master password to unlock access to KeyStores

## Other Features

### Fragments

Figure 4.4 shows the screen for importing a new group key, which illustrates our use of the Fragment class.




Figure 4.4: Import a group key

Fragments are reusable elements of the application's user interface which can be combined to build a multi-pane user interface [?]. As shown here, SecurelyShare is perhaps best

suited to landscape mode as it uses a split-screen, however it could easily be modified to show each fragment in a separate activity on a smaller screen or to improve the display in portrait mode.

## 4.4 Implementation Challenges

One aspect of the Android environment which is challenging for newcomers is the way in which the operating system actively manages storage. When the user navigates away from an activity, the operating system holds it in memory in a paused state. If, however, memory resources run short, the current instance of the activity is simply destroyed and a new one created next time the user navigates back to it, causing variables to be reinitialised.

**DROPBOX** For improvement, use custom file extension registered with Dropbox then would only ever see encrypted files

**GOOD PRACTICE** use of bundle for passing data between activities

use of interface for passing data back from dialog

Use of singleton

**ANDROID FEATURES**

Splash screen and initialization

Fragments

Implemented with algorithms as static variables so that easy to amend if standards change

**CRYPTOGRAPHY**

**CHALLENGES** Major issues with keystore, certificates and default providers.

dbx stuff does not implement serialisable or parcelable

Challenge of unavailability of BKS on pcs in school

No access to key tool in android

Issue: if generate [private key on device, it is device specific - ability to import would allow same keystores to be used on multiple devices for4 same user

Issue: if generate [rivate key on device, it is device specific - ability to import would allow same keystores to be used on multiple devices for4 same user

THINGS NOT INCLUDED However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, due to some of the challenges encountered during the implementation phase, we were not able to implement this aspect of our design fully in the prototype. (digital signatures)

custom pdf reader

## OPTIMIZATION

buffering

decision not to implement threads at this stage Did not optimize for battery and memory

Admin system – basic with no front end. Designed to run on system with Dropbox installed and running so files uploaded to dropbox simply by saving them in the correct location rather than worrying about using Dropbox API within program.

Android prototype

PC version in java that just does basic encryption/decryption. Used primarily for initial development and testing of encryption mechanisms. Single username hardcoded for testing. Fully developed application with user interface outside of scope of this project. Assumption that encrypted blobs are probably also created on PC - simple PC version of program developed to address this, although no gui developed

## 4.5 Testing

The encryption and decryption elements of our prototype were largely testing by inspection - known texts were encrypted, the files were checked to ensure that they were not leaking any of the plaintext, and these were in turn decrypted and compared with the original. In general, the nature of encryption means that the main body of a file either decrypts completely or not at all, however particular attention must be paid to the very beginning and end of a file, as incorrect use of the API can lead to errors here. As our project was aimed at document encryption, we tested using a mixture of text (.txt files) and PDFs (although we did also confirm that our processes generalised to other file types). Since randomness plays an important role in ensuring semantic security for symmetric encryption schemes, this made any sort of unit testing extremely difficult. At the outset we considered using fixed initialisation vectors and encryption keys to make our tests repeatable. However, on closer consideration this involved making some significant changes to the program logic

relating to the use of the cryptography APIs and so was considered to make this sort of testing meaningless.

Other aspects of the user interface were tested manually, trying to make sure that a range of user inputs and behaviour were covered. However, it should be noted that the prototype was not designed to be releasable code and therefore did not include comprehensive validation of user input. Although certain common scenarios were handled (for example, the user is informed if trying to decrypt a document without first importing the appropriate group key), it was deemed that for the purposes of this prototype it was acceptable that other less common behaviours should be permitted to cause the app to terminate (e.g. if the app permission is revoked via the Dropbox website whilst the app is running).

When a user shifts focus away from the current activity, the activity is kept in memory but is switched into the background. Such processes can be killed at any time by the system in order to reclaim memory. In this event, when the user returns to the activity, it is recreated by the system - this may cause some expected results if not designed for properly. Since this process is managed by the operating system and is determined by a number of external factors, it can prove difficult to test. If testing in an emulated environment, it is possible to simulate an artificially small device memory to encourage this behaviour to be triggered. However, as previously mentioned, this option was not available to us so a similar effect was created by rotating the device, which also causes an activity to be recreated. Even though not identical, it proved quite an effective substitute in our testing.

## Chapter 5

# Project Management

In managing this project we used an iterative approach based on the Agile philosophy, although with such a small development team and no external customer many of the processes and artefacts associated with Agile methodologies were inappropriate. In particular, although we had fully working software at the end of each iteration, it was questionable if it could have been considered a 'potentially shippable product' [Gupta, 2008b].

At the outset we had very little knowledge of the Android platform which resulted in it being difficult to form an accurate plan. Although Android applications are generally programmed in Java with which we had some familiarity, we had underestimated how much developing for mobile devices differed from anything we had previously done. We realised that a greater portion of the overall development time needed to be given over to production of the prototype, particularly because one of our initial aims was that we would seek to understand and implement best practice in our code. As a result we had to readjust some of the timescales in our project plan, however this was recognised early and was able to be well managed.

One issue with using an iterative development model was that sometimes time was wasted on learning and development that was critical to get a particular iteration to work but which ultimately ended up being abandoned or didn't contribute significantly to the final product. It was important to guard against retaining features in the final design simply because of the amount of work that had gone into implementing them in an earlier iteration.

During development some elements which were required for security came to light. Some of these were implemented in the prototype, for example we deleted the KeyStore after three failed password attempts, in order to protect against a device which had fallen into the wrong hands, whereas others were merely noted in the security design. Also, as discussed



in Chapter 4 we discovered a difficulty with opening decrypted PDFs without the need to write them out to a temporary file which made it necessary for us to revise the specification of the prototype.

One of the greatest challenges encountered in managing the project was avoiding what is frequently described as "scope creep". It was established at the outset that our development activities should be focussed on maximising the security of the prototype and yet we found it difficult to avoid getting sidetracked into adding features designed to enhance the user interface. The process of delivering a regular progress report to our supervisor proved useful in helping to recognise and correct such digressions.

# Chapter 6

## Security

The issue with our solution scalability is just the admin cost of setting up the dropbox folder, adding all the users and getting all the certificate and importing into the keystore in order to run the initial key generation. In our solution it is possible that this function could be delegated to someone who isn't part of the trusted group and they would never have any access to the shared secret. However it is important that they are honest at the initial setup phase or it would be possible for them to insert Mallory's certificate into the keystore and hence they would generate a copy of the encryption key for Mallory. However, as long as they are honest at the outset, there would be no opportunity for Mallory to subvert them at a later stage as being able to get access to the keystore containing all the certificates wouldn't give any advantage. Gaining access to the Dropbox folder would enable Mallory to see what files were in there but without private keys he wouldn't be able to decrypt anything.

With our scheme, if delegating the admin function it is important that the membership of the group is known at the outset as the encryption key is ephemeral, however it could be the subject of further work to extend the android application to permit the Android application to include the capacity to share the group key with a new user. This would need to be considered carefully as it would provide an additional means of Mallory getting access to the key, even if he only had temporary access to the device whilst the application was unlocked.

There is currently no means of revoking a key, however the fact that we are also making use of the access control afforded by Dropbox would also give some protection in the event that a member left the group as their access to the Dbx folder could be revoked. This is one of the reasons why we suggest our solution may not be scalable to large groups as in this instance the membership is much more likely to be volatile. It could be the subject

of further work consider alternative key sharing mechanisms to see whether improvement could be achieved here without introducing the requirement for a central key management server.

Forward secrecy - requiring perfect forward secrecy adds an additional level of complexity to any encryption. The main application of forward secrecy to our project is that a member who leaves the group should not have access to future documents.*have I got this right?* Although our current cryptographic design does not provide this (once established, the group key is never changed), one of the benefits of using a service like Dropbox is that we are able to avail ourselves of its extensive access control mechanisms. In order to compromise security an attacker needs access to both the group's shared Dropbox folder *and* the group key - a member leaving the group would only have access to the former, which is considered sufficient for our purposes at this point. An evaluation of more sophisticated key exchange protocols in order to strengthen this aspect of security could be the subject of further work.

Client side encryption was used because of the desire to ensure that server had no access to plaintext

digital signatures to protect against man in the middle *is it really MITM*

Dropbox uses SSL so protected against replay attacks

Had to compromise on aim never to write to storage - this is a temporary measure but would need to implement a custom pdf reader which is beyond the scope of this project. It is interesting to note that this is the same issue experienced by xxx application

Write about why I didn't use encrypted folder approach

specifically designed to avoid central server for key management. Essential to avoid running our own and placing trust in 3rd party. Our solution is similar to commercial ones - they make much of being zero-knowledge but' essentially this is a matter of trust as can't examine their code.

Problem with API meant that we had to generate keystore for private key and corresponding certificate chain manually. Further work would be to redesign this part of the app using the additional features offered in Android 4.3. Currently consider this to be one of the weakest parts of the design - by the time I realised that this could have been done better, it was too late to go back and change it.

The security implications and requirements for future work are discussed further in Chapter

6.

Password policy - balance of requiring password for every file access which encourages user to choose insecure password. Opted to use one password both to unlock the keystore and to encrypt each of the group keys. Could have had a separate password for each group but requiring user to remember different passwords often leads to insecure ones. xxx app offers different levels of password policy as a user option - this may be a useful addition to be considered in the future. Similarly, for ease of testing and general usability we decided not to implement encryption of filenames in the prototype. However, this would again be a potential use option.

loss of device - we need to include some protection against loss of device but an attacker who is able to gain access to the device whilst the app is running would be able to use the app to decrypt any documents in Dropbox as key store would be unlocked. It should be noted however that the use of Dropbox does provide some additional protection for this as, once aware that the device is lost, the user is able to log in via the Dropbox website and revoke SecurelyShare's permissions for the account with immediate effect.

Backward secrecy - this is often required in a messaging environment where it is important that new group members are not able to decrypt messages from before they joined the group. However, in our application backward secrecy is not required as all group members should have access to historic documents.

Removal of keystore after password failure

Reasons why didn't choose ID based cryptography or password based solution - aim is to use simplest solution that works. Refer to examples which use PBE. Happy to use it for protection of key material on device as even with password, attacker would have to have access to device or would require more sophisticated remote attack which is out of our scope.

# Chapter 7

## Evaluation

ACHIEVEMENTS • What works well EXPLAIN HOW WELL SOLUTION MEETS OBJECTIVES - WHAT YOU HAVE LEARNED - WHY ANDROID DEVELOPMENT WAS A CHALLENGE major challenge of the fact that android is an operating system not a programming language - event driven programming FURTHER WORK • From prototype to production - next steps Write as though you are providing a basis for a good cs graduate to continue the work - assume they have already done some android development SECURITY EVALUATION Did not implement signing in prototype as largely meaningless with self-signed certificates. Purchase of appropriate certificates for authentication of signatures would be required for a complete solution Attacks and issues to consider • anonymity • forward secrecy • revocation • man-in-middle Delete keys after failed password attempts Write about how protocols as important as implementation - need to support this view from academic papers Talk about why it doesn't matter that encrypted copies of group key are available on dropbox [nelenkov.blogspot.co.uk](http://nelenkov.blogspot.co.uk) - credential storage enhancements in Android 4.3 out of bounds channel - side channel attack Write about issues to do with public key distribution and the need for signing Talk about decision not to implement passing decrypted data directly to another app without needing to write to external storage Don't zero out passwords after use No implementation of digital signatures so vulnerable to man-in-middle Decision to use same password for keystore and aliases - trade off of added security against temptation for users to use insecure passwords or write them down

Group needs admin, although any group member can serve in this role. It is also possible to delegate this to an administrator who is not part of the group without giving them access to the group encryption key. However, if the admin was corrupt, the fact that they had access to the private key for signing the encrypted group key would still be a problem.. Useful phrase "a more sophisticated attacker"

Threats: • Malware on device • Attacker snooping around external storage but not one with root access • Lost device with app open (minimal protection) but can unlink from dropbox remotely so would only have a very small window of opportunity to decrypt files currently stored on device whilst keystore is unlocked • Could have had different password for each group • Could make user re-enter password for each file – trade off between added security in event of lost device and temptation for user to choose a weaker password

Maybe argue why solution is secure here PROTOTYPE EVALUATION dependent on exactly correct alias for groupid and folder name • Is designed as a “proof of concept” • Aspires to use “best practice” within the code • Uses well-tested cryptographic techniques and standard libraries • Adheres to the stated security requirements No ability to change passwords etc added at present

EVALUATION OF PERSONAL LEARNING • zero knowledge starting point • Android is a whole new operating system not just ‘Java with extra bits’ • Unfamiliar API’s operating in a sub-optimal environment

Since many of the example apps that we looked at were focused on personal encryption with the sharing capacity as an added feature, it was important that we remembered that the core purpose of our application was group collaboration and therefore central to any design we might choose was the requirement for a robust key sharing mechanism.

scalability - Structure would work with larger group but there may be better key management protocols - admin issue with setting up dropbox shares etc.

## **Chapter 8**

## **Conclusion**

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